CFC Thematic Report - Rapid Urbanisation and Displacement: The Case of Kabul City, 24 September 13

C I V I L - M I L I T A R Y
F U S I O N
C E N T R E
AFGHANISTAN
September 2013
IN TRANSITION
Comprehensive Information on Complex Crises
Rapid Urbanisation and Displacement: The Case of Kabul City

Rainer Gonzalez Palau
Afghanistan Team Leader Social and Strategic Infrastructure rainer.gonzalez@cimicweb.org
This report provides an in depth review of the global link between conflict-based displacement and rapid urbanisation, with a special focus on the case of Kabul City in Afghanistan, by examining the vulnerabilities and pressures over the urban system posed by urban refugees, returnees and IDPs. Special attention is given to the role of the future Kabul New City in overcoming rapid urbanisation in the Afghan capital. Further information on these issues is available at www.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text.
ince 1975, the worlds population living within urban areas has doubled, rocketing from 1.5 billion in 1975 to 3.4 billion in 2009. Ninety per cent of global urban growth occurs in developing countries. According to the United Nations (UN), the percentage of the worlds population residing in urban areas could surpass 65 per cent by 2050. Climate change, demographic trends, food shortages, environmental degradation, underemployment, volatile commodity prices, crime, economic and financial instability, lack of access to shelter and basic services and weak governance are leading drivers of rapid urbanisation and rural-to-urban migration.
Moreover, in some countries, rapid urban growth may be boosted by conflict and war, as those affected by violence often seek refuge in cities. Recent United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) statistics estimate that nearly half of the worlds 10.5 million refugees reside in large towns and cities with only one third of global refugees living in tents and sprawling camps. At the same time, international and national conflicts have generated more than 26 million internally displaced persons (IDPs while natural disasters generated 36 million more, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). According to UNHCR, it not possible to accurately determine the number of urban IDPs, but available data suggests a total of nearly four million. Other studies report that urban IDPs could account for half the worlds total IDPs. Refugee and IDP status are distinct humanitarian designations. The main point of distinction is that IDPs remain within the borders of their own countries. Both refugees and IDPs have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. While refugee
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AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT
status grants certain rights and protections under international law, specifically by the 1951 Geneva Convention, IDPs are at the mercy of their own governments, which in many cases could be the principle cause of displacement. Hence, UNHCR describes IDPs as probably the largest group of vulnerable people in the world. Returnees, defined by the humanitarian community as a refugee who has returned to his or her home country [] after a conflict and the country is being rebuilt are another source of violence-originated displacement influencing rapid urbanisation. Cases of urban returnees are found in Rwanda, South Sudan and most recently, Afghanistan, where at least five million have returned since 2002. Large numbers of urban refugees, IDPs and returnees poses a series of challenges to the economic, governmental and social structures of the cities in which they settle. This report is structured into two sections. The first section examines urban displacement from a global perspective in order to understand the profile of the displaced, the roots of displacement to urban areas and vulnerabilities of the urban displaced populations. The second section focuses on the specific context of the conflict-generated urban displacement in Kabul. Additionally, the report considers the vulnerabilities posed to urban returnees and IDPs, and the pressures and challenges placed on the citys infrastructure, environment, employment, housing and other markets. This report gives special attention to the Kabul New City, considering whether the project will ameliorate the conditions of urban IDPs and returnees.
Profiling the Urban Displaced Populations1

