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*Guerrilla

Warfare

*The ObjectiveandVietnam o Mechanized FightingVehicle

UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND

AND GENERAL STAFF COLLE6E
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
COMMANDANT ilfaj Gen Harru J. Lemleu, Jr. COMMANDANT

ASSISTANT

Brig Gen Robert C. Taber

Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

Mechanized Fighting Vehicle Guerrilla Warfare Pattern War of Independence Berlin Confrontation . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . Col Robert P. Zeigler, USA 3
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19
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40
52
61
64
73
62
67
91

Brig J. Michael Calvert, British Army, Ret Col M. Dugu6 MacCarthy, French Army, Ret . . . . . . . . Jean Edward Smith

Intelligence Role in Policymaking Red Chhra Colonizes Tibet The McMahon Line . . . . . . .

Capt Roy H. Pinkerton, USNR

Wg Cdr M. K. Chopra, Indian Air Force, Ret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Earl B. Shaw

The American Revolution

Maj Ray L. Bowers, Jr., USAF . . . . . Dean Rusk

Anatomy of Foreign Policy Decisions The Objective and Vietnam . .

Lt Col John%. D. Cleland, USA . . . . . . Harriet Fast Scott

Soviet Military Literature for 1966 Cheap Solutions for winning Wars? Miiitary Notes Military Books . . . . . . . . . .

Col Robert B. Rigg, USA . . . . . . . . ...97

...106

TheVIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessarily thoseof the USArmy or the Command andGeneral StaffCollege.

IJOTICE
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Editor in Chief
Col DonaldJ. Delaney

Associate Editor

Col John B. McKhrney

Army Wer College
Assistant EdNor

Lt Col A. Leroy Covey

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MILITARY REVIEW-Publlshad monthly by theU.S.Arm Command andGeneral Staff College,

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The Military Review announces the selection of the following arti cle from the May 1966 issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD ARTI CLE:
The IWyth of the Thud Man

Lieutenant Cokmel Irvin M. Kent, USA, and Major Richard A. Jones, USA

Three broad avenues of attack against insurgency are currently recog nized. Counterguerrilla and environmental improvement are two which are fairly clearly established under Country Team responsibility. How ever, the man responsible for a population and resources control pro gram is more difficult to identify. Military personnel with military gov ernment or civil affaira training may inherit the responsibility for imch a program. The nuclei around which the principles and techniques can be taught are already in existence at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Gordon, Georgia.

+7

COMING:
Lieutenant Colonel Harry O. Amos, a former artillery battalion commander in Vietnam, writea of problems met and overcome by US artillery units in Artillery Support of Vietnamese. These unite have found that tbe ahnda~ forward Ob. server and liaiaon organization can provide effective firepower zupport to the Vietnamese commander. Colonel A. E, Younger in Self-Training for Senior Otlicera discusaea several areas of strategy with which the senior officer should become acquainted. He alao urgea the Staff Colleges to institute programs to stimulate officer interest in self-training which may start them on the road to higher posta within the Armed Forces.
I

The tiewe ez17rea8t?d in thie article are the authore and are not nece8 8arily thoee of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U. S. AmmI Command and General Staff Colkge.-Editor. HE search for new concepts has haen underway for 20 years, T and nothing of great consequence hae appeared. This is not baeause there are no new concepts available. The real problem lice with thoee who are hunting for something new. They want a new look, but one that is famil iar enough to suit their own tastes. Alternately, they proclaim that or derly evolution ie the key to progress or that conditions cannot be satisfied My 1900

with anything less than a revolution. It should he clear by now that no revolu tionary concepts will ha forthcoming on an automatic baeis. The raquira ment for a quantum jump affeete too many people and institutions to ha palatable. This is because the needed changee enhancq some and detreet from others according to the inteneity of warfare under dkwussion. Contrary to the view of moat mili tary pareone, the art of soldiering is a trade, not a science. The turds change constantly, and tbe method of applica tion should be changed to adapt the tools to the job at hand. The solution to a eeientitic problem can be pr dieted with a high degree of accuracy. Such precision is not poeeible inkthe 8

MECBAMIZED VEltlGIE military profession, and, if we are to accelerate progress, this inaccuracy should be recognised. The usual arguments are continuing among our branches, each basing its recommendations on tradition abetted to a degree by progress. Some armor men would relegate the infantry to the Middle Ages while they mount their trusty steeds and gallop off to win the fray. The infantry points to those situations wherein tanks cannot oper ate, and the artillery has concentrated its development on missiles. As a re sult, our conventional artillery support has shrunk, and the pieces are not significantly improved over those of 20 years ago. Sh~ to Rear The Army now finds itself largely equipped with tools and doctrine to fight World War II in a superior man ner. As the World War II group pro gressed in age, the Army emphasis has shifted toward the rear in certain re spects. We have improved communica tions in tbe rear; we are automating the rear so that generals can control squads. There are mobile command vans to follow troops back and forth, even though our doctrine remains es sentially linear in natur-nd the equipment and impedimenta support this scheme of operation. The criteria for a new concept in Coloael Robert P. Zeigler is Chief of the Organisation and Doet?ine Divi sion, Headquarter Combined Arms Group, at Fort Leavenworth. A grad uate of the University of Omaha and the Air Command awdStaff College, he has ee:ved with the US Armv Arctic Teet Board at Fort Greely, Alaska, amf was with the 29th Infantty Divieion during World War II. He is the author of the reeerztlripublished book, The Dog Chases the Bird. 4 the Army are somewhat different than they were 20 yeara ago. This is not because we have nuclear weapons, helicopters, or missiles. It is not due to the many new missions and wide spread deployments. We need different criteria becauee it appears we shall be heavily outnumbered in any conflict of large proportions.
Incerrect Approach

What then should be our approach? First, we need efficiency on the battle field. This is hard to get, but it is not hard to get a greet improvement over what we have now. The wrong ap proach is to sit down and demand a better tank, rifle, cannon, or missile. The second incorrect approach is to oversophkticate a combat system that is almost identical to that of the enemy, and, additionally, one wherein you are outnumbered five or 10 to one at tbe outset. Most combat experience is gained in what might be termed traumatic circumstances. As a result, it is deeply engraved upon the mind. When something better is requested, most people go back in a sort of traumatic psychodrama and relive the experi ence with a better weapon or other device that would have solved a his toric problem. Any new idea that does not fit the eagraving is often sum marily rejected. ~~ Doctrinal field manuals produced following World War II provide a good example. It took two to three years to produce manuals that were, in effect, a coordinated description of how the war was fought in different environ ments. Actually, these manuals only detailed the experiences of one force structure versus another in many re spects. The books were written, and the new students were required to memoMilitary ROVieW

.
MECIIANIZED VEHICLE rize the new dogma. Unfortunately, there is scarcely any other way to learn, but the teachera should not en deavor to guard the dogma from de sirable changes. It would be interest ing tO surmiee what would be in exieting manuals had there been 20 fewer Allied divisione on the Western . .,-, . . ., .. ~,,,.O ...., ; ,,,,~ when mobility was being used tQ the maximum extent by ground forcee, the need for firepower wae apparently lessened during that space of time. This revolutionary, but misdirected, thinking is with us still, The trend over the past 100 years bse placed more and more weapons at ,.. . -~ . .. .,,. : .;J;,,-;,.. , ..

AWIW New. Fe@we.

The OV-1 Mehawkcan providebrigade and battalioncemaranders immediateaerial re connaieeance and surveillanceinformation Front during World War II. We would have won anyway, but via different experiences. In retroepeet, World War I wea a kind. of linear siege warfare. World War II featured linear lines of fox holes and occupants that sometimes moved at a rate of approximately four kilometer per hour, with the excep tion of breakthroughs where, on occa sion, mobility was not hindered by any opposition. Product improvements on the tank and airplane appeared to @ve a new complexion to the picture. Thus, My 1986 the disposal of the frontline units machinegune, carriers, tanks, night vision equipment, and mortars. The ideal solution is to package these ca pabilities in a form that makes them more lethal and, at the same tilme, greatly assists the frontline soldier in doing his job. Squads must also be come more independent in nature to contribute to a truly mobile defense. The combat reeponse will thus be more in line with communication capabili. ties regarding direction. If the linear foxholes are mecha 1 5

MECtlAtilZEO VEtSGU nized, so to speak, the flexibility of the structure is greatly atfeeted. The point in question is whether or not the fox holes should be converted to mere armored mobility; or mobility and fme power; or mobility, firepower, and chock effect. The latter is possible, hut not unlees traditional ideas are changed. The linear linee and positions of World Ware I and H were ideal targets for artillery, mortars, and aircraft. Unite guarded terrain with fierce de termination, which fixed them in place as ideal targets for indireet fire sys tems.
Movement and Siding

One of the features of a new doc trine should be to operate in a fashion that takes some of the teeth out of the efficiency of artillery, including mie silea. This should not be accomplished by putting more effort in dig ging holes. It should be accomplished through movement and hiding. Fixed and mobile hedgehogs should be used to such a degree that it is ditlicult for the enemy to determine how deep the defenees are in given areas. The new atructuree should be amenable to nu clear or nonnuclear conditions through changes in frontages without the need to reanalyze command and control, service support, intelligence, and mo bility. The doctrine for inferior numbers must embrace other changes. We need to reexamine our choice of objectives. The trend to central authority must be reversed. Some automation should be put at the front. Whenever possible we should avoid combat in large cities and forests. These featuree are actually obstacles requiring large masees of infantry to eepture or hold. The de ,fense should utilise large open areas whenever possible, and in the attack 8

shou!d seek to go around such obsta cles, using air lines of supply in lieu of the road nets in and near urban areas. We should not devote great eums of money and effort to tbe organization of defensive zones. The money should be invested in the mobile force to de fend the zone. Withdrawal and retro grade operations should bedomea drill that permits infliction of maximum casualties. The composition of the force should embrace operattone that call for fewer small decieions. The combination of in fantry and armor in one team will greatly assist in thie regard. Complex coordination problems must be avoided to obtain rapid response against a superior force. Emphasis should be placed on destroying enemy units as opposed to guarding terrain features. Night operations should feature in creased employment of foot elements to offeet daytime vulnerability to mechanized fires.
Surveillance

In mobile warfare, the battalion and brigade commander must have first call upon surveillance. Higher com manders need information, too, hut first thought should be given to the immediate situation. There is aleo need for a better flow of information through lateral channels. For example, the Air Force could be detailed to furnish corps, army, and theater aer ial reconnaissance requirements, and the Army could put its entire resources at the disposal of commanders at divi sion and below. A suitable mobile defeneive system must be able to detect, close with, and destroy a numerically superior aophie ticated enemy. The defenee must move, absorb, ewallow, and digest the intru sion. Needless to cay, the inferior Military Review

force must have better intelligence on enemy locations. In part, this can be accomplished by frequent movement of friendly forces to alternate loca tione ae opposed to depending solely on technology to improve an in-place capability. Basically, mechanized firepower, whether offensive or defensive, should be thought of somewhat in the terms of the old interlockhg bands of machlnegun fire that crossed the bat talion front, but adjusted to the major

end the squa~ should be invested with mobility, mechanized firepower ade quate to deetroy any vehicle on the battlefield plus shock action, and the capability to convert immediately from mounted to ground attack and vice verea. We must spend our money to place thie capability at the foxhole, not behind battalion and brigade rear boundaries. We need a light mechanized fighting vehicle (MFV) that is an armored per sonnel carrier, antimechanized weaP

MEcHANlzEn VEHICLE

greater lethality, which is all impor tant now because lethality has already outrun mob]lity. The new MFV should serve as a dual tank and carrier vehicle. It should be provided with a miniaturized Sitd telagh or TOW-type missile system that would also use conventional am munition. A emall coaxial machinegun should be provided. The front section of the vehicle should contah provision for a fourman operating crew consisting of a vehicle commander, driver, gunner, and loader. The center section of the vehicle should contain the power pack8

cording to availability. The vehicle design must provide a good swimming capability without a kit. In this re spect, the vebicIe should have approx imately 46 centimeters of freeboard. There are equally good reasons for a light vehicle from tactical and op erational points of view. Extremely heavy vehicles are not only costly, but a mobility differential over enemy forces is difficult to obtain using these vehicles. Aside from these factors, modern antitank missiles give assur ance that land battleships can be knocked out just as readily as a much lighter vehicle. Military R8YkW

MECHANIZED VEHICLE The vehicle must be at least as ground mobile as the current M119 if it is to execute the role for which it is intended. Adherence to this concept would permit employment in such areas as southeast Asia, or in temper ate, desert, or arctic environments. Tests have shown that regardless of other variables, tracked vehicles pro vide the best cross-country mobility.
Armor-Weight Ratios

The armor-weight ratios should not, under any circumstances, exceed those associated with the armored recon naissance airborue assault vehicle. Auxiliary power units, environmental control units, automatic stabilization equipment, and other sophisticated de vices should not be hung on the ve hicle. Nuclear shielding should be pro vided through exterior applique at a later date. There should be no special integral provisions for anti-infrared or anti radar protection. One object in designing such a rela tively simple vehicle is to acquire a great density that will make less prob able a one-sided duel with an enemy equipped with more sophisticated ve hicles. The M4 tank versus the German Tiger was an object lesson in numbers versus sophistication, weight, and fire power. The accompanying chart shows the approximate number of personnel, tanks, and carriers in the maneuver battalions of typical armored and mechanized divisions. Personnel tig ures are based upon 11 men per carrier and four men per tank. An MFV is substituted for each tank and carrier, and new MFV battalions are substi tuted on a one for one basis to give an equivalent number of maneuver bat talions in the same division10 in the mechanized infantry division and 11 in the armored division, Personnel for July 1986

the MFV are based upon 10 men per vehicle, four men for the driver and main armament system, and six men for the assault portion of the vehicle squad. This arrangement triples the gunpower in the mechanized division, us ing the same number of vehicles found in the current table of organization and equipment (TOE ). It increases the major caliber tubes in the armored division by 74 percent over current TOE. The number of new MFVa to be placed in company and battalion TOE requires considerable study. As a gen eral appreciation, 60 percent of the personnel would be ground oriented with respect to their combat function.
Major Echelons

The divisional organization of the MFV force should be in four major echelons to permit two echelons for ward and two back. There should be a separation of from five to 10 kilo meters between the echelons to permit a good reception for attackers that break through the front islands of resistance. This would permit attack helicopters, artillery, and aircraft to work on the enemy before he reached the second zone. Additionally, this would permit time for the front zone defense to move to the rear in suffi cient strength to augment the depth of the second zone of defense. Advantages of an MFV force are many: There would be a net increase in system efficiency with a dual armor and infantry capability in one pack age. The new force would be less sus ceptible to 10SS of momentum in going from one form of combat to another. o It would be less vulnerable to enemy artillery and air attack. \ 9

MECHANIZED

VEHICLE

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R8ViCJW Military

MECHANIZED VENICLE
Competition for funds for two expensive mechanized weapon eystems %anks and armored personnel carrierswould be eliminated. Battlefield coordination would be enhanced and tank-infantry actione would be integrated at the outset. Tailoring forces for tactical sit uation, and providing tactical re servee would be simpler and, at the same time, probably more effective. . Road space and movement con eiderhtions would he 1sss complex. Two epecial types of divieione could be eliminatedthe armored and the mechanized-by forming a single combined-arm type division. The antimechanized defenee problem would be nearer to solution without so much dependence upon overly sophisticated eystems that may not be available when needed. The 10 spaces in the current in fantry rifle squad would man the en tire vehicle, and the man-machine ef fectiveness ratio weuld be improved. A powerful weapon would be placed in the hands of the squad. In turn, the number of men is sufficient to make the weepon more effective in local security, removing mines, engag ing roadblocks, and overcoming obeta clee that reqnire manual labor. Engineer support and mainte nance would be greatly simplified. More direct fire weapons would be brought to the front and would be directly responsive to the needs of the lower unit commander. Tbe number of duplicating weap ons and communications syeteme would be greatly reduced. The fighting portion of the mech anized combat etructure would contain more mobility, firepower, and men for tbe money invested.

It is recognized that there are some disadvantages to this concept, but they have to be weighed largely against what was or what is. The modem antitank miesile appears to be the key that demands a return to a lighter and more flexible combat vehicle. Thie concept doee not endorse the muRipurpose weapons approach, be cause a weapon appropriate for the target is included as an integral part of tbe vehicle. What it does suggest ie that the personnel are to become multi purpose oriente~s It would be naive to think that branch attitudes would not enter into evaluating the need for such a vehicle. The continned need for conventional armored reconnaissance, infantry, and airborne units ie beyond question. But compared to the bulk of the combat structure and the existing trends, they would OCCUPY a progressively smaller elite of the structure.
Administrative Problems

There is room for such specializa tion witbin a combined combat arms. Officere or enlisted men with a given military occupational specialty (MOS) should be able to function effectively in most of the resultant organizations. It ie recognized that this proposal would necessitate changee in tbe MOS-schord structures, and that it would also create some problems in volving peacetime and mobilisation training requirements. For the most part, these are administrative prob lems that are not beyond solution. Prior to the 1950 decade, it was safe to say that the soldier with his hoots and rifle was a key feature on the battlefield-in the sophisticated en vironment. Now, without detracting from the soldiers etature, it is better to hold that the key feature on the battlefield is a machine operated ~d 11

July 1966

MECHANIZED

VEHICLE

tended by tbe soldier, who departs from it when he has a chore that can not be performed otherwise. The pres ence of a potent vehicle would do much to assuage the feeling of impotency that often affects a squad. While the battalion has been looked upon as a basic unit for a number of good reasons, it would be well to con sider what the real basic unit can ac complish if fitted out for maximum effect. Dual capabilities should begin at the squad level. The relative size of opposing forces is a key factor in the design and com position of systems. We should not devise too many systems or one that bas too many variables beyond the control of the commander at the lower levels. Quick response is needed at division

and below for mobile operations. At tbe Army level, quick response should be thought of in the rapidity with which air and artillery support can be delivered and reserves committed. The most fertile field for a military revolution lies in combining techno logical performances with adaptations in military organization. The chief problem here lies in overcoming op position within existing organiza tions. This can delay revolutions by a factor of one or several decades or, indeed, channel tbe revolution into Iese effective expenditures. The mechanized fighting vehicle concept certainly does not solve all of the problems faging tbe commander. It does, however, give bim a fighting machine that can be the focal point for future ground actions.

COMMENTS INVITED
The Military Review welcomes your comments on any mate rial published. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought will assist us and may lead to publication of your ideas. If you are an authority on a certain sub.iect, why not write an article for our consideration? If you have only an idea, query us; per haps we can assist you in developing an acceptable article.

12

Military Review

-,

~he Puftern of

GWEIWLLA
WARFARE

rigadierJ. Michael Calvert, British Army, Retired

HE more mechanized, civilized, and industrialized a country or army becomes, the easier it is to bring about its downfall by putting a spau ner in its delicately balanced works. A predominantly agricultural nation has its roots deep in firm foundations and is not easily upset even by the most modern weapons of war. A nu clear attack on an agricultural nation is not much worse in the amount of damage done, and may even be less, than that experienced through drought or flood. Industrial organizations and weapon systems have tended to become larger and more complicated. This lays the way open for a comparatively emall but intelligent nation with limited means to exercise every form of in genuity and cunning in turning the very assets of the larger nation into liabilities that can destroy it. Large concerns necessitate rigid discipline and regimentation to make them work. The weaker nation can
kdy

use this military virtue of dkcipline against its disciple. The Yugoslav guerrillas once used traffic manage ment as their weapon. Dressed as Ger man military policemen, they altered the road eigns on a mountain road and carefully guided tanks and vehi cles of an armored regiment, which they had summoned by a ruse, one by one over a prceipice. This is the art of jujitsu, where the smaller competitor uses the strength, aggressiveness, and bigness of his OP ponent to destroy him by pulling him in the direction that he wants t,o go, but off balance. The makeup of a guerrilla mind must have a certain love of black comedy, as well as an element of ruth lessness and wile. A guerrilla must al ways look for both the strong and weak points of an opponent. The weak points are the pressure points, the nerve centers, where a carefully aimed thrust can hurt and disable mos$ In the makeup of modern indnst$ial 13

1966

p=

GUERRILLA WARFARE meiety, we have seen, for instance, hew one faulty signal box can para lyae a suburban railway sjmtem; how a fault in an el ic power eystem can bring New Yor T to a standstill; and how a few dissidents at vital points in a factory, an airport, at docks, or on a commercial supply line can bring an industry or even a nation to its kneea. There is no greet muecular strength shown here, only a carefully calculated guile. An Analogy The word guerrilla means a little war, euch ae was waged with decisive results against the most efficient, highly disciplined, and superbly equipped French armies in the penin eula. An analogy could be made with the gladlater armed with the net and trident, the net being the Spanish guerrilla entangling the magnitlcently fit opponent, and the trident of the Duke of Welfingtens armies striking his handicapped adversary again and again to eventual destruction. We must uever neglect to manufac ture a net to entangle our enemies before attempting to strike them with the trident of our regular forces. One lesson of nuclear war is to get close to your enemy so that he cannot use weapons of mass destruction to wipe out your forces, and there is no closer embrace than the in-fighting of the guerrilla. Brigadiev J. Michael Calvert, Brit. ich ArmII, Retired, baa had extensive expemence in epecial warfare and jun gle operations. He eevved with Orde C. Wingate in Burma and commanded the British Warfare School there dur ing World War II. He also commaaded the British Special Air Service Regi ment, an organization 8imitar to US Special Forcee, and nupermeed its . training in deep jungle operation. 14 GnerrilIa warfare in the wider sense bas come to mean the art of combat waged by the weak to over come tbe strong. But it is not wild cat scrimmage. It ie s highly intelli gent form of art in which needletipped force is eurgieally appfied to the vital points of ones oppanente body politic. It is not the action of an ill-formed, uncontrolled rabble al though, at timee, the guerrilla con trol may wish to make uee of mob psychology for particular ends.
Knowledge of Sfmofurs

The succeesfuI practice of guerrilla warfare requires an intricate knowl edge of the opponents structure whether military, governmental, com mercial, economic, or political. The weakest and most vulnerable would become the target. Every factory manager and every commercial or public utility director knowe, or should know, the vital and most delicately balanced parts of lde enterprise, and can say If that goes, were really eunk! The vulnerable parts of London and other vital centers in the last war were known and assessed by engi neere and the beade of statutory bod ice, such as the Metropolitan Water Board, the Central Electricity Gene rating Boarde, and the hoards con trolling the railwaye, eubways, and other transport systeme. Theee pointe would hardly be gueeeed at by a layman. An example ie a main sewage pipe running over Sloane Square Station whlcb, if punctured, would have flooded most of Westminster and Pimlico in a few meters of diseasebearing sewage. Another is Bruneia tunnel under the Thames which now, with dredging, projects come meters above the bed of the river. If rupMilitsry Revlsw

GUERRILLA WARFARE tured by a bomb or underwater charge, this could siphon water and flood huge areas of the underground railway system. In the industrial and other spheres, the vital shortages and, therefore, targets for attack were the unlikely, bedfellows of ball bearinge, fighter pilots, nuclear physicists, and indussystem which controlled and sifted much of the rail traffic of Southern Europe; get himself accepted; and, then, on the outbreak of war and thereafter, carefully consign goods, trucks, and,trains in the wrong direc tion. This he did until 1946. His meet memorable coup was in 1942 when a trainload of iron ore reached the am-

trial diamonds. In another crisis, it might be zirconium, mineral lubri cating oil, or meteorologists. By knowing your body structure and its weaknesses, you can assess that of your opponent while also making allowance for his assets. But this requires a continuous study of the other fellow, not only by the serv ices, but by economists, industrialists, and physicists. . Having decided on the targets, the directors of guerrilla warfare must fashion the instruments of destruc tion of these targets. This includes the choice of the right type of instru ment, ite forging or training, and its placement ready for use. In 1938 a man called Sullivan was introduced into the Vienna marshal ing yards. His job was to learn the July 1336

munition-starved Germans outside Strdingrad and a complementary trainload of shells arrived in the Rubr. Worthwhile targets are not neces sarily the obvious ones. Junctions can be temporarily disrupted by bombing, but all the meana of rapid repair are situated at a junction. A determined enemy can quickly right the destruc tion he can see on bis doorstep, both by cannibalization and workshop re pair, in spite of any overhead inter ruptions. Far more difficult to repair is damage done to the transport eys tem at some remote spot. Also, this is a much easier target for the uniformed guerrilla and could do juet as much, if not more, lasting damage to the transport eystem. The guerrilla band might be gi~en 15

GUERRILLA

WARFARE

the orders to cut, and keep cut, a re mote section of a main trunk route between two vital centers. They could start with an initial cut. Then they could ambush the reconnaissance party sent out to locate the cut and prepare plans for ite repair. This could con tinue until the enemy had built up a covering force around the repair par ties. These could then be isolated by cuts on either side of them. By using time charges and boobytraps, this harassment could go on indefinitely. This is a comparatively simple task for the guerrilla as long as there is an efficient ground organization on which he can work and from which he can obtain information, supplies, trained replacements, medical aid, and other forms of administration. Guer rilla warfare is, in essence, area war fare. As in a railway network, the guerrilla bands, like rolling stock, need a network of lines prepared for them on which they can operate. Otherwise, they will find that nearly all their energies are taken up purely in a struggle to live and exist, leav ing little time or inclination to Oper ate offensively.
Support Needed It is not often realized that an army

highly emotional, idealistic people who will respond to leadership, example, battle cries, and emotions of all sorts, but rarely to orders as such.
Directives

requires at least 10 times its strength in administrative personnel to sup port it so that it can get on with its job of fighting the enemy without dis traction. Active guerrilla bands also need at least a similar proportion of organized sympathizers to feed them, keep them informed, recruit replace ment, and look after casualties. Otherwise, they will be of little worth. Ideally, the ground organization should be created before the active guerrillas take the field. But in guer rilla warfare it must never be for gotten that you are dealing with 16

Directives stating the objective and then allowing the local leader to work out how and when he will carry it out are the rule. A direct order to blow a bridge on a particular date at all costs is not the right way to get the best out of guerrillas as so many regular generals throughout history have found out. Orders should not he given to a net to apply pressure since it is the victims own struggles that tighten the net. In Italy, during WorJd War II, army headquarters gavei orders for British Special Air Service Captain Roy Farran to attack a German corps headquarters on a particular date. Captain Farran had raised a guerrilla force-mainly by his own personality and exampl=omprised of Italian partisans, Soviet escaped prisoners, and about 10 of his own Special Air Service men. BY that date, he had raised the morale of his motley force to such a pitch by rumors of atroci ties and rewards to come, coupled with appeals to their undying patriot ism, that they were eager to attack at any price. Then came the order from army to postpone the attack for a fortnight and conform to the army ~imetable. By this time, the guerrilla force was assembled and on the move. A post ponement would disintegrate the force, security would be lost, and there would never be another oppor tunity. The attack was carried out with great success. Captain Farran narrowly mieeedbeing court-martiaIed for disobedience, but was finally re warded when the facts of guerrilla MitaryReview

warfare were made clear to army headquarters. The pattern of a guerrilla war thus takes shape. At the top are the direc tors who lay down policy and plan the consecutive phases. These phases graduate from irregular armed bands to more organized, possibly uni formed, units, then to general armed combat with the guerrilla force sup-

the directors will be much concerned with the morale of their emergent forces during this time. The directors are Iikely to lay down targets, appoint field commanders, and aet up the ad ministrative organization, leaving tac tics to the commanders in the fie]d. The administrative network would necessarily include an intelligence sys tem. This might be manned by law-

US Annu

Aviation

Dige;

An air control center is a vulnerabletarget whose damagecould create havoc over a wide area ported by a government-in-exile, with or without outside help from some in terested party. The final phase occurs when the occupation force is demoral ized and its supporters at home are weakening in their resolve. The new nation is now at arms in a general insurrection with the guer rillas now formed into a more ortho dox organization of an army. This development might take years, and
July

yers and bankers at whose offices per sonal and secret conferences would not be out of place. The medical or ganization might be based on the use of isolation hospitals, leper colonies, and mental homes where curiosity and interference is least likely. Ammunition and weapon supply can be obtained from two sources-ex ternally and from the occupation forces. The antiguerrilla would coqrr 17

1966

6UERRILLA WARFARE ter this by supplying them with in stantaneous fuze grenades and breechexploding bullets. Idealistic school masters are often the best instruments for recruiting young guerrillas. Hand to-hand communications are usually carried out by women and children, but today a more sophisticated wire less network of communications is also organized and expected. There must be police to control and discipline tbe guerrilla bands and their helpers, preventing backsliding, treasonable activities, and lack of en thusiasm. They also have the task of collecting taxes to pay for the forces of insurrection. These police; by the very nature nf their tack, do not attract the beet types and are often recruited from the criminal element of the commun ity. Beaides killing or maimin their own backsliders, they are 1 sually chosen to carry out acts of terrorism against the enemy who occupies their country. Tbe type of guerrilla warfare must naturally be adapted to suit the coun try where it is to be waged whether it is overpopulated or eparsely culti vated, whether primarily industrial or agricultural. But the principles re main the same. All nations study this type of warfare, and powerful na tions fear it. It is the weepon of a poor nation and cannot be defeated easily by the sophisticated weapons of a rich and powerful country. Tbe British, who enjoy ingenuity and take pride in paradox, had to fear this form of warfare when they were a great power with great pos eessione, but resorted to it with suc cess when things were bad and they bad no allies and few arms. Britain had forgotten that sbe had become greet through this ingenuity, skill, and initiative and not by big battal ions. Now Britain can and must learn again to use this particular art of conflict which, coupled with idealism and a high sense of purpose, can bring down a Goliatb without having to be too reliant on allies. If these methods are used against us, what are the best methods of combating them? There are two well-tried methods. One is to counter terrorism by coun. terterrorism. If a bridge is blown, bold all the neighboring villages responsi ble and execute hostages. This method stopped the Chinese in Japaneseoccupied China. In Yugoslavia, it stopped all but the Communists who carried on regardless of retaliation. It curtailed many of our operations in Western Europe in the period before our own military offensive. The other method is not so brutal, but much more worthwhile as it forces its exponent to examine his own ideals, principles, and purpose. It is based on tbe tenet, If you cant beat them, join them. There is nothing new in this teach ing. Maurice de Saxe, Belisarius, Si m6n Bolfvar, Napoleon, and others have said the same thing in different ways. The only way to beat guerrillas is to live, move, and fight in tbe same element as the guerrilla, and so meet, and, with superior weapons, training, and morale, defeat him. This makes it essential that the antiguerrilla must be trained and equipped so as to be even more mobile, harder, and more idealistic even than the guerrilla. The antiguerrillas must be able to win over the population, the ground organisation, by being mis sionaries of their own way of life, whuee exemplary bebavior and dedi cation present an alternative to the guerrillae ideals.

