m EIl Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

Strategy Whispers Protection Monsoons

and $ystems

Analysis . . . . .

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Lt Col Delbert Lt Col Gustav . , . . Lt COI . . . .

M. Fowler, J. Gillert,

IJSA

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25 35 43
48
56 63 69
76

in a Windstorm of Roads and Military Insurgency . . . . . . . , . . .

Jr., USA

Slavko
Harlan &

N. Bjelajac
Koch, USA

Operations . . .

Hukbalahap

. . . . . .

Robert

Ross Smith USA

NATO Infrastructure NATOs Flanks

Lt COI . . .

Emmett . MN2

R. Arnold,

Eu~ene David

Hinterhoff USN

USA

Anguish of Normandy Inter-American Force

. . .

H. HoIt,
R. ArjrOn,

Lt (lol , .

I-k@l

The Good OfNcer Soviet Tactics

Davis

B. Bobrow Soviet Soviet Army Army

USA

Maj Gen V. Reznichenko, Col A. Sidorenko, . . . . Capt William P. Yeuell, . . . . . Richard . . . . .

Soviet Armored Shift in Soviet Original t(MAG

Carriers Strategy . . . . . . . . .

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E. Odom,

81
87
93

Col Donovan . . . . . . . . ,

Jr., USA, Ret P. Weinert

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MilitaryN odes . Military Books

100
108

The Military Review, of mil!tary thought with

a publication of the UNITEO STATES ARMY, provides a forum for the expression emphas}s on doctrine concerning the drwsion and higher Ievel$ of command. in this magazine and General Staff ARE THE AUTHORS College. and not necessarily those of the

The VIEWS expressed US Army or !Ije Command

Editor in Chief Col Donald J. Delmrey Assistant Editor Lt Col AlbertN. Garland features Editor Maj RobertL. Burke Layout Editer 1st Lt RobertK. Lirrdgrerr Acting Sparrish-American Editor LuisA. Monserrate BrazilianEditor Lt Col LUIZ de A. Arari~e Associate Editor Lt Col Algin J. Hughes Army War College Production Officer Maj NormanC. Murray Staff Artist Charles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEWPubfished monthly by the U.S Army Command arrd Generai Staff College, Fort Lea! enworth, Kansas, m Engl!sh, Spamsh, and Portuguese. Use of funds for p+mfing of this publication has been approved by Headquarters, DeIIartment of the Army,3 July 1962. Second-class postage paid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Subscription rate% $3.50 (US currency)a year m the United States, United States mlli~ary post offices, andthose countries which are members of the Pan AmerJcan Postal Un!on (including Spaml, $4.50 a year in all other countries Address subscnp tion mail to the %mirDenartmerrt. . U. S. ,4rmv and Genera! Steff Colleee. Fort Leavenworth, . Command . . Kansas 66027.

STRATEGY ANDSYSTEMS
ANALYSIS

Lieutenant Colonel Delbert M. Fowler, United States Armg URING the past few years, in -national publications and in nor mal conversation in the balk of the Pentagon, we have been bombarded with such statements ae: Its a battle between the generals and the whiz kids. Its a struggle between flag officers and the Secretary of Defense. Its a debate over the relative mer its of military intuition versus quan titative analysis. June 1965

Its tbe age-old struggle between age and youth. Some individuals have attempted to take personalities out of tbe discus sion by aiming their barbs at science and the inanimate computer. As Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, said to a recent space writ ers convention in Florida: I can iwmgine that most editors

would much

prefer

to see a story 3

about a ftst fight betwee% a general and a whiz kid! on the third floor of the Pentagon rather than a straight discus8io?c of the various complicated and conflicting factor-s that go into a decision on a major weapon system.
These have been the headlines for the past few years. But what have been tbe real iesues behind these head lines ? Two years ago, Dr. Entboven said: . . . top defense oficials are now being aided in making these judg

