CHAPTER TWO

THE LAHORE RESOLUTION--A PERMANENT CLEAVAGE BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND SIKHS

The Lahore Resolution of 1940 had an immense political impact on the Punjab politics. In particular, the prospect of a Muslim homeland raised anxieties for the Sikh political leadership which by this time was dominated by the Shiromani Akali Dal. The Sikhs from time to time had raised their demands for the protection as the politics became more democratized. But their demands had not been fully accepted either by the British or the Congress and merely distanced them further from the Punjabi Muslim sentiment. The Sikh demands were weak because they always worked in reaction to the Muslim political developments. This chapter aims to look into the Muslim-Sikh relations in the backdrop of the Lahore Resolution up to the time of the Cripps proposals. The Muslim-Sikh relations had been somewhat good but the Lahore Resolution of 1940 drew a hard-line and widened the gulf between the two communities even in the rural areas. To the Sikhs, the Pakistan scheme had ended any possibility of settlement with the Muslims. It created a crisis in the Punjab particularly in the Sikh politics. The Hindus adopted different styles of opposing the Pakistan scheme from different platforms nevertheless the strongest reaction came from the Sikh community because the Punjab, cornerstone of the Leagues plan, was a sacred land of Sikhs. Despite their fullest endeavours, they could not find a solid scheme to counter the Pakistan scheme. They planned resistance of Pakistan instead of making a plan to meet the rapidly changing situations of the 1940s. In the crucial phase of the

110 freedom movement, the Sikh leadership ignored all the situational realities of the day relating to the panth, their sister communities and the turning tide of the Indian history. This further weakened the nature of the Muslim-Sikh relationship in the Punjab. The Sikhs by and large remained disunited, leaderless and directionless. As far as the Sikh attitude towards the Muslims was concerned, the Sikhs continued to portray them as the worst evil. The Akalis proved equally unsympathetic to the Muslims whether they were Leaguers or the pro-British Unionists. They were confused because their utmost desire was to remain with the defiant Congress but at the same time they never wanted to lose the opportunity of the recruitment in the army. Moreover, they did not want to surrender the benefits for their community which the Muslims could have from the British. The Unionist Premier, Sir Sikandar Hayat, had already assured the British of the Muslim support in the war. And the Unionist Muslims after the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact were technically members of the League1 at that time as Ahmad Yar Daultana admitted in his letter to Jinnah, I am a member of the Muslim League and my relations of loyalty with you will always remain un-shattered.2 Under the Muslim threat and the personal benefits, the Sikhs decided to support the British and fought zealously in the World War I leaving behind all their homes and dear kinspersons. According to Khushwant Singh, the main purpose of the Sikh recruitment was to arm the community so that after the British departure they might utilize these army men as the Khalsa fauj. 3 The Hindu Mahasabha had a similar sentiment. Its Working Committee on 22 September 1940 passed a resolution opposing Gandhian approach on the recruitment. The leaders said that the war was a big opportunity for the general militarization of the Hindus, and for the organization of the system of India on sound and up-to-date modern lines, so that India be converted into a self-contained

111 defence unit. 4 The Sikhs and Mahasabha Hindus were united against the Muslim League and were trying to increase their fighting strength.

Communal Tension The communal clashes in towns such as Shahpur, Sargodha, Sialkot, Gujranwala, and Ludhiana caused an additional setback to the Muslim-Sikh relations. Local conflicts coincided with the constitutional deadlock between the main political parties none of whom appeared willing to compromise. In the first week of March 1940, Dr. R. P. Paranjpye, President, the National Liberal Federation of India depicted the deplorable political situation in which the Congress was held responsible for the constitutional deadlock:
It shows no desire on the part of the Congress to reach a peaceful settlement of the Indian problem. While inveighing against British imperialism and exploitation, it is blind to the dangers of a much worse imperialism and exploitationDemocracy, in Congress eyes, apparently means subservience to the High Command and ultimately to Mr. Gandhi. The Congress, by its methods, alienating more and more several minorities and is working against national unityI agree in the Congress repudiation of attempts to divide India or to split up her nationhood, but earnestly trust that the Congress will counteract these attempts by deeds of conciliation and not merely by words of repudiation. As it is, the Congress has contributed largely to the separatist tendencies by antagonising the minorities.5

The Congress resigned from the ministries (22 October 1939) in seven provinces which gave Jinnah an opportunity to gain strength in the provinces as an alternative political force. Therefore, in the current scenario, the League had its governments in NWFP, Sindh and Balochistan while to K. C. Yadav, Punjab and Bengal already were his.6 In the beginning of March 1940, Dr. Muhammad Alam, MLA, resigned from the Deputy leadership of the Congress party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly and analyzed the Hindu attitude of the Congress which was not confined to sideline Jinnah and his party but to all the Muslims; it never acknowledged the services of other nationalist Muslims who were compelled to desert the Congress gradually. He

112 further stated that the war had made the situation very fragile and crucial therefore the Congress must change its attitude towards the Muslim rights because soon the situation would change in the country: The time for fighting over rights against the British Government is soon to change into a time for distribution of rights. 7 Furthermore, the nationalist Muslims kept on pressing the Congress leaders to change their behaviour towards the Muslims. An article published in Hindustan depicts the grievances of the Congressite Muslims:
Today we have issue of the Muslim inclusion in the Congress before us and amazingly all aspects related to the issue are surfacing out time to time. To me, the severest and the most important point is the Hindu mentality that the Congressite leaders themselves have presented as a big psychological hurdle. In general, the atmosphere of the daily routine work and meetings of the Congress does not attract the Muslims. For example, our national songs, language of the proceedings, traditions, etc. were pestering and irritating to the Muslims. And civilizationally it can conspicuously be said a Hinduiyat. This is the root cause, which blocks the Congress popularity among the Muslims. It is listened that Comrade M. N. Rai too has conceded the very point.8

This was the original face of the Congress, which always made the Muslims feel that they were inferior and aliens. On the other hand, the Sikhs were not ready to tolerate even parleys between Congress and the League. On the League-Congress dialogue, the Executive Committee of the Khalsa National Party in the Punjab Assembly under Sir Sundar Singh Majithia,
9

the Revenue Minister, resolved that the Sikhs

apprehensions had increased after watching the current political situation of India in which the Sikh demands got no attention. He further elucidated that the GandhiViceroy and then Jinnah-Gandhi discussions showed that the Congress was ignoring the Sikh claims just to pacify the Muslims because during these negotiations only the Muslims were being considered as an important minority. 10 Although the Sikhs desired to participate in the discussions on the communal issue but as a matter of fact the Hindu leadership and others perceived that the Sikhs could not survive without the

113 Hindu support. If the Congress was satisfied, the Sikhs would have felt the same ultimately. At Lahore, a major clash took place between the Khaksars and the police and caused serious bloodshed (19 March 1940). Sir Sikandar requested Jinnah to prorogue the Leagues session but Jinnah refused. According to Ashiq Hussain Batalvi, every Muslim house was sad and mourning the poignant incident but the Sikhs were pleased on the police action against the Khaksars.11 Under such a stringent atmosphere, the League held its annual session at Lahore in March 1940 in which its leadership set a goal to achieve Pakistan before the Indian Muslims. Sir Sikandar participated in the drafting process of the Lahore Resolution commonly known as the Pakistan Resolution.12

The Lahore Resolution Jinnah had declared that the Lahore League session would be a landmark in the future of the Muslims of the Subcontinent. Distinguished Punjabi Muslim leaders like the Premier Sir Sikandar, Khizr Tiwana, Mian Abdul Haye and Sir Shah Nawaz of Mamdot welcomed Jinnah to the ceremonial platform of Lahore. The people in thousands were waiting for their leader outside the Railway Station while the streets had been decorated to show love and devotion for the League leaders. 13 In his presidential address on 23 March, Jinnah gave a complete reply to the Ramgarh Congress session ideology by saying that the spiritual, financial, cultural, social and political differences between the Muslims and non-Muslims were fundamental and deep-rooted which maintained the dividing line between the two throughout the centuries. After experiencing a close interaction of a thousand years, both the communities never merged into each other and were still separate and distinctive.

114 Merely the democratic constitution could not unite them forcibly together. Binding to such a system was an un-natural and artificial effort of the British in the guise of the parliamentary system.14 The major portions of the Lahore Resolution are as under:
no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute Independent States That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them15

According to Sir Craik, the resolution produced three results which elevated the Muslims to speak more forcefully for their rights, including the status of the League, unchallenged leadership of Jinnah and the unanimity of the Muslims on the Pakistan demand. 16 The Lahore Resolution 17 was eventually to provide a rallying point for Muslims from the majority and minority provinces who had possessed different political interests. Its immediate impact was to invoke a hostile reaction among all the factions of the Sikhs.

Sikh Reaction to the Lahore Resolution The Pakistan Resolution passed by the League provoked a new sense of rights among the Indian Muslims by determining the clear-cut destination of Pakistan but proved a bomb-shell to the Sikh community. Despite the rampant factionalism in Sikh politics, all the Sikh groups were firmly united on one point, opposition to the Pakistan scheme. To Tai Yong Tan, the Resolution of 1940 brought a colossal unrest for the Sikh community. Their anger was genuine because it was a direct threat to the economy, canal colony lands, religion and existence of Sikhs.18 On 24 March 1940, Kartar Singh and Master Tara Singh led a Sikh procession in Amritsar and condemned the idea of Pakistan. They advised the Sikhs to get ready for sacrifices

115 against the Muslims. 19 Sikhs were hit the most by the Lahore Resolution. The Shiromani Akali Dal declared it out rightly a declaration of the civil war.20 Even before the passage of the Lahore Resolution, the Sikhs had been raising voice against the expected Muslim demands for a separate state. The All India Akali Conference was held at Attari (15 miles from Lahore) on 10-11 February 1940 in which the Akali Sikhs from all the parts of India participated. Isher Singh Majhail, Professor Ganga Singh, Santokh Singh, Sant Singh, MLA, and Partap Singh, MLA condemned the idea of a separate Muslim state. They also criticized the Unionist ministry. Teja Singh of Akarpura said in his presidential address that the Unionist Muslims were spending the government finances to spread Islam. The speakers expressed determination that the Sikhs would always work to strengthen the Congress position. They also advised the audiences to set up the Akali Fauj Centres in every village.21 To H. N. Mitra, the Sikhs pledged in this conference that the endeavours to convert the Punjab into Pakistan would be resisted by all possible means. 22 On the question of Pakistan, according to Joseph T. OConnell, they were even ready to sacrifice Indian independence which was their political creed.23 Master Tara Singh argued soon after the League resolution that if the Indian Muslims feared from the Hindu majority, the Sikhs too feared from the Muslim domination in the Punjab.24 The Pakistan scheme created panic among the common Sikhs and the recruitment efforts in 1940 were severely downed. Major-General Lockhart reported that the main factor behind the Sikh reluctance to enlist and the desertions from the army was that the Sikhs thought that if they went to the front abroad, their property, lands and villages would be attacked and occupied by the Muslims who desired to capture the Punjab. The Sikhs, therefore, wished to live in India to look after their families and community and protect them from the Muslims.

116 The Sikhs would be contented if the concessions were to be given to the Congress rather than the League.25 The Sikhs were well aware of the dangers which they faced but the situation required them to come up with remedies. Master Tara Singh himself writes in his book that Pakistan meant Muslim Raj either in the name of Pakistan or without it. To him, Pakistan created a new sense of prejudice in the Muslims and increased apprehension of the non-Muslims. He further says that the rule in the Punjab by the Unionist Muslims was enough to irritate the Sikhs but the Leaguers had been pinching them more and more by adopting the word Pakistan.26 On 20 May 1940, 125 Sikh leaders gathered at Lahore who established Guru Raj Khalsa Darbar to achieve an independent state of Khalistan from Jumna to Jamrud. They also planned to have two more states including Takht Sri Hazur Sahib (Hyderabad State) and Takhat Sri Patna Sahib. They claimed to regain the areas which had been under the Sikh rule. In the next meeting presided over by Gopal Singh Gargaj on 23 May, the Sikh leaders discussed the practicality of the scheme.27 This meeting was a countering measure to the idea of Pakistan.

Pakistan Resolution and the Congress In the practical parlance, the League had demanded Pakistan on the basis of the Two-Nation Theory. The Times of India threw light on the League session of Lahore and wrote that the Congress Session of Ramgarh highlighted the single nation theory in India as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had argued while the League retaliated with the Two-Nation theory.28 The popularity of the League pervaded all the Muslim minds. Raghuvendra Tanwar depicts the post-League session situation that With every passing day after the adoption of the Pakistan Resolution the League moved one step closer to its goal of a separate home land for Muslims.29 The sane minds could

117 look into the sharply changing situation. The Times portraying importance and numerical strength of the Muslims wrote that the course of Muslim feelings could not be brushed aside. The other communities would have to accommodate them in the constitutional war. The French are a minority in Europe, which does not imply that they must submit to German domination.30 Jinnah himself asserted in January 1941 that the Muslim League now represents 90 per cent Mussalmans 31 in the Subcontinent which meant that the increased support of Muslims created more congenial atmosphere for the League leader to continue his struggle. As far as the British response to the Pakistan scheme was concerned, they, as usual, favoured the united India and seemed satisfied that the Muslim demand had no backing of the Muslim majority provinces. Lord Linlithgow32 expressing his adverse remarks against the League and Jinnahs move wrote to Zetland33 that they could not make a plan as an alternative to the Hindu domination. 34 Zetland supported Linlithgows standpoint by saying that he disagreed in April 1940 with the Leagues proposal for the Indian vivisection. He said that to concede such a demand would mean to dishonour the efforts of the British and Indians for the unity of India.35 In fact Zetland had always been in favour of the united India. He had expressed the same in 1938 by saying that they would have insuperable difficulties in the acceptance of any move that would result in the territorial separation from the Indian Union. 36 Moreover, in 1942, Linlithgow wrote to Amery37 that it was the Hindu community which made a mistake of taking Jinnah seriously about Pakistan, and as a result they have given substance to a shadow.38 The Congress had many friends in England39 who always paved the way for the Congresss popularity through effective propaganda. The press generally supported whatever the Hindu leadership stood for. The New Statesman in 1942

118 favoured Gandhis campaign and condemned the governments decision to exempt the Muslims from the fines. Lord Huntingdon wrote in his book titled Common Sense About India (1942) that the British should withdraw from India and surrender the political powers to the Congress. Professor Laski through the Manchester Guardian pressed on the Viceroy to accommodate Gandhi through dialogue. The wife of Lord Pethick-Lawrence in August 1942 appreciated Gandhian campaign of civil disobedience through a letter to The Times. 40 All these fronts were facilitating the Hindu struggle, even Sir Stafford Cripps, a friend of Nehru, extended greetings on the success of Congress in the elections 1937 and latter had been continuously in contact with him before he was sent to India in 1942.41 The Congress leadership adopted erratic attitude towards the Lahore Resolution and the Sikhs. In the beginning, they tried to conceal their real feelings about the Pakistan scheme but they could not help exposing themselves with the passage of time. Sir Chimanlal Setalvad said that Jinnahs scheme would be disastrous to the interests of all the communities equally. 42 In a meeting of the Congress in 1940, Rajendra Babu said that the recent resolution of the League meant civil war without caring as to what his leader Gandhi was uttering in favour of the Muslim separatist movement. In the same meeting, Gandhi had said that If Muslims want separatism, he will not oppose. 43 Gandhi in April 1940 declared the fight against the Muslim scheme of partition through non-violent methods44 but at the same time he conceded that all the communities had a right to demand their due political share which suited them. Nehru, C. Rajagopalachari, Maulana Azad and other Congress leaders considered that the Pakistan scheme was absurd. They believed that the Muslim masses would never back it. The other Congress leaders expressed their incapability to oppose it if the Muslims desired it. During May 1940, they made it

119 clear that the Congress wished no use of coercion against the Pakistan demand. The Congress did not make any formal statement or pass a resolution against the partition scheme of the League till April 1942. 45 The situation after the Lahore Resolution shows that no community of India or Punjab including the British had any sympathy for the scheme presented by the League. The British may have been conducive to the Muslim rights but they showed no favour for the Pakistan idea. Therefore, the League leadership had to plead its case on the universally accepted principle of selfdetermination.