Wa

Colonel M. Dugu6MacCarthy,French .-trmg,Retired F THE American War of Inde pendence, the Frenchman re members especially the aid given hy hie country to the insurgent British Colonies which were destined to form the United States. This primacy in memory is entirely justified when it is considered that the aid by France was, in part, tbe origin of a friend ship between the two countries, a brother-in-arms, which twice contrib uted to the saving of France. From the start, the insurrection re ceived favorable opinion in France for several reasons: Sentimentally, since the Ameri cans were fighting in the defense of libertyan idea greatly in favor in France due to the current of ideas set in motion by the philosophers. Politically, besause France still felt the humiliation suffered in the treaties of 1763, and also because Eug July 1986

land had bsen her traditional enemy for a long time. Economically, because the Ver sailles Government hoped that its trade would be easier with an inde pendent United States than with Eng lish Colonies. In 1776 the American Congress had sent Benjamin Frankfin to France as a clandestine ambassador. His skN, his simple and dirsst manners, hk high order of intelligence, and the equally high order of Charles de Ver gennes, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, were to result i? modest French aid to the United Statss. Weapons, ammunition, equipment, and, above all, numerous infantry, ar tillery, and enginser officers were dis creetly landed in America. The tech nical advisor role of these officers was to be of prime importance in the or ganization, equipment, and trai ing 1 19

WAR OF INOEPENOENCE

of the insurgent army. One of them, the Marquis de Lafayette, was to be come the friend of George Washing ton and would soon command an Amer ican division.
Moral Support

With respect to this first form of French aid, it is important to re member that during the difficult years of 1777 and 1778 the Americans, in cluding Washington, were losing cour age, and many were inclined toward a compromise with England. But the moral support of France, a sup port rendered concrete by the presence of French officers in the American ranks, and the certainty that France had no ambitions in the direction of a colonial conquest, played a stimu lating role, restoring confidence, cour age, and determination to the Amer icans. Throughout the early part of the war, Washington was really the heart and eoul of the resistance. He had been obliged to make use of the French promise to sustain the energies, to shake off the apathy, and to prod the inertia of some of his compatriots who, on the verge of despair, were tempted to give up. The victory of General Horatio Gates over General John Burgoyne at Saratoga on 17 October 1777 had a Colonel M. Duguc! MacCarthy, French Army, Retired, was with the Historical Service of the French Army until his retirement in 1965. While on active duty he served in Morocco, the western Sahara, Indochina, and the French front in 19.10. He was an in structor at the Armor School at Sau mur and a Professor of Military His tor2t at the ficole Sup6rieure de Guerre. His article, The Corps of the Army: A Historical Summary, ap peared in the May 1965 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.
20

considerable effect in Europe. The capitulation of Saratoga, signed on 6 February 1778 in Paris in the H6te1 de Coislin, Place de 1a Concorde, just a few steps from the present US Em bassy, resulted in the alliance of France with the United States. This treaty had considerable influ ence on the American resistance. The alliance signified, in fact, that the new Republic was officially recognized by a great European power. It an nounced, moreover, strong and con crete military aid. It posed, lastly, as a condition that in no peace concluded with England, may America re nounce her independence, and come again under the English domination.
Mutual Exchange

Through this stipulation, the pledge poseessed a solemn character of reci procity. France pledged herself to aid the insurgents by casting into the bal ance the weight of her arms. On their part, the Americans pledged them selves to continne the struggle nntil they had obtained full and complete independence. This was precisely the moment that the London Government choee for sending a large diplomatic mission to America charged with proposing to the American Congress the cessation of hostilities im the ba$is that the British Government would be willing to grant to the American Colonies all that they demanded, except irrdepend ence. It is difficult to understand how such a move, following close on the signal American military victory at Saratoga and the conclusion of a treaty of alliance full of promises for the insurgence, could have been under taken. The morale of the American population and Army was, in fact, particularly high. The insurgents had Military Raview

WAR OF INOEPENOENCE

no doubts of the possibility of a prompt settlement of the conflict by arms, and the promises of French mil itary aid reinforced this conviction. The first reinforcements sent by France were the 12 shipa of the squad ron of Admiral Jean dEstaing which arrived in Delaware Bay on 17 June 1778. General Sir Henry Clinton, who succeeded General William Howe at the head of tbe British forces, thus found himself blockaded at Philadel phia,. the British naval forces having failed to intercept the French Fleet. Clinton, fearing an investment of Philadelphia by the American troops, hurriedly evacuated the city and fell back on New York. Washington elowly followed and established him self on the Hudson, thus inveeting New York by land.
Superior in Numbers

the islands and attempted to reoccupy Savannah. This operation ended in a total failure in spite of the valor of the troops and the courage of the ad miral who wae twice wounded while personally leading an aseault. But the lack of coherence of the operations conducted by dEstaing illustrated the

Unfortunately, dEstaings squadron was not capable of measuring up to the Englieh Fleet which was snperior in numbers, and it was impossible to blockade New York. Moreover, the French admiral was not subordinated to Washington and had orders from Louie XVI to execute a mission of liaison with the French possessions in the Antillee which were being greatly worried by the English. In 1779, England reinforced her forcee in America. But, instead of concentrating all ber forces against Washingto~s small army, she dis persed them between Peneacola and New York, wishing to retain control of porte and future landing sites. British General Sir George Prevost, who was in command in the South, won a few victories in Georgia and seized possession of Savannah. DEs taing, back from a brilliani campaign in tbe Caribbean, levied 4,000 i]lfan trymen from the French garrison of

Natimnl

Archive.

GeneralJohn Burgoyne,whose defeat at Ssratoga openedthe way for Frenchirr tervention in the War of Independence neceesity, and algo the difficulty, of achieving unity of command. The year of 1780 began badly for the Americans. On 11 May, Clinton obtained the snrrender of Charleston after 40 dayg of siege. He then re turned to New York, giving command in the South to Lord Charles Corn wallis. The taking of Charleston, coming after five years of a hard and ex hausting war for the finances of the young state, resulted in a serious cri sis m the morale of the insurgents. Washington indefatigably bolst~red

.
WAR OF INOEPENOENCE the waning energiee. He wrote letters to Congress in which he said that a collapse of America would be a dis honor and that the Americans must associate themselves with the good will of France by means of extraordi nary efforts. He added: The present juncture ie so interest ing that ifitdoes not produce cor- respondent exertions, it wilt be a proof that motivee of honor, public good, and even eelf preservation have lost their influence upon our miade. . . . The Court of France ha made a glonoew effort for our deliverance, and if we disappoint it$ intention bg our srcpinonees we mwst become con temptible in the egee of all mankind; nor can we after that venture to cou fide that our alliee will persist in an attempt to eetablieh what it will ap pear we want inclination or ability to aseiat them in, We see that Washington, torch of the American resistance, made use of the promises made by France, even before the arrival of the wrench Ex peditionary Corps, for awakening in his fellow countrymen the will to fight and a national coneciouenese.
French Forces

On 10 July 1780 the expeditionary force of Lieutenant General Jean de Rochambeen disembarked in Rhode Island. Of a strength of 5,000 men, it comprised eight battalions of in fantry, three squadrons of cavalry, a detachment of artillery, and a com pany of engineere. At the time of the decisive operations of 1781, the 25 ships of the squadron of Admiral FranWis de Graese would be added and 3,500 men levied from the French garrisons of the Antilles. The French forces would comprise, therefore, in addition to a large fleet, approxi mately 9,000 men. 2s

On the scale of modern armies with their enormoue numbers of men, this figure may not appear large, but Washingtons army, with a theoretical strength of 15,000 men, was scarcely ever able to place in the line of bat tle more than 4,000 to 5,000 combat ants at one time. Operational Immobility Almost a year was to go by before the forces of Rochambeau actually participated in the operations, At that time, no means existed for instanta neous communication or for rapid transportation. The entrance into the line of battle of the French Expedi tionary Corps could not, therefore, be prepared by any conference between the respective headquarters. In addition to this, France was not able to keep a large naval force in the American theater before 1781. For thie reason, the French Army tnuk up defensive positions at Newport, Rhode Island, as soon as it landed. Rochambeau wae, in fact, obliged to assume the defensive because his fleet was weak and he had to insure the defense of his ships. Their nu merical strength was insufficient for holding out alone against the British Fleet. Let us note, in passing, that a chief who was in fear, of running too great ricks could have delayed his departure from France until he was able to have an adequate naval force at his dieposal. The end of the year 1780 went by, therefore, in a etate of operational immobility. Washington was carrying on the blockade of New York, and Ro cbambean was blockaded, himself, in Newport. Only North Carolina was the theater of a certain amount of activity. There, Cornwallis and hie adversary were carrying on an epic duelthe first wishing to carry the Military Review

WAR OF IHOEPENOEMCE

war into the rich province of Vir ginia; the second prohibiting him with the aid of Lafayette who was commanding a small American divi sion. In June of 1781, the Newport gar rieon, reinforced by militiamen, joined Washington before New York. While the siege developed, an event eecurred in the South which wae to

word of this, he decided to direct hls efforts against Yorktown, The French naval force of 39 ships under Admiral de Graeee, whose arrival was sched uled for the month of Auguet, would participate in the operations. Wash ington held the attention of Clinton by diversionary manuevers before New York, while the main body of the allied forces2,000 Americans

us Amw

Cooperetienof the French and AmerieenArnrieeand the French Navy forced Lord CharlesCemwa13ie te surrenderat Yorktown decide the fate of the war. Cornwallis, exhausted by the haraesed pureuit of the elusive troops of General Na thanael Greene and Lafayette, re ceived the order from Clinton to go to Yorktown where he would be in a position to come to the rescue of New York in case the allied pressure on the city became too dangerous. Lafayette followed elowly after Corn wallis and succeeded in hemming him in Yorktown. Ae soon as Washington received July 1933 and 4,000 French under the command of Rochambeau-wae directed in forced marches against Yorktown. Cornwallis found himself invested, from 25 September OL by the com bined forces of Lafayette, Washing ton, and Rochambeau, while Graese, after having disembarked 3,000 men from the Antilles, denied him all help by way of the sea. The Englieh bravely attempted two eecapeeon 10 and 16 October and were eeverely repulsed by the Duke of Lpu
1

23

WAR OF INOEPENOENCE

zun. On 17 October, Cornwallis sur rendered with 7,000 men, 171 cannon, 22 flags, and 20 transport veseels. 1 his capitulation put an end to land operations on the American Conti nent. In England it caused the fall of the Cabinet, and the members of the op position constituted the new govern ment. Charles J. Fox aseumed the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Diplomatic Efforts

In his first speech hefore the Par liament, Fox declared that it seemed OPPortuneto him to grant the inde pendence of the American Coloniee. He added that the sacrifice that Eng land would make in eo doing would be compensated for by requiring of the Americans a limitation of their liberties in the matters of commerce and navigation, a limitation which would be of such a nature as to pro cure great commercial advantages for England. Mr. Fox doubtless forgot that, in order to reqnire, one has to he in a position of strength, which was not the case with England juet after a spectacular eurrender. But he quickly realized that it was not possible for him to maintain such an attitude. In May 1782 he acknowledged that Eng land was in a much more eerious state of weakness than he had imag ined. He added that If America is not granted her total independence without condition, England is hope lessly lost. And Fox concluded bis epeech by affirming that the Ameri cans, touched hy this act of generosity on the part of England, would impose sacrifices on themselves and would favor British commerce. On these bases, the London Govern ment proposed a separate peace to America. This was forgetftd of the 24

fact that such proposals were contrary both to the honor and to the interest of America. At the same time, Fox had negotiations opened with France to lead her to accept a separate peace. These proposale, too, were contrary= to the honor and to the interest of France. The results of these diplomatic ef forts were diametrically opposed to the one which the British Government was eeeking. Far from making an end to the alliance between France and the United Statee, they strengthened the ties. On the seas, after alternate suc cessee and reverses in the Caribbean, French naval forces finally defeated an English Fleet off the coasts of India. On 30 November 1782 the British Government signed the preliminaries of peace. The Versailles Treaty, signed on 3 September 1783, officially estab lished the independence of the United States.
Lessons Learned

The American War of Independence preeents numerous analogies with more recent conflicte of a enbvereive nature. It demonstrated that: Outside aid is important even before it appeare at tbe ecene of tbe conflict. The fact that a great world power hae endorsed tbe insurrection and has promised to eupport it played the role of a powerful stimulant to the morale of the insurgents, strength ening their will and their capabilities. Maesive military intervention by a third power will be decieive. The strength of the land and naval forces sent by France to America tipped the scales in an irreversible manner in favor of the ineurgente and insured the ultimate victory of their cause. The personality of tbe leader of Military Review

WAR OF INOEPENOENCE

the insurrection is of paramount im portance. Without any doubt, the choice of Washington was a most for tunate one. With a leader who was less tenacious, less magnanimous, an imated with less willpower, and who was less great, the American re- . sistance might not have been able to endure to the end. Negotiations with insurgents en tered into from a position of weak ness will fail. The negotiations un dertaken by England after Saratoga,

as well as after Yorktown, show that the London Cabinet had not thor oughly understood the true nature of the conflict. When a war is, in fact, an insurrection, negotiation between equals is impossible. Ideological an tagonism, passions, and hatred are so strong that there cannot be either victor or vanquished. Under these cir cumstances, a government cannot open negotiations with the rebels with any chance of success unless it is in the position of conqueror.

What we need more of teday are perseveranceand patienceto see our purpose through. We need te remind ourselves of our own perilous, pro tracted effort to implantthe torch of Jihertyin America.We need to recall that AmericanColonists began their resistance to harsher British celonial laws in 1763;that 12 years later the shot rang out at Lexington; that eight more years of bitter strugglefollowed before the Treaty of Paris was signed ending the RevolutionaryWar; that six more years were consumedin our endeavorto forge a document of governmentwhich has stood the test of time, inehufinga civil war. It took 26 years to forge our Nation, yet the South Vietnamesehave been building one since 1954-only 12 years. Free dom worth fightingfor is worth the time and tears te build. General Harofd K. Johnson

i
July 1966 25

Confrontation
3ean EdwardSmith LLIED victory in World War H left Berlin jointly occupied by the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Joint occupation symbolized Allied unity. Berlin was to be the seat of the Al lied Control Council for Germany, and from there Allied policy for Germany was to be coordhated. The occupation was to be short. Cooperation among the victors was to insure that Ger many never again menaced the peace of Europe. This dream faded quickly. In the euphoria of wartime partnership, lit tle attention had been devoted to likely causes of discord. Friction with the Soviet Union wae inadequately an ticipated. Allied diplomacy, for exam26

pie, located Berlin 160 kilometers within the Soviet zone of occupation. Explicit access provisions had been considered unnecessary. To the world of 1966, these omissions appear cul pable, but in 1945 the arrangements seemed eminently appropriate. As Eaet and Weet drew apart in the postwar years, Berlin became a flashpoiritof cold war tension. Stresses elsewhere were reflected in Berlin. And Berlin, as a result of its anoma lous position, proved a ready testing ground for cold war confrontation. The methods of conflict employed in Berlinshow of force, bluff, intim idation, blockade, economic pressure, gradual encroachment, and the exten sive nse of proxieswere not new. Militmy Review

BERLIN

What was new was the changed tech nological and political environment in which they were employed. . There have been two major Berlin confrontations: the blockade of 1948 49, and tbe closing of the! East Berlin sector boundary of 1961. Each of these crises refleets the changing nature of international conflict; each illustrates the impact of profound technological, political, and psychological change; and each exhibits the intimate rela tionebip between political objectives and military force. In the immediate postwar yeare, de teriorating East-West relations were reflected by increased Soviet preseure in Berlin. This preesure took two forms: increased harassment of West ern military garrisons, and acceler ated efforts to capture control of the citys political organe. The first effort was spearheaded by the Soviet Army; the second by the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), later the So cialist Unity Party (SED ). Both, it seems fair to say, were directed by the Soviet occupation authority. SovietCoals Soviet goale appear varied and flex ible. Maximum snccess involved driv ing tbe Western Powers from Berlin and incorporating the entire city in the Soviet occupation zone. Failing thie, the division of the city into Com munist and demucratie sectors offered an attractive alternative. It wae for this latter alternative that the Berlin blockade wae finally lifted. Beginning in 1946, Soviet occupa tion authorities accelerated their efJean Edward Smith, a former US Armg oficer, ie Associate Profeeeor of Political Economy at the Vniver eitg of Toronto. ,He is a contributor to various periodical, and the author of the book, The Defense of Berlin. July 1366

forts to capture political control in Berlin, Preparatory to the firet post war elections, Soviet officials eought to merge Berlins large Communist Party with the even larger Social Democratic Party (SPD). On 31 March 1946 the SPD rejected merger in a citywide referendum. In the three Western eeetors, the vote went 19 to two againet tbe proposal. In the So viet sector, voting was interrupted under varioue pretexts, and no count was taken. Three weeke later, Soviet authorities went forward with the merger in their eector and in tbe Su viet sone of Germany.
Postwar Elections

The first postwar e ctions in Ber lin in October 1946 g } ve the SPD 63 seate in the City Assembly, the Chrie tian Democratic Union (CDV) 29 seats, the Communist-dominated So cialist Unity Party (SED) 26 64.% and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 12. Dr. Otto Oetrowski (SPD) was elected Oberburger-me$eter by the City Assembly in December. Ostroweki proved unable to with stand tbe combination of blandish ment and pressure directed at him hy the Soviets. His complicity with Soviet occupation authorities forced his repudiation by the City Assembly. Dr. Ernst Reuter (SPD), who was elected to replace Ostrowski, was pre vented from taking office by Soviet veto on 27 June 1947. Throughout thie period, Communist preeeure to capture Berlin public opinion wae in tenee. Failure to do so led to the adoption of other meane. On 25 February 1948 the coalition government of Czechoelovakla yielded to Communist coup. In Berlin, Soviet pressure intensified. USSR occupation authorities imposed paes requirement@ on all German nationals travelidg 21

, 1

BERLIN

through the Soviet zone to Berlin. Following signature in Brussels of the European Mutual Defenee Treaty in March, Marshal Vasili I. Sokolov sky, Soviet Military Governor for Germany, walked out of the Allied Control Council. On 30 March, Soviet authorities, imposed extensive documentation de mands on Western military traffic to Berlin. Rather than submit, US occu pation authorities organized the Lit tle Airlift which ferried goods and personnel between West Germany and the Allied garrison in Berlin. On 3 April the Soviet military ad ministration severed all rail links be tween Berlin and the Western zones except via Helmstedt. A few days later, individual clearances were de manded of all trains traveling the Helmstedt route, and on 20 April sim ilar requirements were imposed on all barge traffic to Berlin. Additional re strictions were imposed one month later. On 11 Jnne rail service between Berlin and Helmstedt wae interrupted for 48 hours. The autobahn bridge across the Elbe was closed for repairs on 12 June. Four days later, the So viet sector commandant in Berlin left the quadripartite Allied government.
Currency Reforms

sectors of Berlin. The Soviets coun tered by suspending all remaining traffic between Berlin and the West ern zones. The blockade had begun. On 25 June, General Lucius D. Clay commenced the Berlin Airlift, and the first cargo planes landed the follow ing day. A formal Western protest was delivered to Marshal Sokolovsky by the British Military Governor, General Sir Brian H. Robertson. Sok olovsky replied on 29 June that the interruption was due to technical difficulties and pledged a prompt re sumption of service.
Soviet Pressure

A new currency was introduced by the Western Powers in their respec tive zones of Germany on 18 June, but Berlin was not affected. The fol lowing day, Soviet authorities re sponded by suspending all highway and rail passenger traffic between Ber lin and the West. On 23 June the Soviets introduced a currency reform of their own, in cluding the entire city of Berlin un der ita provisions. That evening, West ern Military Governors extended the new West German currency to their
2e

Unable to capture public opinion in Berlin, the Soviets paralleled their pressure on the Western garrisons with a series of moves designed to intimidate the city government. In June, a throng of 5,000 Communist demonetrators besieged the city hall (located in the Soviet sector) and disrupted a meeting of the City As sembly. Similar harassment continued throughout July and August. Pleas for Soviet assistance in controlling the demonstrations went unanswered. Unable to conduct its businese, the as sembly withdrew to the British sec tor in September. In October and November, perceiv ing, perhaps, that the Western Pow ers might not depart, the Soviets severed governmental ties, between their sector and the rest of the city. Non-Communist borough officials were dismissed in tbe Soviet sector, city offices and departments were removed to the West, and separate organs were established by the Soviets. On 30 November 1948 an extraor dinary session of the City Assembly was convened in the Soviet sector. It was attended exclusive]y by Commu nist delegates and functionaries and Milkwy Review

BERLIN

proclaimed a new city government. Three days later, Soviet occupation authorities recognized the new crea tion as the only organ of city gov ernment in Berlin. Negotiations to lift the blockade be gan unfruitfully. On 6 July 1948 the United Statee, Britain, and France protested the blockade to Moscow as a clear violation of existing agree ments. Moscow replied that the block

lifting the blockade in return for in troduction of Soviet zone currency in Berlin. Discussions by the four Mili tary Governors on means to accom plish this resulted in deadlock. Tbe Western Powers then referred the Berlin question to the UN Security Council. A Security Council resolution providing for settlement was vetoed by the Soviet Union on 25 October. A compromise proposal by Security

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. .

