EN BANC

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY CASTRO, ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN

G.R No. 187167

Present:

CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.

FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,

- versus HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO

ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, Respondents. July 16, 2011 Promulgated:

x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys
1

archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.

The Antecedents

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the
2

maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law followed the
3

framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their
4

territorial sea, the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III
5 6

prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended
7

continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one

8

baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators, as the case may be, assail the
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constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the
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terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the
11 12

countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
13

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To buttress their argument of
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territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.

Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah.

Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.

We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:

1. Preliminarily

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and 2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail

the constitutionality of RA 9522.

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.

On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as Citizens

Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative nor misuse of public funds, occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA
16 15

9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.
17

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition Are Proper Remedies to Test the Constitutionality of Statutes

In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise

of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.
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Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.
19 20

Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law. RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national territory because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory
21

under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.
22

Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones ( i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was
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the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the

rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.
24

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties
25

on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.
26

RA 9522s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas

Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that area. Petitioners
27

add that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine

archipelagic baselines results in the loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters, prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. A comparison
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of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis--vis the Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.

The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.

Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:
Extent of maritime area using RA 3046, as amended, taking into Extent of maritime area using RA 9522, taking into account
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account the Treaty of Paris delimitation (in square nautical miles) Internal or archipelagic waters

UNCLOS III (in square nautical miles)

166,858

171,435

Territorial Sea

274,136

32,106

Exclusive Economic Zone TOTAL 440,994

382,669 586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.
30

Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:

SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.
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Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG

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and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such
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that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.

The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:

What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own. This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
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Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:

[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit: 1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent

of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles. 2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water. 3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.
35

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance
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of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
37

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained

Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitutions Delineation of Internal Waters

As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.
38

Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:

39

Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. 1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. 2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. xxxx 4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and

sea lanes passage. Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are
40

now pending in Congress.

41

In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international
42

law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern

43 44

State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community. The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser
45

footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own
46

maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.
47

Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) must also fail. Our present state of
48

jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x. Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting
49

implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran treated the right to a healthful and
50

balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7 ), are not
51 52

violated by RA 9522.

In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters

previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
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UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States

RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522. We have looked at the relevant provision
54

of UNCLOS III and we find petitioners reading plausible. Nevertheless, the

55

prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationallyrecognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines

in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

(Pls. see concurring opinion) PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDODE CASTRO Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice Associate Justice

I certify that Mr. Justice Abad left his concurring vote. ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice

(on leave) JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

1Entitled An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes. 2 Entitled An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines. 3 The third Whereas Clause of RA 3046 expresses the import of treating the Philippines as an archipelagic State: WHEREAS, all the waters around, between, and connecting the various islands of the Philippine archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimensions, have always been considered as necessary appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland waters of the Philippines. 4 One of the four conventions framed during the first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in Geneva, this treaty, excluding the Philippines, entered into force on 10 September 1964. 5 UNCLOS III entered into force on 16 November 1994. 6 The Philippines signed the treaty on 10 December 1982. 7 Article 47, paragraphs 1-3, provide:
1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. 2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles.

3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx 8UNCLOS III entered into force on 16 November 1994. The deadline for the filing of application is mandated in Article 4, Annex II: Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State. The coastal State shall at the same time give the names of any Commission members who have provided it with scientific and technical advice. (Underscoring supplied) In a subsequent meeting, the States parties agreed that for States which became bound by the treaty before 13 May 1999 (such as the Philippines) the ten-year period will be counted from that date. Thus, RA 9522, which took effect on 27 March 2009, barely met the deadline. 9 Rollo, p. 34. 10Which provides: The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. 11Entered into between the Unites States and Spain on 10 December 1898 following the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. Under the terms of the treaty, Spain ceded to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands lying within its technical description. 12 The Treaty of Washington, between Spain and the United States (7 November 1900), transferring to the US the islands of Cagayan, Sulu, and Sibutu and the US-Great Britain Convention (2 January 1930) demarcating boundary lines between the Philippines and North Borneo. 13 Article II, Section 7, Section 8, and Section 16. 14 Allegedly in violation of Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 and Article XIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. 15 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 320 Phil. 171, 186 (1995). 16 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. COMELEC, 165 Phil. 303 (1976).

17Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 899 (2003) citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 155-156 (1995) (Feliciano, J., concurring). The two other factors are: the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy and a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition. Id. 18. Rollo, pp. 144-147. 19See e.g. Aquino III v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617 SCRA 623 (dismissing a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, not for the impropriety of remedy but for lack of merit); Aldaba v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA 137 (issuing the writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591); Macalintal v. COMELEC, 453 Phil. 586 (2003) (issuing the writs of certiorari and prohibition declaring unconstitutional portions of Republic Act No. 9189). 20See e.g. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008, 549 SCRA 77 (granting a writ of certiorari against the Philippine Senate and nullifying the Senate contempt order issued against petitioner). 21 Rollo, p. 31. 22Respondents state in their Comment that petitioners theory has not been accepted or recognized by either the United States or Spain, the parties to the Treaty of Paris. Respondents add that no State is known to have supported this proposition. Rollo, p. 179. 23UNCLOS III belongs to that larger corpus of international law of the sea, which petitioner Magallona himself defined as a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. x x x x (Merlin M. Magallona, Primer on the Law of the Sea 1 [1997]) (Italicization supplied). 24 Following Article 47 (1) of UNCLOS III which provides:
An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. (Emphasis supplied)

25 Under the United Nations Charter, use of force is no longer a valid means of acquiring territory. 26 The last paragraph of the preamble of UNCLOS III states that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law.

