A Chaotic Model of Power Concentration in the International System Author(s): Diana Richards Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol.

37, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), pp. 55-72 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600831 . Accessed: 27/09/2013 11:01
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International StudiesQuarterly (1993) 37, 55-72

A ChaoticModel of PowerConcentration in theInternational System

DIANA RICHARDS

University ofMinnesota Manypreviousstudieshave pointed to the presence of cyclicpatterns in the distribution and concentrationof internationalpower. I test this and findthatthe evolutionof systemic theory since powerconcentration 1494 is not cyclic, but is chaotic. This impliesthat,althoughthereare no strictcycles, the evolution of power concentrationis influenced by structural An underlyingorder in the transfer constraints. of power resultsin a patterned, althoughnot a determinate, evolutionover time.An model in the chaotic domain is developed by combininga exploratory fewcommon assumptions fromthe power literature. This model results in some interesting implications, such as the findingthatmultipolarity, and hegemonycan all be stable configurations under certain bipolarity, conditions.

Introduction
The study of the concentration and distribution of power in the international systemis an important topic in the study of world politics because of a presumed correlation with the likelihood of war (Deutsch and Singer, 1964; Waltz, 1979; Doran and Parsons, 1980; Organski and Kugler, 1980; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Gilpin, 1981; Doran, 1983; Siverson and Sullivan, 1983; Wayman, 1984; Modelski and Morgan, 1985; Morgenthau, 1985). Many theories on power concentration point to the existence of cycles over time. In this paper I test this proposition using the Modelski and Thompson (1988) data, and find that the evolution of power concentration is not strictly cyclic, but is chaotic.The finding of chaoticdynamics confirms the premise of cycle theorists: there are patterns in the evolution of power concentration. However, the patterns are not in the form of strictcycles,but are broad structuralconstraintson feasible paths and outcomes. The application of
Author's note: The authorwould like to thankBruce Russett and RobertAbelson forhelpfuldiscussionson topics leading to thiswork, RichardStoll forsuggesting the seapowerdata set,and Cliff Morganand RickWilsonforcareful readingsof an earlier draft.Responsibility for errorsis myown. Computingserviceswere provided by the Cornell CenterforTheoryand Simulationin Science and Engineering. The empiricalsectionwas originally preparedforthe 1990 IBM Supercomputing competition. A versionof thispaper was presentedat the 1991 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington,D.C. The work was completed while the author was a postdoctoral research fellow at the Irvine Research Unit in Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine. ? 1993 International StudiesAssociation. PublishedbyBlackwellPublishers, 238 Main Street, Cambridge,MA 02142, USA, and 108 CowleyRoad, OxfordOX4 UK 1JF,

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56

Chaotic Model

extend withwhich to rigorously can providea formalframework chaotic systems in international politics. thenotionof "cycles" The finding of chaotic dynamics also has several substantiveimplications. does not imply the presenceof chaoticdynamics Contrary to some interpretations, or crisis.Ratherit impliesthatthe concentration the emergenceof war,conflict, to small,random of poweris continually evolving, is very sensitive and distribution to predictbased on difficult willbe extremely distributions effects, and thatfuture conditions and trends. current exploratory Based on the resultsof the empiricaltest,I compose a preliminary model derivedfromseveral common assumptionsregardingpower growthand of chaotic the pervasiveness transfer. The purpose of this model is to illustrate model thisfirst-cut nations.Already in even a simplemodel of interacting dynamics I findthat (1) the level of the "burdenor implications. severalinteresting suggests of different systemic on the stability effect of leadershiphas an important benefit" and hegemonycan each be stable bipolarity, tripolarity, polarities:multipolarity, under certainconditions;(2) those excluded frompower can alter the natureof of public to influencethe cost distribution system by attempting the international and (3) a hegemon can prolong its goods and the extent of welfaretransfers; membershipin the world elite by decreasing its public goods burden (such as its by increasing A greatpower can also stabilizethe system throughcost-sharing). public goods burden-although this latter solution also entails a more equal ofpoweramong thegreatpowers. sharing

Cyclesand Chaos approaches. has takentwodistinct The study of power in the international system whichfocuson the effect On one hand are the static"balance of power"theories, of the international of the numberof actors,theirrelative power,and the structure system(Gulick, 1955; Deutsch and Singer, 1964; Wayman,1984). On the other theories approaches,whichhave been dominatedby "cyclic" hand are the dynamic in the evolutionof power (Modelski,1979; periodicity pointingto an underlying 1985; Modelski, Gilpin,1981; Doran, 1983; Raslerand Thompson,1983; Goldstein, 1987; Modelski and Thompson, 1988). For example, Modelski and Thompson (1988) point out thatthe period fromthe end of one global war to the end of the next conflictaverages about 107 years-or roughlyfour generations.Likewise, are said to occur in approximate in major hegemonictransformations fluctuations spans. Manypublic goods theoriesalso contain an implicitcyclic four-generation evolution (Olson, 1971, 1982; Gilpin, 1981; Kindleberger, 1981, 1983; Keohane, evolvesthrough 1984). For example,Gilpin (1981) proposesthatglobal hegemony of four recurring patterns:(1) a locally stable equilibrium,(2) a redistribution of the system, and (4) a (3) an emergingdisequilibrium power in the system, in a new, temporary, war) resulting resolutionof the system crisis(oftenthrough equilibrium. Although cyclic approaches have built upon balance of power theories by the process or evolutionof power, movingfroma staticmodel to understanding Most of these criticisms theyhave also been the targetof some serious criticisms. a rigorous, in formulating arise (legitimately or not) fromthe difficulty empirically of a "cycle."For many,a "cycle"continues to testablesocial science definition deterministic an inflexible, denote a patternwith a fixed periodicity, implying but at leastwitha a "cycle" is understoodas not precisely fixed, process.For others, a 100-year cycle limitedrange of variation.For example, in this interpretation theorywould implythat cycleson the order of 10 or 200 years are ruled out. have an even broader conceptionof a "cycle."For However,manycycletheorists

