POLITICAL LAW By Dean Hilario Justino F.

Morales, Powerhaus Review Center

National Territory 01. a) What do you understand by the Archipelago Doctrine? b) How does the Doctrine, as embodied in Article I of the Philippine Constitution, differ from the version of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea? ANSWERS: a) The archipelagic doctrine emphasizes the unity of the land and waters by defining an archipelago either as a group of islands and islets or body of waters studded with islands. For this purpose, it requires that baselines be drawn by connecting the appropriate points of the outermost islands to encircle the islands within the archipelago. The waters on the landward side of the baselines regardless of breadth or dimension are considered merely internal waters. b) Article I of the Philippine Constitution treats the vast areas of water between islands as internal waters and therefore not subject to the right of innocent passage. The 1982 UNCLOS version calls such areas archipelagic waters and are subject to the right of innocent passage through passages designated by the archipelago concerned. But, where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with Article 4 of the UNCLOS has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been considered as part of the territorial sea or of the high seas (referred to as archipelagic waters), the right of innocent passage shall exist in those waters, through passages designated by the archipelago concerned. 02. What is the new archipelagic baseline law of the Philippines? What is its implications, if any, upon the Philippine territorial claims over Sabah and the Kalayaan Islands Group? ANSWER: The new archipelagic baseline law of the Philippines is embodied in RA 9522 which effectively amended Section 1 of RA 3046, entitled An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines, as amended by Section 1 of RA 5446. RA 9522 adopts the regime of islands formula in dealing with our claim over Spratlys. The new law would operate as a repeal of the Sabah provision of the previous baseline law, RA 5446 (the only legislative re-affirmation of Philippine sovereignty over Sabah), resulting in the derogation of the other territories clause of the Constitution. (Merlin M. Magallona, A Framework for the Study of National Territory: A Statement of the Problem IBP Journal, September 2008.) 03. What is the Regime of Islands Doctrine enunciated in RA 9522, or the new archipelagic baseline law of the Philippines? What are the arguments for and against the doctrine. ANSWER: The Regime of Islands Doctrine as embodied in the new archipelagic baseline law of the Philippines modifies the Archipelagic Principle by excluding two disputed territories, namely, the Kalayaan Islands Group and the Scarborough Shoal from the countrys archipelagic baseline but they remain as parts of Philippine territory and considered as regime of islands consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). It adopts a mix formula that combines archipelagic baselines for the main archipelago, and regime of islands for the disputed islands with the option to fix normal baselines in the islands we claim in the disputed Spratly islands group. Under the regime of islands principle, baselines will be drawn on an island-to-island basis rather than a package deal-type archipelago. 04. The New Baseline Law, RA 9522 was enacted by Congress to comply with the terms of the UNCLOS which the Philippines ratified in 1984. Such compliance shortened one baseline and optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territorries such as Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zone. Is RA 9522 unconstitutional for converting internal waters into archipelagic waters and exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard? ANSWER: NO. The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines because an archipelagic state has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baseline, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. The Philippines is subject to UNCLOS III which grants innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, thus, the right of innocent passage, being a customary international law is automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. The compliance to UNCLOS III through RA 9522 will not expose Philippine waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard. If the Philippines did not comply with the baseline law, it will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured and which will produce two-fronted disasters: (1) open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around the archipelago and (2) it shall weaken the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. (Magallona v. Ermita, GR No. 187167, July 16, 2011) Citizenship 05. Who can elect Filipino citizenship under Article IV Section 1(3) of the 1935 Philippine Constitution and Section 1 of CA No. 625?

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ANSWER: The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children and not to one who was concededly an illegitimate child, as her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. Being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent is a Filipino since birth, without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reaches the age of majority. (Republic vs. Lim, 420 SCRA 123, GR No. 153883, January 13, 2004) 06. Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? ANSWER: NO under Art. IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made upon reaching the age of majority. The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma is resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within reasonable time after attaining the age of majority. This phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean the election should be made within three years from reaching the age of majority. (Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999) 07. What is naturalization? Name the three modes of acquiring Filipino citizenship through naturalization. ANSWER: Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen. Under existing laws, there are three modes by which an alien may become a Filipino citizen by naturalization: (1) administrative naturalization pursuant to RA 9139; (2) judicial naturalization pursuant to CA 437; and (3) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress granting Philippine citizenship to an alien (So, vs. Republic, GR No.170603, January 29, 2007) 08. Who are eligible to apply for naturalization under RA No. 9139, the Administrative Naturalization Law? State the rationale for the enactment of the law. ANSWER: RA 9139 is an act providing for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship for 1) aliens born in the Philippines and 2) residing therein since birth by administrative naturalization subject to certain requirements dictated by national security and interest. RA 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging. It also addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting "brain drain for the Philippines. (So vs. Republic, supra) 09. Are the qualifications prescribed under Act 473 applicable to RA 9139? ANSWER: NO. The qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of CA 473. On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of RA 9139 provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative act. First, CA 473 and RA 9139 are separate and distinct laws- the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to customs and traditions. Second, if the qualifications prescribed in RA 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who are not native-born. Third, applying the provisions of RA 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. (Ibid.) 10. Are minor children of naturalized Filipino citizens under LOI 270 also granted Philippine citizenship? ANSWER: Yes, pursuant to the principle of derivative naturalization. Section 15 of CA 437, which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized thereunder should be similarly applied to the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270. The following are requisites to be entitled to Philippine citizenship: (1) they are legitimate children of petitioner (2) they were born in the Philippines and (3) they were still minors when petitioner was naturalized as Filipino citizen. (Tan Co vs. Civil Register of Manila, 423 SCRA 665) 11. Distinguish dual citizenship from dual allegiance. ANSWER: Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.

