THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON IN ST.

THOMAS AQUINAS ACCORDING TO THE "CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY" OF ETIENNE GILSON By Darrell D. Wright

INTRODUCTION... 1. THE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.... 2. THE CONCEPT OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 3. THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. 4. FAITH AND REASON... 5. REVELATION AND THE CHRISTIAN TEACHER. 6. SACRED DOCTRINE 7. THEOLOGY AS A SCIENCE.... 8. THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THEOLOGY.. CONCLUSION....... NOTES....
Abbreviations:

S.T. (Summa Theologiae) C.G. (Summa Contra Gentiles) INTRODUCTION Etienne Gilson (1884-1978), although primarily known as a historian of medieval philosophy, is widely considered to be one of the greatest and most influential Catholic philosophers of the twentieth century. Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Fides et Ratio (1998) mentions Gilson specifically as one of the great Christian philosophers of modern times (n. 74; see note 120 below). This writer believes Gilson to have outranked as a philosopher the more widely known Jacques Maritain and to be, in fact, the greatest philosopher of the last century, and possibly even the greatest philosopher since St. Thomas Aquinas (who himself was first and foremost a theologian). Like Maritain, Gilson was a French lay Catholic. And for both of them, Thomistic philosophy was a deliberate intellectual choice after having received a cultural, intellectual and philosophical formation extraneous and even hostile to the faith. Gilson recounts his intellectual journey in his autobiographical work, Le philosophe et la thologie.1 In the book Gilson recounts that his initial philosophical studies were in Descartes and Brunschvicg, and then in the neo-positivistic atmosphere at the Sorbonne. After receiving his licentiate at the Sorbonne he chose, following the suggestion of Lucien Levy Bruhl, to write his doctoral thesis on the scholastic influence on certain concepts utilized by Descartes, which resulted in the celebrated volume, La libert chez Descartes et la thologie,2 published in 1913. Before beginning his work on the thesis, however, Gilson had not had any contact whatsoever with St. Thomas Aquinas or any other scholastic philosopher. "At the Sorbonne," Gilson relates, "...not one of my professors knew anything about [St. Thomas'] doctrine. All that I learned concerning it was that, were anyone enough of a fool to read it, he would find there an expression of that Scholasticism which, since the time of Descartes, had become a mere piece of mental archeology."3 It was during his research for his doctoral thesis that Gilson came into contact with scholastic philosophy for the first time. That research taught him two things:

...first, to read Saint Thomas Aquinas; secondly, that Descartes had vainly tried to solve, by means of his own famous method, philosophical problems whose only correct position and solution were inseparable from the method of Saint Thomas Aquinas. In other words it had become clear to me that, technically speaking, the metaphysics of Descartes had been a clumsy overhauling of scholastic metaphysics, [so] I decided to learn metaphysics from those who had really known it, namely, those very Schoolmen whom my own professors of philosophy felt the more free to despise as they had never read them.4

During the early part of the twentieth century, especially in France, the entire lay culture was dominated by a rationalistic prejudice according to which "Christian philosophy" had never existed, because it couldn't exist. Historically there existed philosophy from the time of the ancient Greeks up to Plotinus in the second century, then a huge leap of fifteen centuries was necessary to arrive at the re-emergence of philosophy with the advent of Descartes. Gilson's study of the scholastics, and especially of St. Thomas, led him to realize that there were during these fifteen centuries of so-called dark theological obscurantism, philosophies of independent and significant value and validity. Gilson's contact with the thought of St. Bonaventure, Duns Scotus and especially St. Thomas, philosopher-theologians whom the official French and European culture had ignored from the time of the Enlightenment, set him on the road to a lifetime of intense study of medieval philosophy. As a historian of medieval thought he was confronted especially by two problems:
...above all, if that which was philosophically valid in the medieval doctrinal systems was a mere residue of pre-Christian philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus), or whether it was an original elaboration; second, how was Christian theology able to conserve in its own womb the rational elements of Greek philosophy without suffocating in dogma, or exactly, how was it able to generate original philosophical elements.5

Gilson came to the conclusion, after his studies of medieval scholastic thought, that medieval Christian philosophy, although an integral part of and inseparable from Christian theology, was not denatured on account of its utilization as the handmaiden of theology (ancilla theologiae) but rather reached philosophical heights unattained by the

Greek tradition, all the while remaining purely philosophical. Gilson became one of the strongest defenders in the last century of Christian philosophy in the strong sense of the word, meaning thereby not merely a philosophy as an exercise of the reason on the part of a believing Christian in a historical, psychological or gnoseological sense, nor only in a negative and extrinsic sense, but in its full, positive, intrinsic and constitutive meaning.6 According to Gilson the two terms "philosophy" and "Christian" need to be taken in their full meaning, neither term denaturing or devaluing the other. He states the crux of the problem thus: "...it is simply a question of knowing whether to admit or deny that the exercise of natural reason, assisted by Revelation, is still a natural exercise of it, and whether the philosophy it begets still deserves the name of philosophy."7 To both questions Gilson responds with a decisive "yes". And he attributes the divine revelation of God as Ipsum Esse as being the key factor which permitted Christian thinkers, beginning in the second century, to transform and develop Greek philosophy, a development which Gilson calls more a revolution than a mere evolution in the history of philosophy.8 This revolutionary transformation found its greatest exponent in the person of St. Thomas Aquinas who, according to Gilson, brought Western philosophy to its greatest heights and whose doctrine on the relationship between nature and grace, faith and reason, and philosophy and theology earned for him the appropriate title of Christian philosopher par excellence. In this paper we will limit ourselves to the relationship between faith and reason in St. Thomas Aquinas according to the Christian philosophy of Etienne Gilson. A further study on the transforming influence of divine Revelation on the notion of being and on the philosophical notion of God, although central to the philosophy of St. Thomas, would require much more space than is possible within the parameters of the present work. As it is, even the general presentation here offered is far from exhaustive. 1. THE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY Few experiences in the realm of philosophy appear as obscure and as hard to define as the term "Christian philosophy". Splitting the term up into its two constituent elements we have on the one hand the term "Christian", which deals with matters of the faith, and

on the other hand the term "philosophy," which deals with rationally demonstrative understanding. We are faced with a problem. Reduced to its simplest terms, the problem consists in asking whether the very concept of Christian philosophy has any real meaning, and then, as a subsidiary matter, whether there was ever any corresponding reality.9 If the term Christian philosophy is meaningless, or a mere contradiction in terms, then of course we will be forced to admit, ipso facto, that it never existed. Those who hold this position would equate the absurdity of such a notion as "Christian philosophy" with such notions as "Christian mathematics" or "Christian medicine," which nobody would think of propounding, since science, in its principles as well as in its method, is independent of religion and theology. And since philosophy is likewise independent of religion in its principles and method, the term "Christian philosophy," they say, is equally invalid. Such was the position of Leon Brunschvicg during the grande querelle of 1931 during the annual reunion of the Societ Francaise de Philosophie, when the existence and very possibility of Christian philosophy was heatedly discussed. The renowned French philosopher stated: "Either the baptism inflicted by St. Thomas on the doctrine of Aristotle conserves its essence or transforms it substantially: In the first case, Thomistic philosophy being in its intimate nature Aristotelian or pagan, has no Christian character; in the second case it is a faith and not a philosophy."10 Another opponent of the concept of Christian philosophy during the same period, also of considerable rank and prestige, was Emille Brehier. In his Histoire de la philosophie he wrote that "the development of philosophy has not been strongly influenced by the advent of Christianity and, to say it in one word, there doesn't exist any Christian philosophy."11 Other important voices during the period preceding World War II also rejected the expression "Christian philosophy". Martin Heidegger, like Brunschvicg, saw the expression as a theoretical contradiction in terms, while other philosophers, like Brehier, rejected the term from an historical point of view. Gilson was in a singular position, given his unequalled erudition in the area of medieval philosophy and his seemingly natural "vocation for Christian philosophy,"12 to take up the gauntlet in defense of the existence of Christian philosophy. The result was

one of Gilson's greatest works, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy. Essential to Gilson was the question whether the Christian faith did play a role in the constitution of certain philosophies during the early Christian era and the Middle Ages. He did not start, however, from any preconceived idea of Christian philosophy, but began to notice while studying medieval authors that there is a real connection between Revelation and the philosophy of those under its influence.13 Before undertaking an historical examination of medieval philosophy in The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, Gilson first confronts the "problem" of Christian philosophy. He points out the theoretical and historical objections to the expression, even going so far as to say that "to-day, even in the most opposite philosophical quarters, we find something like a general agreement to refuse the expression all positive significance."14 Gilson continues: "It encounters in the first place the criticism of historians who, without discussing a priori whether a Christian philosophy is possible or not, are clear at any rate that even in the Middle Ages there never was one in fact. Shreds of Greek thought more or less clumsily patching up theology -- that, we are told, is about all the Christian thinkers have left us."15 Gilson then brings up the philosophical argument against the concept of Christian philosophy, stating that the roots of such an argument lie in rationalism. This theoretical argument maintains that religion and philosophy are so essentially different that no collaboration between them is possible.16 Gilson states that many neo-scholastics, even professed Thomists, are influenced by the spirit of rationalism. Though they are willing to subordinate philosophy to theology, many of them refuse to admit anything more than a negative control or veto power of theology over philosophy.17 If such a position is adopted then Thomism will be seen as a philosophy with no intrinsic relationship to faith. In fact, "certain Thomists reply that Thomism is true but not in the least because it is Christian. They are forced, in fact, into this position; because once reason, as regards its exercise, has been divorced from faith, all intrinsic relation between Christianity and philosophy becomes a contradiction."18 Such Christian opponents of the notion of Christian philosophy, while defending Thomistic philosophy, usually defend their position while stating that

