TAN VS.

COMELEC, 237 SCRA 353, OCTOBER 4, 1994 Facts: On May 10, 1992, the petitioner, as an incumbent City Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the COMELEC as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers in the said area for the May 11, 1992, synchronized national and local elections conformably with the provisions of Section 20 (a) of Republic Act 6646 and Section 221 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a Congressional seat to represent the 2nd District of Davao City. Alterado, the private respondent, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation. The cases filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the Office of the Ombudsman was dismissed. What is still pending is an administrative charge, against the Board of Canvassers and herein petitioner for Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence, and Acts Inimical to the Service, instituted in the COMELEC. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction to take action on the administrative case when in fact the petitioner as a City prosecutor is under the Administrative jurisdiction. Held: The COMELECs authority under Section 2 (6 -8), Article 9 of the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters, also Section 52, Article 7 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner is in relation to the performance of his duties as an Election canvasser and not as a City Prosecutor. The COMELECs mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate suspension and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national and local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of the process to the official or employee concerned.

the Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include the construction of Human Development Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and waterworks systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital and laboratory equipment; and the rehabilitation of office and equipment. On the same day, respondent Judge issued the question TRO. In the same order, he directed the petitioners to file their Answer within 10 days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for April 24, 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. They contend that the case principally involves an alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465. RULING: The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link the private respondent's principal grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is particular emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which read: Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense: (a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. xxx xxx xxx (b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. xxx xxx xxx (v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any public official or employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for: (1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following: xxx xxx xxx (w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b)

Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr. January 29, 1993 218 SCRA 253 FACTS: On April 10, 1992, private respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil Action No. 465) before the court a quo against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting certain public works projects as it violates the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because although they were initiated few days before March 27, 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are preconditions for the commencement of any public works project. The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a) those that are Locally-Funded, consisting of 29 different projects for the maintenance or concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of

issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds. The court ruled that Comelec has jurisdiction to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The 1987 Constitution implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules and regulations as provided in Section 2 of Article IX-C. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Comission with the power to investigate and, where appr opriate, prosecute cases of violations of election law, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. It is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the election laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The Constitution itself grants to it exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal officials. Neither can the Court agree with the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action filed in the RTC below involves the prosecution of election offenses; the said action seeks some reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged election offenses; specifically, what is sought is the prevention of the further commission of these offenses which, by their alleged nature, are continuing. There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no legal standing to initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in the law to prevent any citizen from exposing the commission of an election offense and from filing a complaint in connection therewith. On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of complaints for election offenses may be done motu propio by the Commission on Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered political party or organization under the party-list system or any of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission. However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal." As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not seriously concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He merely sought a stoppage of the public works projects because of their alleged adverse effect on his candidacy. Indeed, while he may have had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked the wrong authority. The court, therefore, has no alternative but to grant this petition on the basis their resolution of the principal issue. Nevertheless, it must be strongly emphasized that in so holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465.

GADOR vs. COMELEC Facts: The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980 because of the news in the Bulletin Today. The said news stated that the respondent COMELEC issued a resolution for the extension of time for filing COC. However, the President denied said resolution. Therefore, respondent COMELEC informed the petitioner that his name might not be included in the list of candidates for mayor because of the said incident. Thus, this petition. ISSUE: WON the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid. DECISION: WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. RATIO DECIDENDI:

NO. A certificate of candidacy filed beyond reglementary period is void. Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy. This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.

In the case of De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La Union, and Lucero (48 Phil., 211), the court said: "The certificate of the respondent Juan T. Lucero was defective, lacking the formality of the oath. This irregularity might have justified the elimination of the name of Juan T. Lucero as a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor, if an objection on the part of the petitioner Tomas de Guzman had been made in due time. Yet we are of the opinion that this irregularity does not invalidate the election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technically consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to." The second and eight assignments of error are groundless and must be dismissed.

Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698 Facts: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide: SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position. Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs. Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause Held: Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle. Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the law. The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign. As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could

be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

2175 of the Administrative Code did not violate the right to freedom of religion because it did not give any requirement for a religious test. The view of the dissenting seven failed to obtain a vote of eight members, so it was not controlling. The provision of the

PAMIL VS. TELECOM [86 SCRA 413; G.R. 34854; 20 NOV 1978] Facts: Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected as Municipal Mayor in Alburquerque, Bohol. Petitioner, also an aspirant for said office, then filed a suit for quo warranto for Gonzagas disqualification based on the Administrative Code provision: In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The respondent Judge, in sustaiing Fr. Gonzagas right to the office, ruled that the provision had already been impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. Petitioner on the other hand argues that there was no implied repeal. Issues: (1) Whether or Not Fr. Gonzaga is eligible for the position of municipal mayor, according to law. (2) Whether or Not the prohibition regarding elected or appointed ecclesiastics is constitutional. Held: The court was divided. Five voted that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. Seven others voted that the provision was impliedly repealed. However, the minority vote overruled the seven. According to the dissenting seven, there are three reasons for the said provision to be inoperative. First, the 1935 Constitution stated, No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Second, said section 2175 is superseded by the Constitution. Third, section 2175 has been repealed by Sec. 23 of the Election Code (1971): Appointive public office holders and active members of the Armed Forces are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office. Ecclesiastics were no longer included in the enumeration of personsineligible under the said Election Code. On the other hand, the controlling five argued: Section 2175 of the Administrative Code deals with a matter different from that of section 23 of the Election Code. Also, section