Sikh Strategy The Sikhs had been complaining against the Muslim domination in the provincial legislature and proposed an increase in their representation from time to time. The situation became worse because the League had declared a plan to have a permanent Muslim domination in the Punjab. The Muslim state was not an abrupt show of the Muslims rather this idea had been in the air since 1930, and the idea of a physical division of the country had been underlined by the Muslim League throughout 1939.46 Therefore, the rival community was ready to fully oppose it. Demand for division and its opposition went simultaneously as parallel forces. The prime Sikh strategy was to show utmost annoyance through the press and public statements. A day after the Pakistan Resolution the Akalis organized a conference at Anandpur in which Giani Dhanwant Singh and Master Ajit Singh strongly criticized the idea of Pakistan.47 On 27 March, the executive committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal in a meeting at Amritsar condemned the Pakistan scheme. 48 The Khalsa National Party held a conference at Lahore on 29 March in which the idea of Pakistan was rejected. The Revenue Minister Sundar Singh Majithia warned that the Lahore Resolution was

120 fraught with grave dangers. A resolution passed at the conference expressed the Sikh sentiments that it would be the height of audacity for anyone to imagine that the Sikhs would tolerate for a single day the undiluted communal Raj of any community in the Punjab which is not only their homeland but also their holy land.49 According to the resolution:
In the opinion of the party the resolution of the Muslim League has created a situation which may mean a parting of the ways for the Sikhs and Muslims with whom the Khalsa National Party has been co-operating in the Provincial Autonomy regime in the best interests of the province and the Sikh community.50

On 29 March 1940, the City Akali Jatha of Amritsar passed a resolution against the Leagues demand for the Muslim state. 51 All the Sikhs who had otherwise been disunited were united in making statements against the Pakistan scheme. The Communist Sikhs favoured the Muslim right of self-determination but appeared confused in their response to the Pakistan scheme. They on 5 April arranged a conference at Attari which was attended by the eminent leaders like Sohan Singh Josh, Ghulam Fatima and Gopal Singh Qaumi to give a reply to the Akalis. The conference deplored the communal activities of the organizations such as the Khaksars and the Akalis at the same time opposition was raised to the Pakistan scheme. Although the Intelligence reports considered it a weak counteraction to the Akali conference of March 194052 but through the speeches they had conveyed their message to the Sikhs, Muslims and the Hindus that on the issue of the partition scheme of the League they were with the Sikhs and Congress. They raised objections to the Akali Dal because of its religious claims to represent all the Sikhs and its verdict that their political opponents were traitors to the panth. 53 At Pherala (Lyallpur) on 6 April 1940, Master Tara Singh briefed the audience about the Akali understanding on the current political scenario and the Akali policy to deal with the situation. He said that the Sikhs were fighting a war for survival. The weak position of

121 the British in the war could result in a great change in the politics while the Leaguers had called them for the civil war. He further maintained that the British government had discouraged the Sikhs therefore they had become religiously very weak.54 Giani Kartar Singh, the brain of the Akalis, held that the Muslim scheme of a separate state aimed to enslave the Sikhs. 55 The SGPC postulated the Sikh cooperation with Sir Sikandar on the war efforts to his resignation from the League.56 In an anti-Pakistan conference at Lyallpur, Master Tara Singh repudiated the ideology of Muslim separatism.57 In a Sikh diwan at Nankana Sahib, the Pakistan scheme was deprecated.58 The Pharala Akalis Conference (Lyallpur) on 6-7 April 1940 attracted a big throng to which the Sikh leaders like Ishar Singh Majhail, Master Tara Singh, and Kartar Singh MLA, delivered anti-Pakistan speeches with determination that the Sikhs would forcibly resist such an idea of the Muslim state. They even demanded that Sir Sikandar should disown the League59 to show his impartiality. Baba Kharak Singh of the Central Akali Dal maintained that the vivisection of India would never be allowed and the Sikhs would undermine the anti-India campaign. 60 The Sikhs expressed their anger in the speeches made in the Akali Conference held at Hasanabdal. They termed the Lahore Resolution as the end of peace of the region.61 On 15 April 1940, at Lucknow, Master Tara Singh, President of SGPC, made a tirade in the UP Sikh Conference decrying the League resolution for a Muslim state. He demanded that the UP Sikhs must not be treated as the Punjabi Sikhs who were under the Unionist Muslims. 62 He further said that the Pakistan scheme would mean a civil war and the Muslims would have to cross an ocean of Sikh blood63 for the accomplishment of their task. The Central Khalsa Youngmen Union in April 1940 pledged to suffocate the Pakistan scheme.64 The Sikhs launched a series of protests through conferences in which they condemned the Pakistan scheme

122 but were silent on counter proposals as solution to the communal problem which could be acceptable for all the stakeholders. The Sikh conferences attracted big gathering from the rural areas who conveyed the infused anti-Muslim feelings to the other community members. They also rejuvenated Sikh bitter memories of the Mughal oppression and their sacrifices. On the other hand, the League was busy to spread the idea of Pakistan in the minds and hearts of the Muslim masses. According to the Intelligence Reports, the League held eleven meetings at mosques in the districts of Lahore, Amritsar, Rohtak, Jullundur, Jhelum, Karnal, Gurdaspur, Lyallpur, Jhang, Rawalpindi and Simla and celebrated the Pakistan Day on 19 April and passed pro-Pakistan resolutions. In the Rawalpindi meeting, Dr. Muhammad Alam declared that the Muslims were ready to sacrifice their lives for their own cause but not for the Hindu raj.65 Master Tara Singh, always spoke in terms of sacrifice, but in resistance to Pakistan he urged the Sikh militants to get ready for an action to block the possibility of emergence of Pakistan.66 In July 1940, the government reports depicted the Sikh intention that they would undermine the hopes of the Muslim self-determination at any cost. For this purpose, they had started purchasing weapons and ammunition. They were buying Kirpans and axes in large numbers so that the Sikhs could use them in case of a fight. 67 The SGPC and the Akali Dal organized a commemorative ceremony for the Sikh martyrs of the Ghallughara. A gathering of 20,000 Sikhs pledged to resist the Pakistan drive68 along with the revival of the Akali Saina (Sikh army). 69 The Muslims protested and condemned the Ghallughara Day celebrations and warned that such activities would inflame the communal feelings in the region.70 Despite sensing the Muslim feelings, they kept on launching anti-Muslim activities throughout the region. Another Ghallughara Conference was arranged at

123 Gujarwal (district Ludhiana) on 15 June 1940. The leaders held a secret session in which they discussed the establishment of the Sikh state if the British government collapsed. The report informed the conference about the distrust between the Sikh and Muslim communities in the Ludhiana district. 71 Dr. Satyapal considered the Sikhs as communalists on the celebration of the Ghallughara Day. 72 The Sikhs organized the Ghallughara days or conferences almost in all the Sikh centers and caused friction between the two communities. Nothing was done however to stop this communal hatred. The British government was not taking the Sikh activities against the Leagues Pakistan scheme seriously. 73 The Sikh press fully participated in the anti-Pakistan activities and said that they would never let the Muslims establish their rule over the Sikhs. The Muslims had to face fierce hurdles.74 An array of the non-Muslim political forces was against Pakistan and intimidating the Muslims through speeches, press statements, physical trainings and parades. In April 1940, the SGPC held a meeting at Amritsar in which Dalip Singh Doabia expressed that creation of the Muslim state would remain a dream for good. He hoped that the Sikh legislators would withdraw their support from the Unionist ministry unless its Muslim members dissociated themselves from Muslim League.75 The Khalsa Defence League was organized in 1940 under the Maharaja Patiala with Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar as its members. The pro-government Khalsa National Party refused to co-operate with the Khalsa League on the inclusion of the Akali Dal. The clash of personalities remained a permanent feature of the Sikh politics76 despite raging campaigns against the Pakistan scheme. In November 1940, the Sikhs came to know that the British desired to establish an Ahmadi77 state (covering area of 10 miles) in Qadian, district Gurdaspur which caused bitterness between them and the Muslims. A big procession of the

124 Akalis passed through Qadian chanting anti-Qadian state slogans. Udham Singh Nagoke, Parlok Singh, Teja Singh Akarpuri and many others addressed the conference (17-18 November) held near Qadian. Parlok Singh appealed to the government not to form an infant Pakistan in the Punjab. Nagoke spoke against the proposed Ahmadi state and Pakistan and exhorted the Sikhs to join the Congress and the Akali Dal. Pandit Dhirat Ram of Qadian told stories of the painful experiences of the non-Ahmadis of the area and requested the Sikhs to save them from the cruelty of the Qadiani Muslims.78 The Sikhs found allies in the Hindu Mahasabha. In December 1940, an Anti-Pakistan Conference was arranged under the chairmanship of Mr. Anney, a Mahasabha leader, who said that the Muslims were planning to rule India without using weapons. The Conference also condemned the Pakistan scheme. Thousands of non-Muslims attended this Conference including Master Tara Singh.79 In March 1941, an anti-Pakistan conference was arranged at Lahore in which the Hindus mostly from the Punjab, Sindh and NWFP participated. This was originally conceived as purely a Hindu gathering, but the Sikhs enthusiastically joined them because they were following the same agenda. Shyama Prasad Mukerji of the Hindu Mahasabha, in his presidential address promised that 280 million Hindus would be a big hurdle for the Pakistan scheme. He said that Pakistan would be confined to the papers, pamphlets, slogans and the speeches only. He requested the Sikhs to strengthen the hands of the Mahasabha to achieve their destination. M. C. Khanna, a leader of the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party (NWFP Assembly), denounced the Muslim state. Bhai Parmanand asked the audience to use weapons to upset the Muslim hopes.80 The Hindus and Sikhs had joined hands with each other as usual. According to the Police reports, Mahasha Khushal Chand Khursand was provoking the Akalis against the Unionist government. It was also reported that Dr. Gokal Chand

125 Narang, Raja Narendra Nath and Bhai Parmanand had deliberations with Master Tara Singh and the SGPC leaders to organize Hindu Sikh Unity League under Master Tara Singh. Its major aim was to take joint action against the Muslims in case of attacks on the Hindus or Sikhs. The other purpose was to counter the Unionist government and the Pakistan scheme. 81 The programme of the Hindu-Sikh Unity League apparently was a defensive plan against the Muslim attacks but observing the Sikh and Hindu leaders statements and activities, one can easily infer that it was being organized to perpetrate violence against the Muslims. The All-India Akali Conference was held on 15-16 February 1941 at Rurka (Roorka) Kalan district Jallandhar in which the Sikhs presented their demands in detail. The SGPC passed resolutions such as the release of the Sikhs of Sargodha, approval of the SGPC in any legislation regarding Sikh religion, introduction of Gurmukhi and Hindi languages in schools, removal of ban on Jhatka and waiving off tax on religious and the educational institutions. Master Tara Singh appealed to the Muslims and Hindus to support them in their struggle for justice and religious freedom. He further expressed that the government could infuse a sense of security into the Sikhs by conceding these demands. 82 He wrote to the Governor on 28 February 1941 that the provincial government had launched a policy against the Sikhs.83 Governor Craik on 3 March 1941 wrote to Linlithgow that Tara Singh was wrong if he thought that the Punjab Ministers had an anti-Sikh policy.84 Master Tara Singh met the Governor and the Premier in a friendly atmosphere in which Sir Sikander assured that all the possible measures would be taken to meet the Sikh demands. Craik passed his comments through a letter to the Viceroy that Master Tara Singh lacked the leadership qualities:

126
Tara Singh cut a poor figure in argument with Sikander. He was shaky about the facts and has no gift for expressing himself lucidly, but like most Sikhs he is extraordinarily tenacious about his own point of view and incapable of seeing that there can be any other.85

At Gojra, near Lyallpur, B. Singh Daler presiding over the Akali Political Conference on 8-9 March 1941 promised that the Sikhs would launch morcha if their demands passed at the Rurka Kalan conference were not conceded. Amar Singh Dosanjh said that the Sikhs under the Unionist ministry were pushed to the bottom of the society. In another conference at Chajjalwadi (Amritsar) Isher Singh Majhail, Giani Puran Singh and Joginder Singh Shant strongly disapproved the Unionist government on the issues of Jhatka, Gurmukhi, and discriminatory treatment with the Sikhs. The principle of the Gandhian non-violence was repudiated in the conference. 86 According to the Intelligence Report, the Muslim-Sikh relations deteriorated speedily in the province and the Sikhs under the fear of the Muslim attacks were putting all energies in collecting weapons and giving physical trainings to their people in all of the Punjab districts. The Muslims were investing their energies in the Pakistan demand while the Sikh leadership was working on a retrograde agenda, dependence on violence.87 Even Master Tara Singh demanded that the British should let the Sikhs and Muslims settle their problems with weapons. In the same meeting at Amritsar, he attacked the Unionist ministry and declared that the Unionist government was a band of the Sikh and Muslim traitors. He attributed all the Sikh problems to the Unionist government and indicated towards the following problems: 1. Ban on Jhatka, which was an interference with the Sikh religious affairs. 2. Unionist government was working to perpetuate the Muslim dominance and weaken the Sikh panth. 3. The immoral activities of the Muslim ministers including outraging the modesty of Hindu and Sikh girls in College hostels, especially those in the Medical School, Amritsar.88 He also alleged that the British government had collaborated with the Muslims to prolong their own rule. The speakers protested against the Sikh murders at Sargodha and Amritsar, ban on the Nishan Sahib, and the passive response on the issue of the

127 Sikh inclusion in the expanded Viceroys Council.89 All the problems pointed out by the Sikh leaders were meant to counter the Pakistan scheme. They were looking for the British support but at the same time they accused them of working under the policy of divide and rule. The voice for the Sikh kingdom was raised as usual, but not as a well-worked demand. The Nihang issue90 was another problematic area of the tension in the region. The Nihang Sikhs were found engaged in immoral activities. They had also refused to obey the court orders regarding ban on the Nishan sahib. Many Nihang Sikhs were arrested in the case of trespassing Anant Rams house in Sialkot but their associates started protesting against these arrests.91 The police got reports that in many cities like Kasur, Gujranwala, and Amritsar, the Nihangs were strengthening their numerical position and were involved in the illegal activities. They traveled without tickets and terrorized the commoners at the public places through violent postures.92 Isher Singh Majhail advised the Sikhs to help out the Nihangs and store the spears in the Gurdwaras so that they could be used when needed. He accused the Hindus for giving money to the Akalis just for their own benefit. He said that the fight with the Muslims was inevitable therefore the panth must increase the number of Nihangs particularly in the central areas of the Punjab. In all these meetings, they kept on condemning the Pakistan scheme and the Unionist ministry in the Punjab and ban on Jhatka.93 On the Nihang issue, Master Tara Singh warned his followers that the Nihangs could seize the Gurdwara funds if they gained more strength, therefore, the Akalis must be careful in helping them. In the meeting of the SGPC held in July 1941, the Sikh leaders tried to arrive at some agreed action against the Arms Act and the High Court decision against the Nishan sahib. Udham Singh Nagoke was of the view that Nihangs were armed with spears who could be useful in clashes with the Muslims, therefore, they at

128 any rate must be defended. The Sikh leaders anyhow advised the Nihangs to confine to the Gurdwaras. 94 The Akali approach ostensibly was evident by their political activities and response to the events. Amazingly, they were not prepared to tolerate any faction of the Sikh community which could challenge their authority in the political, religious or financial matters. They were keener to obtain the Gurdwara funds rather than the future of the Sikh community. They had never tolerated any parallel leadership within the community and attacked those who stood outside their ranks. In the Sikh Political Conference held on 29-30 May 1941, they insulted Sardar Bahadur Ujjal Singh, MLA when he was talking about the Sikh recruitments for the war. He was howled down by audience notwithstanding, Gurbachan Kaur who came under escort of fifty armed Nihangs and repeated the same advice uttered by Ujjal Singh to the same audience but nobody questioned and insulted her.95 The Akali leadership most of the time took submissive decisions which led them to a confused policy. The Governor on 13 January 1941 wrote to the Viceroy that Major Short, an experienced officer and Sikh enthusiast, had been in contact with Master Tara Singh and other Akali leaders. To Major Short, Master Tara Singh along with his lieutenants was genuinely anxious to stimulate recruitment, but they could not do it openly because of the fear of the others who could project them as reactionaries and supporters of Government. He further reported that the Akalis agreed to continue the British support by supplying agents who would propagate and make every effort for the recruitment. Short opined that the Sikh recruitment depended on their own efforts and government could not be effective in this regard.96 In April 1941, the Daska Akali Conference was arranged in which Sant Singh, MLA, used objectionable language for Jinnah and pledged to oppose the stunt of Pakistan at any cost. He said that Pakistan would only be achieved over the dead bodies of the

129 Sikhs.97 They shouted against the Muslim Premier of the Punjab and observed that even before the establishment of Pakistan the Premier during his four year regime had made the Punjab a virtual Pakistan. His policies reduced the minorities to the drawers of waters and hewers of wood and all the important appointments were given to the Muslims. They also maintained that Sir Sikandar had sent Feroz Khan Noon to the Viceroys Executive Council instead of giving the Sikhs a seat in the central cabinet.98 Many people were of the opinion that the Nihang activities had compatibility with those of the Akalis but Kehr Singh repudiated the allegations regarding Nihangs planning to constitute an Akali army. There were discussions about the funds required for future defence purposes. Madan Mohan Malaviya arranged a conference at Benares to ponder over the safeguards for the Hindus in the possible future clashes. Before leaving to join the Benares conference, Master Tara Singh talked to the Akali leaders to seek comments on a Hindu proposal which was to offer Rs. 500,000 for the Hindu protection against the Muslim attacks. The leaders suggested that the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Hindu Mahasabha should be given equal share of the money. They also urged him to consolidate the organizations such as Akali Saina and Ram Saina.99 On 2 November 1941, the Akhand Hindustan Conference was arranged by the Hindus and Sikhs in which Master Tara Singh through a resolution declared that he disliked the Khalistan scheme as he did regarding the Pakistan scheme. The Hindu and Sikh leaders also advised the audience to give unconditional support to the British in the war so that they might reject the Pakistan scheme.100 It is not amazing in the perspective of the leadership-crisis in the Sikh community that the Akali leaders were accepting money from the Hindus and using the Gurdwara funds against the Muslims. Some of the Sikhs talked of the Sikh state

130 while Master Tara Singh vividly declared that Khalistan meant as much of a betrayal of the Indian nationalism as the League had done by demanding Pakistan. To meet the Pakistan challenge, the sole solution the Sikhs found, was the strategy of violence and joining hands with the Hindus. In Ajit, Master Tara Singh wrote that Sir Sikandar was the worst enemy of the Akali Sikhs. He disclosed a violent plan to occupy Lahore in 1940 after the expected defeat of the British in the war. The Sikh Jathas had been deployed on the appropriate places from where they could easily capture Lahore. Master Tara wrote that they did not arrange for guns because during attack it was quite easy to snatch ammunition from the police stations. The surrender of Lahore could establish the awful authority of the Sikhs which would make further plan very easy.101 L. V. Deane102 filed a report on the Sikh politics on 13 January 1942 observing that the Sikh political parties were working on the traditional lines. The pro-Unionist Khalsa National Party was not still organized at the grassroots level. It had very little hold on the Sikh masses. The Central Sikh League which associated itself with the All-India Sikh League too had no reliable workers. Giani Sher Singh had deserted to seek refuge under the SAD just to save himself from prosecution for embezzlement. The Central Akali Dal aimed to damage the position of the SAD. Though it demanded inclusion of a non-Akali member in the Viceroys Executive Council but as a matter of fact it had no constructive programme for the Sikh community. When the Kirti Kisan Party was banned, the Punjab Kisan Committee emerged and tried to work on the communist lines but it enjoyed no popular support and was confined to the specific areas of the province. The Sikhs were represented in the Punjab Communist Party but like other Kisan organizations the government action made them unimportant. The Sikh element in the Congress also had little importance in the Sikh

131 masses. The Akali Dal was a well entrenched party and had firm control over the Gurdwara funds but had no agreed programme for the Sikhs. The Akalis opposed the non-violence principle of Gandhi but even then they could not sever their uneasy association with the Congress at the same time they favoured the Sikh recruitment in the British army. The Akalis had been raising their voice against the Unionist ministry on the points of the Pakistan scheme, pro-agriculturists policy, jhatka, Muslim favouritism in the appointments, Sikh seat in the Executive Council and ban on Hindi and Gurmukhi in the primary schools. The report further said that the Akalis had no solid programme to pursue.103 The Akali party faced dissension between Giani Kartar and Udham Singh Nagoke on the presidential nomination in 1942. Seeing this friction, Master Tara Singh ended this fight by forwarding his own name as the president of the SAD. In his brief speech, he said that although the Akali Dal was not allowed to join the Khalsa Defence of India League but even then they would favour the Sikh recruitment policy. He also declared that the Sikhs would support the Congress policy of complete independence.104 The Akali leadership felt that Sir Sikandar wanted the British-Sikh relations to be bitter and unfriendly.105 The CAD arranged a conference at Muktsar, district Ferozepore on 13 January in which Baba Sohan Singh, Rais of Muktsar, accused Master Tara Singh and his associates of misusing the Gurdwara funds. The conference passed a resolution against the Pakistan scheme and ban on jhatka. On 21 January 1942, speaking to 5,000 people in a conference of the SAD at Chheharta (Amritsar district), Mohinder Singh Pihariwala declared that the Sikhs were confronting the issue of Pakistan, Jhatka and Punjabi language. The speakers criticised the British and demanded a seat in the Executive Council for the Sikhs.106 Sometimes, the Akalis joined hands with the other forces just to create problems for