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DIANA RicHARDs

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example,Modelskiand Thompson (1988) refer to a cycle as "patterned repetition." Theystate(1988:112), "a recurrence of thesephenomena are all thatis requiredto earn the label of a cycle."In theirstudy the lengthof the cyclehas rangedfrom92 to 129 yearsover the past 500 years.Cyclelengths vary, prohibiting anyconclusive in the predictions concerningthe lengthof the nextcycle.However,thisflexibility definitionof a cycle entails several criticisms, particularly regardingfalsifiability and explanations of cyclevariability. In the formal study of dynamical systems, dynamical behavioris typically divided into three,mutually exclusivecategories:equilibrium(steadystate), cyclic(strict periodicity), and chaotic. A chaotic system is unique in thatit produces a complex time series evolutionwithsecond- and higher-order change, incorporating many outcomes,and witha continualevolutionthatmay show glimpsesof patternbut thatis neverperfectly repeated.1 The basic idea behind a chaotic process is best illustrated with an example. in three Equation (1) shows the Lorenz equations, a well-known chaotic system variables:2 dX/dt=aY- aX -XZ+ c X- Y dY/dt= dZ/dt=XY- b Z (1)

of power,but it is a good Equation (1) is not proposed as a model forthe evolution of the relationbetweenstrict and chaotic illustration cycles, social science "cycles," The time series of a chaotic process is very erratic,mimickinga dynamics.3 stochastic seriesand showing no obviousorder.The iteration of the Lorenz system in a very results complextimeseries,a shortsectionofwhichis shownin Figure1A.
30

20 -

10

-10
-20-

1
t

-30'

time FIG. 1A. Time seriesofLorenz system.

lIntroductions to chaoticsystems in the social science literature include Baumol and Quandt (1985), Baumol and Benhabib (1989), Huckfeldt(1990), and Richards(1990). See also Glieck (1987) and Hofstadter (1985). 2Note thatEquation (1) is nonlinear.Chaotic systems are a subsetof nonlinearsystems-in particular, nonlinear in the "unstable" domain wherethe evolutiondoes not reach an equilibriumpointor a fixedcycle. systems 3Berry (1991) containsanotherdiscussionof long wavesin lightof chaotic dynamics. He noticespatternsin the first returnmap of severaltimeseries (whichare similarto the patterns found in the seapowerdata). However,first returnmaps are highly dependent on the timedelay chosen and do not provideconclusiveevidence eitherforthe presenceof cyclesor forchaoticdynamics.

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58

30 -

Model Chaotic

-20

-L

i;;t-

10

0-

-20

~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
100 0 0 1 02

-2

FIG. 1B.

system. ofLorenz structure Attractor

terms. However,note that the Lorenz equations do not contain any probability The complexity of the timeseriesis produced solelyby the nonlinearinteraction among variables. random,the feasible Althoughthe evolutionof a chaoticprocessappears largely as seen in Figure 1B. This structure, outcomes are constrainedby an underlying is An attractor is called the attractor, and it is createdsolelybythe system. structure points.For some forsome set of starting whichthe system converges the set toward thisconvergenceis to a single point or a cycle.In the case of a "fractal systems, the system convergesto a complicated"odd set" (see, e. g., Mandelbrot, attractor" time.In set is visitedtwicein finite 1983:193-199) whereno point in the attractor consists of twoapproximate the case of theLorenz equations,theattractor "cycles," The evolutionof outcomesremainscomplex repetitive. butwhichare not perfectly of of behaviorwithinthe general constraints variety and is capable of an infinite the erraticevolutionis not a structure, the attractor. Because of the underlying withnoise." fixedcyclenor is ita "cycle is the effectof small random of chaotic systems An importantcharacteristic statemaycause a large change overtime.This A slightchange in a current effects. implies that the influenceof random shocks,which are pervasivein any social createsnew initialconditions.Because the process is science context,continually as seen in FigureIA. nonlinear,the consequences overtimeare profound, causing microlevel effectsto be exponentially Because of this sensitivity, from the observationof previous predictability amplifiedover time, long-term behavior becomes impossible in chaotic systems.Current behavior becomes of the state timeperiod. "Knowledge unrelatedto previouseventsoversome finite for an arbitrarily long time does not enable us to predictits later of the system evolution"(Berge, Pomeau, and Vidal, 1984:103). The examinationof a chaotic prediction,but does not guarantee accurate longprocess allows for short-term chaoticsystems side of unpredictability, termpredictions. However,on the positive in the social science sense of the term.As Huckfeldt "deterministic" are not overly (as in the nonlineardynamical determinism witha chaoticsystem, (1990) discusses, process. a determinate imply of Equation (1) ) does not strictly system

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DLANARIcHARDs

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An Empirical Test
a Chaotic Identifying Process

