STEELCASE VS DESIGN INTERNATIONAL April 18, 2012 x-------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION MENDOZA, J.

: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the March 31, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the May 29, 2000 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Makati City (RTC), dismissing the complaint for sum of money in Civil Case No. 99-122 entitled Steelcase, Inc. v. Design International Selections, Inc. The Facts Petitioner Steelcase, Inc. (Steelcase) is a foreign corporation existing under the laws of Michigan, United States of America (U.S.A.), and engaged in the manufacture of office furniture with dealers worldwide.[3] Respondent Design International Selections, Inc. (DISI) is a corporation existing under Philippine Laws and engaged in the furniture business, including the distribution of furniture.[4] Sometime in 1986 or 1987, Steelcase and DISI orally entered into a dealership agreement whereby Steelcase granted DISI the right to market, sell, distribute, install, and service its products to end-user customers within the Philippines. The business relationship continued smoothly until it was terminated sometime in January 1999 after the agreement was breached with neither party admitting any fault.[5] On January 18, 1999, Steelcase filed a complaint[6] for sum of money against DISI alleging, among others, that DISI had an unpaid account of US$600,000.00. Steelcase prayed that DISI be ordered to pay actual or compensatory damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit.

In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims[7] dated February 4, 1999, DISI sought the following: (1) the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Steelcase from selling its products in the Philippines except through DISI; (2) the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit; and (3) the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages together with attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. DISI alleged that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and to contain the required allegations on Steelcases capacity to sue in the Philippines despite the fact that it (Steelcase) was doing business in the Philippines without the required license to do so. Consequently, it posited that the complaint should be dismissed because of Steelcases lack of legal capacity to sue in Philippine courts. On March 3, 1999, Steelcase filed its Motion to Admit Amended Complaint[8] which was granted by the RTC, through then Acting Presiding Judge Roberto C. Diokno, in its Order[9] dated April 26, 1999. However, Steelcase sought to further amend its complaint by filing a Motion to Admit Second Amended Complaint[10] on March 13, 1999. In his Order[11] dated November 15, 1999, Acting Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda dismissed the complaint, granted the TRO prayed for by DISI, set aside the April 26, 1999 Order of the RTC admitting the Amended Complaint, and denied Steelcases Motion to Admit Second Amended Complaint. The RTC stated that in requiring DISI to meet the Dealer Performance Expectation and in terminating the dealership agreement with DISI based on its failure to improve its performance in the areas of business planning, organizational structure, operational effectiveness, and efficiency, Steelcase unwittingly revealed that it participated in the operations of DISI. It then concluded that Steelcase was doing business in the Philippines, as contemplated by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7042 (The Foreign Investments Act of 1991), and since it did not have the

license to do business in the country, it was barred from seeking redress from our courts until it obtained the requisite license to do so. Its determination was further bolstered by the appointment by Steelcase of a representative in the Philippines. Finally, despite a showing that DISI transacted with the local customers in its own name and for its own account, it was of the opinion that any doubt in the factual environment should be resolved in favor of a pronouncement that a foreign corporation was doing business in the Philippines, considering the twelve-year period that DISI had been distributing Steelcase products in the Philippines. Steelcase moved for the reconsideration of the questioned Order but the motion was denied by the RTC in its May 29, 2000 Order.[12] Aggrieved, Steelcase elevated the case to the CA by way of appeal, assailing the November 15, 1999 and May 29, 2000 Orders of the RTC. On March 31, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC orders, ruling that Steelcase was a foreign corporation doing or transacting business in the Philippines without a license. The CA stated that the following acts of Steelcase showed its intention to pursue and continue the conduct of its business in the Philippines: (1) sending a letter to Phinma, informing the latter that the distribution rights for its products would be established in the near future and directing other questions about orders for Steelcase products to Steelcase International; (2) cancelling orders from DISIs customers, particularly Visteon, Phils., Inc. (Visteon); (3) continuing to send its products to the Philippines through Modernform Group Company Limited (Modernform), as evidenced by an Ocean Bill of Lading; and (4) going beyond the mere appointment of DISI as a dealer by making several impositions on management and operations of DISI. Thus, the CA ruled that Steelcase was barred from access to our courts for being a foreign corporation doing business here without the requisite license to do so.

Steelcase filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 23, 2006.[13] Hence, this petition. The Issues Steelcase filed the present petition relying on the following grounds: I THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FOUND THAT STEELCASE HAD BEEN DOING BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES WITHOUT A LICENSE. II THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING STEELCASES LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE, AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN ITS ANSWER. The issues to be resolved in this case are: (1) Whether or not Steelcase is doing business in the Philippines without a license; and (2) Whether or not DISI is estopped from challenging the Steelcases legal capacity to sue. The Courts Ruling The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. Steelcase is an unlicensed foreign corporation NOT doing business in the Philippines Anent the first issue, Steelcase argues that Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7042 or the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA) expressly states that the phrase doing business excludes the appointment by a foreign corporation of a local distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its own name and for its own account. Steelcase claims that it was not doing business in the Philippines when it

entered into a dealership agreement with DISI where the latter, acting as the formers appointed local distributor, transacted business in its own name and for its own account. Specifically, Steelcase contends that it was DISI that sold Steelcases furniture directly to the end-users or customers who, in turn, directly paid DISI for the furniture they bought. Steelcase further claims that DISI, as a nonexclusive dealer in the Philippines, had the right to market, sell, distribute and service Steelcase products in its own name and for its own account. Hence, DISI was an independent distributor of Steelcase products, and not a mere agent or conduit of Steelcase. On the other hand, DISI argues that it was appointed by Steelcase as the latters exclusive distributor of Steelcase products. DISI likewise asserts that it was not allowed by Steelcase to transact business in its own name and for its own account as Steelcase dictated the manner by which it was to conduct its business, including the management and solicitation of orders from customers, thereby assuming control of its operations. DISI further insists that Steelcase treated and considered DISI as a mere conduit, as evidenced by the fact that Steelcase itself directly sold its products to customers located in the Philippines who were classified as part of their global accounts. DISI cited other established circumstances which prove that Steelcase was doing business in the Philippines including the following: (1) the sale and delivery by Steelcase of furniture to Regus, a Philippine client, through Modernform, a Thai corporation allegedly controlled by Steelcase; (2) the imposition by Steelcase of certain requirements over the management and operations of DISI; (3) the representations made by Steven Husak as Country Manager of Steelcase; (4) the cancellation by Steelcase of orders placed by Philippine clients; and (5) the expression by Steelcase of its desire to maintain its business in the Philippines. Thus, Steelcase has no legal capacity to sue in Philippine Courts because it was doing business in the Philippines without a license to do so.

The Court agrees with the petitioner. The rule that an unlicensed foreign corporations doing business in the Philippine do not have the capacity to sue before the local courts is well-established. Section 133 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines explicitly states: Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. The phrase doing business is clearly defined in Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7042 (Foreign Investments Act of 1991), to wit: d) The phrase doing business shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether called liaison offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty (180) days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization: Provided, however, That the phrase doing business shall not be deemed to include mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; nor having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such corporation; nor

appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its own name and for its own account; (Emphases supplied) This definition is supplemented by its Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule I, Section 1(f) which elaborates on the meaning of the same phrase: f. Doing business shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether liaison offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors, operating under full control of the foreign corporation, domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period totalling one hundred eighty [180] days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to and in progressive prosecution of commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization. The following acts shall not be deemed doing business in the Philippines: 1. Mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; 2. Having a nominee director or officer to represent its interest in such corporation; 3. Appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in the representative's or distributor's own name and account; 4. The publication of a general advertisement through any print or broadcast media;

5. Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by another entity in the Philippines; 6. Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local company to be used in the processing of products for export; 7. Collecting information in the Philippines; and 8. Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated contract of sale which are not on a continuing basis, such as installing in the Philippines machinery it has manufactured or exported to the Philippines, servicing the same, training domestic workers to operate it, and similar incidental services. (Emphases supplied) From the preceding citations, the appointment of a distributor in the Philippines is not sufficient to constitute doing business unless it is under the full control of the foreign corporation. On the other hand, if the distributor is an independent entity which buys and distributes products, other than those of the foreign corporation, for its own name and its own account, the latter cannot be considered to be doing business in the Philippines.[14] It should be kept in mind that the determination of whether a foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines must be judged in light of the attendant circumstances.[15] In the case at bench, it is undisputed that DISI was founded in 1979 and is independently owned and managed by the spouses Leandro and Josephine Bantug.[16] In addition to Steelcase products, DISI also distributed products of other companies including carpet tiles, relocatable walls and theater settings.[17] The dealership agreement between Steelcase and DISI had been described by the owner himself as: xxx basically a buy and sell arrangement whereby we would inform Steelcase of the volume of the products needed for a particular

project and Steelcase would, in turn, give special quotations or discounts after considering the value of the entire package. In making the bid of the project, we would then add out profit margin over Steelcases prices. After the approval of the bid by the client, we would thereafter place the orders to Steelcase. The latter, upon our payment, would then ship the goods to the Philippines, with us shouldering the freight charges and taxes.[18] [Emphasis supplied] This clearly belies DISIs assertion that it was a mere conduit through which Steelcase conducted its business in the country. From the preceding facts, the only reasonable conclusion that can be reached is that DISI was an independent contractor, distributing various products of Steelcase and of other companies, acting in its own name and for its own account. The CA, in finding Steelcase to be unlawfully engaged in business in the Philippines, took into consideration the delivery by Steelcase of a letter to Phinma informing the latter that the distribution rights for its products would be established in the near future, and also its cancellation of orders placed by Visteon. The foregoing acts were apparently misinterpreted by the CA. Instead of supporting the claim that Steelcase was doing business in the country, the said acts prove otherwise. It should be pointed out that no sale was concluded as a result of these communications. Had Steelcase indeed been doing business in the Philippines, it would have readily accepted and serviced the orders from the abovementioned Philippine companies. Its decision to voluntarily cease to sell its products in the absence of a local distributor indicates its refusal to engage in activities which might be construed as doing business. Another point being raised by DISI is the delivery and sale of Steelcase products to a Philippine client by Modernform allegedly an agent of Steelcase. Basic is the rule in corporation law that a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its

stockholders and from other corporations with which it may be connected.[19] Thus, despite the admission by Steelcase that it owns 25% of Modernform, with the remaining 75% being owned and controlled by Thai stockholders,[20] it is grossly insufficient to justify piercing the veil of corporate fiction and declare that Modernform acted as the alter ego of Steelcase to enable it to improperly conduct business in the Philippines. The records are bereft of any evidence which might lend even a hint of credence to DISIs assertions. As such, Steelcase cannot be deemed to have been doing business in the Philippines through Modernform. Finally, both the CA and DISI rely heavily on the Dealer Performance Expectation required by Steelcase of its distributors to prove that DISI was not functioning independently from Steelcase because the same imposed certain conditions pertaining to business planning, organizational structure, operational effectiveness and efficiency, and financial stability. It is actually logical to expect that Steelcase, being one of the major manufacturers of office systems furniture, would require its dealers to meet several conditions for the grant and continuation of a distributorship agreement. The imposition of minimum standards concerning sales, marketing, finance and operations is nothing more than an exercise of sound business practice to increase sales and maximize profits for the benefit of both Steelcase and its distributors. For as long as these requirements do not impinge on a distributors independence, then there is nothing wrong with placing reasonable expectations on them. All things considered, it has been sufficiently demonstrated that DISI was an independent contractor which sold Steelcase products in its own name and for its own account. As a result, Steelcase cannot be considered to be doing business in the Philippines by its act of appointing a distributor as it falls under one of the exceptions under R.A. No. 7042.

DISI is estopped from challenging Steelcases legal capacity to sue. Regarding the second issue, Steelcase argues that assuming arguendo that it had been doing business in the Philippines without a license, DISI was nonetheless estopped from challenging Steelcases capacity to sue in the Philippines. Steelcase claims that since DISI was aware that it was doing business in the Philippines without a license and had benefited from such business, then DISI should be estopped from raising the defense that Steelcase lacks the capacity to sue in the Philippines by reason of its doing business without a license. On the other hand, DISI argues that the doctrine of estoppel cannot give Steelcase the license to do business in the Philippines or permission to file suit in the Philippines. DISI claims that when Steelcase entered into a dealership agreement with DISI in 1986, it was not doing business in the Philippines. It was after such dealership was put in place that it started to do business without first obtaining the necessary license. Hence, estoppel cannot work against it. Moreover, DISI claims that it suffered as a result of Steelcases doing business and that it never benefited from the dealership and, as such, it cannot be estopped from raising the issue of lack of capacity to sue on the part of Steelcase. The argument of Steelcase is meritorious. If indeed Steelcase had been doing business in the Philippines without a license, DISI would nonetheless be estopped from challenging the formers legal capacity to sue. It cannot be denied that DISI entered into a dealership agreement with Steelcase and profited from it for 12 years from 1987 until 1999. DISI admits that it complied with its obligations under the dealership agreement by exerting more effort and making substantial investments in the promotion of Steelcase products. It also claims that it was able to

establish a very good reputation and goodwill for Steelcase and its products, resulting in the establishment and development of a strong market for Steelcase products in the Philippines. Because of this, DISI was very proud to be awarded the Steelcase International Performance Award for meeting sales objectives, satisfying customer needs, managing an effective company and making a profit.[21] Unquestionably, entering into a dealership agreement with Steelcase charged DISI with the knowledge that Steelcase was not licensed to engage in business activities in the Philippines. This Court has carefully combed the records and found no proof that, from the inception of the dealership agreement in 1986 until September 1998, DISI even brought to Steelcases attention that it was improperly doing business in the Philippines without a license. It was only towards the latter part of 1998 that DISI deemed it necessary to inform Steelcase of the impropriety of the conduct of its business without the requisite Philippine license. It should, however, be noted that DISI only raised the issue of the absence of a license with Steelcase after it was informed that it owed the latter US$600,000.00 for the sale and delivery of its products under their special credit arrangement. By acknowledging the corporate entity of Steelcase and entering into a dealership agreement with it and even benefiting from it, DISI is estopped from questioning Steelcases existence and capacity to sue. This is consistent with the Courts ruling in Communication Materials and Design, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[22] where it was written: Notwithstanding such finding that ITEC is doing business in the country, petitioner is nonetheless estopped from raising this fact to bar ITEC from instituting this injunction case against it. A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine Courts although not authorized to do business here

against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited by said corporation. To put it in another way, a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity: The principle will be applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract. The rule is deeply rooted in the time-honored axiom of Commodum ex injuria sua non habere debet no person ought to derive any advantage of his own wrong. This is as it should be for as mandated by law, every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Concededly, corporations act through agents, like directors and officers. Corporate dealings must be characterized by utmost good faith and fairness. Corporations cannot just feign ignorance of the legal rules as in most cases, they are manned by sophisticated officers with tried management skills and legal experts with practiced eye on legal problems. Each party to a corporate transaction is expected to act with utmost candor and fairness and, thereby allow a reasonable proportion between benefits and expected burdens. This is a norm which should be observed where one or the other is a foreign entity venturing in a global market. By entering into the "Representative Agreement" with ITEC, petitioner is charged with knowledge that ITEC was not licensed to engage in business activities in the country, and is thus estopped from raising in defense such incapacity of ITEC, having chosen to ignore or

even presumptively take advantage of the same.[23] (Emphases supplied) The case of Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies v. Oriental Wood Processing Corporation[24] is likewise instructive: Respondents unequivocal admission of the transaction which gave rise to the complaint establishes the applicability of estoppel against it. Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides that a written admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof. We held in the case of Elayda v. Court of Appeals, that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him. Thus, our consistent pronouncement, as held in cases such as Merril Lynch Futures v. Court of Appeals, is apropos: The rule is that a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to foreign as well as to domestic corporations; one who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its existence and capacity. The principle will be applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract . . . All things considered, respondent can no longer invoke petitioners lack of capacity to sue in this jurisdiction. Considerations of fair play dictate that after having contracted and benefitted from its business transaction with Rimbunan, respondent should be barred from questioning the latters lack of license to transact business in the Philippines. In the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. CA, this Court noted that it is a common ploy of defaulting local companies which are sued by

unlicensed foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines to invoke the latters lack of capacity to sue. This practice of domestic corporations is particularly reprehensible considering that in requiring a license, the law never intended to prevent foreign corporations from performing single or isolated acts in this country, or to favor domestic corporations who renege on their obligations to foreign firms unwary enough to engage in solitary transactions with them. Rather, the law was intended to bar foreign corporations from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without first taking the steps necessary to render them amenable to suits in the local courts. It was to prevent the foreign companies from enjoying the good while disregarding the bad. As a matter of principle, this Court will not step in to shield defaulting local companies from the repercussions of their business dealings. While the doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on failure to first acquire a local license may be resorted to in meritorious cases, it is not a magic incantation. It cannot be called upon when no evidence exists to support its invocation or the facts do not warrant its application. In this case, that the respondent is estopped from challenging the petitioners capacity to sue has been conclusively established, and the forthcoming trial before the lower court should weigh instead on the other defenses raised by the respondent.[25] (Emphases supplied) As shown in the previously cited cases, this Court has time and again upheld the principle that a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license may still sue before the Philippine courts a Filipino or a Philippine entity that had derived some benefit from their contractual arrangement because the latter is considered to be estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after it had acknowledged the said corporation by entering into a contract with it.[26]

In Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[27] this Court had the occasion to draw attention to the common ploy of invoking the incapacity to sue of an unlicensed foreign corporation utilized by defaulting domestic companies which seek to avoid the suit by the former. The Court cannot allow this to continue by always ruling in favor of local companies, despite the injustice to the overseas corporation which is left with no available remedy. During this period of financial difficulty, our nation greatly needs to attract more foreign investments and encourage trade between the Philippines and other countries in order to rebuild and strengthen our economy. While it is essential to uphold the sound public policy behind the rule that denies unlicensed foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines access to our courts, it must never be used to frustrate the ends of justice by becoming an allencompassing shield to protect unscrupulous domestic enterprises from foreign entities seeking redress in our country. To do otherwise could seriously jeopardize the desirability of the Philippines as an investment site and would possibly have the deleterious effect of hindering trade between Philippine companies and international corporations. WHEREFORE, the March 31, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its March 23, 2006 Resolution are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The dismissal order of the Regional Trial Court dated November 15, 1999 is hereby set aside. Steelcases Amended Complaint is hereby ordered REINSTATED and the case is REMANDED to the RTC for appropriate action. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154618

April 14, 2004

AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES SINGAPORE (PTE) LTD., petitioner, vs. INTEGRATED SILICON TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, TEOH KIANG HONG, TEOH KIANG SENG, ANTHONY CHOO, JOANNE KATE M. DELA CRUZ, JEAN KAY M. DELA CRUZ and ROLANDO T. NACILLA, respondents. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review assails the Decision dated August 12, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66574, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C and annulled and set aside the Order dated September 4, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92. Petitioner Agilent Technologies Singapore (Pte.), Ltd. ("Agilent") is a foreign corporation, which, by its own admission, is not licensed to do business in the Philippines.1 Respondent Integrated Silicon Technology Philippines Corporation ("Integrated Silicon") is a private domestic corporation, 100% foreign owned, which is engaged in the business of manufacturing and assembling electronics components.2 Respondents Teoh Kiang Hong, Teoh Kiang Seng and Anthony Choo, Malaysian nationals, are current members of Integrated Silicons board of directors, while Joanne Kate M. dela Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz, and Rolando T. Nacilla are its former members.3 The juridical relation among the various parties in this case can be traced to a 5-year Value Added Assembly Services Agreement ("VAASA"), entered into on April 2, 1996 between Integrated Silicon and the HewlettPackard Singapore (Pte.) Ltd., Singapore

Components Operation ("HP-Singapore").4 Under the terms of the VAASA, Integrated Silicon was to locally manufacture and assemble fiber optics for export to HP-Singapore. HPSingapore, for its part, was to consign raw materials to Integrated Silicon; transport machinery to the plant of Integrated Silicon; and pay Integrated Silicon the purchase price of the finished products.5 The VAASA had a fiveyear term, beginning on April 2, 1996, with a provision for annual renewal by mutual written consent.6 On September 19, 1999, with the consent of Integrated Silicon,7 HP-Singapore assigned all its rights and obligations in the VAASA to Agilent.8 On May 25, 2001, Integrated Silicon filed a complaint for "Specific Performance and Damages" against Agilent and its officers Tan Bian Ee, Lim Chin Hong, Tey Boon Teck and Francis Khor, docketed as Civil Case No. 311001-C. It alleged that Agilent breached the parties oral agreement to extend the VAASA. Integrated Silicon thus prayed that defendant be ordered to execute a written extension of the VAASA for a period of five years as earlier assured and promised; to comply with the extended VAASA; and to pay actual, moral, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.9 On June 1, 2001, summons and a copy of the complaint were served on Atty. Ramon Quisumbing, who returned these processes on the claim that he was not the registered agent of Agilent. Later, he entered a special appearance to assail the courts jurisdiction over the person of Agilent. On July 2, 2001, Agilent filed a separate complaint against Integrated Silicon, Teoh Kang Seng, Teoh Kiang Gong, Anthony Choo, Joanne Kate M. dela Cruz, Jean Kay M. dela Cruz and Rolando T. Nacilla,10 for "Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages", before the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92, docketed as Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. Agilent prayed that a writ of replevin or, in the alternative, a writ of

preliminary mandatory injunction, be issued ordering defendants to immediately return and deliver to plaintiff its equipment, machineries and the materials to be used for fiber-optic components which were left in the plant of Integrated Silicon. It further prayed that defendants be ordered to pay actual and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.11 Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C,12 on the grounds of lack of Agilents legal capacity to sue;13 litis pendentia;14 forum shopping;15 and failure to state a cause of action.16 On September 4, 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted petitioner Agilents application for a writ of replevin.17 Without filing a motion for reconsideration, respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.18 In the meantime, upon motion filed by respondents, Judge Antonio S. Pozas of Branch 92 voluntarily inhibited himself in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. The case was re-raffled and assigned to Branch 35, the same branch where Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C is pending. On August 12, 2002, the Court of Appeals granted respondents petition for certiorari, set aside the assailed Order of the trial court dated September 4, 2001, and ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. Hence, the instant petition raising the following errors: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT DISMISSING RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE RESORTING TO THE REMEDY OF CERTIORARI. II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3123-2001-C BELOW ON THE GROUND OF LITIS PENDENTIA, ON ACCOUNT OF THE PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3110-2001-C. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER DATED 4 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3123-2001-C BELOW ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING, ON ACCOUNT OF THE PENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3110-2001-C. IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 323-2001-C BELOW INSTEAD OF ORDERING IT CONSOLIDATED WITH CIVIL CASE NO. 31102001-C.19 The two primary issues raised in this petition: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in giving due course to respondents petition, notwithstanding the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the September 4, 2001 Order; and (2) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. We find merit in the petition. The Court of Appeals, citing the case of Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO v. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc.,20 held that the lower court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C because of the pendency of Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C and, therefore, a motion for reconsideration was not necessary before resort to a petition for certiorari. This was error.

Jurisdiction is fixed by law. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 vests jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C in the RTC.21 The Court of Appeals ruling that the assailed Order issued by the RTC of Calamba, Branch 92, was a nullity for lack of jurisdiction due to litis pendentia and forum shopping, has no legal basis. The pendency of another action does not strip a court of the jurisdiction granted by law. The Court of Appeals further ruled that a Motion for Reconsideration was not necessary in view of the urgent necessity in this case. We are not convinced. In the case of Bache and Co. (Phils.), Inc. v. Ruiz,22 relied on by the Court of Appeals, it was held that "time is of the essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against petitioner corporation, on account of which immediate and more direct action becomes necessary." Tax assessments in that case were based on documents seized by virtue of an illegal search, and the deprivation of the right to due process tainted the entire proceedings with illegality. Hence, the urgent necessity of preventing the enforcement of the tax assessments was patent. Respondents, on the other hand, cite the case of Geronimo v. Commission on Elections,23 where the urgent necessity of resolving a disqualification case for a position in local government warranted the expeditious resort to certiorari. In the case at bar, there is no analogously urgent circumstance which would necessitate the relaxation of the rule on a Motion for Reconsideration. Indeed, none of the exceptions for dispensing with a Motion for Reconsideration is present here. None of the following cases cited by respondents serves as adequate basis for their procedural lapse. In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission,24 the questioned order was null and void for failure of respondent tribunal to comply with due process requirements; in Matanguihan v. Tengco,25 the questioned

order was a patent nullity for failure to acquire jurisdiction over the defendants, which fact the records plainly disclosed; and in National Electrification Administration v. Court of Appeals,26 the questioned orders were void for vagueness. No such patent nullity is evident in the Order issued by the trial court in this case. Finally, while urgency may be a ground for dispensing with a Motion for Reconsideration, in the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,27 cited by respondents, the slow progress of the case would have rendered the issues moot had a motion for reconsideration been availed of. We find no such urgent circumstance in the case at bar. Respondents, therefore, availed of a premature remedy when they immediately raised the matter to the Court of Appeals on certiorari; and the appellate court committed reversible error when it took cognizance of respondents petition instead of dismissing the same outright. We come now to the substantive issues of the petition. Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means "a pending suit." It is variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. While it is normally connected with the control which the court has on a property involved in a suit during the continuance proceedings, it is more interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in court. Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;

(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.28 The Court of Appeals correctly appreciated the identity of parties in Civil Cases No. 3123-2001C and 3110-2001-C. Well-settled is the rule that lis pendens requires only substantial, and not absolute, identity of parties.29 There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case.30 The parties in these cases are vying over the interests of the two opposing corporations; the individuals are only incidentally impleaded, being the natural persons purportedly accused of violating these corporations rights. Likewise, the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or vice versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.31 The identity of parties notwithstanding, litis pendentia does not obtain in this case because of the absence of the second and third requisites. The rights asserted in each of the cases involved are separate and distinct; there are two subjects of controversy presented for adjudication; and two causes of action are clearly involved. The fact that respondents instituted a prior action for "Specific Performance and Damages" is not a ground for defeating the petitioners action for "Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages." In Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C filed by respondents, the issue is whether or not there

was a breach of an oral promise to renew of the VAASA. The issue in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, filed by petitioner, is whether petitioner has the right to take possession of the subject properties. Petitioners right of possession is founded on the ownership of the subject goods, which ownership is not disputed and is not contingent on the extension or non-extension of the VAASA. Hence, the replevin suit can validly be tried even while the prior suit is being litigated in the Regional Trial Court. Possession of the subject properties is not an issue in Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C. The reliefs sought by respondent Integrated Silicon therein are as follows: (1) execution of a written extension or renewal of the VAASA; (2) compliance with the extended VAASA; and (3) payment of overdue accounts, damages, and attorneys fees. The reliefs sought by petitioner Agilent in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, on the other hand, are as follows: (1) issuance of a Writ of Replevin or Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction; (2) recovery of possession of the subject properties; (3) damages and attorneys fees. Concededly, some items or pieces of evidence may be admissible in both actions. It cannot be said, however, that exactly the same evidence will support the decisions in both, since the legally significant and controlling facts in each case are entirely different. Although the VAASA figures prominently in both suits, Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C is premised on a purported breach of an oral obligation to extend the VAASA, and damages arising out of Agilents alleged failure to comply with such purported extension. Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, on the other hand, is premised on a breach of the VAASA itself, and damages arising to Agilent out of that purported breach. It necessarily follows that the third requisite for litis pendentia is also absent. The following are the elements of res judicata: (a) The former judgment must be final;

(b) The court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (c) It must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) There must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.32 In this case, any judgment rendered in one of the actions will not amount to res judicata in the other action. There being different causes of action, the decision in one case will not constitute res judicata as to the other. Of course, a decision in one case may, to a certain extent, affect the other case. This, however, is not the test to determine the identity of the causes of action. Whatever difficulties or inconvenience may be entailed if both causes of action are pursued on separate remedies, the proper solution is not the dismissal order of the Court of Appeals. The possible consolidation of said cases, as well as stipulations and appropriate modes of discovery, may well be considered by the court below to subserve not only procedural expedience but, more important, the ends of justice.33 We now proceed to the issue of forum shopping. The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum-shopping was laid down in the case of Buan v. Lopez.34 Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the final other. There being no litis pendentia in this case, a judgment in the said case will not amount to res judicata in Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C, and respondents contention on forum shopping must likewise fail. We are not unmindful of the afflictive consequences that may be suffered by both petitioner and respondents if replevin is granted by the trial court in Civil Case No. 3123-

2001-C. If respondent Integrated Silicon eventually wins Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C, and the VAASAs terms are extended, petitioner corporation will have to comply with its obligations thereunder, which would include the consignment of properties similar to those it may recover by way of replevin in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. However, petitioner will also suffer an injustice if denied the remedy of replevin, resort to which is not only allowed but encouraged by law. Respondents argue that since Agilent is an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, it lacks the legal capacity to file suit.35 The assailed acts of petitioner Agilent, purportedly in the nature of "doing business" in the Philippines, are the following: (1) mere entering into the VAASA, which is a "service contract";36 (2) appointment of a fulltime representative in Integrated Silicon, to "oversee and supervise the production" of Agilents products;37 (3) the appointment by Agilent of six full-time staff members, who were permanently stationed at Integrated Silicons facilities in order to inspect the finished goods for Agilent;38 and (4) Agilents participation in the management, supervision and control of Integrated Silicon,39 including instructing Integrated Silicon to hire more employees to meet Agilents increasing production needs,40 regularly performing quality audit, evaluation and supervision of Integrated Silicons employees,41 regularly performing inventory audit of raw materials to be used by Integrated Silicon, which was also required to provide weekly inventory updates to Agilent,42 and providing and dictating Integrated Silicon on the daily production schedule, volume and models of the products to manufacture and ship for Agilent.43 A foreign corporation without a license is not ipso facto incapacitated from bringing an action in Philippine courts. A license is necessary only if a foreign corporation is "transacting" or "doing business" in the country. The Corporation Code provides:

Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. The aforementioned provision prevents an unlicensed foreign corporation "doing business" in the Philippines from accessing our courts. In a number of cases, however, we have held that an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may bring suit in Philippine courts against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited from said corporation.44 Such a suit is premised on the doctrine of estoppel. A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. This doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence and capacity applies to foreign as well as domestic corporations.45 The application of this principle prevents a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract.46 The principles regarding the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit in Philippine courts may thus be condensed in four statements: (1) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it cannot sue before the Philippine courts;47 (2) if a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs no license to sue before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any business transaction48; (3) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, a Philippine citizen or entity which has contracted with said corporation may

be estopped from challenging the foreign corporations corporate personality in a suit brought before Philippine courts;49 and (4) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with the required license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction. The challenge to Agilents legal capacity to file suit hinges on whether or not it is doing business in the Philippines. However, there is no definitive rule on what constitutes "doing", "engaging in", or "transacting" business in the Philippines, as this Court observed in the case of Mentholatum v. Mangaliman.50 The Corporation Code itself is silent as to what acts constitute doing or transacting business in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has it, however, that the term "implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization."51 In Mentholatum,52 this Court discoursed on the two general tests to determine whether or not a foreign corporation can be considered as "doing business" in the Philippines. The first of these is the substance test, thus:53 The true test [for doing business], however, seems to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another. The second test is the continuity test, expressed thus:54 The term [doing business] implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in the progressive prosecution of, the purpose and object of its organization.