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5?7-

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USArmu This US Air Force Globemmtercarries a load of 20 tona of Jfourd&ing the Berfin AMift ade was a result of Weetern violations of agreements on Germany, including the currency reform and the diamemberment of Germany. Meetings between the Western Ambassadors and Joseph Stalin and Vyacheslav M. Molotov in Moscow during August resulted in agreement July 1966 Council neutrals was rejected by the United States shortly afterward. On 30 January 1949, Marshal Stalin granted an interview to Joseph Klngsbury-Smith of the International News Service. Among the issues discussed was Berlin. Smiths question and St? Iins answer were as follows: \ 29

BERLIN

Question: If the governments of the United Statee of America, the United Kingdom and France agreed to p08tp0718th8 88tnblishmcnt Of @ 8eparate West German 8tate, pendirzg a meeting of the CoutuSl of Formgn dfinieter8 to con8ider the Gevman problcm as a whole, wenld the Gov~ ernmcnt of the U.S.S.R. be prepared to remove the reetrictionc which the Soviet authorities have imposed on cemmunicatioae between Berlin and the We8tern zone8 of Germany? Anewer: Provided the United Nate8 of America, Great Bmtain,and France ob80rve the conditions 8et forth [above], the Soviet Government 8ee8 no obet&?le8 to lifting tra~port re 8tmction8,on the understanding, how ever, that tran8port and trade re8tnc tien8 introduced by three powere 8houhf be lifted 8imultinemwly. Following coneultetione in Wash ington, Dr. Phi3ip C. Jessup, US Rep resentative to the UN Security Coun cil, queried h]e Soviet counterpart, Yakov A. MalilG se to whether Sta lins omi8sion of the currency issue in his reply tv Klngebury-Smith wae accidental. Malik replied that Strdine omiesion of the currency problem was not accidents]. Discussions between Jeseup and Malik continued through out March and April.
Blookade lifted

gates from tbe United States, British, and French zones of omupation con vened in Bonn to draft a constitution. A draft was 8ubmitted to the West ern Military Governors in March 1949. At that time, the Military Gov ernore took exception to provision incorporating Berlin into the new gov ernment. Merger of the three zones wae approved in protocole iesued in Washington on 8 April 1949. Follow ing approval of the final draft of basic law by the Parliamentary Council, ap proval of the Weetem Military Gov ernore wae added on 12 May 1949 with cetiln exceptions concerning the etatue of Berlin.
Unique Setting

On 4 May a four-power declaration was ieeued in New York announcing the lifting of the hloekede in return for the convening of. a conference of Foreign Ministers in Parie on 23 May. The blcdmde wae lifted without in cident on 12 May 1949. Currency reforms in the Western zones paved the way for formation of a Waet German Government. On 1 September 1948 a special Parlia mentary Council composed of dele
30

Berlins peculiar location gives rise to the assumption that all aspecte of the Berlin problem are unique. Tbe assumption ie understandable. An ieo lated baetion 160 kilometers within unfriendly territory is without prece dent. Yet once that is eaid, the fa miliar beeomee dominant. Goale and methods on both sidee, again compli cated by alliance consideration, re eemble notldng eo much ae the tradi tional teehniquee of greet powere hov ering at the brink of war, yet each intent on avoiding the precipice. The Berlin blockade of 1948-49 wae a prime example. Clearly, the Soviet Union sought to extend her hegemony in central Europe; Berlin wae clearly cardinal to that purpoee; and, juet ae clearly, the methods to be employed were necessarily restricted. An out break of hoetilitiee-given the US nu clear monopoly and the depleted etzte of Soviet resourcee in 1948-would deny the Soviet Unions immediate goal and probably much more beeides. Thue, Iimite were imposed on what the Sovieta might do in Berlin. To achieve control of the city, they were preMilitary ROVi8Vl

BERLIN

did not exceed the bounds of neeee eluded from using the most direct sity, nor were those selected likely to meansnamely, to invoke their pre ponderant landpnwer and forcibly dic trigger a, violent Western responee. The methods by which pressure was tate a solution. Hindsight makes this appear lucid, exerted are alao revealing. As the but in 1948 perception of this reality chronology makes clear, firat intbda came hard. Indeed, the problems faced tion of Soviet deairea wae the attempt by the West just to stay in Berlin of the local Communist Party to cap ture the dominant Sucial Democratic seemed insurmountable. By focusing on our own difficulties, the hazards Party machinery. Western officiala in faced by our opponent nearly went Berlin made no move to oppeae the unnoticed. Tbia ia scarcely a new phe takeover. Rebuffed by the Socialite, nomenon in political and military con the Communists endeavored, nonethe frontations. But becauee this confron less, to win the 1946 election. Their tation was taking place in a aettlng defeat taught them that the road to so unique, the peculiar difficulties of power lay elsewhere than through free our own predicament were streseed eltilona. But it was not until tbie out of proportion. became clear that more extreme maas The Soviets, it seems fair to say, ures were taken. enjoyed a more exact appreciation of MilitsryPressure the possible. Rejecting the alternative The same holds true for the mili of open hostilities from the beginning, tary pressure which replaced local po all lesser means were carefully Or litical efforts. Introduction of the chestrated to drive the West from the ~, blockade was halting and gradual. city. The ground was carefully tested be fore each step. At no time would it Soviet Control have heen impossible for the Soviets . If in the end the Sovieta failed, to pull back. The lesson for a study their ability to keep the crisis care fully modulated-indeed, to dictate of the changing nature of war is that the application of force becomes more the level of conflict-deserves respect, discriminate, that increasing risks de At no time did the Soviet Union lose mand increased control of all instru control of the situation. Escalation ments of policy. WJdle the overt use through various phases from local po of force is restricted, the entire strug litical action to military blockade was gle reflecte the reciprocal relation be purposefully controlled. And when the tween the total potential force which Soviets reached the end of the ecale each side can bring to bear. in this case, blockad+without When the Soviets lifted the block achieving their goal, they quickly liq ade, it was for much less than their uidated the encounter. original goal. Instead of driving the The changing nature of contlict re West from Berlin, they achieved ab veals itself in the political and mili solute control over a portion of the tary limits imposed. Given the Soviet city only. This the West was in no goal of driving the Weat from Ber position to deny. But the Ieeeon is lin, preeaure wae carefully limited. explicit: political goals in the context Throughout the duration of the con of great power confrontation tend to frontation, each step was carefully be limited and varied; what cann~t prepared in advance. Soviet actions JuJs 18S8 M

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BERLIN

be achieved immediately may yieId to gradual encroachment; and all posi tions tend to be temporary, tend to provide takeoff points for further ac tion when the climate has improved. Diplomatically, the Berlin crisis of 194S-49 revealed the inherent diffi culty of coalition operations. Ach]ev ing a united Western front was long and arduous. Not only were there dif ferences between London, Paris, and Washington, but there were serious differences between Western ofiicials

marily as an appeal to public opinion. Mediation by neutral members of the Security Council was rejected by the West when the solution suggested went beyond that considered neces sary. Nonetheless, tbe organization did play a major role in lifting the block ade. By providing a recognized chan nel of contact, United States and So viet delegates to the Security Council were able to negotiate informally and eventually arrive at a mutually agree

in Berlin and their respective capitals as well. The role of the United Nations also deserves comment. Given the nature of the disput%a quarrel involving the permanent members of the Secu rity Councilthe formal appartus of the organization proved ineffective. Original reference of the dispnte by the Western Powers was intended pri 3f

able formula. To be sure, both sides sought agreement at that time. But the opportunity for informal contact offered by the United Nations proved highly effective. Psychological factors played a ma jor role in the Berlin blockade. Ini tially, Soviet efforts were directed toward capturing public opinion in Berlin. Control of the traditionally

Ifeview Military

BERLIN

dominantSocial Democratic Party was a means to that end. Capitalizing on the widespread hardship prevalent in postwar Berlin, the Soviets employed their economic resources to the hilt. Before the election of 1 46, food, fuel, and long-neglected lUXUy 1 items were virtually preseed on re&idents of the Soviet sector. Notebooks were distrib uted free to school children-compli ments of the Socialist Unity Party. Unfortunately for the Soviets, the earlier actione of the Red Army dur ing the Battle of Berlin created such animosity among the Berliners that all subsequent protestations of Com munist good faith seemed ingenuous. The rape of tbe city by the forces of Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov perma nently eatranged the workers of Ber lin from supporting the Soviets. The German Communist Party bore the stigma of a Soviet appendage. This effectively prevented the USSR from winning control in Berlin through parliamentary means.
Popular Support

sought out Ernst Reuter at the time of the blockade to verify Berliner mo rale. Repeated efforts by Washh@on to evacuate US dependents in Berlin were steadfastly resisted by General Clay because of the possible adverae effect on the local population. And by meeting each new Soviet encroach ment vigorously, General Clay con vinced the Berliners of Western re solve.
Tho Airlift

In spite of a lack of success by the Soviets, their attention to Berlin pub lic opinion focuses on a well-recOg nized adjunct of modern conflict: the vital role of popular support. Indeed, the Soviets pursued this goal relent lessly. After the 1946 election convinced most Soviet officiala that they could not win a free election in Berlin, they at least sought to deny popular sup port to the West. Thie involved ex tensive efforts to intimidate Western supporters, to capitalize on fears that the West would not remain, and to in duce such hardships among the popu lation that capitulation might appear preferable to further resistance. General Lucius D. Clay was alert to these dangers. He assiduously JIJly 1966

The airlift offers the beat example. The Berliner continuously saw or heard the visible proof of Western de termination. Indeed, the plight of the pilots evoked great sympathy among the Berliners. A feeling of comrade ship developed. And for the Berliners, enduring their hardships resolutely was their part of the compact. Thus, the airlift galvanized German resistance. Until then, most Europe ans had stood on the sidelines, anx ious not to offend a seemingly unstop pable Communist expansion. But with US forces holding fast, a rallying post was provided for those longing to re sist. Decisive action in this case pro vided the margin of victory. The Berlin blockade and the US air lift were psychologically important elsewhere. One by one the conntries of Eastern and central Europe had yielded to Communist regimes. Were the West to relinquish Berlin, all Germany would possibly follow. The very difficulty posed by Berlin proved a singular advantage for the West. The citys isolated position captured public imagination. Previous identi fication of Berlin with Adolf Hitlers capital gave place to symbolic resist ance to Communist aggression. Pub lic sympathy was overwhelming. The West was able to mount the Berlin Airlift because of overwbe\m 33

ing technological superiority. That the Soviet Union chose not to inter fere with the airlift can be attributed to the same factor, for the nuclear monopoly wldch the United States en joyed at that time made the risks of doing so unacceptable. As General

a period of almost one year staggers the imagination. Mayor Reuter, we are told, was clearly skeptical of the operation when first advised by Gen eral Clay. But General CIay and Lieu tenant General Curtis LeMay were de termined that Berlin could be sup-

USAWIU! United States-Soviet confrontation at CheekpeintCharlie reassured Serliners that the West would stand firm Clay advised Washington, the Sovieta could only disrupt the airlift by shoot ing down planes. They would not take this risk unless they were bent on war, and, in that case, war would come regardlees. Thus, modern technology made it possible for the United States to re main in Berlin. The airlift wae pes sible only bemuse of the tremendous air strength of the United States. To supply a city of two million by air for 34 plied by air. And in the end, their determination carried the day. Besides the effest of airpower it self, teshnologieal change was central to other aspaeta of tbe Berlin prob lem. Without all-weather navigation aids, the airlift would certainly have bogged down during the fog-shrouded months of Deeember, January, and February. Advanced packaging tech niques also contributed to the succese of the airlift. By removing water MilitaIY nWiEW

BERLIN

from most food substances, for exam ple, available space went many times further. The introduction of large cargo aircraft became of crucial im portance as the winter began, and fuel was added to the items carried.
Communications

When a city is isolated to the ex tent of Berlin, communications are often as important as transportation. Had the Western garrisons been en tirely dependent upon lsndline tele phone extending through the Soviet cone, it is certain that long-term re sistance would have been impossible. As it was, Western headquarter in Berlin were linked inetanteneously with their respective capitals. General Clay in Berlin could seek instructions or offer advice on a moments notice, Second Soviet Effort and the same was true of his British From the end of the blockade until and French counterparts. the late fifties, Soviet pressure was But to a certah extent, technology noticeably absent in Berlin. Sporadic cuts both ways. Berlin in 1948 was incidents merely emphasized the un a city subsisting at a minimal level derlying calm. But in 1958 the at of luxury. Recovery had scarcely be mosphere changed. Preceded by the gun. Life was rigorous; requirements successful launchlng of Sputnik I in were limited. Industrial and consumer 1957, and the growing confidence in demands were eatisfied with a mini Soviet nuclear capacity, Moscow mal tonnage. Today, taebnological launched a second major effort againet progress and industrial recovery im Berlin. Whether the aim was to drive pose demands many times greeter. the West completely from tbe city, Higher standards of living enjoyed or whether it was simply to complete by the Berliners further complicate the incorporation of the Eaetem sec the picture. Stated differently, tech tor into the German Democratic Re nological development makes man public (GDR), is a moot point. In more dependent. And at Berlins pres the end, the Soviets once more settled ent state of development, it would be for the limited achievement. highly unlikely that a new airlift The second Soviet campai~ in Ber would prove adequate. lin can be traced from 27 November The Berlin blockade offers impor 1958-the date of Chairman N]kita tant evidence concerning the close re S. Khrushcheve ultimatum to the lation between strategic and tactical Western Powers. According to Khru forces. Almost by definition, the West shchev, the West had aix months to ern garrisons in Berlin were capable terminate the occupation and declare of .notbing except tbe most limited West Berlin (but not the Eastern sec holding action and the control of civil tor) a free city. i My

disturbances. Yet because of US stra tegic dominance, these forces were sufficient to deter overt Soviet aggres sion. Indeed, the threat of armed ac tion was never offered. Also, the relation between strategic and tactical forces tende to be recip rocal. Had the Western garriaons not been adequate to contiln potential Communist-inspired riots and demon stratilone, the Sovieta could have cap tured control of the city by never presenting sufficient provocation to trigger US strategie forces. To launch overwhelming retaliatory ac tion against overt military aggression has the ring of credibility; to scram ble strategic bombere in response to civil disorder is patently ludlcrous.

ma

35

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During the winter of 1958-59, Khru shchev gradually moderated his de mands. A visit by Anastas I. Mikoyan to the United States in January 1959 paved the way for a conference of Foreign Ministers which convened in Geneva. The Geneva Conference ended unproductive]y. It had been upstaged hy the impending visit of Chairman Khrushchev to the United States. Khrushchev arrived in New York on 15 September 1959 and conferred for three days with President Dwight D. Eisenhower at Camp David. The Camp David discussion elicited Khru shchevs formal withdrawal of his ear lier ultimatum in return for a fulldress summit conference to be con vened in Paris tbe following spring. Between Camp David and the Paris Summit, the Soviet Union scrupu 10US1Y refrained from exerting pres sure on Berlin. Instead, the Soviets encouraged, or at least did not re strain, their Eaet German satellite from moving against the Western po sition.

their intention to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany. This was followed by Soviet protests of high-altitude US flights into Berlin. In the face of the upcoming Paris Summit, the United States relaxed her position. At hk press conference on 9 March, President Eisenhower an nounced the temporary suspension of all flights into Berlin over 3,000 me ters. U-2 Incident On the eve of the Paris Summit Conference, an American U-2 recon naissance aircraft was shot down over the Soviet Union. The conference ad journed without issue two weeks later on 17 May. Following the Paris Con ference, East German salami tactics intensified. Use of the autobahn was denied to participants in a German Homeland Day rally in Berli on 5 > September all barge traffic to erlin was halted for 48 hours; and, three days later, rigorous restrictions were imposed on West German entry to East Berlin. Further, on 18 September the Apostolic Nuncio to Germany was barred from entering East Berlin. This was followed by extending tbe ban to all diplomats accredited in Bonn. A few days later, Eaet Berlin officials sealed the sector boundary completely for 24 hours protesting in cendiary rallies (Billy Graham) in West&erlin. Only the threat of Weet German economic sanctions caused the GDR to desist. Election of a new administration in tbe United States found tbe Ber lin issue seemingly defused. But tbe meeting of President John F. Ken nedy and Chairman Kbrushcbev in Vienna on 3 and 4 June 1961 rekindled the crieis. Khrushchev presented an uide-mdmoire reviving Soviet demands Militsry Review

Actions of 6DR Beginning in October, the GDR nibbled repeatedly and effectively at Western rights in Berlin. On 6 Octo ber 1959, East German flags were hoisted over all S-Buhn (elevated) stations in Berlin. A similar attempt on 1 November was prevented only by threat of Western military interven tion. On 3 February 1960 tbe GDR in stituted its own pass procedures for tbe three Western military missions to the Soviet commander in chief in Potsdam. These procedures were re laxed only when similar curbs were imposed on the Soviet military mis sions in the West. On 4 February the Warsaw Pact nations meeting in Moscow announced 36

BERLIN

for a free city and, in effect, giving the West a new ~ltimatum. Following the Vienna Conference, events in Berlin moved quickly. A scheduled Bundesrat (Federal Coun cil) meeting in West Berlin was can celed. On 10 June, Moscow made pub lic the aide-nwhoire presented by Khrushchev. Throughout the remain der of June and July, the number of refugees fleeing the GDR grew to rec ord proportionsadding further to the unreet which Washington feared in East Germany. Between 2 and 11 August the GDR moved to close the East Berlin sector boundary. Bordercrossing restrictions were tightened, and all East Berliners working in the West were forced to register.
Sector Boundary Closed

General Clay arrived in Berlin on 19 September and two days later vis ited the isolated enclave of Stein stiicken by helicoptervisibly demon strating US presence. One month later, a confrontation of United States and Soviet armor at Checkpoint Char lie reassured the, Berliners that the West would stand firm. With West

Leaders of the Wareaw Pact na tions met in Moscow to discuss the situation, and a parallel meeting of Western Foreign Ministers convened in Parie. All the while, the number of refugees increased. Shortly after mid night on 13 August 1961, East Ger man authorities sealed the boundary completely. When the GDR cloeed the sector boundary, Western authorities in Ber lin did not contest it. Even a formal protest proved tardy. As a result, West Berlin morale all but collapsed. Near patlic gripped the city, and de partures for West Germany rose alarmingly. To counter the threat, President Kennedy dispatched Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and General Clay to the city. At the same time, reinforcement of the US garri son was announced by the White House. Two weeks later, in the face of continued erosion of morale, Pres ident Kennedy announced that Gen eral Clay was returning to Berlin as his personal representative.
kdy

US Anw

GeneralLuciuaD. Clay gainadthe grati tude of the Germansfor his promptreac tien te the blockade and his presence following the border clomre Berlin mbrale restored, General Clay departed Berlin on 8 May 1962. The second Berlin crisis bears strong resemblance to the first. The principal antagonist were the same; the goals of Communist action were varied; pressure wae discriminate; and tactics were carefully moderated to avoid a final confrontationuntil it was certain what that confronta tion would yield. But there were differences as w@]. 31

1966

BERLIN

At certain points, US and Soviet in terests appeared to coincide. The most important of these was in dousing the fire which both perceived to be rag ing in East Germany. When it became clear that this could be done onIy by closing the Berlin sector boundary, then border closure became inevitable. The larger consideration of United States-Soviet reIations provided the backdrop before which the whole drama was enacted. During the crucial stages of the crisis, both the United Statea and the USSR were noticeably absent from affairs in Berfin. Tbe Soviete left ar rangement completely in tbe hands of the GDR. The United States did the equivalent, keeping her garriaon tightIy restricted to its Kaservtez. Both avoided the dangeroua confron tation which political Ieadere feared might escalate.
Ulhricht Regime

confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie reveals a fundamental point of proxy warfar%nameIy, that, barring total victory, the principals must ultimately resume contact. In this case, the con. tact posed great danger of escalation, but considerably less so than an ex tended confrontation between United States and Eaet German proxy forces.
Fear of Escalation

Use of the Ulbricht regime by the Soviets was a prominent feature of the border closure. Doubtless one con sideration was to add stature to the hitherto undiatinguished East Ger man Government. A second was to fnrther delineate the separation be tween East and West-clearly to de fine the sphere of control of each. Agreeing in principle with the need for this delineation, the United States, Britain, and France were estopped from contesting the border closure. The resuIt was that Walter Ulbricht moved virtually at will during the month of August. Indeed, a halt was called only in October when General Clay finally deployed US tanks at Checkpoint Charlie. The Soviets re sponded by deploying their own tanks opposite, thus ending Ulbrichts seem ing autonomy. The eventual United States-Soviet
aa

The fear of escalation was the cru cial factor in the second Berlin crisis. It was thpt fear which compelled the East to close the border. The Soviets were tacitly settling for the more lim ited goal of separation, and it was that fear which triggered Western response-in this case, acceptance of the closure. When the closure was complete, the fear of escalation forced tbe Soviets to return to the city: Diplomatically, the crisis of 1960 61 involved the same problems of co alition diplomaty as the 1948-49 block ade. Presenting a united Western front at all levels of Communist har assment proved exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. This was true not on]y at the governmental level, but in Berlin as well. The existence of vigor oue governments in West Berlin and Bonn complicated the picture further. Preparation of contingency plans in volved dozens of separate headquar ters and departments. That Western response was as unified as it was re mains a tribute to US leadership. The one element underrated by Weetern Governments in 1961 was the deleterious effect of tbe border clo sure on West Berlin morale. Atten tion centered on the explosive situa tion in Eaat Germany. The dangers of escalation posed by the continuing refugee exodus required that the East Berlin sector boundary be sealed. Warnings by Mayor Winy Brandt and Military Revisw

BERLIN

other West Berlin officials prior to 13 August were either ignored or attrib uted to election campaign propaganda. Not even the West German Govern ment took Brandte alarm seriously. On 11 August, Foreign Minister Henrich von Brentano dismissed out of hand the idea of possible panic in Weet Berlin. Reports of the seriousness of the situation were diemissed as coming from those toomuch involved to have a proper perspective. Indeed, it was the fortuitous presence of Edward R. Murrow in Berlin which finally caused Washington to appreciate the serious ness of the crisis. Clearly not a local official, Murrows warnings of im pending panic could not be ignored. The result was the hasty dispatch of Vice President Johnson and General Clay. Reinforcement of the US garri son was also directed at soothhrg Ber liner morale, for the added combat effectiveness of a single battle group was scarcely significant. The choice of General Clay to ac company Vice President Johnson was a good one. No one could better con vince the Berliners of US resolve than the former Military Governor who had launched the airlift. Indeed, General Clays stature in Berlin approaches charisma. With him touring the city, the danger of panic flight temporarily subsided. Hie return as President Kennedys personal representative was a logical outgrowth. The principal question posed by the second Berlin confrontation is how

had West Berlin response been so poorly anticipated ? Indeed, it now seems clear that tbe crisis was largely a crieis of local morale. Had the West Berliners not thought they were being forsaken, they would not have bolted as they did. Firm US actionnot to open the border, but to demonstrate Western presence and concernprobably would have sufficed. The presence of US treeps at the sector boundary would have served a salutary effect. The de terioration of West Berlin morale would have been avoided, and the propaganda subsequently victory claimed by the West would have been unblemished. As it was, Ulbricht was able to en hance hia own standing considerably by seeming to intimidate the Allies. Absence of Western troops on 13 Au gust and the days immediately follow ing was widely attributed in both halves of Germany to Allied timidity. In retrospect, it seems fair to say that Western capitals were oblivioue to Berlin morale because they chose to be so. Concern with the larger pur pose of the exercise-the removal of a dangerous source of tensionled of ficials in Washbrgton to downgrade evidence which might detract from that purpose. The warnings in this caee had been loud and clear. Because they did not jibe with the desire~ re sult, they were not acted upon untill tee late. In this respect, the crisie over the wall waa largely of our own making.

My

1333

39

Captsin ROY

IL

Pinkerton,Umted States Naval Reserve

.
The views eZpTe8eedin this arti cle are the authors and are not net. eesarily those of the Department of the At-my, Department of Defenee, or the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.Editor. ANY Americans have an un aasy feeling that we are falter ing in the somewhat dubioue activi ties referred to as intelligence, which we have only lately come to accept as a necessary adjunct to the conduct of our foreign affaire and military planning. Today, by word of mouth and on the printed page, come queetione and comments yevasling the chagrin commonly felt when the turn of world events indicates possible fail ures or inadequacies in our intelli gence-producing agenciee. We suepeet an ineptnees in theee activities, where as we desire forthright and positive results leading toward more stable foreign relationships in thie unsettled world. 40

Historically, intelligence hae been negleeted in this country. The inat tention of past yeare has been partly due to the view that the power, pree tige, and geographical position of the United States were such that an in telligence organization wae really not needed. This attitude has been fos tered by our open and democratic form of seciety in which spying, as a continuing practice of government, is looked upon by many ae something to be tolerated, perhaps, but not whole heartedly approved. With an almost automatic reaction, we are quick to disclaim any involve ment in intelligence activities, whether the incident at hand concerns a U-2 flight, the covert duties of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) man in Singapore, or an attach6 in our Em bassy in Bonn. It eeems that our straightforward approach to problems tends to condition our thinking to the point that we may honeetly challenge the need for and cost of an intelligence Military Review

POLICYMAKING

organization, or we may denounce its methods, or even question its objec tives.
Term Defined

In examining the role of intelli gence, we should start with a common understanding of the term. In consid ering it in relation to the broad as pecte of national policy and national security, we can use the definition from the Dictionary of Vntted State8 Military Terms for Joint Usage, 1 December 1964: The product resulting from the eof tection, evaluation, analyeie, integra tion, and interpretation of all avail able information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations and which is immediately or potentially significant to military pfanning and operations. In ite most simple terme it ie the procees of becoming informed. This concept of the term calls for an unlimited scope of knowledge and streesee the use of this body of knowl edge for planning. This is applicable for the function of intelligence at those levels of government where de cisione are made for the conduct of our foreign affairs and the planning for military operations. A new and expanding role for in telligence began to evolve during the pressures of World War II and has developed at an accelerated pace since then. This new role ie rooted in the Captain ROII H. Pinkerton, United States Naval Reserve, attended the University of Washington and re ceived his commission in October 19.&. During World War II, he served in intelligence assignments in the United States and in the Paciffc. He is presently a member of the Naval Reserve Intelligence Division, San Francisco, California.
My

fact that many kinds of knowledge are now required by our policymakere. In addition, the world is experiencing an information explosion. The activi ties of mankind are producing such a flood of material that we are hard pressed to etore and catalog it, with out even considering aeeimilatilng it. Todays levels of agitation, whether labeled cold war; nuclear stale mate, or war of national Iiheration, have created new criteria for what we need to know. To meet present-day conditions, it is imperative that the emphasis and orientation of our intelligence prO gram be realigned to coincide with pattqrne of international life. have been introduced into our foreign policy considera tions, causing profound changes in our relationships with other natilons. First, we realize today, more than ever before, the need for friends and allies to maintain our interestc in the world and to combat the spread of communism. We have found that many of these allies must have suP port to survive. As a result, we are furnishing large sums for economic and military aid to friendly nations. At the same time, we have learned foreign aid does not, in itself, solve al[ probleme. In fact, it may only cre ate new tensione. Another foreign policy element is the preeent worldwide emphaeis on multination conferences as forums for deliberations, negotiation, bar gaining sessions, and for arranging compromises in the give-and-take of todays diplomacy. For this reaeon, the United States hae heen active in a number of international organiza tions such as the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, tb e 41
Foreign Aid New elements

1966

POLICYMAKING

World Bank, Organization of Ameri can States, the North AtIsntic Treaty Organisation, and the Southeaat Asia Treaty Organization. Meaningful par ticipation within these groups calla for a fine blend of leadership and di plomacy, together with joint! action with other governments and the peo ples they represent. A third element is our maintenance of extensive military and naval forces in foreign areas to advance our na tional interests. Perhaps our greateet problem arising from this display of military power is the difficulty of con vincing other nationsboth friendly and otherwis+that we have no de signs for conquest of territory or in the extension of colonialism. Whether we admit it or not, we do seek to exert influence by this means. We are con vinced that our security and the peace of the world requires US military strength of various typea on. duty in many places around the globe.
Instruments of Warfare A fourth element affecting our for

These new patterns of activity ia foreign affairs and in the military ephere have enlarged our commitments and responsibilities to other nations. As a consequence, our intelligence needs have also reached new propor tions.
Cultural Offensive

eign policy considerations ia that we are in an age of new instruments of warfare-nuclear weapons, supersonic aircraft, intermediate range and in tercontinental ballistic missiles, space vehicles and satellites, and advanced electronic devices. Scientific and tech nological progress is so rapid it is difficult for intelligence estimates and military strategy to keep pace. Finally, we have found it necessary to employ the techniques of propa ganda and psychological warfare in support of our political, economic, and military objectives. Here, we find a field in which we are unsure of our selves. It may be argued that our ac tivities have been characterized by a naive approach resulting in few ben efits. 42