A diagnostictest has been developed recently by Malraison,Attens,Berge, and DuBois (1983) and byGrassberger and Procaccia (1983) thatcan identify whether a complex time series is the resultof a chaotic process or is largelythe resultof In thissectionI explain the logic of thistestand apply it to stochastic influences. Modelskiand Thompson's (1988) data on seapower.Since a completeexplanation of this method for a political science audience is providedelsewhere (Richards, 1992), and since the procedureis ratherinvolved, onlythoseaspectsof immediate relevanceto understanding theresults of thispaper are discussed. The keyto the diagnostictestcan be illustrated withthe example of Figure 1. Recall thata chaotic system produces a complex time evolution(Figure 1A), but has an underlying geometricorder (Figure 1B). This arisesbecause the temporal evolutionof a chaoticnonlineardynamical containsan attractor in abstract system space. Imagine that the time series of Figure IA was influencedin large partby stochastic influences. The timeseries of a stochastic similar processwould look very to the timeseriesproduced by a chaotic process.However,the stochastic process would not have the order of the chaotic process. For example, the stochastic versionof Figure 1B would not have a pattern, and the pointswould be randomly distributed overtherangeofvalues. This geometricorder can be described in termsof a "fractal dimension" (see, e. g., Mandelbrot,1983:14-19). A fractal dimensionis greaterthan zero, less than the Euclidean dimension,and not necessarily A chaoticprocesshas a an integer.4 fractal attractor, whereasa stochastic processdoes not. A chaoticsystem originates froma low numberof degrees of freedom,despite producingverycomplex time series.In contrast, a stochastic a verylarge numberof degrees of process involves freedom. The diagnostic test of the spatial correlation method distinguishes deterministic chaos from a stochastic timeseriesbythesetwodifferences. A chaotic is identified in abstract system by the geometricorder of an attractor space and by a lowfractal dimension. The characterization of geometricregularity is accomplished by the "circlecounting" technique.This techniquecountsthe numberof pointsinsidea circleof radius r and its dependence on r. For example, imagine a circle centered at an arbitrary point in Figure lB. As one increasesthe radiusof thiscircle,the number of points contained in that circle will also increase. N(r) denotes the number of
points inside the circle as a function of the radius. It is known that N(r)

v approximates the dimensionof the set of points.If the set of pointsis generated by deterministic chaos, then not onlywilltherebe a spatialcorrelation or pattern to this set of points,but the set will have a dimension v where v is not a whole number.This is because theattractor of a chaoticsystem has a fractal dimension. By centering circlesat each point,countingthe pointswithin thatcircleand its dependence on r, and repeating this procedure for a varietyof embedding dimensions p (Figure 1B showsan embeddingdimensionof 2: X and Y), one can obtainvalues fortwomeasures:v and p. Briefly, v approximates the dimensionof the set of points,and p is the embeddingdimension.The important aspect when the resultsis that if v reaches a limit of a non-integer interpreting value as p increases,then the complex time series is the resultof a chaotic process. If v continuesto increaseas a function ofp, thenthe complexity is largely the resultof stochastic influences.

e, where

4Also,the fractal dimensionis less than the topologicaldimension.This conditiondefinesa fractal set (see, e. g., Mandelbrot,1983).

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60

Chaotic Model 1494-1990 TheData: Global Seapower,

The most complete data set available on the historical evolution of world leadershipand conflict has recently been compiled by Modelski and Thompson of severalkey (1988), who meticulously document the "global reach capabilities" nation-states over the past 500 years.Accordingto Modelski and Thompson, a nation'scapability forglobal reach consists primarily ofnavalpower.Controlof the sea has been and remainsa centralaspect and index of a nation's international power.As Modelskiand Thompson (1988:3) pointout,
ofleadership Navies are nottheonly facet and oftheupsand downs important a crucial that seemto be boundup with itbutthey form factor politico-strategic in conjunction other that with socialand cultural, helps input factors, economic, to laythefoundation thequalifications) foroperations ofglobal (or constitutes without globalreach. reachand implementation. Therecan be no globalsystem in themodern ofsuperior world, staked outa Onlythosedisposing navies have, goodclaim toworld leadership.

Seapower is essential to one's power in war: for conflictwith other navies, preserving home bases, intercepting routesof opponents,and securinglinkswith allies. In peacetime,seapowerallowsone to protectthe statusquo via a deterrent of effect, providesearly warning, protects traderoutes,and controlsthe movement undesirablegoods. As Modelskiand Thompson pointout, althoughseapowermay decline as a centralcomponentand index of nationalpowerdue to theemergence of ICBM's or space-basedweapons, since 1500 the controlof the seas has been a centralaspect of worldleadership,power,and conflict. Thus, any changes in the in the distribution of seapower,an positionof worldleadershipare linkedto shifts indicator of economic, military, and technological power in the international system. Modelski and Thompson (1988) considerfourmeasures of the seapower of a nation: number of warships, naval expenditures, expenditureson construction, since 1494 and numberof seamen. However,reliable data on naval expenditures are unavailable.Construction onlyon capability expenditures provideinformation increments, not the capability base. Data on numberof personnelare not available priorto the nineteenth century. Therefore Modelskiand Thompson conclude that comparingthe "numberof ships"is the least problematicindex. They adjust for technological changes by dividing the data into four historical periods of era); circa technological development: 1494-circa 1654 (the pre-ship-of-the-line 1655-1860 (the ship-of-the-line era); 1861-1945 (the battleship era); and 1946-present (the aircraftcarrier/submarine era). Seapower is measured by combining data on the number of warshipstaking into account technological changes over time. Earlier historicaleras can be indexed simplyby counting warshipswith more than a minimumnumber of guns. The period since 1945 and of nuclear-attack carriers, involvesa considerationof the number of aircraft submarines,counter military potential (a calculation of missile accuracy), and equivalentmegatonnage(Modelskiand Thompson,1988). From the relativepower capabilitiesof the global nation-states, Modelski and of power in the Thompson (1988) compile two data sets on the concentration international system. One index consistsof the proportionof totalglobal power capabilitiescontrolled by a single world leader. However, this index obscures such the leader's relative thatdo not affect capabilities, changes in concentrations as shifts by B and C thatleave A's relative power the same. In addition,the index includes only a singleworld leader's share-who thatleader is mustbe adjusted time of the leader at a givenhistorical This requiresthe identification historically. is troublesomeand has in order to calculate the index. This analytic intervention been one of themajorcriticisms of theModelski-Thompson work.

