YNOT vs IAC Case Digest

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents. FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A which provides that the carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES: Whether or not executive order no. 626-A is unconstitutional due misapplication of police power, violation of due process, and undue delegation of legislative power? HELD: The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the light of the tests mentioned, we hold with the Toribio Case that there is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. This measure deprives the individual due process as granted by the Constitution. The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require. Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

THE UNITED STATES vs. BULL

G.R. No. L-5270, January 15, 1910

Facts: The information alleged the following: That on and for many months to December 2, 1908, H. N. Bull was the master of a steam sailing known as the steamship Standard, the said vessel is engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippines. That the accused Bull while being the master of the said vessel on or about the 2nd day of December 1908, wilfully, and wrongfully carry, transport and bring into the port and city of Manila 677 head of cattle and carabaos from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals. In this, to wit, the accused as the master of the vessel, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed. All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission. Issue: 1. The complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. 2. That under the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case. Ruling: 1. Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which such ship or water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender. The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not established until within comparatively recent times. Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and regulation which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the French theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another. Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.) The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquility of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language requires us to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or tranquility of the country. The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this case. It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it does not. The evidence shows not only that the defendants acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the assertion that according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the a nimals. It was conclusively proven that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally. 2. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act cannot be left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the abovementioned facts true and all of which are fully sustained by the evidence. The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

Notes: Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation. By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof the following: The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to the thorns. Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked.

THE UNITED STATES

vs.

RICARDO BAYOT.

WILLARD, J.: G.R. No. L-4352

March 24, 1908

During the month of April, 1907, and for several years prior thereto, the defendant was and had been the janitor of the city hall in the city of Manila. He had under his charge 12 or 15 men whose business it was to take care of and clean the building. In the month of April, one of these men was Manuel Manalo. The work assigned to him was the cleaning of the water-closets. The work done by all of these laborers had to be performed before the offices opened in the morning or after they were closed at night. The water-closets were cleaned only once a day and that work was done by Manuel Manalo in the morning before 8 o'clock. During the month of April he went to the building every day about half past 6 and performed this work, which was all the work that was assigned to him, and which was all the work which he had to perform during the entire day. He was not in the building any day after 9 a. m. There was evidence, however, that it was the duty of these men to remain in the building so that if any extraordinary work should be required of them they would be there to perform it. The evidence shows that some of the men were allowed to go away, and others stayed there and that those that stayed there did nothing except to perform the regular work assigned to them. On the 1st of May, 1907, a pay roll was made out for the month of April. It contained the names of all the workmen and a square against each name for each day in the month. All of the square against each name of Manuel Manalo contain a vertical line. The defendant signed the following certificate upon this pay roll: "I certify that I have been in charge of the men whose names appear on the above roll during the period indicated, that the roll is correct, and that the labor has been performed as stated." Manuel Manalo received pay at the rate of 70 cents a day and for the month of April he was paid P21. A complaint was filed against the defendant charging him, as a public official, with the falsification of a public document, to wit, this pay roll, it being alleged that the certificate which he attached thereto was false. He was convicted in the court below of the crime charged against him and has appealed. To our minds the only question in the case is as to the meaning of the vertical lines placed in the square opposite the names of these laborers. It is claimed by the appellant that they only mean that the persons to whom the lines referred had performed upon the days mentioned the services which had been required of each one. If this is the correct meaning of these lines, then the certificate signed by the defendant was true, because it was proven that Manuel Manalo had performed during the month of April all the work which was assigned to him. It is claimed by the Government, however, that these lines indicate, not that Manuel Manalo performed all the work that was required of him during the day, but that he was present in the building during all the day and it relies upon the following statement made at the top of the payroll: "Mark the time each day in ink under the proper date, using full or fractional marks for part of a day as earned." The Attorney-General insists that, inasmuch as Manuel Manalo was not present all of the day, the time during which he was present all of the day, the time during which he was present should have been indicated by a fractional mark. There are no fractional marks upon this time roll. Mr. Dorrington, the then superintendent of public buildings and a witness for the Government, was asked: "What mark is generally made on the labor pay rolls to indicate a man has worked one-half a day?" and he answered: "I do not know what would be put there in a case of that kind." He further testified: "Q. Have you ever seen on the pay roll a man's name for one half a day's work? A. Not that I recall; it may be possible in some cases; I do not recall." If that part of the certificate signed by the defendant which states that he had been in charge of the men was correct, and that part which states that the labor had been performed was correct, the only question is, Is that part of the certificate which says "that the roll is correct," false or true? After considerable hesitation we have come to the conclusion, in view of all the testimony in the case, that it can not be said that this statement was false; in other words, that the vertical lines do not necessarily mean that the person against whose name they appear was present in the building during every hour of the day. The defendant, therefore, can not be convicted of the crime of falsification of a public document by a public official. There are some additional facts in the case not before stated, which to our mind have no bearing upon the precise question in this case, namely, whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged against him, for the crime thus charged does not depend upon the advantage of profit which the defendant may obtain from the falsification. A defendant may be guilty of this crime without in any way profiting thereby. The additional facts referred to are the following: It was proven by the Government and admitted by the defendant, that during the month of April, and for sometime before, Manuel Manalo was and had been the defendant's cook; that after he had finished his work at the city hall in the morning the defendant gave him money and sent him to the market where he bought provisions; and that he returned to the city hall, stayed there until about 9 o'clock, and then went to the defendant's house where he worked as cook until about 2 o'clock in the afternoon and then went to his own house. For these services as a cook the defendant paid nothing, although he claims that he was educating the minor child of Manuel Manalo. That this conduct of the defendant in availing himself of the services of Manuel Manalo under the circumstances was grossly irregular and that it perhaps constitutes a crime under the provisions of the Penal Code is not to our minds decisive of the question here raised. However delinquent the defendant may have been, the question here is, Did his delinquency amount to the crime of the falsification of a public document? If it did not, he must be acquitted of the present charge and we can not inquire under this complaint as to what other offense he may have committed. The judgment of the court below is reversed and the defendant is acquitted, with the costs of both instances' de oficio. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Tracey, JJ., concur. Johnson and Carson, JJ., dissent.