According to the Cities Alliance, urban displaced populations, regardless of the nature of their displacement, are subjected to a higher level of vulnerabilities and challenges than the urban poor. The majority of displaced persons, having lost all their assets, including housing, land and property rights arrive in the city searching for safe haven. Urban displaced persons commonly strive to keep a low profile to avoid expulsion or detention. Many of them do not possess identity documents required to access public services or subsidised food, highlights a report from the United National Human Settlements Programme (UNHABITAT). Many lack the social networks or the skills to survive in the complex socioeconomic landscape of cities. Even those benefiting from a recognised refugee status are often excluded from accessing the labour market, education services and basic health services in host countries. Research addressing refugees, IDPs and returnees issues is extensive, while studies linking displacement and rapid urbanisation, as well as their transformative impact on settled populations and municipal and national institutions, is scarce. Unbeknownst to the municipal authorities, in some urban areas, large communities of urban displaced persons have dwelt in the city for many years. In many cases, they will likely become permanent residents; therefore, it is important to account for their presence for purposes of urban planning, poverty reduction strategies, service delivery and other urban interventions. Similarly, while voices of urban poor are usually reported, urban displaced populations are rarely heard by policy makers. As a result, few cities have developed strategies and plans to overcome rapid urbanisation driven by displacement. The following describes profiles, trends, challenges and causes of displacement of urban refugees, IDPs and returnees. Urban Refugees The State of the Worlds Cities 2010/2011 report published by the UNHABITAT states that Amman, Jordan hosts the largest refugee population in the world. With roughly 500,000, the majority of refugees in Amman are Palestinian and Iraqi. Since the onset of conflict in Syria, a new flow of an undetermined number of urban refugees has flooded Amman. The Jordanian governments commitment to provide urban refugees with the same standards as nationals, while praised by the UNHCR, has burdened the citys public health and educational systems, according to the Institute for the Study of International Migration. UNHCR reports that 75 per cent of
1
The terms urban displaced populations or urban displaced persons encompass urban refugees, urban IDPs and urban returnees.
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Syrian refugees arriving in Jordan over the last two years live outside of refugee camps. This rapid increase in the number of dwellers has created hostility towards urban refugees in Amman, as locals blame them for the rising prices in real estate, rent and food, overcrowding of schools and health services, and shortages of water and electricity. Housing costs have sky-rocketed, explained partially by claims that property-owners prefer refugee tenants, who are easier to intimidate and overcharge than Jordanian citizens. Large refugee flows that continue to burden the citys subsystems are a phenomenon increasingly common in several other cities around the globe (Figure 1). During recent years, turmoil, conflict and instability within North Africa, East Africa and the Middle East, along with environmental disasters in South Asia, have generated enormous displacement flows. Recent data from UNHCR reflects that seventy per cent of urban refugees sought refuge in cities of developing countries. Indeed, this adds an extra burden to the economies and institutions of developing countries cities, often located in conflict-prone regions, which do not have the ability or the willingness to absorb large numbers of new dwellers needing assistance.
Figure 1. Refugees Living in Urban Areas around the World
Source: 2008 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons, UNCHR, 2009.
In several countries, refugees must reside within the boundaries of refugee camps to receive assistance from UNHCR. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other humanitarian organisations also concentrate aid efforts in refugee camps. There are some exceptions to the pre-condition, such as imminent security threats, a need for medical or psychological care, pursuit of education or undertaking the resettlement process, according to a Working Paper of the Overseas Development Institute. However, the constraints that host countries encounter while enforcing these restrictions, coupled with the lure of better opportunities in urban areas, facilitates refugees movements to urban areas. Assessments and studies in Kenya and Tanzania highlight five main pull-factors for refugees from camps to cities: security threats, limited livelihood opportunities, harsh climatic conditions and lack of health and educational services. For example, UNHCR confirmed hundreds of cases of rape and violence between the various clans and ethnicities living in the refugee camp of Dadaab, located on the Kenya-Somalia border. Tensions over natural resources or crime between refugees and local communities residing near the camps are also common. Moreover, even though Kenyan laws restrict refugees from employment, the influx of men moving to the city in search of better economic opportunities keeps rising. While UN agencies and NGOs provide a stipend to refugees ranging from USD 23 to USD 71 per month, Kenyans working in the informal or the formal economic sector have access to an average income of USD 450 to USD 1,500. Overcrowding of refugee camps
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not only places significant pressure on shelter and water and sanitation infrastructure but also burdens the capacity of International Organisations (IOs) and NGOs to operate at minimal standards. Refugee camps frequently operate high above their intended capacity. For example, Dadaab Camp was designed to shelter 90,000 people but hosts almost 450,000 refugees, says UNHCR. As a result of overcrowding, refugees move to urban areas attracted by better livelihood opportunities and greater security. Many refugees use their extended social networks to secure work in the informal sector and to find accommodation in urban areas. Similarly, those refugees who access the city for educational or health purposes rarely go back to the camps. Overall, cities offer greater independence and a consequent sense of self-worth and dignity over refugee camps. The migration of refugees from camps to urban areas poses new challenges to humanitarian organisations traditional approaches to assistance. In 2009, UNHCR issued new operational guidelines to deal with urban refugees. The agency acknowledged protection must be provided to refugees in a complementary and mutually supportive manner, irrespective of where they are located. Nonetheless, urban refugees are not in an enclosed and spatially distinctive context within the hosting countries, which makes service delivery more expensive and limits the humanitarian organisations scope of application, according to UNHCR. Historically, humanitarian organisations perceived refugee status as temporary and given the choice, refugees will return home as soon as circumstances allow. However, case studies over the last two decades show that this is not always the case with urban refugees. In this regard, UNHCR stresses that refugee room for manoeuvre in urban areas is limited, and the provision of protection and assistance to urban refugees largely depends on national and municipal actors. Therefore, Cities Alliance says it is vital that UNHCR, together with other agencies working with urban displacement, develop new relationships that go beyond national government and ministers, including municipal institutions, services providers, and urban police forces as well as representatives of displaced and resident communities. Experts suggest that consistent approaches are lacking in the treatment of urban refugees by local authorities in comparison to refugees living in camps. For example, in Tanzania, the government is reviewing the 2003 National Refugee Policy, which required all refugees to be encamped. Refugee presence in Tanzania, a country once regarded as a world leader in refugee protection, has been leveraged to achieve political pay-offs by blaming refugees for crime, environmental degradation and economic downturn, according to the Oxford Refugees Studies Centre (ORSC). Despite this, in 2011, the Tanzanian Ministry of Home Affairs adopted a policy that accepted de facto urban refugees, allowing refugees to work in urban areas while simultaneously denying them refugee status that guarantees their rights, protection and assistance. Although some organisations say this is a promising development, in reality, urban refugees who willingly forego humanitarian aid will be barred from access to the protection of international law, repatriation assistance or other durable solutions. Similarly, by law, urban refugees in South Africa have been granted protection and temporary integration in local communities by allowing them access to social services and the right to compete in labour and housing markets. A recent assessment of the situation of urban refugees in Johannesburg concludes that these legal entitlements have not translated into effective protection of the refugees. While status and entitled rights of urban refugees are recognised, an overloaded South African administrative system that lacks resources and capacity, and bears high levels of corruption, is unable provide the protection recognised by law. As a general recommendation, humanitarian organisations suggest that governments must understand effective protection beyond status determination and document provision; countries should educate officials, employers and security forces to ensure their rights and protections are also delivered. Another Journal of Refugee Studies paper analyses the role of urban refugees in Cairo, where the granting of refugee status has had minimal impact on the socioeconomic conditions. Allegedly, those with refugee status suffer the same level of marginalisation as those with a rejected refugee status. In these circumstances, where harsh economic and social conditions dominate the day-to-day lives of refugees, integration in the hosting community is unlikely. As a result, Sudanese urban refugees inhabiting Cairo proactively decided to
act as social agents in solving the problems of their community by providing housing, establishing schools and lending centres, and claiming their rights as refugees. According to the Journals author, the case of the selfsustainable approach by Sudanese refugees in Cairo is an example that governments could opt to take advantage of the economic and social potential contribution of urban refugees to the host society rather than turning a blind eye to refugees needs and rights, thereby creating long-lasting negative scenarios propitious for marginalisation and vulnerability. Urban IDPs While refugees are relatively easy to identify, governments and humanitarian agencies struggle to determine which persons qualify as IDPs. The line dividing those internally displaced who migrate forcibly or voluntarily, simply seeking better life opportunities, is obscure in many instances. This process becomes even more difficult when different stakeholders in charge of IDP protection try to quantify and profile urban IDPs as these persons do not congregate in clusters like refugees in camps, writes a paper by the ORSC. Further complicating matters, the main international body regulating protection and assistance to displaced people, the UNHCR, has a specific policy addressing urban refugees but lacks one on urban IDPs. It is not clear how the UNHCR handles urban IDPs, in particular in those urban areas where governments are unable or unwilling to assist IDPs. This is especially striking considering there are twice as many IDPs in the world as refugees, and the majority of IDPs live within urban areas, adds Cities Alliance. Experts claim that lacking any framework regulating the presence of IDPs in urban areas, it is impossible to design and implement effective durable solutions and help host countries managing each caseload through context-specific, targeted protection and assistance programmes. Typically, urban IDPs are not formally separated from host communities or housed in physically distinctive areas. Often, urban IDPs are scattered across cities, blending into the urban poor and migrant populations. Recent surveys on urban IDPs populations by the Feinstein International Centre of Tufts University and the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) show that in developing countries, IDP and non-IDP populations share similar demographic characteristics and experience much the same stresses related to urban poverty. Lack of an adequate infrastructure, limited access to basic social services, low levels of education, and high unemployment rates are cross-cutting issues for both IDP and non-IDP communities. However, surveys also conclude that IDPs are significantly poorer and suffer more insecurity than non-IDPs. In the majority of circumstances, IDPs are structurally more impoverished, as land, harvest and other assets have been lost, stolen or destroyed. Further, they lack strong support networks, urban livelihood skills, knowledge of the urban setting and may not even speak the native language. As a consequence of their unprotected status, IDPs experience multiple relocations in the form of eviction, forced relocation by local authorities or manoeuvres to escape detection. In addition, because they lack documentation, IDPs do not have access or are unwilling to report injustices to security forces thus exposing them as targets for extortion, human trafficking, intimidation and looting by criminal groups or militias operating within the city. While the causes of displacement differ by nature and magnitude in each country, the characteristics of the displacements are structurally similar. Below, Table 1 illustrates the characteristics of five relevant countries where IDPs flows have been persistently significant and widely studied over the last decades: Colombia, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan and Uganda. UNHCR distinguishes different causes of displacement, emphasising the difficulty in isolating a single cause. Typically, there is one unexpected tipping point such as a war or a natural disaster that sparks displacement, but contributing factors convincing people that urban areas can provide a better life are various and interrelated. Moreover, the causes motivating displacement vary across age, ethnic groups and gender. For example, numbers of children and women displaced to urban areas in Uganda were much larger than men because of the higher risk of abduction or sexual and gender-based violence in rural areas. Although, conflict is
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habitually the primary source of displacement, secondary displacement is also common. In Uganda, IDPs living in rural camps in the north of the country have sought refuge in the cities due to the extreme vulnerability encountered as result of the high frequency of murders, rapes and mutilations within the camps. Once IDPs have lived encamped for a period of time, secondary displacement from the IDP camps to the city is frequent as some search for better economic opportunities. Livelihood opportunities are marginal within the camps, hindering IDPs from becoming self-reliant and finding long-term solutions to their plight. In Azerbaijan, for instance, dire living conditions in rural IDP camps support the argument that secondary displacement (relocating from rural IDP camps to urban areas) is also a type of forced migration, says UNHCR. Likewise, the phenomenon of inter-urban displacement has been observed in Mogadishu, Somalia, and in several cities in Colombia. In these urban settings, IDPs were forced to move to other parts of the city on several occasions to escape fighting and extortion. Similarly, inter-urban displacement is another complex trend experienced by IDPs, where some are forced to move between several urban areas searching for assistance, protection or an environment that better satisfies needs. Finally, there has been some debate regarding the actual existence of environmental IDPs. Some authors believe that political and economic factors drive displacement of populations that are environmentally vulnerable, whereas others say that environmental factors cause political and ethnic conflicts, eventually resulting in forced displacement. In any case, there is an emerging consensus accepting multi-causality in environmentally-induced displacement whereas environmental factors contribute to more direct causes such as social, economic or institutional elements of forced displacement.
Table 1. Characteristics of Five Urban IDP Case Studies