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Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive acts, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is voluntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. (Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, May 29, 1999) 12. Who may validly avail of repatriation under RA No. 8171? Does this mode require a judicial proceeding? ANSWER: RA No. 8171, which lapse into law on October 23, 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, including their minor children. (Angat vs. Republic, GR No. 132244, September 14, 1999) Included in the second group are minor children at the time of repatriation and does not include one who is no longer minor at the time of his repatriation or one who lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law. The loss of Philippine citizenship must be on account of political or economic necessity and not by operation of law such as derivative naturalization, or for the purpose of avoiding deportation and prosecution in the US. (Tabasa vs. CA, 500 SCRA 9) Repatriation as a mode of reacquiring Philippine citizenship does not require the filing of a petition in court. All that an applicant had to do is to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. (Angat, supra.) In addition thereto, registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. (Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655) But in Tabasa, supra, the Supreme Court ruled that petition for repatriation shall be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN) which was designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to AO 285 dated August 22, 2006. 13. Under the Repatriation Law, what kind of citizenship is reacquired by the repatriate? ANSWER: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. (Bengson III vs. HRET, et. al. GR No. 142840, May 7, 2001) 14. What are the salient features of RA 9225, The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or the so-called Dual Citizenship Law? ANSWER: It allows former natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country to reacquire Filipino citizenship. It also allows Filipino citizens to retain their Filipino citizenship even if they acquire another citizenship in a foreign country. Retention or reacquisition is accomplished by simply taking the oath of allegiance as prescribed by RA 9225. The required oath of allegiance does not contain the usual renunciation of allegiance to any and all other states, thereby impliedly allowing continued allegiance to the adopted state. The usual absolute renunciation is, however, required from those seeking public elective office or appointed to public office in the Philippines. Likewise, under the principle of derivative citizenship, the unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of RA 9225, shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. 15. Does RA 9225 violate Section 5 of Article IV of the Constitution prohibiting dual allegiance? ANSWER: NO. Section 5 of Article IV of the Constitution is a mere declaration of policy and it is not a selfexecuting provisions. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Section 2 and 3 of RA 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship, per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters as to what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department to rule on the issues pertaining to dual allegiance. (Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR 160869, May 11, 2007) Separation of Church and State 17. What do you understand by the Doctrine of BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY or ACCOMMODATION? ANSWER: The doctrine believes that the wall of separation that divides the church and the state is meant to protect the church from the state. The principle recognizes that the state is not hostile to religion because it plays an important role in public life. It believes that the wall of separation does not require the state to be adversary, rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups or religious believers and nonbelievers. Under the doctrine, accommodation of religion may be allowed not to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Thus, the Philippine Constitution provides for tax exemption of church properties, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools. The adoption of the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant exemption every time a free exercise claim comes before it. (Estrada vs. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1) 18. Can the courts, in the performance of their judicial functions, exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions?

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ANSWER: NO. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution or organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. In disputes involving religious institution or organization, there is one area which the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary matters. The amendments of the constitution, re-statement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by the appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of civil courts. (Taruc vs. Cruz, 453 SCRA 123) Non-delegation of Power 19. Congress enacted the EVAT Law, a provision of which allows the President to increase the rate from 10% to 12%. The provision of the law is assailed for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of powers. Decide. ANSWER: The provision is not a delegation of legislative power it is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which the enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. No discretion would be exercised by the President. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of its authority in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legal process can go forward. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. (ABAKADA vs. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1) 20. What are the requisites of valid delegation of power? ANSWER: A delegation of power is valid only if the law (1) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate, and (2) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. (Abakada vs. Ermita, supra.) Legislative Department 21. A law was passed by Congress imposing sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. During the interpellation of the bill, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorom but was not able to do so until the end of his interpellation. After such announcement, there was a move to approve and ratify the conference committee report. The Deputy Speaker asked if there are any objection to the motion. When asked what was the question by Arroyo, said deputy did not respond and instead, continued to approve the report. Arroyos objection was not entertained. The bill was signed into law. Arroyo questions the validity of the law because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House. Decide. ANSWER: A law may not be nullified on the ground that internal rules of procedure of the House has been violated. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of non-compliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberation. The constitutional provision that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings must be invoked to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts, not for the purpose of invoking judicial review. Moreover, no rights of private individuals were involved and as such, the Supreme Court has no power to look into the internal proceedings of the House. (Arroyo vs. de Venecia, GR. No. 127-255, August 14, 1997). Legislative Privilege 22. Accused appellant Congressman RJ filed a motion before the Court asking that he be allowed to fully discharge his duties, including attendance in legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted of a non-bailable offense He contended that his re-election being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest- not even the police power of the State. Decide. ANSWER: NO. All top officials of the government executive, legislative and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. What the appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing him to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. In the ultimate analysis, the issue boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The immunity from arrest or detention of a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution, not inferred from the duties of a position. The doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which the reelected official may have committed during his previous term. (People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689)