Although each case must be judged in light of its attendant circumstances, jurisprudence has evolved several guiding principles for the application of these tests. For instance, considering that it transacted with its Philippine counterpart for seven years, engaging in futures contracts, this Court concluded that the foreign corporation in Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Spouses Lara,55 was doing business in the Philippines. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Japan Airlines ("JAL"),56 the Court held that JAL was doing business in the Philippines, i.e., its commercial dealings in the country were continuous despite the fact that no JAL aircraft landed in the country as it sold tickets in the Philippines through a general sales agent, and opened a promotions office here as well. In General Corp. of the Phils. v. Union Insurance Society of Canton and Firemans Fund Insurance,57 a foreign insurance corporation was held to be doing business in the Philippines, as it appointed a settling agent here, and issued 12 marine insurance policies. We held that these transactions were not isolated or casual, but manifested the continuity of the foreign corporations conduct and its intent to establish a continuous business in the country. In Eriks PTE Ltd. v. Court of Appeals and Enriquez,58 the foreign corporation sold its products to a Filipino buyer who ordered the goods 16 times within an eight-month period. Accordingly, this Court ruled that the corporation was doing business in the Philippines, as there was a clear intention on its part to continue the body of its business here, despite the relatively short span of time involved. Communication Materials and Design, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, ITEC, et al.59 and Top-Weld Manufacturing v. ECED, IRTI, et al.60 both involved the License and Technical Agreement and Distributor Agreement of foreign corporations with their respective local counterparts that were the primary bases for the Courts ruling that the foreign corporations were doing business in the

Philippines.61 In particular, the Court cited the highly restrictive nature of certain provisions in the agreements involved, such that, as stated in Communication Materials, the Philippine entity is reduced to a mere extension or instrument of the foreign corporation. For example, in Communication Materials, the Court deemed the "No Competing Product" provision of the Representative Agreement therein restrictive.62 The case law definition has evolved into a statutory definition, having been adopted with some qualifications in various pieces of legislation. The Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (the "FIA"; Republic Act No. 7042, as amended), defines "doing business" as follows: Sec. 3, par. (d). The phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totaling one hundred eighty (180) days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity, or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in the progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization. An analysis of the relevant case law, in conjunction with Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the FIA (as amended by Republic Act No. 8179), would demonstrate that the acts enumerated in the VAASA do not constitute "doing business" in the Philippines. Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the FIA (as amended by Republic Act No. 8179) provides that the following shall not be deemed "doing business":

(1) Mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; (2) Having a nominee director or officer to represent its interest in such corporation; (3) Appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in the representatives or distributors own name and account; (4) The publication of a general advertisement through any print or broadcast media; (5) Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by another entity in the Philippines; (6) Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local company to be used in the processing of products for export; (7) Collecting information in the Philippines; and (8) Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated contract of sale which are not on a continuing basis, such as installing in the Philippines machinery it has manufactured or exported to the Philippines, servicing the same, training domestic workers to operate it, and similar incidental services By and large, to constitute "doing business", the activity to be undertaken in the Philippines is one that is for profit-making.6 By the clear terms of the VAASA, Agilents activities in the Philippines were confined to (1) maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by Integrated Silicon; and (2) consignment of equipment with Integrated Silicon to be used in the processing of products for export. As such, we hold that, based on the evidence presented thus far, Agilent cannot be deemed to be "doing business" in the Philippines. Respondents contention that

Agilent lacks the legal capacity to file suit is therefore devoid of merit. As a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, it needed no license before it can sue before our courts. Finally, as to Agilents purported failure to state a cause of action against the individual respondents, we likewise rule in favor of petitioner. A Motion to Dismiss hypothetically admits all the allegations in the Complaint, which plainly alleges that these individual respondents had committed or permitted the commission of acts prejudicial to Agilent. Whether or not these individuals had divested themselves of their interests in Integrated Silicon, or are no longer members of Integrated Silicons Board of Directors, is a matter of defense best threshed out during trial. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66574 dated August 12, 2002, which dismissed Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated September 4, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92, in Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C, is REINSTATED. Agilents application for a Writ of Replevin is GRANTED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 168266 March 15, 2010

CARGILL, INC., Petitioner, vs.

INTRA STRATA ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This petition for review1 assails the 26 May 2005 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 48447. The Facts Petitioner Cargill, Inc. (petitioner) is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, United States of America. Petitioner and Northern Mindanao Corporation (NMC) executed a contract dated 16 August 1989 whereby NMC agreed to sell to petitioner 20,000 to 24,000 metric tons of molasses, to be delivered from 1 January to 30 June 1990 at the price of $44 per metric ton. The contract provides that petitioner would open a Letter of Credit with the Bank of Philippine Islands. Under the "red clause" of the Letter of Credit, NMC was permitted to draw up to $500,000 representing the minimum price of the contract upon presentation of some documents. The contract was amended three times: first, on 11 January 1990, increasing the purchase price of the molasses to $47.50 per metric ton;3 second, on 18 June 1990, reducing the quantity of the molasses to 10,500 metric tons and increasing the price to $55 per metric ton;4 and third, on 22 August 1990, providing for the shipment of 5,250 metric tons of molasses on the last half of December 1990 through the first half of January 1991, and the balance of 5,250 metric tons on the last half of January 1991 through the first half of February 1991.5 The third amendment also required NMC to put up a performance bond equivalent to $451,500, which represents the value of 10,500 metric tons of molasses computed at $43 per metric ton. The performance bond was intended to guarantee NMCs performance to deliver the

molasses during the prescribed shipment periods according to the terms of the amended contract. In compliance with the terms of the third amendment of the contract, respondent Intra Strata Assurance Corporation (respondent) issued on 10 October 1990 a performance bond6 in the sum of P11,287,500 to guarantee NMCs delivery of the 10,500 tons of molasses, and a surety bond7 in the sum of P9,978,125 to guarantee the repayment of downpayment as provided in the contract. NMC was only able to deliver 219.551 metric tons of molasses out of the agreed 10,500 metric tons. Thus, petitioner sent demand letters to respondent claiming payment under the performance and surety bonds. When respondent refused to pay, petitioner filed on 12 April 1991 a complaint8 for sum of money against NMC and respondent. Petitioner, NMC, and respondent entered into a compromise agreement,9 which the trial court approved in its Decision10 dated 13 December 1991. The compromise agreement provides that NMC would pay petitioner P3,000,000 upon signing of the compromise agreement and would deliver to petitioner 6,991 metric tons of molasses from 16-31 December 1991. However, NMC still failed to comply with its obligation under the compromise agreement. Hence, trial proceeded against respondent. On 23 November 1994, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff [Cargill, Inc.], ordering defendant INTRA STRATA ASSURANCE CORPORATION to solidarily pay plaintiff the total amount of SIXTEEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-THREE THOUSAND AND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P16,993,200.00), Philippine Currency, with interest at the legal rate from October 10, 1990 until fully paid, plus attorneys fees in the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS

(P200,000.00), Philippine Currency and the costs of the suit. The Counterclaim of Intra Strata Assurance Corporation is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.11 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and dismissed the complaint. Hence, this petition. The Court of Appeals Ruling The Court of Appeals held that petitioner does not have the capacity to file this suit since it is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without the requisite license. The Court of Appeals held that petitioners purchases of molasses were in pursuance of its basic business and not just mere isolated and incidental transactions. The Issues Petitioner raises the following issues: 1. Whether petitioner is doing or transacting business in the Philippines in contemplation of the law and established jurisprudence; 2. Whether respondent is estopped from invoking the defense that petitioner has no legal capacity to sue in the Philippines; 3. Whether petitioner is seeking a review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals; and 4. Whether the advance payment of $500,000 was released to NMC without the submission of the supporting documents required in the contract and the "red clause" Letter of Credit from which said amount was drawn.12 The Ruling of the Court We find the petition meritorious. Doing Business in the Philippines and Capacity to Sue

The principal issue in this case is whether petitioner, an unlicensed foreign corporation, has legal capacity to sue before Philippine courts. Under Article 12313 of the Corporation Code, a foreign corporation must first obtain a license and a certificate from the appropriate government agency before it can transact business in the Philippines. Where a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without the proper license, it cannot maintain any action or proceeding before Philippine courts as provided under Section 133 of the Corporation Code: Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. Thus, the threshold question in this case is whether petitioner was doing business in the Philippines. The Corporation Code provides no definition for the phrase "doing business." Nevertheless, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5455 (RA 5455),14 provides that: x x x the phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether called liaison offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the

purpose and object of the organization. (Emphasis supplied)

business

This is also the exact definition provided under Article 44 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. Republic Act No. 7042 (RA 7042), otherwise known as the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, which repealed Articles 44-56 of Book II of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, enumerated not only the acts or activities which constitute "doing business" but also those activities which are not deemed "doing business." Section 3(d) of RA 7042 states: [T]he phrase "doing business" shall include "soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether called liaison offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty (180) days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization: Provided, however, That the phrase doing business shall not be deemed to include mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; nor having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such corporation; nor appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its own name and for its own account. Since respondent is relying on Section 133 of the Corporation Code to bar petitioner from maintaining an action in Philippine courts,

respondent bears the burden of proving that petitioners business activities in the Philippines were not just casual or occasional, but so systematic and regular as to manifest continuity and permanence of activity to constitute doing business in the Philippines. In this case, we find that respondent failed to prove that petitioners activities in the Philippines constitute doing business as would prevent it from bringing an action. The determination of whether a foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines must be based on the facts of each case.15 In the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. CA,16 in which a foreign corporation filed an action for collection of sum of money against petitioners therein for damages and loss sustained for the latters failure to deliver coconut crude oil, the Court emphasized the importance of the element of continuity of commercial activities to constitute doing business in the Philippines. The Court held: In the case at bar, the transactions entered into by the respondent with the petitioners are not a series of commercial dealings which signify an intent on the part of the respondent to do business in the Philippines but constitute an isolated one which does not fall under the category of "doing business." The records show that the only reason why the respondent entered into the second and third transactions with the petitioners was because it wanted to recover the loss it sustained from the failure of the petitioners to deliver the crude coconut oil under the first transaction and in order to give the latter a chance to make good on their obligation. x x x x x x The three seemingly different transactions were entered into by the parties only in an effort to fulfill the basic agreement and in no way indicate an intent on the part of the respondent to engage in a continuity of transactions with petitioners which will categorize it as a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.17

Similarly, in this case, petitioner and NMC amended their contract three times to give a chance to NMC to deliver to petitioner the molasses, considering that NMC already received the minimum price of the contract. There is no showing that the transactions between petitioner and NMC signify the intent of petitioner to establish a continuous business or extend its operations in the Philippines. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7042 provide under Section 1(f), Rule I, that "doing business" does not include the following acts: 1. Mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; 2. Having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such corporation; 3. Appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in the representative's or distributor's own name and account; 4. The publication of a general advertisement through any print or broadcast media; 5. Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed by another entity in the Philippines; 6. Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local company to be used in the processing of products for export; 7. Collecting information in the Philippines; and 8. Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated contract of sale which are not on a continuing basis, such as installing in the Philippines machinery it has manufactured or exported to the Philippines, servicing the same, training domestic workers to operate it, and similar incidental services.

Most of these activities do not bring any direct receipts or profits to the foreign corporation, consistent with the ruling of this Court in National Sugar Trading Corp. v. CA18 that activities within Philippine jurisdiction that do not create earnings or profits to the foreign corporation do not constitute doing business in the Philippines.19 In that case, the Court held that it would be inequitable for the National Sugar Trading Corporation, a state-owned corporation, to evade payment of a legitimate indebtedness owing to the foreign corporation on the plea that the latter should have obtained a license first before perfecting a contract with the Philippine government. The Court emphasized that the foreign corporation did not sell sugar and derive income from the Philippines, but merely purchased sugar from the Philippine government and allegedly paid for it in full. In this case, the contract between petitioner and NMC involved the purchase of molasses by petitioner from NMC. It was NMC, the domestic corporation, which derived income from the transaction and not petitioner. To constitute "doing business," the activity undertaken in the Philippines should involve profit-making.20 Besides, under Section 3(d) of RA 7042, "soliciting purchases" has been deleted from the enumeration of acts or activities which constitute "doing business." Other factors which support the finding that petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines are: (1) petitioner does not have an office in the Philippines; (2) petitioner imports products from the Philippines through its nonexclusive local broker, whose authority to act on behalf of petitioner is limited to soliciting purchases of products from suppliers engaged in the sugar trade in the Philippines; and (3) the local broker is an independent contractor and not an agent of petitioner.21 As explained by the Court in B. Van Zuiden Bros., Ltd. v. GTVL Marketing Industries, Inc.:22

An exporter in one country may export its products to many foreign importing countries without performing in the importing countries specific commercial acts that would constitute doing business in the importing countries. The mere act of exporting from ones own country, without doing any specific commercial act within the territory of the importing country, cannot be deemed as doing business in the importing country. The importing country does not require jurisdiction over the foreign exporter who has not yet performed any specific commercial act within the territory of the importing country. Without jurisdiction over the foreign exporter, the importing country cannot compel the foreign exporter to secure a license to do business in the importing country. Otherwise, Philippine exporters, by the mere act alone of exporting their products, could be considered by the importing countries to be doing business in those countries. This will require Philippine exporters to secure a business license in every foreign country where they usually export their products, even if they do not perform any specific commercial act within the territory of such importing countries. Such a legal concept will have deleterious effect not only on Philippine exports, but also on global trade. To be doing or "transacting business in the Philippines" for purposes of Section 133 of the Corporation Code, the foreign corporation must actually transact business in the Philippines, that is, perform specific business transactions within the Philippine territory on a continuing basis in its own name and for its own account. Actual transaction of business within the Philippine territory is an essential requisite for the Philippines to to acquire jurisdiction over a foreign corporation and thus require the foreign corporation to secure a Philippine business license. If a foreign corporation does not transact such kind of business in the Philippines, even if it exports its products to the Philippines, the Philippines has no jurisdiction to require

such foreign corporation to secure a Philippine business license.23 (Emphasis supplied) In the present case, petitioner is a foreign company merely importing molasses from a Philipine exporter. A foreign company that merely imports goods from a Philippine exporter, without opening an office or appointing an agent in the Philippines, is not doing business in the Philippines. Review of Findings of Fact The Supreme Court may review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals which are in conflict with the findings of the trial court.24 We find that the Court of Appeals finding that petitioner was doing business is not supported by evidence. Furthermore, a review of the records shows that the trial court was correct in holding that the advance payment of $500,000 was released to NMC in accordance with the conditions provided under the "red clause" Letter of Credit from which said amount was drawn. The Head of the International Operations Department of the Bank of Philippine Islands testified that the bank would not have paid the beneficiary if the required documents were not complete. It is a requisite in a documentary credit transaction that the documents should conform to the terms and conditions of the letter of credit; otherwise, the bank will not pay. The Head of the International Operations Department of the Bank of Philippine Islands also testified that they received reimbursement from the issuing bank for the $500,000 withdrawn by NMC.25 Thus, respondent had no legitimate reason to refuse payment under the performance and surety bonds when NMC failed to perform its part under its contract with petitioner. WHEREFORE , we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Decision dated 26 May 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48447. We REINSTATE the Decision dated 23 November 1994 of the trial court.

SO ORDERED. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 159586. July 26, 2004] The Contract for Services provides that the German Consortium shall be empowered to enter into a contract or agreement for the use of the integrated waste management center by corporations, local government units, entities, and persons not only within the CSEZ but also outside. For waste collected within the CSEZ, the German Consortium may impose a tipping fee per ton of waste collected from locators and residents of the CSEZ, which fees shall be subject to the schedule agreed upon by the parties and specified in the Contract for Services. For its operations outside of the CSEZ, the German Consortium shall pay CDC US$1.50 per ton of non-hazardous solid waste collected.[3] The CDC shall guarantee that nineteen thousand eighteen hundred (19,800) tons per year of solid waste volume shall be collected from inside and outside the CSEZ.[4] The contract has a term of twenty-five (25) years,[5] during which time the German Consortium shall operate the waste management center on a day-to-day basis.[6] Article VIII, Section 7 of the Contract for Services provides that the German Consortium shall undertake to organize a local corporation as its representative for this project. On April 18, 2000, the German Consortium entered into a Joint Venture with D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. (DMWAI) and Ma. Elena B. Villarama (doing business as LBV and Associates), embodied in a Memorandum of Understanding*7+ (MOU) signed by the parties. Under the MOU, the parties agreed to jointly form a local corporation to which the German Consortium shall assign its rights under the Contract for Services. Pursuant to this agreement, petitioner European Resources and Technologies, Inc. was incorporated. The parties likewise agreed to prepare and finalize a Shareholders Agreement within one (1) month from the execution of the MOU, which shall provide that the German Consortium shall own fifteen percent (15%) of the equity in the joint venture corporation, DMWAI shall own seventy

EUROPEAN RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and DELFIN J. WENCESLAO, petitioners, vs. INGENIEUBURO BIRKHAHN + NOLTE, Ingeniurgesellschaft mbh and HEERS & BROCKSTEDT GMBH & CO., respondents. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 15, 2003, which sustained the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 61, dated June 28, 2001, and its subsequent Resolution dated August 3, 2003 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. European Resources and Technologies Inc. (hereinafter ERTI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is joined by Delfin J. Wenceslao as petitioner in this case. Ingenieuburo Birkhan + Nolte Ingiurgesellschaft mbh and Heers & Brockstedt Gmbh & Co. are German corporations who are respondents in this case and shall be collectively referred to as the German Consortium. The German Consortium tendered and submitted its bid to the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) to construct, operate and manage the Integrated Waste Management Center at the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). CDC accepted the German Consortiums bid and awarded the contract to it. On October 6, 1999, CDC and the German Consortium executed the Contract for Services[2] which embodies the terms and conditions of their agreement.

percent (70%) and LBV&A shall own fifteen percent (15%). In the event that the parties fail to execute the Shareholders Agreement, the MOU shall be considered null and void.[8] On August 1, 2000, without the Shareholders Agreement having been executed, the German Consortium and petitioner ERTI entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)[9] whereby the German Consortium ceded its rights and obligations under the Contract for Services in favor of ERTI and assigned unto ERTI, among others, its license from CDC to engage in the business of providing environmental services needed in the CSEZ in connection with the waste management within the CSEZ and other areas.*10+ Likewise, the parties agreed that should there be a disagreement between or among them relative to the interpretation or implementation of the MOA and the collateral documents including but not limited to the Contract for Services between the German Consortium and CDC, the dispute shall be referred to a panel of arbitrators.[11] On December 11, 2000, ERTI received a letter from BN Consultants Philippines, Inc., signed by Mr. Holger Holst for and on behalf of the German Consortium,[12] stating that the German Consortiums contract with DMWAI, LBV&A and ERTI has been terminated or extinguished on the following grounds: (a) the CDC did not give its approval to the Consortiums request for the approval of the assignment or transfer by the German Consortium in favor of ERTI of its rights and interests under the Contract for Services; (b) the parties failed to prepare and finalize the Shareholders Agreement pursuant to the provision of the MOU; (c) there is no more factual or legal basis for the joint venture to continue; and (d) with the termination of the MOU, the MOA is also deemed terminated or extinguished. Attached to the letter was a copy of the letter of the CDC,[13] stating that the German Consortiums assignment of an eighty-five percent (85%) majority interest to another

party violated its representation to undertake both the financial and technical aspects of the project. The dilution of the Consortiums interest in ERTI is a substantial modification of the Consortiums representations which were used as bases for the award of the project to it. On February 20, 2001, petitioner ERTI, through counsel, sent a letter to CDC requesting for the reconsideration of its disapproval of the agreement between ERTI and the German Consortium. Before CDC could act upon petitioner ERTIs letter, the German Consortium filed a complaint for injunction against herein petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 61, docketed as Civil Case No. 10049. The German Consortium claimed that petitioner ERTIs continued misrepresentation as to their right to accept solid wastes from third parties for processing at the waste management center will cause irreparable damage to the Consortium and its exclusive right to operate the waste management center at the CSEZ. Moreover, petitioner ERTIs acts destroy the Consortiums credibility and undermine customer confidence in it. Hence, the German Consortium prayed that a writ of temporary restraining order be issued against petitioner ERTI and, after hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be likewise issued ordering petitioner ERTI to cease and desist from misrepresenting to third parties or the public that it has any right or interest in the waste management center at CSEZ.[14] Petitioners filed their Opposition to the application for preliminary injunction on February 7, 2001. The following day, February 8, 2001, petitioners sent respondents, through Mr. Holger Holst, a letter demanding that the parties proceed to arbitration in accordance with Section 17 of the MOA. At the hearings on the application for injunction, petitioners objected to the presentation of evidence on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case since the German Consortium was composed of foreign corporations doing

business in the country without a license. Moreover, the MOA between the parties provides that the dispute should be referred to arbitration. The trial court overruled the objection and proceeded with the hearing. On June 28, 2001, the trial court issued an Order granting the writ of preliminary injunction.[15] Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution dated November 21, 2001. On January 17, 2002, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial courts Orders dated June 28, 2001 and November 21, 2001.

(d) Issuing the writ of preliminary injunction that is tantamount to a decision of the case on the merits.[18] The petition is partly meritorious. There is no general rule or governing principle laid down as to what constitutes doing or engaging in or transacting business in the Philippines. Thus, it has often been held that a single act or transaction may be considered as doing business when a corporation performs acts for which it was created or exercises some of the functions for which it was organized.[19] We have held that the act of participating in a bidding process constitutes doing business because it shows the foreign corporations intention to engage in business in the Philippines. In this regard, it is the performance by a foreign corporation of the acts for which it was created, regardless of volume of business, that determines whether a foreign corporation needs a license or not.[20] Consequently, the German Consortium is doing business in the Philippines without the appropriate license as required by our laws. By participating in the bidding conducted by the CDC for the operation of the waste management center, the German Consortium exhibited its intent to transact business in the Philippines. Although the Contract for Services provided for the establishment of a local corporation to serve as respondents representative, it is clear from the other provisions of the Contract for Services as well as the letter by the CDC containing the disapproval that it will be the German Consortium which shall manage and conduct the operations of the waste management center for at least twentyfive years. Moreover, the German Consortium was allowed to transact with other entities outside the CSEZ for solid waste collection. Thus, it is clear that the local corporation to be established will merely act as a conduit or extension of the German Consortium.

Meanwhile, on February 11, 2002, the temporary restraining order issued was lifted in view of respondents failure to file sufficient bond.[16] On September 6, 2002, all proceedings in Civil Case No. 10049 were suspended until the petition for certiorari pending before the Court of Appeals shall have been resolved.[17] On May 15, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated August 25, 2003. Hence, this petition arguing that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in: (a) Ruling that petitioners are estopped from assailing the capacity of the respondents to institute the suit for injunction (b) Ruling that respondents are entitled to an injunctive writ. (c) Not holding that the dispute is covered by the arbitration clause in the memorandum of agreement.

As a general rule, unlicensed foreign nonresident corporations cannot file suits in the Philippines. Section 133 of the Corporation Code specifically provides: SECTION 133. No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines, but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. A corporation has legal status only within the state or territory in which it was organized. For this reason, a corporation organized in another country has no personality to file suits in the Philippines. In order to subject a foreign corporation doing business in the country to the jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and appoint an agent for service of process. Without such license, it cannot institute a suit in the Philippines.[21] However, there are exceptions to this rule. In a number of cases,[22] we have declared a party estopped from challenging or questioning the capacity of an unlicensed foreign corporation from initiating a suit in our courts. In the case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[23] a foreign corporation instituted an action before our courts seeking to enjoin a local corporation, with whom it had a Representative Agreement, from using its corporate name, letter heads, envelopes, sign boards and business dealings as well as the foreign corporations trademark. The case arose when the foreign corporation discovered that the local corporation has violated certain contractual commitments as stipulated in their agreement. In said case, we held that a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without license may sue in Philippine Courts a Philippine citizen or entity that had contracted with and benefited from it.

Hence, the party is estopped from questioning the capacity of a foreign corporation to institute an action in our courts where it had obtained benefits from its dealings with such foreign corporation and thereafter committed a breach of or sought to renege on its obligations. The rule relating to estoppel is deeply rooted in the axiom of commodum ex injuria sua non habere debetno person ought to derive any advantage from his own wrong. In the case at bar, petitioners have clearly not received any benefit from its transactions with the German Consortium. In fact, there is no question that petitioners were the ones who have expended a considerable amount of money and effort preparatory to the implementation of the MOA. Neither do petitioners seek to back out from their obligations under both the MOU and the MOA by challenging respondents capacity to sue. The reverse could not be any more accurate. Petitioners are insisting on the full validity and implementation of their agreements with the German Consortium. To rule that the German Consortium has the capacity to institute an action against petitioners even when the latter have not committed any breach of its obligation would be tantamount to an unlicensed foreign corporation gaining access to our courts for protection and redress. We cannot allow this without violating the very rationale for the law prohibiting a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines from suing or maintaining an action in Philippine courts. The object of requiring a license is not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single acts, but to prevent it from acquiring domicile for the purpose of business without taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suits in the local courts.[24] In other words, the foreign corporation is merely prevented from being in a position where it takes the good without accepting the bad. On the issue of whether the respondents were entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioners

claim that respondents right is not in esse but is rather a future right which is contingent upon a judicial declaration that the MOA has been validly rescinded. The Court of Appeals, in its decision, held that the MOA should be deemed subject to a suspensive condition, that is, that CDCs prior written consent must be obtained for the validity of the assignment. This issue must be resolved in a separate proceeding. It must be noted that the hearing conducted in the trial court was merely a preliminary hearing relating to the issuance of the injunctive writ. In order to fully appreciate the facts of this case and the surrounding circumstances relating to the agreements and contract involved, further proof should be presented for consideration of the court. Likewise, corollary matters, such as whether either of the parties is liable for damages and to what extent, cannot be resolved with absolute certainty, thus rendering any decision we might make incomplete as to fully dispose of this case. More importantly, it is evident that CDC must be made a proper party in any case which seeks to resolve the effectivity or ineffectivity of its disapproval of the assignment made between petitioners and respondent German Consortium. Where, as in the instant case, CDC is not impleaded as a party, any decision of the court which will inevitably affect or involve CDC cannot be deemed binding on it. For the same reason, petitioners assertion that the instant case should be referred to arbitration pursuant to the provision of the MOA is untenable. We have ruled in several cases that arbitration agreements are valid, binding, enforceable and not contrary to public policy such that when there obtains a written provision for arbitration which is not complied with, the trial court should suspend the proceedings and order the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of their agreement.[25] In the case at bar, the MOA between petitioner ERTI and respondent German Consortium provided:

17. Should there be a disagreement between or among the Parties relative to the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement and the collateral documents including but not limited to the Contract for Services between GERMAN CONSORTIUM and CDC and the Parties cannot resolve the same by themselves, the same shall be endorsed to a panel of arbitrators which shall be convened in accordance with the process ordained under the Arbitration Law of the Republic of the Philippines.[26] Indeed, to brush aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration in case of disagreement between parties would be a step backward.[27] But there are exceptions to this rule. Even if there is an arbitration clause, there are instances when referral to arbitration does not appear to be the most prudent action. The object of arbitration is to allow the expeditious determination of a dispute. Clearly, the issue before us could not be speedily and efficiently resolved in its entirety if we allow simultaneous arbitration proceedings and trial, or suspension of trial pending arbitration.[28] As discussed earlier, the dispute between respondent German Consortium and petitioners involves the disapproval by the CDC of the assignment by the German Consortium of its rights under the Contract for Services to petitioner ERTI. Admittedly, the arbitration clause is contained in the MOA to which only the German Consortium and petitioner ERTI were parties. Even if the case is brought before an arbitration panel, the decision will not be binding upon CDC who is a non-party to the arbitration agreement. What is more, the arbitration panel will not be able to completely dispose of all the issues of this case without including CDC in its proceedings. Accordingly, the interest of justice would only be served if the trial court hears and adjudicates the case in a single and complete proceeding. Lastly, petitioners question the propriety of the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction claiming that such is already tantamount to

granting the main prayer of respondents complaint without the benefit of a trial. Petitioners point out that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and decided. It cannot be used to railroad the main case and seek a judgment without a full-blown trial as in the instant case. The Court of Appeals ruled that since petitioners did not raise this issue during the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction before the trial court, the same cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and even in special civil actions for certiorari as in this case. At the outset, it must be noted that with the finding that the German Consortium is without any personality to file the petition with the trial court, the propriety of the injunction writ issued is already moot and academic. Even assuming for the sake of argument that respondents have the capacity to file the petition, we find merit in the issue raised by petitioners against the injunction writ issued. Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites are present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction to be directed is a violation of such right.[29] The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.[30]

the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[31] At the time of its application for an injunctive writ, respondents right to operate and manage the waste management center, to the exclusion of or without any participation by petitioner ERTI, cannot be said to be clear and unmistakable. The MOA executed between respondents and petitioner ERTI has not yet been judicially declared as rescinded when the complaint was lodged in court.[32] Hence, a cloud of doubt exists over respondent German Consortiums exclusive right relating to the waste management center. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68923 dated May 15, 2003 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the trial court dated June 28, 2001 and November 21, 2001 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and Civil Case No. 10049 is DISMISSED for lack of legal capacity of respondents to institute the action. Costs against respondents. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 97642 August 29, 1997 AVON INSURANCE PLC. BRITISH RESERVE INSURANCE CO. LTD., CORNHILL INSURANCE PLC. IMPERIO REINSURANCE CO. (UK) LTD., INSTITUTE DE RESERGURROS DO BRAZIL, INSURANCE CORPORATION OF IRELAND PLC, LEGAL AND GENERAL ASSURANCE SOCIETY LTD., PROVINCIAL INSURANCE PLC. QBL INSURANCE (UK) LTD., ROYAL INSURANCE CO. LTD., TRINITY INSURANCE CO. LTD., GENERAL ACCIDENT FIRE AND LIFE ASSURANCE CORP. LTD.,