27 Rollo, p. 51. 28 Id. at 51-52, 64-66. 29 Based on figures respondents submitted in their Comment (id. at 182). 30 Under Article 74. 31 See note 7. 32 Presidential Decree No. 1596 classifies the KIG as a municipality of Palawan. 33 KIG lies around 80 nautical miles west of Palawan while Scarborough Shoal is around 123 nautical west of Zambales. 34 Journal, Senate 14th Congress 44th Session 1416 (27 January 2009). 35 Rollo, p. 159. 36 Section 2, RA 9522. 37 Article 121 provides: Regime of islands. 1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. 2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory. 3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 38 Rollo, pp. 56-57, 60-64. 39Paragraph 2, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution uses the term archipelagic waters separately from territorial sea. Under UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State may have internal waters such as those enclosed by closing lines across bays and mouths of rivers. See Article 50, UNCLOS III. Moreover, Article 8 (2) of UNCLOS III provides: Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters. (Emphasis supplied) 40 Mandated under Articles 52 and 53 of UNCLOS III:

Article 52. Right of innocent passage. 1. Subject to article 53 and without prejudice to article 50, ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters, in accordance with Part II, section 3. 2. The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been duly published. (Emphasis supplied) Article 53. Right of archipelagic sea lanes passage. 1. An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, suitable for the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea. 2. All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in such sea lanes and air routes. 3. Archipelagic sea lanes passage means the exercise in accordance with this Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. 4. Such sea lanes and air routes shall traverse the archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea and shall include all normal passage routes used as routes for international navigation or overflight through or over archipelagic waters and, within such routes, so far as ships are concerned, all normal navigational channels, provided that duplication of routes of similar convenience between the same entry and exit points shall not be necessary. 5. Such sea lanes and air routes shall be defined by a series of continuous axis lines from the entry points of passage routes to the exit points. Ships and aircraft in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall not deviate more than 25 nautical miles to either side of such axis lines during passage, provided that such ships and aircraft shall not navigate closer to the coasts than 10 per cent of the distance between the nearest points on islands bordering the sea lane. 6. An archipelagic State which designates sea lanes under this article may also prescribe traffic separation schemes for the safe passage of ships through narrow channels in such sea lanes. 7. An archipelagic State may, when circumstances require, after giving due publicity thereto, substitute other sea lanes or traffic separation schemes for any sea lanes or traffic separation schemes previously designated or prescribed by it. 8. Such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes shall conform to generally accepted international regulations. 9. In designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or substituting traffic separation schemes, an archipelagic State shall refer proposals to the competent international organization with a view to their adoption. The organization may adopt only such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as may be agreed with the archipelagic State, after which the archipelagic State may designate, prescribe or substitute them. 10. The archipelagic State shall clearly indicate the axis of the sea lanes and the traffic separation schemes designated or prescribed by it on charts to which due publicity shall be given.

11. Ships in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall respect applicable sea lanes and traffic separation schemes established in accordance with this article. 12. If an archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes or air routes, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may be exercised through the routes normally used for international navigation. (Emphasis supplied)

41Namely, House Bill No. 4153 and Senate Bill No. 2738, identically titled AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES IN THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS, PRESCRIBING THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF FOREIGN SHIPS AND AIRCRAFTS EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES PASSAGE THROUGH THE ESTABLISHED ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES AND PROVIDING FOR THE ASSOCIATED PROTECTIVE MEASURES THEREIN. 42 The relevant provision of UNCLOS III provides: Article 17. Right of innocent passage. Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 19. Meaning of innocent passage. 1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law. 2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities: (a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; (b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; (c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State; (d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State; (e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; (f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;

(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State; (h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; (i) any fishing activities; (j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; (k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State; (l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage Article 21. Laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to innocent passage. 1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the following: (a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic; (b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or installations; (c) the protection of cables and pipelines; (d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea; (e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State; (f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof; (g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys; (h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State. 2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards. 3. The coastal State shall give due publicity to all such laws and regulations. 4. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and all generally accepted international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea.

43The right of innocent passage through the territorial sea applies only to ships and not to aircrafts (Article 17, UNCLOS III). The right of innocent passage of aircrafts through the sovereign territory of a State arises only under an international agreement. In contrast, the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters applies to both ships and aircrafts (Article 53 (12), UNCLOS III). 44Following Section 2, Article II of the Constitution: Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis supplied)

45Archipelagic sea lanes passage is essentially the same as transit passage through straits to which the territorial sea of continental coastal State is subject. R.R. Churabill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 127 (1999). 46 Falling under Article 121 of UNCLOS III (see note 37). 47 Within the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the following rights under UNCLOS III:

Article 58. Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone. 1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention. 2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. xxxx

Beyond the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the freedom of the high seas, defined under UNCLOS III as follows:

Article 87. Freedom of the high seas.

1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: (a) freedom of navigation; (b) freedom of overflight; (c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; (d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, subject to Part VI; (e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; (f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. 2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area. 48 See note 13. 49 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 698 (1995); Taada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 580581 (1997). 50 G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792. 51 The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. 52The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources. 53This can extend up to 350 nautical miles if the coastal State proves its right to claim an extended continental shelf (see UNCLOS III, Article 76, paragraphs 4(a), 5 and 6, in relation to Article 77). 54 Rollo, pp. 67-69.