...if Thomism took up the doctrine of Aristotle and purified, completed it, gave it precision, it did not accomplish this by means of any appeal to faith, but simply by a more correct and complete deduction of the consequences implied in his own principles than Aristotle was able to achieve for himself. Thomism, in short, regarded from the standpoint of philosophic speculation, is nothing but Aristotelianism completed....19 rationally collected and judiciously

Gilson states that the logical upshot of this attitude is a pure and simple negation of the concept of Christian philosophy. "It looks as if we were trying to define, in distinct terms, a contradictory concept; that, namely, of a philosophy, that is to say a rational discipline, which at the same time would be religious, and thus depend, either in essence or in exercise, on non-rational conditions."20 Gilson presents the objections against Christian philosophy in an objective manner, bestowing upon them their full strength. But he does point out that around the definition of Christian philosophy there has been a good deal more of deductive than of inductive reasoning, especially in Christian quarters.21 In other words many Christian theologians fail to ascertain historically whether divine Revelation did in fact have any influence on the development of philosophy. "The fact that there is no philosophy in Scripture does not warrant the conclusion that Scripture could have exerted no influence on the evolution of philosophy."22 In a certain sense those Christians who deny that there can exist a Christian philosophy are right. Sacred Scripture is not a treatise in philosophy; there is not a single proposition in it formulated by any author under philosophical inspiration. However, Gilson states, there are not lacking propositions in Scripture from which a philosopher can profit.23 There is nothing therefore which renders the concept of Christian philosophy absurd a priori from a philosophical standpoint. Thomists need to recognize that "for a Christian, reason is not to be divorced from faith in the sphere of its exercise."24 As Gilson incisively puts it: "There is no such thing as a Christian reason, but there may very well be a Christian exercise of reason. Why should we refuse to admit a priori that Christianity might have been able to change the course of the history of philosophy by opening up to human reason, by the mediation of faith, perspectives as yet undreamt of.25 We can even see the influence of Christian revelation on those modern philosophies

which pride themselves on being totally autonomous and independent of religion altogether. "Can it be seriously maintained that modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant would have been just what in fact it was, had there been no 'Christian philosophers' between the end of the Hellenistic epic and the beginning of modern times?"26 Using Descartes as an example of the definite although almost universally unperceived and unacknowledged influence of medieval thought on modern philosophy, Etienne Gilson states that Descartes' demonstrations for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul owe much to the influence of St Thomas and that "his doctrine of liberty owes a great deal to the mediaeval speculations on the relations between grace and free will."27 Moreover, although Descartes stridently professed that faith should have no influence whatsoever on philosophical speculation, his omnipotent God who creates the universe ex nihilo and conserves it by an act of continuous creation, who is infinite, perfect, omnipotent being, creator of heaven and earth, who makes man in his own image and likeness, is not merely the fruit of rationalist speculation. Descartes depends directly on Biblical and Christian tradition.28 And the same can be said for Malebranche,29 Leibniz.30 and even Kant.31 The "imagination" of these and other modern metaphysicians was absolutely possessed by the idea of the Biblical Creator.32 The influence of Christianity on philosophical speculation, according to Gilson, is therefore more pervasive than is usually acknowledged, by both Christians as well as non-Christians. It is a curious fact, he notes, "that if our contemporaries no longer appeal to the City of God and the Gospel as Leibniz did not hesitate to do, it is not in the least because they have escaped their influence. Many of them live by what they choose to forget."33 Sometimes it is a matter of certain vague recollections of the Gospel absorbed in childhood which a rationalist thinker takes for new philosophical ideas. Whatever it is, though a person may "choose to forget" the religious influence on his thinking, something deep down inside him refuses to forget.34 Gilson sums up the problem of Christian philosophy in these words: "If pure philosophy took any of its ideas from Christian revelation, if anything of the Bible and the Gospel has past into metaphysics, if, in short, it is inconceivable that the systems of Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz would be what in fact they are had they been altogether withdrawn from Christian influence, then it becomes highly probable that since

the influence of Christianity on philosophy was a reality, the concept of Christian philosophy is not without a real meaning."35 We can now see how our author proceeds to delineate the intellectual advantages which were to be gained by Christian philosophers by turning to the Bible and the Gospel as sources of philosophical inspiration. 2. THE CONCEPT OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY Etienne Gilson calls Christian philosophy "every philosophy which, although keeping the two orders formally distinct, nonetheless considers the Christian revelation as an indispensable auxiliary of reason."36 The Christian philosopher does not attempt to transform faith into science.
What he asks himself is simply this: whether, among those propositions which by faith he believes to be true, there are not a certain number which reason may know to be true. In so far as the believer bases his affirmation on the intimate conviction gained from faith he remains purely and simply a believer, he has not yet entered the gates of philosophy; and if it is to the Christian faith that he owes this new philosophical insight, he becomes a Christian philosopher. 37

Beginning in the second century Christian thinkers began utilizing Greek philosophy for the sake of better understanding as well as explaining the faith. Among the early Christians claiming the title of philosopher we may note Justin, Athenagoras, Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria.38 Because they were men of faith they believed that possessing faith in Jesus Christ was to achieve wisdom par excellence and therefore absolves one from all need of philosophy.39 For them faith in Christ dispenses with philosophy since revelation supersedes it; but supersedes it only because it fulfills it.40 One of their favorite arguments in support of their faith was drawn from "the contradiction of the philosophers," an argument commonly used throughout the early centuries of Christian thought. What seems to have struck Justin and his successors was not merely the incoherence of the speculative philosophies but more especially the coherence of the answers given to philosophic problems by a doctrine which, instead of giving itself out as one philosophy

among others, claimed to be nothing less than the one true religion.41 Standing opposite the pagan philosophers who endlessly contradicted one another we now have the Christian philosopher, whose faith "provides him with a criterion, a norm of judgement, a principal of discernment and selection, allowing him to restore rational truth to itself by purging away 'errors that encumber it.' Solus potest scire qui fecit, says Lactantius: God, Who made all, therefore knows all. If He condescend to teach us, let us listen."42 And what are some of the things that God has taught us? He has taught us through Divine Revelation that he is one, that he is Creator, that he is being, that matter is good, that he is the author of the moral law, that he is provident, and other truths which were never attained by the pagan philosophers. They were never attained because though capable of being the object of philosophical speculation and demonstration, man had need of divine aid on account of the weakness of his intellect in order to arrive at such notions. Faith taking man so to speak by the hand, puts him on the right philosophical road.43 "...this effort of truth believed to transform itself into truth known, is truly the life of Christian wisdom, and the body of rational truths resulting from the effort is Christian philosophy itself. Thus the content of Christian philosophy is that body of rational truths discovered, explored or simply safeguarded, thanks to the help that reason receives from revelation."44 Gilson speaks of Christian philosophy as a concrete historical reality and says that it includes in its extension "all those philosophical systems which were in fact what they were only because a Christian religion existed and because they were ready to submit to its influence."45 The Christian philosopher is one who effects a choice between philosophic problems and in fact is interested above all in those problems which affect the conduct of his religious life.46 As we will see in the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, it is precisely in the study of the revelabilia, those things revealed by God but capable of being understood by the human reason, that Christian philosophy finds its home. 3. THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY According to Etienne Gilson, the greatness of St. Thomas Aquinas as a philosopher

lies not as a commentator and interpreter of Aristotle but in the way he prolonged and surpassed the philosophic effort of Aristotle. Where St. Thomas's views surpassed the philosophy of Aristotle can be found especially "when he is speaking of God and of the soul and of the relations between God and the soul. The deepest of them have often to be disentangled from the theological contexts in which they are embedded, for it is there, in the bosom of theology, that they effectively come to birth."47 St. Thomas was, according to Gilson, both a philosopher and a theologian, but his philosophy does not exist independently of his theology. It has value only inasmuch as it is subordinate and renders service to theology. "If there is a Doctor of philosophic truth in the complex personality of St. Thomas, it is only within the theologian that we can hope to find him. his own definition of his role as a philosopher is that he is a philosopher in the service of a theologian."48 "What, then, do we call the philosophy of St. Thomas? As he had created it only for the sake of the service it renders Christian wisdom, he himself never separated it from this wisdom to give it a name. Probably he did not foresee that the day would come when scholars would go searching through his works to extract the elements of a philosophy from his theology."49 Gilson states that St. Thomas, being primarily a theologian, would not have attempted to separate his philosophy from his theology. Even though Thomas did produce purely philosophical works such as his commentaries on Aristotle, that which is most profound in his philosophical thought is to be found in his theological works, especially the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles.50 It is in his theological writings that an original Thomistic philosophy is to be found. Certainly St. Thomas has borrowed many philosophical doctrines from his predecessors, especially Aristotle, but what he has borrowed becomes less important than what he has been able to do with this borrowed material.51 St. Thomas had to transform almost all that he borrowed in order to organize it into an integral theology.52 Gilson points out the temptation among Thomists to extract from St. Thomas's theological works the philosophical notions which they contain, and to then attempt to reconstruct them into some kind of philosophical order. But this is to imply that St. Thomas developed a philosophy with purely philosophical ends, rather than with the ends proper to the Christian Doctor and theologian.53 Those ends being, of course, the

teaching of the faith. We can see, first of all, that St. Thomas, in presenting his philosophy, though he lays claim to a purely philosophical method, follows a theological order.54 In both Summae, in fact, Thomas begins with the study of God and proceeds to the study of creation. Gilson points out a common misconception, even among Thomistic theologians and philosophers, regarding the nature of theology and philosophy in the mind of St. Thomas:
It has become customary to label "theological" any conclusion whose premises presuppose faith in a divinely revealed truth, and to label "philosophical" any conclusion whose premises are purely rational, that is, known by the light of natural reason alone. This is not the point of view stated by St. Thomas himself at the beginning of his Prologue to the Second Book of his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. According to him, the philosopher considers the nature of things as they are in themselves, whereas the theologian considers them in their relation to God conceived as being both their origin and their end. From this point of view, every conclusion concerning God himself, or the relations of being to God, is theological in its own right. Some of these conclusions presuppose an act of faith in the divine revelation, but some of them do not. All of them are theological; those, among them, which are purely rational, belong to theology no less than the others. The only difference is that, since these do not presuppose faith, they can be extracted from their theological context and judged, from the point of view of natural reason, as purely philosophical conclusions.55