The events of the past 20 years have involved this country in a strug gle with the Soviet bloc to determine whose methods will most effectively influence the social, economic, and po litical growth in many areas of the world. We are actually engaged in a cultural offensive aimed at the minds and loyalties of the peoples in the lessdeveloped areas and in the non aligned and neutraI nations. There fore, the internal political affairs and the trends of public opinion in these countries are becoming increasingly important to us. Traditionally, intelligence activities are associated in the public mind with the military attach6 stealthily gather ing information in a foreign country or with an occasional colorful covert cloak-and-dagger operation. Obvi ouely, these methods, by themselves, are inadequate to probe the broad ca pabilities and intentions of foreign powers in todaya world. A highly so phisticated organization is required, yet one that is capable of the steady, plodding, day-after-day work which is the heart of good intelligence produc tion. Intelligence is not a new function of our government, but it continues to suffer internal growing pains. Be latedly, following World War 11, ma jor organizational changes were ini tiated to assure a more coordinated effort within the intelligence com munity. The CIA was created in 1947, and charged with the responsibility
Militsrv Review

and dissemination of intelligence by the military services. One reaeon for duplication may have been the statutory jurisdictions of the agenciea imposed by Congress; an other the difficulty of defining func tional responsibilitiea such as separat ing the political and military aepects in many situation. It ie unavoidable that conflicts in doctrines, ideas, and strategies will take root and grow among thoee in the military services and civilian agen cies responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. These represent nat ural and human responses. They are
July 1966

services, Henry A. Kissinger in his book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policv, etatee that Interservice rival ries are inherent in the definition of missione. A similar thought is ex pressed by Jack Raymond, author of Power at the Pentagon, who commente that under our political eystem, each of the military services is forced to shout for its objectives. He then quotes from Morris Janowitz in The Professional Soldier: The military profession ie not a monolithic power group. A deep eplit pervadee ita ranks in respect to ite doctrine and viewpoints on forefgn 43

POLICYMAKINO

aflairs, a split tohieh mirrors civilian disagreement. Still another basic conflict relates to contingency planning to meet rapid]y changing situations. Robert Strausz-Hnp6, William R. Kintner, and Stefan T. Possony in their book, A Fcwward Strategy for America, emphasize that the obstacles to con-

During the past several ueare, pre fessiimal military men have had less and less to say as to how these deci sions are made and tes8 and lees injfu. ence on the actual choices. Robert EKswortb Elder in his book, The Palicg Machine, in commenting upon the relationship between the CIA and tbe other agencies in the intelli

tingency planning include the usual occupational hazards of governmental bureaucracy and interdepartmental ri valry. They conclude: At the crux of the problem are the long-standing difference on the day to-dag conduct of foreign affaire which have long ixcisted between the Depart ments of State and Defense. Mr. Klntner discusses in detail the politico-military conflict in hie article, The Politicalization of Strategy in the Marine Corps Gazette, and is crit ical of the trend whereby professional military people are denied a more ac tive role in formulating strategy and coordinating plane. He states: 44

gence community, including the De partment of State, maintains that the latter: . . . can develop their independent viewe and service their individual needs, but they are subject to the crow-check of composite, anal~ees evolved by Central Intelligence Agency leadership and coordination of the intelligence community. Thie is undoubtedly tbe way it should work. However, the authors of A Forward Strateg~ for America note that CIA has only limited power to reconcile evaluations, and because the same interdepartmental staffoperator system prevails throughout Military Review

POLICYMAKING

the National Security Council struc ture, CIAs assessor functions suffer from the same handicaps of parochial presentation. This system may also account for another aspect of interservice rivalry referred to by Kissinger: . . . the departmental viewpoint is sometimes purposely exaggerated in order~to fa cilitate compromise. He concludes that, as a result, the decisions reflect the attainable consensus among SOV. ereign departments rather than a sense of direction . . . (and) do not end serious interdepartmental dis putes.
Varying Viewpoints

which they believe their bosses want. There are also the continuing ad ministrative problems of recruiting and retaining capable, dedicated anal ysts, investigators, and technical spe cialist, and of budgeting sufficient funds from various sources to pay for the needed skills. However, we are con cerned with more elusive shortcom ings. The underlying cause of possible inadequacies in the intelligence com munity is the task of adapting its per spective to the continual changes in the relationships between nations.
Changes in Alliances

Andrew H. Berding in his book, fhdles on Diplomac#, recalls the situ ation in 1958 in which one of the ma jor policy decisions under considera tion was the question of whether to suspend nuclear testing. Mr. Berding quotes Secretary of State John Foster Dunes to the effect that, prior to the final decision by the President, the agencies concerned had been sharply divided on the subject. The Depart ment of Defense and the Atomic En ergy Commission strongly opposed the suspension based on their estimates of national security needs, The De partment of State favored the suspen sion on the grounds that the impon derable of world opinion might be harmful to the United States in her relations with other nations. The point to be emphasized is not that varying viewpoints or honest dif ferences of opinion exist as to the wisest course of action in any. given sitnation, but that the policies or po sitions taken by the agencies must not be pressed upon the intelligence analysts and evaluators to the end that their product loses its objectivity. Otherwisa, they may produce only that
July le66

The status of each nation in the affairs of the worldwith respect to each of the other nationsia never static. History proves that changes are inevitable in the relationships of sovereign powers, as in all things managed by men. Governments, like the people who run them, are adept at shifting positions and allegiances. While such a zigzag conrse in policy direction may be upsetting to those who value the status quo, they repre sent normal progression. Freque-ntly, they are, in themselves, policy objec tives adopted as a etrategic move or, perhaps, as a defensive safeguard. The important task is to understand their meaning. History also shows that suc~ changes in alliances ultimately lead either to the acquisition of allies or the evolution of enemies. The emer gence of new sovereign states in Asia and Africa has caused widespread ad justments in the relationships among nations. New centers of potential na tional power, represented by the re grouping or federating of former co lonial areas, are being conceived. How will we deal with the rising new lead ers, and how will they deal with us? How will we treat these government.s 45

of recent origin which have Iittle eco nomic or politieel stability? As a re sult of being exposed to our strate gies and diplomacy, and to the vari ous pressures applied to them by other governments, will the peoples of these newly independent nations beeome friendly, neutral, or hostile?
Knew the Enemy

It is axiomatic that if we are to preserve our security and maintah our way of life, we must know our enemies-potential as well as present. Assuming that our friends of today will always remain so ie a fallacy. Also, we should not blindty timit the list of our future challengers to those who presently oppose our policies. It would be a serious mistake to restrict our planning to the premise that the rulers in Moscow and Peking consti tute our only threat. There may he no military threat from other nations or coalition of nations at this time, but in this era of nuclear stalemate other threats do exist with political, economic, and psychological objec tives. How do we foretell the future swings in the intricate balances of power on tbe international scene? How do we determine precisely what action to take and when to take it? The answers would seem to lie in reaching correct assumptions about the national strategies of other coun trie% This is essential, but represents only a partial solution. We must also consider the direction and control that we are able to apply to our own strat egies. In either approach, the intelli gence process can serve se a guide, setting forth facts and evaluating in formation. National strategy stems from baeic national objectives. Broad national objectives include a multitude of na

tional interests and aims, and these, in turn, will influence foreign policies. Therefore, we can say that national strategy is the over-all or master plan of a nation for the implementation of its policies and employment of its na tional power. It follows, then, that a nations strategy and its policies to. ward other nations must necessarily he influenced by the components of power. in his book, Politics Among Nations, describes these major groups of elements as con. stituting the power of a nation on the international scene: Geography. NaturaI resourcesfood and raw materials. . Industrial capacity. . Military preparedness-quality and quantity factors of the armed forces. o Population-distributilon and trends. . National character. National morale. o The quality of diplomacy. . The quality of government. These elements of power show the scope of knowledge required to ana lyze a nations capabilities and ulti mately to make a judgment as to its intentions. They also illustrate the wide range of subject matter that must be covered to inform, those who make the decieions. It is essential, from the intelligence viewpoint, that we recognize the many complex fac tors that make up a nations strength. A thoughtful review of Mr. Mor genthaus list will serve to bring out the difficulty and magnitude of the task of providing accurate and timely intelligence on many aspects of these subjects. We may be able to obtain Military Review
Elements ef Power Hans J. Morgenthau

POLICYMAKING

statistics including tables of organi zation and order of battle relating to an enemys armed forces, but how do we assess the quality factors of mo rale and leadership ? How will these factors influence the enemys effective ness? How do we gauge the natilonal character or national morale of a for eign people? How do we judge the

ther our national interests and objet. tives. Counter the effectiveness of in telligence efforts by foreign powers. If theee functions are properly and continuously carried out, they will fulfill the eesential intelligence re quirements for the development of national strategy and the imnlemen

quality of diplomacy practiced by a potential enemy? How do we evaluate the quality factore of a foreign gov ernment in its day-to-day operation or in its long-range commitments? As an integral part of our pbmning process, intelligence can meet the broad long-range challenges we have outlined by performing three basic functione to: Identify and give warning of threats and plans directed against our national security or our national in terests anywhere in the world. Provide knowledge upon which policies and plans can be based to fur July 1986

tation of policy. In this way, intelli gence can better serve as the key to decision. There are a number of guidelines which can be utilized to assist in im proving intelligence operations. One of these is that we should require the producere of intelligence, as well as tbe users, to maintain a perspective that is positive, alert, and capable of rapid adjustment. This perspective should strese the long-term view. There is no place for bias, or a line: or for following what may be con sidered a currently fashionable scho$ of thought in the analysis of raw i~ 47

POLICYMAKING

formation. This is also true in the exercise of judgment in its evaluation -either on the part of the individual because of personal or emotional rea sons or on the part of the agency it self because of habit, complacency, or a bureaucratic attitude. Since the patterns of events, situa tions, and conditions throughout the world are always in a transitional tur moil, a geod intelligence system can not afford mere]y to keep currentit

in our policies and strategies must be based on intelligence processed in ad vance of the need. For example, it is not enough to concentrate only on the affairs of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, we must anticipate the next trouble spot in the Caribbean. Plan ners dare not take a holiday. Another guideline is that our rea soning processes should be designed not only to extract the significant items and trends from raw informa-

Amw

New

Fedurea

Loudspeakerssnd leatists play s part in psychologicalwarfare in Vietnamto secure the surrenderof Viet Cong members must work ahead. This leads to the second point that our intelligence effort is obliged to be a continuous one in peaee or in war. Up-to-date knowl-. edge, constantly replenished, is essential. The critical decieions embodied ,48 tion, but also must be directed toward the cause and effect of human thought and action. More emphasis placed on studying the history, customs, and tbe cnltural heritage of foreign peoples will add to tbe authenticity and re Military Bwiaw

POLICYMAKING

liability of our intelligence estimates. An additional step in judging a government and its diplomacy is studying the propaganda, subversion, and psychological warfare efforts of that country. These activities can give indications of the aims, ambitions, and, perhaps, even more important, the fears of the directing government. The effects may not be readily appar ent since these undertakings are of a subtle and nebulous character. We should, however, make every effort to gauge their impact on the target na tions.
Information Retrieval A fifth guideline is that intelligence

which it can either he projected on a screen or reproduced on paper. The foreign language area is of vital interest to all intelligence agen cies since less time-consuming meth ods of translating foreign language newspapers, books, magazines, and other publications of interest are badly needed. Tbe existence of many new sovereign states and the reliance on international and regional organi zations, as well as constant advances in science, have increased the volume of published material worthy of translation to the point of inundation of present facilities.
lines of Communications

officials should encourage the use of computers and electronic data pro cessing (EDP) in the many ways they are now applicable to information storage and retrieval. It is not sug gested that computers and EDP sys tems can take the place of human reasoning processes in the analysis and evaluation functions. However, the task of data mobilization in the future will be of such proportions that recording, collating, and storing the overabundance of information avail able appears to be practical only with the use of increasingly sophisticated equipment. Given the mass of data on hand, information retrieval through EDP systems will be the most feasi ble method of filtering and directing the flow of these pertinent pieces of acquired knowledge within the critical time limits allowable. One of the most advanced examples of information retrieval by comput ers is the CIAs Walnut system. By this means, an eight-inch by 14-inch page of information is reduced to a microscopic image. Any one of 990,000 images can be plucked out of CIAS computers wit in five seconds, after i
kdY le6e

Fhally, improved channels of inter nal communication are needed to as sure that the intelligence produced reaches the right person at the right time. One aspect of this problem is the physical separation of the wide spread locations of the producers and the ultimate users. While some tech nological advances in communications may be expected in the future-such as the use of communication satellites and laser beams for television and telephone transmissions--cnq present methods of disseminating information are generally appropriate for their intended use and adequate in capacity. Whatever the methodlong-range radio, diplomatic pouch, or a mes senger in the Pentagonit is essen tial that our lines of communications be: . Direct as possible between sender and receiver. Always physically available, ready for use, and not overloaded with traffic. o Secure from compromise of class ified material. . Uncluttered by hampering ad ministrative restrictions.

49

POLICYMAKING

A more important aspect of the communication problem is the staggering sise and complexity of our governmental structure and its many lay. ers of bureaucracy. The exchange of, information laterally or the flow of information upward or downward

Chiefs of Staff or the three military services in the Department of De fense. Mr. McCamy concludes that all the persons and units . . . directed by law to do something in foreign rela tions, either full or uart time. make

TesImolegicsl advances in cemmunieetione such as the S#neom /11 eommunieetiom+ satellite sen expeditedieeeminstionof information ia especially critical in the conduct of foreign affaira beeauae of what James L. McCamy deacribee as the sprawl of the exeeutive branch. In hia book, Conduct of the New Di plomacy, he namea the 26 persons and agencies involved consistently in foreign affairs in 1962. Twelve were in the Executive Office of the Presi dent and 14 outside. These did not include such semiautonomous unite within the Department of State as the Agency for International Devel opment and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, nor the Joint 50 close direction and coordination dif ficult if not impossible. It ia signifi cant that most of them are users of intelligence and also originators. It is not easy to have coordination and a free flow of information even within a single department. The De partment of Defense, with offices and installations all over the world, made a worthwhile beginning in 1961 by the establishment of the Defense Communications Agency whose job is to develop a single, fully integrated communications syetem for all of the military services.
Military R@viow

Restrictions in the free flow of information may stem from ignorance or carelessness on the part of the dis seminator, from clogged channels of communications, or because of its classification. Whatever the reason may be, Mr. Khtner-in the Marine COWS Gazette artWe previously re ferred to-in discussing the miiitary role in formulating national strategy, warns of this poeeible deficiency in our procedures: Another major development of re cent geare has been the tendency to restrict accese to vital information and intelligence ew%nate8 as well aa to crucial policy decieiona. While there can be no valid objection to a etmct need to know policg with re8pect to eensitive information, the obstaclee which aueh a policy impoaee on active stafl collaboration muet not be over looked. True intelligence is obtained only after intensive sifting and winnow-

ing. The mere accumulation of data is not enough. Day-today eventa must be weighed againet relevant back ground information and previously charted patterns. Evaluation, analy sis, and interpretation of data avail able muet be accomplished objectively and impa~lally. This is the real chal lenge to our intelligence eystem. In meeting the demands imposed by todays policymakers, there ie one final role that intelligence may play which could tranecend all others. It can be used as an implement of peace. If in telligence can reach the truth through the maes of facts and data collected, we will be forearmed to mainttdn our eecurity and to work toward peaceful settlement throughout the world. Truth can be the clearest exponent of our ideala of democracy and free dom, and if truth can be made known to all peaplee, it will be an unbeatable weapon in our fight against the spread of communism and tyranny.

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My 1966

51

HE year 1950 marked a water shed for modern Tibet. In Oc tober of that year, the armed forces of the Communist regime of China in vaded it. Its feeble defenses were broken up, the population terrorized, and its government knocked out. The old Chinese Emperors had never been near the Himalaya, but Mao Tse-tung now made a bid to be installed under its shadow as well as on its flanks, if not beyond its crest. A new era dawned for Tibet and for south Asia. If the valley is reached by a high pass, says a Tibetan proverb, only the best friends or the worst enemies are visitors. The Red visitors have turned out to be the worst enemies. Peking has been propounding Ti bets close affinities with China. This is not correct, for Tibet and Tibetans have enjoyed a distinctiveness of their own for centuries. Ethnologically, the Titlephoto
52
crmke+Y

Ke@.one.

northern Tibetantall, long limbed, and Iongheadedbelongs to the same stock as the Turk and the Mongol, while the southernshort, flatnosed, and roundheaded-origi nates from the same stock as the Chinese, Burmese, and Thais. The Tibetan language is akin to the Burmese and distinct from the Chinese-Thai group and has never employed ideograms. On this racial foundation a special kind of superstructure began to be raised with the arrival of Mahayana Buddhism in the 7th centwry. Grad ually, the church acquired supreme authority and also became the polit ical government. Features of this unique society included the reincarna tion and discovery of the Dalai Lama, the establishment of a large number of monasteries to which every family contributed at least one monk, medi tating ascetics, and elaborate rituals. Geography had a hand in giving Military Ileview

TIBET

Tibetane their distinctive character. Tibet is bounded on the north by a complex of mountains. But for these mountains most of northern Tibet would have been a continuation of the Takla Makan Desert of Sinkiang. The mountain barrier is roughly 190 kilo-, meters wide with many high peaks including Ulugh Muztagh (7,700 me ters). Even this, however, is lower than those of the Himalaya. of Karakoram and Ladakh. Karakoram provides the principal passageway be tween Tibet and Sinkiang. In its shadow lies Indias territory of La dakh, and it is through the northeast of LadakhAksai Chinthat China has built a road. The Himalaya, 2,400 kilometers long and 240 kilometers wide, forms Tibets southern flank, running through two civilizations, the Indian and Tibetan; two climatee, the mon soonal and dry central Asian; and two terrains, the plain and the plateau. There are many passes in these moun tains, but few considering their enor mous length. There has been no largescale movement of populations. East Tibet, on the other hand, pro vides a major gap for peoples to flow in and out. This gap, roughly be tween Nan Shari and Burma, contains mountain ranges and also deep gorges of the upper Salween, Mekong, and Wing Commander Maharaj K. C= pra, Indzan Air Force, Retired, is military correspondent for the Eng lish-language Indian newspaper, The Indian Exprees. A frequent contribu tor to the MILITARY REVIEW, he is the author of Land Communications Through Asias Highest Mountains; which appeared in the November lg65 ieeue. JUJY 1966
Physical Features On the west are the massifs

Yangtze which are formidable bar riers by themselves. But movements through it are comparatively easy, so that it is through its east and north east that Tibet has had its main, al though meager, contacts with China. Lying within these highly inacces sible physical features is the Chang Tang, or the northern plain. This great desert, with an average altitude of 4,900 meters, is windswept, cold, and harsh. Amazingly enough, it con tains the sources of some of Asias greatest riversthe Indus and Tsang po flowing into India, the Salween into Burma, the Mekong into Viet nam, and the Yangtze and Hwang Ho into China. It is the valleys of these rivers which are Tibete paramount attraction.
Tibet Never Conquered

Geography enabled Tibet to remain alone without, bowever, isolating it completely. For two centuries it was indeed a military power when it con quered parts of China and Mongolia. This period ended in the 10th cen tury. Two centuries later, Kublai Khan conquered Tibet, but when in 1368 the Mongols were overthrown in China, they were also eliminated from Tibet. The Manchus, ascending the throne in 1636, sought to bring it within their empire, but with little success, and they also fell in 1912. Meanwhile, the British came to In dia and, in due course, moved UP to the Himalaya. Wading through an in tricate maze of diplomacy, represent atives of British India, China, and Tibet met in 1914 and drew a con vention by which they sought to give Tibet its proper boundaries.* Then came World War I, Chinas civil war and war with Japan, and World War

cm P 61.

aeeTheMcMahon Line

by Earl B. ShaW
\

53

TIBET

Ililitary Review

TIBET

IL During World War II, Tibet pro claimed that it was neutral, neither pro-A1ly nor pro-Axis, neither proCbiang Kai-shek nor pro-Mao Tse tung, and pressed its neutrality by refusing Chiang permission to build a throngh supply road to India. Until 1950 the Dalai Lama was the temporal and spiritual ruler. He had an armed force, but it possessed little beyond rifles and old-fashioned moun tain guns which, despite attempts of the Tibetan Government, could not be supplemented from outside. In the Dalai Lamas Tibet, educa tion was fairly widespread. Monks could uee a roeary as well as a rifle. Tibetans produced enough of their staple food and plenty of wool that could be exchanged for outside tea, rice, su ar, and textiles, and also for foreign change. The average Ti $ betan was known to he fairly well off, healthy, and cheerful. In all Tibets history there was before 1950 hardly an instance of rebellion against the government. lying on the roof of the world, and possessing a distinc tive political and cultural personality, Tibet fell to the Red Chineee in 1950. The Peoples Liberation Army ( PLA ) struck from the west and the east.. Ten thousand troops, based on Khotan, marched in from the direc tion of Ladakh. This was a difficult route and violated Indian territory, but west Tibet was known to be an easy prey only loosely controlled from Lhasa. Another 40,000 troops launched a four-pronged attack from the eaet directed at Chamdo, Tibets garrison town. Resistance was feeble and practically ceased when Chamdos governor surrendered. Tibet appealed in vain to the United July 1966
Invasion and Control Mountain-bound,

Nations, and was forced to sign an agreement with China in 1951. Pref aced with peaceful liberation of Tibet, this agreement promised au tonomy to the country and assured the Dalai Lama a rightful place. Ac tually, it spearheaded political and military penetration. Construction of roads began immediately. A prepara tory committee was set up to intrO duce territorial divisions and reforms. Along with schools, a number of small factories and modern gadgets appeared. Monasteries began to be looted and demolished.
Foreign Influence What foreign influence existed in

Tibet began to disappear. The SinoIndian Agreement signed in 1954 spoke of the Tibetan Region of Chinaa provision against which not only Tibetqns, but many Indiana pro tested. For/ three years, from 1956 to 1959, reports circulated of fierce guer rilla attacks against the Chinese lines of communications and garrison towns, and of Chinese atrocities to suppress the Tibetan people. The Dalai Lama fled to India in March 1959. The Red Chinese are aware that, whether in the days of the Mongols or the Manchus, the main difficulty of subjugating Tibet lay in its in accessibility and ite distance from the seat of imperial power. Communica tions have, therefore, been at the top of their multiheaded program of colo nizing it. These communications have three aimsto form a reliable and effective link with the home base, to join Tibet with east and west CM nese Provinces, and to radiate roads up to the Himalaya. This system cov ers, for the present at Ieast, the more vulnerable parts of Tibet. In the past, there have been fbur 55

TIBET

main routes of Tibet radiating from Lhasa to the outside world. The LhasaLeh route branched off at Leh to Kashgar and to Srinagar. The LhasaChumbi route was a comparatively short one. The Lhasa-Nagachuka route led to Mongolia, Sinkiang, and China. Finally, there was the Lhasa. Chamdo route which branched off to

Communist China had made ample use of Tibets old communication lines, Theee are being improved and ~ many more are being laid. In general, . the principal routes have become trunk roads. The east-west road, Kashgar-Lhasa-Tatsienlu, is more than 4,000 kilometers long. This and the two main roads to China take heavy

Sining-Lanchow in the north and Kantse-Tatsienlu-Chengtu in the east. More often than not Tibets old routes were tracks or bridle paths rather than roads, and security was at least one reason why they were no better. The mnle and the yak were the principal means of transport, apart from human beings. The mule is better than the yak on elippery grass, but the yak is unrivaled on ap parently impossible rocks and boul ders. Neither has been dispensed with even in these days of trucks and air planes. 56

trucks., A number of feeder roads have sprung UP along the Great Hi malayan Range, and there are road links now between most of the eastern towns of Tibet. In the fighting in Ladakh in the fall of 1962, the Chinese brought up light tanks which had been air trans ported. At least a dozen runways, ca pable of taking heavy loads, have al ready been constructed in Tibet, and Lhasa has become an important air center. According to a statement of the Chinese State Council, Tibet assumed Military Raview

TIBET

the status Of an autonomous region on 1 September 1965. Actually, this pattern of transformation began to be woven in 1951. While the Dalai Lamaand his Cabinet were given nom inal authority, real control was vested in a Chinese-controlled military head quarters and an adminietrative com mittee established at Lhaea. A pre paratory committee for working out the autonomy was set up which, after the flight of tbe Dalai Lama, toOk complete control under Chinese Gen eral Chang Kuo-hua and Tibetan quis ling Ngapho.
Tibet Redivided Since then, there bas been a ter

iron-smelting furnaces, and the man ufacture of light agricultural imple ment. Last year, according to one broadcast, there were 67 plants and 25,000 industrial workers in Tibet while there were none before libera tion. The PLA is much in evidence, of course, with a gun in one hand and a plough in the other.
Foreign Relations

ritorial and administrative redivision of Tibet. Parts of east Tibet have been incorporated into the neighbor ing Chinese Provinces of Kansu, Tsinghai, and Sikang. The remaining Tibet has been divided into eight zones. The fact that Lhasa is only one of these zones would show that they seek to thin out its old magic and influence. According to Lhasa radio broad casts, there have been elections for zonal congresses accompanied by of fere of ceremonial scarves to the por traits of Mao Tse-tung. Since 1960, thousandaof meetings are said to have been held to promote unity, class struggle and socialist education. A total of 22,000 cooperatives embrac ing 160,000 families have been set up, and there is a plethora of mutual aid teame. Among tbe documents on Tibet re cently released, there is mention of a report prepared by a research team headed by Li Po, a Chinese geog rapher, reflecting light on Tibets natural resources. Meanwhile, the Chinese have announced the exploita tion of coal, the establishment of
hl[y

Tibets foreign relations have com pletely changed. Britain disowns fur ther interest and the Soviet Union once a meddler in Tibetnow ac knowledges it as a part of Communist China. Burma, a neighbor, is inditTer ent and also handicapped because of a difficult northern border. Nepals entire northern border, 800 kilometers long, adjoine Tibet. Until the advent of tbe Communists, Nepal conducted direct political relations with the Dalai Lamas foreign office, but now the dialogue is with Peking. The Sino-Nepalese frontier has been demarcated more or lees along the traditional boundary line, with an un derstandingimplicit, but not explicit that the frontier would pass through Mount Everest. Reports of trouble along this border, caused by refugee Tibetans or guerrillas, come to the outside world, but have not been se rious. Nepal receives considerable aid from the outeide world including the United States, the Soviet Union, and India. Chinae contribution is small, but she has scored one significant suc cess. The Lhasa-Kodari road to Kat mandu bas brought China halfway down the Himalayan flank overlooking India. Indias relations with Tibet were at least 1,300 years old when Bud dhism first reached Tibet. These rela tions have been religious :and cultural.