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DIANA RIcHARDs

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index Modelski and Thompson also provide the data series for an alternative (Figure2), derivedfroman index of systemic concentration proposed by Rayand Singer (1973). This index measures the extent to which a system'spower is concentrated:
concentration= systemic

V(

s2-

1/N) / (1 - 1/N)

(2)

wheresi= the ithactor'spercentageshare of the distribution of powerand N= the number of actors in the system.The systemicconcentrationindex minimizes and therefore was used for the resultspresented in this analyticintervention, paper. AlthoughModelski and Thompson provide the data for both series,for theirworktheyrelyon the simple proportionalindex.5However,theypoint out thatthe twoseriescapturethe same changes in systemic concentration over time. For confirmation, the diagnostictestspresentedin thispaper were completedon both data series,and produced similar results. Results of an The diagnostictest described in the previoussection,and the availability of the excellentdata set on the evolutionof global power,allowforan examination presence of chaotic dynamics. The absence of strict cycleshas been shownmost recentlyby Beck (1991), who applied spectral analysisto data measuringwar I also performed intensity. on the Modelskiand Thompson (1988) spectral analysis data and foundno evidenceforstrict cycles. The resultsof the diagnostictestapplied to the Modelski-Thompson data are seriesproduces a diagnosticplot that shownin Figure 3A. Recall thata stochastic continuesto rise as one increases the embedding dimensionp, while a chaotic sequence reaches a limitat a non-integer value.6The resultsof the seapowerdata showa limiting value of between3.34 and 3.69, sustainedforvalues ofp as high as

1.0
c 0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

1450 1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 year

FIG. 2. Time seriesof international powerconcentration (Modelskiand Thompson data).

5The plateau in the timeseriesis not artificial but results fromU.S. dominance after WorldWar II. 6A sequence generatedfromcycleswitha stochasticcomponentwas also testedfor comparisonand produced very different results in thediagnostictest.

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62

Chaotic Model

15. Althoughthisvalue is not perfectly accuratedue to the limits on availabledata points (N 500), it does provide a first indication.7Although convergenceof dimensionestimates remainsa problem,Berg6 et al. (1984:152n) have noted that, in manyof the cases theyexamined,a reasonableaveragewas obtainedafter about a hundredpoints,althougha higherN certainly increasesthe statistical accuracyof the estimate. For comparison,one can randomlyshuffle the Modelski and Thompson data and testthisnew series.8Shuffling the data resultsin a serieswiththe same range The results of the shuffled ofvalues,butwherethe trajectory structure is destroyed. sequence are shown in Figure 3B. Contraryto the empirical series, where v reached a limit,in the control series v continues to rise as a functionof p, indicating a stochastic process. The resultsof the diagnostic test suggest that the evolution of power does contain some underlyingorder as observed by cycle theorists.However, the evolutionof power is a chaotic process ratherthan a fixedcycle.The findingof chaotic dynamicsis not to be confusedwithunstable conditionson the verge of conflict or war.Althoughsome (e. g.,Saperstein, and Mayer-Kress, 1984; Saperstein 1988) have pointed to the emergence of chaotic dynamicsin arms races as implying conflict, this implicationis debatable (see, e. g., Grossmanand MayerKress,1989). Chaotic dynamics do not imply"social chaos," but implya complex constraints on non-equilibrium evolutionthatis structured bycomplexunderlying is that the feasible paths and outcomes. The proper substantive interpretation and evolutionof powerconcentration willcontinueto evolvein complex patterns In addition,the long-term future willbe very sensitive to smallrandom influences. and of powerwillbe very difficult to predictfromcurrent distributions distribution current trends. Anyrelationbetweenchaoticdynamics and warmuststemfroman of the configurations of power that are associated withwar (see, understanding e. g., Organski and Kugler, 1980). However,the presence of chaotic dynamics impliesthatone can reach a particular powerconfiguration thatis associatedwith warfrommanydifferent paths.
15 , 12

10

10

V
5 v.3 69 v3.334

~~~~~~~~Vs
4

s p

to

1~ ~~~5

~~~~~~~~~~~~0 0
p

1'2

FIG. 3. Results of spatialcorrelation testforthe seapowerdata (A) and forthe

shuffled randomly seapowerdata (B).

foroptimalstatistical accuracy 7Some have suggested10D data points,whereD is the dimensionof the attractor, (see, e. g., Eckmannand Ruelle, 1985). This would require on the order of 1,000 to 10,000 data pointsin the global powercase. thiscomparison. forsuggesting 81am indebtedto an anonymousreviewer

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DIANA RicHARDs

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A Model in the ChaoticDomain Establishing the empiricalrelevanceof a chaotic dynamicalsystems approach is only a preliminary step. In the previoussection,I presentedevidence that the temporalevolutionof powerconcentration is not a randomstochastic process,nor is it a perfectly cyclicprocess.Instead,thereis empiricalevidence thatthe evolutionof poweris chaotic-i.e.,theresultof a non-equilibrium nonlinearprocess. What typeof a model can include the blend of orderand complexity suggested bythe empiricalresults? The applicationof chaos theory is motivated theoretically by the combinationof three aspects: (1) the evolution of power resultsfrom interactions among nations,(2) thisinteraction web is likely to be nonlinear, and (3) many cases of nonlinear interaction resultin chaotic ratherthan equilibriumor cyclicoutcomes.This section outlinesa simple exploratory modeling exercise in the chaoticdomain. The model is not intendedas a definitive or perhapseven an accurate model of the evolutionof power,but as a demonstration of how the combinationof a few existingassumptionsin the power literature can resultin I assume two main forceson the evolutionand distribution of chaotic dynamics. and decayof a nation'spower (whichI model as linked power:the internal growth of public good provision), to the costsand benefits and the constraints imposedby in terms the system of proportional power.
Growth andDecay Power