Country Hosting Urban Areas Origin of the Displacement
Characteristics
Colombia has the largest IDP population in the world, between 4.9 and 5.5 million people. The conflict produces 130,000 IDPs on a yearly basis. The majority of them have migrated from rural to urban areas. 95 per cent of the IDPs live in poverty, 72 per cent of them in extreme poverty. Urban IDPs in Colombia live in illegal subdivisions prone to natural disasters and comprised of overcrowded houses of poor structural integrity. High unemployment, lack of infrastructure and limited access to public services are also frustration of urban IDPs. Women and girls are subject to sexual abuse and adolescents are vulnerable to recruitment into illegal armed groups. Average time to access to humanitarian aid in Bogot is two years from displacement. Best estimates say there are still 2.1 million Iraqi IDPs, the majority of them urban IDPs. As in other cases, the fact that the urban IDP population is dispersed countrywide in different urban areas hides the magnitude of the problem and makes difficult the provision of assistance and protection for them. Eighty per cent of IDPs are women and children as the majority of the causalities in the war were men. Iraqis live with families in rented accommodation or informal settlements in urban areas. Around 467,000 urban IDPs were living in more than 382 informal settlements across the country. Residents of these settlements have a constant threat of eviction and do not have access to infrastructure, services and livelihoods. In order to avoid more displacement eleven out of eighteen governorates have closed their border to IDPs arguing that infrastructure is overstretched. Experiences have shown that an increased and a more impoverished population of IDPs can acerbate sectarian violence and make urban IDPs, which are poorer and have more limitations that host
Colombia
Bogot, Santa Marta, Medelln, Cali and Barranquilla.
Armed conflict between the government and guerrillas since 1960s.
Iraq
Baghdad, Mosul, Karbala, Basra, Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah, amongst others.
Displacement in Iraq has occurred in multiple waves over the last 30 years. The IranIraq war, sectarian violence, civil war and the Gulf and Iraq wars were the main source of displacement.
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Government counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and natural disasters, mainly the monsoon floods between 2010 and 2012.
Pakistan
Peshawar, Lahore and Karachi.
Sudan
Mainly large cities and towns within Darfur like Al Fashir or Nyala, but also other cities in Sudan, including Khartoum.
Ethnical conflict against non-Arab populations in Darfur region since 2003.
Conflict between the government and the religious Lord Resistance Army in Northern Uganda.
Uganda
Kampala, mainly, Jinja as well as other secondary urban areas.
communities, more vulnerable to recruitment by insurgency. Approximately, five million IDPs due to sectarian violence and human rights violations since 2004. Around fifteen million people were displaced by three years of monsoon flooding and millions more by earthquakes and drought. The outskirts of Karachi have served as refugee destinations for hundreds of thousands of IDPs affected by the floods in the Sindh province. Ethnic conflicts in Karachi between Sindhis, Pashtun and Muhajirs rose after the rural-urban migration influenced by floods. The absorption of urban IDPs in Karachi and Lahore has put pressure on infrastructure. The planning by municipal authorities to ensure that infrastructure development matched the influx of people has been very limited. Peshawar has roughly doubled since 1998, being the largest recipient of displaced people in South Asia. Infrastructure and other subsystems have not been extended accordingly. Assessments claim that one of the main challenges for urban IDPs and refugees in Pakistan is related to their legal status and documentations, mandatory to access to services and livelihoods. At least 2.5 million IDPs. The urban population in Darfur in 2000, before the conflict outbreak, was eighteen per cent. Six years on, one third of Darfur's population is urbanised, one third rural and one third displaced. Most of the IDP camps are in the cities margins and are rapidly becoming socially and economically integrated into the cities. Recent assessments conclude that if a peace agreement is reached, fifty per cent of the IPDs would not return home and would remain in their current locations, move to Darfurs cities or relocate in central Sudan. At its peak, the conflict displaced around 1.5 million people countrywide. It is estimated that 300,000 to 600,000 were urban IDPs. Since the 2006 cease-fire, there has been a significant return of those displaced by the conflict. The remaining urban IDPs in urban areas are often perceived as either economic migrants or IDPs that have reached a durable solution, thus they are not given much attention in comparison to those confined in IDP camps. Urban IDPs in Uganda receive limited assistance for several reasons: lack of registration; as they remain mixed with the urban poor, favouring IDPs over the local host community might create frictions; and, due to the lack of information it is difficult to distinguish those IDPs who are forced or voluntary migrants. As a result, experts believe that the reluctance of some humanitarian actors to provide assistance to inconveniently located urban IDPs contradicts their commitment to a rights-based approach towards displaced people.
Sources: Adapted from Conflict transformation and the urban displaced in Colombia, Humanitarian Practice Network, 2009; Colombias indigenous pushed to find safety in cities, UNHCR, 2012; Country Statistics, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2013; Colombia: Transformational Change Must Include Urban IDPs, Refugees International, 2012; Urban displacement and migration in Colombia, ORSC, 2010; Iraqs Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: The Untold Story, Elizabeth Ferris, 2008;Pakistan Floods: Internally Displaced People and Human Impact, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2010; Sanctuary in the City Urban Displacement and vulnerability in Peshawar, Pakistan, Overseas Development Institute, 2013;The urbanisation of displaced people, Cities Alliance, 2011; Do Darfurs IDPs Have an Urban Future?, African Arguments, 2009; and Urban IDPs in Uganda: victims of institutional convenience, ORSC, 2010.
Urban Returnees In some circumstances, both IDPs and refugees choose to return to the country or area of origin as the causes that forced their displacement have faded out. At this point, these populations become returnees. Nevertheless, these returnees, once IDPs or refugees sheltered in urban areas, increasingly return to urban centres instead of their rural
areas of origin. A desk review carried out by UNHCR found that IDPs and refugees moving from rural to urban areas find it more difficult to reintegrate in their original rural community upon returning home. While UNHCR alleges a scarcity of data, some assessments quantify that the numbers of returnees moving to urban areas is very high. In Somaliland, for instance, the city of Hargeisa is now home to the sixty per cent of recent Somali returnees. Similarly, 42 per cent of the 5.7 million Afghan returnees, the largest returnee movement UNHCR has handled, resettled in urban areas in Kabul, Nangarhar and Kunduz provinces. Similarly, in Angola, after the signing of the peace agreement, four million refugees returned primarily to urban areas, the majority of them to Luanda. While the main reason of refugees and IDPs moving to urban areas is the belief that cities offer better livelihood opportunities, in Angola large number of landmines, lack of resources to relocate to further rural areas, and apprehension of hostile reactions from rural populations were considered contributing factors to the decision of refugees resettling in urban areas. Urban returnees must overcome the same challenges as urban poor, just as experienced by urban IDPs and urban refugees. Urban returnees face difficulties accessing education, health, livelihood opportunities as well as basic infrastructure and services. UNHCR asserts returnees consistently face serious problems over housing, land and property issues. Urban returnees are usually more exposed than urban poor to challenges related to non-durable housing and insecure tenure, in most cases due to the lack of social networks in the new urban areas where they settle. In Angola, UNHCR claims that an assessment among the returnees showed that urban returnees have higher levels of poverty than other returnees that opted for rural areas for reintegration due to several reasons. Firstly, the majority of the returnees were working in foreign countries where Portuguese was not the official language, thus hindering access to employment opportunities. Secondly, the assessments found that urban returnees were skilled and qualified enough but they struggled to gain documents and recognition of their skills and qualifications, which served as a barrier to entering the urban labour market. Also, due to the fact that returnees chose urban instead of rural areas, they have limited access to land for agricultural purposes, either as means of production for livelihoods or meeting their food needs
Confronting the City: Vulnerabilities of the Urban Displaced