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Legislative Inquiry 23. Distinguish Question Hour of Sec. 22, from Legislative Investigation of Sec. 21, both of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. ANSWER: As to purpose QH: directed merely to congressional oversight over the implementation of laws, in line with the principle of checks and balances LIn: to illicit information that may be used in aid of legislation As to persons who may appear QH: only a department head/cabinet members appearance may be requested LIn: any person, and the appearance is mandatory, unless a valid claim of executive privilege is made by a department head As to who conducts inquiry QH: entire body, either Senate or House of Representatives LIn: committees As to subject matter QH: matters related to the department only LIn: any matter for the purpose of legislation As to the requisite of Presidents permission QH: Presidents permission for cabinet members to appear required LIn: Presidents permission for cabinet members to appear not required As to the use of compulsory process QH: Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials LIn: Congress can compel executive officials to appear (except when a valid claim of executive privilege is invoked) 24. The President issued EO 464, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of which prohibit Cabinet Members and other officials from appearing before congressional investigations without securing her prior consent to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. The Senate assailed the validity and constitutionality of the EO on the following grounds: (1) the EO contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress, (2) the EO violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, and (3) there was grave abuse of discretion in implementing the EO prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Decide. ANSWER: In Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006, the Supreme Court issued the following ruling: 1) Section 3 and Section 2 (b) must be invalidated. The assailed EO severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In the conduct of congressional inquiry in aid of legislation, any person, including Cabinet Members and other public officials may be required by either House of Congress to appear before congressional investigations under pain of contempt without prior permission of the President. The requirement of securing prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress applies only to Cabinet Members and not to other public officials and only when either House of Congress conducts a Question Hour and not in cases of inquiries in aid of legislation as the latter should be untrammelled because it is co-extensive with the power to legislate. 2) Any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information, which are presumably a matter of public concern. 3) While EO 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. Due process requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented. However, in Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006, the Supreme Court en banc clarified the above ruling and upheld the Presidents constitutional authority over the military and to stop the two officers from attending the Senate hearing by virtue of her power as Commander in Chief, and that as a consequence, a military officer who defies such an injunction was liable under the military justice. In the same case, the Supreme Court also ruled that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President, has adequate remedies under the law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the

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President has the duty to faithfully execute. But the Supreme Court said that the two officers could have been allowed to testify before the Senate without having to defy their Commander in Chief and superior officers. And if emphasis be needed, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulder of the President, as Commander in Chief, to authorize the appearance of military officials before Congress. 25. Can the Senate require members or staff of the PCGG to testify or produce evidence concerning matters within its official cognizance? ANSWER: YES. Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution grants Congress and any of its committee the power of legislative inquiry notwithstanding the exemption granted by Section 4 (b) of EO NO.1, which is deemed repealed by the aforementioned constitutional provision. The power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. The operation of the government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate. Furthermore, Section 4 (b) is inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on accountability of public officers and the States policy of transparency and full public disclosure of its transac tions involving public interest. (Sabio vs. Gordon, GR 174340, October 17, 2006) 26. Is the Senate barred from inquiring into the same issues being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan? ANSWER: NO. The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose. So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected by the Senate Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. (Sabio vs. Gordon, supra.) In Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, GR 167173, December 27, 2007, it was held that the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation. 27. What are the limitations on the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation? ANSWER: The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected. (Neri vs. Senate Committees, supra) 28. VIII. Explain briefly the following doctrines: (12%) 1) Doctrine of Automatic Re-appropriation 2) Doctrine of Inappropriate Provision 3) Doctrine of Augmentation 4) No-amendment Rule ANSWERS: (1) Under the Doctrine of Automatic Re-appropriation, if by the end of any fiscal year, Congress shall have failed to pass the General Appropriation bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and in effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by Congress. (2) A general appropriation bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to special sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered inappropriate provision. (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, 429 SCRA 736) It is a provision which does not relate to any particular item or which extends its operations beyond an item in an appropriations law which can be vetoed by the President separately from the item. (3) Under the Doctrine of Augmentation, no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriation; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. (4) The no-amendment rule in law-making refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the

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other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited. (ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita, GR No. 168056, September 1, 2005) 29. What government agency is vested with emergency powers? ANSWER: Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that "the State may during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. (David vs. Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006) 30. During a period of national emergency, Congress may grant emergency powers to the President. State the conditions under which such a vesture is allowed. ANSWER: Under Section 23(2), Article VI of the Constitution, Congress may grant the President emergency powers subject to the following conditions: 1. There is war or other national emergency; 2. The grant of emergency powers must be for a limited period; 3. The grant of emergency powers is subject to such restrictions as Congress may prescribe; and 4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a declared national policy. Executive/Judicial Departments 31. What is the nature of the president's power to appoint? Can the President validly issue an acting appointment for cabinet members? ANSWER: The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary [1996]) Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. (Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 459) The scope of the legislature's interference in the executive's power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office. (Flores vs. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568) Even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its power is executive and not legislative. It is independent of Congress. Its powers do not come from Congress but emanate directly from the Constitution. The Commission on Appointment does not legislate when it exercises the power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointment. YES. EO 292, The Administrative Code of 1987, allows the President to make acting appointment by temporarily designating an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, including cabinet members. 32. What do you understand by an ad interim appointment? Is the President prohibited to issue this kind of appointment to the three Constitutional Commissions? How can an ad interim appointment be terminated? ANSWERS: An ad interim appointment as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked anytime. It is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and the individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his functions without loss of time. The same can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointment. (Matibag vs. COMELEC, 380 SCRA 49) NO. The Constitution does not prohibit the President from making ad interim appointment to the three independent constitutional commissions. An appointment or designation in temporary or acting capacity is the kind of appointment that the constitution prohibits. While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable, except as provided by law, an appointment or temporary appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. (Ibid)