1966

TIBET

Attempts to demarcate the traditional Indo-Tibetan boundary were made, but wars and instabilities in China stood in the way. India inherited British interests in Tibet, including, besides the frontiers, a mission, com

Himalaya, and repudiation of tbe tra ditional Indo-Tibetan boundary. A Sine-Indian Commission on the bound ary dispute ended in a deadlock, and from cold war the entire questhn was taken by the Chinese to the battle. field. Following a few engagements, Indian troops withdrew from their positions, and there followed a ceasefire, partial withdrawal of Cbhese forces from their forward occupied positions, and efforts once again to settle the matter without the use of arms. Communist China continues to ocCUPYAksai Chin and launches occa sional incursions into Indian territory. While India was engaged in contlict with Pakistan in 1965, China threat ened to intervene. Near]y 14 Red di visions along with two million Civjlian Han Chinea+including technicians, administrators, and party fanatics form tbe new imperial elite of Tibet with whom India, more than any other country, now has to deal.
Population Decrease

KeU8t0ne

Railroad constructionhad a top priority in the Csmmunistprogramof colonizing Tibet mercial arrangements, and a few com munication centers and military con cessions. India recognized the interest of China in Tibet by the Sine-Indian Agreement of 1964 in which the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were affirmed. New trade agencies were eetabIished on both sides, India handed over her facilities in Tibet, and a new pasapurt eystem was es tablished. On the heels of tbe agreement came Chinese construction of the road through Indias Lzdakh, claims to a number of strategic passes in the
es

Peking has announced that the present population of Tibet is 1.25 million. This is not near to the ear lier estimate of five to seven million. The population has no doubt been re duced by truncating the territory and, as the International Commission of Jurists pointed out, by large-scale genocide and exile of Tibetans. Shrunken, this Tibetan population is also overwhelmed by the Han immi grants in the ratio of one to three. Tibet, it seems, has run into the fate of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. In Tibet, monasteries have either been torn down or have been turned into administrative or military head quarters and their treasures confis cated. The old Tibetan political and social structures have been replaced Milii Review

.!

TIBET I

by streamlined Communist parapher nalia which envelops the new genera tion of Tibetans. Some weak spots in this situation are discernible. The sturdy, patriotic Khambu,residente of east Tibet, have fiercely resisted the aggressor in the pest, and, although short of weapone, are still active despite Communiet pressure. Herdsmen of the plateau, who once thrashed unite of Mao]e army in the course of ite Long March, are a menace, and would not give up their freedom-loving, fierce nomadic habita eaeily. of Tibet, Chi nese communication pass through barren, ieolated wastes, high passee, and precipitous mountains, and are vulnerable. Presently, in its undevel oped form, Tibet cannot support either the civil population or the mas sive military machine. Logistics, which are of such paramount impor tance, are by no meana reliable. Above all, there is the Dalai Lama, a divine incarnation, venerated in the Buddhist lands of southeast Asia, and prseently a refugee in India along with 60,000 Tibetans. He euffered exile many tirnee in the past, but al waya returned to Lhasa. He says that, like the Manchus, the Red Chineee cannot hold Tibet forever. While his future is uncertain, he continues to be a political and religioue rallying point and a eymbol of defiance of the Red Chinese aggressors. But these adverse factors do not, at present, appear to be powerf td enough to turn the Red tide in Tibet. Three times in tbe postwar period the General Assembly of the United Nations has debated Tibet, the last time occurring in December 1965. It bas condemned China for violating
July 1SS6 Adverse Factora Over the vast spans

Tibetans human righta and freedoms, but not for swallowing up Tibet. In the worlds eyes, Tibet has ceaaed to exist ae an independent state. How does thie colonized Tibet fit and what role does it play in the Red Chineee poetwar empire?
Focus of Power

It is clear that for the time being tbe Chang Tang backed by the Kun lun must remain a great buffer be tween south Azia and central Azia. Sven A. Hedin deecribed it well as a most massive range on the cruet of the earth. Until it is explored and developed, it could serve, perhaps, @Y virtue of its size and isolation, as a site for nuclear explosion. Compared to thie the value of the Himalaya as a barrier is downgraded. During the last decade and a half, numerous com munication Iineeand centers have been built on its northern and southern flanks and foreground by which armies can now move along or across tbe mountain with comparative ease. The lifeline of Tibet muet etill flow through its valleye where water, a bracing climate, and fertile soil are available and, therefore, the bulk of the population finds ite habitation. Ae in the past so in the present, Lhasa remains the focus of power, not be cause of ite location in relation to the whole of Tibet, but because of ita Io cation in relation to the rivers and valleys. With the passage of time, east Ti bet, truncated now, is likely to acquire
greater prominence than tbe west.
Firat, it is the main traffic zone be tween Tibet and the heart of main land China, and, eecond, it is a land
of promise.
To Communiet China, Tibet has
been a windfall. During tbe last 150
years, no nation has been able
T

! :

TIBET

seize so much territory with so little effort, with the possible exception of Russia which simply roI1ed over Si beria. Siberia, once considered worth six rubles, has already begun to pay rich dividends, and the same also may be the case with Tibet. whether Tibet is really a second California from the point of view of gold remains to be seen, but Li Pos economic report offers tempting glimpses of wealth ly ing in wait on the roof of the world. Along with tbe impetus of profit, Tibet provides China an excellent buffer, better than Sinkiang and prob ably the best on the Chinese main land. Further, it provides an elevated position overlooking Indiathe plains of which are 500 to 600 kilometers away from bases recently constructed and also a vast tableland of great immunity and strategic refuge. The salient between Sikkim and Bhutan is only a few kilometers from tbe northern apex of east Pakistan, and this is the place where the collusion between the two countries could be tactically consummated. Despite assiduous attempts in the past, no central Asian power has so far been able to reach the Indian Ocean. From tbe Himalayan border of Tibet to the Bay of Bengal the distance is no more than 800 kilo meters, one-fourth of which was tra versed by the Chinese forces during the last invasion. Some Chinese gen erals at least could have smelled the ealt air of the Indian Ocean. The advantages for Communist China are disadvantages for India. India is aware of the vulnerability of some of her important border areas the Assam oilfields, the corridor with east Pakistan, and the trans-

Himalayan Kashmir. The delicate character of the buffer of Nepal is evident. Compared to her own, (%L nae vital centers are at a greater striking distance. For geopolitical and military rea sons, India is presently engaged in building a defensive posture along the border of Tibet. It would be futile to visualize how a military conflict might develop in this area in the future, but strategists would not fail to take note of Tibets position. Tibet can be bombed from bases in India and car riers in the Bay of Bengal, but eeo nomically the damage would be slight and militarily could be inconsequen tial. Tibet is a land suited for highaltitude, mountain, and jungle war fare in which the human factor, light weapons, and proper logistic support are of primary importance. The more massive, sophisticated arms are sec ondary. Between forces which are equally matched this will almost in variably end in guerrilla warfare. No country today wants this kind of con frontation with the hope of a deci sive victory. Therefore, the Red Chinas Achilles heel relating to Tibet lies outside Ti bet. From the Indian standpoint, it lies in the eaet and northeast of it, broadly along the routes to Kunming and Chungking which were followed by the Allied planes over the Hima laya in World War II. From the world point of view, it lies in the heart of the Middle Kingdom itself, ap proached from the Pacific. Strategies of such nature and dimensions are, however, not contemplated at present, for the fact is that the world is more preoccupied with the aftermath of Tibets bondage than its liberation.

60

Military Review

TheMcMahon line

Earl B. Shaw

HE present boundary between India and Red China has caused trouble between the two countries for a long time. This friction, like border problems afflicting many nations, re sults largely from the lack of detailed care and cooperation between the two nations at the time the boundary was made. A few conditions are extremely significant in the establishment of any satisfactory boundary. One of these is that the interested parties should delimit the boundary carefully by treaty or other written contract. A second condition requires them to be sure that boundary limits and defini tions are understood and agreed upon by all parties concerned. They should also make a systematic demarcation of the borderline. This involves the actual marking of the boundary on the ground with pillars or other de
July 1933

vices to give visual evidence of its exact location. None of these condi tions has been fulfilled along the SinoIndian border. An attempt was made more than a half centnry ago, between 13 October 1913 and 3 July 1914, to establish a boundary. Representatives of Great Britain, then in control of the Indian subcontinent; Tibet, who had pro claimed her independence over a year before in January 1913; and China, whose Manchu dynasty had fallen by revolution in 1911, met to discuss boundary probleme at Simla. Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, the British delegate, presided at the meet ings, and the boundary resulting from the discussions at the Simla Confer- ence hae become known as the McMahon Line. Generally, the McMahon Line is regarded as the boundary extendi g ? 61

along the eastern sector of the SinoIndian zone of contact. It stretches from the western border of the Indian protectorate of Bimtan across the northern fringe of the North-East Frontier Agency of India as far as the Isu Rezi Paea on the Sino-Bur meae border.
6eographic Sase

The geographic base for the MeMabon Line istbe water parting made by the generslly east-west trending Himalaya Mountabw. In other worde, the line was drawn to follow the bmd forms separating the headwaters of streams flom-ng north into China from those tlowing south into India. Some writers have deecribed the Iine incorrectly when they eay it conforms to the crest of the Himalayas-this is not true, for the crest and drainage divide are not synonymous by any means. Unfortunately, the McMahon Line waa not properly marked at the close of the Simla Conference. Of course, this would have been extremely dif ficult because the line runs for a great dietance through high moun teine constantly covered with ice and snow. But even at lower and less rigorous altitudes, there was no at tempt to eetablieh markers that would show tbe definite location of the bor der. Furthermore, no official verbal description of the line has ever been made public. Earl B. Shaw & Professor of Geog raphy at Assumption College in Worce8ter, Maesashuaetts. He r8G$iVed his Rfaster8 deg?ae from Washington University, Saint Loaie, Mi.wouri, and hia Ph. D. from Ckzrk Univer8itg in Worc88ter. He is the author of 8everal booke and a frequent con tribwter to profe88ional geographic magamnea.
ez

It ie a]eo unfortunate that the offi cial map, ehowing the line, was drawn on a scale of one inch to eight miles -a scale far toe small to eIiminate opportunities for misinterpretation by the bordering countries. Thus, it is inevitzble that one power fringing the line could interpret the small- , scale map in such a way as to include an important salient of ground or drainage confluence as lying within that countrys territory, whereas an oppOsite interpretation might include the strategic area withh the territory of the other bordering country.
Red Ctdnas View

Many causes may be cited for the 1962 Chinese invaeions of India at several placee along the entire SinoIndian boundary. The same can be said about the 1965 confronbkion north of Silddm. This small Indian protectorate lies just west of Bhutan, the western anchor of the McMahon Line. Three of the causes for these 1962 and 1965 international troubles have received less publicity than some of the others. First, China refuses to accept the McMahon Llnc as the proper SinoIndian boundary because the Chinese representative at the Simla Confer. encc rcfueed to sign the treaty. He aleo had ifietructions from hk gov ernment not to recognize the agree ment between Britain and Tibet, or any other future agreement in wldch Britain and Tibet were involved, as binding upon China. A second cause for trouble is that the Chinese eay that at the Simla Conference only the Sino-Tibcten border wae discussed, and that the boundary between China and India was never placed on the agenda. Moreover, they claim that the McMa hon Line was marked on the official

McMAHON LINE

map after the close of the confer ence, and the changed map was at tached later to the treaty as a part of the boundary settlement. Finally, the Chinese argue that the eastern sector of the Sino-lndian bor der should be the traditional ethnic boundary separating the hill people of Mongoloid stock, who speak a Ti betan-%rmese dialect, from the In dians whom they consider as people of the plains. China thus maintains that a proper Sino-lndian boundary should lie along the base of the Himalayas rather than along the water parting or the crest. The Reds further say that the McMa hon Line moved the historical bonnd

ary north to include about 90,000 square kilometers which was tradi tionally a part of Tibet. India claims that the McMahon Line is valid and legal, and that China is in error in saying that the line was placed on the map after the close of the Simla Conference. Fur thermore, India states that under international law the Indian Govern ment inherited the Simla Conference Treaty obligations from Britain and is bound to uphold the treaty agreed upon by Tibet and British India. In dia claims that, at the time of the Simla Conference, Tibet was an in dependent nation and entitled to share in the treaty in her own right.

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July 1S6S

A STliDY iN INSURGENCY

The American Revolution

Major Ray L. Bowers,Jr., United.WatesAir Force N THE spring of 1775, thousands of New England farmers, musket in hand and powder horn at the belt, converged from every part of the coun tryside upon the British Army block aded in Boston. An identical spirit surged two summers later when mul titudes of American citizen soldiers inundated General John Burgoyne at Saratoga. Such happenings were unheard of in 18th-century Europe where war fare involved hut the fringe of a na tions population. The American Rev olution was introducing into modern history elements of peoplee or pop ular war. As the patriot cause gained power over the Thirteen Colonies, and as Britain acted to reassert Imperial control, the conflict soon became a classic study in popular insurrection, one which constituted the first mod ern war of insurgency. . Particularly in the eouthern thea ter, the history of the American Revo lution is largely one of unconventional warfare, possessing many aepects cOm mon to 20th-century insurgences. Re cent theorists of Communist revolu tionary warfare might well have de veloped their most successful ideas from an analysis of the American struggle. Likewise, current problems

Militery Review

AMERICAN REVOLUTION

t
1 in effecting counterinsurgency opera tion resemble Britaine task in paci. fying her rebellious Colonies nearly two centuries ago.
Internal Civil War

The American Revolution from the beginning was fundamentally an in ternal civil war. In each of the Col onies, patriot and loyaliet movements divided over the question of opposi tion to Britain and a variety of inter. nal social, economic, and political is sues. In some Colonies, radical polit ical leaders led opposition to British rule as a means of advancing their own interests and power and those of the lower classes. Elsewhere, espe cially in the South, underprivileged back-country farmers, themselves vic time of colonial ruling groups, tended to align with the Crown. Although the pattern of division varied widely, in each of the Colonies it wae the revolutionary patriot move ment that triumphed. The result was an entire countryside controlled by an inSUrgent movement and adminis. tered and policed by revolutionary au thority. The British Army was thus con fronted with the nearly impossible strategic problem of reconquering and occupying a vast space occupied by an uncooperative population. British armed force could capture cities on the coast, it could garrison forts in the interior, and it could march at will through patriot territory, but it Major Ray L. Bowers, Jr., is an A8sociats Professor in the Depart ment of Hi8toW, United Statee Air Force Academyr Colorado. He rsceiued his Maeters degree in History from the Univereitg of Wisconein and, be fore his present assignment, was a navigator with the Tactical Air Com mand.
JUIY le66

could not itself control the entire countryside. To do this, it was dependent on a strong loyalist movement+ne which could, with British assistance, rebuild the old institutions of authority. With out it, the British Army was like a ship moving through an ocean. The Revolution parted as the Britieh Army advanced, but, when the army passed through, the Revolution closed in again behind.
Patriot Dominance

The victory of the patriot revolu tionary forces in each Colony was not always the reeult of an advantage in numbers. Until the final stagee of the war, perhaps only one of three Amer icane felt committed to the cauee of revolution. Another third probably would have taken arms on behalf of Khg George III if circumstances per mitted. The rest remained in the mid dle to swing gradually to the patriot side as events proceeded. Patriot dom inance was often the work of a highly active minority. One reaeon for patriot succees in the early internal conflict was orga nization. Revolutionary committees of safety appeared at all levels to grasp politicat power as the old institution faltered. The patriot-dominated com mittees functioned in theory as the executive authority of the revolution ary Iegislatnres, but there wae Jfttle check on their authority. The loyalist movement, by contrast, remained thoroughly disorganized and impotent, subdued by the vigorous group strength and firm methods of the patriots. The patriots proved successful in employing force as a political instru ment in the internal civil war. The flavor of lawlessness and violence in the revolutionary movement con~ti

AMEltlCAN REVOLUTION tuted an important ingredient of pa triot success, Radical and patriot or ganizers loudly proclaimed liberty and freedom of speech, but they allowed neither to the loyalist Americans. Mob violence, intimidation followed by imposed oaths, destruction of prop erty, tarring and feathering, and other forms of persuasion were widely emp loyed against individual loyalists. Absence of Ieaderehip and unity meant inaction for the Tories. Be moaning events in the coffeehouses and in their generally temperate press, the loyalists failed to raeognize the need for arme and organized force. Essentially conservative in outlook, loyafists were prone to await British action rather than organize them selves for counterviolence.
Organized Military Forces When the situation required, pa triot leaders in the southern Colonies

areaa directly eecupied by the British Army, organized Ioyaliet movements in the South remained dormant. Lord Charles Cornwallis reported to Gen eral Sir Henry Clinton on 29 August 1780: The eeveritg of the Rebel govern ment has so terriyied and totallg sub. clued the mind8 of the people, that it is ver~ difficult to rouse them to an~ exertions
Propaganda ~eapon

applied organized military forces against the loyalists. In late 1775 in South Carolina, a newly raised pa triot bandincluding the future par tisan leader, Thomae Sumterseized Tory leadere and confiscated arms. Early the next year, patriot forces crushed, with few casualties, an as sembly of North Carolinians loyal to Britain at Mooree Creek. In Georgia a newly rallied loyalist force was routed by Andrew Pickenz leading 400 irregular patriot fighters at Kettle Creek. Meanwhile, in Virginia a gathering of patriot militia inflicted casualties in a brisk exchange near Norfolk, causing a British and loyalist force to retire to nearby ships. These ac tione signified tbe ability and willing ness of the patriot movement to or ganize military force for the political purpose of crushing their internal foes. Throughout tbe war, except in
Se

The patriote also employed the weapon of propaganda with skill and effect. The, justice of the American canse, the tyranny and depravity of the British, the atresities of the mer cenary He$sian bloodhounds (who were gener~lly the least vicioue of any of the soldlers in America), and the contrasting humanity and enlighten ment of the Frenchthese ideas echoed endlessly in the patriot news paper and pamphlet press and from the platforms of pulpits, legislatures, and town squaree. The propagandists magnified and invented British atrocities and under. lined the wickedness and enslavement which wouId allegedly follow patriot defeat. One of the most active writers was Benjamin Franklin. Weaker voices of moderation were lost amid the flood of violently partisan pa triot propaganda backed by force. The Americans also direpted their propaganda against the French pop ulation of Canada and against tbe Hessian mercenaries. Tbe British re plied with inflammatory appeals to the American Negro slaves, a practice which infuriated American whites. The Royal Governor of Virginia, Lord Dunmore, proclaimed freedom for Negroes willing to bear arms for the King. Propaganda and intimidation, pracMilitary fteview

ticed with determination and backed by organized strength, broke the vi tality of the loyalist cause early in the Revolution and constantly under mined its possible resurgence there. after. Of such ingredients successful revolutions are made. tended to think of the American insurgency as essentially a military problem. Lord George Sackville Germain, the Minis ter most reeponeible for conducting the war, wrote on taking office: Nothing is 80 much to be wi8hed for w a dec$eive action. . . . one deci8ive blow bg land ie abeolutelv neceeearg. After that, the whole witl depend upon the dil$gence and activitg of the of ficers of the Navfi. Like many Britishers, Germain held the Americans in-contempt, par ticularly the ones in armed rebellion againe.t a lawful and God-ordained sovereign. Gerrnain credited the pa triots with no staying power in the face of British determination and mil itary power. Gradually, British leadere began to realize the political and cultural ae pects of the situation, and that Eng Iande main hope. rested in revitaliz ing the loyalist cause. The insurgency could be broken only if organized loy alist counterrevolutionary elemente could effectively control areas cleared by the British Army. Enlisted men in the British Army, ae in all European armies of tbe 18th century, came from the lowest and Ieaet productive groups in society. The eoldiers lived a world apart from their aristocratic officer corps. How ever, the American loyalists who came from the farms and villages of the New World and who volunteered to fight under the Kings colors were a
July 1968 Political and Cultural Aapacta Initially, British leaders

wholly different breed. Treated like domestic eervante by the British ofTi cers, thousands of these loyalists de eerted to the patriot side, carrying weapons and information with them, Perhaps her ehabby treatment of the loyalists constituted Britaine great est political mistake. British officers erred eeriously in using the torch against the patriots. Atrocity and reprieal badly under-

BanjzminFranklinwaz one of the moat sctive propagandietzfor the revolution. ary cauze mined Britaine fundamental objec tive which was essentially one of paci fication. A Major Wemyee wrote that American Presbyterian Churches were sedition houses. While the assump tion of Wemyss wae, perhaps, true, certainly the wrong way to pacify an aroused populace wae to go about burning the churchee. Wemyss not only burned churches, but executed le~ders, fired homes, slaughtered cat tle, and even rustled horses in loy alist areas. The British officer, Major Patrick Ferguson, proved competent in hie political tasks, rallying loyalists to his al

.
AMERICAN REVOLUTION force in the Carolinas. Yet Fergusorrs downfall came from a grievous polit ical blundera proclamation dis patched into the western country threatening banging for patriot lead ers and destruction for the country side unless the region submitted to Royal control. Fergqsons proclama was successfully intimidating British sympathizers. British officers, partly out of con. tempt for Americans, failed to pre. vent unnecessary pillage and destruc tion by the soldiers who were them selves scarce]y goodwill ambassadors. Although patriot propagandists exag.

US A,nw

The concepts of Iihertyand freedom from tyrannyinehrd.~in the Declarationof Irr dependence were close to the beliefs of manyEnglishmen tion galvanized formation of a pa triot force of frontiersmen which crossed the mountains to crush him at Kings Mountain. Colonel Sir Banastre Tarletons British and loyalist cavalry moved over the Carolinas, burning the farms of known rebels, but scarcely chang ing convictions among the victims. Yet Tarleton sensed that, while Brit ish use of terror yielded mainly hat red and defiance, patriot use of force 68 gerated and distorted atrocities, the British Army provided plqnty of ma terial to work with. As figures of the Age of Reason, 18th-century British leaders insti tuted no wholesale campaign of ter ror. Tbe extermination of entire com munities awaited the 20th century. Sometimes the British tried honest if inconsistent policies of conciliation. ,Some 5,000 American troops fell into British hands with the surrender of Military Review

I
AMERICAN REVOLUTION Charlestonin 1780. Most of these men wereparoled to their homes, on prom ise of not again taking up arms against the King. This was a sensible gestureof moderation and might have becomethe basis for real pacification of the Colony. But the British had second thoughts on the matter, and the parole agree ment was abolished and the men or dered to join new loyalist regiments. To the Americans, it seemed only sen sible to rejoin the patriots since the British, after all, had broken the agreement.Hundreds of men left their homes to join the partisan forces in the swamps and forests rather than join the Britieh. Erratic policies such as this re vealed that the British never under stood the Americans nor sensed the essentially cultural and political meas ures required either to pacify the pa triots or bolster the loyalists. Policy rested upon men equipped with the narrow thought of the 18th-century European soldier.
Counterinsurgency Psychology

it clear that after seven years Britain was virtually in the position of be ginning all over again. The tax bur dens required to finance the war hit heavily upon those claeses with larg est representation in Parliament. The ideology of the Americans the concepts of liberty and freedom from tyranny proclaimed by the pa triotssat uncomfortably closg to the

The American Revolution consti tuted a test of British determination. It was unnecessary for the patriots to crush British military and economic resourc& totally. Essentially, inde pendence would be won when Eng lands leaders lost zest for the whole distasteful businees. After 1781, Brit ain might have built new fleets and armies, and probably would have eventually broken the American in surrection. But a number of circum stances by this time had intervened to weaken British resolve. One of these was simple war weari nees. The American military victories at Saratoga and Yorktown, and par ticularly the failure of CornwaKis to subdue the southern Colonies, made.
July le86

Major General NathanaelGreene made full use of partisanbands in operations against Lord Charles CornwalJia beliefs of many Englishmen. Most heIieved th!it Englands own parliamen tary system stood in real need of re form. Whig political leaders took every opportunity to haraes the Min istry, even sometimes championing the American cauee in Parliament. William Pitt, organizer of Britieh strategy in the Seven Years War, ex pressed satisfaction with the Ameri can victory at Saratoga by attacking the in.iustice of the Kinge cause. Some Englishmen contrasted the sacrifices and dedication of the A erY 69

AMERICAM REVOLUTION icans for their cause with the alleged moraI decline in Britain. Upper classes were said to be luxury-loving, concerned mainly with the enjoyment of the prevailing prosperity. Watis tics proved that England was experi encing a general crimewave of real proputi]on. Reformers loudly criti cized the weakening moral tone. of British life. All of these circumstances helped weaken Britains resolve in Parliament to continue the war. The involvement of France and Spain in the conflict had altered the war to one of major dimension, and Britains possessions in the West In. dies, the Mediterranean, and India seemed in peril. Lord Frederick Norths majorities in Parliament gradually fell away, and, finally, in February 1782 a motion was passed to cease efforts in America. The King bowed to the temper of Parliament and aRowed North to quit. At this moment, American independence was won. Partisan Warfare Techniques Several techniques of Partisan war fare had been utilized to achieve in dependence. The Britieb had opened their serious campaign toward end ing the reheliion in the South with the successful seaborne expedition against Charleston in 1780. The de struction of General Horatio Gates army at Camden soon afterward crushed tbe last American military forces in the theater. In these weeks of adversity, with the Carolinas seem ingly fully open to British occupation and control, a patriot guerrilla and partisan movement took form in the almost roadless swamps and forests. Southern Americans made ideal ir regular fighters. The Indian menace had kept skill in marksmanship and fighting in foresta strong. Many of 70 the partisan leaders had Ied expedi. tions against Indians along the fron tier. Southerners were genera]ly skilied horsemen, and the partisans formed highly mobile bands who dis mounted only to fight.
Improvised Weapens

The geography of tbe South was far Iess developed into farmland and viilages than in the North, and of fered vast wooded and swamp regions for the exploitation of guerrilla meth ods. The partisan weapons were those used against the Indiansrifle or musket firearms, with knife or toma hawk instead of bayonet. Tbe Amer icans learned to shorten musket bar rels for use on horseback. Multiple projectilesbuckshot in combination with musket bane, the iatter some times sawed in halfgave extra tirepower in close action. Backwoods smiths forged hundreds of sabers for cavalry action. Colonel Francis Marion formed his partisan band shortly after the fall of Charleston, under the orders of tbe South Carolina revolutionary Gover nor. An isolated island of the Pee Dee River swamp country became a se cure base of operations where hoqses, ammunition, and supplies were ac cumulated. Marions men rode the Pee Dee country soon after Camden, striking a J3ritieh coIumn and releasing 150 prisoners. In September .1780, Mar iona 400 men surrounded and at tacked a large loyalist encampment, causing panic with their multiprojec tile weapons. Marion often ueed the ageless tactic of simulating retreat, iuring the pursuing enemy into am bush. The British developed a counterforce, the Tory Legion of Tarleton, which dueled with some success Militaty Review

againstMarion and the other partisan bands.When the pressure became too intense, Marion disbanded bis force, and the men returned to their farms where they became indistinguishable from the rest of the population, ready to re-form on Marions call. OiverseRoles The roles of the partisans were di verse. For a time, irregular forces constituted the only patriot units con taining Cornwallis in the South. Ac tive harassment of enemy militarY forces included attacks on isolated forces, messengers, and foraging par ties. Later, cooperation with Conti nentalArmy forces was generalpro viding information, scouting, and aid in foraging. The most important role of the partisans, however, involved their function in maintaining patriot control among the general civil pop ulation. Partisan forces sometimes cam paigned side by side with regular Con tinental troops. At Cowpens, Guilford Court House, and elsewhere, irregu lar unite fought under their partisan leadersfar more effectively than newly raised militia. Regular Continental troops, particularly cavalry, operated in the ewamps and forests with Mar ion and other partisan leaders. In a major campaign, regular and irregular forces combined to confront Cornwallis with an impossible stra tegic problem. To defeat the partisans and local militia, the British needed to break into smaller nnits and patrol side areas, thereby policing the coun tryside and maintaining communica tions. But in order to contend with the small bnt menacing army of Ma jor GeneraI Nathanael Greene, Corn wallis had to keep his main strength concentrated. He could not do both; in the end he was bound to lose. July 196S

Greene understood this and evaded direct engagement with Cornwallis except on his own terms. From the beginning of his campaign, Greene sensed the essential role which the partieans would play in his success. He escaped across the Dan River, and, as the two armies watched one an other over the weeks, the partisan bands operated against Cornwallis. his baggage trains to increase his mobility and had to live off the land or maintain lines of communication to the sea. Neither was possible as the partisan leaders, now under Greenes strategic direction, captured foraging parties and messenger and blocked loyalist support. Cornwallis began to feel iso latedmuch like Burgoyne near Sar atogaand decided to march for tbe coast, his campaign for pacifying the South a failure. Greene continued operating against British forces in the Carolinas and Georgia, developing yet further his strategy of combining regular and ir regular forces. Marion, Sumter, Lee, and Pickens led mobile forces to pick off isolated British posts and control the countryside, while Greenes army, losing nearly every battle, remained alive to hold down the main British strength. By the end of 1781, the British were confined to the cities of Savannah and Charleston. Elsewhere throughout the South, the Revolution held sway unchallenged. The British failed repeatedly to ea. tablish similar cohesion. The Tory cause in North Carolina might have triumphed at the time of Moores Creek if the first expedition of Corn wallis and Clinton had arrived on schednle in Febrnary 1776. In the summer of 1780, a Ioyaliat force nf
71 Block Loyalist Support Cornwallis had burned

AMERICAN REVOLUTION der Colonel Sir John Moore was smashed hy a surprise attack by pa triot irregulars. Moores premature effort served only to weaken the Brit. ish cause a few months later when Ferguson came through calling for loyalist recruits. The lack of timeli ness in this case contrasted sharply with Greenes coordinated action. During the Revolution, the Amer icans employed conventional and un conventimraI force over a wide spec trum. The patriots skillfully pr~cticed techniques of propaganda and polit ical warfare. They knew how to use force or its threat for politieal pur poses, intimidating opposition groups and preventing organization of a strong loyalist movement. Britains superiority in conventional mjlitary and naval power was an asset, but an inadequate one. There are vast differences between Americas War of Independence and the 20th-century wars of insurgency. The peliticai alertness of the Amer ican popuIation in 1776, the essential juetice of cause, and the absence of airpower all distinguished the earlier conflict. Yet modern counterinsurgent efforts must come to grips with the same fundamental political and cul turaI problems that confronted the British two centuries ago. Successful counterinsurgency sUZI1 depends on de veloping an indigenous loyal force that is strong enough to control areas lib erated by military action. The psychological weakness of the counterinsurgent power remains the fundamental target for insurgent ac tivity. The same unconventionalweap onspropaganda and intimidation, psychological and political warfare, and partisan and gnerrilla acti.vity remain available to the insurgent movement. These weapons are as dif ficult to counter now as yesterday.