132 the Unionists. For example, the small traders were at protest against the Unionist government on the issue of tax. The Akali Dal took up the issue because they had connection with the trading classes but more to weaken the Unionist government. The Akali Dal provided them jathas and other support while Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot asked in the meeting of the League Provincial Working Committee at Lahore on 15 February for action against the leaders who were participating in the beopari agitation. Nevertheless, this point was not conceded as many Leaguers pointed out that the Muslim shopkeepers were also affected by the Sales Tax Act. The Congress and Ahrars joined the Akalis in the on-going agitation of the small traders.107 On 26 February, a meeting of the Working Committee of the All-Parties Sikh Conference was held in Lahore which Sardar Baldev Singh presided over. Through the resolutions, the leaders demanded formation of a national government at the centre with acceptable Sikh representation. In another resolution, they appealed to the Congress to honour the Ravi pledge of 1929 (Lahore). They also constituted a committee which met on 28 February and wished to send a deputation consisting of Master Tara Singh, Sir Joginder Singh and Baldev Singh with 12 other leaders to convince the Sikh masses of the Punjab to be united to cope with the critical political situation. In another conference, the speakers condemned the Unionist government while various irresponsible speakers recited poems vilifying the Unionist Ministry. 108 Master Tara Singh presided over a secret meeting of the Akali Dal which suggested various changes in the sums of Akali Dal and the SGPC so that the balance of the SGPC could be maintained properly as required by the Gurdwara Act. Master Tara informed the activists that he had given a task through a circular to all the Gurdwaras of the Punjab for raising the Sikh volunteers so that they could be called to Amritsar whenever required. The volunteers would maintain their distinguished status

133 with yellow coloured uniform, called Shahidi Wardi. Through a letter, he also conveyed the Sikh sentiments to Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for India (194045) against the Pakistan scheme and Jinnah, and put up a demand for formation of a national government at the centre and consultation with the Sikhs on any constitutional move in future.109 Giani Kartar, MLA, in another meeting at the Akali Diwan (Amritsar) assured the British of the Sikh military support but in return demanded an assurance for the Sikh rights. 110 In an Akali conference held at Anandpur (Jallandhar), the speakers like Ganga Singh Badal, Achhar Singh, Giani Mehr Singh, Professor Ganga Singh and Labh Singh addressed the different sessions. The huge gatherings listened to their leaders who declared that the Sikhs would never support the British in the war. They gave a verdict that the supporters of the Khalsa Defence and the British were not the real Akali Sikhs. Baldev Singh said that the Unionist ministry was a staunch anti-Sikh coalition.111 Master Tara Singh was present in the session but he did not reiterate the Akali policy of the British support in the war. Baldev Singh was an important ally of the Unionist and British government but he too posed as an opponent to the government. At the Doaba Diwan, Giani Mehr Singh spoke out against the principle of nonviolence and appreciated Sobhash Chandra Bose. He also suggested the Akali Sikhs to establish their own rule with the help of weapons. The communal disturbance would be the best opportunity to materialize this dream. At Baba Nath Singh Shahid Akali conference (Sialkot) on 15 March 1942, Santokh Singh urged the need to manage wheat supply to the Sikhs in the villages. He held the Punjab government responsible for the wheat shortage. Sardar Gurmukh Singh, MLA, condemned the idea of establishment of a Muslim state and asked the British to approve the demands sent by Master Tara Singh to Mr. Churchill. Gopal Singh Qaumi spoke to a Sikh

134 Diwan at Rawalpindi on 17 March and asked the Sikhs for organising a jatha comprising 500 Sikhs to protect the community. He also expressed satisfaction that Sir Cripps had been sent to India to meet the constitutional challenge.112 The Akali Sikhs and the League adopted the policy to help out the rural Sikhs and Muslims to overcome the shortage of the consumer goods which strengthened their position while their popularity undermined the Unionist position. The provincial authorities had been expedient in the communal affairs and never took a stern action against the violent activities of the Sikh leaders but they maintained the writ of law when the illegal forces clashed with the British interests. They arrested Udham Singh Nagoke due to the rumour that he was preparing the Sikhs to seize power in the province. Master Tara Singh condemned his arrest and said that the Sikhs had the right to organize themselves for the protection of their Gurdwaras and the community. He, in a meeting at Amritsar, said that the Punjab government was unable to control the violence therefore it was a duty of the Akalis to safeguard the sacred city of Amritsar from looting. The CAD passed a resolution on 22 March that the Sikhs should be given the same rights which the Muslims had been enjoying in the Muslim minority provinces. The disunity, however, remained a dilemma of the Sikh politics and Baba Jiwan Singh, leader of the Mazhabi Sikhs, also came forward and appealed to the Viceroy to permit them to place their demands before Sir Stafford Cripps in a separate political entity.113 The Sikhs in the Sikh All Parties Committee (June 1942) expressed concern over the British response to the Sikh loyalty and sacrifices for the Empire. They said that since the British advent in the Punjab the Sikhs sacrificed their lives for the British Empire but in return their position in the Punjab which England promised has been finally liquidated 114

135 against all promises. They kept on reminding their past services but could not spell out what exactly their demands were.

Popularity of SAD and League At Fatehgarh Sahib (Sirhind) in the Patiala Sate, the Sikhs gathered to commemorate the murder of the two young sons of Guru Gobind Singh by the Mughal governor of Sirhind where Giani Kartar and S. Kartar Singh115 expressed the strong support for raising the Sikh living standard in the Patiala State. Later on all the points mentioned by the speakers were published in a pamphlet to emphasise the demands. The Sikh leaders hoped that His Highness would win the Sikh hearts by appointing a Sikh as his Prime Minister. They demanded 60 per cent share in the State services, changes in the management of the Gurdwaras and Sikh shrines with their properties under the jurisdiction of the Gurdwara Act. Voice was raised for Gurmukhi to be declared as official language and its compulsory study for the Sikh youth. They asked for a Legislative Assembly in which the Sikhs should constitute a majority. These demands were unanimously passed by the Sikh Dewan at the Annual Shahidi Dewan held on 26 December 1941 and endorsed by the Amritsar meeting of the Akali Dal held on 19 and 20 January 1942.116 Through such demands, the Akalis tried to interfere in the Princely States affairs. No doubt, protection of the Sikh rights was their duty but at this crucial time they should have avoided opening more fronts to remain focused on their core issues. The Police report of 31 January 1942 reported about the period from October to December 1941 accepted the SAD as the most popular party at that time among the Sikhs. 117 The appointment of Jogindar Singh as the Chief Minister of Patiala strengthened the Akalis who were gratified with a strong hold on the affairs of Patiala

136 and other Sikh states.118 Unlike the Akalis, the Leagues ideological and constitutional performance gained profound support of the masses who seemed fully prepared to play their due role in the political activities. According to the Intelligence Report, the Punjabi Muslims had full devotion to the League for its constitutional attitude while they disliked the Congress. 119 The Punjab Students League held the Pakistan Conference at Batala on 27 February 1942 in which Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, MLA (Central), Sheikh Chiragh Din and Professor Dildar Khan appreciated Jinnahs leadership and pledged to support the Pakistan movement. 120 The League declared that the 23rd March should be celebrated as the Pakistan Day with full zeal. The Intelligence Reports revealed the high graph of Jinnahs popularity among the Punjabi Muslims and the leaders in the Ahrar Working Committee meeting at Lahore expressed the opinion that Jinnah was working for the Muslim interests and the Ahrar leaders could never be effective among the Muslim public if they denounced Mr. Jinnah and the Pakistan scheme. 121 The leadership of Jinnah and the Pakistan demand had stricken from a common person to the Unionist Premier, Sir Sikandar who expressed his views in a public gathering that he had not been against the Lahore Resolution which ensured a peaceful life for the Hindus and Sikhs in the Muslim majority region. Raja Ghazanfar Ali said that the Premier could never part with the League.122 The Pakistan scheme of the Muslims and the anti-Pakistan or anti-Muslim outbursts of the Akai Dal popularized the two parties in their respective communities. The political and religious organizations, hierarchy and the ministers could feel this profound change in the political domain. The Unionist Muslims sometimes sided openly with the Pakistan scheme which caused uncertainty in the minds of their Sikh and Hindu allies in the Assembly.

137 Muslim Preparations The word protection remained very popular during these years and different parties publicly passed resolutions for recruiting volunteers in the name of protection. In a meeting of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema at Amritsar, Maulvi Abdul Hanan and Maulvi Baha-ul-Haq Qasmi criticized the British for not training and arming Indians. In a Working Committee meeting held at Lahore on 19 March 1942, the leaders advised their workers to raise volunteers for self protection.123 The Khaksars decided the same in an Amritsar meeting that they must work under Hilal-i-Ahmar and volunteers be raised to protect the community in times of internal unrest.124 In Sheikhupura district, Maulvi Zahir Niaz Begi lauded the Muslim state and enrolled 1,000 Muslim National Guards who were given training in lathi fighting. 125 The Sikhs, Hindus and the religious parties of the Punjab felt the necessity to organize the masses for self-protection. This sense of insecurity and mistrust of other communities presented a woeful picture of the Punjabi society as the British rule drew to its end. The provincial authorities seemed ineffective in this regard. All the communities were scared and felt insecure from the other communities. According to the Governors report:
No communal incidents of importance have been reported. As indicated in the foregoing portions of this report, fears of internal unrest and feelings engendered by the conflicting constitutional claims of rival political parties have combined to heighten communal unrest and mistrust. One result of this has been a tendency to revive volunteer organisations, the advertised objects of which are invariably innocuous, though rival bodies show little disposition to accept them at their face value. The ban on uniforms and military drill prevents these bodies being organised on a directly military basis, but Akali efforts to organise the Sikh community clearly contemplate a resort to violence in certain circumstances, and contribute to intensify communal suspicion.126

Though, the Muslim National Guards, Sheikhupura collected the Muslims for the training but it cannot be generalized that this organization had become strong enough in all the areas of the Punjab. Yet much was required to popularize it.

138

Muslim-Sikh Tension Although the Punjab government tried to restore peace but the Muslim-Sikh riots continued. The year of 1940 produced nothing good in this regard and clashes took place during the Moharram processions. The communal uneasiness furthered when a communal fracas between the Hindu Jats and the Muslim Kamins broke out on 7th April, 1940 in Lahara, district Rohtak. The next year showed unchanged trends in the communal relationship as numerous riots occurred on 14 March at Amritsar and in May and June at Bhiwani district Hissar. Mian Iftekhar-ud-Din, President of the Punjab Congress, organized a unity conference to restore peace and invited the League, Akali and Mahasabha leaders but it produced nothing beneficial regarding the communal harmony. Mohaya writes that the Punjab had ranked as a province in which public peace was in serious and constant danger from terrorism.127 Communalism was not confined to the physical clashes on the roads but was prevailing in the institutions and other departments as well. The Sikhs had been claiming that the Unionists had appointed the Muslims on all the key posts to relegate the Sikhs to an ineffective position. But a Muslim newspaper retaliated with accurate figures that the non-Muslims were ruling in the Forest Department with a high percentage which was against the Muslims.128 Such kind of differences did not fare so badly for the future as did economic boycotts and rumours of armed assaults. The Muslim-Sikh tension arose in district Gujrat and both the communities started boycott of each other but the situation settled down as the Muslims and Sikhs agreed to end the boycott at Ala village. In Gujranwala, tension arose when the Sikhs celebrated Ghallughara Day and the Muslim residents protested against the Sikh speeches and asked the Muslims to prepare for any emergent situation. The tension was furthered

139 when a rumour pervaded that the Muslims would attack the Sikhs on 31 May 1940. Nevertheless, the Deputy Commissioner called the leaders of both the communities who promised to maintain peace in the area. 129 In the same city, the Muslims protested against the orders issued by the DC which irked them. He had filled the post of the Civic Guard with a Sikh candidate while the Sikhs made only one percent of the total population.130 The Muslim-Sikh tension proved pernicious to the communal harmony of the region. Through an editorial, a Muslim newspaper pointed out the root causes of the Muslim-Sikh tension and wrote that during the Muslim rule, the Sikh sacred places were insulted while the Sikh rule was recalled as Sikha Shahi which meant authoritarian and insulting rule to the Muslims. Their holy places were insulted and the Muslims could not say Azan in the Sikh dominated villages. The Sikhs and Hindus were the same as they inter-dined and intermarried. The Hindu Mahasabha considered them as co-religionist and the Akali leaders strongly supported the Sikh separation from the Hindus in the religious identity but were ready to work closely with the Hindu Mahasabha where it made strategic sense. The editorial continued that the Sikhs wanted to take a big portion of the Punjab and gift it to the Hindus. The paper further questioned as to why the Sikhs demanded a Sikh state if they were actually Hindus. They ought to join Pakistan if they were a separate nation. They were opposing the partition of India as well as demanding the same.131 The initiation of the Sikh province could be a supportive demand for the League but the painful aspect was that the Muslim-Sikh understanding was dwindling day by day.

Sikh Preparations for Violence The Police reports verify that the Khaksar activities added to the Sikh fears and in response to this they were arming themselves against the Muslims. They held

140 meetings in Mandirs and Gurdwaras and advised their communities to organize the defence bodies at mohalla level.132 The Sikhs under the Akali patronage were proudly involved in the violent activities. The Akali Dal had the militant offshoots which practiced Gatka (wielding a stick in a fight) and physical exercises. On 3 March 1940, the Akalis held a meeting at Lahore where the leaders condemned the ban on the Akali regiments.133 The members of Akali Sena of Tarn Taran were fully engaged in practicing Gatka. 134 The Police reports informed the authorities that Teja Singh Akarpuri and Isher Singh Majhail were preparing a scheme which would assign every Gurdwara Committee to plan a programme for the physical training of 20 to 50 Akalis. These trained Akalis would extend training to the rest of the Sikh community in the Punjab. Every trainee would be given Rs. 10 with the facilities of food and accommodation. The report further revealed that they had planned to encourage the Akalis to procure arms smuggled from the North-West Frontier Province.135 Master Tara Singh explained in a conference at Pherala that the Khaksars by show of their military strength in the bazaars were busy to overawe the people. The government took action against these activities very late and banned drill which was not a correct decision. The action was taken observing the Sikh force in the Attari Conference. He motivated the audience to continue strengthening the Akali Fauj by increasing its number and practicing Gatka daily.136 In July 1940, a Hindu from Dera Ghazi Khan disclosed under the Rawalpindi Police custody about his provincial Hindu gang which had planned to kill the Muslim leaders. In January 1941, the Delhi CID arrested a fully armed Sikh band. During enquiry, Gyani Rattan Singh revealed that they had smuggled arms from the NWFP and aimed to snatch weapons from the guards. The Sikh preparations against the Muslims were going on in all the corners of the country. 137 The Governor during the second half of May 1942 presented a very

141 serious state of the rearmament. According to the report, unlicensed fire-arms had been abundantly obtained in the province. The CID arms staff which was assigned the duty to disarm the people found about 1,000 fire-arms in the Hissar district in a few weeks. It was further informed that the illegal weapons in Hissar had been obtained from the States of Patiala and Bikaner. 138 On 15 April 1942, the Hindu and Sikh locals gathered at Rawalpindi and decided to take arms for protection against the activities of the bad characters. It was accordingly decided to distribute tridents in every mohalla for this purpose.139 The rural Punjab remained peaceful but the conferences were mostly attended by the rural Sikhs which was to have negative implications for its continued tranquility. The Akalis stepped up their efforts to secure rural support. After discussions on the current situation, the Akali leaders met in Amritsar (3-5 May 1942) and decided to launch propaganda in the rural areas through the Dadhi Jathas.140 The Hindu allies of the Sikhs were equally engaged in such activities. Dr. Gopi Chand disclosed that Gandhi was sure of the victory of the Axis powers and the Japanese invasion of India after the rainy season. To him, it would be the best time to start civil disobedience movement. The Congress also continued its workers physical training particularly the use of lathi fighting. A lawyer Sham Lal at Hissar supervised this training. Fifty-six volunteers from the towns of Ferozepore, Fazilka and Abohar also joined this training plan.141 The Akalis were increasing their violent activities day by day. They were intimidating even the other Sikh parties. It was reported that the Akalis used force in preventing the other Sikh parties like communist Sikhs and the Central Akali Dal from propagating their agenda in the Sikh masses. They also pressurised the Jallianwala Bagh committee not to allow the Central Akali Dal to have a meeting in the Bagh. On 13 July 1942, the Akalis tried the Kirti Kisan workers to

142 abandon their meeting at Guru ka Bagh. The meeting was held away from this site in which the speakers used rough language for the Akalis.142 The murder of a Sikh, Autar Singh in Sargodha, badly affected Muslim-Sikh relations and the Unionist government showed biased reaction in the administrative measures.143 In all the conferences since the murder, the Sikhs condemned the district and provincial authorities and held protests in all parts of the Punjab. The Hindus in general and the Hindu Mahasabha in particular worked in Lahore to collect more funds and volunteers to protect Hindus and Sikhs. It added tension immensely to the decaying Muslim-Sikh relations. 144 In a conference, Master Ajit Singh, Secretary General of Shiromani Akali Dal, issued a circular that the Sikh community should observe 28 July as the Autar Singh Shahidi Day. The Akalis decided to inaugurate a training camp at Chheharta (Amritsar) in September. The trained Sikhs were supposed to open new camps in their native districts. In a conference on 17-18 July 1940, Isher Singh Majhail maintained that the Sikhs were not safe in the Punjab districts administered by Muslim Deputy Commissioners. He said that the hooliganism was increasing in the Muslim areas.145 The members of the Akali Sewadars and Akali Saina carried on the exercise of Gatka in the areas of district Amritsar according to the Police reports.146 An Akali Diwan was organized at Ugoke near Sialkot on 22-24 October 1940 in which Master Tara Singh emphasized that the Sikhs must join the army with an objective that they were not supporting the British but to militarize their own community. 147 The speakers at Diwan (Amritsar) held on 30-31 October 1940 condemned the Pakistan scheme and advised their fellow Sikhs to strengthen the Akali Saina and learn how to use weapons.148 A similar message was conveyed by Master Tara Singh in Lahore on 30 May 1941 in which he said that the Unionist government was purely a Muslim rule