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An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution first, by the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments, and second, by the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointment acting on his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. (Ibid.) 33. Distinguish "ad interim appointment" from appointments in an acting capacity. ANSWER: Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended anytime there is a vacancy. Moreover, ad interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.(Bernas, supra) In Pimentel, Jr. vs. Ermita, 472 SCRA 587, it was held that there was no abuse in the President's appointment of cabinet members in acting capacity. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from her issuance of ad interim appointment to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. 34. The President issued a permanent promotional appointments to A, B C and D as Rear Admiral, Vice Admiral, Commodore and Naval Captain in the Philippine Coast Guard, respectively. The promoted officers subsequently assumed office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the 1987 Constitution. S filed a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality and legality of the appointment made by the President. Decide. ANSWER: The petition must be denied. Their assumption of office without the confirmation is valid and legal. While the Philippine Coast Guard used to be a subordinate unit of the Philippine Navy, a major branch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, EO 475 transferred the same to the Office of the President, then transferred again to the Department of Transportation and Communications. Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of the respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA. (Soriano vs. Lista, GR No. 153881, March 4, 2003) 35. Can the President validly issue appointment for RTC judges within 90 days from submission of list by the Judicial and Bar Council, during the period of the ban on appointments by reason of presidential election? ANSWER: NO. To allow the President to issue such appointment is violative of the prohibition against two types of appointment, namely: 1) those made for buying votes and 2) those made for partisan consideration, except in a temporary appointment to executive position where continued vacancy will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. While the time frame for filling up vacancies generally prevails over the restriction on the Presidents power to appoint, there is no compelling reason to justify the making of appointment during the period of the ban. Besides, the vacancies in lower courts can be filled up temporarily by designation. (In Re Appointments of Hon. M. Valenzuela and Hon. P Vallarta, AM No. 98-5-01 SC, Nov, 9, 1998) 36. X and Y applied for pardon as well as for amnesty pending appeal. They were granted conditional pardons but such were declared void by the Supreme Court for having been extended during the pendency of their appeal. The application for amnesty was later granted. They were subsequently released. Were X and Y validly released? ANSWER: YES. The release of the accused can only be justified by the amnesty, but not by the pardon. While the pardon was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment, and therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty was valid because in amnesty, finality of judgment is not needed. (People vs. Casido, GR No 116512, March 7, 1997). 37. President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 43 creating the Presidential Commission on Constitutional Reforms and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the purpose of which is to study and recommend proposed amendments to the 1987 Constitution. Under Section 7 of the Executive Order, the amount of PhP 3 M is earmarked for its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. RAG, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assailed the constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR contending that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law. He likewise sought to enjoin the COA from passing in audit expenditure of the PCCR. (1) Does RAG have the standing to raise the constitutional issue? (2) Would your answer be the same if the petitioner in the case is Senator Pimentel Jr.? (3) Can the President validly authorize the release of PhP 3 M taken from funds intended for the office of the President for the operational expense of the PCCR?

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW /P09 ANSWERS: (1). NO. Petitioner has sustained no direct or even any indirect injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or Constitution. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President by the President not by Congress in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25 (5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. In fact there was no appropriation at all. Thus, a taxpayers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise of Congress of its taxing or spending power. (Gonzales vs. Narvasa, et. al., GR No. 140835, August 14, 2000) (2) NO. Congress can claim injury in this case since the act of the President infringed on their prerogatives as legislators by encroaching upon the legislators power to create a public office and to propose amendments to the charter by forming the PCCR. (Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141) (3) YES. Under the Doctrine of Augmentation, the President may transfer funds from one agency to another within the same department from savings in other items of their respective appropriation pursuant to Sec. 25 (5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. 38. The President issued Letter of Instruction ordering the deployment of members of the Philippine Marines in the metropolis to conduct joint visibility patrols with members of the Philippine National Police in various shopping malls. The IBP filed a petition before the SC questioning the validity of the order. (1) Does the IBP have the legal standing to file the petition? (2) Does the Presidents order constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution? (3) Can the same order be the subject of judicial review? ANSWERS: (1) NO. The IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi apart from its declaration of its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. It has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Moreover, the IBP has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. (2) NO. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes a permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which provides the metes and bounds of the Marines authority. The real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. It is the local police forces that are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, with the Metro Manila Police Chief as the overall leader. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is their duty to provide logistical support to these soldiers. (3) NO. It is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawlessness, violence, invasion or rebellion. The exercise of this discretionary power is solely vested in him. The Court, thus cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. Unless it can be shown that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court. (IBP vs. Hon. Zamora, GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000) 39. What is the power of impoundment of the President? What are its principal sources? ANSWERS: Impoundment refers to the refusal of the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type. Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second, is the executive power drawn from the Presidents role as Commander-in-Chief. Third, is the Faithful Execution Clause. Proponents insist that faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist from implementing the law if by doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is when through efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In such case, it is sheer folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506, August 9, 1994) 40. Who has been vested with the power to ratify a treaty? ANSWER: In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. (BAYAN vs. Zamora, GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000)