One lesson we have learnedabout insurgencyis that it is most di5cu1t, if not impassible,to defeat if the enemyhss s sanctuary.With a sanctuary, the enemy can control his loeses, the rate and types of supplies and rein forcements and, in effect, call the tune. Insurgent defeats under such cir cumstances are only temporary since replacementpersonnel and materiel are soon available,as in Vietnam in tbe past. Witbout a sanctuary.insur gency becomes entirely in-sountry snd, providedthe governments&ee is just, the peopleem he rallied to win the day. General Earle G. Wheeler

72

Milltsry Review

From Department

of State Bulletin

Dean Rusk

+, ,< 4/.

Y ATTENTION was drawn many years ago to the anatomy of foreign policy decisions by two analogiee. At Fort Leavenworth, Kan sas, officere destined for high com mand responsibilities are schooled in the elements of a five-paragraph field order. Seldom do commander in com bat ieeue orders on tbe Leavenworth template. But the schooling ser,ves as a checklist to insur? that the com mander doee not overlook a critical factor in thinking about his situation. Later, I became intrigued by the checklist< followed by pilots taking off or landing in a complicated aircraft. I muet confees that even today I am nervous if the no smokingfasten seat belts sign does not come on.

What else has been forgotten ? The fuel ? The landing wheels? What questione should a foreign policy o~er ask himself before he takes off on a policy? How does he avoid the fatal flaw which comes from overlooking a factor which proves to be decisive in the flow of events? Let me emphasize that I do not mean the bureaucratic procedur+that is, who reports to whom about what. Instead, I refer to the thought processes of those who are involved in a decision a desk officer, or a Secretary of State, or a President. The first requirement is to identify accurately the question which has to be answered. In many situations, the very framing of the question stroylY 73

July 1966

FOREIGN POLICY, OECISIONS

affects the answer. I recall that, in the first days of the United Nations, the question arose as to whether appoint ments to the Secretariat, se interna tional civil servants, should he sub ject to national veto. The more speeific issue at that time was whether the Secretariat could employ nationals of Cornmuniatcountries who were thern selvee refugees from their own coun tries. The answer was to support the concept of an international civil serv ice.

auestion Rephrased Years later, the question was turned around: Should American citizene, who could not he certified as meeting national loyalty and sesnrity stand ards for employment by the United Statee, be employed hy the United Na tions ? To many, in the 1950s, the an swer seemed to be No, and that is now the general practice in the United Nations. It is not easy to pose the queetion accurately. Having served my time in both the Department of State and the Pentagon, I am familiar with the typicsd staff paper with its headings: Problem; Facts Bearing on the Prob lem; Considerations; Conclusions; and Recommendations. But I am also fa miliar with the temptation to reverse the sequence of thought. I have seen This article tsae digested from the enginat, published in the DEPAWTBfENT OF STATE BULLE TIN, 27 September 1965, volume LIII, Numbtw IS70. Mr. Rusk is the Secretarg of Stcte. The photo of the Pan American Union Building is reprinted from the Am6ricas, a monthlu maga zine published by the Pan Amar icms Union in English, Spanieh, and Portrtgue8e. 74

such papers constructed with the rec ommendation as the base, upon which was constructed the conclusions, the facte, and the statement of the prob lem. In which caee, the liveliest con troversy can occur about how to pose the question. Physics to the contrary, pyramids can be built from the apex downward, but it is a fragile pracess which endangers the entire editice. Sir Winston S. Churchill dmcrihed how an American with whom he did much bueiness, Harry L. Hopkzns, met his need to define the question: When the discneaion jhzgged and at? seemed baffied, it wae on theee occa sions he would rap out the deadlg gues tien, Surely, Mr. President, here is the point we have got to 8ettle. Are we going to face it or not? Faced it alwage was, and, being faced; wae coaquered. We will not get far in dealing with any probIem nnleee the point to settle is clesr[y defined. We must know not only what the main question ie, but what its constituent subquestions are. We must know how and by whom it was raised, when it must be answered, and by whom. Securing the Facts Once we are satiefied that we have honestly and accurately posed the question, the policy officer must try to insure his command of tbe factual situation. Do~ he have all of tbe facte relevant to the answer? Is there fur ther information that he must get? Which are crucial factc ? Hae be pulled them out of the heap of jacketraws adequately? Has he separated hard fact from speculation and estimate? Ie he aware of the gradations of relia bility among MS facts? Policy operates on the future, and the future cannot be surely known. But a solid grasp of factand how
Military R8vkw

FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

elusive this is-is essential to a rele vant judgment. Having the question and the rele vant facts before us, we then ask: WMch US interests, objective, or re speneibilities are involved? To put it more baldly: What difference does it make to us? To anewer thie, we have first to look at the immediate political, eco nomic, and security interests of the

are directly involved in ite realization. Four postwar US adminietratione have recognized that these interests could not be protected merely by meet ing immediate threate ae they arose. We have not only to put out fires ae they break out, but also to try to build a more fireproof structure, a more secure world. The military and economic facts of life increaeingJy contradict the no

The Organization of Americsn States recognizesthe need for cooperationemongfike mindedcountriesin order to build a more secure world United States. We need to know which of these interests are involved in the problem at hand and how they would be affected by the alternative answers. But we have to examine a larger question: How will the outcome of this problem affect the building of a decent world order, tbe kind of world envisaged in the UN Charter? We ask this question not becauee of abstract dedication to this ideal, but because the largest US interests
JuJy1986

tion of national self-sufficiency which underlay the worlds political organi zation before World Wars I and II. A half century of war and revolu tion destroyed that organization. Our task ie to create a new one which will recognize the need for cooperation both among like-minded countries and among those who disagree in major respects with each other. New institutions have been created to help meet this need. Preeminen} is \ 75

FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

the United Nations, but we can add the Common Market in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in At lantic affairs, and the Alliance for Progress and the Organization of American States in Latin America. More steps loom aheadan Asian De velopment Bank and new institutions for regional cooperation in Africa. In all these ways, we and others get on with building a community of free na tions. In a sense, this effort can be com pared to the building of a house. A large number of individual bricks must be put together in ways that add up to the desired result. Many of the epecific foreign problems that we face seem small and unexciting, but how they fall into place will help to decide whether the house goes up. The wise policymaker will also see what past US policies or commitments are in volved.
Imaginative Policy A willingness to ignore the past is sometimes described as an imagina

later say that we have changed our minds, they will pay less attention to what we say the next time. Allies and potential aggressors will then give less heed to our counsel and our warnings, for neither will see these as reflecting enduring commitments. We owe it to tbe rest of the world, as well as to ourselves, to remain steady on course. This is not to say that past com mitments should never be changed. But the policymaker should be aware of the costs of changing them before deciding whether to set them aside. He should also look to the fnture corn mitments involved in the course that he is proposing. What shadow will this course cast over later policymakers?
Other Governments Views Few foreign problems can be solved by the United States alone. In facing

tive policy; it can just as easily be the prescription for disaster. Which is it? There lies the art of the matter, and there are few guidelines. The United States has too much mass and momentum to be a hummingbird, darting in and out of alluring blos soms to see what nectar can be had for the whims of the moment. We can only shape what happens in the world by influencing the views and actions of other nations. And other nations will only be moved hy the United States if they believe that she will do what she says and if her actions are reasonably predictable. If we tell them one day that we are going to do eomething, and then 76

most problems, therefore, the policymaker must assess what other govern ments will think. Who are the other interested parties ? This means not only who claims to have an interest, but how much and what kind of in terest. We find many conntries offering free advice on foreign policy. We should not be too impatient with them, for we were similarly generons throughout much of our history. We find fewer countries willing to accept a serious responsibility in the field of action. It is the views of the latter that we are anxious to discover. When planning an Asian Develop ment Bank, for example, we consult most closely the other countries will ing to contribute and those for whose benefit it was conceived. When consid ering how to strengthen the alliance in Europe, we deal most intimately with those willing to assume the bur dens and responsibilities involved.
Military Review

FOREIGN POLICY OECISIONS

But the policymaker must also as certain the viewe of countries that do not have a direct stake in the matter. The founders of this country, in de claring its independence, spoke of their decent respect to the opinions of mankind. And so it is today. While the views of bystanders should not act as a bar to needed action, we want to take account of them in shap ing or explaining our action as, in deed, we want to know the views of those who would make themselves our adversaries. Respect National Interests
We want the emerging world order to be one which can eventually encom pass every country, to be one in which each country can freely manage its own affairs. We are not trying to build a community which excludes anyone or is directed against anyone. But some exclude themselves by seek ing hegemony. We must not stop building the house because some people want to burn it down or take it over. We should go ahead, leaving room for them and making sure that their national inter ests are respected. If we are success ful, and it turns out to be a good house, they may come around. So the polic~aker will ask himself whether the intended course of action accords with the legitimate interests of the nations whose regimes form the Communist world: to shape their Own institutione, to maintain their security, and to achieve a prosperous future for their peoples. He will ask himself whether it is likely to con tribute to the process of constructive change in the Communist world. Some evolution in Communist pOl icy has taken place in the last two decades. This evolution has been tbe result, in part, of the Free Worlds

successes in deterring and repelling aggression, in restoring security and prosperity in Western Europe, and in supporting economic growth in the Southern Hemisphere. I hope that we will see further evolution.
Common Strategy I

Some in the Communist world ap pear to realize the prohibitive costs of nuclear war; some may not. But the strategy of trying to win control of Asia, Africa, and Latin America thus encircling and strangling the Atlantic worldis common to all. Their differences-which are impor tantare about bow to get on with their world revolution. I was struck by the Chinese Com munist Defense Ministers approving repetition of Mao Tse-tungs views that the seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issues by war, is the central task and the high. est form of revolution and that im perialism and the reactionaries are paper tigers. I hope that a successful defense of South Vietnam will help to change this judgment and bring the marshal to share what he deprecatingly calls the revisionists gloomy view of war. But more than this will be needed. We must also help the free peoples of Asia make a success of their efforts to build free nations. That is the mean ing of the proposals for economic aid and cooperation made by the Presi dent. If success attends these efforts to build a better world, we can hope that they will, with time, lead to a gradual change in the Communist countries internal as well as external policies. We hope for progress toward more open societies and toward the unfin ished business all of us have on be

kdy1966

; 17

FORE16N POLICY OECISiONS

half of our own peoples, for these will make it easier to move toward general peace. In the meantime, we continue our search for such agreements with the Communists aa are feasible, especially on measures which would reduce the risks of major war. And we hold out

and interests of other countries. But he is not yet ready to propose an an swer. There are other factors to be weighed. The office of the Legal Advisor in the State Department will be quick to bring some of these to his atten tion. Strengthening the United Na.

US Army

Cengress is an indispensablepartner in the conduct of foreign relations to them the prospect of cooperation in constructive effort whenever they are prepared to join. All these are considerations which the policy framer must bear in mind when he asks himself: Will the in tended course of action contribute to usefu] evolution in the Communist world and its relations with the West ? If he has gotten this far, he will have fixed the question he must an swer, defined hia objective, considered our intereata and past commitments, and ascertained the relevant views 78 tions and building international law are important parts of our effort to build a decent world order. The policy framer, in addressing a problem, will thus want to know what principles of international law are involved. Are tbe accepted norme of international law relevant? He will tdso want to know whether the UN Charter and UN resolutions are involved and whether any treaties or agreements are applicable. The policyrnaker should also look to his own legal backyard: Is there any Military Ileviow

FORE16N POLICY OECISIOMS

relevant US legislation? Does the in tended action require us to make an exception, or execute a waiver, under exisflng law? Will new legislation or appropriations be required? The test of policy by reference to law goee beyond tha technical issues of law or even tbe broader objective of the rule of law. Lsw is the custo dian of the standard of generalized conduct. Our Legal Advisor is respon sible for putting to use the questions: What happens if everyone else acte as we are proposing to do? How are we prepared to act if a similar situation arises elsewhere? The law liberates by making it pos sible to predict, with reasonable as surance, what the other fellow is go ing to do. One of the most exciting and hopeful developments of this post war period, even though largely un noticed, is the rapid growth of what C. Wilfred Jenks has called the common law of mankind. The gravi tational pull of law in policy is and must be a powerful factor in policy decision.
Public Opinion

should be handled by a self-anointed aristocracy. Throughout my years with the Government, I have found that tbe American people expect the Government to travel a broad high way of policy which responds to their own simple and decent purposes. When the Government wanders over toward the soft shoulders on either side of the road, the people have a dozen ways to nudge the public vehicle back onto the hard surface.
Congress

The United States cannot act in secret. This ie a simple proposition which derives from the nature of our democracy, our power and influence outside our borders, and the presence of a vigorous and propsrly inquiring press. The bias, therefore, must be set against action in seeret, and the policy officer is well advised to cheek his answer with the question: What if tbe American people knew about this tomorrow morning at 0900? The simple fact is that the longrange foreign policy of the United States is determined by tbe American people; on this point, I am a plebaian and cannot agree with patrician friends who feel that such matters
hdy

I do not include Congress simply as a part of public opinion. Presi dent Lyndon B. Johnson has repeat edly reminded his colleagues that the Government of the United States com prises executive, legislative, and judi cial branches. The policy officer who fails to understand this elementary truth lives in an unreal world. Congress is an indispensable part ner in the conduct of foreign rela tions, and Congress cannot be taken for granted. Any action which re quires men, money, or legislation de pends upon the judgment of Congress, and a decision taken without consul tation with Congress is in tbe sub junctive mood. It is fashionable in some quarters to look upon Congress as an unfortu nate obstacle blocking the path to wise policy. This is nonsense. It can not be expected that 100 Senators and 435 Representatives will have the same views on complex and sensitive matters. But in hundreds of discus sions in executive sessions with the committees and subcommittees of Con gress, I have never ones seen differ ences of view develop on partiean lines. Of course, there are differant judgments, as there are in the exeeu tive branch, when men can sit down privately and enter into the full ~om 79

lW

I
FORE16N POLICY DECISIONS

the brief news account or the few plexity of events in &turbulent world, minutes of radio or television news but these differences are not partisan. must neceeearily abstract a part of Further, we in the executive branch come and go-perhaps not as fast as . the story because few would read or listen to more. I am encouraged to see come would like ! Those carrying re that news media are giving increas sponsibility live a decade in one cal ing attention to context in an e~ort endar year. But if you look around to give spot news the background es Washington to find those who are vet sential to better comprehension. erana in carrying official reaponeibil ity for our foreign relations, you will Other Counsel find an enorrnone reservoir of experi Pureuing our checklist, the policy ence among the leaders of the key officer must ask himeelf whethert he committees of Congress. We are for hae secured the judgment of all those tnnate that President Johnson and whose interests and responsibilities Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey are engaged or who might have a con have shared this experience, and the tribution to make. Within hie own counsel I get from Capitol Hill is an department, he muet take into account indispensable eource of sound advice the views of hie colleague who might and good judgment to me. be shareholders in a common problem. He muet box the compass of other News Media department and agenciee of our own Constructive solutions to key prob Government, each of whom has heavy lems should, therefore, emerge from a responsibilities which extend beyond continuing exchange of views between our hordera and whoee commitments the executive branch and the legisla to serve and support tbe President tive branch, and between the Govern are no lees than his own. He will wish ment and the public. The policymaker to have the views of our representa who is thinking of launching a novel tives abroad, the private intereste or unexpected couree of action should which might be affected, and the look to the atate of thie dialogue. judgment of private citizens whose In so doing, he should bear in mind experiences identify them as a source the vital role played by the press, ra of good counsel. dio, and television, for it ie largely General George C. Marehall used to through them that the public learns admonish his collesgnes, Gentlemen, about tbe problem with which he ie dont fight the problem, solve it. The dealing. He will coneider what steps policy officer steadily works his way need be taken to make the facts of through the alternative anewerstest the case known to these media. They ing, rejecting, or revising them. In are his potential partners in assisting most mattere, he will find none which the public to understand what is go is completeIy satisfactory. He doee ing on. not live in Utopia, but in a real world Onr key problemboth for the filled with human frailty, ~ including news media and for the Government hie own. He cannot find logical and ie the difficulty of presenting the consistent anewers for situations facta and policy in full context. The filled with contradictions. He is the private citizen cannot epend 80 hours first to know that his answer is sub a week on foreign policy; were be to ject to criticiem from one flank or do so, the country would collapse. Bnt
80

Military Review

FOREIGN POLICY OECISIONS

the other, but he cannot avoid an answer, for inaction is itself a policy decision. He knows that he must recommend who should do what, when, and how. He ia aware that the United States has not been chosen to solve all the worlds problems, that we do not drum up business for ourselves which others can handle without us. But he is also aware that our attitude makes a dif ference and that we seldom enjoy a free ride on any major problem. He knows that miracles are rare and few problems will be completely and permanently solved overnight. He is engaged in a process over time, and his proposals must be related to that process and to the entire texture of our foreign relatirms. Having made up his own mind, the policy officer must then help his su periore to make up theirs. He must prepare a clear and succinct presenta tion Of the issues, the alternatives, and his recommended anewer. He must meet high standards of exposition and objectivity if he is to avoid a disserv ice to those who must make the final decisions. There is a special obliga tion to set forth any significant dif ferences of view. The level at which a final decieion is taken depends, in general, upon the seriousness of the issues involved. With a thoueand cables a day moving to our missions abroad, it is obvious that the President and the Secretary of State can deal with only the most important. Both art and administration are re quired to insure that the highest offi cials see what they should see. The other side of the same coin is the continuous process of guidance from the top to insure that lesser decisions

do conform to eettled Jines of policy. Important and complex decisione necessarily require the Presidents personal attention. He seldom enjoys the luxury of disposing of the easy ones. He carries the central and in escapable responsibility under our constitutional system and must have a chance to determine those matters which affect the Nations course. You will recall Abraham Lincolns worde, upon announcing his Emancip ation Proclamation to the Cabinet: There is no way in which I can havs any other man put where I am. I am here. I must do the beet I can, and bear the reepousibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take. Responsible officials and responsi ble citizens are called upon to put themselves in the Presidents shoes, to try to understand the complexity of the queetions for which he must find an answer. One does not expect 190 million Americans in a vibrant and vigorous democracy to be unani mous. Each of us can, however, have our share of respect for the awesome responsibilities of our Chief Execu tive and can pause to reflect upon the considerations upon which his deci sions are reached. Foreign policy decisions may eeem to be a time-consuming process. How ever, the pace of evente does not al ways afford time, and the process may have to be telescoped into a few hours and, on rare occasions, perhaps even into a few minutes. The element of pace puts a high premium upon the preparation of policy officers to re spond promptly. But it aleo pute a high premium upon a continuous pub lic discourse shout our relations with the rest of the world.
(

MY 1966

81

Principleof the Objective and Vietnam

LieutenantColonelJohnR. D. Cleland,Unated StatesArmu The views expreseed in this arti cle are the authore and are not nec essarily those of the Department of the ArmIJ, Department of Defcnee, or the U. S. Army Command and General Staff CoUege.Editor. b HILE similarities exiet between conflicts, there have been no wars exactly alike. The came basic principle, however, are valid in any conflict and, when properly ap plied, can lead to victory. The first principle of war, the principle of the objactive, has an nnusual application in Viatnam. The military objective in World War II was to engage and defeat the armed forces of the enemy and to de stroy hie industrial base. The mili tary objective in tbe Korean War was also to engage and defeat the armed forces of the enemy and, within rather rigid limitation, to destroy his industrial base. In both conflicte, the armed forces and tbe industrial baee of the enemy were readily idenW tifiable, and their general locations were known. The problem was rela tively clear cut-close with and de stroy the enemy by superior combat power. The military objective in Vietnam has often been etated as kill VC. This is essentially the World War II and Korean objective of engaging and destroying the enemy. However, in Vietnam, tbe enemy is not readily identifiable, his specific location is not known, and, ae a consequence, there ie usually li&e againet which to apply euperior combat power. In the Republic of Vietnam we are dealing with a guerrilla force, the Viet Cong (VC). This force, ie con trolled, diraeted, and supported by the Hanoi regime of Communist North Vietnam through the apparatue of the Lao Dong Party (Communiet Party of Vietnam). For several years, trained VC unite, cadres, political and intelligence agenta, leaders, and weap ons have bssn infiltrated clandestinely into the Republic of Vietnam. MllitaIY Review

PRINCIPLE

OF THE OBJECTIVE

More recently, regular units of the North Vietnamese Army have also been infiltrated into the area. These unite still operate, for the most part, as guerrilla unite although they may employ mobile warfare. When the en emy is strong, they retreat; when the enemy is weak they attack with the objective of annihilating the enemy force.
Separate Population

It must be ideological to win the minds of the populace as a whole. Furthermore, the ideological repara tion mugt be accomplished by other than military means.
Underground Organization

It is axiomatic that any guerrilla force must depend for its continued existenee on the support of the local populace in the area in which it op eratee. Without such support, it can not maintain itself, let alone move effectively to the offensive. The Viet Cong are no exception. By ite very nature, therefore, the war in the Republic of Vietnam is one in which the popnlatilon of the area is involved. The population pro vides the environment in which the Viet Cong can operate. Thus, to de feat the Viet Cong, it becomes neees sary to separate the population from the Viet Cong. The separation must be both phys ical and ideological. It must be phys ical to deny the Viet Cong access to their supporters and, at the same time, protect those people who elect to support and assist the government. Lieutenant Colonel John R. D. Cle land is a 1966 graduate of the United States Army War CoUege. He holde a degree from the University of Omaha amt ie a graduate of the U. S. Army Command and General Staf? CoUege. Other aseignmcnte have included duty with airborne divisiom in the United State8, Japan, Korea, and Germany. He hoe 8erved with the US Military A88i9f5nce Command in Vietnam atid a8 an as8/8tant to the Secretary of State for Vietnamese Affair8, Depart ment of State, in Washington. July 1S36

Unless the Vietnamese peasant and hi8 family are eeparated from and protwted from the Vlet Gong, they will continue their support. The pess ant has no other choice because the Viet Cong have organised an elabo rate underground network into every area of Vietnam. This underground organization not only forme the JifaIine of the guerrilla units in the field, but it is also the means by which the Vlet Cong spread their subversion and impose their will on the pepula tion. Even when active guerrilla forcee have been driven from an area, the underground organization will con tinue to function and, through terror and intimidation, will maintain its hold on the populace. Thus, an Army Republic of Viet nam (ARVN) or US commander ie deprived of vital information that he requires to plan and conduct his op erations. He seldom finds the enemy unless the enemy ie prepared to en gage him. The principle of surprise has been largely forfeited to the Viet Cong. FuAhermore, to bring mass to bear on the critical point in a timely man ner requires good intelligence. The Viet Cong clearly understand the principle of mass and uee their su perior intelligence eystem to insure that they have sufficient strength to overpower and rapidly anniJdIate unite or positions which they attack. After an attack, they rapidly with draw and disperse. By the time a US or ARVN com mander assembles sufficient str~ngth

PRINCIPLE

OF THEOBjEWVE

to relieve the unit or position that is nnder attack, he finds that the Viet Cong have accomplished their objec tive and have disappeared. He may even find himself moving into an area in reaction to a VC initiative without

We should apply our superior com bat power in a meaningful and coor. diuated manner through clear and hold operations. These operations are not new. They were first applied in the Republic of Vietnam in mid-1962,

us Amw The initial military objective should be to protect the people from the Vlet Cong adequate information on VC strength, location, or intentions. Because of a lack of information, he may he mov ing hie relief forces into a planned VC ambush. Without adequate intelligence, it is virtually impossible to seize the ini tiative from tbe Viet Cong and go on the offensive. Since intelligence comes from the people, the initial mil itary objective in the Republic of Vietnam must not be to kill VC, but rather to protect the population. 84 and in many areas were singularly successful. One striking example was the clear ing of organized VC military forces from the populated areas of the Prov ince Of Quangngai in 1962-63. The case of Quangngai is significant be cause its population at the time was tightly controlled by the V]et Cong. It had also been a Vietminh strong hold during the war against the French. It could truly be called a VC province. Military Review