This is a crucial point, according to Gilson, since it clearly shows that strictly metaphysical knowledge can be included within a theological structure without losing its purely philosophical nature.56 Therefore everything in the Summa Theologiae as well as the Summa Contra Gentiles is theological,
yet, elements of genuinely philosophical nature are part and parcel of Thomistic theology precisely because, according to St. Thomas himself, the distinction between theology and philosophy does not adequately answer the distinction between faith and reason. ...his theology requires the collaboration of purely philosophical elements used in view of an essentially theological end.57

The term used by St. Thomas to designate such philosophical elements that have been integrated with a theological synthesis, is re velabilia or "the revealable." According to Gilson the "revealable" constitutes the proper object of Christian philosophy and are precisely those truths which have been revealed by God which are also capable of being demonstrated philosophically. They are truths which pertain especially to God, man, and man's relationship with God, and which are necessary for man to know in order to achieve his salvation. Even though they are demonstrable truths, the revelabilia have been revealed because they need to be known by all and if they were not revealed by God, they would ultimately "be known only by few persons, only after much time and with the admixture of many errors."58 Human learning therefore becomes a part of the sacred doctrine which is founded on faith. It is this human learning or demonstrable knowledge, assumed by theology for its own ends, that St. Thomas calls the "revealable,"59 and which is, according to Etienne Gilson, St. Thomas's personal contribution to philosophy.60 Even the distinction between essence and existence in creatures, which most Thomistic theologians would say pertains exclusively to philosophy, St. Thomas would say pertains to the "revealable," since he is of the opinion that God revealed this philosophic truth.61 The revelabilia or "revealable" is to be distinguished from the revelatum or "the revealed." According to St. Thomas "the revealed" embraces solely that whose very essence it is to be revealed, because we can only come to know it by way of revelation. Both the "revealable" and "the revealed" have been revealed by God, but whereas the "revealable" can be understood, "the revealed" pertains to knowledge beyond to grasp of human reason. Examples of "revealable" truths would be that God exists, that he is one, that man possesses a spiritual soul, and that his soul is immortal.62 Examples of "the revealed" would be that God is three Persons in one divine Nature, that the divine and human natures co-exist in the person of Jesus Christ, and that Christ is miraculously present under the appearances of bread and wine in the Eucharist. Revelation therefore includes other things besides "the revealed," though we can say it concerns essentially "the revealed." The purpose or end of revelation is man's salvation, and that end he cannot obtain unless he first know it. But since God, being man's last end, is infinitely beyond the limits

of man's knowledge, God had to reveal to him knowledge beyond the limits of reason. This whole body of revealed truths is called sacra doctrina or sacra scientia, that is, sacred teaching or sacred science.63 Part of this sacred science is accessible to the metaphysician. The theologian simply explains, with the aid of natural reason, the whole content of revelation, including both the revealed and the "revealable." The Christian philosopher, qua Christian philosopher, studies those truths which constitute the revealable but which are capable of being known by natural reason alone, but in many cases were not known until in fact they had been revealed. As has been stated above, the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles contain a good amount of philosophy. The question then arises, how can it be there without compromising either the purity of its own essence or that of theology? Gilson states that "all that is in the Sum of theology is theological, including the philosophical demonstrations assumed by the theologian in view of his theological end."64 For St. Thomas, the main point was not to safeguard the autonomy of philosophy as a purely rational knowledge; rather, it was to explain how philosophy can enter into theology without destroying its unity.65
Philosophy has no more to lose from being assumed by theology than nature has from being informed by grace. Should not philosophy aspire, on the contrary, to that metamorphosis as to its higher destiny? "Since grace does not destroy nature," Thomas says, "but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural perfection of the will ministers to charity." Why should a theologian worry about losing philosophy, since he now has it transformed into theology and no less rational than before, but more true, and consequently rational in a better way?66

The speculative mixture of philosophy and theology in the Summa Theologiae has been the subject of continual debate. Some attempt to sort out in the Summa what is philosophy and what is theology.
There is no harm in doing so. But if anybody imagines that by taking theology out of the Summa and putting it in another book it becomes philosophy, I am afraid he is deceiving

himself. At any rate, he sees a mixture where there is none. If there were a mixture, Thomas says, the nature of theology would be altered by that of philosophy, and inversely. Then indeed would we have, on the one hand, the adulterated theology so heartily hated by the Reformers and, on the other, the adulterated philosophy which nobody wants to have, neither the philosophers nor the theologians. But what happens, Thomas Aquinas adds, is something entirely different; since one of the two elements passes into the nature of the other one, there is no mixture because a single thing is left. Then he concludes: "Consequently, those who use philosophical documents in Sacred Scripture and put them at the service of faith do not mix water with wine, but rather, they change water into wine." There is no reason why those who prefer water should drink wine. Let them drink their water in peace. Only, they should not advertise it as the wine of Thomas Aquinas.67

In another text, Gilson states: "The theologian changes philosophy into theology by making it subservient to faith. But just as grace does not suppress nature by making it subservient to its own ends, so also theology can assimilate philosophy without corrupting it. If, in a real sense, philosophy does not preserve some of its essential characters, how could it serve theology?"68 Again: "It is somewhat distressing that the same men who preach that grace can make a man a morally better man, refuse to admit that revelation can make a philosophy a better philosophy."69 4. FAITH AND REASON As was stated above, the distinction between theology and philosophy does not adequately correspond to that which exists between faith and reason. This is because philosophy studies matters which are also in the realm of theology, namely the revealable. But faith and reason, or to put it differently, believing and understanding, are mutually exclusive. Where reason is able to understand, faith has no further role to play. In other words, one cannot both know and believe the same thing at the same time under the same aspect: impossibile est quod de eodem sit fides et scientia.70 The proper object of faith is that which reason cannot attain concerning things divine. Therefore any rational knowledge that can be resolved into first principles is by that fact removed from the domain of faith, at least theoretically.71 In actual fact, however, faith must take the place of knowledge in many of our affirmations.72 For example, certain truths can be

believed by the ignorant which are understood by the more learned. Moreover, error can infiltrate our reasoning on account of the weakness of our understanding and the straying of our imagination. We even make mistakes in our deductions from first principles. Also, history is ample witness that among even those possessed of wisdom, continual disagreements, or "the contradictions of the philosophers," abound. It was therefore most fitting that Divine Providence should reveal as truths of faith a number of truths accessible to reason, so that everyone might easily share in the knowledge of God without fear of doubt or error.73 It was also fitting that God reveal to mankind truths which surpass man's natural understanding, since man's salvation depends on believing such truths.74 But faith in such truths which surpass the limits of reason, rather than doing violence to man's reason, confers on rational knowledge its perfection and consummation. In fact, faith in certain truths helps man to realize the proper limits of reason, and also suppresses presumption, the mother of error.75
What is more, since every human science receives its principles from a higher science, it accepts these principles on its 'faith' in this higher science. Thus the physicist, as physicist, relies on the mathematician, or, if one prefers, music believes arithmetic. Theology itself believes in a higher science, that possessed by God and the saints. It is, therefore, subordinate to a knowledge which transcends all human knowledge the knowledge of God. In the natural order of knowledge each science is subordinate to that one whose principles it receives, although these principles are rationally knowable by the higher science concerned.76