143 in the province therefore the Sikh Gurdwaras needed attention for protection particularly where the Sikhs were in acute minority. Giani Kartar emphasized that they must train the community by organizing the Akali Saina and Akali regiments at all levels. Tara Singh announced the deployment of 1,000 Akalis on the Lahore Gurdwaras and urged to mobilize the community against the ban on Jhatka.149 The Sikhs preparations were copied by the Hindu communal organizations. In a conference, Jugal Kishore Birla agreed to the views of Dr. B. S. Moonje that the Arya Vir Dal members should be trained on the lines of the Akali Dal. Sant Singh, MLA said that Pakistan was not possible until the Sikhs were alive in the country.150 The Punjab Hindu Students Federation arranged an anti-Pakistan meeting at Lahore on 10 May 1942 in which Master Tara Singh said that Pakistan reflected the policy of Aurangzeb and was to be put to an end by the Khalsa. The audience burnt a paper named as the Pakistan scheme. 151 The anti-Pakistan Sikh conferences were very provocative for the Muslims. The Akali Sikhs and the Hindu Mahasabha propagated for their joint gathering at Sultanwind (district Amritsar) on 13-14 June 1942 while the CAD planned to hold an anti-Pakistan conference in Lahore on 17-18 June. The Intelligence reports observed that these conferences have evoked Muslim resentmentand relations between the two communities are likely to become increasingly strained if such plans mature.152 Astoundingly, the Sikhs were setting the house on fire wherein they were residing. Attempts to improve communal harmony were meager and unimportant. The Unity Conference was a good step in this regard but disappointingly it could not fill the gap created by the communal animosity and suspicion. In July, the Majlis-i-Ahrari-Islam arranged a Unity Conference at Sialkot in which Hindu, Sikh and Muslim leaders shared goodwill for each other. But it generated controversy over the Pakistan

144 scheme and by condemning the idea of the Muslim state Daulat Ram Bhatia said that the Pakistan idea was being encouraged by the imperialist government. Sheikh Hissam-ud-Din criticized the British policies in India. Sardar Mangal Singh called for communal calm and reiterated that the Pakistan issue could be settled after the British departure. Sayed Ataullah Shah Bhukhari frankly admitted that harmony could never be achieved because hatred was very deep rooted. He, as evidence, quoted that Gandhi refused to eat food prepared by Muslims and.Sikhs were collecting arms in order to establish their own rule.153 During this time, communal relations were deteriorating. In May 1941, the Sikhs took out a procession in Sargodha in commemoration of the Guru Arjun Devs martyrdom. This city had already experienced tension arising from the procession routes. Once again the Jama Mosque was on the Sikh procession route. The procession was crossing the Mosque area when Dalip Singh a notorious local agitator, incited the Sikhs who started playing music. The next day 3,000 Muslims gathered in the Mosque and showed their annoyance over the irritating and insulting behaviour of the Sikhs. 154 In June, the Muslims of Amritsar who gathered in Khair Dins Mosque spoke against the discriminatory behaviour of the Municipal Committee Amritsar and accused that the officials had dismantled the Muslim buildings while they had not removed even a brick of the Hindu and Sikh houses.155 The Sikh political parties were staging protests against Pakistan and the Unionist government by arranging conferences all over the province.156 All of them expressed stereotyped points, generally condemning the government on the issues of Jhatka, Gurmukhi, ban on Kirpan, biased treatment towards the Sikhs, the League and the Pakistan scheme.

145 Demand for Sikh State The sentiments of the Sikhs were at boiling point after 23 March 1940 under these stringent conditions some Sikhs spoke out for a separate homeland. To Anup Chand Kapur, the Akalis at Attari (district Amritsar) soon after the League resolution demanded Khalistan extending its boundaries from the river Chenab to the river Jamna. 157 The Khalsa National Party on 29 March 1940 demanded to restore the Punjab of Maharaja Dalip Singh to the Sikhs. 158 A Guru Raj Khalsa Durbar was organized in a meeting at Amritsar on 19 May 1940. Its main objective was to take the Punjab back from the non-Sikh rulers and to convert it into a Sikh state between the river Jumna and Jamrud. Baba Madan Singh Gaga and Jagjit Singh, Editor, Khalsa Sewak, were the eminent members of the committee to materialize this scheme 159 while Dr. V. S. Bhati, a Sikh from Ludhiana, put forward a scheme of Khalistan, a buffer state between Pakistan and Hindustan. It would consist of the Sikh districts and states and function under Maharaja Patiala. Furthermore, a subcommittee was approved and assigned to work on the scheme. But Master Tara Singh strictly condemned such seceding sentiments among the Sikhs.160 To Anup Chand, Dr. V. A. Bhatti through a pamphlet also demanded Muslim areas running through Bahawalpur, Sindh and Rajputana enabling the Sikhs to have an outlet to the Gulf of Cutch.161 The scheme on which the Akalis laid stress continuously was the Azad Punjab scheme but it had to face severe criticism and opposition. The Governor in the fortnightly report for the first half of December 1942 portrayed that the Akalis did not seem much active in propagating the Azad Punjab scheme. The Hindu Mahasabha leaders clarified their position by saying that they had a principal stand against the Pakistan scheme therefore they were also opposed to the Azad Punjab scheme. The

146 scheme could not gain unanimous opinion of the Sikhs who remained divided. Master Tara Singh and other leaders toured the western Punjab but could not secure favour with the exception of the central Punjab. The All-India Sikh Youth Conference held at Lahore supported this scheme but with an amendment. They opined that the scheme should have the approval of two-third of the Sikh community. The Central Akali Dal and Namdhari leaders also opposed the scheme. The Akalis decided to hold a conference at Bhiwanigarh in Patiala State to prepare the panth to follow their decision but success could not be expected for this scheme.162 Though they avoided using the term Azad Punjab scheme, they pursued it persistently by demanding redemarcation of the Punjab boundaries. Master Tara Singh strode very carefully. He declared that the Sikhs would not demand Khalistan if the Muslims abandoned Pakistan. 163 This attitude appeared vacillating to those outside the community and did not convince the British for consideration of the Sikh demands. Other Sikh leaders however continued to talk of a Sikh state. In 1942, Sardar Kirpal Singh Majithia declared that they desired to establish the Sikh rule. The Working Committee of the Central Akali Dal was organized in Amritsar on 2 April 1942 in which the party reversed the core policy and issued statement in favour of the partition. Baba Kharak Singh rejecting Cripps proposals said that India was going to be partitioned in near future and the Sikhs had a right to demand a separate Sikh state extending from River Jhelum to River Sutlej if the division was inevitable.164 The report said that the Sikh leaders were uncertain about how to block the Pakistan scheme. They also doubted, whether Khalistan would be the best alternative for the Sikhs or not. On the other hand, the Khalsa Youth League was propagating for Khalistan.165 On 2 May 1942, at Amritsar, Master Ajit Singh declared that Khalistan would be achieved with the help of sword. In the

147 Working Committee meeting of the Central Akali Dal at Lahore, Bakhshish Singh, editor of Khalsa, called to launch a movement for the attainment of Khalistan.166 The police report said that Master Tara Singh also discussed the issue of the partition and the Sikh rule in the non-Muslim minority areas with Vir Savarkar, the Mahasabha leader.167 According to the police report, the Akalis demanded the Azad Punjab after the Sikandar-Baldev Pact (15 June 1942).168 The Akali conference was held in Kot Moman (district Shahpur) on 2-3 October 1942 in which Dalip Singh of Sargodha opposed the Pakistan scheme and said that the Sikhs desired no Khalistan. Giani Sher Singh approved the Sikandar-Baldev Singh pact and demanded the re-demarcation of the Punjab in which no community would be in an utter majority.169 Baldev Singh expressed his fury against the Pakistan scheme and said that he would prefer slavery to the partition. Giani Sher Singh elucidated that if the idea of Pakistan was materialized, they would establish Khalistan. In November 1942, a Gurmukhi poster was displayed with the signature of Bhagwan Singh which demanded the revision of provincial boundaries of the Punjab. Sardar Kartar Singh, an Advocate from Patiala, and Professor Ganga Singh emphasized the need for re-demarcation of the provincial boundaries to establish the Sikh rule.170 The lack of vision and disunity was profoundly affecting the Sikh politics. According to an Intelligence report, Master Tara Singh refrained from personal discussions with Jinnah171 while it was an undeniable reality that nothing was possible without negotiations on the conflicting issues. As a matter of fact, Tara Singh possessed no political and constitutional arguments on which he could face Jinnah, a staunch constitutionalist. Disunity overwhelmingly gripped the Sikhs and the leaders could be distracted by trivialities. Sant Singh, an MLA resigned from the All Parties

148 Sikh Conference in 1942 just because his name was not included in the Sikh delegation which was to meet the Cripps Mission.172

Congress and Sikhs The Akalis differed from the Congress on the issue of support for the war effort with the government, but expected support from the organization in their antiPakistan stance. 173 The myth that the Sikhs were their saviours was retained and projected by the Hindus. The Congress had included the Sikh members in the Congress Working Committee more than their proportion. Sardar Sohan Singh Josh, MLA, in a Congress meeting, necessitated a volunteer corps to counter the communal organizations.174 The Congress continued brainwashing the Sikh leadership and the masses that only the Congress could save their interests in the on-going struggle for freedom and on the issue of Pakistan.175 In such an uncertain situation, the Sikhs were struggling for the rights without any agreed voice. Some Muslims perhaps under the stress of the communitarian dominance tried to show their balanced position on the Muslim and non-Muslim issues and criticized the Congress, League and Akalis equally. On 20-21 September 1940, they arranged an Azad Khyal Muslim Conference presided over by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. He objected that the Congress claimed to be a secular party but the communalist Akali Sikhs were speaking against the Muslims from the Congress platform. He further said that Master Tara Singh and the Maharaja of Patiala had planned for the Sikh raj in the Punjab. He also complained that the Congressite Muslims had lost respect either in their own community or in the Congress circles.176 In this way, the nationalist Muslims within the Congress were raising voice against the Hindu leadership on the issue of the Akali Sikhs.

149 On the other hand, the Sikhs continued their submissive allegiance to the Congress. The CAD condemned the Akali-Unionist pact of 1942. Sardar Mangal Singh, MLA appealed to the Sikhs to resist this pact. He went to Wardha with suggestions for the Congress Working Committee members that the Punjab Congress should be given under the leadership of Baba Kharak Singh after the betrayal of the SAD. The Intelligence report concludes that both the SAD and CAD did not want to lose the Congress support. The leaders found themselves helpless in the political arena without the Congress.177 The analysis proved true because Master Tara Singh had to request Vir Savarkar to convince the Congress leadership to avoid attacking the Akalis. The Akali leaders also laid stress on the Sikhs to join the Congress in large numbers to influence the decision-making strength of the party.178 Sikandar and Pakistan The Unionists Muslims and non-Muslims pretended to be above all the communal differences but one can observe through the Punjab Assembly debates wherein the Muslims seemed scared to discuss the Quranic verses because it might create religious tension. Discussing the Primary Education Bill, Chaudhri Shahab-udDin, the Speaker, had to interfere in the debate with the following remarks:
What I said was that it would be enough to say that according to Islam purdah is necessary and must be observed and that this Bill should not interfere with it. But to quote Quran Sharif and translate on the floor of the House might, as already stated, result in unpleasantness. I do not wish the Quran to be discussed and criticized. 179

The Leagues political activities were irritating for Sir Sikandar. Feeling himself sandwiched between the League and the non-Muslim allies, he tried to wriggle out of the situation but his efforts came to naught. He was to maintain his coalition government and confidence of Jinnah simultaneously. The Premier was obliged that Jinnah had never created problems for him even over the issues of the Khaksar-Police clash in 1940 at Lahore. Sir Henry Craik wrote to Linlithgow on the wise leadership

150 of Jinnah that he did not provoke clash between a government headed by a Muslim and the League. He not only facilitated the Punjab ministry but also secured the unity in the League circle. He further wrote that through his wisdom, Jinnah increased his influence over Leaguers in the Punjab.180 Sir Sikandar had to appease the Muslims by presenting himself a pure Muslim leader and, on the other hand, opposed Jinnah to pacify the non-Muslim allies as he did in a speech at Lyallpur. While addressing the Pakistan Conference arranged by the students, he portrayed himself as a pure Muslim by saying that he prayed five times regularly but Quaid-i-Azam did not. He also named Pakistan as Lughwastan (farcical) but the audience shouted Pakistan Zindabad, Quaid-i-Azam Zindabad and none uttered the same for Sir Sikandar.181 He spoke to the Punjab Legislative Assembly on 11 March 1941, rejecting the Muslim raj in the Punjab as the League had envisaged but simultaneously Sikandar dared not repudiate Jinnah.182 According to the government reports, he in deference to Mr. Jinnahs unique position in Moslem community was reluctant to cut adrift from the League. 183 In fact, the Sikhs were criticizing Sir Sikandars participation in the arrangements of the League session and drafting of the Lahore Resolution. They sought what stand particularly on the Pakistan scheme the Premier had. Therefore, in his address to the Assembly he cleared his position by saying the following:
I have often heard them [Sikhs] say: We are nationalists and therefore we will not allow any partition of India- very laudable sentiments....But I should like to point out to my Sikh friends that if they press for a powerful and superimposed Centre at the expense of the provinces, they will be doing gross injustice to the Punjab and incalculable harm to their own community. They should not forget that they constitute only one per cent of the population of India and even if they get 100 per cent weightage they cannot expect to get more than 2 per cent representation at the Centre. 184

In fact amidst the inflammatory atmosphere, the Premier tried to dilute the situation. The League resolution had tarnished the secular image of Sir Sikandar. To remove the horrors of the non-Muslim allies, he in December 1940 stated that he could never concede the League demand to establish the Muslim domination in the Punjab.185 But

151 his anti-Pakistan statements were not sufficient to satisfy the Sikhs. Sir Sikandar was informed that the Sikhs might mount pressure for their own independent state. He feared that the on-going communal tussle might result in some major clashes in the province. In the beginning, it was perceived that the Pakistan demand was one of the bargaining tactics of the League but by and by it became clear to Sir Sikandar that the Leagues struggle was not a phony war. All such developments upset him because by opposing Pakistan his image as a Muslim leader would be seriously damaged, while by siding with the Muslim state he would lose the non-Muslim support. To counter this difficult situation, he tried to adopt a reconciliatory role between the rival forces.186 But his ambivalent attitude to the Pakistan scheme increased insecurity in the Sikh community. He had the support of Chhotu Ram, an anti-Pakistan Hindu Jat, but contrarily he could not resist the Muslim Students Federation and donated them money to meet the expenditures of a conference in support of the Pakistan idea. By giving this money, he showed his commitment to the Pakistan scheme. Before Jinnahs visit to the Punjab, he tried to convince the League leaders to drop the Pakistan idea but on their refusal he dared not to resign from the League Working Committee because he did not want to give space to his Muslim opponents to fill his seat. But at the same time, he continued his struggle to satisfy the non-Muslims and for this purpose he made an anti-Pakistan speech in the Assembly on 11 March 1941.187 In a speech delivered at Government College Lahore, he said neither Pakistan nor Khalistan, instead only the Punjabis would rule over the Punjab.188 Jinnah did not pressurize the Unionist Muslims over the issue of the Pakistan scheme though a severe criticism from the old Leaguers came against them. They were of the view that the Unionist Muslims were not working fairly with the League and its leaders. They raised many questions before Jinnah i.e., the passive role of the Unionist Muslims on

152 the Pakistan issue, by-elections and the League membership but he did not think it right time to take action. Jinnah had an alternative force which could work in remote areas of the Punjab and convey the message of the League. According to Qalb-i-Abid, he activated the Punjab Muslim Students Federation who organized conferences to support the Pakistan scheme. The Muslim youth marvelously fulfilled their leaders hopes and infused the Pakistan idea into the minds of the Muslim masses. Now they had an organization to counter the anti-Pakistan propaganda. The mobilization of the students proved a successful experience and the League got the support of the masses and financial assistance. 189 In a conference arranged by the MSF 190 at Lahore in March 1941 in which a huge gathering listened to their leaders, Jinnah said that Pakistan had become an issue of life and death. He refuted the Hindu stand that Hindustan was a land of Hindus only and it had been a unity throughout the history. In this conference, Jinnah re-assured the Sikhs that their rights would be better secured in Pakistan while in India they would be a drop in the ocean.191 The Leagues influence in the Muslim rural areas was growing rapidly and the people were zealously ready to register themselves as the League members. In October 1940, the Muslims of Gohana (district Rohtak) wrote to the Hon. Secretary of the League that a maulvi (Muslim priest) came to them and asked for the League membership fees so that the League could issue the membership forms. They complained that the people paid the asked fees to the maulvi but still they received no membership forms as he had promised.192 The dilemma of the League membership was that the League had poor interaction with the rural workers. Nevertheless, no evidence shows that the Muslim masses got the League membership forms and refused to fill them out. The common Muslims took part in the struggle for Pakistan

153 scheme as and how they could afford. Moreover, the League plunged into the regional politics just before the 1937 elections and since the critical issues busied the leadership however they tried their level best to bring the masses into the League fold. The Muslims wrote letters to the League leadership with valuable opinions and suggestions as in February 1941 Shah Nawaz Khan outlined the facts about the proposed Pakistan territory. He suggested not to demand Aligarh and Delhi because with the inclusion of these areas into Pakistan, the percentage of the Muslim population would go down.193 The Sikh politics seemed still under the influence of the command of the Congress. Their leadership demonstrated no independent vision in the politics during these years. They just reacted to what the Muslims did and always asked for what the Muslims had been given in the non-Muslim majority provinces. In the Punjab, the Sikhs desired and demanded the end of the Muslim domination in the provincial Assembly. The Akalis had an ambivalent relationship with the Muslim Unionists who frequently condemned them after the Sikander-Jinnah Pact but at the same time tried moving closer to them. The Akalis were against Sundar Singh Majithia but after his death on 2 April 1941, the Akalis overpowered the other Sikh parties. Even the Khalsa National Party came closer which helped them to narrow their difference towards the Unionist Party. Nevertheless, the animosity between the Unionist Muslims and the Akalis could not be rooted out and on 3 August 1941, they organized the Anti-Unionist Government Day.194 The Sikhs never spared the Unionist Muslims whenever they found an opportunity. In the Assembly question hour, Khizr Tiwana, the minister, could not answer the questions raised by the Unionist Sikh Sardar Sumer Singh who raised his voice against corruption:
if they considered the amount of money that had been spent on the Punjab roads, he would say they were not as good as they should have been. He argued the corruption was

154
responsible for this and he suggested that the schedule of rates of the Department was necessarily excessive and should be reduced.195

