LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS (Romero1, 1994) FACTS The residents of Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,

, Caloocan City raised a complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), seeking to stop the operation of the City Government of Caloocan of an 8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the pollution of the surrounding water. LLDA discovered that the City Government of Caloocan has been maintaining the open dumpsite at the Camarin Area without a requisite Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR. They also found the water to have been directly contaminated by the operation of the dumpsite. LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the City Government and other entities to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter on the Camarin dumpsite. The City Government went to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to file an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order and sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking the Pollution Control Law that the review of cease and desist orders of that nature falls under the Court of Appeals and not the RTC. RTC denied LLDAs motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining LLDA from enforcing the cease and desist order during the pendency of the case. The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision that ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage. The residents seek a review of the decision.

WoN the LLDA has authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was injunctive. THEORY OF THE PARTIES City Government of Caloocan: As a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, they have the mandate to operate a dumpsite and determine the effects to the ecological balance over its territorial jurisdiction. LLDA: As an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by RA No. 4850, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to various provisions in EO No. 927. RULING YES. 1. LLDA is mandated by law to manage the environment, preserve the quality of human life and ecological systems and prevent undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution in the Laguna Lake area and surrounding provinces and cities, including Caloocan. While pollution cases are generally under the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it does not preclude mandate from special laws that provide another forum. In this case, RA No. 4850 provides that mandate to the LLDA. It is mandated to pass upon or approve or disapprove plans and programs of local government offices and agencies within the region and their underlying environmental/ecological repercussions. The DENR even recognized the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over the case when the DENR acted as intermediary at a meeting among the representatives of the city government, LLDA and the residents.

2.

LLDA has the authority to issue the cease and desist order. a. Explicit in the law. 4, par. (3) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

ISSUE
1

I love Justice Romero. Her decisions are so organised. <3

While LLDA was not expressly conferred the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order in that language, the provision granting authority to make () orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution, has the same effect.

In 1989, David and Quazon (who purchased Davids unit) filed a complaint in the HLURB against Union Bank and Far East Bank to: o o Allow David and to consign the balance of the purchase price to be paid to the banks Annul the title of the two banks over Davids condominium praying

b.

Necessarily implied powers. Assuming arguendo that the cease and desist order was not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such power as expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. Otherwise, it will be reduced to a toothless paper agency. In Pollution Adjudication Board vs Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the PAB has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order on prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. LLDA has been vested with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of the projects within the Laguna Lake region, and this includes the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the area.

The Banks filed a motion to dismiss and an Answer questioning HLURBs jurisdiction HLURB denied the motion and said that the motion to dismiss will render nugatory the summary nature of proceeding before the HLURB Union Bank filed a petition for certiorari alleging the following: o o The complaint should have been filed in the regular trial courts Since the HLURB was created in 1981, it has no jurisdiction over contracts that took effect prior to 1981

ISSUE: WoN the HLURB has jurisdiction to hear and decide a condominium buyers complaint for annulment of a real estate mortgage constituted by the project owner without his consent and without the prior consent of NHA

DECISION: YES UNION BANK v HLURB | Grio-Aquino | 1992 FACTS: In 1973, Martha David purchased from Fereit Realty Development (FRDC) a condominium unit for P217K payable in 60 equal monthly installments In 1978, FRDC, without Davids knowledge and without prior approval from NHA, mortgaged the condominium project to Bancom (predecessor of Union Bank) FRDC failed to pay its obligation. Consequently, Bancom foreclosed the mortgaged ob 45 condominium units, including the unit of David The Sheriff issued a certificate of sale in favor Far East Bank since it was the highest bidder Sec. 3 of PD 957 vested NHA the EXCLUSIVE jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business while Sec. 18 of the same decree prohibited the mortgage on any unit by the owner or developer WITHOUT PRIOR WRITTEN APPROVAL from NHA Subsequently, PD 1344 expanded the jurisdiction of NHA to include the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: o o o Unsound real estate business practices Claims filed by condominium unit buyer against the project developer Specific performance of contractual obligations filed by condo buyers