A United States Institute of Peace (USIP) paper addressed the success of programmes supporting the return of refugees and IDPs to their place of origin after a conflict. Based on various cases studies in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Burundi and Iraq, the assessment concluded that resettlement programmes usually fail due to: the assumption that the future of the displaced is linked to restoring their previous lives; a lack of long-term engagement by implementing agencies; and, an over-focus on rural reintegration when in fact many of the displaced have settled down in urban areas. By and large, the places of origin from which refugees and IDPs were once forced to flee have been reshaped. Weak governance prevails, infrastructure and access to basic services is limited or nonexistent, and there is a lack of sustainable livelihood opportunities and minimum security conditions. Hence, USIP highlights that refugees or IDPs move to other urban areas closer to their original rural location or remain in the same cities where they decided to settle long ago. As discussed, refugees and IDPs overwhelmingly come from low-income backgrounds, have lost all their assets and in many cases have not received assistance or lack the social networks needed to support their integration. For these reasons, the ORSC says while integrating into the city, urban refugees and IDPs end up blending with local urban poor communities or with other displaced people in slums, informal settlements or urban displaced camps. Consequently, urban refugees and IDPs not only face the same challenges as urban poor, but conditions are aggravated by the lack of specific protection and legal recognition that hinders access to justice, livelihoods, infrastructure and services as well as land tenure, adds UNHCR. Given that the influx of urban refugees and IDPs or their long-term dwelling may become permanent, USIP recommends that national and local governments
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develop urban planning strategies to manage rapid urbanisation processes of their cities. These strategies should be similar to other ones attempting to deal with urban poverty but focusing on the specific cases of urban refugees, returnees or IDPs. Annex 1 shows an inclusive sectorial revision of the many challenges and vulnerabilities that urban poor and urban displaced persons face in their day-to-day life in the city. The green area illustrates the specific issues of the urban poor while the vulnerabilities and challenges of the urban refugees, returnees and IDPs are represented in blue. Indeed, tailored and context-specific approaches must be designed for municipal and national governments in order to deal with chaotic development resulting in slums and informal settlements, where urban poor, returnees, IDPs and refugees most likely settle. The Cities Alliance partnership recommends that governments should work to prevent the proliferation of slums by an ex-ante approach, recognising that urbanisation will happen and, thus planning to determine where and how new residents will live is vital. Even if the government does not have resources to develop the area, the fact that the dwellers feel they have the right to live there will facilitate their investment in it. Stopping rapid urbanisation by investing in rural development is rarely effective, adds Cities Alliance. However, in the majority of cities, slums and other informal settlements where the urban poor reside are well developed. In these cases, the best option is slum upgrading; that is to say an integrated process through which informal areas are gradually improved, formalised and incorporated into the city itself, through extending land, services and citizenship to slum dwellers. Slum upgrading goes further than just upgrading the basic infrastructure; it is about putting into motion the economic, social, institutional and community activities that are needed to turn around downward trends in an area cooperatively among residents, community groups, businesses as citys authorities. Overall, this process benefits the city by fostering inclusion, promoting economic development, improving quality of life, providing shelter for the poor and addressing other externalities such as crime reduction or environmental degradation. Slum upgrading is cheaper, in most cases, more effective than relocation and it can be done incrementally according to the city and residents technical and financial capacity. Also, in many cases urban poor can and are willing to pay for improved services and housing. In cities with both urban poor and urban displaced populations, the approach must be more inclusive with the specific needs of urban refugees, IPDs or returnees. For instance, the case of the port city of Bossaso, in the Somali autonomous state of Puntland, with almost 25 per cent of displaced in-transit migrants from Africa and Asia looking for a better life in Europe and the Middle East, is an illustrative case of how the authorities, IOs and NGOs provided integrative and sustainable solutions, as described by a report of the ORSC. As a result of the disintegration of public institutions, for many years, uncontrolled, dense, un-serviced temporary settlements sprouted and were ruled by members of local clans, charging a rent to the dwellers for their occupation. The lack of any relevant societal position and the opposition of local landlords in charge of the temporary settlements to develop permanent solutions resulted in settlements with unhygienic densities and no livelihood initiatives, community facilities or some extent of household privacy. In order to resolve the complex situation, local authorities attempted unsuccessfully to relocate the displaced ten kilometres out of the city in an area without economic value and far from livelihood opportunities. Led by UN agencies and NGOs, the situation was tackled by the implementation of a rights and protection approach combined with concepts of urbanisation, slum prevention and slum upgrading. The approach, which involved local authorities, landlords and representative of the displaced, consisted of: provision of adequate, affordable and sustainable basic services and infrastructure; guarantee of secure tenure and shelter; social and economic sustainability; integration of the social displaced into the community; spatial sustainability; and, cross-subsiding possibilities and benefits for the host community. The ORSC report highlights that any strategy aiming to achieve protection, sustainable livelihoods and shelter must focus on integration and be built on strong ownership for both the host community and the urban displaced persons. Furthermore, combining upgrading temporary settlements and integrated response allows a more effective incremental response.
City in Crises: the Case of Kabul City

Kabul city exhibits many of the challenges outlined above. The main limitation for urban planners in Kabul is that there is not any census available to ascertain the actual population and its distribution across the city. According to the latest estimates, Kabul hosts five million people. Kabuls population has grown by 250 per cent over the last decade, making it the fifth fastest-growing city in the world. This uncontrolled growth has put the city in the middle of an urban planning crisis, according to an article from The Atlantic Cities. The last urban development master plan was designed 25 years ago by the Soviets and was aimed to guide the citys growth from 1978 to 2003. The plan, which expired ten years ago, was designed when the city had about half a million residents and projected a growth of about three million by 2003. Although the city has reached two million more inhabitants than accounted for in the design, the old master plan was barely applied, because for much of the period covered by the master plan, the country has been under continuous conflict. Hence, the infrastructure and urban development projects to keep up with the plan were not a priority. The uncontrolled growth of the city has been fuelled by millions of refugees and IDPs settling in the Kabul. Still today, war is shaping the city as many migrants move to Kabul looking for the relative security and livelihood opportunities offered by the capital. These displacement processes are inflicting a lot of pressure on the citys infrastructure, economy and institutions. Magnitude and Nature of the Displacement Problem in Kabul Over 25 years of conflict and political instability have generated millions of displaced. Information regarding the refugees and IDPs is scarce but it is known that at least 7.5 million people have been displaced in Afghanistan. Of those, 3.2 and 2.4 million sought refuge in Iran and Pakistan respectively and an estimated two million were displaced within Afghanistans border, says UNHCR. Seventy-six per cent of Afghans have been displaced at least once in their lives either internally or internationally. In 1992, when the different mujahedeen factions fought against each other, the conflict was concentrated in Kabul, resulting in the exodus of 100,000 residents and the destruction beyond repair of many government buildings, infrastructure and sixty per cent of private homes. Four years later, in 1996, when the Taliban seized control of the city they shut down social services, dismissed female employees and purged sectors of experienced staff due to their liberal views. By the time US-led forces arrived in the capital in 2001, the citys institutions and infrastructure were in ruins as a result of two decades of conflicts and abandonment. The end of the Taliban rule triggered repatriation of around six million people between 2002 and 2005, increasing the population of the country by twenty per cent. At the same time, internal displacement resulting from conflict between international and government forces against insurgents led to new displacement waves towards the capital and other major urban areas. The majority of the returnees from Pakistan and Iran have moved to larger cities, particularly to Kabul, which hosts around thirty per cent of the returnees. Currently, between 65 and 80 per cent of Kabuls population live in informal settlements around the capital, the majority of them returnees and IDPs, in precarious conditions in shared accommodation or on land they do not own. The major flow of refugees occurred during the period 2002-2008, but overall figures for returnees during the last years have declined due to worsening economic and security prospects and difficulties with reintegration. Kabul and the eastern provinces have been the destination for twenty per cent of returnees. The Afghanistan Protection Cluster found a correlation between civilian casualties and internal displacement; if the levels of insecurity in rural areas remain the same, the population of Kabul by 2020 could reach six million. An estimated 1.84 million returnees have failed to reintegrate countrywide, facing problems with access to land, shelter, services and livelihoods. Experience has shown that the duration of displacement influences successful reintegration. The majority of the Afghan refugees have been in exile for more than 25 years and half of them have never lived in Afghanistan.
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According to a joint report by the Middle East Institute and the Foundation pour la Recherche Stratgique (MEIFRS), with an annual growth of 5.4 per cent, it is becoming increasingly difficult to track, estimate and assess the presence and profiles of returnee and IDP population in Kabul as well as in other urban areas. The report states that although there have been successful cases of reintegration, generally, urban displaced populations struggle to survive, facing un- or underemployment and living below the poverty line. There are three types of urban displaced persons: i. returnees who came directly to the cities upon their return; ii. returnees who went to their areas of origin and were forced to move to urban areas (secondary displacement); and iii. conflict-induced, natural disaster-induced and poverty-induced IDPs. Urban refugees and IDPs in Afghanistan share similar profiles as the ones described in the first section of this report with some context-specific characteristics. Table 2 reviews some of these, based on two surveys by the MEI-FRS, and the UNHCR and World Bank.
Table 2. Kabuls Urban Returnees and IDPs Profiles