PRINCIPLE OFTHEOBJECTIVE The newly activated 25th Infantry Division of the ARVN wae given a miseion to clear and hold the Province of Quangngai. Plane were drawn UP in close coordination with the Prov ince chief. Troops were allocated, ma terial wae, time phased, and military plans were developed and coordinated with civilian programs. Theee actions insured that civilian personnel and resources were programed to move with or immediately follow military forces. ProtectorRole By the spring of 1963, armed at tacks against the rural population of Quangngai had virtually ceased. The division had gained the reepect and friendship of the local populace by its disciplined behavior, courtesy, and display of genuine interest in the fate of the people of Quangngai. The 25th Division had become identified by tbe people of Quangngai ae their pro tector. In April 1963 the Viet Cong launched a two-battalion attack against 12 remote hamlets in Quang ngai. If the attack had succeeded, the village leaders and those most prom inent in support of the government would have been murdered as an ex ample to others, Faith in the govern ment would have been shattered not only in the 12 hamlets, but elsewhere in the Province. The VC attack was not successful. Timely warning was provided by the people, and the 25th Divieion was able to take the necessary measures for defense. Not a eingle hamlet was overrun and the Viet Cong were soundly de feated by the combined efforts of the populace and the 25th Division. The psychological effect of this vietory was of great importance. With the July 1933 population of Quangngai thus pro tected and cooperating with the gov ernment forces, the 25th Division had a popular base and was ready to move against the VC military forces. The operation showed that when the military force concentrates on the protection of the population, an en vironment is created in which the Viet Cong cannot operate effectively. They are forced to counterattack to retake the objective, or they must withdraw into the difficult and un populated mountaine and jungle areas. The Vlet Cong Ioae their popular sup port, including intelligence, and the initiative passes to the regular forces. The clearing portion of the clear and hold operation is primarily the job of the regular military forces. Tbe protection afforded the population will be only transitory, however, if the hold portion of the clear and hold op eration is not also accomplished.
Major Activities

To hold a populated area that has been cleared of guerrillas involves three major activities: civilians par ticipating in their own defense, an active government preeence, and ac tive military operations outside the area. Civilian participation means prO viding timely information on the Viet Cong and joining paramilitary defense units. Although the people must par ticipate in their own defense, they alone cannot provide it. There must be effective military strength orga nized to prevent small bands or in dividual Viet Cong from imposing their will on the population. Government presence also means that civilian governmental activities and services must be provided. These include justice, health programs, wel fare activities, road maintenance, elec

e5

PRINCIPLE

OFTNEOBJECTIW must be to provide protection to tbe population. The mass of the military and combat power of the Republic of Vietnam, the United States, and other Free World forces should be concen trated on this objective. Success cannot be counted in terms of Vlet Cong killed. It can only be counted in terme of whether people have been provided complete and lasting protection from the Vkt Cong. If we assign the full weight of our combined combat power to the task of providing protection to the people, we will then begin to deny the Viet Cong their popular bases, place them on the defensive, and seize the initiative.

trieity, and agricultural assistance. However, they cannot be brought into an area until protection has been prOvided to the population. The necessity for active military operations outaide the cleared area is readily apparent. Patrols must be pushed out to locate. the enemy, and spoiling attacka must be Iaunched to prevent or break up counterattacks. The area adjacent to the cleared poPulated zone must be made unacceptably hazardous for VC military units. Operations outside the cleared area also prepare the way for bringing protection to the next populated area. The military objective in Vietnam

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Printing costs, postage, and salaries have all gone up. In spite of all our efforts for efficiency and economy, we can no longer hold the line. After 17 years at the same sub scription rate, the price for the MILITARY REVIEW will be increased by 50 cents effective 1 September 1966. Annual subscription rates will be $4.00 a year in the United States including APOs and in those countries which are members of the Pan-American Postal Union (including Spain); $5.oo a Year in all other countries. Subscriptions entered before 1 September will be at the old rate. The MILITARY REVIEW asks your understanding and cooperation so that we may continue to provide a magazine to meet your professional needs.

86

Review Militsry

Iviet
Literature

1966

Harriet Fast Scott

OWARD the end of each calen dar year, representatives of Voyenizdat, the Military Publishing Houee of the Soviet Ministry of De fense, start advertising their planned publications for the next 12 months. The American student of military af fairs cannot help but be slightly tempted by seeing such interesting titles as The Revolution in Military Affaive, Wk.ut Is Its Nature?; Mili targ Doctrine; or Soviet Rocket Forces. These and many other titles were announced for publication in 1966. The program sounde impressive and should make a valuable contribution toward understanding Soviet viewe on warfare. However, before going into detail on the actual scope of the planned Soviet publications, one
July 1%06

should be cautioned concerning expec tations. Tbe careful planning in the Soviet Union sometimee goes awry. For ex ampIe, in the 23 January 1964 issue of Kraemwa Zvezda (Red Star), So viet Colonel I. Korotkov complained ahout the 1963 achievement in that such books as War and Ideology, Pol itics and Strategy, and Armg of the Public State were schednled but were never published. Some were carried*Y over to the 1964 plan of publication. Technical books, such as the an nounced Theory of Rocket Engines With Solid Fuel, probably will be hased on Western material or will use Weetern examples throughout. If past publications are any guide, many of the technical books and articles will contain a note on the title page, based
81

SOVIET LITERATURE on materials

from the foreign press. In almost any large city bookstore in the Soviet Union, a reader can find books, pamphlets, and magazines giv ing detailed drawings and character istics of the Minuteman, the Atlas, and the Titan missiles, or of the XB 20, the X-15, and the F-Io5 aircraft. Soviet security in regard to their own military hardware is so stringent ttiat their own people must sometimes wonder why so many of their text books use American drawings.
Advertise Publications

The administrative chief of Voyen izdat, air force Major General A. Kopitin, advertised his publications in Krasnaya Zvezda, the Soviet daily military newspaper. He announced that some of the forthcoming titles for 1966 are: History of Militarg Art, The Basis of Soviet Militarw Legislation, The Organization and Armaments of Armies and Navies of Capitalistic Countriee, Military Economics, Mili tary Art, and Nnclear-Rocket War. Technical books will inclnde: Auto matic Control of Airplanee and Rock ets, Technical Exploitation of Avia t$on Technology, and %-otective Equipment of Pilots and Cosmonauts. The Soviet journal, VoVennyy Vgestn{k (Militar# Herald), gives a more detailed listing and states that about 370 books, albums, and placards will be published by the Publishing House in 1966. Certain books are singled out for specific mention, especially those deal ing with military theory. Some titlee Iisted are: Mi2itarV Doctrine, !tactice, HarTiet Fast Scott regularly trane latee Soviet military pnblicataons fov the Pentagone Current Newe. Mrs. Scott ie the wife of a US Air Force o#icer who wae Aiv Attmh6 to the Soviet Union during 1962-64.

Militarg Psgchologg, Partu-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces, and About Communist Training and Mili targ Duty. The well-known Soviet Doctor of Military Science, Professor Co]one] General N. A. Lomov, is to edit the book, Military Doctrine. Like the famed Military Strateg~, published in 1962 and edited by Marehal Vasili D. Sokolovsky, it will be a collective work, and is to show: . . . the source of the formation of militaru doctrine in different govern ments, the history of the development of Soviet militaru doctrine, its essence and content. The hook, Tactics, also will he a collective effort by the faculty of the Frunze Military Academy and will give: . . . the basic content of Soviet mil itary science, clarify the problem of tactics, and give a+n analysis of the role of man and the meane of armed combat in the development of tactics.
World War Ii Coverage

World War 11 is far from being forgotten, and in 1966: A major work will be published on one of the most important problems of World War IIthe liberating mis sion of the Soviet Army in 19.L&45. In it, the bourgeoie fakijiers of the Second World War will be convinc ingly unmasked. One might wonder if this is to be a follow-on to the six-volume History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. The writers of this history bad real problems. Volume I, which appeared in 1961, was concerned with de-Stalinization. Glorification of Nikita S. Khrushchev took place in Volumes II through V. Finally, Volume VI, which was pubMiiiiary Review

SOVIET LITERATURE

in 1965, had the task of deKhrushchevization. Historical writera in the Soviet Union must reinterpret history according to the plan of that year. Soviet military bookstores have many translations from tbe Western press, and for the coming year there will be more translations of books on strategy, tactics, and armies of capitalistic countries. Titles specific ally mentioned are: A8pects of Strut. egut The Age of Fear, The Develop
Iished

1966 can expect the following: Re mote-Control Missiles, The Flight of Ballistic Missiles, Gy?oscopic Instru ments of Missiles, and Miseiles in Space. However, any examples, photo graphs, or details probably will be of Western origin, Such books should be of interest to the Soviet rocket forces and tbe forces of the air defense com mand which are responsible for anti aircraft, antirocket, and anticosmic operations. Continued Soviet interest in the US

Samplesof Soviet militaryliteraturepublishedin 1965

ment of Weapons of the Land Forcee in Foreign Countries, Tomovrows Weapo?w, and The Preparation of Troops for Night F{ghting. The Soviets continue their interest in rocket technology, and readers in
Juk 1966 .

Army ie manifested by a promised

book, TheiWechan{zed Diwisionof the
Arm&of the USA, written jointly by
Colonel F. V. Levanov and Engineer
Colonel M. R. Georgiyev. It istosbow
the organization and tactics of sub-

: 89 j

SOVIET LITERATURE

units and units of mechanized divi sions and the characteristics of arma ments and military equipment. For the technical minded, there will be a brochure, Radioslectronics Teaches, Guides, and Contro18, which is devoted to the main direction of the development of modern radioelec tronics. And for communications spe cialists, such books as the Self-Cor recting Systems of Guia%nce, Transis tonzed Amplifiers, Radio Locatore in Antirocket Defense, The flasisof Im pulse Technology, and the Cipher Method of Processing Signals will be of interest. Attention to the needs of publica tions for export is suggested by the statement that the plan provides for the iseuing of a substantial quantity of military dictionaries and different textbook material in foreign lan guages. It is promised that an enlarged out put of reference books will be pub lished, with specific mention, of The Explanatory Dictionary of Military Terminology which is to give: . . . a short explanation of general and special military words, with re gard for the changes tohich have taken place in the last few gearg in arma ments and militar~ technolog~. One wonders if it will follow the Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, published in 1965, and which defines local war as:

.,. local, emall war unleashed bu the ruling circles of imperialieticgov ernments toith the aiw of stamping out uational liberation movements, enslaving peoples of small countriss, or re-establishing capitalistic s?ieteme in any socialist country Local wara ueually are waged with limited force and in limited regions. In contem porary conditions, ang local war may develop into general nuclear-rocket war. The dictionary defines militarism ae: . . . the reactionary politics of in tensif~ing the arms race and prepar ing for war with predatoru aims which is being led bg capitalistic gov ernments and which has achieved great scope in the period of imperial ism. Despite the absolute nonsense and immaturity reflected in the above def initions, there is some evidence that Soviet military thinking ie beginning to face up to reality. It should be in teresting to see what the 1966 pub lications indicate. The chief military editor of Voye nizdat, Major General V. N. Alekse yev, tells us in the magazine Star shina Sergeant that Threat From the Deep, about nuclear submarine, and Rockets in Space, on the views of foreign specialist on using space for military purpoees, will be available in 1966. There will also be, a first aid book for hunters and fishermen.

Military Review

Cheap
Sojuf;ans
for
Winning
Wars ?

Colonel Robert B. Rigg, United States Arm#

July

T IS tempting to shop around for bargain-basement solutions for winning limited wars. In tbcery, there are some hopeful bargainswar by remote control, cheaper manpower and more firepower, superiority by new maneuver and mobility, every soldier a flying platform, and electronic war fare. Are there bargains here? Ultimately, some armed forces of the future may be able to win a iim ited war without really fighting. This sounds like daydreaming. Actually, it is not so remote as it sounds. Two armies in combat have a com mon missionto destroy. But destroy what ? The common or traditional ap proach is to destroy th?, other sides organization. This is primarily the ponnding of tirepower and the grind ing of flesh and machines. An oppo. site approach is to destroy the other sides command and contr~l, and let the enemys milling masses of men and machines be swallowed up by your military pressure bswiuse they are Ieaderless and without direction. Blitzkrieg represented a primary effort at achieving the disruption and destruction of command and control.
91

1666

SOLUTIONS

Blitzkrieg was a good, but still imper fect, beginning in this direction. Paratroop assault deep in an ene mys rear was the next step, aud in theory, at least, it aimed at the same objective. Airborne troop assault coined the term vertical envelopment, yet in combat it enveloped little. Often paratroop landings were, upon de scent, mainly enveloped by the enemy becauee the paratroopers were a mi norityand had to he relieved or sup ported within a matter of days. How ever, parachute troops can inflict sig nificant destruction on given command and control systems provided they have good intelligence and carry out their missions with speed and tactical finesse.
Prime Objective

As more modern military advances come about, enemy systems of com mand, control, and communications could come to represent the prime mil itary objective, rather than the bat talions, brigades, and divisions. In short, the nerve centers and the brain, rather than the military flesh and mus cle, could come to represent the prime elements to be meet savagely attacked in a future limited war. A simple example presents itself, in theory at least. If a given enemy relies heavily on modern electronic communications, his command and Colonel Robert B. Rigg is with the US ATmrl Combat Devslopmsnts Com mand Institute of Advanced Studies, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Dur ing World War II he served in Europe as a military observer toith Soviet Army units and other Allied military forces, and subsequently was aseigned to the staff of the Commander in Chief, Pacific. A frequent contributor to the MILITARY REVIEW, his latest ar ticle, Pekinge Declaration of War, appeared in the March 1966 iseue.

control is largely a case of all eggs in one basket. Destroy or neutralize these electronic communications and his troops will be paralyzed. There are many ways to destroy or neutralize tbe enemys communica tions. Inetead of masses of firepower, the opposing army might employ masses of communications jamming devices. This army would still need firepower, because gunpower and de structive power are both neceesary and persuasive in war. But the primary effort, concurrent with conventional combat preesure, would be to numb out or largely obliterate the enemys military brain and nerve centers. Thus, a campaign or battle under these circumstances might be won without undue hard fighting in tbe conventional sense.
Electronic Oeception Beyond the potential of wholesale jamming of opposing communications

is the yet undemonstrated art of is suing convincing false orders to en emy units in war. The age of such warfare can come-the age of not just electronic warfare, but electronic deception. This theoretical example is still rather extreme because in war, kill ing, capturing, threatening, pressure, and violence must be maintained. Trite as it sounde, there still is no substitute for a gun. Furthermore, in limited wars, potential foes are not likely to be sophisticated in electronic communications equipment. This new form of combat would not be useful against an enemy armed and equipped in more primitive fashion, particu larly in communications. Another attractive form of combat is battle by remote control. Thie mili tary theory bas long existed, and it has prompted many ideas and invenMilitcry IWicw

SOLUTIONS

tions. German miniature remote.con. trolledtanks were tried in combat dur ing World War H, but without real success. The German V-2 rockets rep resentedefforts in the direction of this theory. Today, intercontinental ballis tic missiles and other missiles are simply modern-day advances in this direction. But the eender of the mis. sile is himself a target for the same type weapon. Man has eought for centuries to achieve remote-control combat in

power-heavy army, but not yet, at least for limited wars. Combat expe rience in a variety of limited wars reveals that surrenders of enemy eol diers are ae significant ae enemy corpses on the battleground. Maneu ver, infantrymen, and other forms of combat pressure still retain tradi tional value. This holds true for the offense, but what about defense? Much has been said about disper sion--or fewer troops per linear or square kilometer. Plainly, the indi-

Numericalsuperiority in manpower is militarily fashionable in Red China ground and naval warfare. The Battle of the Coral Sea in World War 11 marked a significant advance wherein the ships did not aee each other in the fight. In ground warfare, artillery has not become a substitute for in fantry and tanks, even though in con ventional conflicts, such as the Korean War and the World War H campaign in Italy, approximately 85 percent of the Allied casualties were inflicted by blasting artillery and bombs. Organizationally, this suggests a trend toward an artillery or blast fire My 196s cated trend on the defense has been to ward lees infantry and more artillery or blast firepower. Militarily, there are recognizable limits here, but the troops neceseary to defend given frontages have been diminishing with the paeeage of history. Captain B. H. Liddell Hart has ex. pressed the view that this is a part ~of a gradual long-term ascendancy of the defense brought about by more efficient communications, better mo bility, and more lethal firepower. He estimatee that to hold a kilometer of 93

front in battle, approximately 20,000 men were required around 1800, about 12,000 in 1870, 2,600 in 1917, and lees than 1,000 today. In a sense, then, war has gradually become more dis pereed and remote controlled because casualties are inflicted at longer ranges and more casualties are pro duced by indirect fire weapons. This makes combat no less deadly beuiuse

defense and remote+zontrolled war fare, particularly if a robot could be substituted for the single soldier. The robot could be a small tank or air ve hicle flinging powerful but miniature nuclear weapons. But what if the other side is not modern enough to employ just a sin gle soldier or a robot? Suppose it em ployed a considerable mass of ma-

progressively there have been fewer places to hide. Battlegrounds today offer few hiding places except for forces that choose to fight as guerril las. But firepower advances have been inducing more and more dispersion. Carried to ite ultimate, a single modernized squad armed with tactical nuclear weapons might be sufficient to defend a kilometer of territory in some potential future battle. Perhaps one soldier could do the job in the next century. Here, then, is cheaper 94

chines and men? Obviously, it would win. Thus, there are Iimits on how cheap the defense can be: Besides, de fense does not win. Perhaps in the future, progressive military technology can insure that Iese manpower will be needed for de fense. But organization and p]anning must coneider the nature of the en emy. We are up against a guerrilla enemy in Vietnam today, and our so phisticated technology largely offers nothing new or unusual by which to Military Review

SOLUTIONS

modernize the conflict against the V1etCong. Even portable night-seeing radar cannot distinguish between a loyal peasant and a Viet Cong. The obvioue truth is that military forces in limited wars have to be designed to fit the foes-and the foes may elect to fight with 18th-century methods and techniques. There ie also the problem of meas uring the superiority one must have to be assured of a good chance of winning.
Modernized Firepower

It has been said frequently that a US Army unit today has several times the firepower of its World War H counterpart. The apparent conclusion to be drawn is that we how can fight with fewer units. This is only partly true. Modernized firepower for a given unit may be 300 percent greater than in the recent past, but on wide fronts or regions of responsibility the unit may not have the range or ability to prevail. On the spot, however, it could overkill, only to be engulfed later be cause it lacked flank protection. Some type of superiority ia neces sary for successful offense. This may be achieved by a variety of combina tions beginning with discipline and morale and ranging up to balanced combinations of soldiers and modern instruments of war. Superiority can also lie in strategy and tactics-as evidenced by the example of blitzkrieg -or it may be found in military reac tion time and air support. Superiority also lies in cheer mass. Numerical superiority in men is mil itarily fashionable in Red China, but the opposite is true in tbe United States. We have always fought with a relatively austere uae of manpower in our combat unite while, at the same time, our logistical use of men genJoly 138S

exceeded those of foreign pow ers. This continues, highlighted by an effort to reduce tbe number of combat troops per unit while increasing unit firepower, mobility, and maneuverabil ity. The aim is to achieve a new form of balanced superiority. Diapersion ia certainly a valid concept where nu clear weapons are ueed, but in limited war, there is danger in carrying dis persion too far. Combat ~uperiority cannot be achieved entirely by weep ons alone any more than it can by manpower alone. There are no standard solutions or operational-analysis conclusions in re gard to this matter of proper superi ority. Military experience shows that there must be superiority in more than just one of the ingredients of morale, organization, discipline, ar mament, mobility, tactics, technique, maneuverability, and leadership.
erally

Quest for hfobility The Army has been in quest of a new form of combat superiority that represents something beyond firepower alone. The quest is for greater mtmeu verability and mobility in all forms. Helicopters, short takeoff and landing aircraft, vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, flying platforms, and even individual rocket belts give promises for the aerial part of attaining the goal. Air mobility and Maneuverability as practiced by the 1st Cavalry Divi sion (Airmobile) does promise new tactical superiority. Entire units can fight several successive places in quick order, and get behind and ambush the enemy on a modernized scale. Of course, the question of aircraft vul nerability is now meeting its most crucial test. - One viewpoint holds that helicop ters bundle up units of fighting men
95

.,.,
SOLUTIONS

in highly vulnerable airborne pack ages. This view argues for making individual soldiere mobile by provid ing them with low-altitude jump belts that will permit them to rise in the air and maneuver over all terrain ob stacles to get behind the enemy. Thus, a thousand troops would present a thousand small targets to the enemy instead of a few big ones in the form of troop-loaded helicopters. Both viewpointssquad and pla toon mobility, and individual mobility have merit. The answer appears to lie in a marriage of both ideas, the balance between to be settled by fur ther research, experimentation, and testing. The individual flight belt it self needs more perfection before it can jump men from fairgrounds to battlegrounds. Man hae been trying to get off the ground for ages. He hoped for wings, but he got an armchair in a cockpit or cabin. Now, he has the potential of being a miesile thrust up in the air. But militarily, be is still not free of the ground for actual tigbting. The tank is no more obsolete than the guerrilla or the infantryman. Cer tain heavy-duty tasks remain to be accomplished in combat. Thus, superi

ority on tbe offenee reste not with masses of men alone, infantry-filled helicopters, tanks, or firepower per se, but with a combination of all tail ored to the enemy to be opposed. We are a long way from the time when we can win without harsh fight ing. There is no better index to this than the ease of psychological warfare waged at its best. By itself, such war fare cannot yet prevail. Firepower and the persuasiveness of presence brought about by maneuver and mo bility are still necessary to induce sur render aid victory. The future holds promise for many things from the military teebnological closet, but there still is no military bargain base ment offering cheap means for win ning limited wars. If we are smart, we do ,n@ have to be as primitive as our potential en emies. But we certainly do have to recognize their military forms and tailor our fighting forces to meet them with superiority distinctive in its quality and unusual in military ap plication and usage. There are no cheap solutions. We can, however, afford extensive re search and development programs in quest of better military superiority.

96

Military Review

UNITED STATES XV-61V VSTOL Aircraft A mobile radar called HIPAR Six XV-6A vertical and short take (High-Power Acquisition Radar) is off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft are being tested by an Army-Navy-Air being developed and built for uee in the Armys Nike Hercules missile sys Force evaluation team in the United tem. The advanced prototype of the States. The test aircraft are the Britishmobile HZPAR as shown here is hauled on five flatbed trailers. built P.1127, redesignated the XV-6A The manufacturer hae redesigned the HIPAR, which is an integral part of fixed Nike Hercules installations, to a mobile configuration having crosscountry capabilities. Adapting and imMobile HIPAR

-+... .
US Amw

by the United States (MR, Feb 1963, p 96). Capable of operating in the VTOL or STOL mode, the XV-6A is a single eeat aircraft powered by a turbofan engine rated at 15,200 pounds.News item.
Helicopter Grensde Launcher
Gettmd E1ecttic CO!IW.W

proving the fixed-site HIPAR for mo bility represent substantial dollar savings compared to tbe cost of de veloping a wholly new acquisition radar. Fixed-site Nike Hercules missile systems now protect cities as well as industrial and military targets from enemy aircraft. Tbe Army Missile Command has awarded the contractor 8.1 million dollare to produce tbe mo bile HJPAR systems.Newe release. My 1966

The Army has awarded a two million-dollar contract for production of the M5 subsystem for the UH IB helicopter. The M5 is a tur ret-mounted, 40-millimeter grenade launcher capable of tiring 200 rounds per minute (MR, Jun 1965, p 103). News item.
The MILITARY REVIEW and the U. S. Army commend and General Sfnff College .s 8. me n. r.spcmeibilits for ..curacy of in f.r nmticm co.1.i.ed in the MILITARY NOTES m.ti,m of this p.bli.ation. lfem. arc DriI!ted = . .ervi.e to the readers. N. oM.i.l em dcmwnent .f the WeW., opinions. or factual statements la inlended.The Editor.
I

e7

MILITARY NOTES Oeflatable Aircraft Tke

An aircraft tire with an expanding folding sidewall that will deflate after an aircraft has taken off, and inflate before landing, is being designed by the Air Force. This concept will give larger air craft a bett~r ground flotation capa bility through increased contact be tween the tire and the ground, thus making rough field landings eaeier. Tire pressures can be controlled so
Arctic

that less pressure is used as the air craft uses ite fuel and becomes lighter. In landings where a tire has been damaged, it can be kept partially inflated by the inflation eystem car ried on the plane. Even if a tire is totally deflated, it will fold inward on itself to give the aircraft a solid tire surface. This will help prevent damage to the wheel and tbe possible collapse of the land ing gear.DOD release.

Teata For Redeve

Anmu Ntnm Featurta

Rede~e air defense guided miseile scores a hit on a target drone during arctic testa at Fort Greely, Alaeka. The light straight line at the top of the photograph shows the dronee course. Curving upward is the cometlike trail of the Redeye. The missile carried a telemetry package for the test instead of an explosive warhead.DA release. 98 Mtlitary fleview

I MILITARY NOTES

Optical Gunsigbt

Amw

New.

Fedred

Rusged optiesl gunsight

A new rifle sight that does away with the traditional front and rear sight alignment and sight picture is under development at the Armys Limited War Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. . The sight uses a Win-eyed optical system to superimpose crosshairs on the target image. When the rifleman places the hairs on the target, he can fire with deadly accuracy. The device, called a JZefZez-Co2Umator Gcmsigkt, is being tested at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.DA release,

Portableileacon A portable tricolored beacon has tion to the landing area, its three been developed by the Army to give projection Ienaea send continuous pilots who muet land at night in beama of red, green, and amber light remote areas the same assistance proskyward. Approaching pilots use the vided by landing lights and radar at lighta as visual glidepaths during airports. landings. Called GAIL (Glide Angle IndiThe red beam is visible when the cator, Light ), the device weighs 26 incoming craft is too low, amber pounds and can be air dropped or when it is too high, and green when carried by a parachutist. it ia at the correct altitude.DA Once the beacon is aligned in relareleaae. I July 1S66 99

MILITARY NOTES
Li@w@i Mm

A new type of exeeptiomd]y strong, lightweight armor that is made from metal that did not exist five years ago has been perfected. It is being used in the Armys biggest helicop ter, the armed version of the CH-47A Ck inook transport helicopter that is designed for escort and fire suppces. sion missions (MR, Jan 1966, p 103).