 EO 648 transferred the regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of NHA to HSRC (Human Settlements Regulatory Commission) and in 1986, EO 90 changed the name of HSRC to HLURB IN THIS CASE, FRDCs act of mortgaging the condominium project to Bancom without the knowledge and consent of David and without the approval of NHA (now HLURB) was not only an unsound real estate business practice but also highly prejudicial to the buyer THUS, the case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of HLURB The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction over complaints for specific performance of the sale, or annulment of the mortgage, of a condominium unit with damages

AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE VS. FACTORAN

Official of Quezon City for violation of the National Building Code. Subsequently, spouses filed a complaint for damages against Ambrosio and Perez before the RTC. Respondents question the jurisdiction of the RTC, contending that the complaint is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. The Office of the Building Official of QC found that the building and occupancy permits were validly issued and dismissed the complaint of the Oseas. RTC granted the damages prayed for by petitioners and held that respondents deviated from the approved plan. CA declared RTCs decision as null and void for lack of jurisdiction as it is the HLURB that has exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint for damages. o The complaint is a necessary offshoot of the alleged violation of the Building Code. The fact that petitioners filed a separate action for damages instead of including it as an ancillary claim does not divest the HLURB of its jurisdiction and bring it within the jurisdiction of regular courts. o This is a case that necessarily needs a determination of facts, circumstances and incidental matters which the law has specifically bestowed to the HLURB.

ISSUES, ARGUMENTS & HELD Osea v. Ambrosio Carpio-Morales, J. | April 7, 2006 WON HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over the action for damages. YES, complaints for breach of contract or specific performance with damages filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.

FACTS In June 1991, Petitioner Edmundo Osea and respondent Antonio Ambrosio (Ambrosio) entered into a Contract to Sell a House and Lot Unit in a subdivision. In November 1991, Edmundo and Amborsio forged a Deed of Sale, where Edmundo agreed to buy the same house and lot subject of the Contract to Sell. In accordance with the package deal provided in the Contract to Sell, corespondent Rodolfo Perez was contracted by Ambrosio to construct the house of petitioner spouses with the specifications in the Contract to Sell, Bill of Materials and Approved Building Plan by the Building Official of Quezon City. The house was completed on August 1991 and the spouses occupied it. A month later, its front and back walls cracked. Ambrosio claimed that the cracks were mere hairline defects in the palitada and filled them up with cement. Petitioner Ligaya Osea lodged a complaint with the Office of the Building Petitioners contend that their action for damages is not based on the deviation from the approved subdivision plan. The complaint for damages alleged a breach of contract, for failure to comply with the building plans, which is a violation of the Civil Code.

Respondents argue that HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction as the controversy arose contracts from contracts between the subdivision developer and house and lot buyer.

RATIONALE Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating

or empowering such agency. PD No. 1344 grants to the HLURB jurisdiction in cases of: (a) Unsound real estate business practices; (b) Claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the developer; and (c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against the developer. PD No. 957 provides that the HLURB shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business. EO No. 90 names HLURB as the sole and regulatory board for housing. The business of developing subdivisions being imbued with public interest and welfare, any question arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be brought to the HLURB, which has the technical know-how on the matter. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by the regular courts. In C.T. Torres v. Hibionada, SC affirmed the competence of HLURB to award damages although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable only by courts of justice. Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction , courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. HLURB has the expertise to determine the basic technical issue of whether the alleged deviations from the building plans and the technical specifications affect the soundness and structural strength of the house. Petitioners attempt to separate their rights to the lot, which they admit is within HLURB jurisdiction, and their rights to the house built on the lot, which they allege is enforceable in regular courts. Both the Contract to Sell and Deed of Sale involve the sale and purchase of the house and lot unit. There is a clear intent by the parties that the house and lot be treated as the single object of their contracts. Allowing the splitting of a single cause of action would result in duplicity of suits and possible conflicting findings by 2 tribunals on the same claim.

Issue

private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager. Sta. Maria was then placed under preventive suspension and San Diego was designated in his place. Sta. Maria was later dismissed on January 7, 1993. January 18, 1993 private respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with preliminary injunction before the RTC. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on 2 grounds: o Court had no jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service Comission o Quo warranto was not the proper remedy Motion to dismiss and MFR dismissed. CA likewise dismissed petition and denied petitioners MFR.