Urban Returnees and Secondary Displaced Individuals
Have lived on average fifteen years in exile in Iran or Pakistan. The preference of those returnees in Iran and Pakistan was to live either in cities or in camps within urban areas. In Iran returnees lived mixed with the Iranian population while in Pakistan half of them lived in refugee camps. Tehran and Peshawar were the two main cities hosting Afghan returnees. 77.4 per cent of the urban returnees were already urban prior to the exile. Urban returnees choose to live in the main cities in Afghanistan (i.e. Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad) instead of going to the origin (urban or not) areas, being the main pulling factor the economic opportunities. Urban returnees report to have a better job during the exile that nowadays. Fifteen of the urban returnees are unemployed (below than the national unemployment rate of 25-30 per cent). Urban returnees' skills set is influenced by their time in exile, with a clear focus on the construction sector. More than half of the returnees do not have access to loans or relatives who can provide financial or material assistance.
Urban IDPs
One fourth of urban IDPs have suffered secondary displacement. One fourth suffers from prolonged displacement, being, on average, the length of their displacement six years. 92 per cent of the urban IDPs lived in urban areas before their displacement. IDPs perceive Kabul as a place of greater security and better economic opportunities. IDPs in Kabul lack of social networks in comparison to other IDPs in Herat or in Kandahar, which usually provide the displaced with better housing and economic opportunities. Hence, IDPs in Kabul end living in informal settlements in the outskirts of the city where different displacement profiles get mixed. Ninety per cent of Kabuls IDPs have received some kind of emergency or winter assistance. Literacy rates for urban IDPs are lower than for urban poor; eighty per cent of urban IDPs males are unable to read compared to 64 per cent urban poor. Also, only one per cent of urban IDPs women are literate compared to 33 per cent of urban poor women. The low literacy rates have a direct impact on IDPs labour markets. Their economic opportunities are usually in construction or other low quality and unsafe jobs. Only 12.8 per cent of urban poor work in construction compared to 50.6 per cent of urban IDPs. 68 per cent of urban IDPs are day labourers, 23 per cent unemployed and six per cent private sector salaried labourer. The average daily earnings of urban IDPs can support two, three and four member households above the poverty line for those working as a day labourers, private sector salaried and self-employed, respectively. Urban IDP households are on average composed of nine family members.
Sources: Adapted from Vulnerability of Internally Displaced Persons in Urban Settings, UNCHR-World Bank, 2011; Migration and Urban Development in Kabul: Classification or Accommodation? , Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization, 2012; and Urban Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan , MEI-FRS, 2011
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Different organisations have surveyed returnees and IDPs, but in both cases, these surveys primarily focused on urban displaced persons living in collective groups, leaving apart those who live individually mixed in the urban landscape. The MEI-FRS highlight a conceptual debate regarding urban displaced populations in Afghanistan. On one hand, a key concern is to establish a boundary between forced and voluntary displacement, as In practice, most migration has elements of both coercion and violation, and is likely to be motivated by a mixture of economic and political factors. For that reason, there have been conflicting approaches between humanitarian organisations and donors, as many think that the urban situation in Afghanistan is not a humanitarian emergency but an urban poor issue. On the other hand, due to the difficulty to record any progress in urban areas where outcomes are less visible than rural areas, it is difficult to delineate the end of displacement. This is even more difficult in Afghanistan, where urban displaced persons will not likely go back or relocate and, municipal authorities are not ready to accept local integration. Kabuls Informal Settlements: Spatial Configuration and Economic Value The spatial structure of Kabul has grown in two adjacent valleys separated by a mountain spin, as seen in Figure 2. As such, communication between the suburbs of the city must go through the city centre, which is located in the central hill spine separating the two valleys. This spatial configuration explains the chronic traffic problems around the city centre. As the city centre is the only location of the city easily accessible from all parts Kabul, the capital has shaped itself as a monocentric metropolis. From the city centre, the primary roads are radial with the exception of the Russian Road in the north of the city. The topography of the city does not allow the expansion northwards or westwards, and the only areas to expand the city are to the south and to the east, to a greater extent. Also, in the other side of the mountain range of the city, the Dehsabz and Barikab plateaus provide enough space for future developments. The rapid influx of urban displaced populations has led to proliferation of informal settlements, which have shaped the urban structure of Kabul. Experts foresee that the implacable influx of IDPs, migrants and refugees will continue to shape the spatial development of the city for many years into the future. Given the limited capacity of municipal authorities to tackle the rapid urbanisation crisis affecting Kabul, urban planners agree that informal development of land and housing has been the most effective way to provide the needed shelter for urban displaced populations in the citys harsh winters. Between 65 and 80 per cent of Kabuls population lives in informal settlements occupying seventy per cent of the urban area. The grand majority of the population lives in informal courtyard houses and, at least one million people live on the slopes of the mountain ranges surrounding the city. Despite the extraordinary demographic growth of Kabul, the houses are composed of durable materials providing adequate and permanent shelter to the dwellers in comparison of other cities with similar or lower growth rates, praises a World Bank report. Nonetheless, the complete lack of basic infrastructure is a common feature of the informal or illegal settlements in Kabul. Based on government practice and working definitions, settlements in Kabul can be classified as: formal areas; informal areas; and illegal areas. Formal areas are classified as residential land as established by the 1978 Master Plan. Informal areas are not recognised by the 1978 Master Plan but have been developed with special permission of the landowner, either private or public, through transfer of customary titles. Illegal areas are informal settlements that do not have any authorisation of landowner, as the majority of them are public and located on the hillsides of Kabul. Given the lack of census and the fact that urban returnees and IDPs are mixed with other urban poor or economic migrants, it is difficult to assess which are the most affected districts in Kabul by forced migration. Kabul comprises fourteen districts, each identified by a number. A recent working paper by the Overseas Development Institute and a report by the Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organisation (APPRO) determine District 5, 7 and 13 have highest level of rapid unplanned urbanisation as result of displacement. The
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ethnic composition of these settlements is complex. For instance, District 5, which hosts the largest informal settlement in Kabul Charahi Qambar, was established in 2007 when a few Jogi families settled there. The population subsequently expanded with the arrival of IDPs who were ethnically Pashtuns, Baluchis, Tajiks and Kuchis from the southern provinces of Helmand, Uruzgan and Kandahar and also returnees from Iran and Pakistan. District 7 is a hillside settlement located in the southern outskirts of Kabul on land owned by the government, which has recurrently searched these areas to locate IDPs. The majority of dwellers, predominantly Pashtuns, Tajiks and Pashayees, moved there before 2001, hold customary deeds and have formal jobs. District 13 was formally recognised by the municipality in 2003 but the majority of the rapid urbanisation has been unplanned. The residents are mainly Hazaras and returnees from Iran.
Figure 2. Spatial Configuration of Kabul City
The municipality of Kabul and the Afghan government have reprehended the rapid urbanisation process that the city has undergone because it has not occurred under any regulatory framework. However, the World Bank concluded that the ad hoc informal development of the city has prevented a worse disaster in the form of homeless families roaming the streets of Kabul and having to be sheltered in temporary refugee camps. Furthermore, in 2004 the World Bank noted that the capital value of the informal housing stock, to a large extent developed by migrants with no alternative employment opportunities, amounted to USD 2.5 billion. Indeed, the rapid development of informal settlements has imposed significant pressure on the limited capacity of the physical and institutional infrastructure of the city, but the informal settlements constitute an important and valuable
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component of the housing stock. Therefore, the World Bank claims they should be seen as an asset rather than a liability. In order to increase and formalise this added value, the World Bank suggests it is important that informal settlements are upgraded over time with water supply, sewerage system, storm drainage, refuse disposal and a network of secondary streets to create a proper grid. Vulnerabilities of Kabuls Urban Refugees and IDPs Urban returnees and IDPs in Kabul have been subject to several quantitative and qualitative surveys and studies. All these assessments have highlighted that urban IDPs and returnees living in Kabul face challenges and vulnerabilities similar to other conflict-based urban displaced populations elsewhere (Annex 1). However, there are some particularities. Governance and Rule of Law. Urban governance structures in Kabul remain weak and fragmented, with overlapping roles and responsibilities, limited capacity, high level of corruption, and influence of social and ethnic ties. The Kabul Municipality has the status of a Ministry and, although it is supposed to coordinate the implementation of urban development plans, it is heavily reliant on the various ministries for the delivery of its responsibilities and provision of services. International actors have shown concern regarding the lack of interest of municipal authorities in addressing the displacement situation in Kabul. Yet it is difficult to obtain the official position of the municipality. The governments de facto policy conceives urban displacement as a temporary phenomenon. Hence, instead of providing the necessary services and infrastructure to urban returnees, IDPs and poor, officials seem more interested in implementing strategies to reinforce the importance of the capital such as by the development of the Kabul New City. The report by ODA quotes an official saying the best thing for the wellbeing of Kabul is to clean the IDPs from the city Kabul city is the capital and it has to show the identity, prestige and dignity of Afghanistan. According to a report from APPRO, another government official stated We have nothing to do with [the migrants] we are not a charity organization. We have other problems to deal with. Others, while saying there are plans for all the government-owned land in Kabul, recognise they cannot bulldoze the homes of these migrants []. These people are also Afghans and have rights to live in the city [] we have to plan very carefully and work [to integrate] them. With regard to the rule of law, disputes are usually referred initially to local waklis. If unresolved, they are referred to shuras, mostly ruled by community elders. If still unresolved, disputes are taken to any of the governmental institutions, although this is avoided as much as possible due to the expectations of bribing. In some districts, police on patrol harassing and extorting bribes from residents are also common. Protection. Although for IDPs, Kabul may be safer than their areas of origin, they are not exempt from a range of protection threats such as communal violence over land and resources, crime, and discrimination on grounds of gender, ethnicity and religion. Many of the displaced communities have been subject to violent threats over land and resources; while certain groups with ties to influential political actors have greater access to land or obtain protection against eviction. This has fuelled tensions, in particular between displaced and non-displaced communities. Pashtun IDPs from the southern provinces are associated with the influx of drugs, arms and insurgents into the districts. Similarly, Pashtuns and Jogi nomads reportedly suffer discrimination on the basis of their ethnicity and cultural practices. Women and children are also exposed to a range of threats related to poverty, survival strategies and restricted mobility. Female students are at risk of sexual harassment while making their way to the schools, which are targeted by anti-government actors through intimidation, abductions and attacks aimed at stopping girls education. Pashtun women, for cultural and religious reasons, cannot leave their homes without male escorts, a fact that limits their access to water and sanitation. Various levels of government understand displacement as a temporary phenomenon and neglect to provide durable protection solutions as required by international law. Investing in public services in the informal settlements is rare and some
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international agencies are not allowed to operate there. ODI quotes one official stating, IDPs are here for short time and they dont need a bathroom and a well in this situation When we provide them these services they will never move back to their areas. Livelihoods and Poverty. Urban IDPs and returnees live on less that USD 1 per household member per day. In addition, casual work as the main source of livelihood is a very unstable source of income. The majority of the workers rely on employment via construction companies, which usually decrease their activities during the winter months when the displaced have to face increased costs for wood, clothing and medicines and treatment for respiratory infections. Many of the ethnic minorities in District 5 complain that the labour market discriminates against them because they come from the countryside, believe them to be unclean or untidy, or they are suspected of being Taliban. Begging is a common practice among the urban displaced children and elderly. Those urban returnees coming from Iran or Pakistan find employment in Kabuls labour market more easily than urban IDPs as they possess the highly-demanded, specific skills for the construction sector. In addition, eighty per cent of the households have contracted debt to cover basic expenses or invest in small business. Only, seven per cent of urban IDPs and refugees report never facing problems satisfying household food needs. Land Tenure and Housing. The majority of the land occupied by urban populations displaced in Kabul is owned by public institutions or private individuals. The level of tenure security is very low, with 85 per cent of IDPs and 46 per cent of returnees unable to obtain customary deeds. The formal housing markets fail to keep pace with Kabuls rapid urban growth rates, generating informal settlements as urban displaced populations cannot afford the high prices of the formal market. These issues consequently lead to land disputes and social fragmentation between displaced and host communities. Also, the lack of land security and regulation brings about widespread allegations of corruption. Powerful individuals grab large plot of lands through illegal means and sell them to desperate, landless urban migrants. The majority of the people living in informal settlements seek to become permanent residents, perceiving the occupied land as their property. Furthermore, half of Kabuls informal settlements dwellers still live in unsustainable shelter conditions such as tents, relatives homes, abandoned buildings or improvised shelter. The persistence of their temporary situation prevents investment in permanent housing and infrastructure. Access to Basic Services and Infrastructure. One of the most pressing issues is the lack of access to safe drinking water in the informal settlements, which affects at least fifty per cent of dwellers. Kabuls renewable water sources, with capacity to supply water to two million people, have already exceeded capacity. Many residents rely on private or public hand pumps but these water points are scarce, far from reach and the quality of the water is unsafe for consumption. Only eighteen per cent of Kabuls residents have access to the piped system. Likewise, only thirty per cent of Kabuls residents have access to improved sanitation. The majority of residents in informal settlements use open ditches outsides homes. Also, only a few districts are served by waste collection services provided by the municipality. Moreover, informal settlements are not provisioned with electricity access and residents illegally connect to the main power network. A variety of private vendors offer alternative access to water and energy at a much higher cost than average urban poor can afford. The direct consequence of lacking water and sanitation, in addition to poor hygienic practices, is a serious decline in overall health levels. Reports say that health conditions are so poor that workers of some humanitarian organisation are hesitant to work in the informal settlements for fear of infection. Health issues in settlements are not a matter of accessibility but affordability, as households do have access to health facilities but cannot pay for the treatment or medicines. Many of the IDPs and returnees show signs of social distress and psychological trauma. In general, public health facilities are ill-equipped, underfunded and understaffed. A common pattern is that, when faced with health hazards, returnees usually travel longer distances to Iran or Pakistan to seek treatment, whereas IDPs do not have a choice but to access treatment in Kabul. Finally, education opportunities for urban refugees and IDPs are limited
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due to insecurity, poor standards of teaching, lack of quality school facilities and lack of separate establishments for girls. Nonetheless, IDPs from Districts 5, 7 and 13 recognised that education opportunities in Kabul are greater than in their areas of origin. Kabuls primary and secondary school enrolment rate is 65.1 per cent compared to the national average of 46.3 per cent. However, enrolment rates in Kabuls informal settlements are much lower, standing at 49 per cent. Urban returnees and IDPs highly value education and state that one of the reasons they came to the capital was to educate their children, both girls and boys. The Kabul New City On 04 September 2013, the Dehsabz-Barikab City Development Authority (DCDA) and an international consortium named International Home Finance and Development LLC signed a contract to construct 6,000 housing units in the next eight years at a cost of USD 1 billion, according to a DCDA press release. This development is another step forward towards the implementation of the Kabul New City Master Plan, more concretely the Parcel-1, Phase One. Certainly, the development of the so called Kabul New City is a flagship project for the Kabul Municipality and the Afghan government. The project was approved by the Afghan government in 2009, but the planning of the Kabul New City has been underway for more than a decade. In 2002, one year after the fall of the Taliban regime, the signs of the coming rapid urbanisation of Kabul city began to manifest with the arrival of thousands of returnees. Diminished physical infrastructure, the rapid emergence of new reconstruction-related business opportunities and a labour market unable to deal with the rapid urban population growth triggered the planning to extend the city towards the northern Dehsabz and Barikab plateaus (Figure 3). As a result, the government of Afghanistan requested technical assistance from the government of Japan to develop a new Master Plan for the Kabul City that would guide the rapid urbanisation of the capital according to the goals set by the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. At the same time, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was conducting a study to design the best strategy to deal with rapid urban development in Kabul; the DCDA and the Independent Board of Kabul New City Development were established. The DCDA, as an implementing agency of land and primary/secondary infrastructure development for the Kabul New City, has the mission to attract the private investment by creating a pro-business environment and promoting legislation favourable to private investors. Furthermore, the DCDA will act as a single regulatory agency to supervise the project, facilitate the land clearance process and build the planned infrastructure. The project will be implemented in three phases, each one lasting for five years, starting in 2010 and reaching completion in 2025 (Annex 2 and 3). By then, it is foreseen that Kabul could have reached a population of eight million people. The Master Plan targets development of at least 250,000 housing units for 1.5 million people, half a million jobs and enough transport infrastructure to facilitate movement of 800,000 vehicles by 2025. According to the plan, seventy per cent of the financial needs of the Kabul New City will be met by the private sector through leases, sales and Public-Private Partnerships. Likewise, the investment infrastructure from the Afghan government, which will amount to between 0.2 and 0.35 per cent of the gross domestic product between 2010 and 2025, will be channelled through the private sector. The Master Plan emphasises the need to develop alternative water supply projects to the current and the Kabul New City. Currently, Kabul is relying on the groundwater aquifers and wells. Water availability could be the main constraint to expand Kabul City, thus the Master Plan includes the development of new groundwater sources and the construction of new dams and canals in the region to transport surface water. Even though no outline is presented, the Master Plan mentions the need for an institutional development strategy in line with the magnitude of the future Kabul metropolitan area, including capacity building of the different departments and elaboration of legal frameworks and national building codes. Through the implementation of the Master Plan, the Afghan government expects to achieve the following goals: strengthened municipal capacity to manage urban development and deliver services; improved institutional
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coordination and monitoring of key urban indicators; increased access to basic services for urban households; phased regularisation of tenure for fifty per cent of households living in informal settlements; upgrading public services and facilities, including new urban area development, for example; the development of a new city in Dehsabz north of the existing Kabul city; increased availability of affordable shelters, including a fifty per cent increase in number of housing units and thirty per cent increase in area of serviced land on the market, coupled with access to affordable finance; and improved urban environment with green areas and open spaces. Nevertheless, the Master Plan also points out several factors that could affect how quickly and successfully the new city may be developed. These factors include the awareness of a policy and strategic plan at institutional level, marketing among private stakeholders and donors, land clearance commitments, funds availability, cooperation among stakeholders, capacity building of implementing agencies and constraints in procurement of materials.
Figure 3. Location of the Kabul New City
Source: Dehsabz Barikab City Development Authority.
Although the new Master Plan is ambitious and will inarguably reinforce the strategic position and enhance the urban efficiency of Kabul, there have been some voices of criticism. Pietro Calogero, an urban studies and planning lecturer at San Francisco State University and a former advisor of the Afghan Ministry of Urban Development and Housing, says the Master Plan is another example of the Kabuls municipality deliberately neglecting the informal areas where urban poor, returnees and IDPs live. Certainly, the Master Plan focus is more on the Kabul New City rather than the current Kabul City; informal settlements are hardly mentioned throughout the document. For instance, regarding District 7 and 13, the most affected in terms of informal settlements as a result of displacement, the plan limits itself by saying that the development of these districts should aim at creation of a large number of employment opportunities as well as step-wise formalization of informal settlements, but does not provide any strategy to achieve this target. Given that between seventy and eighty per cent of Kabuls population lives in informal areas and the Master Plan only foresees the phased regularisation of tenure for fifty per cent of households living informally, the obvious unanswered question is, what will happen with the remaining 35-40 per cent of population living in informal settlements with no planned regularisation. According to the ODI, the solution of relocating people en masse to Kabul New City appears to be unfeasible and
unclear in its implementation. In addition, several experiences have proved that the relocation of people living in informal settlements is prone to fail. UNHABITAT, clearly states that upgrading existing slums is more effective than resettling slum dwellers [] Eradication and relocation unnecessarily destroy a large stock of housing affordable to the urban poor and the new housing provided has frequently turned out to be unaffordable, with the result that relocated households move back into slum accommodation. As a result, more emphasis is needed in upgrading the current Kabul City to prevent having a brand new Kabul New City, on one hand, and the current old and oversaturated Kabul City, on the other hand. This could create high levels of polarisation between the dwellers inhabiting in the two adjacent urban areas. Indeed, the Kabul New City would have a more pleasant landscape occupied by high-value economic activities, government buildings and middle and high-income dwellers while the current Kabul City risks remaining a city lacking basic infrastructure and services, hosting informal economic activities and home of minorities and urban poor and displaced. Likewise, the development of the Kabul New City could be a cause of secondary displacement for the communities located in the Dehsabz plateau. A JICA report recommends the Afghan government establish a dialogue to propose solutions for the Kuchi nomad communities living in the plateau that will be soon affected by the construction works of Phase 1 of the Kabul New City. Recently, there have been some skirmishes and disputes over the land in Dehsabz used by Kuchis for pasture, as these communities are anxious for the fate of the land they have occupied for years. Some who acquired customary deeds are finding these were fraudulent and they are actually settled on land belonging to the government. JICA requests a bottom up approach informing the communities on the development of the Kabul New City and the awarding by the government of their primary resource: pastureland elsewhere. As mentioned above, any strategy dealing with informal settlements must be in consultation with the affected communities in order to achieve good and effective urban planning and governance. In the case of the Master Plan, according to ODI, there is no evidence of consultation with local leaders, association or shuras during the fieldwork, working group meetings or seminars, thus the plan is unlikely to meet the needs of urban poor and displaced communities. Complex and confused land management systems, laws and institutions have meant that many of the citys poorest residents are at risk of secondary displacement and insecurity of tenure is a significant challenge to the local integration of displaced populations and the sustainable and equitable development of the city more generally, adds ODI. In addition, during the consultation phase with government officials, specific urban displaced persons issues were not marked as a priority.
Conclusions
Forced migration resulting from the proliferation of conflicts and complex emergencies will continue to displace significant numbers of urban IDPs, refugees and returnees in the coming years. The challenges of the urban displaced persons will add to the slumization processes already underway in many cities located in developing countries. Conflict-induced urban displacement will not only pose new burdens to many of these resource-scare cities but also jeopardise their ability to plan for their future. Urban displacement is a survival strategy for urban refugees, IDPs and returnees and, the majority of the displaced clearly indicated their intention to remain in the city. In order to ensure the sustainable development and stability of the cities, as well as fulfil the rights of the displaced communities, local authorities must carry out inclusive urban planning strategies. Experiences where inclusive rights and protection-based approaches (combined with elements of urbanisation, slum prevention and slum upgrading) have been applied, as in Bossaso, have demonstrated to be very effective in overcoming the specific needs of the urban displaced populations. In the case of Kabul city, the implementation of such an approach is rather ambitious. Despite the growth of the citys population, government capacities, leadership and resources remain weak. Urban poor and urban displaced
persons in Kabul share similar challenges, in particular, the lack of land tenure and access to basic infrastructure and services. Moreover, urban displaced populations in Kabul suffer additional vulnerabilities in terms of discrimination, protection and access to justice. The municipal authorities in Kabul perceive urban displacement as a temporary phenomenon and this is reflected in the recent Kabul Master Plan, in which the specific needs of the returnees and IDPs are not considered as a priority. Further, the voices of urban displaced populations and the wider urban poor community were not taken into account during the development of the plan. The construction of the Kabul New City, included in the new Master Plan, is a positive urban development step but the Afghan government and the Kabul municipality are more focused on projecting a new image of Kabul as regional strategic hub rather than addressing the problems of informal settlements. The Kabul municipality must acknowledge the socioeconomic potential of urban displaced persons as well as perceive informal settlements as a valuable housing asset rather than a liability. With the implementation of the Master Plan, the municipality could have an excellent opportunity to increase and formalise the added value of these informal settlements. Regardless of the strategy adopted, the rights and needs of poor and vulnerable populations residing in Kabul must be the backbone of any planning processes to effectively ensure adequate standards of living and durable solutions.
September 2013
Page 19
ANNEX 1. Vulnerabilities of the Urban Poor and the Urban Displaced
URBAN POOR
Difficulty of governments to provide permanent education and health infrastructure in informal settlements. Lower rates of primary education attendance and coverage of health facilities by urban poor compared to non-urban poor and, even rural poor. Urban poor girls are the most vulnerable group to drop education because of family responsibilities or lack of sanitation infrastructure. Social exclusion, as well as lack of information and economic resources, deprives poor to access health services. Child labour is critical for urban poor households survival. Urban poor end up on insecure public or private land due to the lack of planning for urban growth. Hence, they are at risk of eviction, do not have access to credit, are excluded from service provision, cannot build up assets or use their house for income generation activities. The lack of documents accrediting land tenure is a perpetual de facto evidence for illegality. Location and transport patterns of urban poor illustrate a complex trade-off between residential location, travel distance and transport mode. Some dwellers decide to reside in areas nearer to city centre, which are more expensive and insecure, rather than cheaper peri-urban areas. Low space per person, high occupancy rates, cohabitation of different households and high number of single-room units. Substandard housing structures and use of non-permanent materials. Urban poor usually reside in hazard-prone locations such as floodplains, waste disposal sites, proximity to toxic industries or areas with risk of landslides.
URBAN IDPS, REFUGEES AND RETURNEES