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Residual Powers 41. Can the President validly issue an executive order deactivating the function of a particular office in the executive branch? Does he have the power to reorganize the executive department? ANSWER: YES. The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. Except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. However, as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department is concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the function of a particular office, or certain law may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The Economic Investigation and Intelligence Bureau is a bureau attached to the DOF. It falls under the office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to organize. (Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, 360 SCRA 718) The Presidents power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers. (MEWAP vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007) 42. What is the nature of the power of the Secretary of Justice to review the tax ordinances enacted by LGUs? ANSWER: Where the Secretary of Justice reviews, pursuant to law, a tax measure enacted by the local government unit to determine if the officials performed their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers under the Local Government Code, the same is an act of mere supervision, not control. While the Secretary of Justice is authorized to review the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance and if warranted, to revoke it on either or both grounds, he cannot substitute his own judgment for that of the local government. (Drilon vs. Lim, 235 SCRA 135) Calling-out Power 43. Can the President validly declare a state of rebellion? What about a state of national emergency? Give the distinction between the two powers. ANSWER: YES. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. The Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. The President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of Chief Executive and Commander-inChief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18 of Article VII. For the purpose of exercising the calling out power, the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of state of rebellion, and the concurrence of the following conditions are NOT required: (1) an actual invasion or rebellion and (b) public safety requires the exercise of such power. The concurrence of the foregoing conditions are required only in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law. The declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Administrative Code of 1987. (Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656, GR No. 159085, February 3, 2004) In David vs. GM-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006, upheld the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 which declared a state of national emergency and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress lawless violence. The Proclamation was based on the power of the President as Commander-inChief to call out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, insurrection or rebellion. But the Court clarified that the provision she relied upon did not give her emergency powers or any new or additional power. She had merely described a situation to deal with which she could call on the Armed Forces to help the civilian national police. However, in the same case, the Court struck down for being unconstitutional the warrantless arrest of protesters, the break-up of rallies, the raid on a newspaper office carried out by security forces, and the imposition of standards on mass media, or any form of prior restraint on the press. Likewise, the provision in the proclamation empowering the President to exercise legislative powers through the issuance of the presidential decree is declared unconstitutional as the same can be exercised only when martial law is proclaimed. Under Section 18 of Article VII of the Constitution, the President can validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest requires a delegation from Congress. 44. Can the President, through Administrative Order No. 308, validly establish a national computerized identification reference system? Would your answer be the same if the order is issued through EO 420 directing entities under the executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection format? ANSWER: NO. In Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional AO No. 308 as it did not merely implement the Administrative Code. It established a national computerized identification reference system which requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies, the

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primacy of national security, the extent of privacy against dossier-gathering by the government, and choices of policies. It deals with a subject that should be covered by law. NO. In Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director General of NEDA, GR No. 167798, April 19, 2006, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of EO No. 420. It ruled that it is within the constitutional powers of the President to direct entities under the executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection format. Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The President did not make, alter or repeal any law when it issued EO 420 and that she merely made use of existing law. EO 420 reduces costs as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of the current ID system of the government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation. EO 420 is limited only to the executive branch and does not apply to the judicial and other independent constitutional commissions. EO 420 limited the information to be collected to 14 special items only. Alter Ego Doctrine 45. What is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency? Is the doctrine applicable to the relationship between the Office of the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor? ANSWER: The acts of a subordinate bears the implied approval of his superior, unless actually disapproved by the latter. Taken with the powers of control and supervision, the acts of Department Secretaries in the performance of their duties are presumed to be the act of the President, unless and until the President alters, modifies, or nullifies the same. NO. The quantity of work in the hands of the Ombudsman does not measure up to the workload of the Office of the President as to necessitate having the Special Prosecutor as an alter ego of the Ombudsman. While the Office of the Ombudsman could very well make a general delegation of powers to the Special Prosecutor, an examination of the office orders issued by the Ombudsman, however, reveal that there had been no such intention to make a general delegation. (Perez vs. People, GR No. 166062, September 26, 2006) 46. Can the exercise of the Presidents foreign borrowing power be exercised by the Secretary of Finance? ANSWER: YES. The Constitution allocates to the President the exercise of the foreign borrowing power subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Said presidential prerogative may be exercised by the Presidents alter ego who in this case is the Secretary of Finance. Section 1 of RA 9245 empowers the Secretary of Finance with the approval of the President and after consultation with the Monetary Board to borrow from time to time on the credit of the Republic of the Philippines such sum or sums as his judgment may be necessary, and to issue therefore evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine Government.(Constantino v. Cuisia, GR No. 106064, Oct. 13, 2005) 47. EO No. 125 was issued by the President Aquino in the exercise of legislative powers. It mandates the now DOTC to make plans, policies, coordinate, implement and regulate the promotion, development and regulation of dependable and coordinated networks of transportation and communication system. Despite such delegation, may the President directly perform such functions or mandates conferred upon the DOTC? ANSWER: YES. Such authority springs from the Presidents power of control over all executive departments as well as the obligation for the faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution. This constitutional provision in echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code defines the President's power of supervision and control over the executive departments which provides that supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate. Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to subordinate, the President may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty. (Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534 and MMDA vs. Viron Transit Co. Inc. GR No. 170656, August 15, 2007) Executive Privilege 48. What is the so-called executive privilege? Who may invoke and how the privilege is invoked? ANSWER: Executive privilege is the right of the President and high level officials authorized by her to withhold information from Congress, from the courts, and ultimately from the public. The privilege is a function of separation of powers. Among the types of information which have been judicially recognized as privileged are state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. Certain information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress, such as Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings. (Chavez vs. PEA, 384 SCRA 152) Since the privilege belongs to the President, only the President can invoke it. The Supreme Court ruling limited to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may also authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case, the Executive Secretary must state that the Act is By order of the President, which means that he personally consulted with the President such matter of concern. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. (Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, supra)