MATEO V. CA August 14, 1995 | J. Puno Facts Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees, petitioners, all Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on

WoN the RTC of Rizal has jurisdiction over cases involving dismissal of an employee of a quasi-public corporation. NO Ratio MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD 198 (Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973). Davao City Water District v. CSC: employees of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the CSC. The established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. PD 807, EO 292 and Rule II, Sec1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the CSC categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the Commission within 15 days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on certiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the RoC if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC. Mancita v. Barcinas: The CSC, under the constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service, and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to the SCs certiorari judgment. Mancita however no longer governs for under the present rule, final resolutions of the CSC shall be appealable to the CA. In any event, whether under the old rule or the present rule, RTCs have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law. PAL v. Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) (Torres Jr, 1997) FACTS:

Private Respondent Grandair applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with the Board. Accordingly, the Chief Hearing Officer of the CAB issued a Notice of Hearing setting the application for initial hearing and directing GrandAir to serve a copy of the application and notice to all scheduled Philippine Domestic operators. GrandAir filed its Compliance, and requested for the issuance of a Temporary Operating Permit Petitioner PAL filed an Opposition to the application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with one of the grounds as: (1) CAB has no jurisdiction to hear his application until the latter has first obtained a franchise to operate from Congress but the CAB Chief Operating Officer denied the opposition Petitioner PAL then opposed private respondent's application for a temporary permit since applicant didn't possess the required fitness and capability and applicant has failed to prove that there's a clear and urgent public need for the services applied for The Board approved the issuance of a Temporary Operating Permit for a period of 3 months and it justified its assumption of jurisdiction over GrandAir's application upon motion by private respondent GrandAir, the temporary permit was extended for 6 months Thus, this petition where petitioner PAL argues that respondent Board acted beyond its powers and jurisdiction in taking cognizance of GrandAir's application for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity and in issuing a temporary permit since GrandAir didn't have a legislative franchise to engage in scheduled domestic air transportation; a legislative franchise may only be granted by Congress as espoused in Sec. 11, Art. 12 and Sec. 1, Art. 6 of Consti2. Respondent GrandAir relies on its interpretation of RA 776 which follows the pronouncements of the CA in Avia Filipinas v CAB and Silangan Airways v Grand Int'l Airways where CA upheld the authority of the Board to issue such authority in the absence of a legislative franchise which authority is derived from Sec 10 RA 776

RATIO:

1.

CAB has jurisdiction over GrandAir's Application for a Temporary Operating Permit. In PAL v. CAB (1968), it was established that RA 776 expressly authorized the Board to issue a temporary operating permit or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. The CAB's authority togrant a temporary permit upon its own initiative strongly suggests the power to exercise said authority, even before the presentation of evidence. Assuming arguendo that a legislative franchise is a prerequisite to the issuance of a permit, its absence doesn't affect the jurisdiction of the Board to hear the application, but tolls only upon the ultimate issuance of the requested permit.

The power to authorize and control the operation of a public utility is a prerogative of the legislature. However, Congress has granted administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for, or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities. It is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than those of a legislative nature. With this, privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents of the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature.

ISSUES: 1. 2. WoN CAB has jurisdiction over GrandAir's Application for a Temporary Operating Permit? YES WoN a legislative franchise is an absolute requirement for the Board to have authority to issue Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity? NO

The trend of modern legislation is to vest the Public Service Commissioner with the power to regulate and control the operation of public services under reasonable rules and regulations and as a general rule, Courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion when it is just and reasonable and founded upon a legal right. Thus, the CAB has the authority to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or Temporary Operating Permit to a domestic air transport operator who, though not possessing a legislative franchise, meets all the other requirements prescribed by law.

See page 546 footnote of case

Congress, by giving CAB the power to issue permits, has delegated to the body the authority to determine the capability and competence of a prospective domestic air transport operator to engage in such venture. Congress has set specific limitations on how such authority should be exercised in RA 776

by specifying the requirements to determine the competency of a prospective operator to engage in the public service of air transportation and the procedure for the processing of application of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.