State bureaucracy, stigmatisation and discrimination may prevent refugees and IDPs to access education and health services. In case they are allowed to access education, urban refugees or IDPs, poorer than urban poor, cannot afford health-care and education costs (e.g. fees, books, uniforms, transport). Lack of awareness of available opportunities and communication barriers prevent quality access to education and health. Education and reintegration is heavily linked, thus deprivation of education jeopardise long-term reintegration of refugees and IDPs. Lack of land and tenure security hinders successful local integration, as the absence of formal land titles entrenches the idea that their (forced) migration is only temporary. Many urban IDPs return sporadically to their rural land to engage in agricultural activities as a means of sustaining livelihoods, whilst continuing to reside in the city for safety and security. For many IDPs and refugees, lack of land in the city hinders access to sustainable livelihoods. Main cause of secondary/tertiary displacement is forced evictions in urban areas, which has a negative impact on livelihoods, social capital, health and education. Urban displaced cannot opt for housing subsidies, as they cannot demonstrate sound credit and financial history. Urban IDPs and refugees do not participate in government-sponsored housing schemes, aiming to keep a low profile to avoid becoming a target of local government or hosting community. Lack of documentation and background checks means that they are at the mercy of landlords who charge higher prices than to urban poor. The legal protection available to urban IDPs is significantly less than for refugees due to unwillingness or lack of capacity of governments. Lack of documentations is the main argument that governments use to obstruct access to civil rights or social benefits. Main concerns regarding protection are: insecurity, risk of eviction or detection, liability to forced relocation, inability or unwillingness to return to their former areas of origin and not being in possession of identity documents. Non-national are more likely to be excluded from the mechanisms of popular justice in place in areas of shallow or compromised government penetration. Thus, they are relatively invisible to the state. Language, dress and cultural practices pose additional risks to the protection of refugees and IDPs targeted by host communities. Isolation of different communities of urban displaced groups make difficult to build strong social networks and capital among urban displaced communities.
ACCESS TO EDUCATION AND HEALTH SERVICES
HOUSING, LAND TENURE AND LOCATION
PROTECTION. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Access to justice and the enforcement of laws can, if not enforced at the local level, adversely affect the urban poor (for example, corruption in public offices, pollution control and personal safety) Urban poor are used to expressing grievances and resolve via traditional, community-based, or informal processes. The main grievance encountered by the urban poor arises from national and local authorities setting and implementing policies that prevent them from obtaining formal access to basic urban services or make it difficult for them to do so. They usually have no (affordable) way of complaining about unfair treatment and seeking redress for grievances caused by government institutions. Inadequate protection of rights through the operation of the law. Voicelessness and powerlessness within political systems and bureaucratic structures. No means of ensuring accountability from aid agencies, NGOs, public agencies and private utilities or being able to participate in the definition and implementation of their urban poverty programs.
ANNEX 1 (Contd). Vulnerabilities of the Urban Poor and the Urban Displaced
URBAN POOR
Urban poor face challenges of low skills, low wages, unemployment and underemployment, lack of social insurance and unsatisfactory working conditions. Spatial location of slums, inadequate infrastructure and negative stigma are also constrains to employment. The majority of urban poor work in the informal sector, which is characterised by poor working conditions, lack of social insurance, operating outside the legal system and is more vulnerable to economic fluctuations. Child labour is significant in the service sector, construction and manufacturing. The relation between income (rather than agricultural productivity) and hunger makes urban poor more vulnerable to malnutrition and hunger-related diseases. Lack of support networks, urban livelihood skills and knowledge of the urban setting, as well as fluency in the local language hinders the access to livelihoods. Main feature: lack of water and sanitation infrastructure. Absence of water collection systems, electricity supplies, surfaced roads and footpaths, street lighting and rain water drainages. Access rates comparable or lower than in rural areas. Qualities of the services very low (only operational few hours a day). Rely on self-provision or by informal service providers at a higher cost due to lack of public providers or unwillingness of private providers to serve urban poor (poor pay more than non-poor for utilities on average). Utilities account for a substantial expenditure of urban poor. Slums and urban informal settlements are areas of social exclusion that are often perceived to have high levels of crime and other measures of social dislocation. Urban areas with high levels of poverty are prone to suffer severe violence. Women and girls are the first to be sacrificed when families do not have resources to send all children to school. Women and girls engaging in sexually risky behavior make them more vulnerable to sexually transmitted diseases.
URBAN IDPS, REFUGEES AND RETURNEES