He further argued that all the officers had been provided with free accommodation but they were still getting allowances from the government for this purpose.196 Lord Linlithgow proposed to bring the on-going communal deadlock to an end and offered expansion of the Executive Council, establishment of a War Advisory Council and according some rights to the minorities in the constitution in August 1940 but both the Congress and the League rejected it. 197 The Viceroy could not afford the loss of the Leagues support due to the on-going war and according to Gulati the Muslim leadership was making the full use of the golden opportunity given by the war to manoeuvre for political advantage.198 The Viceroy reassured the League about the minority rights and that the power could not be transferred to the Indians unless they would arrive at some mutually agreed settlement.199 The Viceroys flexible attitude towards the League further increased the Sikh apprehensions. They were sacrificing their lives for the British masters in the battlefield and in return expected warm response in the case of their demands particularly against the League but their whole efforts were proving futile. It was really a somber picture for the Sikh community. The Akali-Congress harmony was shattered for the time being when Rajagopalachari and Gandhi indicated that the Leagues demand for Pakistan be considered as a rational scheme to win the Muslim support. Master Tara Singh condemned the attitude of Gandhi and Abul Kalam Azad. 200 To Bajwant Kaur, offering the Prime Ministership to the League (Sporting offer) in 1940 by a close associate of Gandhi was the first recognition of the Pakistan scheme. 201 The Sikh League appealed to the Congress to be aloof from the offers made by the Viceroy and

155 Rajagopalachari on 23 August 1940. Speaking to the Akali Political Conference at Murrer (district Sheikhupura) on 7 October 1940, Ajit Singh, General Secretary of the Akali Dal, reminded the Congress about the Ravi pledge of 1929 and asked them to support their demands. Master Ajit Singh expressed disapproval of the Pakistan scheme and the sporting offer to the Muslims by Rajagopalachari.202 According to the Governors report, the communal situation of the Punjab in September 1940 was constantly unsatisfactory and the Akali reaction to the sporting offer and the HinduSikh verbosity against the League divulged the cleavage between the Muslims and Sikhs. Dipalpur (Montgomery district) was caught by the communal clashes during this period and was accelerated by this time due to the issue of the cow slaughter.203 In the late 1940, the Congress-Sikh relations went cold as Gandhi wrote many articles and gave statements against the Sikhs. In a letter on 16 August 1940 to Master Tara Singh, Gandhi advised,
As I told you, in my opinion, you have nothing in common with the Congress nor the Congress with you. You believe in the rule of the sword, the Congress does not Your civil disobedience is purely a branch of violence. I am quite clear in my mind that being in the Congress, you weaken your community, and weaken the Congress. You have to be either fully nationalist or frankly communal.204

The Sikh community was under a constant stress due to Gandhis letter to Master Tara Singh but it furthered the on-going strained situation when an article titled Sikhs and Sword by Gandhi appeared in the Harijan on 29 September 1940 in which Gandhi had written that he disliked the whole Sikh community if it considered Master Tara Singh their undisputed leader. But he promised to maintain the commitments of the resolution of 1929 regarding the Sikhs.205 Master Tara Singh had dual membership; he was President of the SGPC and SAD and also a Congressite. After constant indignation by Gandhi, he resigned from the Punjab Congress Working Committee but dared not tell the original background of his resignation. He told that he had resigned due to personal reasons so that the

156 Akali policy of co-operation with the Congress would continue.206 Sangat Singh is of the opinion that Gandhis advice to Tara Singh to be communalist or nationalist was the best instrument to meet the challenging political developments of the subsequent years 207 but he could not get rid of the Congress. He could play a better and constructive role for the Sikh future if he had accepted the reality of the communal politics suggested by Gandhi. He was representing the Sikhs and working for his community therefore he ought to have accepted his communal role and pursue the right direction but due to some undeclared reasons he did not expose his real intentions. The year 1940 proved turbulent in the Punjab politics pushing the regional and national politics to the new communal problems. All the communities living in the Punjab started thinking in the perspective of the new developments of the communal tussle. The good days seemed to have gone forever when the communities used to live with compromising attitude but after the partition scheme most of them started reviving the negative elements of the combined society. The writers started giving comparative analysis of the communities in the light of the new political trends. Writing on the situation during 1941, Sir William Barton raised a question pertinent to the majority and minority issue in the Subcontinent that the minorities in the Muslimruled provinces were not happy. He explained that the non-Muslim minorities of Sindh, Punjab, NWFP and Bengal were not satisfied with the performance of the Muslim governments and these minorities described the Muslim rule as a reign of terror. They appealed that the Governors ought to do justice in this regard. Even the Hindus complained against the oppressive treatment of the cross-communal government of the Punjab dominated by the Muslims. Politics apart, the officials had been divided on the communal line conspicuously. The Sikh officers openly started

157 anti-Muslim activities. In 1941, Sardar Kapur Singh, DC Karnal, made the Nawab families of Karnal and Kunjpura ineffective and cancelled their weapon licences. Approximately 80 per cent of the Muslims of this district were denied the licences of firearms while the DC issued new firearm licences to the Sikhs and Hindus. 208 Besides, the non-Muslim officials continued disgracing the Islamic signs and the Muslims resisted it to the core. In Kethal (Karnal District), the policemen plucked the beards of the suspected Muslims during the questioning but one of them said that he could do whatever he liked except disgracing the beard because it is a Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).209 All such improper activities helped in deteriorating the Muslim-Sikh understanding.

Jinnah Asserts Authority in Punjab Jinnah turned to the regional politics before the elections of 1936-37 and according to Nijjar, within about an year he won favour of the top Muslim Unionist leadership which pleased the Muslim masses throughout India.210 After winning over the Muslims, he announced what the Muslims of the Subcontinent required as a settlement of the communal tangle. The League demanded separate homeland for the Muslims as a sole solution to the constitutional and communal problem in the British India. The anti-Muslim organizations and political parties construed it as civil war. The Hindu and Sikh communities started breathing fire against the partitioning proposal of India. It created a civil war mentality throughout the society.211 The Pakistan movement entered decisive phase; Jinnah demanded his nation and the party for a total submission and binding to the party discipline. No agreement with any authority was allowed without the Leagues approval. During 1941, Sir Sikandar from the Punjab, A. K. Fazlul Haq from Bengal and Maulvi Saadullah from

158 Assam joined the National Defence Council initiated by the Viceroy. Jinnah took stern action against all these Premiers and asked for their explanation. The Leagues argument was that being the League members they were bound to seek permission from the party before joining any forum while the Premiers contended that they had joined the Defence Council in their official capacity. Jinnah was now fully prepared to exert his authority in the Punjab after observing the past group politics of the Unionist Muslims. After an enquiry, the League Working Committee ordered all of them to resign from the Council. In a meeting on 25 August 1941, the Committee was informed that Sir Sikandar and Muhammad Saadullah had consented to resign therefore no disciplinary action would be taken against them.212 The incident had a great impact on the political scene of the Punjab and India as a whole. Through this action, Jinnah challenged the British authorities and force of the Unionists and succeeded in establishing party discipline in the second line of the Muslim leadership. It also increased the Leagues importance in the eyes of common people. The League was increasing its influence in the Punjab politics day by day by repudiating the existence of the Unionist party. Jinnah did not sideline the Unionist Muslims abruptly rather he mitigated their influence gradually by infusing the cause of Pakistan in the Unionist Muslims and the common folk. He sometimes adopted an assertive attitude in establishing the party discipline in the political circles of the Muslim Punjab. During his address to the annual session of the Punjab League Conference (Lyallpur) held in November 1942, he said that Ministers must be clear about their position. They could not enjoy the office without the Leagues consent.213 The popularity of the League leadership can be gauged by the statement of Sir Chhotu Ram in which he stated that 70 per cent of the Muslim members who were on the Unionist benches were in reality a force behind Jinnah and his Pakistan scheme.214 Before this, Gandhi

159 had admitted that within two years, Jinnah and the Pakistan idea had gained tremendous support of the Muslims. 215 The increasing influence of Jinnah on the Unionist Muslims upset the Sikhs. The on-going Sikh cry proved true in which they had reiterated that the Unionist government meant the Muslim raj in the Punjab. The Premiers submissiveness had alarmed them. This also increased influence of the Sikh leaders among their masses because the communalist character of the Unionist Muslims was proving true.

Cripps Proposals By the beginning of 1942, the British position in the war in Asia was very weak and the Japanese seemed close to capture India. Churchill, the Prime Minister, sent Sir Stafford Cripps, a war cabinet member, to India with a political package as a solution to the constitutional problem. The major objective was to secure cooperation of the Indian communities in the war and to release the American pressure as R. J. Moore writes:
Against his long and fiercely held imperialist prejudices, Churchill was forced by the pressure of Cripps, his Labour colleagues, and the Americans to acquiesce in the offer of post-war Indian Independence and wartime association of the Indian parties with the central government.216

The British were well aware of the background of the Muslim-Sikh problem. On 8 March 1942, Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for India circulated comments made by Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency,217 to the Committee on India of the War Cabinet in which he contended that the Sikhs lacked leadership of all-India level and clear vision to follow:
The Sikh position is more complex. There is always an extreme element which hates the Muslims on historical grounds as the successors of Moguls who persecuted Sikhs and the Gurus and hates the British because they brought Sikh rule to an end in the Punjab. They cherish vague ideas that general disturbance is not a bad thing because it may give birth to opportunities for the restoration of the Sikh Rule in the Punjab. There has never been a

160
Sikh of real importance on the All-India political stage or one prominent as a leader in Congress circles.218

Cripps arrived in India in March 1942 and had discussions with the local leaders. The Viceroy referred Cripps to Sir Sikandar for first hand information but Cripps was reluctant to meet the Punjab Premier in the beginning but ultimately the meeting was arranged. In this meeting, the Premier appreciated the draft proposals of Cripps as far as the Punjab was concerned. Nevertheless, the Punjab Governor, in the perspective of his past erratic behaviour, informed Cripps not to rely on Sikandars opinion.219 The Sikhs and the Muslims were important to Cripps who believed that the British had no problem in the Punjab if the Muslims and Sikhs came to an understanding. Although, Master Tara Singh had demanded the government not to entertain Sardar Kirpal Singh Majithia because of his non-representative position among the Sikhs but Sardar Majithia was given the opportunity to meet the delegation. He after the meeting of the Chief Khalsa Diwan in Amritsar placed the demands before Cripps. The demands included national government, joint electorates with reserved seats, no right for secession of province, and due share of the Sikhs in all national and provincial domains.220 In a meeting of the Working Committee of the Sikh All Parties Conference on 16 March, Baldev Singh, Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar, Santokh Singh, Joginder Singh and Sardar Ujjal Singh expressed a cordial welcome to Stafford Cripps with favourable expectations regarding due share in the national government and communal compromise in the Punjab. They also appointed a sub-committee which was given the task to draft the Sikh demands. The committee included Baldev Singh MLA, Santokh Singh MLA, Giani Kartar MLA, Master Tara Singh and Sant Singh, MLA.221 The Congress was stuck with the Cripps Mission on the issue of immediate

161 transfer of power in general and defence department at that moment in particular.222 Master Tara Singh took Baldev Singh, Ujjal Singh and Jogindra Singh with him and met Cripps on 27 March. They went through the proposals and asked Cripps for the measures for the Sikh protection. Cripps clarified that they had only a few options available to them. He told the Sikh leaders point-blank that they had a weak position with no sound grounds to back up their demands therefore they must adopt a give and take policy with other stakeholders. They should persuade the Congress on the basis of their important position to include maximum clauses for Sikh rights. The Congress would accommodate them because the Congress definitely needed their help at the centre. And if they were unsatisfied with the Hindus, they could bargain with the League because the Sikhs were an important minority in the Punjab and the League could not condone the Sikhs in the plebiscite to materialize the dream of Pakistan. Through this bargaining process, they could force them for the required concessions. The main agenda could be a semi-autonomous Sikh district on the Soviet model or partition of the Punjab into parts:
If, when the constitution was finally settled, the Moslems decided that they had not got sufficient concessions to enable them to remain within the Indian Union, then it would be necessary for them to obtain a vote of non-accession by plebiscite in the Punjab. ..The probability would be that they would try to get the Sikh vote to support their action and in order to do so would offer minority protection clauses.223

In fact, the British viewed the Sikh position better in the Muslim bloc than other options.224 Some Congressite Sikhs led by Sardar Dasaundha Singh, negotiated with Cripps and demanded further partition of the areas on the caste basis if a Sikh state would be conceded. They clearly opposed the Sikh state and damaged the panth. The Sikh leaders busied themselves to fight for insignificant official benefits. Sir B. Glancy225 conveyed the same to Linlithgow as under:

162
The obvious course for the Sikhs to pursue is to seek a satisfactory basis for combining with the major community in the province. The Sikhs are still clamouring for what they profess to regard as their due representation on the Governor-Generals Executive Council and in the Punjab Cabinet.226

To Sangat Singh, Cripps gave the Sikh leaders many hints as guideline on which they could secure their better future. Unluckily, the Sikh leaders could not understand the propositions Cripps offered to them. He wanted them to pursue a well-worked out course of action indicated to them in the meeting. India was undergoing the process of decolonization and the main parties had set tangible goals before them.227 Therefore, in this situation, the Sikhs should have selected clear objectives to achieve. But they failed to present any cohesive and agreed demands before Cripps.228 The Cripps Proposals produced nothing concrete in favour of the Sikhs. On 31 March 1942, the SGPC presented a memorandum to Cripps in which as usual they asked for the re-demarcation of the Punjab boundaries from the river Ravi to Delhi. The language and points of the memorandum were mostly the same as those presented in the RTC by the Sikh representatives. The memorandum evaluated their services towards the British empire and their past political status in the Punjab. They also expressed their resentment on the points of Cripps proposals which undermined the Indian integrity and the Sikh position. In the memorandum, they presented facts and figures about the communal proportion in different areas of the Punjab. They maintained that originally Jhang and Multan districts and trans-Jhelum areas were not a part of the proper Punjab. They demanded not to include these areas into the Punjab. They gave figures up to the Ravi: Muslims 4,505,000 Sikhs and other Non-Muslims 7,646,000 With population of Multan and Jhang districts: Muslims 8,288,000 Sikhs and other Non-Muslims 9,348,000
Source: Kirpal Singh, The Partition of the Punjab, 15-16.

163 They contended that the Sikh population in the states was 2,600,000 which could further reduce the Muslim ratio. 229 In the memorandum, they slipped from the demands to threats and expressed their anger that they were not considered justly by the British. They included the Sikh claims as under: From 25 to 33 per cent share in the Punjab cabinet and the Sikh representation should be compulsory in the cabinet, There should always be a coalition government in the Punjab, The Punjab be re-demarcated into two parts from the Ravi to Delhi consisting of Ambala and Jullundur Divisions and the districts of Lahore, Amritsar and Gurdaspur, The Sikhs be given weightage as the Muslims enjoyed in different provinces as minority, Five per cent representation in the centre, One Sikh minister in the central cabinet, Defence Advisory Committee be created with one Sikh seat in it, The Sikh status be maintained in the Indian defence forces, Sikh share in Indian and provincial services be maintained on existing lines or as the Muslims had in other minority provinces, Only the Sikh members would decide on the laws pertinent to the Sikh religion in the Legislature, The State would not interfere with the religious matters of the Sikhs, The Gurmukhi script would be introduced where necessary.230

The Sikh memorandum was made lengthy with the arguments which they had given so many times before like in the RTC and on other occasions. In fact, they had repeated the decades old demands in the memorandum and the new situation had not moved them to float demands according to the current scenario. The British tried to guide them but it could not mould them. Cripps as enunciated by Joginder Singh Shant advised the Sikhs sarcastically to baptise one member from each Hindu family as a Sikh231 to increase number of their population.

164 The Sikh Memorandum also had an Annexure of the Muslim population in the Punjab districts according to 1931 census report. According to this Annexure, the Muslims had a clean majority in the western districts from Lahore to DG Khan while they had a slight majority (50.8%) in the Gurdaspur district. They also made reasonable percentage in rest of the eastern districts: District Amritsar Ferozepore Jullundur Hoshiarpur Ludhiana
Source: Kirpal Singh, Partition of the Punjab, 21-22.

Muslim Population 47.0% 44.6 44.5 31.8 35.1

Interestingly, they did not give the Sikh percentage in the same districts because without the other non-Muslim populations their claim to be a majority in the eastern districts had no importance. According to the Eastern Times, except Ludhiana the Sikhs were in a smaller proportion than the Muslim population in the eastern districts: District Amritsar Ferozepore Jullundur Ludhiana
Source: The Eastern Times, 2 December 1942.

Sikhs 35% 33 26 46

The British administration showed concern over the possible Sikh reaction to the rejection of their demands. In a letter to the Viceroy, the Punjab Governor wrote that Master Tara Singhs task had become easy to stir up communal feeling at the alleged danger of the Sikhs being subjected to Muhammadan rule. He further wrote that the practical objections to Khalistan are even greater than those which lie in the path of Pakistan.232 Cripps tried to accommodate all the communities in his proposals. The Congress on 2 April 1942 signalled its opposition to the Cripps proposals. The Congress and Sikhs rejected the Cripps proposals on the possibility of the Indian partition with the

165 provision that provinces could opt out of a future Indian Constituent Assembly while the League rejected it finding no clear-cut acceptance of Pakistan.233 Once again the Sikhs were with the Congress following their ideology and action. The Congress Working Committee in the same meeting passed a resolution that they could not compel any people of any unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will and all the units would have full autonomy under the strong centre. 234 Nevertheless, the Congress consented to join the interim government but Cripps did not accept and went back on 12 April 1942 with a dream of Hindu-Muslim unity. The US government forced the British Prime Minister to resume efforts of Sir Cripps in India and try to come to terms with the Indian political parties.235 It was a direct pressure by the US for handing over power to the majority community but the British Foreign Office wrote to Washington on 5 March 1942 that the important community like Muslims could not be ignored:
We are earnestly considering whether a declaration of Dominion status after the war carrying with it if desired the right to secede should be made at this critical juncture. We must not on any account break with the Moslems who represent a hundred million people and the main army elements on which we must rely for the immediate fighting. We have also to consider our duty towards thirty or forty million untouchables and our treaties with the princes states of India, perhaps eighty millions. Naturally we do not want to throw India into chaos on the eve of invasion.236

The US continued pressure on the British by calling the British colonial policy as equivalent to the private estate of a landlord.237 In response to this stress, the British got infuriated and wrote to Viscount Lord Halifax, British ambassador to Washington, that We should certainly not tolerate any interference by foreign countries.238 But even then they had to be accommodating towards the criticism by the US writers and government particularly the public opinion.239 The British tried to placate the US to secure their general goodwill240 to continue getting their military support in the ongoing war.