Thus, it is clear that for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that

COOPERATIVE INSURANCE SOCIETY and PEARL ASSURANCE CO. LTD., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 51. YUPANGCO COTTON MILLS. WORLDWIDE SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., respondents. TORRES, JR., J.: Just how far can our courts assert jurisdiction over the persons of foreign entities being charged with contractual liabilities by residents of the Philippines? Appealing from the Court of Appeals' October 11, 1990 Decision 1 in CA-G.R. No. 22005, petitioners claim that the trial court's jurisdiction does not extend to them, since they are foreign reinsurance companies that are not doing business in the Philippines. Having entered into reinsurance contracts abroad, petitioners are beyond the jurisdictional ambit of our courts and cannot be served summons through extraterritorial service, as under Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, nor through the Insurance Commissioner, under Section 14. Private respondent Yupangco Cotton Mills contend on the other hand that petitioners are within our courts' cognitive powers, having submitted voluntarily to their jurisdiction by filing motions to dismiss 2 the private respondent's suit below. The antecedent facts, as found by the appellate court, are as follows: Respondent Yupangco Cotton Mills filed a complaint against several foreign reinsurance companies (among which are petitioners) to collect their alleged percentage liability under contract treaties between the foreign insurance companies and the international insurance broker C.J. Boatright, acting as agent for respondent Worldwide Surety and Insurance Company. Inasmuch as petitioners are not engaged in business in the Philippines with no offices, places of business or agents in the

Philippines, the reinsurance treaties having been entered abroad, service of summons upon motion of respondent Yupangco, was made upon petitioners through the Office of the Insurance Commissioner. Petitioners, by counsel on special appearance, seasonably filed motions to dismiss disputing the jurisdiction of respondent Court and the extra-territorial service of summons. Respondent Yupangco filed its opposition to the motions to dismiss, petitioners filed their reply, and respondent Yupangco filed its rejoinder. In an Order dated April 30, 1990, respondent Court denied the motions to dismiss and directed petitioners to file their answer. On May 29, 1990, petitioners filed their notice of appeal. In an order dated June 4, 1990, respondent court denied due course to the appeal. 3 To this day, trial on the merits of the collection suit has not proceeded as in the present petition, petitioners continue vigorously to dispute the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction over them. It will be remembered that in the plaintiff's complaint, 4 it was contended that on July 6, 1979 and on October 1, 1980. Yupangco Cotton Mills engaged to secure with Worldwide Security and Insurance Co. Inc., several of its properties for the periods July 6, 1979 to July 6, 1980 as under Policy No. 20719 for a coverage of P100,000,000.00 and from October 1, 1980 to October 1, 1981, under Policy No. 25896, also for P100,000,000.00. Both contracts were covered by reinsurance treaties between Worldwide Surety and Insurance and several foreign reinsurance companies, including the petitioners. The reinsurance arrangements had been made through international broker C.J. Boatwright and Co. Ltd., acting as agent of Worldwide Surety and Insurance. As fate would have it, on December 16, 1979 and May 2, 1981, within the respective effectivity periods of Policies 20719 and 25896, the properties therein insured were razed by fire, thereby giving rise to the obligation of the insurer to indemnify the Yupangco Cotton Mills.

Partial payments were made by Worldwide Surety and Insurance and some of the reinsurance companies. On May 2, 1983, Worldwide Surety and Insurance, in a Deed of Assignment, acknowledged a remaining balance of P19,444,447.75 still due Yupangco Cotton Mills, and assigned to the latter all reinsurance proceeds still collectible from all the foreign reinsurance companies. Thus, in its interest as assignee and original insured, Yupangco Cotton Mills instituted this collection suit against the petitioners. Service of summons upon the petitioners was made by notification to the Insurance Commissioner, pursuant to Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. 5 In a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioners submitted that respondent Court has no jurisdiction over them, being all foreign corporations not doing business in the Philippines with no office, place of business or agents in the Philippines. The remedy of Certiorari was resorted to by the petitioners on the premise that if petitioners had filed an answer to the complaint as ordered by the respondent court, they would risk, abandoning the issue of jurisdiction. Moreover, extraterritorial service of summons on petitioners is null and void because the complaint for collection is not one affecting plaintiffs status and not relating to property within the Philippines. The Court of Appeals found the petition devoid of merit, stating that: 1. Petitioners were properly served with summons and whatever defect, if any, in the service of summons were cured by their voluntary appearance in court, via motion to dismiss. 2. Even assuming that petitioners have not yet voluntarily appeared as co-defendants in the case below even after having filed the

motions to dismiss adverted to, still the situation does not deserve dismissal of the complaint as far as they are concerned, since as held by this Court in Lingner Fisher GMBH vs. IAC, 125 SCRA 523; A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. It should be difficult to conceive for example, that when a defendant personally appears before a court complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served on said defendant. 3. Being reinsurers of respondent Worldwide Surety and Insurance of the risk which the latter assumed when it issued the fire insurance policies in dispute in favor of respondent Yupangco, petitioners cannot now validly argue that they do not do business in this country. At the very least, petitioners must be deemed to have engaged in business in the Philippines no matter how isolated or singular such business might be, even on the assumption that among the local domestic insurance corporations of this country, it is only in favor of Worldwide Surety and Insurance that they have ever reinsured any risk arising from any reinsurance within the territory. 4. The issue of whether or not petitioners are doing business in the country is a matter best referred to a trial on the merits of the case, and so should be addressed there. Maintaining its submission that they are beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, petitioners are now before us, stating: Petitioners, being foreign corporations, as found by the trial court, not doing business in the Philippines with no office, place of business or agents in the Philippines, are not subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. The complaint for sum of money being a personal action not affecting status or relating to property, extraterritorial service of summons

on petitioners all not doing business in the Philippines is null and void. The appearance of counsel for petitioners being explicitly "by special appearance without waiving objections to the jurisdiction over their persons or the subject matter" and the motions to dismiss having excluded non-jurisdictional grounds, there is no voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 6 For its part, private respondent Yupangco counter-submits: 1. Foreign corporations, such as petitioners, not doing business in the Philippines, can be sued in Philippine Courts, notwithstanding petitioners' claim to the contrary. 2. While the complaint before the Honorable Trial Court is for a sum of money, not affecting status or relating to property, petitioners (then defendants) can submit themselves voluntarily to the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, even if there is no extrajudicial (sic) service of summons upon them. 3. The voluntary appearance of the petitioners (then defendants) before the Honorable Trial Court amounted, in effect, to voluntary submission to its jurisdiction over their persons. 7 In the decisions of the courts below, there is much left to speculation and conjecture as to whether or not the petitioners were determined to be "doing business in the Philippines" or not. To qualify the petitioners' business of reinsurance within the Philippine forum, resort must be made to the established principles in determining what is meant by "doing business in the Philippines." In Communication Materials and Design, Inc. et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, 8 it was observed that.

There is no exact rule or governing principle as to what constitutes doing or engaging in or transacting business. Indeed, such case must be judged in the light of its peculiar circumstances, upon its peculiar facts and upon the language of the statute applicable. The true test, however, seems to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was organized. Article 44 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 defines the phrase to include: soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totaling one hundred eighty (180) days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines, and any other act or acts that imply a continuity or commercial dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization. The term ordinarily implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of the functions normally incident to and in progressive prosecution of the purpose and object of its organization. 9 A single act or transaction made in the Philippines, however, could qualify a foreign corporation to be doing business in the Philippines, if such singular act is not merely incidental or casual, but indicates the foreign corporation's intention to do business in the Philippines. 10

There is no sufficient basis in the records which would merit the institution of this collection suit in the Philippines. More specifically, there is nothing to substantiate the private respondent's submission that the petitioners had engaged in business activities in this country. This is not an instance where the erroneous service of summons upon the defendant can be cured by the issuance and service of alias summons, as in the absence of showing that petitioners had been doing business in the country, they cannot be summoned to answer for the charges leveled against them. The Court is cognizant of the doctrine in Signetics Corp. vs. Court of Appeals 11 that for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction by way of summons on a defendant foreign corporation, there is no need to prove first the fact that defendant is doing business in the Philippines. The plaintiff only has to allege in the complaint that the defendant has an agent in the Philippines for summons to be validly served thereto, even without prior evidence advancing such factual allegation. As it is, private respondent has made no allegation or demonstration of the existence of petitioners' domestic agent, but avers simply that they are doing business not only abroad but in the Philippines as well. It does not appear at all that the petitioners had performed any act which would give the general public the impression that it had been engaging, or intends to engage in its ordinary and usual business undertakings in the country. The reinsurance treaties between the petitioners and Worldwide Surety and Insurance were made through an international insurance broker, and not through any entity or means remotely connected with the Philippines. Moreover, there is authority to the effect that a reinsurance company is not doing business in a certain state merely because the property or lives which are insured by the original insurer company are located in that state. 12 The reason for this is that a contract of reinsurance

is generally a separate and distinct arrangement from the original contract of insurance, whose contracted risk is insured in the reinsurance agreement. 13 Hence, the original insured has generally no interest in the contract of reinsurance. 14 A foreign corporation, is one which owes its existence to the laws of another state, 15 and generally, has no legal existence within the state in which it is foreign. In Marshall Wells Co. vs. Elser, 16 it was held that corporations have no legal status beyond the bounds of the sovereignty by which they are created. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that foreign corporations are, by reason of state comity, allowed to transact business in other states and to sue in the courts of such fora. In the Philippines foreign corporations are allowed such privileges, subject to certain restrictions, arising from the state's sovereign right of regulation. Before a foreign corporation can transact business in the country, it must first obtain a license to transact business here 17 and secure the proper authorizations under existing law. If a foreign corporation engages in business activities without the necessary requirements, it opens itself to court actions against it, but it shall not be allowed to maintain or intervene in an action, suit or proceeding for its own account in any court or tribunal or agency in the Philippines. 18 The purpose of the law in requiring that foreign corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do so, is to subject the foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines to the jurisdiction of the courts, 19 otherwise, a foreign corporation illegally doing business here because of its refusal or neglect to obtain the required license and authority to do business may successfully though unfairly plead such neglect or illegal act so as to avoid service and thereby impugn the jurisdiction of the local courts.

The same danger does not exist among foreign corporations that are indubitably not doing business in the Philippines. Indeed, if a foreign corporation does not do business here, there would be no reason for it to be subject to the State's regulation. As we observed, in so far as the State is concerned, such foreign corporation has no legal existence. Therefore, to subject such corporation to the courts' jurisdiction would violate the essence of sovereignty. In the alternative, private respondent submits that foreign corporations not doing business in the Philippines are not exempt from suits leveled against them in courts, citing the case of Facilities Management Corporation vs. Leonardo Dela Osa, et. al. 20 where we ruled "that indeed, if a foreign corporation, not engaged in business in the Philippines, is not barred from seeking redress from Courts in the Philippines, a fortiori, that same corporation cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine Courts for acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines." We are not persuaded by the position taken by the private respondent. In Facilities Management case, the principal issue presented was whether the petitioner had been doing business in the Philippines, so that service of summons upon its agent as under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court can be made in order that the Court of First Instance could assume jurisdiction over it. The Court ruled that the petitioner was doing business in the Philippines, and that by serving summons upon its resident agent, the trial court had effectively acquired jurisdiction. In that case, the court made no prescription as the absolute suability of foreign corporations not doing business in the country, but merely discounts the absolute exemption of such foreign corporations from liabilities particularly arising from acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines. As we have found, there is no showing that petitioners had performed any act in the country that would place it within the sphere of the court's jurisdiction. A general allegation

standing alone, that a party is doing business in the Philippines does not make it so. A conclusion of fact or law cannot be derived from the unsubstantiated assertions of parties, notwithstanding the demands of convenience or dispatch in legal actions, otherwise, the Court would be guilty of sorcery; extracting substance out of nothingness. In addition, the assertion that a resident of the Philippines will be inconvenienced by an out-of-town suit against a foreign entity, is irrelevant and unavailing to sustain the continuance of a local action, for jurisdiction is not dependent upon the convenience or inconvenience of a party. 21 It is also argued that having filed a motion to dismiss in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners have thus acquiesced to the court's jurisdiction, and they cannot maintain the contrary at this juncture. This argument is at the most, flimsy. In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. 22 Fundamentally, the service of summons is intended to give official notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against it. The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff as stated in the complaint. 23 The service of summons upon the defendant becomes an important element in the operation of a court's jurisdiction upon a party to a suit, as service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. 24 Without service of summons, or when summons are improperly made, both the trial and the judgment, being in violation of due process, are null and void, 25 unless the defendant waives the service of summons by voluntarily appearing and answering the suit. 26 When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the

jurisdiction of the court. 27 This is not, however, always the case. Admittedly, and without subjecting himself to the court's jurisdiction, the defendant in an action can, by special appearance object to the court's assumption on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. If he so wishes to assert this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. 28 In the case of foreign corporations, it has been held that they may seek relief against the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction by local courts. In Time, Inc. vs. Reyes, 29 it was held that the action of a court in refusing to rule or deferring its ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack or excess of jurisdiction is correctable by a writ of prohibition or certiorari sued out in the appellate court even before trial on the merits is had. The same remedy is available should the motion to dismiss be denied, and the court, over the foreign corporation's objections, threatens to impose its jurisdiction upon the same. If the defendant, besides setting up in a motion to dismiss his objection to the jurisdiction of the court, alleges at the same time any other ground for dismissing the action, or seeks an affirmative relief in the motion, 30 he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In this instance, however, the petitioners from the time they filed their motions to dismiss, their submissions have been consistently and unfailingly to object to the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction, anchored on the fact that they are all foreign corporations not doing business in the Philippines.

constitute an acquiescence to the court's jurisdiction. 31 Thus, it cannot be argued that the petitioners had abandoned their objections to the jurisdiction of the court, as their motions to dismiss in the trial court, and all their subsequent posturings, were all in protest of the private respondent's insistence on holding them to answer a charge in a forum where they believe they are not subject to. Clearly, to continue the proceedings in a case such as those before Us would just "be useless and a waste of time." 32 ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated October 11, 1990, is SET ASIDE and the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 51 is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 86-37932, and all its orders and issuances in connection therewith are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondent court is hereby ORDERED to DESIST from maintaining further proceeding in the case aforestated. SO ORDERED. EN BANC [G.R. No. 110318. August 28, 1996] COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and WARNER BROTHERS, INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO, INC. and DANILO A. PELINDARIO, respondents. DECISION REGALADO, J.:

As we have consistently held, if the appearance of a party in a suit is precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said tribunal over the person of the defendant, then this appearance is not equivalent to service of summons, nor does it

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] promulgated on July 22, 1992 and its resolution[2] of May 10, 1993 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, both of

which sustained the order[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati, Metro Manila, dated November 22, 1988 for the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053 earlier issued per its own order[4] on September 5, 1988 for violation of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended, otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property. The material facts found by respondent appellate court are as follows: Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation for violation of PD No. 49, as amended, and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of the NBI and private researchers made discreet surveillance on various video establishments in Metro Manila including Sunshine Home Video Inc. (Sunshine for brevity), owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with address at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes, Makati, Metro Manila. On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant with the court a quo against Sunshine seeking the seizure, among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films all of which were enumerated in a list attached to the application; and, television sets, video cassettes and/or laser disc recordings equipment and other machines and paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the unlawful exhibition, showing, reproduction, sale, lease or disposition of videograms tapes in the premises above described. In the hearing of the application, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, upon questions by the court a quo, reiterated in substance his averments in his affidavit. His testimony was corroborated by another witness, Mr. Rene C. Baltazar. Atty. Rico V. Domingos deposition was also taken. On the basis of the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Rene C. Baltazar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, Search Warrant No 87-053 for violation of Section 56 of

PD No. 49, as amended, was issued by the court a quo. The search warrant was served at about 1:45 p.m. on December 14, 1987 to Sunshine and/or their representatives. In the course of the search of the premises indicated in the search warrant, the NBI Agents found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or exclusively distributed by private complainants, and machines, equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories all of which were included in the receipt for properties accomplished by the raiding team. Copy of the receipt was furnished and/or tendered to Mr. Danilo A. Pelindario, registered ownerproprietor of Sunshine Home Video. On December 16, 1987, a Return of Search Warrant was filed with the Court. A Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant was filed but was later denied for lack of merit (p. 280, Records). A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed. The court a quo granted the said motion for reconsideration and justified it in this manner: It is undisputed that the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copies (sic), were never presented in the proceedings for the issuance of the search warrants in question. The orders of the Court granting the search warrants and denying the urgent motion to lift order of search warrants were, therefore, issued in error. Consequently, they must be set aside. (p. 13, Appellants Brief)*5+ Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial court granting private respondents motion for reconsideration, thus lifting the search warrant which it had therefore issued, to the Court of Appeals. As stated at the outset, said appeal was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence,

this petition was brought to this Court particularly challenging the validity of respondent courts retroactive application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[6] in dismissing petitioners appeal and upholding the quashal of the search warrant by the trial court. I Inceptively, we shall settle the procedural considerations on the matter of and the challenge to petitioners legal standing in our courts, they being foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines. Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations, petitioners should have such license to be able to maintain an action in Philippine courts. In so challenging petitioners personality to sue, private respondents point to the fact that petitioners are the copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion pictures or films, and also to the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as their attorney-in-fact, as being constitutive of doing business in the Philippines under Section 1(f) (1) and (2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board of Investments. As foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines, Section 133 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies them the right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts in the absence of a license to do business. Consequently, they have no right to ask for the issuance of a search warrant.[7] In refutation, petitioners flatly deny that they are doing business in the Philippines,[8] and contend that private respondents have not adduced evidence to prove that petitioners are doing such business here, as would require them to be licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, other than averments in the quoted portions of petitioners Opposition to Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Search Warrant dated April 28, 1988 and Atty. Rico V. Domingos affidavit of December 14, 1987.

Moreover, an exclusive right to distribute a product or the ownership of such exclusive right does not conclusively prove the act of doing business nor establish the presumption of doing business.[9] The Corporation Code provides: Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the Corporation Code is not a condition precedent to the maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine courts by a foreign corporation. However, under the aforequoted provision, no foreign corporation shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippines, as this phrase is understood under the Corporation Code, unless it shall have the license required by law, and until it complies with the law in transacting business here, it shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in local courts.[10] As thus interpreted, any foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may maintain an action in our courts upon any cause of action, provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the prescribed license but doing business in the Philippines without such license which debars the foreign corporation from access to our courts. In other words, although a foreign corporation is without license to transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow that it has no capacity to bring an action. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in business in the Philippines.[11]

Statutory provisions in many jurisdictions are determinative of what constitutes doing business or transacting business within that forum, in which case said provisions are controlling there. In others where no such definition or qualification is laid down regarding acts or transactions falling within its purview, the question rests primarily on facts and intent. It is thus held that all the combined acts of a foreign corporation in the State must be considered, and every circumstance is material which indicates a purpose on the part of the corporation to engage in some part of its regular business in the State.[12] No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes doing or engaging in or transacting business. Each case must be judged in the light of its own peculiar environmental circumstances.[13] The true tests, however, seem to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another.[14] As a general proposition upon which many authorities agree in principle, subject to such modifications as may be necessary in view of the particular issue or of the terms of the statute involved, it is recognized that a foreign corporation is doing, transacting, engaging in, or carrying on business in the State when, and ordinarily only when, it has entered the State by its agents and is there engaged in carrying on and transacting through them some substantial part of its ordinary or customary business, usually continuous in the sense that it may be distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or occasional transactions and isolated acts.[15] The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts constitute doing or transacting business in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has, however, held that the term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that

extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization.[16] This traditional case law definition has evolved into a statutory definition, having been adopted with some qualifications in various pieces of legislation in our jurisdiction. For instance, Republic Act No. 5455[17] provides: SECTION 1. Definitions and scope of this Act. (1) x x x; and the phrase doing business shall include soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether called liaison offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and inprogressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization. Presidential Decree No. 1789,[18] in Article 65 thereof, defines doing business to include soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether called liaison offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines, and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works,

or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization. The implementing rules and regulations of said presidential decree conclude the enumeration of acts constituting doing business with a catch-all definition, thus: Sec. 1(g). Doing Business shall be any act or combination of acts enumerated in Article 65 of the Code. In particular doing business includes: xxx xxx xxx

commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization: Provided, however, That the phrase doing business shall not be deemed to include mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investors; nor having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such corporation; nor appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its own name and for its own account. Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by such statutory standards, petitioners are not barred from maintaining the present action. There is no showing that, under our statutory or case law, petitioners are doing, transacting, engaging in or carrying on business in the Philippines as would require obtention of a license before they can seek redress from our courts. No evidence has been offered to show that petitioners have performed any of the enumerated acts or any other specific act indicative of an intention to conduct or transact business in the Philippines. Accordingly, the certification issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission[20] stating that its records do not show the registration of petitioner film companies either as corporations or partnerships or that they have been licensed to transact business in the Philippines, while undeniably true, is of no consequence to petitioners right to bring action in the Philippines. Verily, no record of such registration by petitioners can be expected to be found for, as aforestated, said foreign film corporations do not transact or do business in the Philippines and, therefore, do not need to be licensed in order to take recourse to our courts. Although Section 1(g) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Omnibus Investments Code lists, among others

(10) Any other act or acts which imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, or in the progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization. Finally, Republic Act No. 7042[19] embodies such concept in this wise: SEC. 3. Definitions. As used in this Act: xxx xxx xxx

(d) the phrase doing business shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether called liaison offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totalling one hundred eight(y) (180) days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of,

(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts. Concrete and specific solicitations by a foreign firm, or by an agent of such foreign firm, not acting independently of the foreign firm amounting to negotiations or fixing of the terms and conditions of sales or service contracts, regardless of where the contracts are actually reduced to writing, shall constitute doing business even if the enterprise has no office or fixed place of business in the Philippines. The arrangements agreed upon as to manner, time and terms of delivery of the goods or the transfer of title thereto is immaterial. A foreign firm which does business through the middlemen acting in their own names, such as indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants, shall not be deemed doing business in the Philippines. But such indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants shall be the ones deemed to be doing business in the Philippines. (2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is domiciled in the Philippines, unless said representative or distributor has an independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its own account, and not in the name or for the account of a principal. Thus, where a foreign firm is represented in the Philippines by a person or local company which does not act in its name but in the name of the foreign firm, the latter is doing business in the Philippines. as acts constitutive of doing business, the fact that petitioners are admittedly copyright owners or owners of exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines of motion pictures or films does not convert such ownership into an indicium of doing business which would require them to obtain a license before they can sue upon a cause of action in local courts. Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as attorney-in-fact of petitioners, with express authority pursuant to a special power of attorney, inter alia

To lay criminal complaints with the appropriate authorities and to provide evidence in support of both civil and criminal proceedings against any person or persons involved in the criminal infringement of copyright, or concerning the unauthorized importation, duplication, exhibition or distribution of any cinematographic work(s) films or video cassettes of which x x x is the owner of copyright or the owner of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines pursuant to any agreement(s) between x x x and the respective owners of copyright in such cinematographic work(s), to initiate and prosecute on behalf of x x x criminal or civil actions in the Philippines against any person or persons unlawfully distributing, exhibiting, selling or offering for sale any films or video cassettes of which x x x is the owner of copyright or the owner of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines pursuant to any agreement(s) between x x x and the respective owners of copyright in such works.[21] tantamount to doing business in the Philippines. We fail to see how exercising ones legal and property rights and taking steps for the vigilant protection of said rights, particularly the appointment of an attorney-in-fact, can be deemed by and of themselves to be doing business here. As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing business in the State simply because it enters into contracts with residents of the State, where such contracts are consummated outside the State.[22] In fact, a view is taken that a foreign corporation is not doing business in the state merely because sales of its product are made there or other business furthering its interests is transacted there by an alleged agent, whether a corporation or a natural person, where such activities are not under the direction and control of the foreign corporation but are engaged in by the alleged agent as an independent business.[23]

It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State by an independent dealer who has purchased and obtained title from the corporation to the products sold are not a doing of business by the corporation.[24] Likewise, a foreign corporation which sells its products to persons styled distributing agents in the State, for distribution by them, is not doing business in the State so as to render it subject to service of process therein, where the contract with these purchasers is that they shall buy exclusively from the foreign corporation such goods as it manufactures and shall sell them at trade prices established by it.[25] It has moreover been held that the act of a foreign corporation in engaging an attorney to represent it in a Federal court sitting in a particular State is not doing business within the scope of the minimum contact test.[26] With much more reason should this doctrine apply to the mere retainer of Atty. Domingo for legal protection against contingent acts of intellectual piracy. In accordance with the rule that doing business imports only acts in furtherance of the purposes for which a foreign corporation was organized, it is held that the mere institution and prosecution or defense of a suit, particularly if the transaction which is the basis of the suit took place out of the State, do not amount to the doing of business in the State. The institution of a suit or the removal thereof is neither the making of a contract nor the doing of business within a constitutional provision placing foreign corporations licensed to do business in the State under the same regulations, limitations and liabilities with respect to such acts as domestic corporations. Merely engaging in litigation has been considered as not a sufficient minimum contact to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.[27] As a consideration aside, we have perforce to comment on private respondents basis for arguing that petitioners are barred from maintaining suit in the Philippines. For allegedly

being foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines without a license, private respondents repeatedly maintain in all their pleadings that petitioners have thereby no legal personality to bring an action before Philippine courts.[28] Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue[29] and that the complaint states no cause of action.[30] Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims.[31] On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.[32] The term lack of capacity to sue should not be confused with the term lack of personality to sue. While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real partyin-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue;[33] whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.[34] Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the ground available for barring recourse to our courts by an unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting business in the Philippines should properly be lack of capacity to sue, not lack of personality to sue. Certainly, a corporation whose legal rights have been violated is undeniably such, if not the only, real party-in-interest to bring suit thereon although, for failure to comply with the licensing requirement, it is not capacitated to maintain any suit before our courts.