Few countries allow refugees to obtain work permits, which are an expensive and require a lengthy process and sponsorship. Urban refugees and IDPs experience hostility by host communities as they compete for resources and livelihoods. Failing to access to livelihoods is the main obstacle hindering reintegration in the host community and family reunification. IDPs and refugees living in urban areas are more vulnerable than those living in displaced camps, as these usually have food and shelter granted. Illegal status and lack of documentation limits the access of urban displaced to formal employment opportunities. Also, without legal protection and documentation, employers withhold pay, exploit them, and sexually harass women.
LIVELIHOODS AND POVERTY
ACCESS TO BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE
Hostility inflicted by host community due to an increased pressure on infrastructure by urban IDPs or refugees. Difficult access to municipal services (if any) due to the lack of proper documentation and complex bureaucracy. Areas where urban displaced dwell are the last ones to be serviced by municipal service providers. Urban displaced are in general poorer than urban poor and in many cases cannot afford to rely on informal service providers that charge higher fees for utilities.
GENDER, SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND CRIME
Women and girls are vulnerable to violence, rape and abduction and are more exposed to exploitation and abuse, and having arrived in urban areas, they can become the systemic target of sexual violence. The lack of income-generating activities for urban internally displaced women or refugees places them in a vulnerable position, subject to domestic violence or prostitution. Displacement introduces new family structures as a result of family breakdowns or males being killed during conflict. Due to the lack of protection and fear of deportation or institutional xenophobia, urban IDPs and refugees are more vulnerable to join or suffer from criminal organisations.
Sources: Adapted from Forced Migration Review: Adapting to Urban Displacement, ORSC, 2010; Access to Justice for the Urban Poor, Asian Development Bank, 2010; Urban Poverty: A Global View, World Bank, 2008; Health Care for Urban Poor Falls Through the Gap, The Lancet, 2011; Cities, Slums and the Millennium Development Goals, UNHABITAT; Ignored Displaced Persons: the plight of IDPs in urban areas , UNHCR, 2008; Investigating Grey Areas: Access to Basic Urban Services in the Adjacent Areas of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon, UNDP, 2011; The Challenge of Slums. Global Report on Human Settlements 2003 , UNHBITAT, 2003; and Slums of the World: The Face of Urban Poverty in the New Millennium, UNHABITAT, 2003.
ANNEX 2. Maps of the Current Kabul City according to the Master Plan
Source: Kabul Master Plan, 2009.
ANNEX 3. Maps of the Kabul New City according to the Master Plan
Source: Kabul Master Plan, 2009.