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When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance. (Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, supra) The claim of privilege must be specific, e.g., whether the information sought to be withheld involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information must be clearly asserted. Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so. If the President and Congress cannot agree on whether the matter is privileged or not, then the Court must come in to determine the validity of the claim of privilege. (Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, supra) 49. What are the elements of presidential communications privilege? In Neri vs. Senate Committees, GR No. 180643, March 25, 2008, the Court ruled that the claim of executive privilege was properly invoked by Secretary Neri, specifically under what is called presidential communication privilege. The elements of presidential communications privilege are: (1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power. (2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or by the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President. (3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavaila bility of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. Neri had been asked three explosive questions: (a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project; (b) Whether the President directed him to prioritize the ZTE: and (c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe. It was held that the claim of executive privilege on the ground that the communication elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decisions-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. 50. Congress has been granted by the Constitution to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the courts. (1) Congress enacted RA 6770 providing that decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases be appealed to the Supreme Court, is the provision valid? (2) If, however, a law was passed providing that cases affecting ambassadors and consuls fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, is this enactment valid? ANSWERS: (1) NO. Section 30 of Art. VI provides that no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its consent. This is a clear limitation on the power of Congress to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (Fabian vs. Desierto, GR No. 129742, September 16, 1998) (2). NO. According to Section 2 of Article VIII, Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5, Art. VIII. The Supreme Court has been given the original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and consuls. Congress cannot deprive the highest tribunal of such jurisdiction which has been lodged to the Supreme Court by the Constitution itself. 51. Does the period for decision-making under Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, apply to the Sandiganbayan? ANSWER: NO. The above provision does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. The provisions refers to regular courts of lower collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only to the Court of Appeals. Sitting in five (5) divisions, the Sandiganbayan is a special court of justice, with functions of a trial court. The Sandiganbayan, in original cases within its jurisdiction, conducts trials, allows the introduction of evidence, has the discretion to weigh evidence of the parties, admit evidence it regards as credible and reject that which they consider perjurious or fabricated. Thus, the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special one. The three-month period, not the twelve-month period, to decide cases applies to the Sandiganbayan. (Re: Problem of Delays in cases Before the Sandiganbayan, AM No. 08-05-SC, November 28, 2001)

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What is a Memorandum Decision? Does it violate the requirements as to contents of judicial decisions set forth in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution? ANSWER: Memorandum decisions adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. Incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decisions of the higher court. (Francisco vs. Permskul, 173 SCRA 323). This is particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at. (Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26) It seeks to avoid having to repeat in the body of the appellate decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of the findings of facts by the lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court. NO. For as long as the appellate court does not incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, ie, the decision should be easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision, such as in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision and; should be sparingly used and may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. Ex. Simple litigations such as collection cases. Judicial Review 53. What are the requisites for the exercise of judicial review? ANSWER: A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act of statute must show not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. (Dimasangcop vs. Datumanong, 444 SCRA 203) The requisites for the exercise of judicial review are: 1. There must be before the court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review; 2. The question before the court must be ripe for adjudication; 3. The person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge; 4. The question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and 5. The issue of constitutionality musts be the lis mota of the case. (Ibid.) 53A. What is the Operarive Fact Doctrine.? Is the Doctrine applicable to executive acts? ANSWERS: An unconstitutional law is void, but its effects, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fairplay. The Operative Fact Doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. (HLI v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, GR No.171101, November 22, 2011) 54. What do you understand by the principle of moot and academic case? Name exceptions hereto, if any. ANSWER: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events (Prrovince of Batangas vs. Romulo, 429 SCRAS 736) so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. (Banco Filipino vs. Tuazon, 425 SCRA 129. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, (Royal Cargo Corporation vs CAB, 421 SCRA 21) or dismiss it on ground of mootness. (Lacson vs. Perez, 357 SCRA 756) However, courts will decide case, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, supra); second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved(Lacson vs. Perez, supra); third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (Sanlakas vs. Execcutive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656) 55. What is the Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality? ANSWER: A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions. (Central Bank Employees Association vs. BSP, 446 SCRA 299) 56. What is the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts? State its rationale and the effect of noncompliance thereto? ANSWER: This doctrine applies to cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of trial courts and appellate courts involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to refer to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. When cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary. (Agan, Jr. vs. PIATCO, 420 SCRA 575, GR No. 155001, January 21, 2004)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW /P14 The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from the Supreme Court must be put to halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of the Supreme Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases. (LBPS Commercial vs. Amila, 544 SCRA 199) The disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants the outright dismissal of the petition. (Flaminiano vs vs. Adriano, 543 SCRA 605) 57. What is the direct injury test in the determination of locus standi in public suits? Name exceptions to the rules on standing to sue and hierarchy of courts? ANSWERS: The direct injury test postulates that for a private individual to invoke judicial power to determine the validity of an executtive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. However, taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) the case involves constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised constitute exceptional or compelling circumstances or the issues are of paramount public interests or the issues are of transcendental importance which must be settled early;. (La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. GR No. 127882, January 27, 2004) or other legal issues with far reaching economic and social implications are embedded in the case (Agan, Jr. vs. PIATCO, 420 SCRA 575, GR No. 155001, January 21, 2004); and legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. (Ople vs. Torres, supra) 58. What do you understand by the Writ of Amparo? Writ of Habeas Data? ANSWER: Writ of Amparo is a special constitutional writ or order issued by a court to protect or enforce a constitutional right (other than physical liberty which is already covered by the writ of habeas corpus) in consonance with the power of the Supreme Court to adopt rules to protect or enforce constitutional rights. The Writ of Amparo was usually used in totalitarian countries to protect the rights of victims of disappearances. In the Philippines, the remedy resorted to by relatives of missing persons is the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. But by way of experience, petitions for habeas corpus just ended up with state agents saying the missing person was not in their custody. Under the Writ of Amparo, it is not enough for officials to say that. The writ compels state agents to look for the missing person. And if the court finds that the officials did not exert enough effort in finding the person, it can hold them liable. Write of Habeas Data pertains to the right of a person (1) to access registries (data bank); (2) right to complement information contained in the registries and (3) the right to rectification of said registries. It is a legal process by which an individual may petition, through courts, that government present to the petitioner all information gathered by government on his person, and demand that said data be corrected if erroneous, or totally destroyed if ridiculous. The two new writs were authorized by the 1987 Constitution when it allowed the Supreme Court to promulgate rules to protect constitutional rights. National Economy and Patrimony 59. Give two cases in which aliens may be allowed to acquire entity in a business but cannot participate in the management thereof. ANSWER: Under the Constitution, aliens may acquire entity but cannot participate in the management of business entities engaged in the following activities: (A) public utilities - Section 11, Art. XII (b) education Section 4(2), Art. XIV, and (c) advertising Section 11(2), Art. XVI 60. A corporation, 60% of its capital stock is owned by Filipinos, proposes to publish a weekly magazine for general circulation in Metro Manila which will feature the lifestyle of the rich and famous. May this be done? Cite the constitutional provision in point. ANSWER: No, the corporation cannot publish a weekly magazine since it is engaged in the operation of a mass medium and is not wholly owned by Philippine citizens. Section 11(1) of Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution provides: The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or association wholly owned and managed by such citizens. 61. May a foreigner who owns substantial stock holdings in a corporation engaged in the advertising industry sit as a treasurer of said corporation? Cite the constitutional provision in point. ANSWER: NO. A foreigner who owns shares of stock in a corporation engaged in the advertising industry cannot serve as treasurer in the corporation, for a treasurer is an executive or managing officer. Section 11(2), Art. XVI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides: The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities of such industry shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all the executive and managing officers of such entities must be citizens of the Philippines.