For the purposes of the model outlined below, I assume that the rates of as international powergrowth and decayare relatedto different costsand benefits a function of a nation'srelative positionin theworldsystem. First, it is typically assumedthatthereare costsassociatedwithbeing a hegemon or a member of the world elite. Internationalleaders must contributeto the maintenanceof the statusquo using theirown economic and military resources. of There is widespreadagreementthatpowerleadershipinvolves the responsibility providing goods for the international system, goods such as the maintenanceof international order via defense and alliances,and economic servicessuch as the maintenanceof open tradingroutes. The nation-state that enjoys a position of in maintaining has the mostinterest a stableenvironment of the powerpresumably of being a world leader statusquo. Althoughsome have pointed to the benefits theoriesassume thatcostsexceed benefits. (Russett, 1985), the hegemonicstability The model outlinedin thispaper accommodatesbothcases. open Second, these goods are publicgoods.A stable economic environment, naval passages,and international peace are goods thatare available to all states, these goods or not. Public goods whethertheybear any of the costsof providing be excluded non-contributors cannotfeasibly are characterized by non-excludability: of the good byone memberdoes not reduce the availability and the consumption of the good, to the provision a nationcontributes to others.Regardlessofwhether of others'contributions. it can stillreap thebenefits Third,public goods are not onlysusceptibleto under-provision, theyalso tend of the large by the small" (Olson, 1971; Gilpin, 1981). towardan "exploitation in the public good has providedthe Once the memberwiththe largestinterest is available to all those withsmallerdemands. amount it wants,thiscontribution The "exploitationof the large by the small" occurs because public goods are Smaller states that do not available to all membersregardlessof contribution. as largerstatesthatbear the costsof public contribute stillreap the same benefits good provision. Therefore, the small-demand members will withhold their as unnecessarysince the portion they desired has already been contributions the public good willnot be provided.The distribution of the burden of providing in proportion to thebenefits obtainedfrom the publicgood. The memberwiththe

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64

Chaotic Model

highestdemand for the good will bear a higherproportionof the costswhereas thosewithsmallerdemandswillfree-ride.
Power Transfer

If poweris assumedto be measuredin proportional each nation'sgrowth terms, of power mustbe constrained of othernations. by the possible simultaneous growth The growth and decay of nationsis linkedto the struggle forpowerin periods of "systempower shortage." Although all nations may experience simultaneous increases in real power, simultaneous increases in proportional power are not feasible. The assumptions of power transfer can be understoodin termsof a balanced graph. Each nation is gaining or losing power as a resultof its relativepower positionand the natureof the costsor benefits of thisposition.However,the total of proportional powermustremainconstant; it mustremainbalanced in termsof power being "available"and power being "absorbed."The three cases, balanced, power surplus,and power shortage,each requiresan assumptionabout how the willdistribute system powerto achieve a balanced network. These assumptions are outlinedin theformal model below.
An Exploratory Model

Let pitE [0,1] denote the percentageof worldpower thateach nation i holds at timet.I intentionally leave "power"definedabstractly: "power"can be understood as seapower, general militarypower, economic or political power, or any combination of thesefactors. Assumethatthe relationship betweenone nation'spowerpi and the growth and decay of this power level depends on the public goods "burden" or "benefit" associatedwithpositionsof power,as discussedabove. Let a parameterb represent thisburden or benefit, where b > 0 implies a burden to positionsof power (the of the public goods-hegemoniccycletheories)and b< 0 impliesa benefit viewpoint to positionsof power (hegemonic theories).The cost/benefit parameterb can be understoodas an index of the burden of international For public goods provision. example, b could be operationalizedas an index derived from the percent of G.N.P. spentbynationsof varying powerlevelson international public goods such as overseasmilitary economic and humanitarbases, extended deterrence, foreign ian aid, or maintenance forinternational organizations. Formalizethe previous discussionregarding theburdenor benefit of poweras a functionalrelation such as that shown in Figure 4. This functionis admittedly

APi bcO toigemon) (Publcgood benefit

b > 0 (pubiic bwden to good irgesmon)

0.2

0.4 pi

0.6

0.8

1.0

FIG.4. Powergrowth and decay as a function of a nation'sproportional shareofworldpower.

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DIANA RICHARDS

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discussionof withthe intuitive arbitrary, but servesas a first pass and is consistent international public goods. For values of b > 0, nations with power capabilities small is less forvery below the inflection pointwilltend to gain power.This benefit and states,who do not have the means to take advantage of the opportunity, greatestfor nations with power levels where the curve reaches its maximum. Nations withpower levels greaterthan the inflection point have a net drain on = 0 line in Figure4). If one theirpower (as seen bythe curvepassingbelow the Apz b < 0, then the takes the competingassumptionthat power confersnet benefits, functional relationis flippedacrosstheAp,= 0 line. form:9 is describedbythefunctional This relationship i b sin (4.7pi) 100 (3