CFC Thematic Report - Rapid Urbanisation and Displacement: The Case of Kabul City, 24 September 13

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C I V I L - M I L I T A R Y

Rapid Urbanisation and Displacement: The Case of Kabul City

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

Profiling the Urban Displaced Populations1

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

Figure 1. Refugees Living in Urban Areas around the World

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

Table 1. Characteristics of Five Urban IDP Case Studies

Bogot, Santa Marta, Medelln, Cali and Barranquilla.

Armed conflict between the government and guerrillas since 1960s.

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

Peshawar, Lahore and Karachi.

Ethnical conflict against non-Arab populations in Darfur region since 2003.

Kampala, mainly, Jinja as well as other secondary urban areas.

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

Confronting the City: Vulnerabilities of the Urban Displaced

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

City in Crises: the Case of Kabul City

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

Table 2. Kabuls Urban Returnees and IDPs Profiles

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

Figure 2. Spatial Configuration of Kabul City

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

Figure 3. Location of the Kabul New City

Source: Dehsabz Barikab City Development Authority.

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // RAPID URBANISATION AND DISPLACEMENT

ANNEX 1. Vulnerabilities of the Urban Poor and the Urban Displaced

URBAN IDPS, REFUGEES AND RETURNEES

ACCESS TO EDUCATION AND HEALTH SERVICES

HOUSING, LAND TENURE AND LOCATION

PROTECTION. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE

URBAN IDPS, REFUGEES AND RETURNEES

LIVELIHOODS AND POVERTY

ACCESS TO BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE

GENDER, SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND CRIME

Source: Kabul Master Plan, 2009.

Source: Kabul Master Plan, 2009.

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