current and future NATO strategy, Let us, first of all, examine the word strategy and its definition. As late as 1956, one well-known dictionary defined strategy as: The science and art of employing the armed strength of a belligerent to secure the objects of a war. Upto-Date Definition 1t was not until 1961 that the pro. ducers of that dictionary recognized the facts as they had existed for at least 16 years and brought their, defi nition of strategy up to date: Ths ecience and art of employing the political, economic, psychological,

ments by ths .sgstematic availability Of Quantitative information on the ef fectiveness and costs of alternative strategies, forcss, and weapon sys tems. This information is produced bv a method sometimes called Systems Analysis.
And from that time to this, systems analysis, as it pertaine to alternative forces and alternative weapon sys tems, has been tbe subject of most of the writings in this area. Brooder Iktestion The broader question of systems analysis and alternative strategies bas not been widely discussed. Tbe vari ous multilateral force proposals and the use of atomic demolition muni . tions are examples of such alternative strategies now being considered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza tion nations in the formalization of
I Alai. Decision . . ,.1, C.

and military forces of a nation 07 group of nations to afford the maxi mum support to adopted policies in peace or war.
The first Joint Dictionary issued by tbe US Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1948 defined strategy as:,

The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, psy chological, and armed forces of a na. tion, during peace and during war, to afford the maximum support to na tional policies, in order to increaae the probabilities and favorable conse quences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.
Major General Max Johnson, at the time Commandant of the United States Army War College, defined strategy in somewhat greater detail:

,,. ..... M.ktns,-

E.thwen. W.terns Analwis Mdit.ru Revtem, JmuaIY

and 1963,

The design of a national strategy

involves the setting of goals, the stra tegic appraisal of others and our=

Lieutenant Colonel Detbert M. Fow ler-, a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forcesr <Sa graduate of the United States Military Academri, the United States Army Command and General StatT College, and George Washington University. Co20ne2 Fow lev has served in Korea and GermRny. Move recentlg, he was aesigned to the Sgstems Analgeie Divfsion, O~e, Chief of Staff, US Army. 4

selves, the identification of strategic problems and strategic trends, the analvsis of alternative courses of m tion to attain our ends, the selection of one of these courees, and the devel opment, mobilization, allocation, and alviication of resources (political, ecO nontic, psychological, and military) Militsry Review

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

the integrated, correlated, appor tioned, and reasoned app[<oation of alwaiq. limited resourcesto the ac complwhment of the chosen couree of
action. In th~ definition, note particularly the part which statse: l. . . the anal ysis of alternative courses of action to attain our ends, the selection of one of these courses. . . . Theee words cleary point out the connection be tween eystems analysis and strategy. And the last few words: . . . of al ways limited resourcesto the accom plishment of the chosen course of ac tion distinctly delineate the intercon nection of systems analysis, strategy, and the rmliticaily attractive idea of economy in government.

HistoricalLandmark An excelient historical landmark to denote tbe beginning of the change [ in the defin ]tlon ~ of strategy is the } Marshall plan. The worlds greatest contemporary General strategist, ! George C. Marshall, had transferred his considerable talents from the mil tary sphere to that of international politics and economics. General Mar shalls ability as a strategist is meas ured in the customary American tra dition, principally by what he did I rather than by what he wrote or spoke. That the Marshall plan incorporated political, economic, psychological, and military forces to accomplish a na : tiona] policy in peacetime ie evident. One of Marshails proteges, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, achieved po litical victorythe Presidency itself largely because of his succees in implementing the new broad US strat egy, namely tbe construction of NATO. This played at least as great a part in his poiitical success as did the popularity he had attained ae a maker and executor of the older, more I Iune1963