55Article 47 (1) provides: An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. (Emphasis supplied)

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 159618 February 1, 2011

BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner, vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The Case This petition1 for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 assails and seeks to nullify the Non-Surrender Agreement concluded by and between the Republic of the Philippines (RP) and the United States of America (USA). The Facts Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute3 establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with "the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions."4 The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave

under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.5 On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is "subject to ratification, acceptance or approval" by the signatory states.6 As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92. RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP. Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as "persons" of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.9 The Agreement pertinently provides as follows: 1. For purposes of this Agreement, "persons" are current or former Government officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party. 2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first Party, (a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or (b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council. 3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the [US]. 5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination. In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the nonsurrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.10 In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect. For their part, respondents question petitioners standing to maintain a suit and counter that the Agreement, being in the nature of an executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for its efficacy. And for reasons detailed in their comment, respondents assert the constitutionality of the Agreement. The Issues I. WHETHER THE [RP] PRESIDENT AND THE [DFA] SECRETARY x x x GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION FOR CONCLUDING THE RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT BY MEANS OF [E/N] BFO-028-03 DATED 13 MAY 2003, WHEN THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY SIGNED THE ROME STATUTE OF THE [ICC] ALTHOUGH THIS IS PENDING RATIFICATION BY THE PHILIPPINE SENATE. A. Whether by entering into the x x x Agreement Respondents gravely abused their discretion when they capriciously abandoned, waived and relinquished our only legitimate recourse through the Rome Statute of the [ICC] to prosecute and try "persons" as defined in the x x x Agreement, x x x or literally any conduit of American interests, who have committed crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression, thereby abdicating Philippine Sovereignty. B. Whether after the signing and pending ratification of the Rome Statute of the [ICC] the [RP] President and the [DFA] Secretary x x x are obliged by the

principle of good faith to refrain from doing all acts which would substantially impair the value of the undertaking as signed. C. Whether the x x x Agreement constitutes an act which defeats the object and purpose of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and contravenes the obligation of good faith inherent in the signature of the President affixed on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and if so whether the x x x Agreement is void and unenforceable on this ground. D. Whether the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement is void and unenforceable for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in connection with its execution. II. WHETHER THE RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT IS VOID AB INITIO FOR CONTRACTING OBLIGATIONS THAT ARE EITHER IMMORAL OR OTHERWISE AT VARIANCE WITH UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. III. WHETHER THE x x x AGREEMENT IS VALID, BINDING AND EFFECTIVE WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE BY AT LEAST TWO-THIRDS (2/3) OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE x x x.11 The foregoing issues may be summarized into two: first, whether or not the Agreement was contracted validly, which resolves itself into the question of whether or not respondents gravely abused their discretion in concluding it; and second, whether or not the Agreement, which has not been submitted to the Senate for concurrence, contravenes and undermines the Rome Statute and other treaties. But because respondents expectedly raised it, we shall first tackle the issue of petitioners legal standing. The Courts Ruling This petition is bereft of merit. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of Petitioner Petitioner, through its three party-list representatives, contends that the issue of the validity or invalidity of the Agreement carries with it constitutional significance and is of paramount importance that justifies its standing. Cited in this regard is what is usually referred to as the emergency powers cases,12 in which ordinary citizens and taxpayers were accorded the personality to question the constitutionality of executive issuances. Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."13 Specifically, it is "a partys personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result"14 of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance."15 The term "interest" refers to material interest, as distinguished from one that is merely incidental.16 The rationale for requiring a party who challenges the validity of a law or

international agreement to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."17 Locus standi, however, is merely a matter of procedure and it has been recognized that, in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters who actually sue in the public interest.18 Consequently, in a catena of cases,19 this Court has invariably adopted a liberal stance on locus standi. Going by the petition, petitioners representatives pursue the instant suit primarily as concerned citizens raising issues of transcendental importance, both for the Republic and the citizenry as a whole. When suing as a citizen to question the validity of a law or other government action, a petitioner needs to meet certain specific requirements before he can be clothed with standing. Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.20 expounded on this requirement, thus: In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.21 In the case at bar, petitioners representatives have complied with the qualifying conditions or specific requirements exacted under the locus standi rule. As citizens, their interest in the subject matter of the petition is direct and personal. At the very least, their assertions questioning the Agreement are made of a public right, i.e., to ascertain that the Agreement did not go against established national policies, practices, and obligations bearing on the States obligation to the community of nations. At any event, the primordial importance to Filipino citizens in general of the issue at hand impels the Court to brush aside the procedural barrier posed by the traditional requirement of locus standi, as we have done in a long line of earlier cases, notably in the old but oft-cited emergency powers cases22 and Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr.23 In cases of transcendental importance, we wrote again in Bayan v. Zamora,24 "The Court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review."

