At 12.55 pm, 4th October 2010, a mining waste reservoir containing caustic slurry of burst in Ajka, Hungary.

This catastrophic disaster released approximately 1 million cubic meters of split mud and alkaline slurry, which covered about 1000 acres of land. About 10 people were found dead and almost 150 were injured in this calamity. The purpose of this report is to give an overview about the casual relationship of this disastrous event. Next, an ethical issue of this case would be discussed in detailed. A summary would be given at the end to conclude about all the findings mentioned. A series of activity led to the occurrence of split red mud. It was suspected there was a sink of the dam at a rate of 1 cm/year resulting from the slurry walling. According to ______, this created maximum shear stress and caused shear failure in the dike. Consequently, separation of dike happened and collapse of the dam eventually took place. Toxic sludge, with high value of pH, containing heavy metals such as chromium, mercury, lead and nickel was released and flooded the areas in the vicinity of Ajka as well as polluted the lands and rivers nearby. People were found dead and some experienced minor or severe injury due to the highly corrosive alkaline slurry. Eventually, this gained the attention from different parties about the toxicity of the split mud. Immediate actions had been taken on checking the toxicity of the red mud as well as searching for missing people. Remediation likes pouring acids into river to neutralize the alkaline spill was implemented to minimize the impact of the disaster. Although there are many causes of the toxic sludge disaster which relate to technical, regulatory and organizational factor, it is believed that the breaking of dam was the immediate and root cause that led to great danger and loss in this incident. Ethical implications about safety of the people and environment due to the risk of failure structure of reservoir arise. It was found that both permission-requesting documentation by Mal Co. Ltd and permissiongranting permit by Inspectorate did not consider dam break as a risk factor. According to World Federation of Engineering Organisations (WFEO) Model Code of Ethics, engineers from both parties violate the rules of to hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public and the protection of both the natural and the built environment in accordance with the Principles of Sustainable Development. Mal. Co. Ltd did not take into account the probability of rupture of dam while Inspectorate did not seek professional opinion from expert concerning the stability of the dam. It is also shown that rule was breached as no immediate actions were taken for the significant displacement of dam. Study has been done by a research group, led by Dr. Gyula Grenerczy (Satellite Geodetic Observatory of the Institute of Geodesy) on the motion history of the broken reservoir with the technique called Persistent Scatterer Synthetic Aperture Radar Interferometry (PSI). The results showed that dam moved with rate about 1 cm/year and revealed that the rate of motion and displacement were obvious to be detected with on-site geodetic measurements several years ago. This shows that the company neglected the responsibility of creating a safe environment which has violated the Although there are many causes of the toxic sludge disaster, which relate to technical, regulatory and organizational factor, it is believed that the failure of classification of red mud was the root cause that led to great danger and loss in this incident. It was also one of ethical issue arose in this tragic accident. According to World Federation of Engineering Organisations (WFEO) Model Code of Ethics, classification of red mud as non-hazardous material has violated the rule of analyzing exhaustively the surrounding area that will be affected, evaluating all the possible repercussions that

might arise in the system as well as choosing the best environmental-friendly and sustainably option. Initially, hazardous activities were regulated by Government decree 98/2001, which in effected from 01.01.2002.a more stringent law was established to deposit hazardous waste. Then, Directive 2008/98/EC was being used since 12.12.2010, which to replace Directive 91/689/EEC that consist of partial compatible specifications of Government decree. All Member States are obliged to abide by EU directive, but exception happened in Hungarian Law. After a change in law on 4 December 2003, the obligation on classification of the waste was transferred to its owner. This indicates that the Inspectorate would be only acknowledged the qualification of the owner and the permissiongranting order of the Inspectorate is largely based on the integrated environmental permission requesting documentation submitted the operating company at Ajka. It is believed that the operating company, MAL Co. Ltd has omitted and abused the autonomy. Even though regulations changed and red mud could be categorized as non-hazardous based on the technology used, MAL Co. Ltd. failed in keeping the registry documentation on the waste concerned up to date and reporting on any changes of the chemical constituents of red mud as well as its treatment method. Furthermore, this relates to the reliability of the inspection by the inspectorate. Individual tests were performed and showed that the pH value of red mud exceeded 11.5, which caused the red mud should have been categorized hazardous by the time of issuing permit. Significant conflict between the separated tested data and documents submitted should be taken seriously before granting the permit. Due to the ambiguous classification of red mud, local residents and participants in the rescue operations were not well informed on the composition of red mud as well as the risks brought by its hazardous property. This caused them to a huge exposure of dangerous red mud and eventually led to the dead and injury.