parochial strategy of World War II. Both Generals Marehrcll and Eisen hower found extensive speaking or writing unnecessary in attaining pO sitions from which to make or imple ment strategy. But with the growth in the output of US universities fol lowing World War II, as well as the incrdaeing recognition of the United States new poeition of world leader ship, it became clear that the officer corps of the Armed Forces no longer enjoyed its traditional monopoly of experience in military affairs and na tional strategy. Not only did many highly educated political scientists, economies, and psychologists join the arena of strategy because of the mag nitude, doIlar value, and intellectual attraction of the problem of national defense and eecurity, but most of them were escorted into the arena by the officer corps itself. They were given an education in the military as pects of the problems, and asked to assist in the solution of the problems created as a result of the United States new role as leader of the world. Competition Good evidence of the competition that ensued is found in General Max. well Taylors inability to obtain what he considered to be a fair hearing of his views on nationai strategy, deepite his reputation as an outstanding leader during Worid War II or as a brilliant thinker and debater. As a matter of fact, it was not until he retired and wrote The Urtcertai?z Trumpet that he effectively overcame this essentially intellectual barrier. The advent of the computer spawned a requirement for syetems analysts and programmers to translate the bh nary language of the computer into the language of the decision maker. The new, broader strategy brought s

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS forth as a ~esult of US world leader ship also spawned a requirement for systems analysts to take the products of the various disciplines and to weave them together into alternative strategies for the decision maker. In the case of both strategy and the computer, there will he a require ment for systems analysts until the generalist decision maker and all the specialists learn each others language to the point that interpreters are no, longer necessary. But even if thie were to happen in the near future, can it be said that systems analysts would disappear from the scene ? Hardly! A group well educated and familiar with modern command, management, ~and decision-making processes will more likely replace less well-qualified mem bers on the decision makers staff. Conclusive Evidence Evidence supporting this general thesis of the relationship between systems strategy and analysis abounds. The recent Canadian defense reorganization, for example, still be ing hotly debated in defense circles around the world, was done in the name of economy in government and cost effectiveness. Recent British de fense reorganizations were accom plished for simikw reasons. United States-Federal Republic of Germany agreements to provide operations re search training for the German de fense establishment were signed in Washington in November 1964. Perhaps the most conclusive evi dence came in late 1964 when the Vice President announced that the Govern ment might soon hire a staff of econo mathematicians, mists, sociologists, and scientists to assist in the instaRa tion of some computer-assisted, deti sion-making technique in the White House. Such a technique already has been proposed and ia designated by the acronym PATTERN (Planning Aesietance Through Technical Evalu ation or Relevance Numbers). Accord. ing to the Vice President, such a proc ess would permit decieion makers to see patterna that would ordinarily be too complex to evaluate by the tradi tional intuitive mental process. Aspirations At this point, your reaction may likely be: So what? What has all this to do with me? If you are happy to remain the mil itary specialist, then the answer is:
Nothing. If, however, you aspire to
loftier heights, such as that of the
decision maker or strategist, then tbe
answer is equally as obvious. Last year, Lieutenant Colonel Charles M. Fergusson, Jr., a member of the faculty at the United States Army War College writing for the Mi/itarl/ R#z,ie w, answered this ques. tion in another way: .

Itis difficult to exaggerate the im portance of the subject of strategic the thinking and studies, It concerns most important tceapon that man pos to his most sessesh is mind-applied crucial problemsecurity. . . . We should recognize that sound jcscfg rwent and sound thinking are comple rn~ntary, not conflicting as has too often been assumed.
A recent article in another publica tion pointed out that:

Problems of this complexity, if thev can be solved at all, can be solved only by men generating and excluding pos sibilities with maximum effectiveness, to obtain a high degree of informa tion per unit timem en willing to work a little bit at thinking. Or consider the following:
~Lm@sni ,Cokml Chmles M. Fer!wwm, Jr., M,lU@r#R.. %tmtemc Thrnkins and Stud],,,,) mew. Am] 1964, DP 9-24. Military Review