where pi is nation i's proportionalpower and b is the cost/benefit parameterof publicgoods provision. This relationship can also be adapted to include the case wherethereis a "norm One of the public of sovereignty preservation" among membersin the system. of foris the preservation leaders oftentake responsibility goods thatinternational the sovereignty of small states.However,seldom are statesallowed to fallbelow a certain level before more powerful benefactors intervene to preserve the state'sexistence.Equation (3) impliesthatnationsare onlyconcerned threatened to the with maximizingtheir own relativepower and that theyare indifferent extinctionof other nations. However, there appears to be a strong norm of in the international Members of the interna"sovereignty preservation" system. numberof actorsor tionalsystem are concernedabout anychange in the existing of the in termsof its implications for the stability the collapse of member-states thisaspect: One can adapt Equation (3) to incorporate system. Api.= b b.sin(4.7.(pi+ w)) pi .P 100 (4) 4

where w is the "welfare" adjustmentfor veryweak states.In termsof Figure 4, the function Equation (4) shifts by a factorw to the left,increasingthe positive withlowerrelative change to states power. increasesin Since pi is measured in termsof proportional power,simultaneous the sum overall thepi's cannotoccur. In some cases, theremaybe "surplus" power loss of poweraccordingto Equation (3) or (4). For thismodel I due to the relative after the public goods gains and losses is distributed assume thatpowerremaining to all nations in proportionto their power capability.More powerfulnations of this"free" capturea largerproportion surplus:
pZt+1 = pit+A i+ zPt * (5)

availableat timetafter wherestis the "surplus" publicgoods gainsand losses. in power may occur, causing a power In some cases, simultaneousincreases case in termsof the relation This is the most substantively "shortage." interesting between power and internationalconflict.In this case, states are prepared to
of4.7 onlyservesto scale the function to the interval [0,1] 9The factor

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Chaotic Model

system but are constrainedby increase theirrelativepositionin the international of Equation (3) byequallycapable nations.The dynamic struggle the simultaneous or (4) is constrainedby the limitsof proportionalpower. One would expect in thisscenario. to be mostlikely conflict between two I distinguish In developinga rule by which power is transferred, Api. As a first pi, and its "momentum," aspectsof a nation's power:its "capability," the average momentumof all cut, I focus on each nation's momentumvis-a-vis I assume thatnationswithnegativemomentumreduce their statesin the system. some "slack"forthegainersto powersharebythisamount,providing proportional powershortagestillremainssince thereare more for.However,a systemic struggle The to increase power than power available "on the market." nationsattempting power thatis availablefromthose difference betweenthe amount of proportional decliningin power and the amount demanded by those in a positionto increase s'. theirpoweris the shortage, of assumptions rules are possible, each arisingfromdifferent Several transfer average I focus on the weighted system. power and conflictin the international : A pi, pit,of those stateswithpositivemomentum.Nations withgrowth growth, receivetheirfullgain accordingto Equation (3) or (4). ratesthatare aboveaverage momentumprovidethe amount of the shortage average Those nationswithbelow These two rules assume that "up-and-coming" to their capability. proportionally than stateswithperhaps stateshave a betterlikelihoodof seizingthe opportunity growth rate. but a sluggish largercapabilities ifApi < 0, or ifApi > 0 and Api? Y Api*p then Formally,
P`t+1 Pit +Apit If Api> 0 and Api< YApi. pz, then (6)

P1t?i=iP

t-(7)

pit

wheremcountsthosestates withbelowaveragemomentum. the proportional powerpi of all i nationscan be summarized At each iteration, in the index (Equation (2)) used in theModelskiand Thompson empiricaldata: Z I(E(pi)2_1/N) / (1 - 1/N) (8)

The model outlined in Equations (3) through (8), based on common aspects focuses on the interactionamong discussed in the power evolution literature, in terms of a balanced graph. Simulations of the model yield nation-states comparable to the empiricaldata thatwere examined sequences thatare directly model forvarious above. The nextsectionexploresthe behaviorof thisinteraction values. parameter

Implications The resultsfromthe analysisof the empiricaldata on power evolutionindicated thatthe evolutionof power is a chaoticprocess.This impliesthatthe evolutionof is not the resultof macro-level cycles(althoughroughly poweramong nation-states

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DIANA RIcHARDS

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the result of exogenous similarpatternsmay be present), nor is it exclusively but is the resultof a nonlinear dynamicalprocess. The previous random effects, model in this domain, based on power growthand section outlined a first-cut This interaction model is chaotic for some transferamong nation-states.10 For these parametervalues, the parametervalues and some initialdistributions. sequences produced by a simulationof the model continue to evolve without combined with the fact that the simulationswere repetition.This observation, process (Equations (3) through (8) contain no produced froma deterministic model can be in the aspects), indicatesthateven thissimplefirst-cut probabilistic capable chaotic domain. In addition,Li and Yorke (1975) proved thatany system willalso be chaotic.The model does containa threeof a period of threeiterations cycle, proving that it is chaotic for some parametervalues. For example, the of {b = 10, w = 0.1; 0.2, 0.4, 0.3, 0.1} has a evolutionfromthe initialdistribution is clearlyevident power concentration period three.Chaotic evolutionof systemic in the case of {b = 20, w = 0.1; 0.2, 0.4, 0.3, 0.1}. The combinationof a few commonlydiscussed aspects regardingpower produced a model in the causal of the empiricaldata. bythe analysis domain suggested
and Stability Multipolarity, Bipolarity,