Moreover, bearing in mind what the Court said in Taada v. Angara, "that it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government,"25 we cannot but resolve head on the issues raised before us. Indeed, where an action of any branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution or is done with grave abuse of discretion, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle it. As in this petition, issues are precisely raised putting to the fore the propriety of the Agreement pending the ratification of the Rome Statute. Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement. Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and jargonsis untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations.26 An exchange of notes falls "into the category of inter-governmental agreements,"27 which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows: An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.28 In another perspective, the terms "exchange of notes" and "executive agreements" have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action.29 On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President "sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols."30 As former US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts: The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment.31 x x x It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it viewed as the NonSurrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be

boundis a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations. Senate Concurrence Not Required Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation."32 International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.33 Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned,34 as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.35 Neither, on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution.36 Authorities are, however, agreed that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-requirement aspect.37 As has been observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater "dignity" than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people;38 a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment.39 Petitioner parlays the notion that the Agreement is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner takes a cue from Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court reproduced the following observations made by US legal scholars: "[I]nternational agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties [while] those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements." 40 Pressing its point, petitioner submits that the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading case, and that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and settlement of claims. In addition, petitioner foists the applicability to the instant case of Adolfo v. CFI of Zambales and Merchant,41 holding that an executive agreement through an exchange of notes cannot be used to amend a treaty. We are not persuaded. The categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of

entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. Verily, the matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda42 principle. As may be noted, almost half a century has elapsed since the Court rendered its decision in Eastern Sea Trading. Since then, the conduct of foreign affairs has become more complex and the domain of international law wider, as to include such subjects as human rights, the environment, and the sea. In fact, in the US alone, the executive agreements executed by its President from 1980 to 2000 covered subjects such as defense, trade, scientific cooperation, aviation, atomic energy, environmental cooperation, peace corps, arms limitation, and nuclear safety, among others.43 Surely, the enumeration in Eastern Sea Trading cannot circumscribe the option of each state on the matter of which the international agreement format would be convenient to serve its best interest. As Francis Sayre said in his work referred to earlier: x x x It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-agreement act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. x x x They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil air craft, custom matters and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and copyrights, etc. x x x And lest it be overlooked, one type of executive agreement is a treaty-authorized44 or a treatyimplementing executive agreement,45 which necessarily would cover the same matters subject of the underlying treaty. But over and above the foregoing considerations is the fact thatsave for the situation and matters contemplated in Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution46when a treaty is required, the Constitution does not classify any subject, like that involving political issues, to be in the form of, and ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution merely prescribes is that treaties need the concurrence of the Senate by a vote defined therein to complete the ratification process. Petitioners reliance on Adolfo47 is misplaced, said case being inapplicable owing to different factual milieus. There, the Court held that an executive agreement cannot be used to amend a duly ratified and existing treaty, i.e., the Bases Treaty. Indeed, an executive agreement that does not require the concurrence of the Senate for its ratification may not be used to amend a treaty that, under the Constitution, is the product of the ratifying acts of the Executive and the Senate. The presence of a treaty, purportedly being subject to amendment by an executive agreement, does not obtain under the premises. Considering the above discussion, the Court need not belabor at length the third main issue raised, referring to the validity and effectivity of the Agreement without the concurrence by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading,48 as

reiterated in Bayan,49 given recognition to the obligatory effect of executive agreements without the concurrence of the Senate: x x x [T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts. The Agreement Not in Contravention of the Rome Statute It is the petitioners next contention that the Agreement undermines the establishment of the ICC and is null and void insofar as it unduly restricts the ICCs jurisdiction and infringes upon the effectivity of the Rome Statute. Petitioner posits that the Agreement was constituted solely for the purpose of providing individuals or groups of individuals with immunity from the jurisdiction of the ICC; and such grant of immunity through non-surrender agreements allegedly does not legitimately fall within the scope of Art. 98 of the Rome Statute. It concludes that state parties with non-surrender agreements are prevented from meeting their obligations under the Rome Statute, thereby constituting a breach of Arts. 27,50 86,51 8952 and 9053 thereof. Petitioner stresses that the overall object and purpose of the Rome Statute is to ensure that those responsible for the worst possible crimes are brought to justice in all cases, primarily by states, but as a last resort, by the ICC; thus, any agreementlike the non-surrender agreementthat precludes the ICC from exercising its complementary function of acting when a state is unable to or unwilling to do so, defeats the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Petitioner would add that the President and the DFA Secretary, as representatives of a signatory of the Rome Statute, are obliged by the imperatives of good faith to refrain from performing acts that substantially devalue the purpose and object of the Statute, as signed. Adding a nullifying ingredient to the Agreement, according to petitioner, is the fact that it has an immoral purpose or is otherwise at variance with a priorly executed treaty. Contrary to petitioners pretense, the Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. As aptly pointed out by respondents and admitted by petitioners, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to "be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states]."54 Art. 1 of the Rome Statute pertinently provides: Article 1 The Court An International Crimininal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It x x x shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal

jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute. (Emphasis ours.) Significantly, the sixth preambular paragraph of the Rome Statute declares that "it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes." This provision indicates that primary jurisdiction over the so-called international crimes rests, at the first instance, with the state where the crime was committed; secondarily, with the ICC in appropriate situations contemplated under Art. 17, par. 155 of the Rome Statute. Of particular note is the application of the principle of ne bis in idem56 under par. 3 of Art. 20, Rome Statute, which again underscores the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state vis-a-vis that of the ICC. As far as relevant, the provision states that "no person who has been tried by another court for conduct x x x [constituting crimes within its jurisdiction] shall be tried by the [International Criminal] Court with respect to the same conduct x x x." The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken collectively, argue against the idea of jurisdictional conflict between the Philippines, as party to the non-surrender agreement, and the ICC; or the idea of the Agreement substantially impairing the value of the RPs undertaking under the Rome Statute. Ignoring for a while the fact that the RP signed the Rome Statute ahead of the Agreement, it is abundantly clear to us that the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute. Given the above consideration, petitioners suggestionthat the RP, by entering into the Agreement, violated its duty required by the imperatives of good faith and breached its commitment under the Vienna Convention57 to refrain from performing any act tending to impair the value of a treaty, e.g., the Rome Statutehas to be rejected outright. For nothing in the provisions of the Agreement, in relation to the Rome Statute, tends to diminish the efficacy of the Statute, let alone defeats the purpose of the ICC. Lest it be overlooked, the Rome Statute contains a proviso that enjoins the ICC from seeking the surrender of an erring person, should the process require the requested state to perform an act that would violate some international agreement it has entered into. We refer to Art. 98(2) of the Rome Statute, which reads: Article 98 Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender xxxx 2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.