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

After giving careful consideration to qualification for sea command and required specializations, I believe the selection board should place great shvss on seehing evidence, in the past pctfovmance of prospective flag Ofi cers, of the qualities of flexibility of mind, analytical thought processes, crtiativitv and imagination which will best qualify them to compete with the increasingly professional and intellec tual civilian leadership within an inc~easingly integrated Defense Depart ment. I think that the evidence of SUCIL qualifications can be found in many categories of billets. However, I can think of none zohere the naval oficer is put to a greater test of ability to rise above his background and Possi ble prejudices than by demonstrated outstanding performance in Joint and International Staffs and Agencies. It is here that the common dogma of an~ -

one service must give wag to the give and take of analysis from differing perspectives. It is here that he must rely less on the lessons of past experi ence and more on his basic qualities of intellect and thoughtfulness.
This is but one paragraph of a let ter of. instructions f ram the Secretary of the Navy to a recent Navy flag offi cer selection board. It goes without snying that the demonstration of these qualities will require a good working knowledge of the other dis ciplines involved in the making of na tional strategy, those of polities, eco. nomics, and psychology. Perhaps the best summary that I can give is to paraphrase Clemen ceaus often maligned expression: Let us hope that the making and imple mentation of United States national strategy is too important to leave to everyone but the generals !

We will continue to need men of vision. Our free society encourages original ideas. This is one of the rarest commodities of all and it is our greatest strength. As long as we have men of imagination and vision with the strength of mind to push ahead we will continue to have the strength as a nation that leadership demands. General B. A. .%hriever

June 1965

whispers in a windstorm
Lkutenant Colonel Gustav J. GiIlert, Jr., United States Armu t

The oiews expressed in this ar ticle are the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, Department of De fense, or the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.Editor.

I
8

T IS to be expected, and, perh~ps, it is appropriate, for the current US military activity in South Viet

nam to have an inordinate influence on our attifude and opinion toward present US Army counterinsurgency doctrine. Enunciated, in part, in Field Manual 31-22, U. S. Army Counter irzsurgenc~ Forces, November 1963, this doctrine was influenced in large measure by the Communist subversive threat to South Vietnam. But that doctrine is also intended Military Review

WHISPERS to serve a much broader purpose as the countering mechanism to world wide subversive insurgency. Thus, while our attention currently ie fo. eused !mimarily on southeast Asia, Communist ac~ivity in the Middle and Latin America East, Africa, makes these areas no less critical or important to us. Herein lies much of the basic difference of opinion and academic discord which exist among the various members comprising our counterinsu wency community, partic ularly within the US Army itself. Principalissue Of principal issue is the question as to whether or not South Vietnam should hold a position of preeminence m our counterinsurgency effort. I be {ieve it should. Since South Vietnam is currently the greatest, as well as the most di rect and open, insurgent threat, should our counterinsurgency doctrine and effort be reshaped to reflect this prin. cipal threat, if necessary to the exclu siou of all others? The answer is no ! Furthermore, I do not believe too many people actually subscribe to so narrow a course. There is a growing awareness that while the peculiar po Iitlco-military situation in South Viet nam represents a departure from the accepted counterinsurgency pattern, it need not be considered out of doc trinal context. There is a tendency, however, to oversimplify the variety of complex counterinsurgency problems so that they can be explained readily by quick and superficial analysis. There is also a ten~ency to overcompensate in an attempt to achieve results that are in evitably slow in forthcoming and in variably appear to be of minor im mediate consequence. These results, therefore, are undramatic in nature when they are achieved. Pacification Measures By comparison, the slow, painstak ing pacification measures-clear, hold, and buildappear inadequate re sponse to an insurgent mortar attack against a friendly airbase, or to the sinking of an aircraft carrier by a Viet Cong demolition team. It is espe cially frustrating not to be able to come to grips with such an illusive and yet apparent overt Communist threatand all the more so when we seem unable to smash it quickly with our preponderant military capability. What usually results is a furious soul eearching among both politicians and military authorities to seek rea sons for yet another Viet Cong tri umph and South Vietnamese short coming. It is a dilemma that breeds discontent within the ranks of dedi cated professionals, operational panic in the field, and a form of doctrinal schizophrenia around conference ta bles. In a thrashing about for demon strable success+r acceptable equivo cationsan all-too-ready solution is to follow a course of action that gives the impression of appropriate coun teractivity and viability. From such irresponsible beginnings have come several peculiar military concepts in the past; snme still linger 9