is more or less stable than a A topic of much debate is whethera bipolar system one (Waltz,1979; Wayman,1984; Hopf, 1991; Saperstein,1991). This multipolar because of the lack of large-Nempirical difficult question has been particularly The has severalinterpretations. In addition,the concept of "stability" verification. refers to periodsof relative peace or of reduced likelihood sometimes termstability thatis, is whichis in equilibrium, can also referto a system of conflict. "Stability" of or "balanced" (May,1973). As made clear bythe formalization self-perpetuating are verydistinctaspects. This section the model, the two concepts of stability in terms of a stable polarity.The model points to several examines stability and debate. Hegemony, bipolarity, and stability to thepolarity relating implications (see Figure5). The can all be perpetuating equilibriumdistributions multipolarity of the costs of depends on the distribution of a particulardistribution stability transfer. publicgoods (the value of parameterb), and the levelofwelfare to a hegemon,then thereare twostable If one assumesa net public good benefit with the exact distribution polarities:a single hegemon or a multipolarsystem of hegemonyversus of power. The stability depending on the initialdistribution of power.If thereis a nationwith depends on the initialdistribution multipolarity pointof Figure4, then the powerwhichis greaterthan the inflection proportional {b = -5; 0.08, For example, the distribution will move towardunipolarity. system 0.05, 0.75, 0.12} leads to the stable outcome of {0+, 0+, -1, 0+}. However, if has proportional point, powergreaterthanthe inflection no memberof the system then the systemremains a multipolar system.For example, the distribution {b = -5; 0.20, 0.40, 0.30, 0.10} evolvesover time withonly slightchanges in the of power. distribution evolutionarises,of course,fromthe point at which in systemic The difference is stable in Figure4 crossesApi = 0 (the inflection point). Each system thefunction to anotherby fromone stable polarity in its own region and can onlybe shifted functionof Figure 4. The assumptionof a "norm of in the cost-benefit shifts

itwill notbe evaluated interms anddemonstrative of as an exploratory model, isintended I5Since themodel only fit. empirical

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Model Chaotic

unipolar

powerconcentration .

multipolar

bipolr

egalitaran multipolar 0 0 Costlbenefit parameter

FIG.

parameter b. of the cost/benefit 5A. Stablepolarities as a function

UQI

powerconcentration multipolar j

-W 0

rgion 3-cycle

stble region

region chwooc

Cost/benefit parameter valueswitha FIG.5B. Stable polarities parameter forvarying cost/benefit "normof sovereignty (w = 0.1). preservation"

preservation"(Equation (4)) shiftsthis inflectionpoint, thereby sovereignty the regionbetweenunipolarity (see Figure5B). and multipolarity shifting set of polaritiesis If one assumesa net burdento power (b > 0), then a different is one stable.Withoutthe normof sovereignty, twopolaritiesare stable.Bipolarity stableconfiguration, withtwosuperpowers engaged in a close race forpositionsof {b= 10; 0.20, 0.40, 0.30, 0.101evolvedinto For example,the distribution superiority. a bipolar system of {0+, 0.55/0.45,0.45/0.55,0+}. In otherwords,nations2 and 3 race withthe surpassednations 1 and 4, and remained locked in a competitive exact power share varying over time between55% and 45%. For the same initial in a range between56% fluctuated distribution and b = 30 the two superpowers both and 43% of totalpower.Indeed, the postwarperiod has been characterized of European (in terms public goods burdensbythe twosuperpowers bysubstantial In the and the Easternbloc) and by prolonged,stable bipolarity. reconstruction case of two superpowers, one would expect greaterlikelihood of conflictin the earlieryearsof theirleadership(when momentum is greatest, as seen in Figure4) thanin lateryears(when momentum drops due to consolidationof powerand the with the model is that as this resultingpublic goods burdens). Also consistent by the declines (as seen recently on the part of superpowers public goods effort U.S. and especially weakensand one would expect bythe SovietUnion), bipolarity the incorporation of newactorspotentially system. leadingto a multipolar

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distributed, such as {0.33, 0.33, 0.331 or {0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.21. However, this of egalitarianmultipolarity is veryfragile:any slightchange in the distribution and the eventual progressionto power results in a collapse of multipolarity of nThis outcome is surprisingly on the stability bipolarity. analogous to findings person iteratedgames such as the Prisoner'sDilemma (Axelrod, 1984; Taylor, a cooperative,egalitariansolutionexists, 1987). Like the theoretical predictions, A but it is unstable since a single defectioncauses a collapse of the equilibrium. and that believes it has the nation that findsitselfin such a multipolarsystem, "hidden potential"to be a superpower-thatis, one of the statesthatwould be a member of the bipolar elite, would have an incentiveto disruptthe egalitarian War Europe. multipolarity, as mayhave been the case in pre-World If one incorporates a normof sovereignty preservation (Equation (4)), thenthe frombipolarity (see Figure 5B). A stable configuration shifts to a tripolarsystem norm of sovereignty preservation also changes the evolutionof the distribution and concentrationof power in cases where there is a net burden to power. the substitution with Whereas Equation (3) resultsin a stable bipolar system, Equation (4) resultsin a tripolarsystem.For example, the initial distribution {b = 10, w = 0.1; 0.2, 0.4, 0.3, 0.11evolvestowarda tripolar distribution withfluctualso on the order of {0.333, 0.330, 0.333, 0.0041. Tripolarity ating distributions (assumingb > 0). However, results forn = 5 and forvarying cost-benefit parameters of the tripolarsystemchanges as the burden of power the degree of stability in the distribution of poweramong changes.At b = 10, thereare smallfluctuations less stable, the threeleaders. At b = 20, the tripolarsystem becomes substantially of power continually withthe distribution shifting among the three leaders and in the chaoticrealm.For example,a typical withsystemic concentration fluctuating {0.37, 0.25, 0.37, 0+1. sequence would be {0.34, 0.31, 0.34, 0+},{0.31, 0.37, 0.31, 0+1, returned to a stable However, witha very highburden of power,b = 35, the system m6o-e concentration of distribution (in fact, stablethanb = 10), withstablesystemic of {0.33,0.33, 0.33, 0+1. 0.249 and a distribution The important model is thatthe common question"Which pointof thisfirst-cut or multipolarity?" is fartoo simplistic, an equally is more stable:bipolarity implying ecological systems, May simpleanswer.In askingthe analogous questionregarding and stability is substantially (1973:38) noted that"therelationbetweencomplexity more complicated than appears at firstsight."Forrestand Mayer-Kress (1991) of previously unknownbalance-of-power solutionsin discovereda wide diversity Richardsonmodel. The model outlinedabove includes the case of the three-nation stableconfigurations egalitarian multiporangingfromunipolar,bipolar,tripolar, These results lar, to multipolar. suggestthatthe proper question to ask is, "Which An interactive model in the are stable,and underwhatconditions?" configurations to domain of a nonlinear dynamicalprocess can incorporatethe needed variety the questionof stability.
TheBenefit Power and Burden ofHegemonic