Lastly, on this point, we reiterate this Courts rejection of the common procedural tactics of erring local companies which, when sued by unlicensed foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines, invoke the latters supposed lack of capacity to sue. The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on failure to first acquire a local license is based on considerations of public policy. It was never intended to favor nor insulate from suit unscrupulous establishments or nationals in case of breach of valid obligations or violations of legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or entities simply because they are not licensed to do business in the country.[35] II We now proceed to the main issue of the retroactive application to the present controversy of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., promulgated on August 19, 1988,[36] that for the determination of probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases involving videograms, the production of the master tape for comparison with the allegedly pirated copies is necessary. Petitioners assert that the issuance of a search warrant is addressed to the discretion of the court subject to the determination of probable cause in accordance with the procedure prescribed therefor under Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126. As of the time of the application for the search warrant in question, the controlling criterion for the finding of probable cause was that enunciated in Burgos vs. Chief of Staff[37] stating that: Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

According to petitioners, after complying with what the law then required, the lower court determined that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and which determination in fact led to the issuance and service on December 14, 1987 of Search Warrant No. 87-053. It is further argued that any search warrant so issued in accordance with all applicable legal requirements is valid, for the lower court could not possibly have been expected to apply, as the basis for a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases involving videograms, a pronouncement which was not existent at the time of such determination, on December 14, 1987, that is, the doctrine in the 20th Century Fox case that was promulgated only on August 19, 1988, or over eight months later. Private respondents predictably argue in support of the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the quashal of the search warrant by the lower court on the strength of that 20th Century Fox ruling which, they claim, goes into the very essence of probable cause. At the time of the issuance of the search warrant involved here, although the 20th Century Fox case had not yet been decided, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure embodied the prevailing and governing law on the matter. The ruling in 20th Century Fox was merely an application of the law on probable cause. Hence, they posit that there was no law that was retrospectively applied, since the law had been there all along. To refrain from applying the 20th Century Fox ruling, which had supervened as a doctrine promulgated at the time of the resolution of private respondents motion for reconsideration seeking the quashal of the search warrant for failure of the trial court to require presentation of the master tapes prior to the issuance of the search warrant, would have constituted grave abuse of discretion.[38]

Respondent court upheld the retroactive application of the 20th Century Fox ruling by the trial court in resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration in favor of the quashal of the search warrant, on this renovated thesis: And whether this doctrine should apply retroactively, it must be noted that in the 20th Century Fox case, the lower court quashed the earlier search warrant it issued. On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the quashal on the ground among others that the master tapes or copyrighted films were not presented for comparison with the purchased evidence of the video tapes to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. If the lower court in the Century Fox case did not quash the warrant, it is Our view that the Supreme Court would have invalidated the warrant just the same considering the very strict requirement set by the Supreme Court for the determination of probable cause in copyright infringement cases as enunciated in this 20th Century Fox case. This is so because, as was stated by the Supreme Court in the said case, the master tapes and the pirated tapes must be presented for comparison to satisfy the requirement of probable cause. So it goes back to the very existence of probable cause. x x x[39] Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it is our considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053. Herein petitioners consistent position that the order of the lower court of September 5, 1988 denying therein defendants motion to lift the order of search warrant was properly issued, there having been satisfactory compliance with the then prevailing standards under the law for determination of probable cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence from petitioners in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence, then

existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of probable cause. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Correlatively, Article 8 of the same Code declares that (j)udicial decisions applying the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an independent source of law; it cannot create law.[40] While it is true that judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system of the Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial decisions, though not laws, are nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean, and it is for this reason that they are part of the legal system of the Philippines.[41] Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself.[42] Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code and in light of the above disquisition, this Court emphatically declared in Co vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[43] that the principle of prospectivity applies not only to original amendatory statutes and administrative rulings and circulars, but also, and properly so, to judicial decisions. Our holding in the earlier case of People vs. Jubinal[44] echoes the rationale for this judicial declaration, viz.: Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system. The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that the law was originally passed, since this Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by

numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim legis interpretation legis vim obtinet the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. x x x, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. x x x. (Stress supplied). This was forcefully reiterated in Spouses Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[45] where the Court expounded: x x x. But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. This is expressed in the familiar legal maximum lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]). The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. x x x. The reasoning behind Senarillos vs. Hermosisima[46] that judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect, is all too familiar. Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, and that is precisely the situation obtaining in this case. It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is

adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.[47] To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.[48] There is merit in petitioners impassioned and well-founded argumentation: The case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 164 SCRA 655 (August 19, 1988) (hereinafter 20th Century Fox) was inexistent in December of 1987 when Search Warrant 87-053 was issued by the lower court. Hence, it boggles the imagination how the lower court could be expected to apply the formulation of 20th Century Fox in finding probable cause when the formulation was yet non-existent. xxx xxx xxx

In short, the lower court was convinced at that time after conducting searching examination questions of the applicant and his witnesses that an offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense (were) in the place sought to be searched (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, et al., 133 SCRA 800). It is indisputable, therefore, that at the time of the application, or on December 14, 1987, the lower court did not commit any error nor did it fail to comply with any legal requirement for the valid issuance of search warrant. x x x. (W)e believe that the lower court should be considered as having followed the requirements of the law in issuing Search Warrant No. 87-053. The search warrant is therefore valid and binding. It must be noted that nowhere is it found in the allegations of the Respondents that the lower court failed to apply the law as then interpreted in 1987. Hence, we find it absurd that it is (sic) should be seen otherwise, because it is simply impossible

to have required the lower court to apply a formulation which will only be defined six months later. Furthermore, it is unjust and unfair to require compliance with legal and/or doctrinal requirements which are inexistent at the time they were supposed to have been complied with. xxx xxx xxx

copyright infringement videotapes. Therein it was ruled that

cases

involving

x x x. If the lower courts reversal will be sustained, what encouragement can be given to courts and litigants to respect the law and rules if they can expect with reasonable certainty that upon the passage of a new rule, their conduct can still be open to question? This certainly breeds instability in our system of dispensing justice. For Petitioners who took special effort to redress their grievances and to protect their property rights by resorting to the remedies provided by the law, it is most unfair that fealty to the rules and procedures then obtaining would bear but fruits of injustice.[49] Withal, even the proposition that the prospectivity of judicial decisions imports application thereof not only to future cases but also to cases still ongoing or not yet final when the decision was promulgated, should not be countenanced in the jural sphere on account of its inevitably unsettling repercussions. More to the point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the added requirement in 20th Century Fox calling for the production of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for determination of probable cause in copyright infringement cases needs revisiting and clarification. It will be recalled that the 20th Century Fox case arose from search warrant proceedings in anticipation of the filing of a case for the unauthorized sale or renting out of copyrighted films in videotape format in violation of Presidential Decree No. 49. It revolved around the meaning of probable cause within the context of the constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures, as applied to

The presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioners argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns. The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49. The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. For a closer and more perspicuous appreciation of the factual antecedents of 20th Century Fox, the pertinent portions of the decision therein are quoted hereunder, to wit: In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the

private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Thus the lower court stated in its questioned order dated January 2, 1986: According to the movant, all three witnesses during the proceedings in the application for the three search warrants testified of their own personal knowledge. Yet, Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated that the counsel or representative of the Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will testify on the video cassettes that were pirated, so that he did not have personal knowledge of the alleged piracy. The witness Bacani also said that the video cassettes were pirated without stating the manner it was pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo that has knowledge of that fact. On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the allegedly pirated tapes was from master tapes allegedly belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox, because, according to him it is of his personal knowledge. At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified that when the complaint for infringement was brought to the NBI, the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were shown to him and he made comparisons of the tapes with those purchased by their man Bacani. Why the master tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the Court during the application gives some misgivings as to the truth of that bare statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand. Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude to the filing of criminal cases under P.D. 49, the copyright infringement law, and although what is required for the issuance thereof is merely the presence of probable cause, that probable cause must be

satisfactory to the Court, for it is a timehonored precept that proceedings to put a man to task as an offender under our laws should be interpreted in strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in favor of the alleged offender. xxx xxx xxx

This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of fact it had been enshrined in the Bill of Rights in our 1973 Constitution. So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that master tapes were viewed by the NBI and were compared to the purchased and seized video tapes from the respondents establishments, it should be dismissed as not supported by competent evidence and for that matter the probable cause hovers in that grey debatable twilight zone between black and white resolvable in favor of respondents herein. But the glaring fact is that Cocoon, the first video tape mentioned in the search warrant, was not even duly registered or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C of Opposition, p. 152, record.) So that lacking in the requisite presentation to the Court of an alleged master tape for purposes of comparison with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those seized from respondents, there was no way to determine whether there really was piracy, or copying of the film of the complainant Twentieth Century Fox. xxx xxx xxx

The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found by the court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioners counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search warrants stated that he

had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application (Italics ours). The italicized passages readily expose the reason why the trial court therein required the presentation of the master tapes of the allegedly pirated films in order to convince itself of the existence of probable cause under the factual milieu peculiar to that case. In the case at bar, respondent appellate court itself observed: We feel that the rationale behind the aforequoted doctrine is that the pirated copies as well as the master tapes, unlike the other types of personal properties which may be seized, were available for presentation to the court at the time of the application for a search warrant to determine the existence of the linkage of the copyrighted films with the pirated ones. Thus, there is no reason not to present them (Italics supplied for emphasis).[50] In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of search warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial dicta should always be construed within the factual matrix of their parturition, otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the

vice of overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of undue generalization. In the case at bar, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes who filed the application for search warrant with the lower court following a formal complaint lodged by petitioners, judging from his affidavit[51] and his deposition,[52] did testify on matters within his personal knowledge based on said complaint of petitioners as well as his own investigation and surveillance of the private respondents video rental shop. Likewise, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact, stated in his affidavit[53] and further expounded in his deposition[54] that he personally knew of the fact that private respondents had never been authorized by his clients to reproduce, lease and possess for the purpose of selling any of the copyrighted films. Both testimonies of Agent Reyes and Atty. Domingo were corroborated by Rene C. Baltazar, a private researcher retained by Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc. (MPAA, Inc.), who was likewise presented as a witness during the search warrant proceedings.[55] The records clearly reflect that the testimonies of the abovenamed witnesses were straightforward and stemmed from matters within their personal knowledge. They displayed none of the ambivalence and uncertainty that the witnesses in the 20th Century Fox case exhibited. This categorical forthrightness in their statements, among others, was what initially and correctly convinced the trial court to make a finding of the existence of probable cause. There is no originality in the argument of private respondents against the validity of the search warrant, obviously borrowed from 20th Century Fox, that petitioners witnesses NBI Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo and Rene C. Baltazar did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their respective testimonies and that said witnesses claim that the video tapes were pirated, without stating the manner by which these

were pirated, is a conclusion of fact without basis.[56] The difference, it must be pointed out, is that the records in the present case reveal that (1) there is no allegation of misrepresentation, much less a finding thereof by the lower court, on the part of petitioners witnesses; (2) there is no denial on the part of private respondents that the tapes seized were illegitimate copies of the copyrighted ones nor have they shown that they were given any authority by petitioners to copy, sell, lease, distribute or circulate, or at least, to offer for sale, lease, distribution or circulation the said video tapes; and (3) a discreet but extensive surveillance of the suspected area was undertaken by petitioners witnesses sufficient to enable them to execute trustworthy affidavits and depositions regarding matters discovered in the course thereof and of which they have personal knowledge. It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do, that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause and that, in the absence thereof, there can be no finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the controverted fact is made through demonstrations involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding magistrate.[57] Such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence tending to prove the factum probandum,[58] especially where the production in court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary value.[59] Of course, as a general rule, constitutional and statutory provisions relating to search warrants prohibit their issuance except on a showing of probable cause, supported by oath or

affirmation. These provisions prevent the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact, and emphasize the purpose to protect against all general searches.[60] Indeed, Article III of our Constitution mandates in Sec. 2 thereof that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized; and Sec. 3 thereof provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. These constitutional strictures are implemented by the following provisions of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.

The constitutional and statutory provisions of various jurisdictions requiring a showing of probable cause before a search warrant can be issued are mandatory and must be complied with, and such a showing has been held to be an unqualified condition precedent to the issuance of a warrant. A search warrant not based on probable cause is a nullity, or is void, and the issuance thereof is, in legal contemplation, arbitrary.[61] It behooves us, then, to review the concept of probable cause, firstly, from representative holdings in the American jurisdiction from which we patterned our doctrines on the matter. Although the term probable cause has been said to have a well-defined meaning in the law, the term is exceedingly difficult to define, in this case, with any degree of precision; indeed, no definition of it which would justify the issuance of a search warrant can be formulated which would cover every state of facts which might arise, and no formula or standard, or hard and fast rule, may be laid down which may be applied to the facts of every situation.[62] As to what acts constitute probable cause seem incapable of definition.[63] There is, of necessity, no exact test.[64] At best, the term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged;[65] or the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind acting on all the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the magistrate that the charge made by the applicant for the warrant is true.[66] Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable cause is not concerned with the question of whether the offense charged has been or is being committed in fact, or whether the accused is guilty or innocent, but only

whether the affiant has reasonable grounds for his belief.[67] The requirement is less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility.[68] In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.[69] It being the duty of the issuing officer to issue, or refuse to issue, the warrant as soon as practicable after the application therefor is filed,[70] the facts warranting the conclusion of probable cause must be assessed at the time of such judicial determination by necessarily using legal standards then set forth in law and jurisprudence, and not those that have yet to be crafted thereafter. As already stated, the definition of probable cause enunciated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, et al., supra, vis-a-vis the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126, were the prevailing and controlling legal standards, as they continue to be, by which a finding of probable cause is tested. Since the proprietary of the issuance of a search warrant is to be determined at the time of the application therefor, which in turn must not be too remote in time from the occurrence of the offense alleged to have been committed, the issuing judge, in determining the existence of probable cause, can and should logically look to the touchstones in the laws therefore enacted and the decisions already promulgated at the time, and not to those which had not yet even been conceived or formulated. It is worth noting that neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Court attempt to define probable cause, obviously for the purpose of leaving such matter to the courts discretion within the particular facts of each case. Although the Constitution prohibits the issuance of a search warrant in the absence of probable cause, such constitutional inhibition

does not command the legislature to establish a definition or formula for determining what shall constitute probable cause.[71] Thus, Congress, despite its broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures,[72] does not venture to make such a definition or standard formulation of probable cause, nor categorize what facts and circumstances make up the same, much less limit the determination thereof to and within the circumscription of a particular class of evidence, all in deference to judicial discretion and probity.[73] Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by adding a particular requirement (the presentation of master tapes, as intimated by 20th Century Fox) not provided nor implied in the law for a finding of probable cause is beyond the realm of judicial competence or statemanship. It serves no purpose but to stultify and constrict the judicious exercise of a court's prerogatives and to denigrate the judicial duty of determining the existence of probable cause to a mere ministerial or mechanical function. There is, to repeat, no law or rule which requires that the existence of probable cause is or should be determined solely by a specific kind of evidence. Surely, this could not have been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, and we do not believe that the Court intended the statement in 20th Century Fox regarding master tapes as the dictum for all seasons and reasons in infringement cases. Turning now to the case at bar, it can be gleaned from the records that the lower court followed the prescribed procedure for the issuances of a search warrant: (1) the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, with them particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (2) an examination personally conducted by the judge in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant and witnesses on facts personally known to them;

and, (3) the taking of sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted, which were duly attached to the records. Thereafter, the court a quo made the following factual findings leading to the issuance of the search warrant now subject to this controversy: In the instant case, the following facts have been established: (1) copyrighted video tapes bearing titles enumerated in Search Warrant No. 87-053 were being sold, leased, distributed or circulated, or offered for sale, lease, distribution, or transferred or caused to be transferred by defendants at their video outlets, without the written consent of the private complainants or their assignee; (2) recovered or confiscated from defendants' possession were video tapes containing copyrighted motion picture films without the authority of the complainant; (3) the video tapes originated from spurious or unauthorized persons; and (4) said video tapes were exact reproductions of the films listed in the search warrant whose copyrights or distribution rights were owned by complainants. The basis of these facts are the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, and Rene C. Baltazar. Motion Pictures Association of America, Inc. (MPAA) thru their counsel, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation against certain video establishments one of which is defendant, for violation of PD No. 49 as amended by PD No, 1988. Atty. Lauro C. Reyes led a team to conduct discreet surveillance operations on said video establishments. Per information earlier gathered by Atty. Domingo, defendants were engaged in the illegal sale, rental, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of copyrighted films of MPAA without its written authority or its members. Knowing that defendant Sunshine Home Video and its proprietor, Mr. Danilo Pelindario, were not authorized by MPAA to reproduce, lease, and possess for the purpose of selling any of its copyrighted motion pictures, he instructed his researcher, Mr. Rene Baltazar

to rent two video cassettes from said defendants on October 21, 1987. Rene C. Baltazar proceeded to Sunshine Home Video and rented tapes containing Little Shop of Horror. He was issued rental slip No. 26362 dated October 21, 1987 for P10.00 with a deposit of P100.00. Again, on December 11, 1987, he returned to Sunshine Home Video and rented Robocop with a rental slip No. 25271 also for P10.00. On the basis of the complaint of MPAA thru counsel, Atty. Lauro C. Reyes personally went to Sunshine Home Video at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes Commercial Center, Makati. His last visit was on December 7, 1987. There, he found the video outlet renting, leasing, distributing video cassette tapes whose titles were copyrighted and without the authority of MPAA. Given these facts, a probable cause exists. x x x.[74] The lower court subsequently executed a volteface, despite its prior detailed and substantiated findings, by stating in its order of November 22, 1988 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and quashing the search warrant that x x x. The two (2) cases have a common factual milieu; both involve alleged pirated copyrighted films of private complainants which were found in the possession or control of the defendants. Hence, the necessity of the presentation of the master tapes from which the pirated films were allegedly copied is necessary in the instant case, to establish the existence of probable cause.[75] Being based solely on an unjustifiable and improper retroactive application of the master tape requirement generated by 20th Century Fox upon a factual situation completely different from that in the case at bar, and without anything more, this later order clearly defies elemental fair play and is a gross reversible error. In fact, this observation of the Court in La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez,

et al., supra, may just as easily apply to the present case: A review of the grounds invoked x x x in his motion to quash the search warrants reveals the fact that they are not appropriate for quashing a warrant. They are matters of defense which should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the case. x x x As correctly pointed out by petitioners, a blind espousal of the requisite of presentation of the master tapes in copyright infringement cases, as the prime determinant of probable cause, is too exacting and impracticable a requirement to be complied with in a search warrant application which, it must not be overlooked, is only an ancillary proceeding. Further, on realistic considerations, a strict application of said requirement militates against the elements of secrecy and speed which underlie covert investigative and surveillance operations in police enforcement campaigns against all forms of criminality, considering that the master tapes of a motion picture required to be presented before the court consists of several reels contained in circular steel casings which, because of their bulk, will definitely draw attention, unlike diminutive objects like video tapes which can be easily concealed.[76] With hundreds of titles being pirated, this onerous and tedious imposition would be multiplied a hundredfold by judicial fiat, discouraging and preventing legal recourses in foreign jurisdictions. Given the present international awareness and furor over violations in large scale of intellectual property rights, calling for transnational sanctions, it bears calling to mind the Courts admonition also in La Chemise Lacoste, supra, that x x x. Judges all over the country are well advised to remember that court processes should not be used as instruments to, unwittingly or otherwise, aid counterfeiters and intellectual pirates, tie the hands of the law as it seeks to protect the Filipino consuming public

and frustrate executive and administrative implementation of solemn commitments pursuant to international conventions and treaties. III The amendment of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49 by Presidential Decree No. 1987,[77] which should here be publicized judicially, brought about the revision of its penalty structure and enumerated additional acts considered violative of said decree on intellectual property, namely, (1) directly or indirectly transferring or causing to be transferred any sound recording or motion picture or other audio-visual works so recorded with intent to sell, lease, publicly exhibit or cause to be sold, leased or publicly exhibited, or to use or cause to be used for profit such articles on which sounds, motion pictures, or other audio-visual works are so transferred without the written consent of the owner or his assignee; (2) selling, leasing, distributing, circulating, publicly exhibiting, or offering for sale, lease, distribution, or possessing for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition any of the abovementioned articles, without the written consent of the owner or his assignee; and, (3) directly or indirectly offering or making available for a fee, rental, or any other form of compensation any equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or any material with the knowledge that such equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or material will be used by another to reproduce, without the consent of the owner, any phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article on which sounds, motion pictures or other audio-visual recordings may be transferred, and which provide distinct bases for criminal prosecution, being crimes independently punishable under Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended, aside from the act of infringing or aiding or abetting such infringement under Section 29. The trial courts finding that respondents committed acts in private blatant

transgression of Presidential Decree No. 49 all the more bolsters its findings of probable cause, which determination can be reached even in the absence of master tapes by the judge in the exercise of sound discretion. The executive concern and resolve expressed in the foregoing amendments to the decree for the protection of intellectual property rights should be matched by corresponding judicial vigilance and activism, instead of the apathy of submitting to technicalities in the face of ample evidence of guilt. The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in order to underscore its gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright.[78] A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense that the pirate, in such cases, did not know what works he was indirectly copying, or did not know whether or not he was infringing any copyright; he at least knew that what he was copying was not his, and he copied at his peril. In determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted work is an important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute a piracy.[79] The question of whether there has been an actionable infringement of a literary, musical, or artistic work in motion pictures, radio or television

being one of fact,[80] it should properly be determined during the trial. That is the stage calling for conclusive or preponderating evidence, and not the summary proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant wherein both lower courts erroneously require the master tapes. In disregarding private respondents argument that Search Warrant No. 87-053 is a general warrant, the lower court observed that it was worded in a manner that the enumerated seizable items bear direct relation to the offense of violation of Sec. 56 of PD 49 as amended. It authorized only the seizur(e) of articles used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease and other unconcerted acts in violation of PD 49 as amended. x x x.*81+ On this point, Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc., et al. vs. Ruiz, et al.,[82] instructs and enlightens: A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). x x x. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. x x x. On private respondents averment that the search warrant was made applicable to more than one specific offense on the ground that there are as many offenses of infringement as there are rights protected and, therefore, to issue one search warrant for all the movie titles allegedly pirated violates the rule that a search

warrant must be issued only in connection with one specific offense, the lower court said: x x x. As the face of the search warrant itself indicates, it was issued for violation of Section 56, PD 49 as amended only. The specifications therein (in Annex A) merely refer to the titles of the copyrighted motion pictures/films belonging to private complainants which defendants were in control/possession for sale, lease, distribution or public exhibition in contravention of Sec. 56, PD 49 as amended.[83] That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search warrant uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated video tapes is not to be confused with the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-offense rule. It is pointless for private respondents to insist on compliance with the registration and deposit requirements under Presidential Decree No. 49 as prerequisites for invoking the courts protective mantle in copyright infringement cases. As explained by the court below: Defendants-movants contend that PD 49 as amended covers only producers who have complied with the requirements of deposit and notice (in other words registration) under Sections 49 and 50 thereof. Absent such registration, as in this case, there was no right created, hence, no infringement under PD 49 as amended. This is not well-taken. As correctly pointed out by private complainants-oppositors, the Department of Justice has resolved this legal question as far back as December 12, 1978 in its Opinion No. 191 of the then Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos which stated that Sections 26 and 50 do not apply to cinematographic works and PD No. 49 had done away with the registration and deposit of cinematographic works and that even without prior registration and deposit of a work which may be entitled to protection

under the Decree, the creator can file action for infringement of its rights. He cannot demand, however, payment of damages arising from infringement. The same opinion stressed that the requirements of registration and deposit are thus retained under the Decree, not as conditions for the acquisition of copyright and other rights, but as prerequisites to a suit for damages. The statutory interpretation of the Executive Branch being correct, is entitled (to) weight and respect. xxx xxx xxx

The reason for this is expressed in Section 2 of the decree which prefaces its enumeration of copyrightable works with the explicit statement that the rights granted under this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with respect to any of the following classes of works. This means that under the present state of the law, the copyright for a work is acquired by an intellectual creator from the moment of creation even in the absence of registration and deposit. As has been authoritatively clarified: The registration and deposit of two complete copies or reproductions of the work with the National Library within three weeks after the first public dissemination or performance of the work, as provided for in Section 26 (P.D. No. 49, as amended), is not for the purpose of securing a copyright of the work, but rather to avoid the penalty for non-compliance of the deposit of said two copies and in order to recover damages in an infringement suit.[86] One distressing observation. This case has been fought on the basis of, and its resolution long delayed by resort to, technicalities to a virtually abusive extent by private respondents, without so much as an attempt to adduce any credible evidence showing that they conduct their business legitimately and fairly. The fact that private respondents could not show proof of their authority or that there was consent from the copyright owners for them to sell, lease, distribute or circulate petitioners copyrighted films immeasurably bolsters the lower courts initial finding of probable cause. That private respondents are licensed by the Videogram Regulatory Board does not insulate them from criminal and civil liability for their unlawful business practices. What is more deplorable is that the reprehensible acts of some unscrupulous characters have stigmatized the Philippines with an unsavory reputation as a hub for intellectual piracy in this part of the globe, formerly in the records of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and, now, of the World Trade Organization. Such acts must

Defendants-movants maintain that complainant and his witnesses led the Court to believe that a crime existed when in fact there was none. This is wrong. As earlier discussed, PD 49 as amended, does not require registration and deposit for a creator to be able to file an action for infringement of his rights. These conditions are merely pre-requisites to an action for damages. So, as long as the proscribed acts are shown to exist, an action for infringement may be initiated.[84] Accordingly, the certifications[85] from the Copyright Section of the National Library, presented as evidence by private respondents to show non-registration of some of the films of petitioners, assume no evidentiary weight or significance, whatsoever. Furthermore, a closer review of Presidential Decree No. 49 reveals that even with respect to works which are required under Section 26 thereof to be registered and with copies to be deposited with the National Library, such as books, including composite and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories and gazetteers; and periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers; lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery; and letters, the failure to comply with said requirements does not deprive the copyright owner of the right to sue for infringement. Such non-compliance merely limits the remedies available to him and subjects him to the corresponding sanction.

not be glossed over but should be denounced and repressed lest the Philippines become an international pariah in the global intellectual community. WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, and necessarily inclusive of the order of the lower court dated November 22, 1988, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the court a quo of September 5, 1988 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-053 is hereby REINSTATED, and said court is DIRECTED to take and expeditiously proceed with such appropriate proceedings as may be called for in this case. Treble costs are further assessed against private respondents. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

HON. A. MELENCIO-HERRERA, Presiding Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance, Branch XVII, respondents.

No. L-34382.

Zapa Law Office for petitioner.

Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Office for respondents. No. L-34383. Zapa Law Office for petitioner. Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito & Misa Law office for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Manila FIRST DIVISION Questioned in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are the decisions of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, dismissing the complaints in Civil Case No. 71923 and in Civil Case No. 71694, on the ground that plaintiff therein, now appellant, had failed to prove its capacity to sue. There is no dispute over the facts of these cases for recovery of maritime damages. In L-34382, the facts are found in the decision of the respondent court which stated: On or about January 13, 1967, S. Kajita & Co., on behalf of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation, shipped on board the SS "Eastern Jupiter' from Osaka, Japan, 2,361 coils of "Black Hot Rolled Copper Wire Rods." The said VESSEL is owned and operated by defendant Eastern Shipping Lines (CARRIER). The shipment was covered by Bill of Lading No. O-MA-9, with arrival notice to Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation of the Philippines (CONSIGNEE) at Manila. The shipment was

G.R. No. L-34382

July 20, 1983

THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES and/or ANGEL JOSE TRANSPORTATION, INC. and HON. A. MELENCIO-HERRERA, Presiding Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance, Branch XVII, respondents. G.R. No. L-34383 July 20, 1983

THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. N. V. NEDLLOYD LIJNEN; COLUMBIAN PHILIPPINES, INC., and/or GUACODS, INC., and

insured with plaintiff against all risks in the amount of P1,580,105.06 under its Insurance Policy No. AS-73633. xxx xxx xxx The coils discharged from the VESSEL numbered 2,361, of which 53 were in bad order. What the CONSIGNEE ultimately received at its warehouse was the same number of 2,361 coils with 73 coils loose and partly cut, and 28 coils entangled, partly cut, and which had to be considered as scrap. Upon weighing at CONSIGNEE's warehouse, the 2,361 coils were found to weight 263,940.85 kilos as against its invoiced weight of 264,534.00 kilos or a net loss/shortage of 593.15 kilos, according to Exhibit "A", or 1,209,56 lbs., according to the claims presented by the consignee against the plaintiff (Exhibit "D-1"), the CARRIER (Exhibit "J1"), and the TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (Exhibit "K- l"). For the loss/damage suffered by the cargo, plaintiff paid the consignee under its insurance policy the amount of P3,260.44, by virtue of which plaintiff became subrogated to the rights and actions of the CONSIGNEE. Plaintiff made demands for payment against the CARRIER and the TRANSPORTATION COMPANY for reimbursement of the aforesaid amount but each refused to pay the same. ... The facts of L-34383 are found in the decision of the lower court as follows: On or about December 22, 1966, the Hansa Transport Kontor shipped from Bremen, Germany, 30 packages of Service Parts of Farm Equipment and Implements on board the VESSEL, SS "NEDER RIJN" owned by the defendant, N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen, and represented in the Philippines by its local agent, the defendant Columbian Philippines, Inc. (CARRIER). The shipment was covered by Bill of Lading No. 22 for transportation to, and delivery at, Manila, in favor of the consignee, international Harvester Macleod, Inc. (CONSIGNEE). The shipment was insured with

plaintiff company under its Cargo Policy No. AS73735 "with average terms" for P98,567.79. xxx xxx xxx

The packages discharged from the VESSEL numbered 29, of which seven packages were found to be in bad order. What the CONSIGNEE ultimately received at its warehouse was the same number of 29 packages with 9 packages in bad order. Out of these 9 packages, 1 package was accepted by the CONSIGNEE in good order due to the negligible damages sustained. Upon inspection at the consignee's warehouse, the contents of 3 out of the 8 cases were also found to be complete and intact, leaving 5 cases in bad order. The contents of these 5 packages showed several items missing in the total amount of $131.14; while the contents of the undelivered 1 package were valued at $394.66, or a total of $525.80 or P2,426.98. For the short-delivery of 1 package and the missing items in 5 other packages, plaintiff paid the CONSIGNEE under its Insurance Cargo Policy the amount of P2,426.98, by virtue of which plaintiff became subrogated to the rights and actions of the CONSIGNEE. Demands were made on defendants CARRIER and CONSIGNEE for reimbursement thereof but they failed and refused to pay the same. In both cases, the petitioner-appellant made the following averment regarding its capacity to sue: The plaintiff is a foreign insurance company duly authorized to do business in the Philippines through its agent, Mr. VICTOR H. BELLO, of legal age and with office address at Oledan Building, Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. In L-34382, the respondent-appellee Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., filed its answer and alleged that it: Denies the allegations of Paragraph I which refer to plaintiff's capacity to sue for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.