Moreover, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty;58 whereas a State-Party, on the other hand, is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith. In the instant case, it bears stressing that the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature. As a result, petitioners argument that State-Parties with non-surrender agreements are prevented from meeting their obligations under the Rome Statute, specifically Arts. 27, 86, 89 and 90, must fail. These articles are only legally binding upon State-Parties, not signatories. Furthermore, a careful reading of said Art. 90 would show that the Agreement is not incompatible with the Rome Statute. Specifically, Art. 90(4) provides that "[i]f the requesting State is a State not Party to this Statute the requested State, if it is not under an international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State, shall give priority to the request for surrender from the Court. x x x" In applying the provision, certain undisputed facts should be pointed out: first, the US is neither a State-Party nor a signatory to the Rome Statute; and second, there is an international agreement between the US and the Philippines regarding extradition or surrender of persons, i.e., the Agreement. Clearly, even assuming that the Philippines is a StateParty, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute. Sovereignty Limited by International Agreements Petitioner next argues that the RP has, through the Agreement, abdicated its sovereignty by bargaining away the jurisdiction of the ICC to prosecute US nationals, government officials/employees or military personnel who commit serious crimes of international concerns in the Philippines. Formulating petitioners argument a bit differently, the RP, by entering into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international crimes in the country. We are not persuaded. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmance of the Philippines national criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, as explained above, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try "persons" of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system. Or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US "persons" committing high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. As to "persons" of the US whom the Philippines refuses to prosecute, the country would, in effect, accord discretion to the US to exercise either its national criminal jurisdiction over the "person"

concerned or to give its consent to the referral of the matter to the ICC for trial. In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to "persons" of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction. In the context of the Constitution, there can be no serious objection to the Philippines agreeing to undertake the things set forth in the Agreement. Surely, one State can agree to waive jurisdiction to the extent agreed uponto subjects of another State due to the recognition of the principle of extraterritorial immunity. What the Court wrote in Nicolas v. Romulo59a case involving the implementation of the criminal jurisdiction provisions of the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement is apropos: Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another States territory. x x x To be sure, the nullity of the subject non-surrender agreement cannot be predicated on the postulate that some of its provisions constitute a virtual abdication of its sovereignty. Almost every time a state enters into an international agreement, it voluntarily sheds off part of its sovereignty. The Constitution, as drafted, did not envision a reclusive Philippines isolated from the rest of the world. It even adheres, as earlier stated, to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.60 By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other. On the rationale that the Philippines has adopted the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution.61 Such waiver does not amount to an unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of jurisdiction of Philippine courts.62 Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance with Principles of International Law Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, "leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x."63 The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its

sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.64 The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, "is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously." Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute. No Grave Abuse of Discretion Petitioners final point revolves around the necessity of the Senates concurrence in the Agreement. And without specifically saying so, petitioner would argue that the non-surrender agreement was executed by the President, thru the DFA Secretary, in grave abuse of discretion. The Court need not delve on and belabor the first portion of the above posture of petitioner, the same having been discussed at length earlier on. As to the second portion, We wish to state that petitioner virtually faults the President for performing, through respondents, a task conferred the President by the Constitutionthe power to enter into international agreements. By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his or her office, the President, as head of state and government, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country.65 The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into international agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the required concurrence votes of the Senate. But as earlier indicated, executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, "executive altogether." The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.66 In thus agreeing to conclude the Agreement thru E/N BFO-028-03, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, represented by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, acted within the scope of the authority and discretion vested in her by the Constitution. At the end of the day, the President

by ratifying, thru her deputies, the non-surrender agreementdid nothing more than discharge a constitutional duty and exercise a prerogative that pertains to her office. While the issue of ratification of the Rome Statute is not determinative of the other issues raised herein, it may perhaps be pertinent to remind all and sundry that about the time this petition was interposed, such issue of ratification was laid to rest in Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary.67 As the Court emphasized in said case, the power to ratify a treaty, the Statute in that instance, rests with the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate, whose role relative to the ratification of a treaty is limited merely to concurring in or withholding the ratification. And concomitant with this treaty-making power of the President is his or her prerogative to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate; or having secured the latters consent to the ratification of the treaty, refuse to ratify it.68 This prerogative, the Court hastened to add, is the Presidents alone and cannot be encroached upon via a writ of mandamus. Barring intervening events, then, the Philippines remains to be just a signatory to the Rome Statute. Under Art. 12569 thereof, the final acts required to complete the treaty process and, thus, bring it into force, insofar as the Philippines is concerned, have yet to be done. Agreement Need Not Be in the Form of a Treaty On December 11, 2009, then President Arroyo signed into law Republic Act No. (RA) 9851, otherwise known as the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity." Sec. 17 of RA 9851, particularly the second paragraph thereof, provides: Section 17. Jurisdiction. x x x x In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense with the investigation or prosecution of a crime punishable under this Act if another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime. Instead, the authorities may surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the Philippines to the appropriate international court, if any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties. (Emphasis supplied.) A view is advanced that the Agreement amends existing municipal laws on the States obligation in relation to grave crimes against the law of nations, i.e., genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Relying on the above-quoted statutory proviso, the view posits that the Philippine is required to surrender to the proper international tribunal those persons accused of the grave crimes defined under RA 9851, if it does not exercise its primary jurisdiction to prosecute them. The basic premise rests on the interpretation that if it does not decide to prosecute a foreign national for violations of RA 9851, the Philippines has only two options, to wit: (1) surrender the accused to the proper international tribunal; or (2) surrender the accused to another State if such surrender is "pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties." But the Philippines may exercise these options only in cases where "another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime;" otherwise, the Philippines must prosecute the crime before its own courts pursuant to RA 9851.