Gilson is here implying that the philosopher ought to accept the principles of the higher science of theology, and then proceed to demonstrate those truths which are susceptible to demonstration by means of the natural light of reason. This implies more than a mere extrinsic influence or negative control of faith on reason. Between faith and reason there must exist an internal accord, for there must necessarily be agreement between a reason which comes from God and a revelation which comes from the same God. If God is the author of both, it is impossible for any incompatibility to exist between faith and reason. Any apparent incompatibility is the

result of the limits of our own reasoning powers, for God cannot contradict himself.77 The relation between faith and reason is also one of transcendence. Faith transcends reason as grace transcends nature. And as grace heals and perfects nature, so faith strengthens and perfects reason, allowing reason to see truths which it might otherwise have overlooked. As Gilson states: "The traveller whom a guide has conducted to the mountain peak sees no less of the view because another has opened it up for him."78 Since faith and reason can never conflict, reason cannot be rational if it is opposed to faith. And although revealed texts are never philosophical demonstrations of the falsity of a doctrine, they are nevertheless for the believer a sign that the philosophy is mistaken, and it is up to philosophy alone to demonstrate where.79 Although the relationship between faith and reason is an intimate one, faith and reason still constitute two formally distinct orders, as can be said of philosophy and theology. The two realms of philosophy and theology do cover some common ground, as has been shown. Theology is the science of truths necessary for our salvation, all of which have been revealed by God, and some of which can be known by the natural light of human reason. Since many truths obtainable by reason are not necessary to know in order to be saved, God did not reveal them. While philosophy studies things in themselves, theology always considers them under the perspective of salvation and in relation to God.80 Philosophy and theology differ from one another above all in their principles of demonstration. Philosophy studies the essences of things and their proper causes, while theology argues from the first cause of all things, God. The theologian will also utilize an appeal to certain arguments which will be unacceptable to the philosopher. Sometimes the theologian affirms a truth on the principle of authority, sometimes on the principle of perfection, in that the glory of an infinite God demands that a certain truth be so, and sometimes because the power of God is infinite.81 The philosopher and theologian may both agree on the same truth, however, just as two natural sciences can establish one and the same fact starting from different principles, and arrive by different methods at the same conclusions.82 A second difference is to be found in the order of demonstration. In philosophy, whose proper object is the consideration of creatures in themselves, we proceed from the

consideration of creatures and strive to arrive at the knowledge of their causes, and ultimately the first cause, God. Therefore the consideration of God comes last. In theology it is the consideration of God that comes first and then that of creatures, the study of which is always in relation to God.83 The problem arises in the study of the philosophy of St. Thomas concerning what order is to be followed, the philosophical or the theological, for in none of his works is his philosophical thought exposed for itself and according to the order of reason alone.84 St. Thomas used the philosophical method in his commentaries on Aristotle and in a small number of Opuscula, which gives us an inkling to what might have been the nature of Thomistic philosophy according to St. Thomas himself, as independent of theology and the faith, that is, proceeding from creatures to God. In the second group of works which includes the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles, the latter which Gilson calls "a theological work so full of philosophy that it is often mistaken for a philosophical work,"85 St. Thomas utilizes the principles of philosophical demonstration but presents his arguments according to the order of theological demonstration.86 And he does so, according to Gilson, precisely because he is primarily a theologian utilizing philosophy in the service of the faith. If a philosopher chooses to present the philosophy of St. Thomas according to the philosophical order of demonstration and still call it "Thomistic philosophy," he may be attributing to the Angelic Doctor not a philosophy but a "mutilated theology."87 Gilson asserts that St. Thomas never elaborated a philosophical vision of the world in the modern sense of the expression since he refused to separate philosophy from its theological context.88
The real question is to know whether one can snatch a philosophy from the milieu in which it was born, plant it elsewhere away from the environment in which alone it has ever actually existed, and not destroy it? If the philosophy of St. Thomas has been constituted as revealable, then to expound it in the order proper to the theologian is simply to respect it. 89

Gilson warns against the separation of Thomistic and other medieval Christian philosophies from the theologies that contain them and in which alone they can remain viable. "The lesson of experience is that the more the historian separates philosophy from theology in medieval doctrines, the more scholastic philosophy tends to shrivel into a

general technique that becomes increasingly poorer in originality and, in the end, identifies itself with the philosophy of Aristotle as seen by Avicenna or Averroes."90 On the other hand, experience also teaches that "the more we reintegrate the philosophies of the Middle Ages within their theological context, the more their originality becomes apparent."91 One may say that it is in serving theology that philosophical thought became creative; or that in the golden age of scholasticism, the more a master was a great theologian the more he was a great philosopher.92 "In brief it is to its status as an instrument of theology itself that medieval philosophy owes its fecundity."93 But as an instrument and in the service of theology, philosophy does not lose its specific, distinct character as an autonomous discipline. "Between the claims of these two disciplines, and even when they bear upon the same matter, there remains a strict, formal distinction based on the heterogeneity of the principles of demonstration."94 Theology places its principles in the articles of the faith, while philosophy utilizes reason alone in proceeding from experience and the first principles of understanding. And although the first involves a "descent" from God to creatures, and the latter an "ascent" from creatures to God, it is the same path which goes up and down: eadem via est qua descenditur et ascenditur. (C.G., 4, 1) Gilson states that the most serious difficulty attending the modern dissociation of scholastic philosophy from its theology is a "resulting illusion of perspective,"95 which involves an attempt to represent the medieval theologians as having introduced, within a completely developed doctrine of faith, an also completely developed philosophy, which they borrowed in all its completeness.96 To our author this is historically incorrect. Also erroneous is the position that there is one true philosophy, which is that of Aristotle, and that since scholastic theology is founded on this true philosophy it is itself true. St. Thomas and the scholastics did not found their theologies on any philosophy, not even the philosophy of Aristotle. As theologians, they have made use of philosophy within the light of faith; and it is from this use that philosophy has come forth transformed.97 5. REVELATION AND THE CHRISTIAN TEACHER To the scholastics of the thirteenth century the term "philosopher" signified a man who, born before Christ, could not have been informed of the truth of Christian

Revelation. If a theologian utilized philosophy in his own theological work, as was the case with Thomas Aquinas, he was not normally called a philosopher, but rather a philosophans theologus (a "philosophizing theologian") or, more simply a philosophans (a "philosophizer").98 As Gilson states: "Thomas Aquinas is not speaking of philosophy as it can be found in the mind of an unbeliever. Himself a theologian, living in the thirteenth century after Christ, Thomas speaks of the philosophizing reason of baptized men."99 When St. Thomas is utilizing the doctrine and method of Aristotle for theological ends, as in his Summae, he is reinterpreting the Aristotelian metaphysical notions in the light of Christian truth. In fact, "it should never be taken for granted that the meaning of a certain notion (being, substance, cause, etc.) is the same in the two doctrines. Aristotelianism and Thomism are two distinct philosophies.100 The ancient terms borrowed from Aristotle receive in Thomism an entirely new meaning.101 Since St. Thomas the Christian teacher benefited from the supernatural light of faith, he could see where Aristotle either contradicts the truth of the faith (e.g., the eternity of the world) or simply falls short of it (creation ex nihilo). In such cases, Thomas either openly says so or at least does not attribute to Aristotle what he did not explicitly assert,102 for example, the foreign elements which Aristotle's translators and interpreters (especially Averroes, Avicenna and the Latin Averroists) had blended with it.103 After removing from Aristotle all the obstacles to Christian faith which were not evidently there, but were grafted onto his doctrine by others, St. Thomas saw that Aristotle's "only shortcoming was that on certain points, he had simply failed to see certain truths, and this failure could be remedied by completing his doctrine."104 But in order to complete Aristotle, certain basic notions of his had to undergo "far reaching modifications."105 Nevertheless, for St. Thomas, Aristotle was the Philosopher par excellence and the prime example of the heights to which man's natural reason can reach when it investigates the highest truths and principles without the illumination and guidance of divine revelation. In other words, "Aristotle appeared to Thomas Aquinas as having stated, not the whole truth accessible to human reason, but at least the whole philosophical truth."106 According to Gilson, St. Thomas could not content himself with philosophical eclecticism in developing his own theology, but had to choose one coherent model. As a

theologian he needed a set of philosophical principles to which he could consistently resort in the course of his theological work. These principles can be called "a reinterpretation of the fundamental notions of Aristotle's metaphysics in the light of Christian truth."107 Such an enterprise required the critical examination by St. Thomas of the philosophical eclecticism of his predecessors.108 And he had to eliminate "all the theological positions which, though acceptable in an eclectic system, were incompatible with his own conception of philosophy."109 But Thomas also had to reinterpret the positions of his predecessors in the light of his own philosophical principles, which often makes it seem like he is constantly misunderstanding their teachings, making them teach a doctrine that very much resembles his own. But this is an illusion, according to Gilson. As he puts it, "Thomas Aquinas has his own doctrinal language, but he is always willing to accept the language of someone else, provided he can make it say what he himself holds to be true."110 In his desire to preserve the substance of truth contained in the doctrine of others, "Thomas ceaselessly pours new wine into old casks -- after mending the casks."111 The work of St. Thomas always remained in his own mind that of a teacher of Christian truth -- that and nothing else, although he is sometimes credited, or accused, as the case may be, of having led a sort of double intellectual life: in philosophy, that of an Aristotelian and in theology, that of a teacher of Christian dogma. But neither in his life nor his writings can one find, according to Gilson, the slightest trace of such a double personality.112 For St. Thomas all sciences, including natural philosophy, logic and metaphysics serve no other end than to permit a more perfect contemplation of God. To the question whether there is any philosophy in the works of Aquinas, the answer is yes, but it is always there with a view to facilitating man's knowledge of God.113 "If there is to be found a Doctor of philosophical truth in the complex personality of St. Thomas, it is only within the theologian that we can find him."114 What, then, does Gilson call the philosophy of St. Thomas? As St. Thomas had created it only for the sake of the service it rendered Christian wisdom, he himself never separated it from this wisdom to give it a name.115 "Probably he did not foresee that the day would come when scholars would go searching through his works to extract the