Respondent-appellee, Angel Jose Transportation, Inc., in turn filed its answer admitting the allegations of the complaint, regarding the capacity of plaintiff-appellant. The pertinent paragraph of this answer reads as follows: Angel Jose Admits the jurisdictional averments in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the heading Parties. In L-34383, the respondents-appellees N. V. Nedlloyd Lijhen, Columbian Philippines, Inc. and Guacods, Inc., filed their answers. They denied the petitioner-appellant's capacity to sue for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof. As earlier stated, the respondent court dismissed the complaints in the two cases on the same ground, that the plaintiff failed to prove its capacity to sue. The court reasoned as follows: In the opinion of the Court, if plaintiff had the capacity to sue, the Court should hold that a) defendant Eastern Shipping Lines should pay plaintiff the sum of P1,630.22 with interest at the legal rate from January 5, 1968, the date of the institution of the Complaint, until fully paid; b) defendant Angel Jose Transportation, Inc. should pay plaintiff the sum of P1,630.22 also with interest at the legal rate from January 5, 1968 until fully paid; c) the counterclaim of defendant Angel Jose transportation, Inc. should be ordered dismissed; and d) each defendant to pay one-half of the costs. The Court is of the opinion that Section 68 of the Corporation Law reflects a policy designed to protect the public interest. Hence, although defendants have not raised the question of plaintiff's compliance with that provision of law, the Court has resolved to take the matter into account. A suing foreign corporation, like plaintiff, has to plead affirmatively and prove either that the transaction upon which it bases its complaint is an isolated one, or that it is licensed to transact

business in this country, failing which, it will be deemed that it has no valid cause of action (Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc., 17 SCRA 1037). In view of the number of cases filed by plaintiff before this Court, of which judicial cognizance can be taken, and under the ruling in Far East International Import and Export Corporation vs. Hankai Koayo Co., 6 SCRA 725, it has to be held that plaintiff is doing business in the Philippines. Consequently, it must have a license under Section 68 of the Corporation Law before it can be allowed to sue. The situation of plaintiff under said Section 68 has been described as follows in Civil Case No. 71923 of this Court, entitled 'Home Insurance Co. vs. N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen, of which judicial cognizance can also be taken: Exhibit "R",presented by plaintiff is a certified copy of a license, dated July 1, 1967, issued by the Office of the Insurance Commissioner authorizing plaintiff to transact insurance business in this country. By virtue of Section 176 of the Insurance Law, it has to be presumed that a license to transact business under Section 68 of the Corporation Law had previously been issued to plaintiff. No copy thereof, however, was submitted for a reason unknown. The date of that license must not have been much anterior to July 1, 1967. The preponderance of the evidence would therefore call for the finding that the insurance contract involved in this case, which was executed at Makati, Rizal, on February 8, 1967, was contracted before plaintiff was licensed to transact business in the Philippines. This Court views Section 68 of the Corporation Law as reflective of a basic public policy. Hence, it is of the opinion that, in the eyes of Philippine law, the insurance contract involved in this case must be held void under the provisions of Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code, and could not be validated by subsequent procurement of the license. That view of the Court finds support in the following citation:

According to many authorities, a constitutional or statutory prohibition against a foreign corporation doing business in the state, unless such corporation has complied with conditions prescribed, is effective to make the contracts of such corporation void, or at least unenforceable, and prevents the maintenance by the corporation of any action on such contracts. Although the usual construction is to the contrary, and to the effect that only the remedy for enforcement is affected thereby, a statute prohibiting a non-complying corporation from suing in the state courts on any contract has been held by some courts to render the contract void and unenforceable by the corporation, even after its has complied with the statute." (36 Am. Jur. 2d 299-300). xxx xxx xxx The said Civil Case No. 71923 was dismissed by this Court. As the insurance contract involved herein was executed on January 20, 1967, the instant case should also be dismissed. We resolved to consolidate the two cases when we gave due course to the petition. The petitioner raised the following assignments of errors: First Assignment of Error THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS AN ISSUE THE LEGAL EXISTENCE OR CAPACITY OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT. Second Assignment of Error THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NO CAPACITY TO SUE. On the basis of factual and equitable considerations, there is no question that the private respondents should pay the obligations found by the trial court as owing to the petitioner. Only the question of validity of the

contracts in relation to lack of capacity to sue stands in the way of the petitioner being given the affirmative relief it seeks. Whether or not the petitioner was engaged in single acts or solitary transactions and not engaged in business is likewise not in issue. The petitioner was engaged in business without a license. The private respondents' obligation to pay under the terms of the contracts has been proved. When the complaints in these two cases were filed, the petitioner had already secured the necessary license to conduct its insurance business in the Philippines. It could already filed suits. Petitioner was, therefore, telling the truth when it averred in its complaints that it was a foreign insurance company duly authorized to do business in the Philippines through its agent Mr. Victor H. Bello. However, when the insurance contracts which formed the basis of these cases were executed, the petitioner had not yet secured the necessary licenses and authority. The lower court, therefore, declared that pursuant to the basic public policy reflected in the Corporation Law, the insurance contracts executed before a license was secured must be held null and void. The court ruled that the contracts could not be validated by the subsequent procurement of the license. The applicable provisions of the old Corporation Law, Act 1459, as amended are: Sec. 68. No foreign corporation or corporations formed, organized, or existing under any laws other than those of the Philippine Islands shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippine Islands until after it shall have obtained a license for that purpose from the chief of the Mercantile Register of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, (Now Securities and Exchange Commission. See RA 5455) upon order of the Secretary of Finance (Now Monetary Board) in case of banks, savings, and loan banks, trust corporations, and banking institutions of all kinds, and upon order of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications

(Now Secretary of Trade. See 5455, section 4 for other requirements) in case of all other foreign corporations. ... xxx xxx xxx Sec. 69. No foreign corporation or corporation formed, organized, or existing under any laws other than those of the Philippine Islands shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippine Islands or maintain by itself or assignee any suit for the recovery of any debt, claim, or demand whatever, unless it shall have the license prescribed in the section immediately preceding. Any officer, director, or agent of the corporation or any person transacting business for any foreign corporation not having the license prescribed shag be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than two years or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by both such imprisonment and fine, in the discretion of the court. As early as 1924, this Court ruled in the leading case of Marshall Wells Co. v. Henry W. Elser & Co. (46 Phil. 70) that the object of Sections 68 and 69 of the Corporation Law was to subject the foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines to the jurisdiction of our courts. The Marshall Wells Co. decision referred to a litigation over an isolated act for the unpaid balance on a bill of goods but the philosophy behind the law applies to the factual circumstances of these cases. The Court stated: xxx xxx xxx Defendant isolates a portion of one sentence of section 69 of the Corporation Law and asks the court to give it a literal meaning Counsel would have the law read thus: "No foreign corporation shall be permitted to maintain by itself or assignee any suit for the recovery of any debt, claim, or demand whatever, unless it shall have the license prescribed in section 68 of the law." Plaintiff, on the contrary, desires for the court to consider the particular point under

discussion with reference to all the law, and thereafter to give the law a common sense interpretation. The object of the statute was to subject the foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines to the jurisdiction of its courts. The object of the statute was not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single acts, but to prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local courts. The implication of the law is that it was never the purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines, from securing redress in the Philippine courts, and thus, in effect, to permit persons to avoid their contracts made with such foreign corporations. The effect of the statute preventing foreign corporations from doing business and from bringing actions in the local courts, except on compliance with elaborate requirements, must not be unduly extended or improperly applied. It should not be construed to extend beyond the plain meaning of its terms, considered in connection with its object, and in connection with the spirit of the entire law. (State vs. American Book Co. [1904], 69 Kan, 1; American De Forest Wireless Telegraph Co. vs. Superior Court of City & Country of San Francisco and Hebbard [1908], 153 Cal., 533; 5 Thompson on Corporations, 2d ed., chap. 184.) Confronted with the option of giving to the Corporation Law a harsh interpretation, which would disastrously embarrass trade, or of giving to the law a reasonable interpretation, which would markedly help in the development of trade; confronted with the option of barring from the courts foreign litigants with good causes of action or of assuming jurisdiction of their cases; confronted with the option of construing the law to mean that any corporation in the United States, which might want to sell to a person in the Philippines must send some representative to the Islands before the sale, and go through the complicated

formulae provided by the Corporation Law with regard to the obtaining of the license, before the sale was made, in order to avoid being swindled by Philippine citizens, or of construing the law to mean that no foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines can maintain any suit until it shall possess the necessary license;-confronted with these options, can anyone doubt what our decision will be? The law simply means that no foreign corporation shall be permitted "to transact business in the Philippine Islands," as this phrase is known in corporation law, unless it shall have the license required by law, and, until it complies with the law, shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in the local courts. A contrary holding would bring the law to the verge of unconstitutionality, a result which should be and can be easily avoided. (Sioux Remedy Co. vs. Cope and Cope, supra; Perkins, Philippine Business Law, p. 264.) To repeat, the objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among countries. The objectives enunciated in the 1924 decision are even more relevant today when we view commercial relations in terms of a world economy, when the tendency is to re-examine the political boundaries separating one nation from another insofar as they define business requirements or restrict marketing conditions. We distinguish between the denial of a right to take remedial action and the penal sanction for non-registration. Insofar as transacting business without a license is concerned, Section 69 of the Corporation Law imposed a penal sanction-imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than two years or payment of a fine not less than P200.00 nor more than P1,000.00 or both in the discretion

of the court. There is a penalty for transacting business without registration. And insofar as litigation is concerned, the foreign corporation or its assignee may not maintain any suit for the recovery of any debt, claim, or demand whatever. The Corporation Law is silent on whether or not the contract executed by a foreign corporation with no capacity to sue is null and void ab initio. We are not unaware of the conflicting schools of thought both here and abroad which are divided on whether such contracts are void or merely voidable. Professor Sulpicio Guevarra in his book Corporation Law (Philippine Jurisprudence Series, U.P. Law Center, pp. 233234) cites an Illinois decision which holds the contracts void and a Michigan statute and decision declaring them merely voidable: xxx xxx xxx Where a contract which is entered into by a foreign corporation without complying with the local requirements of doing business is rendered void either by the express terms of a statute or by statutory construction, a subsequent compliance with the statute by the corporation will not enable it to maintain an action on the contract. (Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Clinton Const. Co., 295 P. 1 [1930]. See also Diamond Glue Co. v. U.S. Glue Co., supra see note 18.) But where the statute merely prohibits the maintenance of a suit on such contract (without expressly declaring the contract "void"), it was held that a failure to comply with the statute rendered the contract voidable and not void, and compliance at any time before suit was sufficient. (Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Clinton Const. Co., supra.) Notwithstanding the above decision, the Illinois statute provides, among other things that a foreign corporation that fails to comply with the conditions of doing business in that state cannot maintain a suit or action, etc. The court said: 'The contract upon which this suit was brought, having been entered into in this state when appellant was not permitted to transact

business in this state, is in violation of the plain provisions of the statute, and is therefore null and void, and no action can be maintained thereon at any time, even if the corporation shall, at some time after the making of the contract, qualify itself to transact business in this state by a compliance with our laws in reference to foreign corporations that desire to engage in business here. (United Lead Co. v. J.M. Ready Elevator Mfg. Co., 222 Ill. 199, 73 N.N. 567 [1906].) A Michigan statute provides: "No foreign corporation subject to the provisions of this Act, shall maintain any action in this state upon any contract made by it in this state after the taking effect of this Act, until it shall have fully complied with the requirement of this Act, and procured a certificate to that effect from the Secretary of State," It was held that the above statute does not render contracts of a foreign corporation that fails to comply with the statute void, but they may be enforced only after compliance therewith. (Hastings Industrial Co. v. Moral, 143 Mich. 679,107 N.E. 706 [1906]; Kuennan v. U.S. Fidelity & G. Co., Mich. 122; 123 N.W. 799 [1909]; Despres, Bridges & Noel v. Zierleyn, 163 Mich. 399, 128 N.W. 769 [1910]). It has also been held that where the law provided that a corporation which has not complied with the statutory requirements "shall not maintain an action until such compliance". "At the commencement of this action the plaintiff had not filed the certified copy with the country clerk of Madera County, but it did file with the officer several months before the defendant filed his amended answer, setting up this defense, as that at the time this defense was pleaded by the defendant the plaintiff had complied with the statute. The defense pleaded by the defendant was therefore unavailable to him to prevent the plaintiff from thereafter maintaining the action. Section 299 does not declare that the plaintiff shall not commence an action in any county unless it has filed a certified copy in the office of the county clerk, but merely declares that it shall not maintain an

action until it has filled it. To maintain an action is not the same as to commence an action, but implies that the action has already been commenced." (See also Kendrick & Roberts Inc. v. Warren Bros. Co., 110 Md. 47, 72 A. 461 [1909]). In another case, the court said: "The very fact that the prohibition against maintaining an action in the courts of the state was inserted in the statute ought to be conclusive proof that the legislature did not intend or understand that contracts made without compliance with the law were void. The statute does not fix any time within which foreign corporations shall comply with the Act. If such contracts were void, no suits could be prosecuted on them in any court. ... The primary purpose of our statute is to compel a foreign corporation desiring to do business within the state to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. The statute was not intended to exclude foreign corporations from the state. It does not, in terms, render invalid contracts made in this state by non-complying corporations. The better reason, the wiser and fairer policy, and the greater weight lie with those decisions which hold that where, as here, there is a prohibition with a penalty, with no express or implied declarations respecting the validity of enforceability of contracts made by qualified foreign corporations, the contracts ... are enforceable ... upon compliance with the law." (Peter & Burghard Stone Co. v. Carper, 172 N.E. 319 [1930].) Our jurisprudence leans towards the later view. Apart from the objectives earlier cited from Marshall Wells Co. v. Henry W. Elser & Co (supra), it has long been the rule that a foreign corporation actually doing business in the Philippines without license to do so may be sued in our courts. The defendant American corporation in General Corporation of the Philippines v. Union Insurance Society of Canton Ltd et al. (87 Phil. 313) entered into insurance contracts without the necessary license or authority. When summons was served on the

agent, the defendant had not yet been registered and authorized to do business. The registration and authority came a little less than two months later. This Court ruled: Counsel for appellant contends that at the time of the service of summons, the appellant had not yet been authorized to do business. But, as already stated, section 14, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court makes no distinction as to corporations with or without authority to do business in the Philippines. The test is whether a foreign corporation was actually doing business here. Otherwise, a foreign corporation illegally doing business here because of its refusal or neglect to obtain the corresponding license and authority to do business may successfully though unfairly plead such neglect or illegal act so as to avoid service and thereby impugn the jurisdiction of the local courts. It would indeed be anomalous and quite prejudicial, even disastrous, to the citizens in this jurisdiction who in all good faith and in the regular course of business accept and pay for shipments of goods from America, relying for their protection on duly executed foreign marine insurance policies made payable in Manila and duly endorsed and delivered to them, that when they go to court to enforce said policies, the insurer who all along has been engaging in this business of issuing similar marine policies, serenely pleads immunity to local jurisdiction because of its refusal or neglect to obtain the corresponding license to do business here thereby compelling the consignees or purchasers of the goods insured to go to America and sue in its courts for redress. There is no question that the contracts are enforceable. The requirement of registration affects only the remedy. Significantly, Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, the Corporation Code of the Philippines has corrected the ambiguity caused by the wording of Section 69 of the old Corporation Law. Section 133 of the present Corporation Code provides:

SEC. 133. Doing business without a license.-No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shag be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency in the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. The old Section 69 has been reworded in terms of non-access to courts and administrative agencies in order to maintain or intervene in any action or proceeding. The prohibition against doing business without first securing a license is now given penal sanction which is also applicable to other violations of the Corporation Code under the general provisions of Section 144 of the Code. It is, therefore, not necessary to declare the contract nun and void even as against the erring foreign corporation. The penal sanction for the violation and the denial of access to our courts and administrative bodies are sufficient from the viewpoint of legislative policy. Our ruling that the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contracts was cured by the subsequent registration is also strengthened by the procedural aspects of these cases. The petitioner averred in its complaints that it is a foreign insurance company, that it is authorized to do business in the Philippines, that its agent is Mr. Victor H. Bello, and that its office address is the Oledan Building at Ayala Avenue, Makati. These are all the averments required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner sufficiently alleged its capacity to sue. The private respondents countered either with an admission of the plaintiff's jurisdictional averments or with a general denial based on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averments.

We find the general denials inadequate to attack the foreign corporations lack of capacity to sue in the light of its positive averment that it is authorized to do so. Section 4, Rule 8 requires that "a party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity shall do so by specific denial, which shag include such supporting particulars as are particularly within the pleader's knowledge. At the very least, the private respondents should have stated particulars in their answers upon which a specific denial of the petitioner's capacity to sue could have been based or which could have supported its denial for lack of knowledge. And yet, even if the plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue was not properly raised as an issue by the answers, the petitioner introduced documentary evidence that it had the authority to engage in the insurance business at the time it filed the complaints. WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby granted. The decisions of the respondent court are reversed and set aside. In L-34382, respondent Eastern Shipping Lines is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P1,630.22 with interest at the legal rate from January 5, 1968 until fully paid and respondent Angel Jose Transportation Inc. is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P1,630.22 also with interest at the legal rate from January 5, 1968 until fully paid. Each respondent shall pay onehalf of the costs. The counterclaim of Angel Jose Transportation Inc. is dismissed. In L-34383, respondent N. V. Nedlloyd Lijnen, or its agent Columbian Phil. Inc. is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P2,426.98 with interest at the legal rate from February 1, 1968 until fully paid, the sum of P500.00 attorney's fees, and costs, The complaint against Guacods, Inc. is dismissed. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173463

October 13, 2010

GLOBAL BUSINESS HOLDINGS, INC. (formerly Global Business Bank, Inc.), Petitioner, vs. SURECOMP SOFTWARE, B.V., Respondent. DECISION NACHURA, J.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated May 5, 2006 and the Resolution2 dated July 10, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75524. The facts of the case are as follows: On March 29, 1999, respondent Surecomp Software, B.V. (Surecomp), a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Netherlands, entered into a software license agreement with Asian Bank Corporation (ABC), a domestic corporation, for the use of its IMEX Software System (System) in the banks computer system for a period of twenty (20) years. In July 2000, ABC merged with petitioner Global Business Holdings, Inc. (Global),4 with Global as the surviving corporation. When Global took over the operations of ABC, it found the System unworkable for its operations, and informed Surecomp of its decision to discontinue with the agreement and to stop further payments thereon. Consequently, for failure of Global to pay its obligations under the agreement despite demands, Surecomp filed a complaint for

breach of contract with damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1278.5 In its complaint, Surecomp alleged that it is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines and is suing on an isolated transaction. Pursuant to the agreement, it installed the System in ABCs computers for a consideration of US$298,000.00 as license fee. ABC also undertook to pay Surecomp professional services, which included on-site support and development of interfaces, and annual maintenance fees for five (5) subsequent anniversaries, and committed to purchase one (1) or two (2) Remote Access solutions at discounted prices. In a separate transaction, ABC requested Surecomp to purchase on its behalf a software called MF Cobol Runtime with a promise to reimburse its cost. Notwithstanding the delivery of the product and the services provided, Global failed to pay and comply with its obligations under the agreement. Thus, Surecomp demanded payment of actual damages amounting to US$319,955.00 and an additional amount of US$227,610.00 for Globals unilateral pretermination of the agreement, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.6 Instead of filing an answer, Global filed a motion to dismiss based on two grounds: (1) that Surecomp had no capacity to sue because it was doing business in the Philippines without a license; and (2) that the claim on which the action was founded was unenforceable under the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.7 On the first ground, Global argued that the contract entered into was not an isolated transaction since the contract was for a period of 20 years. Furthermore, Global stressed that it could not be held accountable for any breach as the agreement was entered into between Surecomp and ABC. It had not, in any manner, taken part in the negotiation and execution of the agreement but merely took over the operations of ABC as a result of the merger. On

the second ground, Global averred that the agreement, being a technology transfer arrangement, failed to comply with Sections 87 and 88 of the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.8 In the interim, Global filed a motion for leave to serve written interrogatories to Surecomp in preparation for the hearing on the motion to dismiss, attaching thereto its written interrogatories. After an exchange of pleadings on the motions filed by Global, on June 18, 2002, the RTC issued an Order,9 the pertinent portions of which read: After a thorough and careful deliberation of the respective arguments advanced by the parties in support of their positions in these two (2) incidents, and since it cannot be denied that there is indeed a contract entered into between the plaintiff [Surecomp] and the defendant [Global], the latter as a successor in interest of the merging corporation Asian Bank, defendant *Global+ is estopped from denying plaintiffs *Surecomps+ capacity to sue it for alleged breach of that contract with damages. Its argument that it was not the one who actually contracted with the plaintiff [Surecomp] as it was the merging Asian Bank which did, is of no moment as it does not relieve defendant Global Bank of its contractual obligation under the Agreement on account of its undertaking under it: "x x x shall be responsible for all the liabilities and obligations of ASIANBANK in the same manner as if the Merged Bank had itself incurred such liabilities or obligations, and any pending claim, action or proceeding brought by or against ASIANBANK may be prosecuted by or against the Merged Bank. The right of creditors or liens upon the property of ASIANBANK shall not be impaired by the merger; provided that the Merged Bank shall have the right to exercise all defenses, rights, privileges, set-offs and counter-claims of every kind and nature which

ASIANBANK may have, or with the Merged Bank may invoke under existing laws." It appearing however that the second ground relied upon by the defendant [Global], i.e., that the cause of action of the plaintiff is anchored on an unenforceable contract under the provision of the Intellectual Property Code, will require a hearing before the motion to dismiss can be resolved and considering the established jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, that availment of mode of discovery by any of the parties to a litigation, shall be liberally construed to the end that the truth of the controversy on hand, shall be ascertained at a less expense with the concomitant facility and expeditiousness, the motion to serve written interrogatories upon the plaintiff [Surecomp] filed by the defendant [Global] is GRANTED insofar as the alleged unenforceability of the subject contract is concerned. Accordingly, the latter is directed to serve the written interrogatories upon the plaintiff [Surecomp], which is required to act on it in accordance with the pertinent rule on the matter. Necessarily, the resolution of the motion to dismiss is held in abeyance until after a hearing on it is property conducted, relative to the second ground aforementioned. SO ORDERED. Surecomp moved for partial reconsideration, praying for an outright denial of the motion to dismiss, while Global filed a motion for reconsideration. On November 27, 2002, the RTC issued an Order,12 the fallo of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated 18 June 2002 is modified. Defendants *Globals+ Motion to Dismiss dated 17 October 2001 is denied on the two grounds therein alleged. Defendant [Global] is given five (5) days from receipt of this Order within which to file its Answer.

The resolution of defendants *Globals+ Motion to Serve Written Interrogatories is held in abeyance pending the filing of the Answer. SO ORDERED.13 In partially modifying the first assailed Order, the RTC ratiocinated, viz.: This court sees no reason to further belabor the issue on plaintiffs capacity to sue since there is a prima facie showing that defendant entered into a contract with defendant and having done so, willingly, it cannot now be made to raise the issue of capacity to sue [Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. v. CA, 211 SCRA 824]. That defendant was not aware of plaintiffs lack of capacity to sue or that defendant did not benefit from the transaction are arguments that are hardly supported by the evidence already presented for the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss. As to the issue of unenforceability of the subject contract under the Intellectual Property Code, this court finds justification in modifying the earlier Order allowing the further presentation of evidence. It appearing that the subject contract between the parties is an executed, rather than an executory, contract the statute of frauds therefore finds no application here. xxxx As to defendants Motion to Serve Written Interrogatories, this court finds that resort to such a discovery mechanism while laudable is premature as defendant has yet to file its Answer. As the case now stands, the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear.14 Undaunted, Global filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, contending that the RTC abused its discretion and acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

On May 5, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision,16 the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Orders dated June 18, 2002 and November 27, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146, in Civil Case No. 01-1278 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.17 A motion for reconsideration was filed by Global. On July 10, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution18 denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. Global presents the following issues for resolution: (1) whether a special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy for a denial of a motion to dismiss; and (2) whether Global is estopped from questioning Surecomps capacity to sue.19 The petition is bereft of merit. I An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.20 To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion. By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so

patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.21 In the instant case, Global did not properly substantiate its claim of arbitrariness on the part of the trial court judge that issued the assailed orders denying the motion to dismiss. In a petition for certiorari, absent such showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or ill motive in the disposition of the trial judge in the case, we are constrained to uphold the courts ruling, especially because its decision was upheld by the CA. II The determination of a corporations capacity is a factual question that requires the elicitation of a preponderant set of facts.22 As a rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations doing business in the Philippines cannot file suits in the Philippines.23 This is mandated under Section 133 of the Corporation Code, which reads: Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines, but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. A corporation has a legal status only within the state or territory in which it was organized. For this reason, a corporation organized in another country has no personality to file suits in the Philippines. In order to subject a foreign corporation doing business in the country to the jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license from the Securities and Exchange Commission and appoint an agent for service of process. Without such license, it cannot institute a suit in the Philippines.

The exception to this rule is the doctrine of estoppel. Global is estopped from challenging Surecomps capacity to sue. A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without license may sue in Philippine courts a Filipino citizen or a Philippine entity that had contracted with and benefited from it.25 A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it.26 The principle is applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract. 27 Due to Globals merger with ABC and because it is the surviving corporation, it is as if it was the one which entered into contract with Surecomp. In the merger of two existing corporations, one of the corporations survives and continues the business, while the other is dissolved, and all its rights, properties, and liabilities are acquired by the surviving corporation.28 This is particularly true in this case. Based on the findings of fact of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, under the terms of the merger or consolidation, Global assumed all the liabilities and obligations of ABC as if it had incurred such liabilities or obligations itself. In the same way, Global also has the right to exercise all defenses, rights, privileges, and counter-claims of every kind and nature which ABC may have or invoke under the law. These findings of fact were never contested by Global in any of its pleadings filed before this Court. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated May 5, 2006 and the Resolution dated July 10, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75524 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 176579

June 28, 2011

WILSON P. GAMBOA, Petitioner, vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE UNDERSECRETARY JOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN ANTHONI SALIM OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF METRO PACIFIC ASSET HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN MANUEL V. PANGILINAN OF PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS CAPACITY AS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD., PRESIDENT NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, CHAIR FE BARIN OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, and PRESIDENT FRANCIS LIM OF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, Respondents. PABLITO V. SANIDAD and ARNO V. SANIDAD, Petitioners-in-Intervention.

DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is an original petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief and declaration of nullity of the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment

Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the Philippines to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific). The Antecedents The facts, according to petitioner Wilson P. Gamboa, a stockholder of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), are as follows:1 On 28 November 1928, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436 which granted PLDT a franchise and the right to engage in telecommunications business. In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American company and a major PLDT stockholder, sold 26 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to PTIC. In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) was incorporated by several persons, including Roland Gapud and Jose Campos, Jr. Subsequently, PHI became the owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC by virtue of three Deeds of Assignment executed by PTIC stockholders Ramon Cojuangco and Luis Tirso Rivilla. In 1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC shares, which represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be owned by the Republic of the Philippines.2 In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong-based investment firm, acquired the remaining 54 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On 20 November 2006, the InterAgency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government announced that it would sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, through a public bidding to be conducted on 4 December 2006. Subsequently, the public bidding was reset to 8 December 2006, and only two bidders, Parallax Venture Fund XXVII (Parallax) and Pan-Asia Presidio Capital,

submitted their bids. Parallax won with a bid of P25.6 billion or US$510 million. Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it would exercise its right of first refusal as a PTIC stockholder and buy the 111,415 PTIC shares by matching the bid price of Parallax. However, First Pacific failed to do so by the 1 February 2007 deadline set by IPC and instead, yielded its right to PTIC itself which was then given by IPC until 2 March 2007 to buy the PTIC shares. On 14 February 2007, First Pacific, through its subsidiary, MPAH, entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase Agreement of the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, with the Philippine Government for the price of P25,217,556,000 or US$510,580,189. The sale was completed on 28 February 2007. Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine Government of 46.125 percent of PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 million shares or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT. With the sale, First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40 percent.3 On the other hand, public respondents Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves, Undersecretary John P. Sevilla, and PCGG Commissioner Ricardo Abcede allege the following relevant facts: On 9 November 1967, PTIC was incorporated and had since engaged in the business of investment holdings. PTIC held 26,034,263 PLDT common shares, or 13.847 percent of the total PLDT outstanding common shares. PHI, on the other hand, was incorporated in 1977, and became the owner of 111,415 PTIC shares or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC by virtue of three Deeds of Assignment executed by Ramon Cojuangco and Luis Tirso

Rivilla. In 1986, the 111,415 PTIC shares held by PHI were sequestered by the PCGG, and subsequently declared by this Court as part of the ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos. The sequestered PTIC shares were reconveyed to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with this Courts decision4 which became final and executory on 8 August 2006. The Philippine Government decided to sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, which represent 6.4 percent of the outstanding common shares of stock of PLDT, and designated the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), composed of the Department of Finance and the PCGG, as the disposing entity. An invitation to bid was published in seven different newspapers from 13 to 24 November 2006. On 20 November 2006, a pre-bid conference was held, and the original deadline for bidding scheduled on 4 December 2006 was reset to 8 December 2006. The extension was published in nine different newspapers. During the 8 December 2006 bidding, Parallax Capital Management LP emerged as the highest bidder with a bid of P25,217,556,000. The government notified First Pacific, the majority owner of PTIC shares, of the bidding results and gave First Pacific until 1 February 2007 to exercise its right of first refusal in accordance with PTICs Articles of Incorporation. First Pacific announced its intention to match Parallaxs bid. On 31 January 2007, the House of Representatives (HR) Committee on Good Government conducted a public hearing on the particulars of the then impending sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares. Respondents Teves and Sevilla were among those who attended the public hearing. The HR Committee Report No. 2270 concluded that: (a) the auction of the governments 111,415 PTIC shares bore due diligence, transparency and conformity with existing legal procedures; and (b) First Pacifics intended acquisition of the governments 111,415 PTIC shares resulting in First Pacifics

100% ownership of PTIC will not violate the 40 percent constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public utility since PTIC holds only 13.847 percent of the total outstanding common shares of PLDT.5 On 28 February 2007, First Pacific completed the acquisition of the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC. Respondent Manuel V. Pangilinan admits the following facts: (a) the IPC conducted a public bidding for the sale of 111,415 PTIC shares or 46 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC (the remaining 54 percent of PTIC shares was already owned by First Pacific and its affiliates); (b) Parallax offered the highest bid amounting to P25,217,556,000; (c) pursuant to the right of first refusal in favor of PTIC and its shareholders granted in PTICs Articles of Incorporation, MPAH, a First Pacific affiliate, exercised its right of first refusal by matching the highest bid offered for PTIC shares on 13 February 2007; and (d) on 28 February 2007, the sale was consummated when MPAH paid IPC P25,217,556,000 and the government delivered the certificates for the 111,415 PTIC shares. Respondent Pangilinan denies the other allegations of facts of petitioner. On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief, and declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares. Petitioner claims, among others, that the sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares would result in an increase in First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, and this, combined with Japanese NTT DoCoMos common shareholdings in PLDT, would result to a total foreign common shareholdings in PLDT of 51.56 percent which is over the 40 percent constitutional limit.6 Petitioner asserts: If and when the sale is completed, First Pacifics equity in PLDT will go up from 30.7 percent to 37.0 percent of its common or votingstockholdings, x x x. Hence, the consummation of the sale will put the two largest foreign investors in PLDT First Pacific and Japans NTT DoCoMo, which is the worlds largest wireless

telecommunications firm, owning 51.56 percent of PLDT common equity. x x x With the completion of the sale, data culled from the official website of the New York Stock Exchange (www.nyse.com) showed that those foreign entities, which own at least five percent of common equity, will collectively own 81.47 percent of PLDTs common equity. x x x x x x as the annual disclosure reports, also referred to as Form 20-K reports x x x which PLDT submitted to the New York Stock Exchange for the period 2003-2005, revealed that First Pacific and several other foreign entities breached the constitutional limit of 40 percent ownership as early as 2003. x x x"7 Petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the consummation of the then impending sale of 111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific violates the constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public utility; (2) whether public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific; and (3) whether the sale of common shares to foreigners in excess of 40 percent of the entire subscribed common capital stock violates the constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public utility.8 On 13 August 2007, Pablito V. Sanidad and Arno V. Sanidad filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention. In the Resolution of 28 August 2007, the Court granted the motion and noted the Petition-inIntervention. Petitioners-in-intervention "join petitioner Wilson Gamboa x x x in seeking, among others, to enjoin and/or nullify the sale by respondents of the 111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific or assignee." Petitioners-in-intervention claim that, as PLDT subscribers, they have a "stake in the outcome of the controversy x x x where the Philippine Government is completing the sale of government owned assets in [PLDT], unquestionably a public utility, in violation of

the nationality restrictions of the Philippine Constitution." The Issue This Court is not a trier of facts. Factual questions such as those raised by petitioner,9 which indisputably demand a thorough examination of the evidence of the parties, are generally beyond this Courts jurisdiction. Adhering to this well-settled principle, the Court shall confine the resolution of the instant controversy solely on the threshold and purely legal issue of whether the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total common shares only or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility. The Ruling of the Court The petition is partly meritorious. Petition for declaratory relief treated as petition for mandamus At the outset, petitioner is faced with a procedural barrier. Among the remedies petitioner seeks, only the petition for prohibition is within the original jurisdiction of this court, which however is not exclusive but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The actions for declaratory relief,10 injunction, and annulment of sale are not embraced within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. On this ground alone, the petition could have been dismissed outright. While direct resort to this Court may be justified in a petition for prohibition,11 the Court shall nevertheless refrain from discussing the grounds in support of the petition for prohibition since on 28 February 2007, the questioned sale was consummated when MPAH paid IPC P25,217,556,000 and the government delivered the certificates for the 111,415 PTIC shares.