Fsr tX-47A jutting from the top right-hand side of the pilots seat provides headarea protection. The picture below is a ground view showing the new armor installed to protect the pilot and vital machiuery from enemy ground tire. Tbe pilot is protected by shingles of armor run ning underneath the exterior of tbe cockpit and by armorplate (marked impact aide ) inside the cockpit, which can be seen running under neath and in the area below the for ward rotor blades. Included in the materials used to

The two pictures show some of the strategic areas in which the new armor is used. The picture above is a closeup of the entrance aid interior of the pilots compartment of the Chinook helicopter. It shows exten sive protection of avionics equipment (at left, top to bottom of photo) and the pilot. Of particular interest is the pilots seat which is completely surrounded by armor. The seat is shown with a hinged armor section attached to tbe sides. This entire SecL tion swings across the front seat to protect the pilots chest area. Armor
100

fabricate the armor is a new class of ultrahigh-strength, high-performance steel so classified because it combines high strength with high toughness. The front face, or impact side, of the armorplate is hard enough to shatter a Projectile upon impact. Tbe back face of the armor is softer than the front, but is strong enough to dissiMilitcfy Review

MILITARY NOTES

NORWAY pate the projectiles great energy by absorbing it. The steel armor has a number of important advantages over ceramic materials currently used for armor. In addition to being very light, the steel is stronger and less expensive, but, most important, it can withstand multiple hits without requiring re placement, thereby reducing logistics, maintenance,and helicopter downtime. Installation of the armor has in creased the helicopter weight by about 2,500 pounds.News release.
Swift Patrol Boats Aluminum crew boats are being Nordic tlNEF Forces

constructed for Navy service in the waters off Vietnam. The contract calls for 104 of these vessels, called the fitrijf and classified PCF (patrol craft

Ibis., Aluminum & Chemi.d C.rporatim

Swift patrol boat fast) by the Navy. More than half of them have been delivered. Tbe Swift, manned by a six-man crew, is armed with two caliber .50 machineguns on the forward wheel house and another caliber .50 atop a breech-loading 81-millimeter mortar on the afterdeck. The craft is powered by a matched pair of V-12 diesel engines and has a speed of more than 25 knots. It is 50 feet long and has a 13M-foot beam. When loaded, the .Swiff weighs 45,000 pounds.News release. My 1966

The Defense Ministers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have agreed on a PrOPOsalfor reorganizing Scandi navian DarticiDationin UNEF (United Nation; Eme~gency Forces) in the Middle East as requested by the UN Secretary General. In April 1966 the combined Scandinavian forces were reduced from well over 1,300 to about 600. Since 1 April, Norway and Denmark have had a joint force at Gaza which will remain through 1966. Sweden has temporarily withdrawn and will take over alone at the end of the year. The Norwegian and Danish contingents were cut by about 200 men each. The previous Danish and Norwe gian battalions at Gaza were com prised of 430 Danes (besides about 70 at the UNEF hospital) and 490 Nor wegians. Sweden, because of her other UN commitments, had a 420-man re duced battalion. Administration of the UNEF hos pital at Rafa, south of Gaza, will con tinue to rotate among the three conn tries. The hospital was established and operated by Norway from 1956 to 1963, when Sweden took over for two years. Denmark is now in charge for a similar period. In 1967 it will again be Norways turn.News item. F-5 Fighter Bomber The first 11 of 64 F-5 fighter bombers, called Freedom Fighters, have been turned over to tbe Norwe gian Air Force by the American man ufactnrer (MR. Feb 1966, p 105). When tbe delivery program is com pleted next year, Norway will have three 20-plane F-5 squadrons plus four replacements.News item. \
101

MILITARY NOTES BRAZIL

Reconnaissance Vehicle

F&hien

Naiad

de Mot.re.

Brazil has developed an armored, fully tracked reconnaissance vehicle known as the Cutia. It is 12 feet long, six feet wide, and weigh: approxi. mately 6,000 pounds, including the four-man crew. Powered by a four-cylinder gasoline engine, the vehicle travels at 50 miles

per hour on paved roads and 30 miles per hour cross-country. Its range is 225 miles. The vehicle, officially designated the VETE 21 Al, can remodified to serve as a personnel carrier or as a light tractor. Theprototype has been tested.News item. PORTUGAL Fiat 691 Aircraft Portugal has purchased 40 surplus Fiat G91 aircraft from the Federal Republic of Germany. The eale was made under theprovieions for mutual aid between North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners. The contract specifies that these aircraft may be used only in Portugal for defenee purposes within the framework of NATO.News item. Military Review

Seacat Missiles Surface vessele of the Brazilian Navy are being equipped with mis siles. A number of launchers and mis siles of the Seacat type have been ac quired from the British manufacturer for this modernization program. So far, one destroyer has been armed with these radar-guided antiaircraftt missiles.News item.

102

MILITARY NOTES

CANADA
JapaneseLiaison slircraft
The Canadian Air Force is consid ering the purchase of 30 light Japa neseliaison aircraft of the MU-2 type. The plane has a cruising speed of 247 knots and a maximum speed of 269 knots.News item. FRANCE
Missile Bunkers
French plans call for the initial con struction of approximately 30 rocketJiriws bunkers between the Ithone , River and the Alps. These under ground positione are intended to ac commodate Frances first strategic nuclear missiles which are to have a range of 3,000 kilometers and the capability of carrying a 300-kiloton warhead. They reportedly will be op erational in 1968.News item.
Radar System A new battlefield radar surveillance system haa been developed, by a French manufacturer. The system can locate persons in motion at a dis-

Soldd

und Teahnik

tance of about 10 miles and a moving vehicle at more than 20 miles. The radar is fitted with an acoustic indi cator which makes it poesible to dis tinguish between wheeled and tracked vehicles and between an individual and a group.News item. July1986 Ioa

MILITARY NOTES

BEL61UM : Air.TransportableVekicle Prototypes of a three-wheeled vehi cle designed for use by paratroops have been produced in Belgium.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA Submaclriqegun61 Scorpion Czechoslovakia has introduced a submachinegun which usee 7.65-mil limeter ammunition, a nonstandard caliber in the East bloc. Called the Scorpion, the weapon weighs about three pounds without the magazine; it is 20 inches long with its shoulder

The AA. ,?4after landing

So!&t

U&

Technik

Dropped by parachute, it can be op erational about a minute after land ing. Designated the A.S. 24, the vehicle weighs about 460 pounds, has a top speed of 36 miles per hour, and car ries four persons.News item. INDIA
Naval Craft

stock extended. The Scomons rate of fire is 35 rounds per minute single shot and 100 rounds when used on automatic. It is credited with a maximum range of 650 feet when used as a submachinegun and 160 feet when used as a pistol.News item. WEST GERMANY UndergroundHospital In the town of Guzenhausenin Mid dle Franconia an underground hos pital was inaugurated which is de signed to offer protection against all bombs, including nuclear bombs. The hospital, intended for use in the event of war, can accommodate 500 patients and will require a staff of 160 persons. Construction of the hospital began in 1962. Another hospital of this type is cur rently being built in Schliersee, Ba varia.News item.
Military Review

The Soviet Union will supply India with four to six submarines and an unknown number of motor torpedo boats, patrol boats, and landing craft. Soviet experts will also assist in the construction of a new naval shipyard. News item. 104

MILITARY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN New Assault landing Craft The recently commissioned 12,000 about 400 combat troops (700 for short periods), tanks, and vehiclee. ton assault landing craft of the Royal The Fearlese, essentially a combined Navy is similar to the new dock am phibious transports of the US Navy. services weapon system, will be in cluded in Britains amphibloue force. Calledthe Fearless, the most distinc It features a helicopter platform and tive feature of the warehip ie its en is able to serve as a command ship closed harbor. The stern of the 600. at sea for transit operations and as a foot-long vessel lifts hydraulically to headquarters ship in the assault area. diecharge four 85-ton landing craft. The new assault ship is armed with In addition, the Fearless carriee four SeaCat surface-to-air guided mis four smaller LCVP (landing craft, vehicle, personnel) carriere slung siles. It can steam 5,000 miles at 20 knote. from davits. The LCVPs-which can Another veseel of this type, the In unloadtanks, vehicles, equipment, and trepid, will be commissioned later this supplies across open beacheeinclude year and will also become part of a new type which carries two tanks Britains amphibious force.Newe re and operates from a dock space at the ships stern. The Feartess can deploy lease.
New Multiple.Rocket Launcher

Varioue types of Soviet multiplerocket launchere monnted on vehicles have been in existence for years. Of more recent design, however, are mul tiple-rocket launchers cm split-trail carriages. The BM14/8 with eight tubes in two layers is considered to be the first version of this type. The 16-tube rocket launcher ehown here appears to

be developed from tbe BM14/8. There is a BM14 version with 16 tubes, but that weapon has two layers of eight tubee and is mounted on the chassis of the ZIL151 truck. The development of multiple-rocket launchers on split-trail carriages is de signed to facilitate use of this weapon syetem by air-landing troops .News item. I

My 19ss

105

BOOKS

CRISIS IN TNE CONGO: A fJnitad Nations form hr Action. studies of US Polisy and the UN. BY Errseat W. Lefavar. 215 Pages. Tire

SOURCEOOOK ON TNE SPACE SCIENCES. Oy Samuel Glasstene. 9S7 Pagas. D. Van Nes. trand Cc., Inc., Prbrceten, N. J., 1965.$7.95.

Orrld~Wlnstitutien, Washington, D. C., . . BY LT COL LAWRENCE M. JONES, JR., USA The author traces the events in the Congo from her independence, 30 June 1960, until the withdrawal of the United Nations Force in 1964. The work will be beneficial to future historians, as Mr. Lefever has pe rused, extracted, and digested per tinent United Natione documents on activities of the UN Force. He has interviewed many pereons who were in the UN Secretariat in New York at the time, as well as many of the principals who were on the ground in Africa. At the end of each chapter, the au thor includes a summary and offers his judgments and conclusions. For the reader who has followed the devel opments in the Congo, the author bas eet in proper perspective such key events as the Belgian withdrawal, the UN decieion to intervene, the death of Patrice Lumumba, and the Katan gan eeeession. Of special interest to the military reader is the discussion of problems of the military commanderf or ex ample, the lack of a clear-cut military mission, operational reetrainte on the military force, and lack of unity of command.
ma

BY LT COLJAMES

W.

BARNETT,

USA

Approximately one-half of this book ie devoted to developing a fa miliarity with thoee engineering disciplines which currently attract much public attention-launch veh] cles, space propulsion, guidance and control, communicati]one,and manned and unmanned spacecraft. The other half deals with the more fundamental sciences which have historically been considered as extraterrestrial-for example, astronomy, cosmology, and astrophysics. The book is organized so that a busy reader can select topice of par ticular interest and pureue one or more of them at random without be ing deprived of information essential to a proper understanding of those topics. There are adequate cross -references to interrelated topics, and ample references to additional mate rial if the reader desiree to pursue a eubject in greater detail. There appear to be sm new disclo sures in this volume. It ie, instead, a compendium of current knowledge in a convenient form. The author takes much of the myetery out of the at tempts, accomplishments, and failures of contemporary feats by explaining the laws and principles which govern. Ae a result, these events and their Wsclosures become more meaningful.
Mllitaty Raview

THE DC-S. The Story of a FabulousAirplane. By Colonol Carroll V. 61inos and Lieutenant colonel Wendell F. Moseley, United States Air Force. 202 Pages. J. B. Lippincott Co,, Philadelphia, Pa., 1885. $5S0,

BY LT COLWALTER J. FAUSTINI, Brazilian Armp The C-47 (a military version of the DC-S) was one of the most important planes in World War II. This work horse of the air gave !dlitary logis ticians the means to provide materiel with a speed and over distances never before possible. The C-47 is credited with influenc ing the American public to become airminded. It was the transition air plane for the complicated jets of to day. Although declared obsolete sev eral times, this Methuselah of the sklea seems to be in the prime of life.
THE HUMP. The Great Military Airlift of World War N. By Bliss N. Thorne. 188 Pages. J. B. Lippincett Co., Philadelphia, Pa., 1965.

THE WAR A8AINST JAPAN. Volume iv: Re conqrrest ef Bumrs. History of the Second Worid War, United Kingdom Series. By Ma. jor Ceneral S. Woodbum Kirby with Brigc diar M. R. Roberts, Colonel 6. T. Wards, and Air Vice Marshal N. L Dosoer. 588 Pages. Her Majestys Ststformw Office. London ~~ich$l$$nation So~ce, New York), . .

BY LT

COL BROOKS

E.

KLmraa,

IXSAA!

$5.50. BY COLJOHN C. BELL, USA This is the story of a mans love of a plan~the man, a pilot flying the Hump of World War 11; the plane, the C-46 Commursdo. Although not the purpose of the book, the authors reel affection for the sturdy plane, the backbone of the great Himalayan air lift, is the most recurrent and per vading theme of the text. Mr. Thorne offers no moral and draws no conclusions, but he gives an intimate and interesting account of one mans experiences in the air and in the limited number of Asiatic cities his milk run duties allowed him to ace. His 1943-44 experiences over the Hump between Assam and Kunming make interesting and relaxing read ing~
July 180s

This volume, the fourth of a five vohrme series on the war against Japan, covers the period from the ex pulsion of the Japanese from the Imphal Plain in August 1944 to the capture of Rangoon in May 1945. Es sentially, it is the story of the victory of the British 14tb Army over the Japanese 15th Army. But it is more than that. The authora deal with the complex logistic problems in Burma and the intricate problems of command rela tionship. while the subject of the book is the reconquest of Burma, the authors also discuss concurrent Amer ican actions in the Philippines and Iwo Jima whose outcome was to have such an effect on over-all Japanese strategy. The summary makes an interesting point regarding the tailoring of spe cial formations and units. In the 1944 campaign, nine different brigades were organized and trained for spe cial tcske. Yet in the 1944-45 cam paign, these special units almost dis appeared, bearing out the opinion voiced earlier by certain British com mander. Thie was the belief that a well-trained etandard division, with a small amount of special training, can carry out any operational task and do it without the waste in man power which is inherent in the for mation of forces fitted for particular taeke.

MILITARY BOOKS FIRST BULL RUN. The Nation Wakes to War. By Bruce Palmer. 96 Pages. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1965.$2.95.

BY MAJ VLADIMIR A. POSPISIL, USA The First Battle of Bull Run, 21 July 1861, saw 20,000 untrained Con federate soldiers overwhelm and rout 35,000 Union Army troops. Mr. Palm er, a Civil War buff and author. of four novels, presents an exciting ac count of what happened and offers glimpses of the mentality and military strategy of leaders on both sides. Included in the book are a chronol ogy of event% tactical maps, and ac tion photographs to document this first of many battles that ripped the United States asunder during the Civil War. This book provides excit ing and interesting reading.
CONFLICT ANO OECISION.MAKIN6 IN SOVIET RUSSIA. A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953-1963. BY Sidney 1. Ploss. 312 Paces. Princeton Unjyersity Press, Princeton, ~ J., 1665.$6.50. ~

This book is a must for all who seek a better understanding of decision making in the Soviet Government, Certainly, no military student should neglect this opportunity to study the other side of a problem so acute in our own country, and in which the Soviet military profession has often played an influential role.
THE THEORY ANO PRACTICE OF WAR. Essays Presented to Captain B. H. Liddell Hart on His Seventieth Birthday. Edited by Michael Howard. 377 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1965.$10,00.

BY MAJ BARTON M. HAYWARD, USA Rarely does one get such a birthday present. But then rarely does a Basil Liddell Hart come along. The fertile mind of this man has influenced sol diers, statesmen, and scholarsfor al. most half a century. This series of eesays by so~e of his students and admirers ie a fitting birthday present for him. The 15 essays are arranged gener ally into three parts: prior to World War I, between the World Wars, and subsequent to World War H. All are well written and will appeal to both the novice and the serious student. The subjects developed range from military thought, doctrine, and train ing to the influence of Llddell Hart on several nations armies. It would be impossible to select any individual essay as being better than others. All of them deeerve the atten tion of those interested in military affairs. Of particular intereet to American readers, however, are Henry A. Kiss ingers American Strategic Doctrine and Diplomacy: and Alastair Bu thans Problems of an Alliance Pol icy: An Essay in Hindeight.
Militsry Rsview

BY LT COL DONN STARRY,USA In this fascinating study of the power struggle in the Kremlin, Dr. Ploss seeks to answer the following queetions: Wbo makes decisions at the top ? What political and governmental bodies influence decisione? What are the attitudes of the major personali ties ? Answers are sought by a care ful review of Soviet literature and public statements of the leaders. The study reviews the legacy of Stalinism-a scale of economic pri orities aimed at building heavy indus try, deemphasizing coneumer needs, enforcement powers in a highly cen tralized bureaucracy, unrealistic agri cultural production goals without state inPut of heavy machinery and chem ical fetillizer, and subsistence reward for the agricultural work force.
10s

MILITARY BOOKS

THE FIRST WORLO WAR. OY the Editors ef LIFE. 128 Pages. OoubledaY t% Cc., inc., GardenSNY, N. Y., 1965.$4.95. BY LT COLJOSEPH D. HYNES, USA Combining contemporary paintings snd photographs with narrative de scription, the editors of LIFE maga zine have compiled an excellent sum msry of World War I. It is hased on a series of articles which appeared in LIFE in 1964 and also includes many paintings and photographs which have not been published before. The book vividly portrays the war on land, sea, and in the air as seen by those who were there. It is of in terest to the military reader and a welcome additilonto the library of the student of World War I. A fflSTORY OF SPACE FL16HT.The Evolution ef Mans Development of the Knewledge and the TechnicalMaans Utilized te Esplore
Nis Oynancic Environment in Space. By Eu gene M. Emme. 224 Pages. HoIt, Nhrehart & Winsten, Inc., New York, 1965.$2.95.

space, Mr. Emme states that two ma jor technical innovations of World War II brought space flight to reality, the atom bomb and the liquid-fuel bal listic rocket. This book gives a composite quick reference history of space flight. Al though one small section is devoted to military missile development, too little is devoted to military uses of practicaI spacecraft. It must be recog nized that this shortcoming is due to the classification of the subject mate rial and not the authors competence.
LENIN6RA0 1941: Tke Blockade. By Omitri V. Pavlov. Translated by Jehn Clinton Adams. Ferewerd by Harrison E. Salislnrry. 186 Pages. The University of Ckicago Press, Chicago, 111.,1965.$4.50.

BY MAJANTHONYP. DE LUCA,USA

Described as the best and most im portant book on the war to be trans lated from the Russianfl Leningrad 19.41 presents the facts of the siege of a major city as seen through the BY LT COL DONALD K. MAC GREGOR, eyes of the chief of food supplies for USAF both the military and civilian popula tion of that city. It is unnecessary to read volumin Although it touches briefly on the ous material to establish a basic purely military and political consid foundation for past, present, and fu erations of the siege, thk work is ture space knowledge. Mr. Emme pre concerned mainly with a revelation of sents to the reader, in two phases, the the problems involved in maintaining evolution of mans ideas and the de life within a city of some three mil velopment of his technology which lion people subjested to a siege of eventually led to the 20th-century ad about 900 days. venture beyond earth. The greatest value of this book to This concise and easy-to-read book a military reader lies in ita discus brings the reader through 5,000 years sion of the administrative controle of space studyfrom the mythical cos snpply, rationing, siege law, health, mology of the universe through the and sanitation-which, together with Cooper-Conrad Gsmini V recordbreak the moral force of the Leningraders, ing manned flight in August 1965. limited deaths from other than mili~ Ample background is devoted to the tary causes to an estimated 632,000 evolution of rocket technology and the persons. breakthrough or steppingstone to

i
JUIY 19aa

lee

MILITARY BOOKS TWEN7Y-FIYECENTLIRIES OF SEA WARFARE. By Jacques Mrwdal. Translated From the French by J.enOrfzen, 428 Pages. Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., Maw York, 1C65. $7.50. BY MAJ HAROLDB. BIRCH,USA The author uses numerous pictures and drawings to accompany his vivid descriptions to present an objeetive history of sea battles that occurred between 483 B.C. and 1942. The en counters are placed into political and historical context by detailing events leading up to each battle and by de scribing its aftereffects. While clearly establishing the rela tionship between changes in tactics and developments in armament or ship design, the author touches upon each major historierd development and, in the process, concisely explains naval terminology in a language read ily understood by the laymen. Not only is this book an outline of the development of naval tactics, but it aleo clearly deacrihes the caliber of men who manned the ships during these hktoric encounters. ThkI book is both a etudy in leadership and a concise outline of naval warfare, and will be a valuable addition to the li brary of any military officer.
BA~: True Storias of Combat in World War Il. selected by tha Edtiors of The Sat. rwday Evaning Post. 310 Pages. Doubleday & co., Inc., Garden Cii, N. Y., ICS5. $4.95. YAMAMOTO. The Man Who Menaced Amewca, By John Deane Potter. 332 Pages. The Viking Press, Inc., New York, 1965. $S.50.

BY MAJ JACK G. CALLAWAY, USA This ia supposed to be Isoroku Ya mamotos story, but it is mainly the story of the Japanese side of the Pacific war and of Yamamotos role in the struggle. It concisely reports the principal parts of the Japanese estimates and plans. It also analyzes the brilliance and incompetence of their leaders and their operations. The accounts of the Pearl Harbor at tack, the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, and the battle for Guadalcanal are particularly vivid and clear.
I SAW RED CNINA. By Lisa Nobbs. 217 Pages. Mc6raw-Nill Book Co., New York, 19ss. $4.s5.

BY LT COLDOUGLAS P. HARPER, USA An interesting account of a threeweek torrriat-type visit to Communist China during the spring of 1965. The author, an Australian citizen who lives in California, is an experienced news paper reporter vitally concerned with the social, political, and military prog ress and aspirations of Red China as they appear to threaten world peace. . It ie unfortunate that she did not visit Taiwan following her visit to the Communist-zontrolled mainland in order to compare progress in freedom versus progress through work quo tas and thought reform. The book is worth reading, partic ularly for those with delusions about the inherent weeknesa of Red China. The challenge is real and growing stronger; the thoughtful reader will feel the threat more fully through Mrs. Hobbs observant eyes.
Military Reviaw

FrYLT COL LUIZ DE A. AKARrPE, Brazilian Arnzv From Pearl Harbor through Mur mansk, North Africa, and Hammel burg, on land, sea, and in the air, 16 combat experiences of American fight ing men are put into light prose. Some of the experiences were written by the participant, others as told to. The stories are interesting reading.
110

MILITARY BOOKS AMERICAN FORTS. Yesterday and Today. By Bruce Grant, 381 Pages. E, P. Elutton & Co.,Inc., Now York, 1SS5. $5.95. BY LT COLWILLIAMP. PIPKIN, USA American Forte is an entertain ingly written and easily read history of early places and forte which con tributed to the development of the United States. This book would be a fine supple mentary reading assignment for a high school couree in American his tory. Each chapter presents interest ing historical anecdotes of evente in the development of one of the 50 statee and tells of the part played by the major forts in the hietory of that state. Its value to the military researcher is questionable, for a more detailed examination of the data, particularly the maps, reveals inaccuracies in the location of the forts. PRINCIPLES OF TECHNICAL WRITING. By
Robert Nays. 324 Pages. Adtisorn-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 17eadirrg Mass., 1s35, $6.50.

THE INTERNATIONAL BR16AOES: Spain, 1933-1939.Sy Vincent Brtrme. 317 Pages. William Morrow & Co.r km,, New York, 1963.$3.00. BY CAPTROBEST M. WoacrierE&USAR The Spanish Civil War was prob ably the last conflict in which the in dividual, againet the wishes of his government, could enter a pereonal protest against ideology in the ulti mate way. The Spanish Civil War was prob ably the firet limited war betwocn cap italism and communism. Also, it was a modern war that provided an oppor tunity for a test of modern equipment and tactics. According to the author: The ever watching German aad ItaSiun military experts eaw the action [at Brruwte] ae a fa4chratitzg teet of tank etrateg~. ., . The French might eadg Auve anticipated German tac tice in the Second World War from the enrall ecale model of Brnnete. This is not a grand strategy. It ie with difficulty that the conduct of the war, as opposed te the conduct of the battle, is understood. Even a greater drawback is the lack of po litical and economic perspective of any but the I ternational Brigade pe sition. Mr. omes social conclusion is communiea 4 ed by this quote from the beok: However, what may well have been the laet crueede in the romantic tradi tion of the past finaltg turned into something of a ekam. In the early 19S0;8 a great upsurge of eocial con science and idealism W epread throngheut large parts of England, Europe, and America, inepiring men of totaUy different natkmalitiee and ctacs, but what came out of the Thir tiee in the end? , [
111

BY MAJ FRANK P. VELLELLA,USA Professor Hays, head of the Eng lish Department at Southern Tech nical Institute, wrote this book pri marily as a classroom text. It provides a clear and detailed step-by-etep ap proach to technical writing. The au thor emphasizes the necessity for the writer to analyze his reader in order to make a report both understandable and useful. One chapter contains suggestions on tbe uee of visual aide to help the raader better understand the report. Appendixes contain rules of English, examples of editing, and sample out lines. The book is a practical and uss ful self-instructional text. JrIis1SS$

MILITARY BOOKS OTHER 000KS PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESI DENTS OF THE UNITED STATES. Harry S. Truman. Containing the Pub lic Messages, Speeches, and State ments of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1950. 866 Pages. Super intendent of Documents, US Govern ment Printing Office, Washington, D. C. $7.75. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESI DENTS OF THE UNITED STATES. Harry S. Truman. Containing the Pub lic Messages, Speeehes, and State ments of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1951. 749 Pages. Su perintendent of Documents, US Gov ernment Printing Office, Washington, D. C. $6.25. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESI DENTSOFTHE UNITED STATES. Lyndon B. Johnson. Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and State ments of the President, 1963-64. Book I. November 22, 1963 to June 30,1964. 942 Pages. Superintendent of Docu mente, US Government Printing Of fice, Washington, D. C. $6.75. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESI DENTSOFTHE UNITED STATES. Lyndon B. Johnson. Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and State ments of the President, 1963-64. Book IL July 1 to December 31, 1964.1,813 Pages. Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office,Wash ington, D. C. $7.00. NATO. Facts About the North At lantic Treaty Organisation. 319 pies. Manhattan Publishing Co., New York. $5.00 paperbound. $7.50 clothbound. RECEIVEO NAVAL REVIEW 1966. Edited by Frank Uhlig, Jr. 353 Pagee. United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., 1965.$12.50. IN HONORED GLORY. The Story of Arlington. By Peter Andrews. 191 Pages. G. P. Putnams Sons, New York, 1966.$5.95. THE NONCOMs GUIDE. 479 Pages. The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1965.$4.95. THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT : Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters. United States Army in World War II Special Stud ies. By Charles M. Wiltse. 664 Pages. Superintendent of Decuments, US Government Printing Office,W~sbing ton, D. C. $5.00. THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS: Operations in the War Against Ger many. By William F. Ross and Charles F. Romanus. 793 Pages. Superintend ent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. $3.50. JOINT MAN/MACHINE DECI SIONS: The Phase Beyond Date Proc essing and Operations Research. By Howard Thompson. 157 Pages. Sys tems & Procedures Assn., Cleveland, Ohio, 1965.$6.00. UNIFORMED SERVICES ALMA NAC-1966. Compiled and Edited by Lee E. ShartT in Assrwiation With Wayne, Hawkins and Joseph Young. 168 Pages. Uniformed Services Alma nac, Washington, D. C. $1.00 paper bound.

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