Posing the situation of a US national under prosecution by an international tribunal for any crime under RA 9851, the Philippines has the option to surrender such US national to the international tribunal if it decides not to prosecute such US national here. The view asserts that this option of the Philippines under Sec. 17 of RA 9851 is not subject to the consent of the US, and any derogation of Sec. 17 of RA 9851, such as requiring the consent of the US before the Philippines can exercise such option, requires an amendatory law. In line with this scenario, the view strongly argues that the Agreement prevents the Philippineswithout the consent of the US from surrendering to any international tribunal US nationals accused of crimes covered by RA 9851, and, thus, in effect amends Sec. 17 of RA 9851. Consequently, the view is strongly impressed that the Agreement cannot be embodied in a simple executive agreement in the form of an exchange of notes but must be implemented through an extradition law or a treaty with the corresponding formalities. Moreover, consonant with the foregoing view, citing Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution, where the Philippines adopts, as a national policy, the "generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land," the Court is further impressed to perceive the Rome Statute as declaratory of customary international law. In other words, the Statute embodies principles of law which constitute customary international law or custom and for which reason it assumes the status of an enforceable domestic law in the context of the aforecited constitutional provision. As a corollary, it is argued that any derogation from the Rome Statute principles cannot be undertaken via a mere executive agreement, which, as an exclusive act of the executive branch, can only implement, but cannot amend or repeal, an existing law. The Agreement, so the argument goes, seeks to frustrate the objects of the principles of law or alters customary rules embodied in the Rome Statute. Prescinding from the foregoing premises, the view thus advanced considers the Agreement inefficacious, unless it is embodied in a treaty duly ratified with the concurrence of the Senate, the theory being that a Senate- ratified treaty partakes of the nature of a municipal law that can amend or supersede another law, in this instance Sec. 17 of RA 9851 and the status of the Rome Statute as constitutive of enforceable domestic law under Sec. 2, Art. II of the Constitution. We are unable to lend cogency to the view thus taken. For one, we find that the Agreement does not amend or is repugnant to RA 9851. For another, the view does not clearly state what precise principles of law, if any, the Agreement alters. And for a third, it does not demonstrate in the concrete how the Agreement seeks to frustrate the objectives of the principles of law subsumed in the Rome Statute. Far from it, as earlier explained, the Agreement does not undermine the Rome Statute as the former merely reinforces the primacy of the national jurisdiction of the US and the Philippines in prosecuting criminal offenses committed by their respective citizens and military personnel, among others. The jurisdiction of the ICC pursuant to the Rome Statute over high crimes indicated thereat is clearly and unmistakably complementary to the national criminal jurisdiction of the signatory states. Moreover, RA 9851 clearly: (1) defines and establishes the crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes against humanity;70 (2) provides penal sanctions

and criminal liability for their commission;71 and (3) establishes special courts for the prosecution of these crimes and for the State to exercise primary criminal jurisdiction.72 Nowhere in RA 9851 is there a proviso that goes against the tenor of the Agreement. The view makes much of the above quoted second par. of Sec. 17, RA 9851 as requiring the Philippine State to surrender to the proper international tribunal those persons accused of crimes sanctioned under said law if it does not exercise its primary jurisdiction to prosecute such persons. This view is not entirely correct, for the above quoted proviso clearly provides discretion to the Philippine State on whether to surrender or not a person accused of the crimes under RA 9851. The statutory proviso uses the word "may." It is settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may" denotes discretion, and cannot be construed as having mandatory effect.73 Thus, the pertinent second pararagraph of Sec. 17, RA 9851 is simply permissive on the part of the Philippine State.1avvphi1 Besides, even granting that the surrender of a person is mandatorily required when the Philippines does not exercise its primary jurisdiction in cases where "another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime," still, the tenor of the Agreement is not repugnant to Sec. 17 of RA 9851. Said legal proviso aptly provides that the surrender may be made "to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties." The Agreement can already be considered a treaty following this Courts decision in Nicolas v. Romulo74 which cited Weinberger v. Rossi.75 In Nicolas, We held that "an executive agreement is a treaty within the meaning of that word in international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis--vis the United States."76 Likewise, the Philippines and the US already have an existing extradition treaty, i.e., RP-US Extradition Treaty, which was executed on November 13, 1994. The pertinent Philippine law, on the other hand, is Presidential Decree No. 1069, issued on January 13, 1977. Thus, the Agreement, in conjunction with the RP-US Extradition Treaty, would neither violate nor run counter to Sec. 17 of RA 9851. The views reliance on Suplico v. Neda77 is similarly improper. In that case, several petitions were filed questioning the power of the President to enter into foreign loan agreements. However, before the petitions could be resolved by the Court, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion averring that the Philippine Government decided not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project, thus rendering the petition moot. In resolving the case, the Court took judicial notice of the act of the executive department of the Philippines (the President) and found the petition to be indeed moot. Accordingly, it dismissed the petitions. In his dissent in the abovementioned case, Justice Carpio discussed the legal implications of an executive agreement. He stated that "an executive agreement has the force and effect of law x x x [it] cannot amend or repeal prior laws."78 Hence, this argument finds no application in this case seeing as RA 9851 is a subsequent law, not a prior one. Notably, this argument cannot be found in the ratio decidendi of the case, but only in the dissenting opinion.