elements of a philosophy from his theology."116 Not only should philosophy be ordered toward and act in the service of the higher science of theology, but the ultimate object of both sciences is one and the same, that is, the knowledge of God.117 But even when they study the same subjects, philosophers (that is, non-Christian philosophers) and theologians do not study them with the same end in view. As St. Thomas says: "As to the other branches of learning [besides sacred science or theology], their study does not befit monks, whose whole life should be spent in serving God, except to the extent that such doctrines are made subservient to sacred doctrine."118 We should also keep in mind St. Thomas's words at the beginning of his Summa Contra Gentiles, when he makes the words of St. Hilary of Poitiers his own: "I am aware that I owe this to God as the chief duty of my life, that my every word and sense may speak of Him."119 6. SACRED DOCTRINE Toward the end of his teaching and writing career as a philosopher, Etienne Gilson increasingly believed the Thomistic notion of "sacred doctrine" to be the master key which unlocks the problem of Christian philosophy and sheds the clarifying light necessary for the proper understanding of the relationship between faith and reason in the teaching of Thomas Aquinas. Gilson added, however, that there are "insurmountable psychological obstacles" preventing the acceptance of this point of view, even though it is magisterially defended in the encyclical letter Aeterni Patris of Pope Leo XIII.120 Gilson states that the initial distinction in the Summa Theologiae between inspired sacred doctrine and the philosophical sciences (S.T., I, 1, 1) dominates the problem of the relationship between philosophy and theology. In fact it "dominates the whole teaching of the Summa Theologiae in the sense that everything in it must be either contained in Scripture or in some way related to the teaching of Scripture, itself a doctrine inspired by God."121 Man is directed to God as to an end that surpasses the grasp of reason, and therefore is in need of divine revelation in order to know those truths which he is unable to arrive at by himself, in order to attain his salvation ( S.T., I, 1, 1). "Even as regards those truths about God which human reason can investigate, it was necessary that men be taught by a

divine revelation."122 According to Gilson, St. Thomas's statement that "it is necessary to believe that which can be proved by natural reason" concerning God (S.T., I, 1, 1) implies that the practical problem of salvation is what dominates the whole discussion of the relationship between faith and reason.123 Our author states that St. Thomas did not think that God's providence, His omnipotence and His exclusive right to be worshipped had been discovered by the natural reason by the ancient philosophers, and therefore such truths are rightly included among the articles of the faith.124 As a theologian, Thomas is chiefly interested in the theological knowledge of God, the only knowledge that can lead to salvation, and such knowledge is not to be had without supernatural faith.125 "Even when the natural reason can establish a certain truth about God, it never grasped it in its fullness as applying to the God of the Christian faith."126 The assent of the philosopher and of the faithful to the existence of God "not only do not take place under the same formal light, but they do not even have exactly the same object, because while the God of faith is also the Prime Mover, the Prime Mover is not the God of faith. We can therefore know the existence of the Prime Mover (which all call God) and still believe in the God of faith, for such belief is the only way to salvation."127 Keeping in mind St. Thomas's statement that the same truth cannot be both believed and known by natural reason by the same person at the same time, Gilson states however that the same person can know the existence of the Prime Mover and, as a Christian believe by supernatural faith in the existence of the Christian God.128 In pointing out the distinction in St. Thomas between those truths of faith which cannot possibly become an object of knowledge and those which can be known, Gilson states that many Thomists fail to perceive Thomas's primary aim. Their error lies in thinking that philosophical knowledge should be kept pure of religious belief, while Thomas' primary concern was the other way around. Not the purity of rational knowledge (scientia), but rather that of faith (fides) is what he chiefly aims to preserve.129 7. THEOLOGY AS A SCIENCE In order to establish theology or sacred doctrine as a science, St. Thomas makes a distinction between two kinds of sciences. Some sciences "proceed from principles

known by the natural light of the intellect, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like," while others "proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science," (S.T., I, 1, 2) that is to say, of a science higher than themselves. For example, the science of optics borrows its principles from the higher and more general science of geometry, and music utilizes the principles of arithmetic. Sacred doctrine is an example of the second kind, for it proceeds from principles "made known in the light of a higher science, namely the science of God and of the blessed [that is, the knowledge they possess]. Hence, just as music accepts on authority the principles taught by the arithmetician, so sacred science accepts the principles revealed by God." ( S.T., I, 1, 2) This doctrine of St. Thomas, according to Gilson, has given rise to the notion of theology as a science "sub-alternated" to the science of God, which is the interpretation of Cajetan, although Gilson points out that Thomas spoke only of a "quasi" subalternation.130 For in a true subalternation, the inferior science sees in the same light as the higher science from which it receives its principles, which is not the case with theology and the knowledge that God and the blessed in heaven possess.131 Theology proceeds from principles transcending the order of natural reason, which accounts for the fact that St. Thomas states that the natural theology of the philosophers and the theology that is part of sacred doctrine do not belong in the same genus. ( S.T., I, 1, 1, ad 2) According to Gilson, this radical transcendence of theology over all nearly natural sciences, including metaphysics, places theology in a class by itself. "It is indeed a science, but in a sense distinctly its own."132 The exclusive privilege enjoyed by theology in this respect, in that it "proceeds from principles made known by the knowledge that God Himself has of everything, actual or possible" makes theology transcend "all conceivable limitations." The overlooking of this point, according to our author, is responsible for most of the controversies concerning the nature and object of theology in the teaching of St. Thomas.133 St. Thomas makes a comparison between sacred doctrine and the internal common sense (sensus communis) of man and the non-rational animals, saying that "the common sense, although one power, extends to all the objects of the five senses. Similarly, objects which are the subject matter of different philosophical sciences can yet be treated by this single sacred doctrine under one aspect, namely in so far as they can be included in

revelation." (S. T. , I, 1, 3, ad 2) Gilson interprets this text as implying that theology plays the role of a common bond and center of the philosophical disciplines.134 "Theology, without being engaged in the proper business of any particular philosophical science, but rather keeping at a distance, remains nevertheless informed of everything they do. All their particular reports ultimately come to theology as to a sort of clearinghouse where they are compared, discerned, judged, and, at the same time, ordered and united."135 Granting that no comparison can be perfect, Gilson states however that the analogy of the common sense and the external senses is helpful in understanding the relationship between theology and philosophy. According to him, "sacred doctrine is fully aware of the presence of natural theology as well as of that of all the other philosophical disciplines. It sees them as unconsciously directed to a transcendent end of which left to themselves, they know nothing. Seeing philosophy in the light of the divine revelation, sacred science descries in it possibilities of which natural theology itself is unaware."136 At the same time, the theologian utilizes philosophy for theological ends. "Sacred doctrine envisages philosophy such as it can be seen, in a higher light, as a possible help in the great work of man's salvation."137 8. THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THEOLOGY Gilson has shown how sacred theology, because of its transcendent character, refuses to enter the categories that correspond to the philosophical sciences. He also states that while all other sciences are either speculative or practical, sacred doctrine, despite being in itself a speculative science, does not exclude practical knowledge, ''as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself and His works." ( S.T., I, 1, 4) And although theology is "more speculative than practical," (Ibid.) its competence knows no limits since sacred doctrine "extends to things which belong to the different philosophical sciences [practical as well as speculative] because it considers in each the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known through the divine light." (Ibid.) Since sacred science is in part speculative and in part practical, it belongs to a higher order than all other sciences, which are either wholly speculative or wholly practical. St. Thomas says, "It transcends all other sciences, speculative and practical." ( S.T., I, 1, 5) As a speculative science, sacred science surpasses all other sciences by its greater certitude,

since it cannot err, and by the dignity of its subject matter, since it treats chiefly of those objects which exceed reason. As a practical science it is also the highest of all, since theology is ordained to the noblest of all possible ends, man's eternal beatitude.138 Gilson emphasizes the importance of recognizing that sacred science or sacred theology does not belong in the same class as the other sciences, and that no comparison between them is possible. Theology stands alone because it alone receives its principles not from the light of natural reason or from a higher natural science, but from divine revelation. "The confusion that obtains on the relationship of philosophy to theology has no other cause than usually overlooked fact."139 St. Thomas acknowledges that sacred science does draw upon other sciences, which among natural sciences indicates that the science drawing upon another is the inferior of the two. But sacred science "does not draw upon the other sciences as upon its superiors but uses them as its inferiors and handmaidens." ( S.T., I, 1, 5, ad 2) "Other sciences are called handmaidens of this one." (S.T., I, 1, 5) Sacred doctrine borrows from the lower sciences merely their method of exposition and whatever can help to facilitate the understanding of its teaching.140 Gilson states that among those professing to be Christian, it is naive and ludicrous to believe that any harm is done to the dignity of philosophy, or any science for that matter, by making them subservient to sacred doctrine. He believes that St. Thomas considered sacred science such an exalted science that for any science to be ranked as inferior and subservient to it was far from a dishonor. "Rather, just as it is for man no greater honor than to serve God, so it is for philosophy and science no greater honor than to serve as the 'handmaiden of theology."141 But our author adds that unfortunately we have forgotten the highest meaning of the word "wisdom," and have allowed the very notion of theology to become lost, and metaphysics, instead of being exalted to its rightful place in the service of theology, has become lost as well.142 The Gilsonian interpretation of St. Thomas's doctrine regarding the relationship between faith and reason, and between philosophy and theology, is often objected to on the grounds that such an interpretation turns philosophy into theology, and so destroys it. Gilson answers that Thomas "would concede that the theologian turns philosophy into theology by making it subservient to theology, but he would add that, far from harming

philosophy, this amounts to a sort of transfiguration for philosophy."143 Gilson points out that some theologians had reproached St. Thomas with mixing the water of philosophy with the wine of Scripture, basing their position on the text of Isaiah 1:22.
Thomas first answers that a metaphor cannot prove anything. Then he observes that, in a mixture, the two component elements are both altered and the result is a third substance, different from these elements. In theology, on the contrary, there is no mixture. What happens is that philosophy simply passes under the authority of theology. To make philosophy serve faith is not to mix water with wine, but rather to change water to wine.144

Gilson states further that

St. Thomas certainly means to say that the theologian likewise changes philosophy into theology by making it subservient to faith. But just as grace does not suppress nature by making it subservient to its own ends, so also theology can assimilate philosophy without corrupting it. If, in a real sense, philosophy did not preserve some of its essential characteristics, how could it serve theology?145