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62. (1) Are ancestral domains and ancestral lands part of the land of the public domain? ANSWER: NO. Ancestral domain and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public domain. The Indigenous People Rights Acts grants to indigenous cultural communities/indigenous people a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands. (Cruz vs. Sec. of ENR, GR No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2002) (2) Distinguish ownership of land under native title and ownership by acquisitive prescription against the State. ANSWER: Ownership be native title presupposes that the land has been held by its possessor and his predecessor in interest in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successor-in- interest, the United States and Philippine Government. There has been no transfer of title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State involves a conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person. (Ibid.) (3) Does the principle of jure regalia negate native title held in private ownership since time immemorial? ANSWER: NO. The Regalian Theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Carino vs. Insular Government (41 Phil 935) the US Supreme Court recognized the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. (Ibid.) 63. MAGANDA, natural-born Filipino citizen, went to the US in 1965 to work as a nurse. With her savings she bought a parcel of land consisting of 1,000 square meters in a residential subdivision in MetroManila. She had the said property titled in her name 1970. In July 1972, MAGANDA acquired American citizenship by naturalization. Two months later, she married her Canadian boyfriend. (1) Can MAGANDA validly sell this parcel of land to the younger sister of her husband who is also a Canadian citizen? (2) Supposing MAGANDAs husband dies and she decides to reside in the Philippines permanently, can MAGANDA buy the parcel of land consisting of another 1,000 square meters neighboring her own? (3) Supposing the area where her lot is situated has been reclassified as commercial district by virtue of a zoning ordinance, can MAGANDA use the lot for commercial purposes? ANSWERS: (1) No. Under Sec. 7, Art. XII of the Constitution, as a general rule, aliens cannot acquire private lands since pursuant to Sec. 2 in relation to Sec 3 of said Article, they are not qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Under Sec. 7, an alien can acquire public lands only by hereditary succession. Under Sec. 8, a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private land. The younger sister of her husband is not acquiring the private land by hereditary succession but by sale. Neither is she a former natural-born Philippine citizen who lost her Philippine citizenship. Consequently, neither of the exception found in the above-mentioned provisions is applicable to her. (2) Yes. Under RA 8179, which amended BP 185, a natural-born Philippine citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship may now acquire a maximum of 5,000 square meters of private urban land. (3) Yes. Under the same amendatory law, such land may now be used for business and for other lawful purposes. 64. The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power and responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization thereof. Name the four modes though which the State may undertake these activities. ANSWER: The State may undertake these activities through four modes: (1) The State may directly undertake such activities; (2) The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities at least 60% of whose capital is owned by such citizens; (3) Congress may, by law, allow small scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens (RA 7006 Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 and other pertinent laws); and (4) For the large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance, (RA 79 42 ) subject to the following limitations: a) As to Parties. Only the President, in behalf of the State, may enter into these agreements, and only with corporations. b) As to Size of the Activities. Only large scale exploration, development and utilization is allowed, i.e., very capital-intensive activities. c) The natural resources subject of the activities is restricted to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the intent being to limit service contracts to those areas where