~ieatenan t Colonel Gust;v J. GiL [W, Jr., a member of the faculty of the U. S. Armg Command and General Staff College, is the author of Coun terinsurgenc~ which appeared in the Aprii 1965 issue of the MILITARY RE VIEW. He holds a B.S. degree from the University of Mar@znd and was grad uated from the USA CGSC Regular Course in 1963. He has held various airborne and Special Forces assign ments, including a four of dutg in Laos as .Specia[ Forces Advisor dur ing 1961-62.
June 1965

WHISPERS to haunt US. I am not suggesting that we hold dogged}y to present doctrine or to current military response when it is clearly inadeqttata, when it is ob viously inappropriate, or when it is w , 7 What I am suggesting is that, whether we contemplate change j counterinsurgency doctrine, divisional organ~ation, or the basic rifle for our infantry soldier, we would do well to

A*V N,UJS Fs.ztw,, Republic of Vietnam airborne infantry drop in to reinforce government troops in ~ tight with Viet Cong forces
not in our national interests to do so. And I do not oppose change when change will materially improve or ad vance our capabilities. The purpose of this article is to rec ommend change. However, I am cau tioned by the counsel of a wise, re spected, but generally unsung leader, the late General Henry I. Hades, who, after hearing. a Department of the Army briefing team extol the virtues of the then new pentomic division, summed UP in his taciturn way the doubts of many when he cautioned that change is not always progress.

explore the experiences of history ant evaluate the present while we 100i forward to the ephemeral prospects oi something new and better in the fu. ture. Moreover, we have an almosi inevitable tendency to look for organi. zational and equipment remedies wher tbe problems are essentially person nel performance deficiencies. All tof often the resultant doctrinal and or. ganizational turbulence wrought b~ continual change is not only nonpro ductivt?, but self-defeating as well. WI hardt y have time to find out where W( ha%e been and with what, before W( Military Fiwiw

10

strike out again-cliches and shib boleths flying-in eearch of something new. Consequently, while we may have to look beyOnd the semantics of coun terinsurgency for specific solutions to our Wietnams, we would do well to retain as broad a fundamental miii tary base and capability for general response as our resources will permit. It would seem profitless at this late date in our counterinsurgency experi ence to extend anything but passing reference to the fact that insurgency and, consequently, counterinsurgency transcends military effort and entails total government application. Never theless, before proceeding, I feel obliged to acknowledge and to empha size the paramnunt political, economic, sociological, and psychological consid erations inherent in this type of con tlict. We can search for counterinsur gency technological breakthroughs and attempt to computerize the insurgent threat, but no matter how complicated m exhausting our appraisal of each specific insurgent situation may be, in the final analysis we are engaged in a struggle for the mind of man. This is the first constant. It is a key stone of success when interwoven with the corollary constantthe necessity tn provide the people with physical and psychological protection against subversive violence. Objectives Tbe objective of counterinsurgency, as tbe objective of war itself, is to employ our resources so as to achieve results favorable to our national pur pose. Within the framework of the existing Communist subversive threat to southeast Asia, the employment of US resources should be directed to ward this purpose. It is not my intent to explore the June 1965