Sacred doctrine, according to Gilson, "holds the ultimate answer to any question examined by any science, because its object is God known in all possible ways." Sacred theology, in fact, does not merely add itself to natural theology, it includes natural theology. Hence whatever is known of God to the philosopher qua philosopher is also known to the theologian qua theologian.146 The absolute character of the authority of sacred doctrine is seen from the fact that the principles of the other sciences fall under its jurisdiction, not to prove their truth but to judge them. (S.T., I, 1, 6, ad 2) Since St. Thomas makes no exception, even the principle of metaphysical knowledge, being, must be included under its jurisdiction.147 Gilson states that the use of philosophy in view of an essentially theological end unavoidably creates ambiguous situations, and leads to difficulties in interpreting the doctrine of St. Thomas. When the theologian invokes philosophical arguments in defending and supporting the teachings of the faith, there will always remain a gap between what he says and what the faith actually teaches. For theology is "a transposition

into the language of reason of a truth which surpasses reason."148 St. Thomas in his theological works often refutes arguments of famous philosophers by introducing genuine philosophical arguments in order to establish the contrary philosophy truth. Sometimes however he shows that the philosopher in question did not uphold views contrary to the faith but had merely been unwarrantedly accused of doing so. Most of the time, however, Thomas preferred to follow a subtler way, neither invoking philosophical authority nor refuting it, but rather improving the doctrine of the philosophers in order to bring them as near as possible to the teaching of the true faith.149 By adopting this attitude, Gilson states, Aquinas was preparing no end of trouble for his future historians, but he was not thinking of them, but rather considered it his duty to open the minds of men to the truth of the faith by showing that philosophy not only did not contradict faith, but rather favored it.150 Since during the thirteenth century philosophy and the doctrine of Aristotle were generally accepted to be one and the same thing, Thomas placed philosophical truth under the patronage of Aristotle, making Aristotle say the maximum of truth it was possible to attribute to him on the strength of the expressions he used. But how often St. Thomas clearly realized that he was making Aristotle say things he never said but only should have said, this remains for the most attentive of Thomas's historians a matter of supposition.151 Other philosophers, such as Plato, Boethius, Avicenna and Averroes were also made to say by Aquinas what they should have said in order to be both philosophically right and theologically irreproachable. In fact, according to Gilson, the most original contribution of St. Thomas to philosophy has its origin in this rational interpretation of the philosophies of the past in the light of theological truth.152 CONCLUSION During his long career as a strong defender of the notion of Christian philosophy, Etienne Gilson maintained a firm stance in his belief in the intrinsic, essential and constitutive influence of Christian revelation on medieval philosophy. As both a historian of medieval philosophy, and as a student of St. Thomas Aquinas, Gilson believed strongly in both the formal distinction and the profound continuity, harmony and collaboration

between faith and reason, philosophy and theology, and nature and grace in the doctrine of St. Thomas. In his effort to discover beyond the traditions of Thomistic commentators the personal thought of St. Thomas himself, Gilson often had to swim against a prevailing rationalistic current which sought to separate the philosophy of St. Thomas from the theology in which alone it could retain its viability and fruitfulness. But "he refused to separate in the name of St. Thomas what St. Thomas himself not only did not separate but offered positive evidence against separating."153 There is an historical reason therefore for not separating the personal philosophy of St. Thomas from his theology. Thomas himself never did it. This erroneous tendency of separating the two sciences inevitably then leads to other, even greater and more harmful errors in both philosophy and theology, as the principle states, Parvus error in principio magnus est in fine (a small error in the beginning becomes a large error in the end, that is to say, when it is carried to its logical conclusion). And in Gilson's opinion, this unnatural separation is not a small error, but already a large and dangerous one. The Thomistic doctrine on the role of sacred doctrine, understood in its full transcendent sense, along with the celebrated Thomistic principle: "grace does not destroy nature but perfects it" (gratia non tollit naturam sed perficit: S.T., I, 1, 8, ad 2), were for Gilson the central guiding principles which shed light on the relationship between faith and reason in St. Thomas. To Gilson these principles are often misunderstood and distorted by even professed followers of St. Thomas, and he believed that only by returning to their full original significance as understood and taught by St. Thomas can the unhealthy rupture between philosophy and theology be healed. And only by restoring to theology its pristine and rightful position as guiding light can philosophy attain its noble and exalted status as handmaiden within the royal kingdom of divine science. Gilson continues to be a stumbling block to many people, even a scandal and somewhat of an embarrassment to many Catholic theologians and philosophers. Like Christ and his Church his Thomism finds itself attacked from both left and right, and he will most likely continue to be a "sign of contradiction" in the philosophical world for many years to come. This writer believes Gilson to be a prophetic voice crying in the wilderness of our

modern metaphysically bankrupt age. Like other prophets he is like a man who sees things from a higher vantage point than others, or like one given a pair of glasses in a land where all are nearsighted - he can see things that others cannot see, and even what the others do see he sees more clearly. But fallen human nature being as it is, the prophet when he speaks is not only generally misunderstood but is seen as a threat to the prevailing ways and thought of the people he addresses, and therefore he is rejected by the majority of those who would otherwise profit much from the truths he has to offer. For what he says is always something which goes against the grain. Gilson went against the grain of prevailing Thomistic thought. He still does, although he has a loyal and evergrowing following (and a good number of militant opponents as well - see note 153). But it may very well be that until Gilson's singular insight and authentic interpretation of St Thomas' doctrine is widely recognized and affirmed by Catholic philosophers and theologians, their understanding of the relationship between nature and grace will never be as rich, deep, and complete as it would be otherwise, and the tragic modern rupture between theology and philosophy, and between faith and reason, will not be overcome. NOTES
1 E. Gilson, Le philosophe et la thologie, Paris, 1960 (Eng. tr. The Philosopher and Theology, tr. Cecile Gilson, New York, 1962. This translation is actually a modified and developed version of the French original). 2 E. Gilson, La libert chez Descartes et la thologie, Paris, 1913. 3 E. Gilson, God and Philosophy, New Haven, 1969, p. xii. 4 Ibid., pp. xiii-xiv. 5 Antonio Livi, "La Filosofia di Etienne Gilson" in Doctor Communis, Vol. 38, No. 3, 1985, p. 212 (tr. mine). 6 Luigi Bogliolo, "Per Una Fondazione Teoretica Della Filosofia Christiana Nella Luce Del Pensiero Gilsoniano" in Doctor Communis, op. cit., p. 279. 7 E. Gilson, Christianity and Philosophy (orig. Christianisme et philosophie, Paris, 1936), New York, 1939, p. 92. 8 Cf. God and Philosophy, p. 67. 9 E. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, New York, 1940, pp. 1-2. 10 Quoted in Battista Mondin, "La Storia della Filosofia Medioevale di E. Gilson" in Doctor Communis, op. cit., p. 257 (tr. mine). 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., p. 255. 13 Leo J. Elders, "The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy" in Doctor Communis, op. cit., p. 244. Cf. The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, Chap. 1-2, and passim. 14 The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 2. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., p. 3.

17 Ibid., p. 6. 18 Ibid., p. 7. 19 Ibid., p. 8. 20 Ibid., p. 9. 21 Ibid., p. 10. 22 Ibid., p. 11. 23 E. Gilson, "Wisdom and Time" in Lumiere et Vie, I, 1951, pp. 77-92, in A Gilson Reader, Selections From the Writings of Etienne Gilson, ed. Anton Pegis, Garden City, New York, 1957, p. 333. 24 The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 12. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid., p. 13. 27 Ibid. Cf. E. Gilson, tudes sur le rle de la pense mdivale dans la formation du systme cartsien, Paris, 1930; Idem, La libert chez Descartes et la thologie, Paris, 1913. 28 The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 14. 29 Malebranche, unlike Descartes, protests against scholasticism "for being insufficiently Christian." (The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 15) "In short it is as essential elements in any philosophy truly Christian and based on the idea of omnipotence that Malebranche maintains the truth of occasionalism and vision in God." (Ibid., p. 16) 30 "What would be left of [Leibniz's] system if the properly Christian elements were suppressed? Not even the statement of his own basic problem, that, namely, of the radical origin of things and the creation of the universe by a free and perfect God. The Discours des metaphysique opens with this idea of perfect being, and the whole treatise, incontestably of capital importance in the work of Leibniz, concludes with a justification of divine providence, and even with an appeal to the Gospel. 'The ancient philosophers knew but little of these truths: Jesus Christ alone expressed them most divinely, and in so clear and familiar a manner that the simplest mind can follow; and His gospel wholly changed the face of the earth.' These are not the words of a man who considered himself a successor of the Greeks with nothing but a blank between." (The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 16) 31 "We might say as much of Kant if we were not so much in the habit of identifying him with the Critique of Pure Reason and of forgetting the existence of the Critique of Practical Reason altogether." (The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, pp. 16-17) 32 Cf. Ibid., pp. 16-18. 33 Ibid., p. 17. 34 Ibid., p. 18. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid., p. 37. The expression "Christian philosophy" was a current expression in the early nineteenth century, and is contained in the full title of the encyclical Aeternae Patris which runs: De Philosophia Christiana ad mentem sancti Thomae Aquinatis doctoris Angelici in scholis catholicis instauranda. On the meaning of the expression, see E. Gilson, Christianity and Philosophy, pp. 84-87. The basic idea of this book is that the term "Christian philosophy" expresses a theological notion of a reality observable in history; cf. The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, ch. 1-2; A Gilson Reader, pp. 177-191. 37 The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 36. 38 Ibid., p. 428, note 3. 39 Ibid., p. 23. 40 Ibid., p. 28 41 Ibid., p. 30. 42 Ibid., pp. 31-32. 43 Ibid., p. 42. Cf. E. Gilson, The Elements of Christian Philosophy, Toronto, 1963, p. 26. 44 The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, pp. 34-35.