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Filipino capital may not be sufficient. d) Consistency with the Provisions of Statute. The FTAA must be in accordance with the terms and conditions provided by law. e) The FTAA must be based on real contributions to economic growth and general welfare of the country. f) The FTAA must contain rudimentary stipulations for the promotions of the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. G) Notification Requirement. The President shall notify Congress of every FTAA entered into within 30 days from its execution. H) Scope of the FTAA. Only for agreements involving either financial or technical assistance and does not include service contracts a nd management or other forms of assistance. (La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc., GR No. 127882, January 27, 2004) 65. The Public Estate Authority reclaimed the submerged areas of Manila Bay which are part of the sea. Later, the PEA sought to transfer ownership of the 77 hectares comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificate of title in the name of the PEA as well as the 209 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, to the AMARI Coastal Development Corporation, a private corporation. (1) Discuss the validity of the transfer of a) the Freedom Islands and b) still submerged areas of Manila Bay . (2) Would your answer be the same if the reclamation was undertaken by the National Housing Authority, a government entity not tasked to dispose of public land, under a BOT contract governed by the BOT law? ANSWERS: (1) (a) The reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands are alienable lands of the public domain and as such its transfer to the AMARI is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but not sell or transfer these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens subject to the ownership limitations in the Constitution and existing laws. (b) The transfer of the 209 hectares of the still submerged areas of Manila Bay is likewise void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which prohibits the alienation or natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. After the PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas and until classified as alienable and disposable land open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service, only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the submerged areas are still inalienable and outside the commerce of man. (2) NO. The NHA, unlike the PEA is an "end user agency" authorized by law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. Likewise, the combined and collective effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 is tantamount to and can be considered to be an official declaration that the reclaimed lots are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. (Chavez vs. NHA, 530 SCRA 235) 66. Can a private corporation acquire any kind of alienable land of the public domain? ANSWER: NO. The 1987 Constitution adopts the policy of banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable lands of the public domain. However, it allows private corporation to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case because the land was already private property at the time it was acquired by Acme. In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land was not yet a private property. (Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., GR 154953, June 26, 2008) 67. Are aliens allowed to acquire private lands? ANSWER: NO. The primary purpose of the constitutional prohibition disqualifying aliens from acquiring lands of the public domain and private lands is the conservation of the national economy and patrimony. A German citizen married to a Filipino woman and eventually separated and filed a petition for separation of properties and prayed for the reimbursement of the amount the foreign husband advanced for the purchase of the parcel of land, is disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines. Where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute, no trust can result in favor of the guilty party. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit him to enjoy the fruits of the property which he is not allowed to own. The sale of land as to him is null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that he is merely exercising the prerogative of the husband in respect to conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect contravention of the constitutional prohibition. (Muller vs. Muller, GR 149615, August 29,2006)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW /P17 In Ting Ho, Jr. vs. Teng Gui 558 SCRA 421, a Chinese citizen acquired a parcel of land, together with the improvements thereon. Upon his death, his heirs claimed the properties as part of the estate of their deceased father, and sought the partition of said properties among themselves. The Court, however, excluded the land and improvements thereon from the estate precisely because he never became the owner thereof in the light of the constitutional prohibition. In Matthews vs. Taylor, GR No. 164584, June 22, 2009, the Court upheld the validity of an Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband. Being an alien, the husband is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines even if he claims that he provided funds for such acquisition. He had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. In Borromeo vs. Descalar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009, the Court reiterated the consistent ruling that if land is validly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. 68. What do you understand by the Regalian Doctrine? ANSWER: The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. (Secretary of the DENR vs. Yap, GR 167707, October 8, 2008) 69. Can private claimants of Boracay island have the right to secure titles over their occupied portion in the island? Who has the authority to classify land of the public domain? ANSWER: NO. Except or lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1604. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD 705, hence, inalienable. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public lands into disposable land for agricultural and other purposes. The fact that the island has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments does not negate its character as public forest. The mere continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay and, therefore, they are ineligible to apply for judicial confirmation of title over their occcupied portions in the island. Presidential Proclamation 1801 did not convert the whole Boracay into an agricultural land. It merely classified Boracay as a tourist zone. It was Proclamation No. 1064 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened to private ownership. Section 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. Is issuing Proclamation 1604, the President merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested right. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive department, through the Office of the President. (Sec. of DENR vs. Yap, GR No167707, Oct.8, 2008) 70. When may a public land become alienable and disposable? ANSWER: To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. A certification of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the DENR stating that the land subject of an application is found to be within the alienable and disposable site in a land classification project map is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of the application. (Republic vs. Candymaker, Inc. GR No. 163766, June 22, 2006) 71. What is the State's policy on monopolies? On free enterprise? ANSWER: The Constitution does not totally prohibit the operation of monopolies. It mandates the State to regulate them when public interest so requires. (EASCO vs. LTFRB, 413 SCRA 75) Despite the fact that our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, nonetheless, the Government reserves the power to intervene to promote the general welfare. Free enterprise does not call for removal of protective regulations. It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. (Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque, GR 173034, October 9, 2007)

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72. Can a Japanese citizen be admitted into the practice of medicine in the country? ANSWER: YES, provided he has taken and passed the medical board examination and upon submission of a proof of reciprocity between Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine. It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino to get license and practice therein. Philippine laws do not require that the conditions for the practice of medicine in the other country are practical and attainable by Filipinos. The license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government. However, the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner. (Board of Medicine vs. Ota, 558 SCRA 234) Constitutional Amendments 73. In their desire to change the present system of government, SINGAW NG BAYAN and a couple more of civil society groups sought to change the constitution by proposing a shift from bicameral presidential system to unicameral parliamentary system of government through peoples initiative by gathering more than 6 million signatures from among registered voters nationwide. Under existing laws and jurisprudence, will their move prosper? What are the substantial and procedural requisites in changing the Constitution through peoples initiative upon a petition? ANSWERS: In Santiago vs. COMELEC, GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997, it was held that this mode of amending the Constitution is not a self-executing provision of the Constitution. While there is an existing law on initiative, RA 6735 An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum, the same is in adequate and incomplete to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. Such inadequacy cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate implementing rules and regulations. However, in the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, the Court noted that majority of the justices voted to declare RA 6735 sufficient law for a peoples initiative on the Constitution, effectively abandoning Santiago vs. COMELEC. A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to amendments of the Constitution and not to revisions to Constitution. Only Congress or a Constitutional Convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. Where the intent of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments. Abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks and balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a bicameral presidential to unicameral parliamentary system, involving abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. (Lambino vs. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160) Peoples initiative as a mode of changing the Constitution requires a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people first, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal (No agent or representative can sign on their behalf) and second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative upon petition only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The full text of the amendments may either be written on the face of the petition, or attached to it, and if so attached the petition must state the fact of such attachment. An initiative that gathers signature from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. (Lambino vs. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160) Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiative to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates: (1) Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution allowing only mere amendment and not revision as a mode of changing the Constitution. (2) Section 5 (b) of RA 6735 which requires the that the petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least 12% of the total number of registered voters as signatories and also requires the people must sign the petition xxx as signatories. (3) Section 10 (a) of RA 6735: No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate xxx. The proposed Section 4 (4) of the Transitory Provisions mandates the Interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revision to the Constitution, a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. ---oOo---