2. There's nothing in the law nor in the Constitution that indicates that a legislative
franchise is an indispensable requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air transport operator. Although Sec. 11 of Art. 12 recognizes Congress' control over any franchise certificate or authority to operate a public utility, it doesn't mean Congress has exclusive authority to issue the same. In Sec. 103, Congress intended to delegate the authority to regulate the issuance of a license to operate domestic air transport services. Petitioner PAL argues that a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity is issued to a public service for which a franchise is required by law as distinguished from a Certificate of Public Convenience which is an authorization issued for the operation of public services for which no franchise is required by law. -

implementation of the 1987 Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector, praying specificaly that the direct supply of power to industries within its franchise area (i.e. AMI) be discontinued by Napocor. The Cabinet Policy Reforms provides, in part: o Continue direct connectionsuntil such time as the appropriate regulatory board determines that direct connetion of industry to Napocor is no longer necessary in the franchise area.with satisfactory guarantees of non-prejudice to industries.. In its petition, Iligan alleged that it can meet, even surpass the set of financial standards adopted by the ERB pursuant to the policy guidelines set by the Cabinet. AMI filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: o Lack of jurisdiction on the part of ERB to hear the petition o Failure to state a cause of action o Non-joinder of indispensable parties CA held that the core of the issue is related to the distribution and marketing of energy resources and is hence within the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy, pursuant to RA 7638.

The Court said that the terms convenience and necessity, if used together in a statute, are usually construed together. Public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility will meet a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately afford. It doesn't mean or require an actual physical necessity or an indispensable thing. It is the law which determines the requisites for the issuance of the certification and not the title indicating the certificate.

ISSUE: - WON the ERB has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving direct connection issues. o Iligan claims that RA 7638 transferred to the DOE ERBs non-price regulatory powers and functions relative to the petroleum industry. This argument was founded on the definition of energy source under the act. HELD: - NO. Pursuant to RA 7638, it is now the Department of Energy (DOE) that has jurisdiction. RATIO: - The court cited the consolidated cases (1) NAPOCOR vs. CA and Cagayan Electric Power and (2) Phividec Industrial Authority vs. CA and Cagayan Electric Power, where it was held that: o The determination of which of the two public utilities has the right to supply electric power to an area which is within the coverage of both is certainly not a rate-fixing function which should remain with the ERB. It deals with the regulation of the distribution of energy resources, which under EO 172 is a function of ERB. However, with the enactment of RA 7638, the DOE took over such functions. - It is now the DOE that has jurisdiction over the regulation of the marketing and the distribution of energy resources. Although formerly belonging to the ERB, RA 7638 transferred the non-rate-fixing jurisdiction power and functions of the ERB to the

ERB vs. Court of Appeals Panganiban, J. | March 25, 1999 FACTS: - The members of the Association of Mindanao Industries (AMI) are enterprises which were among those granted direct connection facility by the National Power Corporation (Napocor) although operating within the franchise area of Iligan Light and Power, Inc. (Iligan). - Iligan filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition for the
3

See page 551 for the provision

DOE. The application for the NPCs direct supply or disconnection of power involve essentially the distribution of energy resources, and not by any incident, the determination of power rates. Hence, these applications must be resolved by the DOE. Also, the argument that electricity is not an energy resource is wrong. EO 172 provides that: o Energy Resource is defined as any substance or phenomenn which by itself or in combination with othersemanates, or generatesenergy. o Electric power or electricity is defined as an imponderable and invisible agent producing light, hear, chemical decomposition, and other physical phenomena. Undoubtedly, therefore, electricity, which produces energy, is an energy resource. The regulation of its distribution is, therefore, among those functions formerly belonging to the ERB, which have been transferred to the DOE.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regular courts have jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies. HELD: NO. HIGC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies. The jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate matters concerning homeowners association including their dissolution as found in P.D 902-A has been transferred to the Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation. Whatever ambiguities that may arise regarding jurisdiction over quo warranto action against corporation or person usurping corporate offices are classified and resolved by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Quo Warranto actions against corporation or person using corporate offices fall under the jurisdiction of SEC, unless otherwise provided for by law, such as where the corporate entities involved are homeowners associations, in which case jurisdiction is lodged with the Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation (HIGC).

UNILONGO VS CA April 5, 1999; Kapunan, J.

Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato | Quisumbing,J. FACTS LA Olegario rendered a decision finding that the laborers of Green Mountain Farms had been illegally dismissed and that Green Mountain Farms, et al. were guilty of Unfair Labor Practice. The laborers filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution before the NLRC. LA Rivera issued a writ of execution, directing Deputy Sheriff Ventura to execute the judgment against Green Mountain Farms, et al. o Shreiff Ventura proceeded to garnish personal properties of Green Mountain Farms, et al., which were found to be insufficient to satisfy the monetary award. o Sheriff Ventura proceeded to levy upon a real property, registered in the name of Roberto Ongpin, one of the respondents. Deltaventures Resources, Inc. filed a third-party claim before the NLRC, asserting ownership over the property levied. o LA Rivera ordered the suspension of the auction sale until the merits of petitioner's claim has been resolved. However, Deltaventures filed a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary retraining order against the Sheriff (on the same grounds as the third-party claim) with the Regional Trial Court. o Deltaventures filed an amended complaint to implead LA Rivera and the laborers of Green Mountain Farms. Laborers of Green Mountain Farms moved for the dismissal of the civil case on the ground of the lack or jurisdiction of the RTCGRANTED.

FACTS: Sto. Nino de Cul de Sac Neighborhood Association Inc. (SNSNAI) was incorporated and registered with the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) by petitioners Unilongo Group, comprising them as the original Board of Trustees. However, since no elections for a new Board of Trustees and for a new set of officers were held from the time of its incorporation, the petitioners subsequently amended the SNSNA's bylaws by changing the term of office of the Board of Trustees from 1yr to 2 yrs. Despite amendments, elections were held by private respondents Dino Group, from where they emerged as the new officers. Then again, the Unilongo group established Sto. Nino de Cul de Sac Homeowners Association Inc. (CHSHA) and registered the same with the Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC). From this arise the controversy on who should represent the homeowners and hold the offices and positions therefrom. Private respondents, in their quo warranto complaints, sought to ouster the Unilongo group from the Board of Trustees of the SNSNAI and to dissolve the CDSHA and declare its registration with the HIGC null and void for being in contravention of law and illegally formed. In response, two pleadings, an answer with counterclaim and a motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, were filed by petitioners. They contended that disputes involving homeowners association fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HIGC. The motion to dismiss was denied. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which was again denied for lack of merit. On appeal, petitioners contended that the regular courts have no jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies.

ISSUE WoN the RTC may take cognizance of the complaint filed by Deltaventures and consequently provide the injunction relief sought.NO. Stated differently, WoN the acts complained of are related to, connected or interwoven with the cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor arbiter or the NLRC.YES. RATIO The third-party claim was filed by Deltaventures by reason of a writ of execution to enforce the NLRCs decision issued by Sheriff Ventura against a property to which it claims ownership. o And although the complaint before the RTC was for the recovery of possession and injunction, in essence it was an action challenging the legality or propriety of the levy , and was, in effect a motion to quash the writ of execution of a decision rendered on a case of Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice, which was properly within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. o And as the subject matter of the third party claim is but an incident of the labor case, such is a matter beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC. Moreover, since the jurisdiction to try such cases pertained exclusively to the proper labor official concerned under the Department of Labor and Employment (i.e., the NLRC), to hold otherwise would be to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. o Whatever irregularities attended the issuance and execution of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. o The power of the Labor Arbiter to issue a writ of execution carries with it the power to inquire into the correctness of the execution of his decision and to consider whatever supervening events might transpire during such execution. Finally, the injunction cannot prosper under Article 254, which explicitly prohibits issuance of a temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes by any court or other entity. o Petitioner should have filed its third-party claim before the Labor Arbiter, from whom the writ of execution originated, before instituting said civil case. Moreover, the RTC, being a co-equal body of the NLRC, has no jurisdiction

to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of any decision of the latter. 27 DISPOSITIVE The order of dismissal by Judge Cabato are AFFIRMED, and the records of this case are hereby REMANDED to the NLRC for further proceedings. 1wphi1.nt Cagayan Electric Power vs. Collera | Pardo, J. (2000) FACTS - Respondents were customers of petitioner Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc. - Since 1977, petitioner had been collecting payments for electric consumption from respondents under the so-called Power Adjustment Clause without deducting the discounts and other credit adjustments granted by the National Power Corporation. - In 1985, respondents tendered payments for their individual bills less charges for power cost adjustment, currency exchange rate adjustment and surcharge, which petitioner refused to accept. Because of petitioners refusal, respondents consigned their payments to the court. - Respondents filed with the RTC a complaint against petitioner for unjust enrichment, recovery of sums of money. - RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint which was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Energy, now the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) under Section 9 (c), PD 1206. - CA reversed the trial court, and remanded the case.