b > 0, then a multipolarsystem can also be stable,but only if power is equally

If A second stable configuration in this case is a unique case of multipolarity.

for and the nature of systemic evolutionvaryprofoundly Conditionsof stability different parametervalues. Assuminga public goods benefit to great powers, and hegemony are both stable. If public goods provision falls multipolarity primarilyon larger powers, then bipolarity (or tripolarity)is stable, with multipolarity being a rare, fragileequilibriumonly under conditionsof perfect of stable configurations and theirdependence on equality.Because of the variety of costs and benefitsamong nations, the model has several the distribution

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Chaotic Model

by system implications for the abilityof a nation to influencethe international manipulating the parametervalues. By increasingor decreasingthe cost-benefit a nation can attemptto alter the parameteror the extent of welfaretransfers, of the system and to controlitsownpowerdestiny. qualitative evolution of powerbystressing the distribution For example,smallerpowerscan influence preservation(i. e., increasingthe parameter w). This the norm of sovereignty to fromhegemonyor bipolarity would potentially shiftthe stable configuration A longer term and more radical approach would involvesmaller multipolarity. aid, or economic restructhroughtransfers, nations pushing for egalitarianism in an attempt multipolar equilibrium. egalitarian to achievethefragile turing, natureof the system to influencethe qualitative Largerpowerscan also attempt evolution.Because theyhold positionsof power theyare in a betterposition to An obvious of public good provision. influencethe costs and benefits effectively the burdenof power, itspoweris bylowering waya hegemoncan serveto maintain shifting the system to a stable hegemony.Great powerscan alter the potentially burden of public good provision by creating institutionsthat reduce the institutions "exploitation of the great by the small." For example, international each nation'sbest could be designedwithincentive mechanisms thatmake "truth" procedure that accomplishesthis in the case of public response. A well-known mechanism, whichis designedwithcomplex outcome functions goods is the Groves to reporttheirtrue have the incentive thatstructure thepayoffs such thatmembers theirshare. value of the publicgood, and therefore to contribute more A more surprising finding is thata greatpowercan also make itsleadership results from finding stableby increasing the burden of power.This counterintuitive the complexity of systemic behaviorin a chaoticprocess.For example,if b= 20 then in each fluctuation thesystem is an unstabletripolar system with substantial evolution 0.25 to 0.40) (see Figure5B). Yetif from approximately greatpower'sshare (ranging becomes more the burdenof poweris increased, such as to b = 35, thenthe system the stablewithpower dividedequallyamong the threegreatpowers.By increasing itsmembership in theworldelite,butonlyat burdenofpowera nationcan maintain theexpenseofsharing powermoreequallyamongothergreatpowers.

Conclusion system of the international to the study made a greatcontribution Cycle theorists order containsan underlying thatthe evolutionof powerand conflict by asserting ratherthan being completelyrandom. This work implied that the evolutionof power contained some regularityand thus could be modeled scientifically. withthe notionof a limited, However,the availablemodelingtoolswere originally But the concept of a "cycle" time-series cycleas the mostaccurateapproximation. in most of whicharise fromthe difficulty has been the targetof manycriticisms, of a "cycle." a rigorous,empirically testablesocial science definition formulating of a of a cycle;yeta definition definition Few would ascribeto a strict deterministic of loses anymodeling"bite."The initialobservation repetition" cycleas "patterned system required concepts thatwere not "cycle-like" patternsin the international availableat the time. widely Redefiningthe social science concept of a "cycle"to include the ordered,but not fixed and static,patternsof a chaotic process overcomesthis problem. The the suspicionof empiricalfindingthatthe evolutionof power is chaotic confirms the cyclicapproaches: thereis indeed some regularity and the evolutionof power has is not a random incoherentprocess.The findingthatthisevolutionis chaotic several implications.It implies that the patternsin global power are not strict

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DIANA RicHARDs

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structure. chronological cycles, butvariablepatterns influenced byan underlying It to implies that the patternsin the international system are likelyto be sensitive small random or micro-level effects, makinglong-term predictionof futuredistributionsof powerimpossible. This aspectcan be further exploredusingtechniques such as a genetic algorithmto identify unstable regions (see, e. g., particularly Forrestand Mayer-Kress, 1991). It also implies that the evolutionof power,and simple presumablythen the patternsof war, can be modeled with a relatively how nonlinearinteraction process.In the second sectionof the paper, I illustrated complex processes could arise from the nonlinear combination of existing assumptions.Even this initial modeling exercise pointed to several interesting implications, such as theco-existence of a variety of stablesystem polarities. The debate over "cycles"is far fromsettled.This paper seeks to extend the framework that is available to define and model regularitiesin international behavior.The first sectionof the paper providedevidencethatthisnew domain is empiricallyapplicable to the evolution of power. However, this is only a consistent and preliminary steptowardthe largertaskof developinga theoretically of powerconcentration. empirically accuratemodel of the evolution

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