However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching implications to the national economy, the Court treats the petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus.12 In Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines,13 the Court treated the petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus considering the grave injustice that would result in the interpretation of a banking law. In that case, which involved the crime of rape committed by a foreign tourist against a Filipino minor and the execution of the final judgment in the civil case for damages on the tourists dollar deposit with a local bank, the Court declared Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, exempting foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, inapplicable due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. The Court held that "injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused x x x" that would "negate Article 10 of the Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail." The Court therefore required respondents Central Bank of the Philippines, the local bank, and the accused to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case for damages and to release the dollar deposit of the accused to satisfy the judgment. In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor,14 the Court similarly brushed aside the procedural infirmity of the petition for declaratory relief and treated the same as one for mandamus. In Alliance, the issue was whether the government unlawfully excluded petitioners, who were government employees, from the enjoyment of rights to which they were entitled under the law. Specifically, the question was: "Are the branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the Government, including government owned or

controlled corporations included among the four employers under Presidential Decree No. 851 which are required to pay their employees x x x a thirteenth (13th) month pay x x x ?" The Constitutional principle involved therein affected all government employees, clearly justifying a relaxation of the technical rules of procedure, and certainly requiring the interpretation of the assailed presidential decree. In short, it is well-settled that this Court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus if the issue involved has far-reaching implications. As this Court held in Salvacion: The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has farreaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus.15 (Emphasis supplied) In the present case, petitioner seeks primarily the interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. He prays that this Court declare that the term "capital" refers to common shares only, and that such shares constitute "the sole basis in determining foreign equity in a public utility." Petitioner further asks this Court to declare any ruling inconsistent with such interpretation unconstitutional. The interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching implications to the national economy. In fact, a resolution of this issue will determine whether Filipinos are masters, or second class citizens, in their own country. What is at stake here is whether Filipinos or foreigners will have effective control of the national economy. Indeed, if ever there is a legal issue that has far-reaching implications to the entire nation, and to future generations of Filipinos, it is the threshhold legal issue presented in this case.

The Court first encountered the issue on the definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in the case of Fernandez v. Cojuangco, docketed as G.R. No. 157360.16 That case involved the same public utility (PLDT) and substantially the same private respondents. Despite the importance and novelty of the constitutional issue raised therein and despite the fact that the petition involved a purely legal question, the Court declined to resolve the case on the merits, and instead denied the same for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.17 There, petitioner Fernandez assailed on a pure question of law the Regional Trial Courts Decision of 21 February 2003 via a petition for review under Rule 45. The Courts Resolution, denying the petition, became final on 21 December 2004. The instant petition therefore presents the Court with another opportunity to finally settle this purely legal issue which is of transcendental importance to the national economy and a fundamental requirement to a faithful adherence to our Constitution. The Court must forthwith seize such opportunity, not only for the benefit of the litigants, but more significantly for the benefit of the entire Filipino people, to ensure, in the words of the Constitution, "a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."18 Besides, in the light of vague and confusing positions taken by government agencies on this purely legal issue, present and future foreign investors in this country deserve, as a matter of basic fairness, a categorical ruling from this Court on the extent of their participation in the capital of public utilities and other nationalized businesses. Despite its far-reaching implications to the national economy, this purely legal issue has remained unresolved for over 75 years since the 1935 Constitution. There is no reason for this Court to evade this ever recurring fundamental issue and delay again defining the term "capital," which appears not only in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, but also in

Section 2, Article XII on co-production and joint venture agreements for the development of our natural resources,19 in Section 7, Article XII on ownership of private lands,20 in Section 10, Article XII on the reservation of certain investments to Filipino citizens,21 in Section 4(2), Article XIV on the ownership of educational institutions,22 and in Section 11(2), Article XVI on the ownership of advertising companies.23 Petitioner has locus standi There is no dispute that petitioner is a stockholder of PLDT. As such, he has the right to question the subject sale, which he claims to violate the nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. If the sale indeed violates the Constitution, then there is a possibility that PLDTs franchise could be revoked, a dire consequence directly affecting petitioners interest as a stockholder. More importantly, there is no question that the instant petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. The fundamental and threshold legal issue in this case, involving the national economy and the economic welfare of the Filipino people, far outweighs any perceived impediment in the legal personality of the petitioner to bring this action. In Chavez v. PCGG,24 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus: In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in

connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada, further declared that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been involved under the questioned contract for the development, management and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, public interest *was+ definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved. We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the petitioners standing. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi. Definition of the Term "Capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the Filipinization of public utilities, to wit: Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the

Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) The above provision substantially reiterates Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, thus: Section 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof. (Emphasis supplied) The foregoing provision in the 1973 Constitution reproduced Section 8, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, viz: Section 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a

public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires. (Emphasis supplied) Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, reminds us that the Filipinization provision in the 1987 Constitution is one of the products of the spirit of nationalism which gripped the 1935 Constitutional Convention.25 The 1987 Constitution "provides for the Filipinization of public utilities by requiring that any form of authorization for the operation of public utilities should be granted only to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. The provision is [an express] recognition of the sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and for national security."26 The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from assuming control of public utilities, which may be inimical to the national interest.27 This specific provision explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens control of public utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal of the 1987 Constitution: to "conserve and develop our patrimony"28 and ensure "a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."29 Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must therefore meet the minimum nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted

authority to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its "capital" must be owned by Filipino citizens. The crux of the controversy is the definition of the term "capital." Does the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to common shares or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares)? Petitioner submits that the 40 percent foreign equity limitation in domestic public utilities refers only to common shares because such shares are entitled to vote and it is through voting that control over a corporation is exercised. Petitioner posits that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to "the ownership of common capital stock subscribed and outstanding, which class of shares alone, under the corporate set-up of PLDT, can vote and elect members of the board of directors." It is undisputed that PLDTs non-voting preferred shares are held mostly by Filipino citizens.30 This arose from Presidential Decree No. 217,31 issued on 16 June 1973 by then President Ferdinand Marcos, requiring every applicant of a PLDT telephone line to subscribe to nonvoting preferred shares to pay for the investment cost of installing the telephone line.32 Petitioners-in-intervention basically reiterate petitioners arguments and adopt petitioners definition of the term "capital."33 Petitionersin-intervention allege that "the approximate foreign ownership of common capital stock of PLDT x x x already amounts to at least 63.54% of the total outstanding common stock," which means that foreigners exercise significant control over PLDT, patently violating the 40 percent foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by the Constitution. Respondents, on the other hand, do not offer any definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. More importantly, private respondents Nazareno and

Pangilinan of PLDT do not dispute that more than 40 percent of the common shares of PLDT are held by foreigners. In particular, respondent Nazarenos Memorandum, consisting of 73 pages, harps mainly on the procedural infirmities of the petition and the supposed violation of the due process rights of the "affected foreign common shareholders." Respondent Nazareno does not deny petitioners allegation of foreigners dominating the common shareholdings of PLDT. Nazareno stressed mainly that the petition "seeks to divest foreign common shareholders purportedly exceeding 40% of the total common shareholdings in PLDT of their ownership over their shares." Thus, "the foreign natural and juridical PLDT shareholders must be impleaded in this suit so that they can be heard."34 Essentially, Nazareno invokes denial of due process on behalf of the foreign common shareholders. While Nazareno does not introduce any definition of the term "capital," he states that "among the factual assertions that need to be established to counter petitioners allegations is the uniform interpretation by government agencies (such as the SEC), institutions and corporations (such as the Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation or PNOC-EDC) of including both preferred shares and common shares in "controlling interest" in view of testing compliance with the 40% constitutional limitation on foreign ownership in public utilities."35 Similarly, respondent Manuel V. Pangilinan does not define the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Neither does he refute petitioners claim of foreigners holding more than 40 percent of PLDTs common shares. Instead, respondent Pangilinan focuses on the procedural flaws of the petition and the alleged violation of the due process rights of foreigners. Respondent Pangilinan emphasizes in his Memorandum (1) the absence of this Courts jurisdiction over the petition; (2) petitioners lack of standing; (3) mootness of

the petition; (4) non-availability of declaratory relief; and (5) the denial of due process rights. Moreover, respondent Pangilinan alleges that the issue should be whether "owners of shares in PLDT as well as owners of shares in companies holding shares in PLDT may be required to relinquish their shares in PLDT and in those companies without any law requiring them to surrender their shares and also without notice and trial." Respondent Pangilinan further asserts that "Section 11, [Article XII of the Constitution] imposes no nationality requirement on the shareholders of the utility company as a condition for keeping their shares in the utility company." According to him, "Section 11 does not authorize taking one persons property (the shareholders stock in the utility company) on the basis of another partys alleged failure to satisfy a requirement that is a condition only for that other partys retention of another piece of property (the utility company being at least 60% Filipino-owned to keep its franchise)."36 The OSG, representing public respondents Secretary Margarito Teves, Undersecretary John P. Sevilla, Commissioner Ricardo Abcede, and Chairman Fe Barin, is likewise silent on the definition of the term "capital." In its Memorandum37 dated 24 September 2007, the OSG also limits its discussion on the supposed procedural defects of the petition, i.e. lack of standing, lack of jurisdiction, non-inclusion of interested parties, and lack of basis for injunction. The OSG does not present any definition or interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. The OSG contends that "the petition actually partakes of a collateral attack on PLDTs franchise as a public utility," which in effect requires a "full-blown trial where all the parties in interest are given their day in court."38 Respondent Francisco Ed Lim, impleaded as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE), does not also define the term "capital" and seeks the dismissal of the petition on the following

grounds: (1) failure to state a cause of action against Lim; (2) the PSE allegedly implemented its rules and required all listed companies, including PLDT, to make proper and timely disclosures; and (3) the reliefs prayed for in the petition would adversely impact the stock market. In the earlier case of Fernandez v. Cojuangco, petitioner Fernandez who claimed to be a stockholder of record of PLDT, contended that the term "capital" in the 1987 Constitution refers to shares entitled to vote or the common shares. Fernandez explained thus: The forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by the Constitution refers to ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, i.e., common shares, considering that it is through voting that control is being exercised. x x x Obviously, the intent of the framers of the Constitution in imposing limitations and restrictions on fully nationalized and partially nationalized activities is for Filipino nationals to be always in control of the corporation undertaking said activities. Otherwise, if the Trial Courts ruling upholding respondents arguments were to be given credence, it would be possible for the ownership structure of a public utility corporation to be divided into one percent (1%) common stocks and ninety-nine percent (99%) preferred stocks. Following the Trial Courts ruling adopting respondents arguments, the common shares can be owned entirely by foreigners thus creating an absurd situation wherein foreigners, who are supposed to be minority shareholders, control the public utility corporation. xxxx Thus, the 40% foreign ownership limitation should be interpreted to apply to both the beneficial ownership and the controlling interest. xxxx

Clearly, therefore, the forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by the Constitution refers to ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, i.e., common shares. Furthermore, ownership of record of shares will not suffice but it must be shown that the legal and beneficial ownership rests in the hands of Filipino citizens. Consequently, in the case of petitioner PLDT, since it is already admitted that the voting interests of foreigners which would gain entry to petitioner PLDT by the acquisition of SMART shares through the Questioned Transactions is equivalent to 82.99%, and the nominee arrangements between the foreign principals and the Filipino owners is likewise admitted, there is, therefore, a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Parenthetically, the Opinions dated February 15, 1988 and April 14, 1987 cited by the Trial Court to support the proposition that the meaning of the word "capital" as used in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution allegedly refers to the sum total of the shares subscribed and paid-in by the shareholder and it allegedly is immaterial how the stock is classified, whether as common or preferred, cannot stand in the face of a clear legislative policy as stated in the FIA which took effect in 1991 or way after said opinions were rendered, and as clarified by the above-quoted Amendments. In this regard, suffice it to state that as between the law and an opinion rendered by an administrative agency, the law indubitably prevails. Moreover, said Opinions are merely advisory and cannot prevail over the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution. In the same vein, the SECs construction of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution is at best merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what a law means.39 On the other hand, respondents therein, Antonio O. Cojuangco, Manuel V. Pangilinan, Carlos A. Arellano, Helen Y. Dee, Magdangal B. Elma, Mariles Cacho-Romulo, Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, Ray C. Espinosa, Napoleon L. Nazareno,

Albert F. Del Rosario, and Orlando B. Vea, argued that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution includes preferred shares since the Constitution does not distinguish among classes of stock, thus: 16. The Constitution applies its foreign ownership limitation on the corporations "capital," without distinction as to classes of shares. x x x In this connection, the Corporation Code which was already in force at the time the present (1987) Constitution was drafted defined outstanding capital stock as follows: Section 137. Outstanding capital stock defined. The term "outstanding capital stock", as used in this Code, means the total shares of stock issued under binding subscription agreements to subscribers or stockholders, whether or not fully or partially paid, except treasury shares. Section 137 of the Corporation Code also does not distinguish between common and preferred shares, nor exclude either class of shares, in determining the outstanding capital stock (the "capital") of a corporation. Consequently, petitioners suggestion to reckon PLDTs foreign equity only on the basis of PLDTs outstanding common shares is without legal basis. The language of the Constitution should be understood in the sense it has in common use. xxxx 17. But even assuming that resort to the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission is necessary, there is nothing in the Record of the Constitutional Commission (Vol. III) which petitioner misleadingly cited in the Petition x x x which supports petitioners view that only common shares should form the basis for computing a public utilitys foreign equity. xxxx 18. In addition, the SEC the government agency primarily responsible for implementing the Corporation Code, and which also has the

responsibility of ensuring compliance with the Constitutions foreign equity restrictions as regards nationalized activities x x x has categorically ruled that both common and preferred shares are properly considered in determining outstanding capital stock and the nationality composition thereof.40 We agree with petitioner and petitioners-inintervention. The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares,41 and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares. The Corporation Code of the Philippines42 classifies shares as common or preferred, thus: Sec. 6. Classification of shares. - The shares of stock of stock corporations may be divided into classes or series of shares, or both, any of which classes or series of shares may have such rights, privileges or restrictions as may be stated in the articles of incorporation: Provided, That no share may be deprived of voting rights except those classified and issued as "preferred" or "redeemable" shares, unless otherwise provided in this Code: Provided, further, That there shall always be a class or series of shares which have complete voting rights. Any or all of the shares or series of shares may have a par value or have no par value as may be provided for in the articles of incorporation: Provided, however, That banks, trust companies, insurance companies, public utilities, and building and loan associations shall not be permitted to issue no-par value shares of stock. Preferred shares of stock issued by any corporation may be given preference in the distribution of the assets of the corporation in case of liquidation and in the distribution of dividends, or such other preferences as may be stated in the articles of incorporation which are not violative of the provisions of this Code: Provided, That preferred shares of stock may be issued only with a stated par value. The Board

of Directors, where authorized in the articles of incorporation, may fix the terms and conditions of preferred shares of stock or any series thereof: Provided, That such terms and conditions shall be effective upon the filing of a certificate thereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

6. Merger or consolidation of the corporation with another corporation or other corporations; 7. Investment of corporate funds in another corporation or business in accordance with this Code; and 8. Dissolution of the corporation. Except as provided in the immediately preceding paragraph, the vote necessary to approve a particular corporate act as provided in this Code shall be deemed to refer only to stocks with voting rights. Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation.43 This is exercised through his vote in the election of directors because it is the board of directors that controls or manages the corporation.44 In the absence of provisions in the articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, preferred shares have the same voting rights as common shares. However, preferred shareholders are often excluded from any control, that is, deprived of the right to vote in the election of directors and on other matters, on the theory that the preferred shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders.45 In fact, under the Corporation Code only preferred or redeemable shares can be deprived of the right to vote.46 Common shares cannot be deprived of the right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any provision in the articles of incorporation restricting the right of common shareholders to vote is invalid.47 Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the

Shares of capital stock issued without par value shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable and the holder of such shares shall not be liable to the corporation or to its creditors in respect thereto: Provided; That shares without par value may not be issued for a consideration less than the value of five (P5.00) pesos per share: Provided, further, That the entire consideration received by the corporation for its no-par value shares shall be treated as capital and shall not be available for distribution as dividends. A corporation may, furthermore, classify its shares for the purpose of insuring compliance with constitutional or legal requirements. Except as otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation and stated in the certificate of stock, each share shall be equal in all respects to every other share. Where the articles of incorporation provide for non-voting shares in the cases allowed by this Code, the holders of such shares shall nevertheless be entitled to vote on the following matters: 1. Amendment of the articles of incorporation; 2. Adoption and amendment of by-laws; 3. Sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or other disposition of all or substantially all of the corporate property; 4. Incurring, creating or increasing bonded indebtedness; 5. Increase or decrease of capital stock;

corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities. As revealed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, "capital" refers to the voting stock or controlling interest of a corporation, to wit: MR. NOLLEDO. In Sections 3, 9 and 15, the Committee stated local or Filipino equity and foreign equity; namely, 60-40 in Section 3, 6040 in Section 9 and 2/3-1/3 in Section 15. MR. VILLEGAS. That is right. MR. NOLLEDO. In teaching law, we are always faced with this question: "Where do we base the equity requirement, is it on the authorized capital stock, on the subscribed capital stock, or on the paid-up capital stock of a corporation"? Will the Committee please enlighten me on this? MR. VILLEGAS. We have just had a long discussion with the members of the team from the UP Law Center who provided us a draft. The phrase that is contained here which we adopted from the UP draft is "60 percent of voting stock." MR. NOLLEDO. That must be based on the subscribed capital stock, because unless declared delinquent, unpaid capital stock shall be entitled to vote. MR. VILLEGAS. That is right. MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you. With respect to an investment by one corporation in another corporation, say, a corporation with 60-40 percent equity invests in another corporation which is permitted by the

Corporation Code, does the Committee adopt the grandfather rule? MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, that is the understanding of the Committee. MR. NOLLEDO. Therefore, we need additional Filipino capital? MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.48 xxxx MR. AZCUNA. May I be clarified as to that portion that was accepted by the Committee. MR. VILLEGAS. The portion accepted by the Committee is the deletion of the phrase "voting stock or controlling interest." MR. AZCUNA. Hence, without the Davide amendment, the committee report would read: "corporations or associations at least sixty percent of whose CAPITAL is owned by such citizens." MR. VILLEGAS. Yes. MR. AZCUNA. So if the Davide amendment is lost, we are stuck with 60 percent of the capital to be owned by citizens. MR. VILLEGAS. That is right. MR. AZCUNA. But the control can be with the foreigners even if they are the minority. Let us say 40 percent of the capital is owned by them, but it is the voting capital, whereas, the Filipinos own the nonvoting shares. So we can have a situation where the corporation is controlled by foreigners despite being the minority because they have the voting capital. That is the anomaly that would result here. MR. BENGZON. No, the reason we eliminated the word "stock" as stated in the 1973 and 1935 Constitutions is that according to Commissioner Rodrigo, there are associations that do not have stocks. That is why we say "CAPITAL."

MR. AZCUNA. We should not eliminate the phrase "controlling interest." MR. BENGZON. In the case corporations, it is assumed.49 supplied) of stock (Emphasis

In explaining the definition of a "Philippine national," the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 provide: b. "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a domestic partnership or association wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent [60%] of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty percent [60%] of the fund will accrue to the benefit of the Philippine nationals; Provided, that where a corporation its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] registered enterprise, at least sixty percent [60%] of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent [60%] of the members of the Board of Directors of each of both corporation must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that the corporation shall be considered a Philippine national. The control test shall be applied for this purpose. Compliance with the required Filipino ownership of a corporation shall be determined on the basis of outstanding capital stock whether fully paid or not, but only such stocks which are generally entitled to vote are considered. For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential. Thus, stocks, the voting rights of which have been assigned or transferred to aliens cannot be considered held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals.

Thus, 60 percent of the "capital" assumes, or should result in, "controlling interest" in the corporation. Reinforcing this interpretation of the term "capital," as referring to controlling interest or shares entitled to vote, is the definition of a "Philippine national" in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991,50 to wit: SEC. 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act: a. The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized abroad and registered as doing business in the Philippines under the Corporation Code of which one hundred percent (100%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of each of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of each of both corporations must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that the corporation, shall be considered a "Philippine national." (Emphasis supplied)

Individuals or juridical entities not meeting the aforementioned qualifications are considered as non-Philippine nationals. (Emphasis supplied) Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine national[s]." Under Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, Congress may "reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments." Thus, in numerous laws Congress has reserved certain areas of investments to Filipino citizens or to corporations at least sixty percent of the "capital" of which is owned by Filipino citizens. Some of these laws are: (1) Regulation of Award of Government Contracts or R.A. No. 5183; (2) Philippine Inventors Incentives Act or R.A. No. 3850; (3) Magna Carta for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises or R.A. No. 6977; (4) Philippine Overseas Shipping Development Act or R.A. No. 7471; (5) Domestic Shipping Development Act of 2004 or R.A. No. 9295; (6) Philippine Technology Transfer Act of 2009 or R.A. No. 10055; and (7) Ship Mortgage Decree or P.D. No. 1521. Hence, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution is also used in the same context in numerous laws reserving certain areas of investments to Filipino citizens. To construe broadly the term "capital" as the total outstanding capital stock, including both common and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the "State shall develop a selfreliant and independent national economy

effectively controlled by Filipinos." A broad definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the public utility. We shall illustrate the glaring anomaly in giving a broad definition to the term "capital." Let us assume that a corporation has 100 common shares owned by foreigners and 1,000,000 nonvoting preferred shares owned by Filipinos, with both classes of share having a par value of one peso (P1.00) per share. Under the broad definition of the term "capital," such corporation would be considered compliant with the 40 percent constitutional limit on foreign equity of public utilities since the overwhelming majority, or more than 99.999 percent, of the total outstanding capital stock is Filipino owned. This is obviously absurd. In the example given, only the foreigners holding the common shares have voting rights in the election of directors, even if they hold only 100 shares. The foreigners, with a minuscule equity of less than 0.001 percent, exercise control over the public utility. On the other hand, the Filipinos, holding more than 99.999 percent of the equity, cannot vote in the election of directors and hence, have no control over the public utility. This starkly circumvents the intent of the framers of the Constitution, as well as the clear language of the Constitution, to place the control of public utilities in the hands of Filipinos. It also renders illusory the State policy of an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. The example given is not theoretical but can be found in the real world, and in fact exists in the present case. Holders of PLDT preferred shares are explicitly denied of the right to vote in the election of directors. PLDTs Articles of Incorporation expressly state that "the holders of Serial Preferred Stock shall not be entitled to vote at any meeting of the stockholders for the election of directors or for any other purpose or otherwise participate in any action taken by the

corporation or its stockholders, or to receive notice of any meeting of stockholders."51 On the other hand, holders of common shares are granted the exclusive right to vote in the election of directors. PLDTs Articles of Incorporation52 state that "each holder of Common Capital Stock shall have one vote in respect of each share of such stock held by him on all matters voted upon by the stockholders, and the holders of Common Capital Stock shall have the exclusive right to vote for the election of directors and for all other purposes."53 In short, only holders of common shares can vote in the election of directors, meaning only common shareholders exercise control over PLDT. Conversely, holders of preferred shares, who have no voting rights in the election of directors, do not have any control over PLDT. In fact, under PLDTs Articles of Incorporation, holders of common shares have voting rights for all purposes, while holders of preferred shares have no voting right for any purpose whatsoever. It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute, that foreigners hold a majority of the common shares of PLDT. In fact, based on PLDTs 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS),54 which is a document required to be submitted annually to the Securities and Exchange Commission,55 foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares of PLDT whereas Filipinos hold only 66,750,622 common shares.56 In other words, foreigners hold 64.27% of the total number of PLDTs common shares, while Filipinos hold only 35.73%. Since holding a majority of the common shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of control unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership of public utilities expressly mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Moreover, the Dividend Declarations of PLDT for 2009,57 as submitted to the SEC, shows that per share the SIP58 preferred shares earn a

pittance in dividends compared to the common shares. PLDT declared dividends for the common shares at P70.00 per share, while the declared dividends for the preferred shares amounted to a measly P1.00 per share.59 So the preferred shares not only cannot vote in the election of directors, they also have very little and obviously negligible dividend earning capacity compared to common shares. As shown in PLDTs 2010 GIS,60 as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT common shares is P5.00 per share, whereas the par value of preferred shares is P10.00 per share. In other words, preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares but cannot elect directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends of common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners own only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred shares.61 Worse, preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT while common shares constitute only 22.15%.62 This undeniably shows that beneficial interest in PLDT is not with the nonvoting preferred shares but with the common shares, blatantly violating the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership in a public utility. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipinos in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally required for the States grant of authority to operate a public utility. The undisputed fact that the PLDT preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, are non-voting and earn only 1/70 of the dividends that PLDT common shares earn, grossly violates the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership of a public utility. In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly

contravenes the express command in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that "[n]o franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to x x x corporations x x x organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens x x x." To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise control over PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDTs common shares, constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus do not exercise control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn;63 (5) preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%. This kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a mockery of the Constitution. Incidentally, the fact that PLDT common shares with a par value of P5.00 have a current stock market value of P2,328.00 per share,64 while PLDT preferred shares with a par value of P10.00 per share have a current stock market value ranging from only P10.92 to P11.06 per share,65 is a glaring confirmation by the market that control and beneficial ownership of PLDT rest with the common shares, not with the preferred shares. Indisputably, construing the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution to include both voting and non-voting shares will result in the abject surrender of our telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear abdication of the States constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an interpretation certainly runs counter to the constitutional provision reserving certain areas of investment to Filipino citizens, such as the

exploitation of natural resources as well as the ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising businesses. The Court should never open to foreign control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the national interest. The Court must perform its solemn duty to defend and uphold the intent and letter of the Constitution to ensure, in the words of the Constitution, "a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development of natural resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising business, is selfexecuting. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. The rationale why these constitutional provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,66 thus: x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are selfexecuting. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of selfexecuting, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-selfexecuting. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by

simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphasis supplied) In Manila Prince Hotel, even the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, later Chief Justice, agreed that constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing. Justice Puno stated: Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as selfexecuting, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate them. Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and seizures, the rights of a person under custodial investigation, the rights of an accused, and the privilege against selfincrimination. It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection of property. The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public use without just compensation. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, in numerous cases,67 this Court, even in the absence of implementing legislation, applied directly the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions limiting land ownership to Filipinos. In Soriano v. Ong Hoo,68 this Court ruled: x x x As the Constitution is silent as to the effects or consequences of a sale by a citizen of his land to an alien, and as both the citizen and the alien have violated the law, none of them should have a recourse against the other, and it

should only be the State that should be allowed to intervene and determine what is to be done with the property subject of the violation. We have said that what the State should do or could do in such matters is a matter of public policy, entirely beyond the scope of judicial authority. (Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al., 6 G. R. No. L-5996, June 27, 1956.) While the legislature has not definitely decided what policy should be followed in cases of violations against the constitutional prohibition, courts of justice cannot go beyond by declaring the disposition to be null and void as violative of the Constitution. x x x (Emphasis supplied) To treat Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution as not self-executing would mean that since the 1935 Constitution, or over the last 75 years, not one of the constitutional provisions expressly reserving specific areas of investments to corporations, at least 60 percent of the "capital" of which is owned by Filipinos, was enforceable. In short, the framers of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions miserably failed to effectively reserve to Filipinos specific areas of investment, like the operation by corporations of public utilities, the exploitation by corporations of mineral resources, the ownership by corporations of real estate, and the ownership of educational institutions. All the legislatures that convened since 1935 also miserably failed to enact legislations to implement these vital constitutional provisions that determine who will effectively control the national economy, Filipinos or foreigners. This Court cannot allow such an absurd interpretation of the Constitution. This Court has held that the SEC "has both regulatory and adjudicative functions."69 Under its regulatory functions, the SEC can be compelled by mandamus to perform its statutory duty when it unlawfully neglects to perform the same. Under its adjudicative or quasi-judicial functions, the SEC can be also be compelled by mandamus to hear and decide a possible violation of any law it administers or

enforces when it is mandated by law to investigate such violation.1awphi1 Under Section 17(4)70 of the Corporation Code, the SEC has the regulatory function to reject or disapprove the Articles of Incorporation of any corporation where "the required percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be owned by citizens of the Philippines has not been complied with as required by existing laws or the Constitution." Thus, the SEC is the government agency tasked with the statutory duty to enforce the nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution on the ownership of public utilities. This Court, in a petition for declaratory relief that is treated as a petition for mandamus as in the present case, can direct the SEC to perform its statutory duty under the law, a duty that the SEC has apparently unlawfully neglected to do based on the 2010 GIS that respondent PLDT submitted to the SEC. Under Section 5(m) of the Securities Regulation Code,71 the SEC is vested with the "power and function" to "suspend or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of corporations, partnerships or associations, upon any of the grounds provided by law." The SEC is mandated under Section 5(d) of the same Code with the "power and function" to "investigate x x x the activities of persons to ensure compliance" with the laws and regulations that SEC administers or enforces. The GIS that all corporations are required to submit to SEC annually should put the SEC on guard against violations of the nationality requirement prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws. This Court can compel the SEC, in a petition for declaratory relief that is treated as a petition for mandamus as in the present case, to hear and decide a possible violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in view of the ownership structure of PLDTs voting shares, as admitted by respondents and as stated in PLDTs 2010 GIS that PLDT submitted to SEC.

WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares). Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission is DIRECTED to apply this definition of the term "capital" in determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 176579

October 9, 2012

HEIRS OF WILSON P. GAMBOA,* Petitioners, vs. FINANCE SECRETARYMARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE UNDERSECRETARYJOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT(PCGG) IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN ANTHONI SALIM OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF METRO PACIFIC ASSET HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN MANUEL V. PANGILINAN OF PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS CAPACITY AS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD., PRESIDENT NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE

COMPANY, CHAIR FE BARIN OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, and PRESIDENT FRANCIS LIM OF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, Respondents.

PABLITO V. SANIDAD and ARNO V. SANIDAD, Petitioner-in-Intervention. RESOLUTION CARPIO, J.: This resolves the motions for reconsideration of the 28 June 2011 Decision filed by (1) the Philippine Stock Exchange's (PSE) President, 1 (2) Manuel V. Pangilinan (Pangilinan),2 (3) Napoleon L. Nazareno (Nazareno ),3 and ( 4) the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)4 (collectively, movants ). The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) initially filed a motion for reconsideration on behalfofthe SEC,5 assailing the 28 June 2011 Decision. However, it subsequently filed a Consolidated Comment on behalf of the State,6 declaring expressly that it agrees with the Court's definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. During the Oral Arguments on 26 June 2012, the OSG reiterated its position consistent with the Court's 28 June 2011 Decision. We deny the motions for reconsideration. I. Far-reaching implications of the legal issue justify treatment of petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus. As we emphatically stated in the 28 June 2011 Decision, the interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching implications to the national economy. In fact, a resolution of this issue will determine whether Filipinos are masters, or second-class citizens, in their own

country. What is at stake here is whether Filipinos or foreigners will have effective control of the Philippine national economy. Indeed, if ever there is a legal issue that has far-reaching implications to the entire nation, and to future generations of Filipinos, it is the threshold legal issue presented in this case. Contrary to Pangilinans narrow view, the serious economic consequences resulting in the interpretation of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution undoubtedly demand an immediate adjudication of this issue. Simply put, the far-reaching implications of this issue justify the treatment of the petition as one for mandamus.7 In Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Anti-Dummy Board,8 the Court deemed it wise and expedient to resolve the case although the petition for declaratory relief could be outrightly dismissed for being procedurally defective. There, appellant admittedly had already committed a breach of the Public Service Act in relation to the Anti-Dummy Law since it had been employing non- American aliens long before the decision in a prior similar case. However, the main issue in Luzon Stevedoring was of transcendental importance, involving the exercise or enjoyment of rights, franchises, privileges, properties and businesses which only Filipinos and qualified corporations could exercise or enjoy under the Constitution and the statutes. Moreover, the same issue could be raised by appellant in an appropriate action. Thus, in Luzon Stevedoring the Court deemed it necessary to finally dispose of the case for the guidance of all concerned, despite the apparent procedural flaw in the petition. The circumstances surrounding the present case, such as the supposed procedural defect of the petition and the pivotal legal issue involved, resemble those in Luzon Stevedoring. Consequently, in the interest of substantial justice and faithful adherence to the Constitution, we opted to resolve this case for the guidance of the public and all concerned parties.

II. No change of any long-standing rule; thus, no redefinition of the term "capital." Movants contend that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has long been settled and defined to refer to the total outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or non-voting. In fact, movants claim that the SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked to enforce the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in the Constitution and various statutes, has consistently adopted this particular definition in its numerous opinions. Movants point out that with the 28 June 2011 Decision, the Court in effect introduced a "new" definition or "midstream redefinition"9 of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. This is egregious error. For more than 75 years since the 1935 Constitution, the Court has not interpreted or defined the term "capital" found in various economic provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. There has never been a judicial precedent interpreting the term "capital" in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, until now. Hence, it is patently wrong and utterly baseless to claim that the Court in defining the term "capital" in its 28 June 2011 Decision modified, reversed, or set aside the purported long-standing definition of the term "capital," which supposedly refers to the total outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or non-voting. To repeat, until the present case there has never been a Court ruling categorically defining the term "capital" found in the various economic provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions. The opinions of the SEC, as well as of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on the definition of the term "capital" as referring to both voting and non-voting shares (combined total of common and preferred shares) are, in the first

place, conflicting and inconsistent. There is no basis whatsoever to the claim that the SEC and the DOJ have consistently and uniformly adopted a definition of the term "capital" contrary to the definition that this Court adopted in its 28 June 2011 Decision. In DOJ Opinion No. 130, s. 1985,10 dated 7 October 1985, the scope of the term "capital" in Section 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution was raised, that is, whether the term "capital" includes "both preferred and common stocks." The issue was raised in relation to a stock-swap transaction between a Filipino and a Japanese corporation, both stockholders of a domestic corporation that owned lands in the Philippines. Then Minister of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza ruled that the resulting ownership structure of the corporation would be unconstitutional because 60% of the voting stock would be owned by Japanese while Filipinos would own only 40% of the voting stock, although when the non-voting stock is added, Filipinos would own 60% of the combined voting and non-voting stock. This ownership structure is remarkably similar to the current ownership structure of PLDT. Minister Mendoza ruled: xxxx Thus, the Filipino group still owns sixty (60%) of the entire subscribed capital stock (common and preferred) while the Japanese investors control sixty percent (60%) of the common (voting) shares. It is your position that x x x since Section 9, Article XIV of the Constitution uses the word "capital," which is construed "to include both preferred and common shares" and "that where the law does not distinguish, the courts shall not distinguish." xxxx In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, it is my opinion that the stock-swap transaction in question may not be constitutionally upheld. While it may be ordinary corporate practice to

classify corporate shares into common voting shares and preferred non-voting shares, any arrangement which attempts to defeat the constitutional purpose should be eschewed. Thus, the resultant equity arrangement which would place ownership of 60%11 of the common (voting) shares in the Japanese group, while retaining 60% of the total percentage of common and preferred shares in Filipino hands would amount to circumvention of the principle of control by Philippine stockholders that is implicit in the 60% Philippine nationality requirement in the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) In short, Minister Mendoza categorically rejected the theory that the term "capital" in Section 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution includes "both preferred and common stocks" treated as the same class of shares regardless of differences in voting rights and privileges. Minister Mendoza stressed that the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in the Constitution is not complied with unless the corporation "satisfies the criterion of beneficial ownership" and that in applying the same "the primordial consideration is situs of control." On the other hand, in Opinion No. 23-10 dated 18 August 2010, addressed to Castillo Laman Tan Pantaleon & San Jose, then SEC General Counsel Vernette G. Umali-Paco applied the Voting Control Test, that is, using only the voting stock to determine whether a corporation is a Philippine national. The Opinion states: Applying the foregoing, particularly the Control Test, MLRC is deemed as a Philippine national because: (1) sixty percent (60%) of its outstanding capital stock entitled to vote is owned by a Philippine national, the Trustee; and (2) at least sixty percent (60%) of the ERF will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals. Still pursuant to the Control Test, MLRCs investment in 60% of BFDCs outstanding capital stock entitled to vote shall

be deemed as of Philippine nationality, thereby qualifying BFDC to own private land. Further, under, and for purposes of, the FIA, MLRC and BFDC are both Philippine nationals, considering that: (1) sixty percent (60%) of their respective outstanding capital stock entitled to vote is owned by a Philippine national (i.e., by the Trustee, in the case of MLRC; and by MLRC, in the case of BFDC); and (2) at least 60% of their respective board of directors are Filipino citizens. (Boldfacing and italicization supplied) Clearly, these DOJ and SEC opinions are compatible with the Courts interpretation of the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens mandated by the Constitution for certain economic activities. At the same time, these opinions highlight the conflicting, contradictory, and inconsistent positions taken by the DOJ and the SEC on the definition of the term "capital" found in the economic provisions of the Constitution. The opinions issued by SEC legal officers do not have the force and effect of SEC rules and regulations because only the SEC en banc can adopt rules and regulations. As expressly provided in Section 4.6 of the Securities Regulation Code,12 the SEC cannot delegate to any of its individual Commissioner or staff the power to adopt any rule or regulation. Further, under Section 5.1 of the same Code, it is the SEC as a collegial body, and not any of its legal officers, that is empowered to issue opinions and approve rules and regulations. Thus: 4.6. The Commission may, for purposes of efficiency, delegate any of its functions to any department or office of the Commission, an individual Commissioner or staff member of the Commission except its review or appellate authority and its power to adopt, alter and supplement any rule or regulation. The Commission may review upon its own initiative or upon the petition of any interested party any action of any department or office,

individual Commissioner, or staff member of the Commission. SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission.- 5.1. The Commission shall act with transparency and shall have the powers and functions provided by this Code, Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the Corporation Code, the Investment Houses Law, the Financing Company Act and other existing laws. Pursuant thereto the Commission shall have, among others, the following powers and functions: xxxx (g) Prepare, approve, amend or repeal rules, regulations and orders, and issue opinions and provide guidance on and supervise compliance with such rules, regulations and orders; x x x x (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the act of the individual Commissioners or legal officers of the SEC in issuing opinions that have the effect of SEC rules or regulations is ultra vires. Under Sections 4.6 and 5.1(g) of the Code, only the SEC en banc can "issue opinions" that have the force and effect of rules or regulations. Section 4.6 of the Code bars the SEC en banc from delegating to any individual Commissioner or staff the power to adopt rules or regulations. In short, any opinion of individual Commissioners or SEC legal officers does not constitute a rule or regulation of the SEC. The SEC admits during the Oral Arguments that only the SEC en banc, and not any of its individual commissioners or legal staff, is empowered to issue opinions which have the same binding effect as SEC rules and regulations, thus: JUSTICE CARPIO: So, under the law, it is the Commission En Banc that can issue an SEC Opinion, correct?

COMMISSIONER GAITE:13 Thats correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE CARPIO: Can the Commission En Banc delegate this function to an SEC officer? COMMISSIONER GAITE: Yes, Your Honor, we have delegated it to the General Counsel. JUSTICE CARPIO: It can be delegated. What cannot be delegated by the Commission En Banc to a commissioner or an individual employee of the Commission? COMMISSIONER GAITE: Novel opinions that [have] to be decided by the En Banc... JUSTICE CARPIO: What cannot be delegated, among others, is the power to adopt or amend rules and regulations, correct? COMMISSIONER GAITE: Thats correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE CARPIO: So, you combine the two (2), the SEC officer, if delegated that power, can issue an opinion but that opinion does not constitute a rule or regulation, correct? COMMISSIONER GAITE: Correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE CARPIO: So, all of these opinions that you mentioned they are not rules and regulations, correct? COMMISSIONER GAITE:

They are not rules and regulations. JUSTICE CARPIO: If they are not rules and regulations, they apply only to that particular situation and will not constitute a precedent, correct? COMMISSIONER GAITE: Yes, Your Honor.14 (Emphasis supplied) Significantly, the SEC en banc, which is the collegial body statutorily empowered to issue rules and opinions on behalf of the SEC, has adopted even the Grandfather Rule in determining compliance with the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens mandated by the Constitution for certain economic activities. This prevailing SEC ruling, which the SEC correctly adopted to thwart any circumvention of the required Filipino "ownership and control," is laid down in the 25 March 2010 SEC en banc ruling in Redmont Consolidated Mines, Corp. v. McArthur Mining, Inc., et al.,15 to wit: The avowed purpose of the Constitution is to place in the hands of Filipinos the exploitation of our natural resources. Necessarily, therefore, the Rule interpreting the constitutional provision should not diminish that right through the legal fiction of corporate ownership and control. But the constitutional provision, as interpreted and practiced via the 1967 SEC Rules, has favored foreigners contrary to the command of the Constitution. Hence, the Grandfather Rule must be applied to accurately determine the actual participation, both direct and indirect, of foreigners in a corporation engaged in a nationalized activity or business. Compliance with the constitutional limitation(s) on engaging in nationalized activities must be determined by ascertaining if 60% of the investing corporations outstanding capital stock is owned by "Filipino citizens", or as interpreted, by natural or individual Filipino citizens. If such investing corporation is in turn owned to some extent by another investing

corporation, the same process must be observed. One must not stop until the citizenships of the individual or natural stockholders of layer after layer of investing corporations have been established, the very essence of the Grandfather Rule. Lastly, it was the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt the Grandfather Rule. In one of the discussions on what is now Article XII of the present Constitution, the framers made the following exchange: MR. NOLLEDO. In Sections 3, 9 and 15, the Committee stated local or Filipino equity and foreign equity; namely, 60-40 in Section 3, 6040 in Section 9, and 2/3-1/3 in Section 15. MR. VILLEGAS. That is right. MR. NOLLEDO. In teaching law, we are always faced with the question: Where do we base the equity requirement, is it on the authorized capital stock, on the subscribed capital stock, or on the paid-up capital stock of a corporation? Will the Committee please enlighten me on this? MR. VILLEGAS. We have just had a long discussion with the members of the team from the UP Law Center who provided us a draft. The phrase that is contained here which we adopted from the UP draft is 60 percent of voting stock. MR. NOLLEDO. That must be based on the subscribed capital stock, because unless declared delinquent, unpaid capital stock shall be entitled to vote. MR. VILLEGAS. That is right. MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you. With respect to an investment by one corporation in another corporation, say, a corporation with 60-40 percent equity invests in another corporation which is permitted by the Corporation Code, does the Committee adopt the grandfather rule?

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, that is the understanding of the Committee. MR. NOLLEDO. Therefore, we need additional Filipino capital? MR. VILLEGAS. Yes. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied; italicization in the original) This SEC en banc ruling conforms to our 28 June 2011 Decision that the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in the Constitution to engage in certain economic activities applies not only to voting control of the corporation, but also to the beneficial ownership of the corporation. Thus, in our 28 June 2011 Decision we stated: Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipinoowned "capital" required in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine national[s]." (Emphasis supplied) Both the Voting Control Test and the Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied to determine whether a corporation is a "Philippine national." The interpretation by legal officers of the SEC of the term "capital," embodied in various opinions which respondents relied upon, is merely preliminary and an opinion only of such officers. To repeat, any such opinion does not constitute an SEC rule or regulation. In fact, many of these opinions contain a disclaimer which expressly states: "x x x the foregoing opinion is based solely on facts disclosed in your query and relevant only to the particular issue raised therein and shall not be used in the nature of a standing rule binding upon the Commission in other cases whether of similar or dissimilar circumstances."16 Thus, the opinions

clearly make a caveat that they do not constitute binding precedents on any one, not even on the SEC itself. Likewise, the opinions of the SEC en banc, as well as of the DOJ, interpreting the law are neither conclusive nor controlling and thus, do not bind the Court. It is hornbook doctrine that any interpretation of the law that administrative or quasi-judicial agencies make is only preliminary, never conclusive on the Court. The power to make a final interpretation of the law, in this case the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, lies with this Court, not with any other government entity. In his motion for reconsideration, the PSE President cites the cases of National Telecommunications Commission v. Court of Appeals17 and Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Telecommunications Commission18 in arguing that the Court has already defined the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.19 The PSE President is grossly mistaken. In both cases of National Telecommunications v. Court of Appeals20 and Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Telecommunications Commission,21 the Court did not define the term "capital" as found in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, these two cases never mentioned, discussed or cited Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution or any of its economic provisions, and thus cannot serve as precedent in the interpretation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. These two cases dealt solely with the determination of the correct regulatory fees under Section 40(e) and (f) of the Public Service Act, to wit: (e) For annual reimbursement of the expenses incurred by the Commission in the supervision of other public services and/or in the regulation or fixing of their rates, twenty centavos for each one hundred pesos or fraction thereof, of the capital stock subscribed or paid, or if no shares

have been issued, of the capital invested, or of the property and equipment whichever is higher. (f) For the issue or increase of capital stock, twenty centavos for each one hundred pesos or fraction thereof, of the increased capital. (Emphasis supplied) The Courts interpretation in these two cases of the terms "capital stock subscribed or paid," "capital stock" and "capital" does not pertain to, and cannot control, the definition of the term "capital" as used in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, or any of the economic provisions of the Constitution where the term "capital" is found. The definition of the term "capital" found in the Constitution must not be taken out of context. A careful reading of these two cases reveals that the terms "capital stock subscribed or paid," "capital stock" and "capital" were defined solely to determine the basis for computing the supervision and regulation fees under Section 40(e) and (f) of the Public Service Act. III. Filipinization of Public Utilities The Preamble of the 1987 Constitution, as the prologue of the supreme law of the land, embodies the ideals that the Constitution intends to achieve.22 The Preamble reads: We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) Consistent with these ideals, Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution declares as State

policy the development of a national economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos: Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. Fortifying the State policy of a Filipinocontrolled economy, the Constitution decrees: Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.23 Under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, Congress may "reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments." Thus, in numerous laws Congress has reserved certain areas of investments to Filipino citizens or to corporations at least sixty percent of the "capital" of which is owned by Filipino citizens. Some of these laws are: (1) Regulation of Award of Government Contracts or R.A. No. 5183; (2) Philippine Inventors Incentives Act or R.A. No. 3850; (3) Magna Carta for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises or R.A. No. 6977; (4)

Philippine Overseas Shipping Development Act or R.A. No. 7471; (5) Domestic Shipping Development Act of 2004 or R.A. No. 9295; (6) Philippine Technology Transfer Act of 2009 or R.A. No. 10055; and (7) Ship Mortgage Decree or P.D. No. 1521. With respect to public utilities, the 1987 Constitution specifically ordains: Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) This provision, which mandates the Filipinization of public utilities, requires that any form of authorization for the operation of public utilities shall be granted only to "citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens." "The provision is [an express] recognition of the sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and for national security."24 The 1987 Constitution reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities exclusively to (1) Filipino citizens, or (2) corporations or

associations at least 60 percent of whose "capital" is owned by Filipino citizens. Hence, in the case of individuals, only Filipino citizens can validly own and operate a public utility. In the case of corporations or associations, at least 60 percent of their "capital" must be owned by Filipino citizens. In other words, under Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, to own and operate a public utility a corporations capital must at least be 60 percent owned by Philippine nationals. IV. Definition of "Philippine National" Pursuant to the express mandate of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7042 or the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA), as amended, which defined a "Philippine national" as follows: SEC. 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act: a. The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized abroad and registered as doing business in the Philippines under the Corporation Code of which one hundred percent (100%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of each of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least

sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of each of both corporations must be citizens of the Philippines, in order that the corporation, shall be considered a "Philippine national." (Boldfacing, italicization and underscoring supplied) Thus, the FIA clearly and unequivocally defines a "Philippine national" as a Philippine citizen, or a domestic corporation at least "60% of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote" is owned by Philippine citizens. The definition of a "Philippine national" in the FIA reiterated the meaning of such term as provided in its predecessor statute, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987,25 which was issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino. Article 15 of this Code states: Article 15. "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a diplomatic partnership or association wholly-owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty per cent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty per cent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stock in a registered enterprise, at least sixty per cent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of both corporations must be owned and held by the citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty per cent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of both corporations must be citizens of the Philippines in order that the corporation shall be considered a Philippine national. (Boldfacing, italicization and underscoring supplied) Under Article 48(3)26 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, "no corporation x x x

which is not a Philippine national x x x shall do business x x x in the Philippines x x x without first securing from the Board of Investments a written certificate to the effect that such business or economic activity x x x would not conflict with the Constitution or laws of the Philippines."27 Thus, a "non-Philippine national" cannot own and operate a reserved economic activity like a public utility. This means, of course, that only a "Philippine national" can own and operate a public utility. In turn, the definition of a "Philippine national" under Article 15 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 was a reiteration of the meaning of such term as provided in Article 14 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981,28 to wit: Article 14. "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty per cent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty per cent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stock in a registered enterprise, at least sixty per cent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of both corporations must be owned and held by the citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty per cent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of both corporations must be citizens of the Philippines in order that the corporation shall be considered a Philippine national. (Boldfacing, italicization and underscoring supplied) Under Article 69(3) of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981, "no corporation x x x which is not a Philippine national x x x shall do business x x

x in the Philippines x x x without first securing a written certificate from the Board of Investments to the effect that such business or economic activity x x x would not conflict with the Constitution or laws of the Philippines."29 Thus, a "non-Philippine national" cannot own and operate a reserved economic activity like a public utility. Again, this means that only a "Philippine national" can own and operate a public utility. Prior to the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981, Republic Act No. 518630 or the Investment Incentives Act, which took effect on 16 September 1967, contained a similar definition of a "Philippine national," to wit: (f) "Philippine National" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty per cent of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine National and at least sixty per cent of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine Nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stock in a registered enterprise, at least sixty per cent of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of both corporations must be owned and held by the citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty per cent of the members of the Board of Directors of both corporations must be citizens of the Philippines in order that the corporation shall be considered a Philippine National. (Boldfacing, italicization and underscoring supplied) Under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5455 or the Foreign Business Regulations Act, which took effect on 30 September 1968, if the investment in a domestic enterprise by non-Philippine nationals exceeds 30% of its outstanding capital stock, such enterprise must obtain prior approval from the Board of Investments before

accepting such investment. Such approval shall not be granted if the investment "would conflict with existing constitutional provisions and laws regulating the degree of required ownership by Philippine nationals in the enterprise."31 A "non-Philippine national" cannot own and operate a reserved economic activity like a public utility. Again, this means that only a "Philippine national" can own and operate a public utility. The FIA, like all its predecessor statutes, clearly defines a "Philippine national" as a Filipino citizen, or a domestic corporation "at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote" is owned by Filipino citizens. A domestic corporation is a "Philippine national" only if at least 60% of its voting stock is owned by Filipino citizens. This definition of a "Philippine national" is crucial in the present case because the FIA reiterates and clarifies Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which limits the ownership and operation of public utilities to Filipino citizens or to corporations or associations at least 60% Filipino-owned. The FIA is the basic law governing foreign investments in the Philippines, irrespective of the nature of business and area of investment. The FIA spells out the procedures by which nonPhilippine nationals can invest in the Philippines. Among the key features of this law is the concept of a negative list or the Foreign Investments Negative List.32 Section 8 of the law states: SEC. 8. List of Investment Areas Reserved to Philippine Nationals [Foreign Investment Negative List]. - The Foreign Investment Negative List shall have two 2 component lists: A and B: a. List A shall enumerate the areas of activities reserved to Philippine nationals by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws. b. List B shall contain the areas of activities and enterprises regulated pursuant to law:

1. which are defense-related activities, requiring prior clearance and authorization from the Department of National Defense [DND] to engage in such activity, such as the manufacture, repair, storage and/or distribution of firearms, ammunition, lethal weapons, military ordinance, explosives, pyrotechnics and similar materials; unless such manufacturing or repair activity is specifically authorized, with a substantial export component, to a non-Philippine national by the Secretary of National Defense; or 2. which have implications on public health and morals, such as the manufacture and distribution of dangerous drugs; all forms of gambling; nightclubs, bars, beer houses, dance halls, sauna and steam bathhouses and massage clinics. (Boldfacing, underscoring and italicization supplied) Section 8 of the FIA enumerates the investment areas "reserved to Philippine nationals." Foreign Investment Negative List A consists of "areas of activities reserved to Philippine nationals by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws," where foreign equity participation in any enterprise shall be limited to the maximum percentage expressly prescribed by the Constitution and other specific laws. In short, to own and operate a public utility in the Philippines one must be a "Philippine national" as defined in the FIA. The FIA is abundant notice to foreign investors to what extent they can invest in public utilities in the Philippines. To repeat, among the areas of investment covered by the Foreign Investment Negative List A is the ownership and operation of public utilities, which the Constitution expressly reserves to Filipino citizens and to corporations at least 60% owned by Filipino citizens. In other words, Negative List A of the FIA reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities only to "Philippine nationals," defined in Section 3(a) of the FIA as "(1) a citizen of the Philippines; x x x or (3) a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and

entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or (4) a corporation organized abroad and registered as doing business in the Philippines under the Corporation Code of which one hundred percent (100%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals." Clearly, from the effectivity of the Investment Incentives Act of 1967 to the adoption of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981, to the enactment of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, and to the passage of the present Foreign Investments Act of 1991, or for more than four decades, the statutory definition of the term "Philippine national" has been uniform and consistent: it means a Filipino citizen, or a domestic corporation at least 60% of the voting stock is owned by Filipinos. Likewise, these same statutes have uniformly and consistently required that only "Philippine nationals" could own and operate public utilities in the Philippines. The following exchange during the Oral Arguments is revealing: JUSTICE CARPIO: Counsel, I have some questions. You are aware of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, x x x? And the FIA of 1991 took effect in 1991, correct? Thats over twenty (20) years ago, correct? COMMISSIONER GAITE: Correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE CARPIO: And Section 8 of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 states that []only Philippine nationals can own and operate public utilities[], correct? COMMISSIONER GAITE:

Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE CARPIO: And the same Foreign Investments Act of 1991 defines a "Philippine national" either as a citizen of the Philippines, or if it is a corporation at least sixty percent (60%) of the voting stock is owned by citizens of the Philippines, correct? COMMISSIONER GAITE: Correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE CARPIO: And, you are also aware that under the predecessor law of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, the Omnibus Investments Act of 1987, the same provisions apply: x x x only Philippine nationals can own and operate a public utility and the Philippine national, if it is a corporation, x x x sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock of that corporation must be owned by citizens of the Philippines, correct? COMMISSIONER GAITE: Correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE CARPIO: And even prior to the Omnibus Investments Act of 1987, under the Omnibus Investments Act of 1981, the same rules apply: x x x only a Philippine national can own and operate a public utility and a Philippine national, if it is a corporation, sixty percent (60%) of its x x x voting stock, must be owned by citizens of the Philippines, correct? COMMISSIONER GAITE: Correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE CARPIO: And even prior to that, under [the]1967 Investments Incentives Act and the Foreign Company Act of 1968, the same rules applied, correct?