45 Ibid., p. 37. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., p. 38. 48 E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (tr. Lawrence K. Shook from the V. ed. of Le thomisme. Introduction au systme de saint Thomas dAquin, Paris, 1944), New York, 1956, p. 6. 49 Ibid., p. 7. 50 Ibid., p. 8. On the Summa Contra Gentiles as a theological work, see E. Gilson, The Spirit of Thomism, New York: Harper and Row, 1966 (1964), pp. 38-40, 112 notes 5 and 6. 51 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 7-8. 52 Ibid., p. 8. 53 Ibid.; cf. E. Gilson, "Thomas Aquinas and Our Colleagues," Princeton, The Aquinas Foundation, 1953, in A Gilson Reader, op. cit. p. 289: "... the masters had a name for those who philosophized in theology; they called such a man a philosophans (one who philosophizes); they would not call him a 'philosopher' ( philosophus)." "Today, if we tell a theologian that he is not a philosopher, he feels insulted; had we told Thomas Aquinas he was a philosopher, he would have felt insulted. To tell the whole truth, I do not think he would have understood the meaning of the proposition" (Ibid., p. 288). Cf. The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 12 and p. 308, note 3. 54 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 9. Cf. also p. 441, note 22 where Gilson states that this is seen "particularly in the Contra Gentiles where books I to III (which take us as far as the doctrine of grace) lay claim to a purely philosophical method ('secundum quod ad cognitionem divinorum naturalis ratio per creaturas pervenire potest'. C.G . 4, 1) but follows a theological order: C.G. 2, 4, 5." On pp. 442-443, note 33 Gilson states: "Some [who] profess to reconstruct St. Thomas's teaching in the philosophical order proceeding from things to God rather than in the theological order proceeding from God to things fail to take into consideration the difficulties of such an undertaking. In point of fact, not one of them does so. Those of them who honestly try, either substitute the philosophy of Aristotle for that of St. Thomas or else, as is happening in our own days, flatly contradict the philosophy which they pretend to teach. To summarize what could not be proved without long and tedious developments, let us say that: one does miraculously find the theology of Thomas Aquinas at the end of the philosophy of Aristotle. To isolate his philosophy from his theology is to present the philosophical thought of St. Thomas in an arrangement demanded by a philosophy in which everything is 'considered by natural reason without the light of faith.' In brief, it is to present a philosophia ad mentem sancti Thomae as though it were a philosophia ad mentem Cartesii." (emphasis Gilson's) 55 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 9. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 S.T., I, 1, 1; Cf. also C.G. I, 4. 59 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 10. 60 Ibid., p. 442, n. 27. 61 Ibid., p. 11. Cf. C.G., 1, 22. 62 Ibid., p. 11. "Thomas is almost overgenerous in granting to Plato and Aristotle the knowledge of some of the attributes of the Christian God. The philosophers did not properly speaking, believe that God is all-powerful, they knew it and they demonstratively proved it (in III Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3m). Cf. op. cit., III, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3, solutio, a list of demonstrable preambles to faith: Deum esse, et Deum esse unum, incorporeum, intelligentem et alia hujusmodi. His criterion is simple; if one pagan philosopher has reached any one of those conclusions, it is proof that natural reason unaided by faith is able to know it." ( The Spirit of Thomism, p. 111, note 4) 63 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 12. Cf. The Spirit of Thomism, pp. 21 and 28; S.T. II-II, 1, 1 and II-II, 1, 6 ad 1.

64 E. Gilson, "Thomas Aquinas and Our Colleagues," op. cit., p. 293. 65 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 14. 66 "Thomas Aquinas and Our Colleagues," op. cit., p. 293. 67 Ibid., pp. 293-294. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In Boethii de Trinitate, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5. 68 E. Gilson, The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 316. Cf. S.T., I, 1, 8, ad 2: "gratia non tollit naturam sed perficit." 69 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 310, n. 11. 70 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 17. Cf.. St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaest. Disp. de Veritate, 14, 9, ad resp. and ad 6. 71 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 17. "Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen" (Heb 11:1). 72 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 17. 73 Ibid. Cf. C.G., 1, 4. 74 S.T., I, 1, 1. 75 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 17. St. Thomas states that what a Christian believes by faith is not only more certain for him than what he knows but also more certain than both what he sees and of the first principles of reason. ( In I Sent., Prol., 1, 3, 3, solutio) Cf. St. Thomas On the Creed in The Three Greatest Prayers, Manchester: Sophia Institute Press, 1990, pp. 4-6). 76 Ibid., p. 443, note 41. Cf. the statement pregnant with significance in C.G., 4, 1, 11: "eadem via est qua descenditur et ascenditur." In The Spirit of Thomism Gilson writes: " although philosophy ascends to the knowledge of God through creatures while sacred doctrine grounded in faith descends from God to man by divine revelation , the way up and the way down are the same. Hence, Thomas concludes, we must proceed in the same way in the things above reason which are believed, as we proceeded in the foregoing with the investigation of God by reason. There is not one world for revelation and another one for reason; because the whole reality has God for its only cause, it is one world, and although we must follow two generically different lights in investigating it, since reason too is one, it proceeds in both cases in the same way" (pp. 39-40). 77 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 18. Cf. C.G., 1, 7. 78 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 19. "The relationship of reason and faith is therefore conditioned by that of nature and grace. The philosopher ascends from the knowledge of nature to the knowledge of God, the theologian descends from the perfections of God to those of his effects, but since that twofold movement takes place within one and the same mind, the philosopher and the theologian are bound to meet." (The Spirit of Thomism, p. 37-38) 79 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 20. 80 Ibid., p. 21. Cf. The Spirit of Thomism, pp. 22-23; C.G., 2, 4. 81 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 21. Cf. C.G., 2, 4: "Fidelis autem ex causa prima, ut puta quia sic divinitus est traditum, vel quia hoc in gloriam Dei cedit, vel quia Dei potestas est infinita." 82 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 21. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 85 E. Gilson, "What is Christian Philosophy", in A Gilson Reader, p. 189. Cf. The Spirit of Thomism, p. 38: "In the Summa contra gentiles Thomas twice states that he intends to philosophize so far as the truth of the faith is concerned: quantum ad fidei pertinet veritatem (II, 5); quantum ad fidei veritatem pertinet (II, 46, 1)." "The work is theological from beginning to end, but in it scholastic theology at its best achieves a unified view of the universe, of its cause and of its end under the converging lights of reason and revelation" ( Ibid., p. 40); cf. Ibid., p. 112, note 6. 86 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 22.

87 E. Gilson, "Historical Research and the Future of Scholasticism", in A Gilson Reader, p. 159. 88 Cf. Christian Philosophy (orig. Introduction la philosophie chrtienne, Paris, 1960), tr. A. Maurer, Toronto, 1993, p. 66-67: "What is most remarkable in this regard is that they would like to separate revelation and reason to satisfy the requirements of a notion of philosophy that never existed. No philosopher ever philosophized about the empty form of an argument lacking all content. If we mentally remove everything specifically religious in the great Greek philosophies from Plato to Plotinus, then everything specifically Christian in the philosophical speculation of Descartes, Malebranche, Leibnitz, even Kant and some of his successors, the existence of these doctrines becomes incomprehensible. A religion is needed even to make it stay within the limits of reason." See also E. Gilson, The Philosopher and Theology, op. cit., pp. 93-98. 89 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 22. 90 E. Gilson, "Historical Research and the Future of Scholasticism", op. cit., p. 161. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid., p. 162. 94 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 22. 95 E. Gilson, "Historical Research and the Future of Scholasticism", op. cit. p. 162. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid., p. 163. Cf.. E. Gilson, Christian Philosophy, op. cit., p. 66: "Problems pile up, on the contrary, if it is claimed that these two wisdoms cannot live and work together in the same person, in the same mind. Will philosophy have nothing to say about the teachings of theology, a science whose principles are supernatural? And will theology give no thought to the teachings of philosophy, which proceeds by the light of natural reason? St. Thomas, at least, asserts the exact opposite, for he holds so strongly the formal distinction of the two lights and the two wisdoms only to allow them to collaborate better, without any possible confusion, but intimately and without any false scruples. St. Thomas wanted to make the natural light of reason penetrate right into the most secret parts of revealed truth, not in order to do away with faith and mystery, but to define their objects." 98 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 12. 99 The Spirit of Thomism, p. 30. Siger of Brabant called Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas "praecipui viri in philosophia": They were theologians "eminent in the field of philosophy" (The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 308, note 3). Cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. New York, 1955, p. 397. 100 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 4. Cf. p. 309, note 6: "... speaking of philosophy reduplicative ut sic - that is, as the best that natural reason can say about God and the world [St.Thomas] himself knew of no better philosophy than that of Aristotle, but as a theologian he had to elaborate a philosophy of his own; to wit, the philosophical part of revelation that deals with the truths accessible to natural reason. This philosophy, which, according to Thomas himself, is part of his theology, appeals to no revealed knowledge; it is purely rational in both principles and method, and still, it is irreducible to the philosophy of Aristotle if only for the reason that the first principle of human knowledge, being, is not understood by Thomas and Aristotle in the same way." 101 Ibid., p. 15 102 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 103 Ibid., p. 13. 104 Ibid., p. 14. 105 Ibid. Cf. note 100 above. 106 Ibid., p. 15. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid.