ISSUE/S & HELD: Whether jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint is vested with regular courts or the Energy Regulatory Board. RTC.

RATIONALE - The complaint does not charge any violation of either currency exchange rate adjustment (CERA) or power cost adjustment (PCA). Respondents only allege that

petitioner charged them with the full rate of electric consumption despite absence of any increases in the cost of energy. - The regional trial court is a court of general jurisdiction. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6173, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1206 empowered the ERB to regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies. The power to fix rates of electric consumption does not carry with it the power to determine whether or not petitioner is guilty of overcharging customers for consumption of electric power. This falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. - We have ruled that the question of determining the breakdown and itemization of the power adjustment billed by an electric power company to its customers is not a matter that pertains to the ERBs jurisdiction, but that of the RTC. - Petitioner is a public utility company. If, indeed, petitioner used the deposits, discounts, surcharges, PCA, and CERA rates as instruments to obtain undue profits, then respondents may have causes of action against petitioner to be litigated before the regular courts and decided on the basis of evidence which the parties may present during the trial.

The incumbent officers/members of the board of director questioned the order and resolution (which were issued on separate occasion) with the ordinary courts. Investa Land Corporation, who was dealing with DARBCI that time, also filed a complaint to enjoin the CDA from enforcing its orders. While the cases were pending, the members of DARBCI, on their own initiative, convened a general assembly and held an election effectively replacing the private respondents (the complained officers). The Court of Appeals, however, promulgated a decision on the case for prohibition, ordering the CDA to perpetually cease and desist from the case and reinstating the members of the board of directors who were ousted by virtue of the questioned Orders. Motion for Reconsideration was denied, instant petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE Whether or not the Cooperative Development Authority is vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes. RULING No, the CDA is devoid of any quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes and more particularly disputes as regards the election of the members of the Board of Directors and officers of cooperatives. The authority to conduct hearings or inquiries and the power to hold any person in contempt may be exercised by the CDA only in the performance of its administrative functions under RA No. 6939. The CDA invokes the power vested by 3 of Republic Act No. 6939 (the enabling charter of the CDA). However, after examination of all the powers, functions, and responsibilities enumerated in the section, there is no provision providing for such adjudicative powers. o The language of RA No. 6939 provides for purely administrative functions which consist of policy-making, registration, fiscal and technical assistance to cooperatives and implementation of cooperative laws. Nowhere in the said law can it be found any express grant to the CDA of authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes.

ARRANZA vs. BF Homes

COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs DOLEFIL AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES COOPERATIVE, INC. (De Leon, 2002) FACTS The Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) received complaints from disgruntled members of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI), an agrarian reform cooperative, alleging the mismanagement and/or misappropriation of funds of DARBCIs incumbent officers and members of the board of directors. In response to these complaints, CDA issued: 1. 2. An order freezing the funds of DARBCI and creating a management committee to manage the affairs of said cooperative. A resolution directing the holding of a special general assembly of the members of DARBCI and the creation of an ad hoc election committee to supervise the election of officers and members of the board of directors.

At most, it could facilitate mediation and conciliation of disputes, and 8 of the same Act expressly states that if no mediation or conciliation succeeds within three (3) months, a certificate of non-resolution shall be issued by the commission prior to the

filing of appropriate action before the proper courts. Being an administrative agency, the CDA has only powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those which are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Looking into the legislative records of deliberations for the said act, it is clear that the Congressmen intended the ordinary courts to resolve disputes between cooperatives. o This is in line with the policy of government granting autonomy to cooperatives and minimising intervention in their own disputes (thats why they encourage conciliation and mediation).

10