COMMISSIONER GAITE: Correct, Your Honor. JUSTICE CARPIO: So, for the last four (4) decades, x x x, the law has been very consistent only a Philippine national can own and operate a public utility, and a Philippine national, if it is a corporation, x x x at least sixty percent (60%) of the voting stock must be owned by citizens of the Philippines, correct? COMMISSIONER GAITE: Correct, Your Honor.33 (Emphasis supplied) Government agencies like the SEC cannot simply ignore Sections 3(a) and 8 of the FIA which categorically prescribe that certain economic activities, like the ownership and operation of public utilities, are reserved to corporations "at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines." Foreign Investment Negative List A refers to "activities reserved to Philippine nationals by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws." The FIA is the basic statute regulating foreign investments in the Philippines. Government agencies tasked with regulating or monitoring foreign investments, as well as counsels of foreign investors, should start with the FIA in determining to what extent a particular foreign investment is allowed in the Philippines. Foreign investors and their counsels who ignore the FIA do so at their own peril. Foreign investors and their counsels who rely on opinions of SEC legal officers that obviously contradict the FIA do so also at their own peril. Occasional opinions of SEC legal officers that obviously contradict the FIA should immediately raise a red flag. There are already numerous opinions of SEC legal officers that cite the definition of a "Philippine national" in Section 3(a) of the FIA in determining whether a particular corporation is qualified to own and operate a nationalized or partially nationalized

business in the Philippines. This shows that SEC legal officers are not only aware of, but also rely on and invoke, the provisions of the FIA in ascertaining the eligibility of a corporation to engage in partially nationalized industries. The following are some of such opinions: 1. Opinion of 23 March 1993, addressed to Mr. Francis F. How; 2. Opinion of 14 April 1993, addressed to Director Angeles T. Wong of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration; 3. Opinion of 23 November 1993, addressed to Messrs. Dominador Almeda and Renato S. Calma; 4. Opinion of 7 December 1993, addressed to Roco Bunag Kapunan Migallos & Jardeleza; 5. SEC Opinion No. 49-04, addressed to Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De Los Angeles; 6. SEC-OGC Opinion No. 17-07, addressed to Mr. Reynaldo G. David; and 7. SEC-OGC Opinion No. 03-08, addressed to Attys. Ruby Rose J. Yusi and Rudyard S. Arbolado. The SEC legal officers occasional but blatant disregard of the definition of the term "Philippine national" in the FIA signifies their lack of integrity and competence in resolving issues on the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. The PSE President argues that the term "Philippine national" defined in the FIA should be limited and interpreted to refer to corporations seeking to avail of tax and fiscal incentives under investment incentives laws and cannot be equated with the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Pangilinan similarly contends that the FIA and its predecessor statutes do not apply to "companies which have not registered

and obtained special incentives under the schemes established by those laws." Both are desperately grasping at straws. The FIA does not grant tax or fiscal incentives to any enterprise. Tax and fiscal incentives to investments are granted separately under the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, not under the FIA. In fact, the FIA expressly repealed Articles 44 to 56 of Book II of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, which articles previously regulated foreign investments in nationalized or partially nationalized industries. The FIA is the applicable law regulating foreign investments in nationalized or partially nationalized industries. There is nothing in the FIA, or even in the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 or its predecessor statutes, that states, expressly or impliedly, that the FIA or its predecessor statutes do not apply to enterprises not availing of tax and fiscal incentives under the Code. The FIA and its predecessor statutes apply to investments in all domestic enterprises, whether or not such enterprises enjoy tax and fiscal incentives under the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 or its predecessor statutes. The reason is quite obvious mere non-availment of tax and fiscal incentives by a non-Philippine national cannot exempt it from Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution regulating foreign investments in public utilities. In fact, the Board of Investments Primer on Investment Policies in the Philippines,34 which is given out to foreign investors, provides: PART III. FOREIGN INVESTMENTS WITHOUT INCENTIVES Investors who do not seek incentives and/or whose chosen activities do not qualify for incentives, (i.e., the activity is not listed in the IPP, and they are not exporting at least 70% of their production) may go ahead and make the investments without seeking incentives. They only have to be guided by the Foreign Investments Negative List (FINL).

The FINL clearly defines investment areas requiring at least 60% Filipino ownership. All other areas outside of this list are fully open to foreign investors. (Emphasis supplied) V. Right to elect directors, coupled with beneficial ownership, translates to effective control. The 28 June 2011 Decision declares that the 60 percent Filipino ownership required by the Constitution to engage in certain economic activities applies not only to voting control of the corporation, but also to the beneficial ownership of the corporation. To repeat, we held: Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned "capital" required in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is "considered as non-Philippine national[s]." (Emphasis supplied) This is consistent with Section 3 of the FIA which provides that where 100% of the capital stock is held by "a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits," the trustee is a Philippine national if "at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals." Likewise, Section 1(b) of the Implementing Rules of the FIA provides that "for stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights, is essential." Since the constitutional requirement of at least 60 percent Filipino ownership applies not only to voting control of the corporation but also to

the beneficial ownership of the corporation, it is therefore imperative that such requirement apply uniformly and across the board to all classes of shares, regardless of nomenclature and category, comprising the capital of a corporation. Under the Corporation Code, capital stock35 consists of all classes of shares issued to stockholders, that is, common shares as well as preferred shares, which may have different rights, privileges or restrictions as stated in the articles of incorporation.36 The Corporation Code allows denial of the right to vote to preferred and redeemable shares, but disallows denial of the right to vote in specific corporate matters. Thus, common shares have the right to vote in the election of directors, while preferred shares may be denied such right. Nonetheless, preferred shares, even if denied the right to vote in the election of directors, are entitled to vote on the following corporate matters: (1) amendment of articles of incorporation; (2) increase and decrease of capital stock; (3) incurring, creating or increasing bonded indebtedness; (4) sale, lease, mortgage or other disposition of substantially all corporate assets; (5) investment of funds in another business or corporation or for a purpose other than the primary purpose for which the corporation was organized; (6) adoption, amendment and repeal of by-laws; (7) merger and consolidation; and (8) dissolution of corporation.37 Since a specific class of shares may have rights and privileges or restrictions different from the rest of the shares in a corporation, the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution must apply not only to shares with voting rights but also to shares without voting rights. Preferred shares, denied the right to vote in the election of directors, are anyway still entitled to vote on the eight specific corporate matters mentioned above. Thus, if a corporation, engaged in a partially nationalized industry, issues a mixture of common and preferred non-voting shares, at least 60 percent

of the common shares and at least 60 percent of the preferred non-voting shares must be owned by Filipinos. Of course, if a corporation issues only a single class of shares, at least 60 percent of such shares must necessarily be owned by Filipinos. In short, the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens must apply separately to each class of shares, whether common, preferred nonvoting, preferred voting or any other class of shares. This uniform application of the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens clearly breathes life to the constitutional command that the ownership and operation of public utilities shall be reserved exclusively to corporations at least 60 percent of whose capital is Filipino-owned. Applying uniformly the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens to each class of shares, regardless of differences in voting rights, privileges and restrictions, guarantees effective Filipino control of public utilities, as mandated by the Constitution. Moreover, such uniform application to each class of shares insures that the "controlling interest" in public utilities always lies in the hands of Filipino citizens. This addresses and extinguishes Pangilinans worry that foreigners, owning most of the non-voting shares, will exercise greater control over fundamental corporate matters requiring two-thirds or majority vote of all shareholders. VI. Intent of the framers of the Constitution While Justice Velasco quoted in his Dissenting Opinion38 a portion of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission to support his claim that the term "capital" refers to the total outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or non-voting, the following excerpts of the deliberations reveal otherwise. It is clear from the following exchange that the term "capital" refers to controlling interest of a corporation, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. In Sections 3, 9 and 15, the Committee stated local or Filipino equity and foreign equity; namely, 60-40 in Section 3, 6040 in Section 9 and 2/3-1/3 in Section 15. MR. VILLEGAS. That is right. MR. NOLLEDO. In teaching law, we are always faced with this question: "Where do we base the equity requirement, is it on the authorized capital stock, on the subscribed capital stock, or on the paid-up capital stock of a corporation"? Will the Committee please enlighten me on this? MR. VILLEGAS. We have just had a long discussion with the members of the team from the UP Law Center who provided us a draft. The phrase that is contained here which we adopted from the UP draft is "60 percent of voting stock." MR. NOLLEDO. That must be based on the subscribed capital stock, because unless declared delinquent, unpaid capital stock shall be entitled to vote. MR. VILLEGAS. That is right. MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you. With respect to an investment by one corporation in another corporation, say, a corporation with 60-40 percent equity invests in another corporation which is permitted by the Corporation Code, does the Committee adopt the grandfather rule? MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, that is the understanding of the Committee. MR. NOLLEDO. Therefore, we need additional Filipino capital? MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.39 xxxx MR. AZCUNA. May I be clarified as to that portion that was accepted by the Committee.

MR. VILLEGAS. The portion accepted by the Committee is the deletion of the phrase "voting stock or controlling interest." MR. AZCUNA. Hence, without the Davide amendment, the committee report would read: "corporations or associations at least sixty percent of whose CAPITAL is owned by such citizens." MR. VILLEGAS. Yes. MR. AZCUNA. So if the Davide amendment is lost, we are stuck with 60 percent of the capital to be owned by citizens. MR. VILLEGAS. That is right. MR. AZCUNA. But the control can be with the foreigners even if they are the minority. Let us say 40 percent of the capital is owned by them, but it is the voting capital, whereas, the Filipinos own the nonvoting shares. So we can have a situation where the corporation is controlled by foreigners despite being the minority because they have the voting capital. That is the anomaly that would result here. MR. BENGZON. No, the reason we eliminated the word "stock" as stated in the 1973 and 1935 Constitutions is that according to Commissioner Rodrigo, there are associations that do not have stocks. That is why we say "CAPITAL." MR. AZCUNA. We should not eliminate the phrase "controlling interest." MR. BENGZON. In the case of stock corporations, it is assumed.40 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied) Thus, 60 percent of the "capital" assumes, or should result in, a "controlling interest" in the corporation. The use of the term "capital" was intended to replace the word "stock" because associations without stocks can operate public utilities as long as they meet the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens

prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. However, this did not change the intent of the framers of the Constitution to reserve exclusively to Philippine nationals the "controlling interest" in public utilities. During the drafting of the 1935 Constitution, economic protectionism was "the battle-cry of the nationalists in the Convention."41 The same battle-cry resulted in the nationalization of the public utilities.42 This is also the same intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution who adopted the exact formulation embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions on foreign equity limitations in partially nationalized industries. The OSG, in its own behalf and as counsel for the State,43 agrees fully with the Courts interpretation of the term "capital." In its Consolidated Comment, the OSG explains that the deletion of the phrase "controlling interest" and replacement of the word "stock" with the term "capital" were intended specifically to extend the scope of the entities qualified to operate public utilities to include associations without stocks. The framers omission of the phrase "controlling interest" did not mean the inclusion of all shares of stock, whether voting or non-voting. The OSG reiterated essentially the Courts declaration that the Constitution reserved exclusively to Philippine nationals the ownership and operation of public utilities consistent with the States policy to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." As we held in our 28 June 2011 Decision, to construe broadly the term "capital" as the total outstanding capital stock, treated as a single class regardless of the actual classification of shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the "State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." We illustrated the glaring anomaly which would result in defining the term "capital" as the total outstanding capital stock of a corporation, treated as a single class of shares regardless of the actual classification of shares, to wit:

Let us assume that a corporation has 100 common shares owned by foreigners and 1,000,000 non-voting preferred shares owned by Filipinos, with both classes of share having a par value of one peso (P 1.00) per share. Under the broad definition of the term "capital," such corporation would be considered compliant with the 40 percent constitutional limit on foreign equity of public utilities since the overwhelming majority, or more than 99.999 percent, of the total outstanding capital stock is Filipino owned. This is obviously absurd. In the example given, only the foreigners holding the common shares have voting rights in the election of directors, even if they hold only 100 shares. The foreigners, with a minuscule equity of less than 0.001 percent, exercise control over the public utility. On the other hand, the Filipinos, holding more than 99.999 percent of the equity, cannot vote in the election of directors and hence, have no control over the public utility. This starkly circumvents the intent of the framers of the Constitution, as well as the clear language of the Constitution, to place the control of public utilities in the hands of Filipinos. x x x Further, even if foreigners who own more than forty percent of the voting shares elect an allFilipino board of directors, this situation does not guarantee Filipino control and does not in any way cure the violation of the Constitution. The independence of the Filipino board members so elected by such foreign shareholders is highly doubtful. As the OSG pointed out, quoting Justice George Sutherlands words in Humphreys Executor v. US,44 "x x x it is quite evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latters will." Allowing foreign shareholders to elect a controlling majority of the board, even if all the directors are Filipinos, grossly circumvents the letter and intent of the Constitution and defeats the very purpose of our nationalization laws. VII.

Last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution The last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution reads: The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. During the Oral Arguments, the OSG emphasized that there was never a question on the intent of the framers of the Constitution to limit foreign ownership, and assure majority Filipino ownership and control of public utilities. The OSG argued, "while the delegates disagreed as to the percentage threshold to adopt, x x x the records show they clearly understood that Filipino control of the public utility corporation can only be and is obtained only through the election of a majority of the members of the board." Indeed, the only point of contention during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on 23 August 1986 was the extent of majority Filipino control of public utilities. This is evident from the following exchange: THE PRESIDENT. recognized. Commissioner Jamir is

MR. JAMIR. Madam President, my proposed amendment on lines 20 and 21 is to delete the phrase "two thirds of whose voting stock or controlling interest," and instead substitute the words "SIXTY PERCENT OF WHOSE CAPITAL" so that the sentence will read: "No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least SIXTY PERCENT OF WHOSE CAPITAL is owned by such citizens."

xxx THE PRESIDENT: Will Commissioner Jamir first explain? MR. JAMIR. Yes, in this Article on National Economy and Patrimony, there were two previous sections in which we fixed the Filipino equity to 60 percent as against 40 percent for foreigners. It is only in this Section 15 with respect to public utilities that the committee proposal was increased to two-thirds. I think it would be better to harmonize this provision by providing that even in the case of public utilities, the minimum equity for Filipino citizens should be 60 percent. MR. ROMULO. Madam President. THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Romulo is recognized. MR. ROMULO. My reason for supporting the amendment is based on the discussions I have had with representatives of the Filipino majority owners of the international record carriers, and the subsequent memoranda they submitted to me. x x x Their second point is that under the Corporation Code, the management and control of a corporation is vested in the board of directors, not in the officers but in the board of directors. The officers are only agents of the board. And they believe that with 60 percent of the equity, the Filipino majority stockholders undeniably control the board. Only on important corporate acts can the 40-percent foreign equity exercise a veto, x x x. x x x x45 MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Madam President. THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rosario Braid is recognized. MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes, in the interest of equal time, may I also read from a memorandum by the spokesman of the

Philippine Chamber of Communications on why they would like to maintain the present equity, I am referring to the 66 2/3. They would prefer to have a 75-25 ratio but would settle for 66 2/3. x x x xxxx THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, would Commissioner Rosario Braid support the proposal of two-thirds rather than the 60 percent? MS. ROSARIO BRAID. I have added a clause that will put management in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x x46 While they had differing views on the percentage of Filipino ownership of capital, it is clear that the framers of the Constitution intended public utilities to be majority Filipinoowned and controlled. To ensure that Filipinos control public utilities, the framers of the Constitution approved, as additional safeguard, the inclusion of the last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution commanding that "[t]he participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines." In other words, the last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution mandates that (1) the participation of foreign investors in the governing body of the corporation or association shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital of such entity; and (2) all officers of the corporation or association must be Filipino citizens. Commissioner Rosario Braid proposed the inclusion of the phrase requiring the managing officers of the corporation or association to be Filipino citizens specifically to prevent management contracts, which were designed primarily to circumvent the Filipinization of

public utilities, and to assure Filipino control of public utilities, thus: MS. ROSARIO BRAID. x x x They also like to suggest that we amend this provision by adding a phrase which states: "THE MANAGEMENT BODY OF EVERY CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION SHALL IN ALL CASES BE CONTROLLED BY CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES." I have with me their position paper. THE PRESIDENT. proceed. The Commissioner may

THE PRESIDENT. This is still on Section 15. MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, Madam President. xxxx MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Madam President, I propose a new section to read: THE MANAGEMENT BODY OF EVERY CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION SHALL IN ALL CASES BE CONTROLLED BY CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES." This will prevent management contracts and assure control by Filipino citizens. Will the committee assure us that this amendment will insure that past activities such as management contracts will no longer be possible under this amendment? xxxx FR. BERNAS. Madam President. THE PRESIDENT. recognized. Commissioner Bernas is

MS. ROSARIO BRAID. The three major international record carriers in the Philippines, which Commissioner Romulo mentioned Philippine Global Communications, Eastern Telecommunications, Globe Mackay Cable are 40-percent owned by foreign multinational companies and 60-percent owned by their respective Filipino partners. All three, however, also have management contracts with these foreign companies Philcom with RCA, ETPI with Cable and Wireless PLC, and GMCR with ITT. Up to the present time, the general managers of these carriers are foreigners. While the foreigners in these common carriers are only minority owners, the foreign multinationals are the ones managing and controlling their operations by virtue of their management contracts and by virtue of their strength in the governing bodies of these carriers.47 xxxx MR. OPLE. I think a number of us have agreed to ask Commissioner Rosario Braid to propose an amendment with respect to the operating management of public utilities, and in this amendment, we are associated with Fr. Bernas, Commissioners Nieva and Rodrigo. Commissioner Rosario Braid will state this amendment now. Thank you. MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. Will the committee accept a reformulation of the first part? MR. BENGZON. Let us hear it. FR. BERNAS. The reformulation will be essentially the formula of the 1973 Constitution which reads: "THE PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE GOVERNING BODY OF ANY PUBLIC UTILITY ENTERPRISE SHALL BE LIMITED TO THEIR PROPORTIONATE SHARE IN THE CAPITAL THEREOF AND..." MR. VILLEGAS. "ALL THE EXECUTIVE AND MANAGING OFFICERS OF SUCH CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS MUST BE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES." MR. BENGZON. Will Commissioner Bernas read the whole thing again? FR. BERNAS. "THE PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE GOVERNING BODY OF ANY

PUBLIC UTILITY ENTERPRISE SHALL BE LIMITED TO THEIR PROPORTIONATE SHARE IN THE CAPITAL THEREOF..." I do not have the rest of the copy. MR. BENGZON. "AND ALL THE EXECUTIVE AND MANAGING OFFICERS OF SUCH CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS MUST BE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES." Is that correct? MR. VILLEGAS. Yes. MR. BENGZON. Madam President, I think that was said in a more elegant language. We accept the amendment. Is that all right with Commissioner Rosario Braid? MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. xxxx MR. DE LOS REYES. The governing body refers to the board of directors and trustees. MR. VILLEGAS. That is right. MR. BENGZON. Yes, the governing body refers to the board of directors. MR. REGALADO. It is accepted. MR. RAMA. The body is now ready to vote, Madam President VOTING xxxx The results show 29 votes in favor and none against; so the proposed amendment is approved. xxxx THE PRESIDENT. All right. Can we proceed now to vote on Section 15? MR. RAMA. Yes, Madam President. THE PRESIDENT. Will the chairman of the committee please read Section 15?

MR. VILLEGAS. The entire Section 15, as amended, reads: "No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least 60 PERCENT OF WHOSE CAPITAL is owned by such citizens." May I request Commissioner Bengzon to please continue reading. MR. BENGZON. "THE PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE GOVERNING BODY OF ANY PUBLIC UTILITY ENTERPRISE SHALL BE LIMITED TO THEIR PROPORTIONATE SHARE IN THE CAPITAL THEREOF AND ALL THE EXECUTIVE AND MANAGING OFFICERS OF SUCH CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS MUST BE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES." MR. VILLEGAS. "NOR SHALL SUCH FRANCHISE, CERTIFICATE OR AUTHORIZATION BE EXCLUSIVE IN CHARACTER OR FOR A PERIOD LONGER THAN TWENTY-FIVE YEARS RENEWABLE FOR NOT MORE THAN TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public." VOTING xxxx The results show 29 votes in favor and 4 against; Section 15, as amended, is approved.48 (Emphasis supplied) The last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, particularly the provision on the limited participation of foreign investors in the governing body of public utilities, is a reiteration of the last sentence of Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution,49 signifying its importance in reserving ownership and control of public utilities to Filipino citizens.

VIII. The undisputed facts There is no dispute, and respondents do not claim the contrary, that (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus foreigners control PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDTs common shares, constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus Filipinos do not control PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn;50 (5) preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%. Despite the foregoing facts, the Court did not decide, and in fact refrained from ruling on the question of whether PLDT violated the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Such question indisputably calls for a presentation and determination of evidence through a hearing, which is generally outside the province of the Courts jurisdiction, but well within the SECs statutory powers. Thus, for obvious reasons, the Court limited its decision on the purely legal and threshold issue on the definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution and directed the SEC to apply such definition in determining the exact percentage of foreign ownership in PLDT. IX. PLDT is not an indispensable party; SEC is impleaded in this case. In his petition, Gamboa prays, among others: xxxx

5. For the Honorable Court to issue a declaratory relief that ownership of common or voting shares is the sole basis in determining foreign equity in a public utility and that any other government rulings, opinions, and regulations inconsistent with this declaratory relief be declared unconstitutional and a violation of the intent and spirit of the 1987 Constitution; 6. For the Honorable Court to declare null and void all sales of common stocks to foreigners in excess of 40 percent of the total subscribed common shareholdings; and 7. For the Honorable Court to direct the Securities and Exchange Commission and Philippine Stock Exchange to require PLDT to make a public disclosure of all of its foreign shareholdings and their actual and real beneficial owners. Other relief(s) just and equitable are likewise prayed for. (Emphasis supplied) As can be gleaned from his prayer, Gamboa clearly asks this Court to compel the SEC to perform its statutory duty to investigate whether "the required percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be owned by citizens of the Philippines has been complied with [by PLDT] as required by x x x the Constitution."51 Such plea clearly negates SECs argument that it was not impleaded. Granting that only the SEC Chairman was impleaded in this case, the Court has ample powers to order the SECs compliance with its directive contained in the 28 June 2011 Decision in view of the far-reaching implications of this case. In Domingo v. Scheer,52 the Court dispensed with the amendment of the pleadings to implead the Bureau of Customs considering (1) the unique backdrop of the case; (2) the utmost need to avoid further delays; and (3) the issue of public interest involved. The Court held:

The Court may be curing the defect in this case by adding the BOC as party-petitioner. The petition should not be dismissed because the second action would only be a repetition of the first. In Salvador, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., we held that this Court has full powers, apart from that power and authority which is inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-in-interest. The Court has the power to avoid delay in the disposition of this case, to order its amendment as to implead the BOC as party-respondent. Indeed, it may no longer be necessary to do so taking into account the unique backdrop in this case, involving as it does an issue of public interest. After all, the Office of the Solicitor General has represented the petitioner in the instant proceedings, as well as in the appellate court, and maintained the validity of the deportation order and of the BOCs Omnibus Resolution. It cannot, thus, be claimed by the State that the BOC was not afforded its day in court, simply because only the petitioner, the Chairperson of the BOC, was the respondent in the CA, and the petitioner in the instant recourse. In Alonso v. Villamor, we had the occasion to state: There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one and become the other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.53 (Emphasis supplied) In any event, the SEC has expressly manifested54 that it will abide by the Courts decision and defer to the Courts definition of

the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Further, the SEC entered its special appearance in this case and argued during the Oral Arguments, indicating its submission to the Courts jurisdiction. It is clear, therefore, that there exists no legal impediment against the proper and immediate implementation of the Courts directive to the SEC. PLDT is an indispensable party only insofar as the other issues, particularly the factual questions, are concerned. In other words, PLDT must be impleaded in order to fully resolve the issues on (1) whether the sale of 111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific violates the constitutional limit on foreign ownership of PLDT; (2) whether the sale of common shares to foreigners exceeded the 40 percent limit on foreign equity in PLDT; and (3) whether the total percentage of the PLDT common shares with voting rights complies with the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens under the Constitution for the ownership and operation of PLDT. These issues indisputably call for an examination of the parties respective evidence, and thus are clearly within the jurisdiction of the SEC. In short, PLDT must be impleaded, and must necessarily be heard, in the proceedings before the SEC where the factual issues will be thoroughly threshed out and resolved. Notably, the foregoing issues were left untouched by the Court. The Court did not rule on the factual issues raised by Gamboa, except the single and purely legal issue on the definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. The Court confined the resolution of the instant case to this threshold legal issue in deference to the fact-finding power of the SEC. Needless to state, the Court can validly, properly, and fully dispose of the fundamental legal issue in this case even without the participation of PLDT since defining the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution does not, in any way, depend on

whether PLDT was impleaded. Simply put, PLDT is not indispensable for a complete resolution of the purely legal question in this case.55 In fact, the Court, by treating the petition as one for mandamus,56 merely directed the SEC to apply the Courts definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in determining whether PLDT committed any violation of the said constitutional provision. The dispositive portion of the Courts ruling is addressed not to PLDT but solely to the SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked to enforce the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Since the Court limited its resolution on the purely legal issue on the definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, and directed the SEC to investigate any violation by PLDT of the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens under the Constitution,57 there is no deprivation of PLDTs property or denial of PLDTs right to due process, contrary to Pangilinan and Nazarenos misimpression. Due process will be afforded to PLDT when it presents proof to the SEC that it complies, as it claims here, with Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. X. Foreign Investments in the Philippines Movants fear that the 28 June 2011 Decision would spell disaster to our economy, as it may result in a sudden flight of existing foreign investors to "friendlier" countries and simultaneously deterring new foreign investors to our country. In particular, the PSE claims that the 28 June 2011 Decision may result in the following: (1) loss of more than P 630 billion in foreign investments in PSE-listed shares; (2) massive decrease in foreign trading transactions; (3) lower PSE Composite Index; and (4) local investors not investing in PSE-listed shares.5

Dr. Bernardo M. Villegas, one of the amici curiae in the Oral Arguments, shared movants apprehension. Without providing specific details, he pointed out the depressing state of the Philippine economy compared to our neighboring countries which boast of growing economies. Further, Dr. Villegas explained that the solution to our economic woes is for the government to "take-over" strategic industries, such as the public utilities sector, thus: JUSTICE CARPIO: I would like also to get from you Dr. Villegas if you have additional information on whether this high FDI59 countries in East Asia have allowed foreigners x x x control [of] their public utilities, so that we can compare apples with apples. DR. VILLEGAS: Correct, but let me just make a comment. When these neighbors of ours find an industry strategic, their solution is not to "Filipinize" or "Vietnamize" or "Singaporize." Their solution is to make sure that those industries are in the hands of state enterprises. So, in these countries, nationalization means the government takes over. And because their governments are competent and honest enough to the public, that is the solution. x x x 60 (Emphasis supplied) If government ownership of public utilities is the solution, then foreign investments in our public utilities serve no purpose. Obviously, there can never be foreign investments in public utilities if, as Dr. Villegas claims, the "solution is to make sure that those industries are in the hands of state enterprises." Dr. Villegass argument that foreign investments in telecommunication companies like PLDT are badly needed to save our ailing economy contradicts his own theory that the solution is for government to take over these companies. Dr. Villegas is barking up the wrong tree since State ownership of public utilities and foreign investments in such industries are diametrically

opposed concepts, which cannot possibly be reconciled. In any event, the experience of our neighboring countries cannot be used as argument to decide the present case differently for two reasons. First, the governments of our neighboring countries have, as claimed by Dr. Villegas, taken over ownership and control of their strategic public utilities like the telecommunications industry. Second, our Constitution has specific provisions limiting foreign ownership in public utilities which the Court is sworn to uphold regardless of the experience of our neighboring countries. In our jurisdiction, the Constitution expressly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose capital belongs to Filipinos. Following Dr. Villegass claim, the Philippines appears to be more liberal in allowing foreign investors to own 40 percent of public utilities, unlike in other Asian countries whose governments own and operate such industries. XI. Prospective Application of Sanctions In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the SEC sought to clarify the reckoning period of the application and imposition of appropriate sanctions against PLDT if found violating Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.1avvphi1

appropriate sanctions only if it finds after due hearing that, at the start of the administrative case or investigation, there is an existing violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Under prevailing jurisprudence, public utilities that fail to comply with the nationality requirement under Section 11, Article XII and the FIA can cure their deficiencies prior to the start of the administrative case or investigation.61 XII. Final Word The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to Philippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The FIAs implementing rules explain that "[f]or stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential." In effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpretation that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation. Any other construction of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution contravenes the letter and intent of the Constitution. Any other meaning of the term "capital" openly invites alien domination of economic activities reserved exclusively to Philippine nationals. Therefore, respondents interpretation will ultimately result in handing

As discussed, the Court has directed the SEC to investigate and determine whether PLDT violated Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Thus, there is no dispute that it is only after the SEC has determined PLDTs violation, if any exists at the time of the commencement of the administrative case or investigation, that the SEC may impose the statutory sanctions against PLDT. In other words, once the 28 June 2011 Decision becomes final, the SEC shall impose the

over effective control of our national economy to foreigners in patent violation of the Constitution, making Filipinos second-class citizens in their own country. Filipinos have only to remind themselves of how this country was exploited under the Parity Amendment, which gave Americans the same rights as Filipinos in the exploitation of natural resources, and in the ownership and control of public utilities, in the Philippines. To do this the 1935 Constitution, which contained the same 60 percent Filipino ownership and control requirement as the present 1987 Constitution, had to be amended to give Americans parity rights with Filipinos. There was bitter opposition to the Parity Amendment62 and many Filipinos eagerly awaited its expiration. In late 1968, PLDT was one of the American-controlled public utilities that became Filipino-controlled when the controlling American stockholders divested in anticipation of the expiration of the Parity Amendment on 3 July 1974.63 No economic suicide happened when control of public utilities and mining corporations passed to Filipinos hands upon expiration of the Parity Amendment. Movants interpretation of the term "capital" would bring us back to the same evils spawned by the Parity Amendment, effectively giving foreigners parity rights with Filipinos, but this time even without any amendment to the present Constitution. Worse, movants interpretation opens up our national economy to effective control not only by Americans but also by all foreigners, be they Indonesians, Malaysians or Chinese, even in the absence of reciprocal treaty arrangements. At least the Parity Amendment, as implemented by the Laurel-Langley Agreement, gave the capitalstarved Filipinos theoretical parity the same rights as Americans to exploit natural resources, and to own and control public utilities, in the United States of America. Here, movants interpretation would effectively mean a unilateral opening up of our national economy to all foreigners, without any reciprocal

arrangements. That would mean that Indonesians, Malaysians and Chinese nationals could effectively control our mining companies and public utilities while Filipinos, even if they have the capital, could not control similar corporations in these countries. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have the same 60 percent Filipino ownership and control requirement for public utilities like PLOT. Any deviation from this requirement necessitates an amendment to the Constitution as exemplified by the Parity Amendment. This Court has no power to amend the Constitution for its power and duty is only to faithfully apply and interpret the Constitution. WHEREFORE, we DENY the motions for reconsideration WITH FINALITY. No further pleadings shall be entertained. SO ORDERED.