The view further contends that the RP-US Extradition Treaty is inapplicable to RA 9851 for the reason that under par. 1, Art. 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, "[a]n offense shall be an extraditable offense if it is punishable under the laws in both Contracting Parties x x x,"79 and thereby concluding that while the Philippines has criminalized under RA 9851 the acts defined in the Rome Statute as war crimes, genocide and other crimes against humanity, there is no similar legislation in the US. It is further argued that, citing U.S. v. Coolidge, in the US, a person cannot be tried in the federal courts for an international crime unless Congress adopts a law defining and punishing the offense. This view must fail. On the contrary, the US has already enacted legislation punishing the high crimes mentioned earlier. In fact, as early as October 2006, the US enacted a law criminalizing war crimes. Section 2441, Chapter 118, Part I, Title 18 of the United States Code Annotated (USCA) provides for the criminal offense of "war crimes" which is similar to the war crimes found in both the Rome Statute and RA 9851, thus: (a) Offense Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a war crime, in any of the circumstances described in subsection (b), shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death. (b) Circumstances The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that the person committing such war crime or the victim of such war crime is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States (as defined in Section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act). (c) Definition As used in this Section the term "war crime" means any conduct (1) Defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva 12 August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party; (2) Prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27 or 28 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907; (3) Which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 (as defined in subsection [d]) when committed in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not of an international character; or (4) Of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996), when the United States is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or causes serious injury to civilians.801avvphi1

Similarly, in December 2009, the US adopted a law that criminalized genocide, to wit: 1091. Genocide (a) Basic Offense Whoever, whether in the time of peace or in time of war and with specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such (1) kills members of that group; (2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group; (3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members of the group through drugs, torture, or similar techniques; (4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part; (5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or (6) transfers by force children of the group to another group; shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).81 Arguing further, another view has been advanced that the current US laws do not cover every crime listed within the jurisdiction of the ICC and that there is a gap between the definitions of the different crimes under the US laws versus the Rome Statute. The view used a report written by Victoria K. Holt and Elisabeth W. Dallas, entitled "On Trial: The US Military and the International Criminal Court," as its basis. At the outset, it should be pointed out that the report used may not have any weight or value under international law. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) lists the sources of international law, as follows: (1) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (2) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and (4) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. The report does not fall under any of the foregoing enumerated sources. It cannot even be considered as the "teachings of highly qualified publicists." A highly qualified publicist is a scholar of public international law and the term usually refers to legal scholars or "academic writers."82 It has not been shown that the authors83 of this report are highly qualified publicists. Assuming arguendo that the report has weight, still, the perceived gaps in the definitions of the crimes are nonexistent. To highlight, the table below shows the definitions of genocide and war crimes under the Rome Statute vis--vis the definitions under US laws:

Rome Statute Article 6 Genocide For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 1091. Genocide

US Law

(a) Basic Offense Whoever, whether in the time of peace or in time of war and with specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such (1) kills members of that group; (2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group; (3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members of the group through drugs, torture, or similar techniques; (4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the group in whole or in part; (5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or (6) transfers by force children of the group to another group; shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

Article 8 War Crimes 2. For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means:

(d) Definition As used in this Section the term "war crime" means any conduct (1) Defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions

(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: x x x84 (b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: xxxx (c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause: xxxx (d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and

signed at Geneva 12 August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party; (2) Prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27 or 28 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907; (3) Which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 (as defined in subsection [d]85) when committed in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not of an international character; or (4) Of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996), when the United States is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or causes serious injury to civilians.86

sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. (e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: x x x. Evidently, the gaps pointed out as to the definition of the crimes are not present. In fact, the report itself stated as much, to wit: Few believed there were wide differences between the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court and crimes within the Uniform Code of Military Justice that would expose US personnel to the Court. Since US military lawyers were instrumental in drafting the elements of crimes outlined in the Rome Statute, they ensured that most of the crimes were consistent with those outlined in the UCMJ and gave strength to complementarity for the US. Small areas of potential gaps between the UCMJ and the Rome Statute, military experts argued, could be addressed through existing military laws.87 x x x The report went on further to say that "[a]ccording to those involved, the elements of crimes laid out in the Rome Statute have been part of US military doctrine for decades."88 Thus, the argument proffered cannot stand. Nonetheless, despite the lack of actual domestic legislation, the US notably follows the doctrine of incorporation. As early as 1900, the esteemed Justice Gray in The Paquete Habana89 case already held international law as part of the law of the US, to wit: International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for the trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.90 (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, a person can be tried in the US for an international crime despite the lack of domestic legislation. The cited ruling in U.S. v. Coolidge,91 which in turn is based on the holding in U.S. v. Hudson,92 only applies to common law and not to the law of nations or international law.93