166 The Intelligence report passed extremely surprising comments on the Sikh leadership that even after the withdrawal of the Cripps offer, the Sikh leadership kept on propagating against the Cripps proposals in the public conferences. 241 The Governors report concluded that as repercussion of the Cripps Mission no communal incident of any importance occurred but it badly affected the communal relations. The Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh (RSSS), 242 the military offshoot of the Hindu Mahasabha gave a call for membership. The report said:
The activities of this body, which are prosecuted as unostentatiously as possible, keep within the letter of the law, but its communal proclivities and the fact that its leaders might not be averse to enlisting Japanese aid to attain their object makes it necessary to regard them with considerable suspicion. Meanwhile, Akalis continue their efforts to organise the Sikh community in a semi-military footing, and Congressmen persist in proclaiming that the people should not look to the Government agencies for protection in times of emergency, but should instead band themselves into volunteer brigades under Congress direction. 243

The uncompromising Congress leadership again had to turn to the League and started showing greater flexibility towards the demand for Pakistan. The day after Cripps moved back to England, Gandhi expressed his emotions through an article in Harijan that the demand of the Muslims as a nation could not be challenged. They as a nation had a right to ask for the partition of India, but at the same time the Hindus had a right to resist such a partition. Moreover, C. Rajagopalachari along with some Congress leaders resolved and accepted the Pakistan demand to win the Muslim support in the freedom struggle. This change in response gravely alarmed the Sikh leaders. Despite the stormy criticism, Nehru said that the Muslims had the right to secede from India. 244 The Akali leaders arranged several meetings in which they attacked the British on ignoring the Sikh interests, rejected Rajagopalacharia on his pro-League role, and snubbed the Unionist ministry. They alleged that the Muslim Unionists had been favouring the Muslims in the appointments at the cost of the Sikh rights.245 The common Muslims appreciated the Acharis farsightedness but the Hindus and Sikhs

167 criticized the pro-Pakistani Madrasi group under Achari and the Punjabi Congress leadership under Mian Iftikharuddin. Kirpal Singh called a meeting of the Sikhs in Amritsar in which Master Tara said that Pakistan was being imposed on the Sikhs but they were fully prepared to fight with the Muslims. 246 The Akalis pledged in a conference at Amritsar to make the Pakistan scheme a mere dream. 247 The Akalis should not have been so furious as their representative Master Tara had also been invited to the talks with Jinnah at Delhi 248 but they showed a lot of anger on the accommodating attitude of the Congress towards the League, which merely displayed their hatred towards the Muslims. Observing the popularity of the Pakistan scheme among the Muslims, the Hindu leaders tried to convince the League to postpone it till the end of the war. But the Muslim leadership was well aware of the expected betrayal of the Congress. Therefore, Jinnah always responded to every move with sagacity stressing on what the League had demanded. The Sikhs should have struggled for their own rights collectively but at this very sensitive moment the Sikh leaders of all the parties were following separate agendas. Sardar Kharak Singh, President CAD, said on 1 April 1942, that the Cripps Proposals were entirely anti-national. The Cripps Mission paved the way for separation as enunciated by the Muslims on the religious basis then not to speak of one Pakistan, as many Pakistans may be established.249 On 5 April 1942, a meeting of the Moderate Sikhs was held at Amritsar in which 150 Sikhs including the leaders such as Sardar Jodh Singh and Sardar Buta Singh participated and after four hours discussion they issued a statement that the Defence department be transferred to the Indians. The secession of the provinces should not be accommodated and joint electorates be introduced with reservation of the minority seats including the Sikhs.250 The resolutions passed by the Moderate Sikhs with the

168 same language and demands adopted by the Congress. Jinnah had already explained his position regarding the Defence portfolio in late 1940. In an interview with the Viceroy on 25 September, Jinnah demanded the Defence portfolio for himself or his nominee, otherwise it must not go to any Indian political party.251 After the Cripps proposals, a letter by a Sikh was sent to Jinnah suggesting solution to the Sikh question. The writer explained that the Sikhs had been nobody in their own homeland before 1920s but they got prestige not on numerical basis but the military strength in the shape of the Akali Dal. The solution of the Muslim-Sikh problem was that a new state be created for Sikhs where all the communities should have balanced population. Otherwise, Pakistan was a matter of life and death for the Sikh community. He went on to say that the idea of Pakistan was conceived from the Muslim theocracy where according to the Lahore Resolution the Muslims would live and develop their culture, social and religious values independently.252 The Islamic idealism would ruin their military status:
Jinnah desires Muslim States and at the same time he also like [likes] the Sikhs to be a part of this Pakistan.Sikhs will form an inalienable part of Pakistan, where there is going to be perhaps no democracy, and without democracy, there are, no minority rights but forceful suppression, persecution, conversion or eliminationSikhs constitute not merely a nation but are a cent per cent military organization and have a born right to rule by virtue of their creedWe refuse to form ourselves into a slave community under fanatical Mohammedan tyranny. That we, in no case, would be under PakistanUnlike Hindus we will not have any neighbouring co-religious state to back and sanction the promised minority safeguards.253

The writer also suggested that Khalistan as buffer state could be created with the consent of the Muslims and Hindus.254 Sikhistan was impossible to achieve as seen by L. S. Amery, the Secretary of State for India because of the scattered population of the Sikhs. He accordingly wrote to Linlithgow that the administration should avoid exposing any administrative move so that the Sikhs would not have false expectations.255 Amery warned the Viceroy that the British must clear their minds about the factual conditions and seek various

169 possibilities. He further observed that he should visualize that the Sikh state was unworkable without an extensive exchange of population. Amery was well aware that the Sikhs felt insecurity under the proposed state of Pakistan which could instigate them to demand their own space in the Punjab as he wrote to Viceroy that the more Pakistan is pressed the more the Sikhs are likely in their turn to press for a degree of autonomy sufficient to protect them from Muslim domination. 256 In reply, the Viceroy expressed the same feelings on September 1942:
My judgment is, quite frankly, that the Sikhs though a nuisance well worth placating, are a relatively small nuisance. But there are no circumstances I can think of in which it would be practical politics to consider any sort of Sikhistan ; and I would not think it wise even to mention it to Glancy. 257

The British adopted a pragmatic approach to solve the communal issue in the light of the ground realities. They definitely wished to facilitate the Sikhs but approval by the other parties was essential to materialize any new arrangement. Commenting on the Sikhs and Cripps proposals, Nawa-i-Waqt (a pro-Muslim League paper) wrote that the Sikh question was merely a regional matter but the Hindu press had highlighted it as a big issue. Cripps had made it clear to the Sikh leaders that their issue was of a trivial nature which could be resolved through bargaining with the League. He also suggested that Master Tara should contact Jinnah and clear his mind relating to the Muslim-Sikh problems.258 According to Khushwant Singh, it was not astonishing if Cripps conceded the Muslim state because many states were already there in the Subcontinent. But the Muslim demand to be separate from the Indian union was really a success of the League. While Cripps on 29 March 1942 refused in a press conference the acceptance of the Pakistan scheme.259 The clause of non-accession seems a tactical ruse to secure the League support in the war efforts.

170 Sikandar-Baldev Pact 1942 The bitterness between the Muslims and Sikhs could be detrimental to the government and the war effort. Therefore, the British worked to bring about Sikandar-Akali rapprochement.260 Baldev Singh with the support of the members of the Khalsa National Party, the Akali Dal and the independent members had formed the Punjab Sikh United Party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly in March 1942. Its major objective was to reach at some agreed solution to the Sikh problem. It was able to conclude the Sikandar-Baldev Singh Pact on 15 June 1942.261 At Lahore, on 15 June 1942, Sir Sikandar announced the terms of the pact.262 Through this agreement, the Sikhs and the government tried to settle outstanding issues which had threatened the stability of the Punjab. The Pact allowed the communities to use either the meat of Jhatka or Halal. The teaching of Gurmukhi was promised in the institutions wherein sufficient Sikh students would be enrolled. The communities would be free to take stand in the Assembly relating to their religious matters. The Unionist Premier pledged to support the Sikh representation at the centre. The Punjab government agreed to ensure the implementation of 20 per cent quota in services for the Sikhs.263 The real reason behind the Pact was that in the early 1940, the Sikh desertions from the army immensely increased while some Sikhs disobeyed the officers orders which led the British to take stern action against the Sikhs. They even proposed to disband the Sikh units and stop future Sikh army recruitment. The Punjab government suggested adopting reconciliatory measures to restore the loyalty of the Sikhs. Numerous experts on Sikhs were given the task to dig out the roots and solution to the problem. Soon Major Short was given the task to normalize the situation. Master Tara Singh in July 1940 issued a press statement in which he advised the Sikh soldiers to perform the duties as pledged because it would be the only way of maintaining our

171 position in an uncertain future.264 The Akalis and other Sikhs could not afford the loss of the Sikh benefits, which they were enjoying as a martial people. On the other hand, they were reluctant to become part of the Muslim government which they had been criticizing. They were well aware that the anti-British activities might deprive them of the British favours in the political domain. Major Short, by using his friendly relations with the leading Sikh personalities helped end the crisis. During these parleys, he won over the Governor, Sir Sikandar and the Sikhs. He was of the opinion that the Anglo-Sikh amity was directly related to the Muslim-Sikh friendly relations. Thus he started working for an alliance between the Muslims and the Sikhs. The Akalis were deadly against Sir Sikandar for his open support to the Pakistan scheme while Sikandar disliked and considered the Akalis untrustworthy. To him, the insatiable nature of the Akalis was hard to meet; they forwarded demand after demand and nothing would win their permanent attachment.265 Shorts efforts, nevertheless proved fruitful and the Sikandar-Baldev Singh Pact was signed. The main achievement of Sikandar government was that the Akalis did not join Gandhis protest in August 1942. But as a matter of fact, it was a timely patch-up.266 Master Tara Singh in his presidential address threw light on the Pact and said that the Pact is purely a communal in nature and did not compel them to follow the Unionists agenda. He also pointed out that such a pact in itself could not change the mentality of the officials and government therefore it had no political importance. Sir Sikandar, Baldev Singh and the Akali leadership still had different political agenda to follow. He further declared that the coming events would testify the reality of the pact.267 In the same speech, he said that he believed that Pakistan was to rule over the Sikhs. If it is not so, what is it then?268 According to Master Tara Singh, the role of Raja Nerendra Nath, Sir Narang, Mahashe Khushal Chand

172 (Daily Milap), Mahashe Krishan (Daily, Partap), Goswami Ganesh Das and Bhai Parmanand was significant in concluding the pact.269 It is noteworthy as to how much the British officers and the Hindus had influence on the Sikh politics. It has also exposed that the Hindus had been working for the British masters. The Akali leaderships reaction to the Pact depicts the confused and ambivalent politics as they supported it in vague terms and opposed it as well. According to Jaspreet Walia, through this Pact, Master Tara Singh once again lifted the Akalis to the top of the Sikh politics.270 While Tara Singh writes in his book that the Akalis selected Baldev Singh for the ministership finding him affiliated neither with the Congress nor the Akali Dal. By this, the Akali Dal could continue the anti-Unionist campaign by projecting that no Akali was there in the Unionist government and this would not displease the Hindus because the Sikhs did not want to dissociate with the Congress. Master Tara Singh further pointed out that Sir Sikandar was determined to destroy the Akali Dal. 271 Nevertheless, the benefit Sikandar gained from the Pact was that the Akalis did not participate zealously in the civil disobedience movement launched by Gandhi. The Pact accelerated the anti-Tara Singh moves within the Sikh community as the Communist Sikhs and Central Akali Dal called it a double-standard in Master Taras personality and selfishness of the Akalis. Anyhow, this friendly step appeased the Sikh passion against the Muslims and lessened the degree of the communal hatred. To Tai Yong, it entirely ceased the anti-Unionist activities of the Akalis. 272 The strained situation created by the Sikh anti-Pakistan conferences and statements could not be stopped with a single pact to bring the Muslims and Sikhs closer. Some big decisions were required to bring about lasting amicable Muslim-Sikh relations which seemed impossible because no group in the Punjab was working seriously and honestly for the communal harmony.

173 Nevertheless, Baldev Singh thought this Pact very beneficial for the Sikhs and on 26 June 1942, he became minister of the Unionist government. Neither Congress nor League was happy about the Pact. Master Tara Singh declared this Pact as a big achievement but at the same time, he opined that the political issues of the community persisted as unsolved and for that they would continue their fight against the Unionists. To Tanwar, Master Tara Singh was justified in his assessment because the Sikandar-Baldev Pact was merely a blend of assurances, pledges, and

acknowledgments of the social, cultural and religious values. It did not solve the core issues therefore it lacked importance as the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact had. Jinnah expressed a deep concern over the Sikandar-Baldev Singh Pact. To him, it was a clear violation of the party discipline because Sir Sikandar being a League member was bound to take consent of the League leader. 273 Nevertheless, this pact became meaningless when Jinnah visited the Punjab in November 1942. Sir Sikandar could not face the champion of Pakistan and surrendered what he gained through the Pact with the Sikhs. This added to the Sikhs apprehensions who came to the conclusion that Sir Sikandar was not sincere and was playing a double game. The Premier passed away suddenly in December 1942274 but before his death he was a member of AIML Working Committee. A few weeks before his death he had stated publicly that he might disagree with Jinnah but he could not disobey him.275 The succession of Sikandar was a sensitive issue about the Governor reported to the Viceroy that Khizr Hayat Tiwana was not a suitable successor of Sikandar Hayat.276 Some of the anti-Unionist people also propagated that Tiwana family had always been the British stooge who looked down upon the Muslims. Such people believed that his appointment would be a great misfortune for the Punjab. It was also

174 projected that the Governor had placed him just to destroy the image of the League and Jinnah.277 The third All-India Akali Conference at Vahila Kalan (Lyallpur district) was held on 26-27 September 1942 presided over by Master Tara Singh. The main resolutions passed by the 15,000 Akali gathering were that the Sikhs would support the Congress demands for the Indian independence and provisional cabinet at the centre. The Akali leader said that the efforts to establish Muslim domination in the Punjab would only result in a foreign rule. He went on to condemn the Pakistan scheme and asserted that trust in the British was necessary, however the Sikhs would support any agreement by which the civil administration would be placed in the Indian hands immediately. He also said that the British should quit India at once without any condition. Giani Sher Singh supported the partition of the Punjab into two portions so that a Sikh majority could be secured.278 The points raised by Tara Singh in this speech were not clear as usual except the support to the Congress and national independence. The foreign rule to which Master Tara Singh hinted in his speech could be the Japanese because before this, he had cleared that the Sikhs would prefer the Japanese rule to the Muslim domination in the Punjab. Therefore, this speech was a threat to the British authorities that in case of Pakistan, the Sikhs might join the antiBritish forces. In this conference, they also pressed for the partition of the Punjab. The Governor reported to the Viceroy that in the subsequent Akali meetings fresh emphasis on the need to counter pro-Japanese tendencies was laid. They beset a plan to the re-demarcation of the Punjab to achieve a balanced proportion.279 The Akali leaders started testing political reaction on the re-arrangement of provincial boundaries synonymous to the Azad Punjab scheme. The immediate reaction of the Hindu press was very hostile and the Vir Bharat declared Master Tara Singh as

175 Jinnah. Master Tara Singh explained through a press statement that the Akali plan did not desire to form Khalistan outside the federation. The report found Jinnah willing to consider it favourably.280 During the first half of December 1942, Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar tried to convince the Sikhs to support the Azad Punjab scheme. They got a meager sympathy from their co-religionists but could not secure either the Muslim or the Hindu support. However, the Akali leadership seemed convinced to continue the traditional policy of opposition to the Pakistan scheme. The leaders also attacked the Unionist government and pledged that the Sikhs would never accept the majority rule of the Muslims. They also claimed that the Unionists were violating the Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact therefore the Unionist regime was tantamount to Pakistan. They also complained that the recent visit to the province by Jinnah had accelerated communalism in the Punjab.281

Leadership of Master Tara Singh Master Tara Singh acted erratically and changed his statements on a daily basis. His statements depicted the illusory future of the Sikh politics. He had no clear vision of the current and future political developments. Sometimes he seemed vociferous against Pakistan and simultaneously he would be ready to concede the demand of Pakistan if the League consented to concede Sikh demands like the Sikh state. In the public, he would seem determined to massacre the Muslims and somewhere else he posed to be a pacifist. He at one time was a secessionist, integrationist, violent strategist, pacifist, nationalist and communalist. He did not have the sagacity to produce a futuristic vision and solid programme for his community. J. S. Ahluwalia shared the same views in an article in The Eastern Times and exhorted the Sikhs that their Gurus had sacrificed their lives to expel the Muslim rulers from

176 India and being original nationalists they must put in every possible effort for the national integrity and save their birthplace.282 In September 1942 while presiding over the All-India Akali Conference, Lyallpur, Master Tara Singh said that the Muslims should postpone the demand of Pakistan and in return the Sikhs would cease their struggle against the idea of Pakistan. He did not want to disturb the British who were fighting against Japan for the Indians: Pakistan or no Pakistan can easily be postponed till after the war. 283 Although he talked of some peaceful avenues to prorogue this issue but in the same speech, he repeated that the Muslim demand for Pakistan was a call for civil war. This demand had already caused tension between Muslims and Sikhs and if they went on insisting on their demand, the civil war between the Sikhs and Muslims was inevitable. 284 The postponing of the Muslim struggle for Pakistan till the end of the war meant to follow the Congress policy which could never be acceptable to the League. Master Tara Singh yet had no clear picture of the prevailing political situation which had created confusion in the Sikh minds. He said that the demands for Pakistan and complete independence were inconsistent because if the British granted Pakistan and independence then who would enforce the agreed formula? On the other hand, there would be no independence if the English stayed in India; and if they left India then which force would implement the English decisions. If the British decided in favour of Pakistan then they would have to stay in the Subcontinent to execute their decrees. He further elucidated that if the Muslims desired to establish Pakistan with the British support and demand their expulsion only after the consolidation of Pakistan, it would be a blind trust in the British masters. By this strategy, they could not succeed to have independence.285 Such speeches by the Akali leadership, full of assumptions could please his followers only otherwise the international and national

177 realities had left the only option for the British to liberate India. The issue they were facing was to have an honourable return by concluding some agreed plan pertinent to all the political stakeholders in India. The Sikh destiny was in the hands of Master Tara Singh who sometimes confessed that he was unable to chalk out any future plan for the Sikhs:
I cannot chalk out a particular plan of action. I can only say that the times are hard and the situation is complicated. God alone be our guide in such times. I ask you to pray to God, and cleanse your mind of evil by recitation of Gurbani and meditation upon Gods name. That is the only sure right pathHoly people must be our guide.286