US national policy aapects of the sit uation in South Vietnam. Suffice to say, however, that the military and political considerations are sd closely and inexorably interwoven that we must relate all possible courses of ac tion, or options open to na, to our vital nation-al interests. For the purpnses of thie discussion I have limited my remarks to the course of action pred icated on our cnrrent counterinsur gency doctrine and based on present national policy. In effect, this option saya, let us keep the conflict localized, keep it counterinsurgencythat is, let us con tinue to help the South Vietnamese do the job themselves. Rut why ? Is it becanse it is the only remaining, or acceptable, alternative ? Partially, yes. But primarily this is the only course of action that holds promise of a satisfactory solution for the people of southeast Asia. I do not say victory-at least, not total vic tory in a military sense, althnugh I dont rule out this conclusion com pletely. A satisfactory military con clusion is still possible, even though political realities might militate against such a solution. limited Participation Precisely what does this course of action have to offer? Our present counterinsurgency doctrine, as I in terpret it, limits the participation of US ground combat units in tactical operations to a brigade-size force, recognizing that the requirement for commitment of larger combat forma tionsby definition, if not in fact expands the conflict beyond counter insurgency. I believe that this stipu lation is fundamental to our doctrinal approach to counterinsurgency as well as to our military effort in South Vietnam. 11

WHISPERS It is ditlkult to visualize a situa. tion in Soutfr Vietnam where the in troduction of a US brigade-size force would have materiaf consequence on the tactical situation. A brigade-size force would be but a drop in the ricefields of Asia, In other countries, though, under other circumstances and against Iess formidable pbstacles, the employment of a US brigade might have significant tactical value. In both force should be our immediate and rel. ative capability and the imperative tf commit this type of force. In principle, then, US participation and, in particular, the level of om force employmentshould be as lim ited as the achievement of our na tional objectives permit. And then j! should be only ancillary to the indige nous effort. The major effort musl come from the threatened govern

LEVELS OfARMYCOMMITMENT
10COUNTERINSURGENCY

TIER

FIRST
TIER

situations, certainly, the psychological effect would be considerable. However, beyond any local psycho logical value and the obvious di~play of national purpose and intent, the overriding consideration for the ap plication and extent of US ground
12

ment, because the problems area are local and unique society.

in eacl to tha

It is important for the Unite, States to remain in the background an~, where poseible, to limit our sup port to training, advice, and provid
Military Review

WHISPERS ing material. Otherwise, we might prejudice the local governments ef. forts and expose ourselves to unjus tified but sometimes effective Commu nist charges of intervention and co lonialism. Our policy should be to provide only those pertinent resources and capabilities to augment the in digenous effort so that credit for ~c complishments accrue to the local gov ernment. While tilis is a most acceptable and prudent policy, in practice-esPeciaNy in the field of military assistance~we have seen that it is not always @pra cticable or desirabIe. In many of the newly emerging nations, the basic force structure is so inadequate, and the Communist threat is so great or imminent, that the application of the building block concept of advice and assistance is inhibited. Doctrinal Proviso Our present doctrine does say that whentraining requirements impose an macceptable Ieadtime to the attain ment of an operational status, it may be necessary to introduce selected US Army units into the host country to assist indigenous military forces in combat support and combat service support missions. Further, the doc trine spells out that, under exceptional circumstances, US Army combat units may be introduced into a host country to perform tactical missions. This is a flexible and responsive doctrinal pro viso which permits a reasoned and ap propriate application of force. We Americans must realize that we can conduct successful counterinsur gency operations in these threatened countries only through indigenous leadership and institutions. A coun try that will not fight, one that is not motivated or prepared to accept the principal role and the greatest bur kore1965 dens in the fight for its national exist. ence, is an extremely poor risk as a partner in counterinsurgency. Such limited partnership really demands too much from counterinsurgency; odds this unfavorable would be difficult to overcome in al~:out war. Succes~
But propitious accepting that we face a more

set of circumstances, how can we succeed with our present re sponse <to Communist subversion in %uth Vietnam? We must first under stand that success will be an agoniz. ingly slow process, difficult and de manding on our resources and pa tience. We must appreciate that there was, in fact, no South Vietnamese Army until 1958; the implications of South Vietnams previous colonial sta tus; the inexorable pressure of Ho Chi-minh; and the political conse quences of successive COUPS detat. When you have digested these fac tors, balance off our past record in this country and. you are ready to be gin your appraisal. We must not lose sight of the fact that our present concentration of US advisory forces and our direct involve ment in South Vietnam is of recent origin, and that our effort has been measurably and increasingly success ful, despite severe reverses and admit tedly less than hoped for results. Our counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam really ha? not functioned over a sufficiently long period to permit a valid evaluation, or to arrive at, a fair verdict. But I believe we can grant the point that we have been slow, or less than effective, in our use of our multiple capabilities, and that we have a va riety of military, political, and Psy chological resources that are still un used. 13