Indeed, the Court in U.S. v. Hudson only considered the question, "whether the Circuit Courts of the United States can exercise a common law jurisdiction in criminal cases."94 Stated otherwise, there is no common law crime in the US but this is considerably different from international law. The US doubtless recognizes international law as part of the law of the land, necessarily including international crimes, even without any local statute.95 In fact, years later, US courts would apply international law as a source of criminal liability despite the lack of a local statute criminalizing it as such. So it was that in Ex Parte Quirin96 the US Supreme Court noted that "[f]rom the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals."97 It went on further to explain that Congress had not undertaken the task of codifying the specific offenses covered in the law of war, thus: It is no objection that Congress in providing for the trial of such offenses has not itself undertaken to codify that branch of international law or to mark its precise boundaries, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which that law condemns. An Act of Congress punishing the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations is an appropriate exercise of its constitutional authority, Art. I, s 8, cl. 10, to define and punish the offense since it has adopted by reference the sufficiently precise definition of international law. x x x Similarly by the reference in the 15th Article of War to offenders or offenses that x x x by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions. Congress has incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of military commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the law of war x x x, and which may constitutionally be included within that jurisdiction.98 x x x (Emphasis supplied.) This rule finds an even stronger hold in the case of crimes against humanity. It has been held that genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity have attained the status of customary international law. Some even go so far as to state that these crimes have attained the status of jus cogens.99 Customary international law or international custom is a source of international law as stated in the Statute of the ICJ.100 It is defined as the "general and consistent practice of states recognized and followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."101 In order to establish the customary status of a particular norm, two elements must concur: State practice, the objective element; and opinio juris sive necessitates, the subjective element.102 State practice refers to the continuous repetition of the same or similar kind of acts or norms by States.103 It is demonstrated upon the existence of the following elements: (1) generality; (2) uniformity and consistency; and (3) duration.104 While, opinio juris, the psychological element, requires that the state practice or norm "be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it."105 "The term jus cogens means the compelling law."106 Corollary, "a jus cogens norm holds the highest hierarchical position among all other customary norms and principles."107 As a result, jus cogens norms are deemed "peremptory and non-derogable."108 When applied to international

crimes, "jus cogens crimes have been deemed so fundamental to the existence of a just international legal order that states cannot derogate from them, even by agreement."109 These jus cogens crimes relate to the principle of universal jurisdiction, i.e., "any state may exercise jurisdiction over an individual who commits certain heinous and widely condemned offenses, even when no other recognized basis for jurisdiction exists."110 "The rationale behind this principle is that the crime committed is so egregious that it is considered to be committed against all members of the international community"111 and thus granting every State jurisdiction over the crime.112 Therefore, even with the current lack of domestic legislation on the part of the US, it still has both the doctrine of incorporation and universal jurisdiction to try these crimes. Consequently, no matter how hard one insists, the ICC, as an international tribunal, found in the Rome Statute is not declaratory of customary international law. The first element of customary international law, i.e., "established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States,"113 does not, under the premises, appear to be obtaining as reflected in this simple reality: As of October 12, 2010, only 114114 States have ratified the Rome Statute, subsequent to its coming into force eight (8) years earlier, or on July 1, 2002. The fact that 114 States out of a total of 194115 countries in the world, or roughly 58.76%, have ratified the Rome Statute casts doubt on whether or not the perceived principles contained in the Statute have attained the status of customary law and should be deemed as obligatory international law. The numbers even tend to argue against the urgency of establishing international criminal courts envisioned in the Rome Statute. Lest it be overlooked, the Philippines, judging by the action or inaction of its top officials, does not even feel bound by the Rome Statute. Res ipsa loquitur. More than eight (8) years have elapsed since the Philippine representative signed the Statute, but the treaty has not been transmitted to the Senate for the ratification process. And this brings us to what Fr. Bernas, S.J. aptly said respecting the application of the concurring elements, thus: Custom or customary international law means "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris] x x x." This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is how the states behave, and the psychological factor or subjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do. xxxx The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of states. This includes several elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of states. The required duration can be either short or long. x x x xxxx

Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important is the consistency and the generality of the practice. x x x xxxx Once the existence of state practice has been established, it becomes necessary to determine why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way they do because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law.116 (Emphasis added.) Evidently, there is, as yet, no overwhelming consensus, let alone prevalent practice, among the different countries in the world that the prosecution of internationally recognized crimes of genocide, etc. should be handled by a particular international criminal court. Absent the widespread/consistent-practice-of-states factor, the second or the psychological element must be deemed non-existent, for an inquiry on why states behave the way they do presupposes, in the first place, that they are actually behaving, as a matter of settled and consistent practice, in a certain manner. This implicitly requires belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.117 Like the first element, the second element has likewise not been shown to be present. Further, the Rome Statute itself rejects the concept of universal jurisdiction over the crimes enumerated therein as evidenced by it requiring State consent.118 Even further, the Rome Statute specifically and unequivocally requires that: "This Statute is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States."119 These clearly negate the argument that such has already attained customary status. More importantly, an act of the executive branch with a foreign government must be afforded great respect. The power to enter into executive agreements has long been recognized to be lodged with the President. As We held in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, "[t]he power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence."120 The rationale behind this principle is the inviolable doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government. Thus, absent any clear contravention of the law, courts should exercise utmost caution in declaring any executive agreement invalid. In light of the above consideration, the position or view that the challenged RP-US NonSurrender Agreement ought to be in the form of a treaty, to be effective, has to be rejected. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.