This speech depicts the words of a weak leadership. It seems Master Tara Singh was turning to religious fatalism rather than focusing on the stormy politics of the day just to secure help in some specific problematic domains within the community. His main target in fact was to isolate the other Sikh leaders from the Sikh masses. His speech is full of tactics rather than sincerity towards the Sikh nation. He talked of peace and tranquility to pacify the pacifists; his declaration of Pakistan as invitation to civil war was to pacify the extremist Sikhs; his exhortation to consult the religious book and the will of God was to enhance his religious status as a spiritual leader and his advice to take guidance from the holy people was to curry the Sikh Granthis or others. It was just to save his position as a leader otherwise he was confessing his inability to chart out a plan for the Sikh community at the pinnacle of the Sikh struggle. League Assures Sikh Rights In the Lahore Resolution, the Muslim leadership tried to determine the majority and minority rights. It accepted the cultural, economic, religious, administrative, political and other rights of the minorities particularly to satisfy the Sikhs. The Sikhs should have come to the table with Muslims to bargain on the lines given by the League in the Lahore Resolution. But without consultation they declared crusades against the Pakistan scheme. The propaganda was perilously worsening the

178 Muslim-Sikh relations in all the areas of the Subcontinent. The Congress leaders reacted not as zealously as the Sikhs did. During the 3rd annual gathering of the MSF in January 1940 at Aligarh, Liaqat Ali Khan had clarified that the League was not an adversary to its sister communitys rights. He made it perfectly clear that the League wanted freedom for every community. Congress nationalism on the other hand wanted domination of one community on all others. 287 On 1 April 1940, talking about the Sikh position, Jinnah said that they would be an effective community in Pakistan while in India their voice would be negligible. In the Muslim Punjab, they would enjoy an honourable and effective place.288 The Muslim leaders were fully optimistic about the popular response to the Pakistan idea by the Muslims. They were giving hope to the Muslims that the government would work on Sharia289 in Pakistan as Raja of Mahmudabad said at Lahore.290 Since, he was well aware of the impact of the theocratic version of Islam perceived by the non-Muslims. Through a letter to Jinnah, he indicated towards the campaign against Pakistan launched by the Hindus of Lucknow. He wrote that the biased attitude of the Hindus would create a favourable atmosphere within the Muslim community. As far as the Sikhs were concerned, Raja Sahib wrote that the Muslim leadership must be careful while using the term Islamic state because the nonMuslims feared the repetition of the Muslim theocracy they had already experienced during the Mughal rule. He clarified:
When I say Islamic State I do not mean a Moslem State. The Hindu and other sects are really affraid [afraid] of the repetition of another Ghori, Ghaznavi, or Moghal empire and they are perfectly justified in holding these suspicions against all Moslem dominationTheir past experienceas well as ourhave shown that a Moslem power may not be necessarily be an Islamic one.291

It is perfectly clear that the Leagues struggle for Pakistan was not to enslave any community or to revive the memories of the Mughal rule rather the minority rights

179 had been assured in the Lahore Resolution. Despite this, the Sikhs were alarmed about the proposed Sharia laws in the Muslim state.292 Therefore, they propagated that in the proposed state of Pakistan, the Sikh existence would be in danger. They projected the point that the Muslim rule would eliminate the Sikhs and Sikhism from the earth. In fact, the Sikhs were not sensing the nature of events and demands of the current scenario. Instead of the near past, they were doing politics in the light of the past history of the Subcontinent. Notwithstanding, there was no forcible conversions or ban on any kind of religious practices under the Unionist government whom they usually called the Muslim Raj. They saw the League as a theocratic party but they had no example to quote that the League had supported any anti-Sikh movement. They could see the League leaders response when the Mazhabi Sikhs in March 1940 demanded rights as a separate community from the Sikh panth. The leaders of the Mazhabi Sikhs contacted the Muslim leaders and desired to discard Sikhism. The CMG reported that the League leaders did not provoke the Sikh sectarianism. They never welcomed the Sikh conversions to Islam. 293 This incidence was never propagated and projected either by League or the Sikhs which testify that the League leadership was not pursuing the policy of religious persecution in the proposed Pakistan. In March 1941, observing the Sikh anxiety, Jinnah tried to make the Sikhs understand the sensitivity of the time. He warned them that they numerically were too small to be weighed honourably in India and their position in Pakistan would be effective and honourable. They would be an important political partner in the Punjab.294 These assurances could not move the Sikh obstinacy and they never ceased their anti-Pakistan activities. Sir Nazimuddin talking about the Sikh question during his address at the annual session of the Punjab Muslim League Conference held in November 1942 said that the Sikhs had got a prominent position in the last twenty

180 years with a powerful voice at the national level. The League could never ignore them.295 The Leaguers assured certain rights for the Sikhs through different proposals to win the Sikh cooperation. Some of the assurances were projected in The Eastern Times, Lahore in September 1942: 1. The provinces in Pakistan would not be authorized to pass any law affecting the Sikh religion without the consent of two-third of the Sikh members. 2. Gurmukhi would be the second language in the schools where demanded by the Sikhs. 3. The government would not interfere in the Gurdwara affairs managed by the Central Sikh Committee. 4. The Punjab government would give the Sikhs 20% share in all the government services. 5. The Sikh community would enjoy 20% representation of total elected members of the Punjab Assembly. 6. One-fifth of the total strength in the Punjab cabinet would be extended to the Sikhs. 7. In the federal cabinet and all the federal government departments the Sikhs would be given 10 per cent quota. Moreover, in all three forces of Pakistan, the Sikhs would be given fixed 20 per cent share of all the recruitments from the Punjab.296 Master Tara Singh writes in his auto-biography that during the Quit India Movement in 1942, Gandhi, Nehru and others were in jail and Rajgopalachari was trying for a communal unity to force the British to leave India. This effort concluded indirect negotiations between Jinnah (at his own house) and 20 to 25 Sikh and Hindu leaders at Birla House. Raja Maheshwar Dyal was playing the role of a middle man. Jinnah and the non-Muslim leaders concluded an agreed settlement according to which Pakistan was to be acceptable in the areas wherein the Muslims made 65 per cent of the population but Swami Ganesh Dutt who joined the talks later through Gokal

181 Chand Narang rejected it. Master Tara Singh writes that thus the compromise failed due to us and not due to Jinnah.297 It shows that in 1942, the Akalis along with the Congress leadership had accepted the Pakistan demand and they were merely concerned with the territorial redistribution. Many hopes of a Muslim-Sikh understanding were attributed to the Provincial Muslim League Conference at Jullundur on 15 November 1942. The Akali leaders including Giani Kartar adopted a realistic approach to the situation. They, it was reported, opined that Pakistan seemed inevitable therefore they must secure confidence of the League because in the united India their status would be ineffective. 298 In this perspective, the Jullundur session was very important in the history of the Muslim-Sikh relations. In the speech, Jinnah requested the Sikhs to pull themselves away from the Congress cloak and settle the matters with the Muslims.299 The Sikhs maintained their demands for re-demarcation of the province as Master Tara Singh resented Jinnahs statement in which he talked to achieve Pakistan through force.300 Although Jinnah always gave statements keeping the constitutional terms and the counterpart Congress in his mind and surely the statement did not mean to humiliate the Sikhs. According to the Intelligence reports, Jinnahs visit to the Punjab worsened the Muslim-Sikh relations. The Muslim-Sikh unfriendliness was again revived and the Akali Sikhs deplored Jinnahs refusal to accept the right of selfdetermination for the Sikhs scattered in different areas of the Punjab. Jinnah considered them a sub-national group and was not ready to accept the redemarcation of the Punjab. It made the Akali-League patch-up impossible in the current political scenario. 301 The hopes of the possible patch-up between the two communities were over-run by the assertive and blunt stand of Jinnah and it roused the anti-League sentiments among the Sikhs. The Sikhs in general concluded that it

182 was better to focus on Sir Sikandar rather than on Jinnah. Master Tara Singh repeated his pledge with the Hindus regarding partition that he was not in favour of Pakistan and Khalistan.302 But once more it was reported in November 1942 that an informal agreement had been concluded between Akalis and the League. The Eastern Times welcomed this agreement and evaluated its importance. In an Editorial, the newspaper favoured what points were included in the Amritsar rumour. All the points including Halal-Jhatka were repeated and maintained that the Sikhs must not worry about their rights as Islam had already assured all rights to minorities. 303 The Eastern Times appreciated the agreement but at the same time the paper disagreed with the demand of Sikh state and Amritsar its centre. The Editorial said that the Sikhs had many sacred places in several cities but enjoyed majority nowhere in these cities therefore they could not be declared as the Sikh states. The paper wrote that being scattered people, the Sikh demand for a Sikh state could not be justified. The Sikh state would be an injustice with the Muslims and Hindus. The paper further noted that the Sikhs had already five Sikh states, Patiala, Nabha, Faridkote, Jhind, and Kapurthala and these were enough for them. 304 Jinnah said that the Sikhs were their friends and advised them to redeem themselves from the Congress and have dialogue with the League:
I am on the Punjab soil, I should like to say that question between Hindus and Muslims is an all-India question, and the question between the Sikhs and the Muslims in the Punjab. If our Sikh friends wishLet us not talk at each other; but let us talk to each other. We have no designs on our Sikh friendsLet us sit together and I pray to God that we shall come to a settlement.305

Jinnah kept all the venues of a mutual discussion open but one thing hurting the Sikhs was that he had opposed the Sikh status.306 Baldev Singh stated that they did not need freedom with the vivisection of India. Responding to Jinnahs Jullundur speech, the Tribune wrote that the Sikhs had the same right in the Punjab which the Muslims had

183 in India. Being scattered they have no politics of their own and have always behaved as tools in the hands of the Hindus. 307 The Hindu press highlighted Jinnahs statement of sub-nation about the Sikhs and put in all the devices to make Pakistanists recoil from their goal. Ashar Yasin through an article observed that 3050000 Sikhs could not compel two crore and thirty-six lakhs Muslims to act according to their desire. The following figures show hollowness of the Sikh demand for self-determination: District Jullundur Ludhiana Ferozepore Amritsar Lahore Total 9,43, 721 6,72,494 11,56,732 11,17,120 13,78,970 Sikh Population 2,49,571 3,12,829 3,88,108 3,99,951 2,44,304 Percentage 26 46 33 35 17

Source: The Eastern Times, 2 December 1942.

The writer also commented that the threatening statements by the Sikhs could not increase their numerical strength.308 The violent activities of the Sikhs were badly effecting the Muslim-Sikh relations. The circumstances were dragging the two communities to a great danger. New peaceful developments seemed a dream while the antagonistic past was overtaking day by day. The Muslim religious forums were still struggling to regain the Shahidganj Mosque from the Sikhs.309 But the Muslims as a community launched no campaign against the Sikhs as the Sikhs had done against the Pakistan scheme. Amidst this critical phase of the communal problem Chhotu Ram took another step to save the communal unity and tried to organize the Jats irrespective of their religion. The All-India Jat Conference held its session at Delhi. Chhotu Ram said that they aimed to eliminate the influence of the Mullah, Pandit and Granthi from the politics and it would be the best way to achieve communal unity. He was of the opinion that the Hindus had control over the caste system in the domain of politics but the

184 Muslims and Sikhs were under the religious stress. 310 He addressed another Jat conference at Sonepat where he pledged to resist any endeavor to create an Islamic state.311 He was putting his energies to secure the territorial integrity of the Punjab but the Leagues drive was so forceful that it could not be checked by such a small maneuver.

Leadership Crisis in Punjab Resolution of the Punjab problem was handicapped by the fact that this region had not produced an all-India level political leadership. They never seemed inclined to go beyond the political boundaries of the Punjab. The leaders worked in the central council for a few years and returned to the regional politics. They never tried to assert their position in the national politics. The provincial leadership either Muslim or Hindu remained incessantly under the national command of the respective community. The Sikh politics remained constantly under the influence of the Congress which was led by a different community. The Punjabi politicians could not get out of the regional politics because it was materially beneficial and supportive in maintaining their rule in their respective areas. They were keener in the personal rule rather than the national interests. Jawaharlal Nehru said in May 1942 at Lahore that the Punjabi political workers lacked a sense of responsibility and were interested in petty party squabbles to the exclusion of matters of vital importance.312 The Muslim-Sikh relations during 1940 to 1942 presented a critical form of communal tussle in the political domain of the Punjab. The League, after experiencing a bitter time under the Hindus, ultimately demanded a separate Muslim state in the north-west and north-east of Indian Subcontinent. The demand relating to the northwest created crisis in the Sikh politics. All their stakes were involved in the Punjab

185 therefore they retaliated with anger and pledged to resist Pakistan by sacrificing their blood. It was a very critical juncture as far the Sikhs were concerned but their leadership never found a way to meet this challenge. The Sikh public reacted with a strange temperament and no effective criticism came from the Sikh masses against their leaders on their duality of character or weak role in the political matters but they at the same continued backing their political organisations. The Sikhs had conflicting opinion about the political on-goings while the Akali leaders never worked in one direction. They discussed no options for the community except exhortation to fight, for which they were collecting weapons. The Sikh politics remained under scattered minds and the Hindu influence. The Governors reports in April 1941 depicted truly the contradicting attitude of the Sikh leadership:
Akalis with Congress leanings consider that Sikhs should throw in their lot with Congress and concentrate on persuading it not to accept the scheme; Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh consider that an Akali-Hindu alliance offers the best chance of resistance; while Baba Kharak Singh considers that Akalis, instead becoming subservient to the Hindu Mahasabha, should attempt to enlist the sympathies of nationalist Muslims. Meanwhile, the Khalistan alternative is being kept in the background, though efforts continue to be made to arm the community and to place it on an organised and semimilitary basis on the plea of self-preservation.313

The Sikh leadership had opened all the fronts simultaneously. They wanted to get sympathy of the British, Hindu Mahasabha, Congress and the Unionists though all of them had never treated them as an equal in the political arena. All of them promised but none kept his word. The sad aspect of the Sikh leadership was that despite this illtreatment, they continued working under the same strategy. They still could not overcome these psychological weaknesses. Master Tara Singh in October 1940 said that the Sikhs must neither rely on the Congress nor the British.314 This advice made political sense but he himself could not carry it out. Another aspect of the Sikh politics was that they could not show courage to step forward towards the League. Their attitude towards the League was more arrogant than the Congress. They kept on

186 intimidating the stakeholders with a threat to start civil war to solve the communal tangle in the Punjab. Due to these reasons, one observes the lack of mutual dialogue between the Akali and the League leaders which further widened the gulf between the two communities. The specific environment justified the League in initiating its own political programme which could redeem their community from the threats and agony.

Notes

187

Chapter Two
Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs: 1839-1964, vol. II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 239-241 2 Letter from Ahmad Yar Daultana to MA Jinnah on 28 March 1940, in Rizwan Ahmad, The Quaid-E-Azam Papers 1940 (Karachi: East & West Publishing Company, 1976), 96-97. 3 Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs, vol. II, 240-41. 4 H. N. Mitra, ed., The Indian Annual Register 1919-1947, vol. II, 1940 (New Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1990), 75. 5 CMG, 5 March 1940. K. C. Yadav, The Partition of India: A Study of the Muslim Politics in Punjab, 1849-1947 The Punjab: Past and Present XVII-I (April 1983): 133. 7 CMG, 6 March 1940; see more details in the Letter from Dr. Muhammad Alam to Jinnah on 24 January 1940, in Rizwan Ahmad, The Quaid-E-Azam Papers, 41-42. 8 Translation of Congress mein Musalmanon ki Shirkat aur Hindu Zehniyat ka Sawal, Weekly Hindustan, (Lucknow) September 12, 1937, 5-8. 9 Sir Sundar Singh Majithia was the man who recognised the Sikhs as an important and separate minority. The Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 1941 (Lahore: Superintendent Government Publishing, 1942), 405. 10 CMG, 6 March 1940. 11 Ashiq Hussain Batalvi, Chand Yadein Chand Tasurat (Urdu) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1992),194. 12 Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs, vol. II, 241. Not only Sir Sikandar Hayat but also the other prominent Unionist Muslims participated in the session. Ashiq Hussain Batalvi, Chand Yadein Chand Tasurat, 195-97. 13 CMG, 22 March 1940. 14 Ibid., 24 March 1940. 15 Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents: 1906-1947 (Karachi: National Publishing House Ltd., 1970), 340-41; for detail see, Dr. (Miss) Kaniz F. Yusuf, Dr. M. Saleem Akhtar and Dr. S. Razi Wasti. Pakistan Resolution Revisited. (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1990) and Latif Ahmad Sherwani, ed., Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, 1940-1947 (Karachi: National Publishing House Ltd., 1969). 16 Letter from Craik to Linlithgow on 1 April 1940 in Lionel Carter, ed., Punjab Politics, 19401943 (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2005), 108. 17 It is generally perceived that the non-Muslim press projected the Lahore Resolution as the Pakistan Resolution but as a matter of fact, the Muslim press too used the word Pakistan as CMG used the same on the very next day. CMG, 24 March 1940; Majlis-i-Kabir was another organization which was using the word Pakistan. Majlis-i-Kabir-i-Pakistan was founded in 1937 by the young Lahorites, Abdullah Anwar Baig, Khurshid Alam, Sahibzada Abdul Hakim, Sarwar Hashmi and others. It used a letter pad with a map of Pakistan. Its leaders were in touch with the League leaders but after the Lahore Resolution this organization went into background. Sarfraz Mirza, Tasawar-i-Pakistan se Qarardad-i-Pakistan Tak (Lahore: 1983). 18 Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia ((London: Routledge, 2000), 101-102.
19 20 6 1

Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para. 151.

Shiv Kumar Gupta, Sikhs and the Partition of the Punjab, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 58th Session, Bangalore, 1997 (Aligarh, 1998): 591-98; see also Indu Banga, Crisis in Sikh Politics, 1940-47, in Joseph T. OConnell et al., Sikh History and Religion in the Twentieth Century (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1990), 236. 21 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para. 73. 22 H. N. Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1940), 356-57. According to Mitra, the Akali leaders held conference on 12 February 1940 at Atari and expressed concern over the idea of Pakistan. Joseph T. OConnell, Sikh History and Religion, 235n. 23 Joseph T. OConnell, ed., Sikh History and Religion, 239. 24 The Times of India, 25 March 1940 in Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India: 1936-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 60.