109 Ibid., p. 16. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid., 17. See p. 309, note 6 where Gilson distinguishes between the manner in which St. Thomas writes in his commentaries on Aristotle and in his theological works such as the Summa Theologiae. In his commentaries on Aristotle "it is literally true to say that he seldom or never disagrees with the teaching of Aristotle. Now this is precisely the reason one can not expound the philosophy of St. Thomas out of his commentaries on Aristotle alone. As Aristotle's expositor, Thomas is a polytheist, there are no divine Ideas, the world has not been created ex nihilo, there is no divine providence in respect of singulars, there is no efficient causality as distinct from moving causality, the world is necessarily eternal, everything in it is either an eternal separate substance or a perishable compound of matter and form, there is no personal immortality of the soul. This is not to deny, or to minimize, the wide and deep indebtedness of Thomas Aquinas to Aristotle." But as a theologian St. Thomas had to elaborate a philosophy of his own. See note 100 above. 113 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 19. 114 The Christian Philosophy St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 6. 115 Ibid., p. 7. 116 Ibid. 117 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p.20. 118 S.T., II-II, 118, 5, ad 3. See The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 310, note 11: "Incidentally, this exactly describes the place attributed to philosophy in theology by Thomas Aquinas. Unless we suppose he betrayed his religious vocation, as he himself understood it, the Saint cannot have done what a 'philosopher' would naturally do -- that is, study Aristotle for the sake of Aristotle and philosophy for the sake of philosophy only. As to the 'continuity of development' owing to which Thomism followed from the philosophy of Aristotle by a sort of 'natural unfolding,' it should be noted that two elements of discontinuity at least have played a part in this story. First, the incarnation of Christ and the preaching of Gospel to the Western world; next, the birth of a man wholly dedicated to the task of turning 'sacred doctrine' into an organized body of knowledge after the pattern of Greek episteme. There always is continuity at the level of nature, for indeed all that which happens to nature is bound to be natural, but the cause of a natural event can be supernatural. It is somewhat distressing that the same men who preach that grace can make a man a morally better man refuse to admit that revelation can make a philosophy a better philosophy." 119 S.C.G., 1, 2, 2. 120 Cf. the letter from Gilson to Luigi Bogliolo, March 14, 1962; in Doctor Communis, op. cit., p. 296: "Personnellment, je tends de plus en plus placer Aeterni Patris au sommet de la courbe et considrer que la notion (thomiste) de la sacra doctrina est la clef du problme, mais il y a des obstacles psychologiques presque insurmontables vaincre pour faire accepter ce point de vue. La notion scolastique de thologie a t perdue de vue et l'on passe pour un fidiste ds qu'on entreprend de la restaurer." On Aeterni Patris, see Christianity and Philosophy, pp. 91-102; The Philosopher and Theology, pp. 175-76, 180-92, 206-07, 218-19, 228-29. More recently, the term "Christian philosophy" has been defended by Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Fides et Ratio (1998). See especially n. 76. The Pope also mentions Gilson specifically as being among those in whose philosophical research there was a "fruitful relationship between philosophy and the word of God." (n. 74 ) 121 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 24. See the appending note 3, p. 311. 122 S.T., I, 1, 1. Regarding the problem of how many men can arrive at philosophical truth, especially regarding God, one of the main sources utilized by St. Thomas was Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, Bk. I, Ch. 33. The personal contribution of Thomas was to add to Maimonides's words pauci (Thomas also uses the word paucissimi) and post multum

tempus, this third one: cum admixtione multorum errorem, found in S.T., I, 1, 1; cf. C.G. 1, 4, 3 and In III Sent., 24, 1, 3, 3, solutio. Thomas is echoing the patristic argument per errores philosophorum. Cf. The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 312, note 4; The Spirit of Thomism, pp. 105-107, notes 15 and 16. 123 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 26. Cf. Christianity and Philosophy, pp. 64-72. 124 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 26. Cf. S.T., II-II, 1, 8, ad 1. 125 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 313, note 15. Cf. S.T., II-II, 2, obj. 3 and ad 3: "That which pertains even to nonbelievers can not be placed among the acts of faith. But to believe that God exists pertains even to nonbelievers. Therefore, it must not be placed among the acts of faith." The answer: "To believe God does not pertain to the nonbelievers in the way it should in order to be counted and an act of faith. For they do not believe that God exists under the conditions determined by faith. And therefore they do not truly believe God." 126 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 27. 127 Ibid., p. 313, note 15. Gilson goes on to say that "the distinction is well marked by the fact that, while the common as well as the philosophic knowledge of the existence of God are 'preambles' to the knowledge of God by faith, the act of faith in God's existence grasps the very being of God and, along with it, the totality of the articles of faith as implicitly contained in it." (The Elements of Christian Philosophy, pp. 313-314, note 15) Cf. also S.T., I, 1, 1, ad 2: "Hence the theology included in sacred doctrine differs in genus from that theology which is part of philosophy." Gilson adds that this is true even in those instances when theology and philosophy are treating the same things. (The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 28) 128 S.T., II-II, 1, 5: "...non est possibile quod idem ab eodem sit scitum et creditum ." Cf. The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 29. 129 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 29. 130 Ibid., p. 314, note 21: "Cajetan considers that theologia secundum se est vere scientia simpliciter subalternata." St. Thomas however states: Est ergo theologia scientia quasi subalternata divinae scientiae a qua accipit principia sua. (In Sent., Prologue, q. 1, art. 3) Cf. In Boethii de Trinitate, 2, 2, ad 5. 131 Ibid. In the same note 21 Gilson states that "Thomas Aquinas has at least once spoken of a quasi subalternation, and, in other cases, has omitted all reference to subalternation." 132 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 31. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid., p. 34. 135 Ibid., p. 35. 136 Ibid., p. 36. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid., p. 38. Cf. S.T., II-II, 4, 8, ad 2 and ad 3. 139 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 38. 140 Ibid., p. 39. 141 Ibid., p. 40. 142 Ibid. Cf. Christian Philosophy, p. 67. 143 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 316, note 36. 144 Ibid. Cf. In Boethii de Trinitate, 2, 3, ad 5. 145 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 316, note 36. 146 Ibid., p. 40. Cf. S.T., I, 1, 6. 147 The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 41. 148 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 149 Ibid., p. 43. 150 Ibid., p. 44. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid.

153 Anton Pegis, in A Gilson Reader, p. 8. This rationalistic interpretation of the doctrine of St Thomas which seeks to separate the philosophy of St. Thomas from the theology upon which it is dependent persists even among the most theologically orthodox of Catholic scholars. In the 1940s and 50s the famous theologians Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. and Fr. Louis Boyer both strenuously opposed Gilson's Thomism (see Lawrence K. Shook, Etienne Gilson, Toronto: PIMS, 1984, pp. 299-301). In 1993, when the present writer took a seminar on "Christian Philosophy" at the Angelicum University, his instructor, Fr. Georges Cottier, O.P., who was papal theologian for Pope John Paul II and even co-writer of the encyclical Fides et Ratio, said to this writer personally that he thought Gilson's understanding of Thomistic philosophy became, in his words, "a bit exaggerated towards the end." And then there is the case of the University of Leval in Quebec and its philosophical colony Thomas Aquinas College in California (several of TAC's founding professors, including its first president, did their graduate work in philosophy at Leval), with a revolving door relationship between the two in which TAC graduates often do graduate studies at Leval, and then return to TAC to teach. At both institutions an anti-Gilsonian Thomism is taught. This position basically holds that Gilson was a great historian of medieval philosophy but was seriously mistaken as a philosopher, especially as an interpreter of St Thomas. One of the chief representatives of TAC (which is widely considered, like Christendom College, to be one of the best Catholic Colleges in the US) said in a letter to this writer: "We here at the college -- at least those many of whom I'm sure -- do not take Gilson seriously. We repudiate, and think we can demonstrate, the falsity of his promotion of St. Thomas as opposed to Aristotle concerning the act of existence, as well as on other topics, and we think that on the whole he throws no significant philosophical or theological light on the subjects he touches. The intent and spirit of the college go in a different direction...." If in fact a Catholic College or University institutionally holds and teaches a negative position on Gilson, does this not indicate a possible unhealthy philosophical dogmatism, something which has no place in the pursuit of wisdom and truth, especially when matters of revealed Catholic doctrine are not denied or compromised? Is not such a position even more culpable when used to attack a Catholic philosopher - considered by many to be a distinguished theologian as well - who was always in good standing with the Church and even supported by at least two popes - Pius XII in the establishment of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies under Gilson's leadership and John Paul II in Fides et Ratio? (see note 120 above) On the other hand, among the distinguished philosophers and theologians who support Gilson and his interpretation of St Thomas (and this is only a small sampling) are such names as Jacques Maritain, Cardinal Henri De Lubac, Joseph Owens, Anton Pegis, Vernon Bourke, Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, Henri Gouhier, Antonio Livi, Antonio Piolanti, Joseph De Finance, Luigi Bogliolo, Armand Maurer, Battista Mondin, S.X., Abelardo Lobato, O.P., Leo J. Elders, S.V.D., Ralph McInerny, and Joseph Koterski, S.J. And apparently at least one or two popes as well. Darrell Wright received his Licentiate in philosophy, magna cum laude, from the Angelicum University in Rome in 1993. The author wishes to express his thanks to Fr. Luke Dempsey, O.P. for introducing him to Gilson's great work, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy and for his heroic patience, and also to Anne Kemsley-Paschen for her assistance in the early preparation of this paper and even more so for helping him to perceive and then pursue the great hidden treasure found in the contemplative monastic life at least for a number of years. The author can be reached at darrell@knightsoftheholyrosary.com.