188

25

Note by Major-General Lockhart, Military Secretary, India Office, L/PO/6/106b (iii) ff 266-

559.
26 27

Master Tara Singh, Pakistan (Gurmukhi) 2nd ed. (Amritsar: Shiromani Akal Dal, n.d.), 2. Triune (Lahore) 22 May 1940. 28 The Times of India (Bombay) 25 March 1940; see details in Editorial of CMG, 24 March 1940. Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party, 1923-1947 (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 1999). 150. 30 CMG, 28 March 1940. 31 PREM 4/45/1. Linlithgow remained the Indian Viceroy from 18 April 1936 to 1 October 1943. Zetland was the Secretary of State for India during the period of 1935-1940. 34 Linlithgow to Zetland in Prof. Waheed-uz-Zaman, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Myth and Reality (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1976), 59; also see Sikandar Hayat, QuaidI-Azam Jinnah and the Demand for a Separate Muslim State: Resolution Reappraised, Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan XXIV (October 1987): 12. 35 Waheed-uz-Zaman, Myth and Reality, 59; Sikandar Hayat, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah and the Demand for a Separate Muslim State, 12. 36 Letter from Zetland to Linlithgow on 13 December 1938, Oriental India Office Collection, vol. III, F I 25/6. 37 Leo Amery was the Secretary of State for India during the period of 1940-1945. 38 Linlithgow to Amery on 5 September 1942, MSS.EUR.F. 125/11. 39 K. K. Aziz, Britain and Pakistan: A Study of British Attitude towards the East Pakistan Crisis of 1971 (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1974), 30. 40 Ibid. 41 R. J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps, and India, 1939-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 4-9. 42 CMG, 28 March 1940. 43 Proceedings of Congress Working Committee, Wardha, 16-19 April 1940 in R. J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps, and India, 39. 44 CMG, 14 April 1940. 45 Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: Uncommon Books, 1996 and 2005), 236-37. 46 Joseph T. OConnell, Sikh History and Religion, 235. 47 The Tribune, 27 March 1940. 48 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 151. 49 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1940), 357 also see Gurnam Singh Rekhi, Sir Sundar Singh Majithia and his Relevance in Sikh Politics (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1999), 125-126 50 O. P. Ralhan and Suresh K. Sharma, eds., Documents on Punjab 6, part II, Sikh Politics (1927-1947) (New Delhi: Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1994), 491. 51 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1940, file no. S-408, para 16. 52 Ibid. 53 Rajiv A. Kapur, Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith (London: Allen & Unwin Inc., 1986), 197. 54 Presidential Address by Master Tara Singh, Letter from Akali Dal to Maharaja Kapurthala on 11 April 1940, Political Department, Political Branch, IOR: R.1/1/3554, File no. 15 (22)-P (S) 1940. 55 The Tribune, 2 April 1940. 56 Ibid., 5 April 1940. 57 Ibid., 8 April 1940. 58 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1940, file no. S-408, para 191. 59 Ibid., para 178. 60 The Tribune, 11 April 1940. 61 CMG, 14 April 1940. 62 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1940), 358. 63 Joseph T. OConnell, Sikh History and Religion, 236. 64 The Tribune, 18 April 1940. 65 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1940, file no. S-408, para 292.
33 32 29

189

CMG, 18 April 1940. S. Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 1921-47 (Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd., 1992), 238-39. 68 The Tribune, 28 May 1940. 69 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1940, file no. S-408, para 230. 70 Ibid., para 244. 71 Ibid., para. 300. 72 Ibid., para 242. 73 Letter from the Viceroy to the Governor Punjab on 18 April 1940, Mss. Eur F125/149, 31 Linlithgow Papers. 74 FR, 30 April, 1940, L/P&J/5/243. 75 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, 1940, file no. S-408,para 164 and 178. 76 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 210. 77 Ahmadi or Qadiani people were the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadiani (Gurdaspur) but other Muslim sects opposed his religious beliefs. 78 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 515. 79 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 239. 80 CMG, 6 March 1941. 81 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-409, para 130. 82 Resolution of the SGPC in Lionel Carter., Punjab Politics, 1940-1943, 227, 232-33. 83 Letter from Master Tara Singh to Craik on 28 March 1941 in Ibid., 231. 84 Letter from Craik to Linlithgow on 3 March 1941. Ibid., 230. 85 Letter from Craik to Linlithgow on 17 March 1941. Ibid., 240.
67

66

Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-409, para 130. Review of the Terrorist Situation in the Punjab for the Year April 1940-April 1941, Supplement to the Punjab Police, Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, vol. LXIII, 1941, file no., S-409, para 1. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid., para 355. 90 Nihang Sikhs were extremists and were involved in unlawful activities like violation of ban on Kirpan, etc. 91 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, vol. LXIII, 1941, file no. S-409, para 180. 92 Ibid., para 272. 93 Ibid., para 284. 94 Ibid., para 294. 95 Ibid., para 245. 96 Letter from Governor to Linlithgow on 13 January 1941, L/PJ/5/244.
87 97 98

86

CMG, 1 April 1941. Letter from Bahawal (Gujrat) to MA Jinnah on 14 August 1941, file no. 1099, QAP. 99 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-409, para 305. 100 Ibid., para. 481. 101 Master Tara Singh, Akalion ke Khilaf Sazshen, Ajit in Editorial, Inqelab, 18 January 1946. Assistant to the DIG of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, Punjab. Supplement to the Punjab Police Secret Abstract of Intelligence, Lahore, 10 January 1942, no. 2, S-410. 104 Ibid., para. 21, 32, 36. 105 Master Tara Singh, Meri Yad (Gurmukhi) (Amritsar: Sikh Religious Book Society, 1945), 128. 106 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, S-410, para 36. 107 Ibid., para. 86, 89. 108 Ibid., para. 109, 111. 109 FR, March, 1942, L/PJ/5/245. 110 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, S-410, para 119. 111 Ibid., para 129. 112 Ibid., para 129. 113 Ibid., para 139. 114 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1942), 149.
103 102

190

Sardar Kartar Singh MA, LLB, Advocate High Court Patiala was the Chairman of the Reception Committee. 116 G. Kartar Singh MLA, Lyallpuri, Patiala Administration and the Position of the Sikhs (Pamphlet) (n.d.) R/1/1/384 File No. 353-P(S)/42. Political Department. 117 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 211. 118 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, S-410, para 139. 119 Ibid., para 112. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid., para 130-31. 122 Ibid., para 140. 123 Ibid., para 132. 124 Ibid., para 142. 125 Ibid., para 294. 126 FR, March, 1942, L/PJ/4/245. 127 Naranjan Dass Mohaya, Administration of Law and Order under the Unionist Party (19371941), Punjab History Conference, 20th Session (Patiala: Punjab Historical Studies, Punjabi University, 1987): 379. 128 The Eastern Times, 7 November 1942. 129 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 269-71. 130 Letter from WS Dhory, Bat-at-Law, Secretary District Muslim League in The Eastern Times Lahore, 6 December 1942. 131 The Eastern Times,18 December 1942. 132 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 267. 133 Ibid., para 113. 134 Ibid., para 272. 135 Ibid., para 385. 136 Presidential Address by Master Tara Singh through a Letter from Akali Dal to Maharaja Kapurthala on 11 April 1940, Amritsar, Political Department, IOR: R.1/1/3554, File no. 15 (22)-P (S) 1940. 137 Review of the Terrorist Situation in the Punjab for the Year April 1940-April 1941, Supplement to the Punjab Police, Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, vol. LXIII, 1941, file no. S-409, para. 1. 138 FR, May 1942, L/PJ//245. Secret Police Abstract, file S-410, para. 182. Ibid., para. 206. 141 Ibid., para 294. 142 Ibid., para 329. 143 Master Tara Singh, Meri Yad, 130. 144 Review of the Terrorist Situation in the Punjab for the Year April 1940-April 1941, Supplement to the Punjab Police, Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, vol. LXIII, 1941, file no. S-409, 1940, para 343. 145 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, Punjab, file no. S-408, para. 354. 146 Ibid., para 461. 147 Ibid., para 484. 148 Ibid., para 492.f 149 Ibid., file no. S-409, para 272. 150 Ibid., S-410, para 154. 151 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file S-410, para 225. 152 Ibid., para 203. 153 Ibid., S-409, para 324. 154 Ibid., para 249 and 326. 155 Ibid., para 260. 156 Ibid., passim, para 144. 157 M. Aslam Malik, Sikh Reaction to Pakistan Resolution 1940, Pakistan Journal of History & Culture XVIII, no. 2 (July-December 1997): 49. 158 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. 1 (1940), 357. 159 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 244. 160 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 211.
140 139

115

191

161

Anup Chand Kapur, The Punjab Crisis: An Analytical Study (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co.,

1985), 64. FR L/PJ/5/246. Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 266. 164 Ibid., file no. S-410, para 162. 165 Ibid., para 183. 166 Ibid., para 206. 167 Ibid., para 295. 168 Ibid., para 452. 169 Ibid., para 473. 170 Ibid., para 529. 171 Ibid., para 517. 172 Ibid., para 174. 173 Tai Yong Tan, The Aftermath of Partition, 103 174 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 242. 175 Ibid., para 266. 176 Ibid., para 450. 177 Ibid., S-410, para 390. 178 Ibid., para 402. 179 Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, vol. 11, 1940 (Lahore: Superintendent Government Publishing, 1941), 99. 180 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 60. 181 Letter from Malik Barkat Ali to Jinnah on 21 July 1941 in Rizwan Ahmad, comp., The Quaid-i-Azam Papers, 1941-42 (Karachi: East & West Publishing Company, 1976), 63-64. 182 David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (London: A.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988), 183-85. 183 External Affairs Department, Government of India to Secretary of State for India, 29 July 1943, IOR: L/PJ/8/662 (Punjab Ministry Affairs and Appreciations). 184 V. P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, rep. (Kothrud, Poona: Sangam Books Ltd., 1979), 456-457. 185 FR 15 December 1941, L/PJ/5/244. 186 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 241. 187 Ibid., 244. 188 Letter from S. Muhammad Sabir Jaffery to MA Jinnah on 5 February 1941, Ropar. vol. 138, Archives of Freedom Movement. 189 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 242. 190 The Muslim students mainly used the platform of the All-India Students Federation, a Hindu-sponsored organisation. The Muslim Students Federation was founded in 1937; see details, Sarfraz Hussain Mirza, The Punjab Muslim Students Federation, 1937-1947 (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1991), xiv and passim. 191 FR, 15 March 1941, L/PJ/5/244.
163 162

Letter from Gul Muhammad Khan, Honourary Secretary, Muslim League Gohana to Hon. Secretary, Muslim League, Delhi, 24 October 1940, vol. 132, AFM. 193 Letter from Shah Nawaz Khan to MA Jinnah on 8 February 1941, file no. 1099, QAP. 194 Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power, 158. 195 CMG, 31 March 1940. 196 Ibid. 197 Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs, vol. II, 243. 198 K. C. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present (New Delhi: Ashajanak Publications, 1974), 87. 199 Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims: A Political History, 1858-1947 (Lahore: Book Traders, 1976), 296-97. 200 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para 230. 201 Bajwant Kaur Dhillon, Demand for Pakistan: Role of Master Tara Singh, in Verinder Grover, ed., The Story of Punjab: Yesterday and Today (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995), 537. 202 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, 1919-1947, vol. 1 (1940), 323. 203 FR, September, 1940, L/PJ/5/243.

192

192

Letter from Gandhi to Master Tara Singh on 16 August 1940 in Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 211-13. 205 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 211-12. On the other hand, the Akali members of the Congress Working Committee, Punjab assured the Congress that the Sikhs or Akalis could never leave the Congress. Sampuran Singh, MLA, Partap Singh, MLA, Darshan Singh Pheruman, Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir, S. Basant Singh of Moga and S. Labh Singh were prominent among this CWC. Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-408, para. 475. 207 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 212. 208 Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 1849-1947 (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1988). 150151; see also file no. 1090/60, QAP. 209 Letter from Muhammad Fazl Qadeer Zafar Nadvi, Secretary Anjuman-i-Islamia, Kethal District Karnal to Secretary Muslim League on 2 November 1941, vol. 138, AFM. 210 Bakhshish Singh Nijjar, Punjab under the British Rule, 1849-1947, vol. III (1932-1947) (Lahore: Book Traders, n.d.), 160-161. 211 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register1919-1947, vol. II, 1940, 73. 212 Ibid., vol. II, 1941, 212-213. 213 Ikram Ali Malik, A Book of Readings on the History of the Punjab 1799-1947 (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, Punjab University, 1970), 531. 214 The Eastern Times, 8 November 1942. 215 Interview of Gandhi by Sir Stafford Cripps in Nicholas Mansergh, ed., The Transfer of Power, 1942-47, vol. 1 (London: Her Majestys Stationery Office, 1970), 499. 216 R. J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps, and India, v. 217 Sir Geoffrey Fitzhervey de Montmorency, Governor of the Punjab during 9 August 1928 to 19 July 1932 and then from 19 October 1932 to 12 April 1933. 218 Parliamentary Debates,(Central) L/PO/6/106b (ii) ff 1212-265. 219 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 248-49. 220 Punjab Police Secret Abstract of Intelligence, S-410, para. 162. 221 Ibid., para. 129. 222 The Congress wanted the Defence Department to be handed over to the Indians which was opposed by the British and Jinnah. FO/954/12A. 223 Henry Hayes, ed., The Sikh Question in India (London: Helms Publishing, n.d.), 7-9. 224 Telegram from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy on 1 March, 1942, L/ PO/6/106b (iii) ff 266-559. 225 Sir Bertrand James Glancy remained Governor of the Punjab from 7 April 1941 to 8 April 1946. 226 Nicholas Mansergh, ed., The Transfer of Power 1942-7, vol. II, 7; also see Gurmit Singh, Failures of Akali Leadership (Sirsa: Usha Institute of Religious Studies, 1981), 46. 227 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 213-214. 228 Harjindar Singh Dilgir, Shiromani Akali Dal: Ik Ittehas (Gurmukhi) (Jullundur: Punjabi Book Co. 1986), 35. 229 Kirpal Singh, Partition of the Punjab (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1972), 15-16. 230 Sikh Memorandum presented by SGPC to Sir Cripps on 31 March 1942 in Kirpal Singh, The Partition of the Punjab, 15-21. 231 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, file no. S-410, para. 174. 232 Letter of Governor Punjab Glancy to Viceroy Linlithgow in Henry Hayes, The Sikh Question in India, 11. 233 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 250; see also B. K. Mishra, The Cripps Mission: A Reappraisal (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1982), 125 and passim. 234 Ram Narayan Kumar and Georg Sieberer, The Sikh Struggle: Origin, Evolution and Present Phase (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1991), 131-132. 235 Message from US President for the British Prime Minister on 12 April 1942, FO/954/12A. Lord Linlithgow in the beginning had opposed such a mission to India and threatened to resign but later on, he agreed. The British government was of the view that such a mission was necessary to project the British sincerity to the world and to gain time for further workout. Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 1849-1947, 188. 236 Private Office Papers of Sir Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, FO/954/12A/0/427.
206

204

193

Letter from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, on 13 December 1942, FO/954/12A. Letter from Prime Minister to Lord Halifax, on 19 September 1942, PREM/46/4b. 239 Letter from Washington to Foreign Office on 16 September 1942,Ibid. 240 Letter from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, on 13 December 1942, FO/954/12A. 241 Secret Police Abstract of Intelligence, S-410, Para. 174. 242 RSSS was initiated in 1925 by Keshav Rao Bali Ram Hedgewar, a doctor from Nagpur. 243 FR, April 1942, L/PJ/5/245. 244 Ram Narayan Kumar, The Sikh Struggle, 131-133. 245 FR, April 1942, L/PJ/5/245. 246 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 251. 247 CMG, 15 April 1942. 248 Jaspreet Walia, Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics, 1920-47 (Ph.D. diss., Guru Nanak Dev University, 2005), 147. 249 The Indian Annual Register, vol. I, 1942, 344. 250 Ibid., 256-57. 251 Jinnah, interview with the Viceroy on 25 September 1940, PREM 4/45/1, National Archives, London. 252 The Sikh Problem, file no. 930, QAP. 253 Ibid. 254 Ibid. 255 Letter from Amery to Linlithgow on 20 August 1942, MSS.EUR.F. 125/11. 256 Ibid. 257 Ibid., on 5 September 1942. 258 Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore) 11 April 1942. 259 Khushwant Singh, The History of the Sikhs, vol. II, 250n. 260 Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, 214. 261 Gulati, Akalis Past and Present, 82-83. 262 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. I (1942,), 344-46. 263 Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power, 158-59. 264 Master Tara Singhs press statement in July 1940, Short Collection, Mss Eur F 189/3. 265 Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit, 32-34. 266 Ibid., 36-37. 267 Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, vol. II (1942), 299. 268 Ibid., 300. 269 Sangat Singh, Sikhs in History, 214n. 270 Jaspreet Walia, Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics, 209.
238 271 272 273

237

Master Tara Singh, Meri Yad, 133.

Tai Yong Tan, The Aftermath of Partition, 105. Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power, 160. 274 Tai Yong Tan, The Aftermath of Partition, 106. 275 Sikandar Hayat, Aspects of the Pakistan Movement (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1998), 113. Letter from Governor Punjab to Secretary of State for India on 1 January 1943, IOR: L/PJ/8/662. 277 Extract from Broadcast on 2 January 1943, Rome news in Hindustani, in Letter from Government of India, Department of Information and Broadcasting, to the Secretary of State for India, 4 January 1943, ibid. 278 FR, September, 1942, L/PJ/5/245. 279 Ibid., October, 1942, L/PJ/5/245. 280 Ibid. 281 Ibid., December 1942, L/PJ/5/245.
282 283 276

J. S. Ahluwalia, Sikhs! Beware of Congress Wills, The Eastern Times, 30 August 1942. Mitra, The Indian Annual Register,, vol. II (1942), 299. 284 Ibid. 285 Ibid. 286 Ibid., 300. 287 CMG, 4 January 1940.

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The Sikh Problem, file no. 930, QAP. Islamic laws 290 Sharifuddin.Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, 341. 291 Letter from Raja of Mahmudabad to Jinnah on 28 July 1940 in Rizwan Ahmad comp., The Quaid-e-Azam Papers 1940, 111-112. 292 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 60. 293 CMG, 13 March 1940; see also letter from the President Bawa Jiwan Singh Dal (Mazhabi Sikhs organization) to Quaid-i-Azam, n.d. file- F-930, QAP. 294 CMG, 2, 4 and 15 March 1941. 295 Ikram Ali Malik, A Book of Readings, 529-30.
289

288

The Eastern Times, 27 September 1942. Gurmit Singh, Failures of Akali Leadership, 60-61; also see Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh: Jeevan Sangharsh tey Udaish (Gurmukhi) (Amritsar: 1972), 191-92. 298 Police Abstract, 1942, file no. S-410, para 513. 299 Ibid. para 518. 300 Ibid .para. 517. 301 Ibid. para. 525. 302 Ibid. para. 546. 303 The Eastern Times, 24 November 1942. 304 Ibid. 305 Ibid., 17 November 1942. 306 Ibid. 307 Ibid., 20 November 1942. 308 Ashar Yasin, Hollowness of Sikh Claims Exposed, The Eastern Times, 2 December 1942. 309 Volume 132, AFM. 310 The Eastern Times, 2 December 1942.
297 311 312 313 314

296

Gulati, Akalis Past and Present, 89. Secret Police Abstract, S-410, para. 217. FR, April, 1942, L/PJ/5/245. The Tribune, 31 October 1940.