WHISPERS In the final analysis, we must go as far as .neceseary to eneure a solution favorable to our national purpose. Mil itarily, thk could mean increased op erational assistance, combat support, and combat serviee support against the internal insurgency forc+and an expanded interdiction effort against the sou rees of outside intervention. Other targets can be found in the gov ernments and within the populations of the external powers sponsoring in surgency in South Vietnam and, more broadly, among tire world forum where these eponeoring powers have political and economic assets that , could be jeopardized by effective po litico-psychological counterattacks. Force Structure The US Military Assistance Pro gram, and, more precisely, our coun terinsurgency effort, ia predicated on our Military Assistance Advisory Groups ( MAAGs ) and missions: The concept of providing only ancillary as sistance, with the preponderant effort emanating from the indigenous coun try, is fundamental to the US counter insurgency program. This ancillary assistance, based on our MAAG and mission organization, provides for a stable table of distribution base or ganization, with temporary augmenta. tion, when necessary, by eelf-con tained, specifically organized, counterinsurgency-oriented task forces. An alternate system would require the establishment of multiple, sepa rate, permanent-type US military or ganizations in each country, with each organization specifically designed and deliberately oriented to the immediate local situation. These fixed organiza tions could not be completely, or rea sonably, responsive to Communist strategy or to the diverse demands and tactics of the so-called peoples wars since Communist subversiv~ insurgency varies in scope, intensity and geographic application. For example, in 1955, in response to the then recognized threat, our ad. visory effort in Sonth Vietnam totaled less than 35o personnelit currently exceeds 21,000. Essential responsiwness and appropriate counteraction to this type of threat can be achieved only within a doctrinal framework that recognizes the broad and far. reaching military, politica~ and psy. chological implications of Communist insurgency, and by a complementary, ftexible military organization. We can and should base such .? responsive counterinsurgency orgamzation on our existing force structure and present capabilities. In sum, our present build. ing block or tier force structure for providing increased military assist ance is fundamentally sound and should be reinforced. ] ~ / $ i j j ~ : :

Organizational Modification The rationale for the organizational structure of the Armys principal counterinsurgency force-the Special Action Forces (SAFs)folIows the concept of providing specifically or ganized, area-oriented, counterinsur gency-trained task f orees. The Armys Special Forces Groups (SFGS), or ganized the same for unconventional warfare and for counterinsurgency and with both unconventional warfare ! and counterinsurgency mission:-con stitute the organizational baee for the SAFS. This concept, however, places exces-. sive and, perhaps, unreasonable de mands on any one military organiza tion. In order to focus more directly on each of theee two demanding areas, unconventional warfare and eomrter insurgency, and to eneure appropriate gefieral and cold war capabilities, some Military Review

WHISPERS organizational modifications can be made without an extensive disruption of our. present counterinsurgency effort. Capabili&MIX I suggest that we develop a capa bility mix by establishing three sep arate types of SFGs+ne organized exclusively for unconventional war fare; a secOnd for counterinsurgency; and a third, a composite group, pos sessing both capabilities. These groups would be deployed on the baeis of ex isting or anticipated requiremente. A possible deployment, for example, might be: A European SFG (unconven tional warfare), comprised of four Special Forces companies (unconven tional warfare). A Middle Eastern SFG (compos ite), comprised of one Special Forces company (unconventional warfare) and three Special Forcee companies (counterinsurgency). . An African SFG (counterinsur of four Special gency), comprised Forces companies (counterinsur gency). An Asian SFG (composite), comprised of one Special Forces com pany (unconventional warfare) and three Special Forces companiee (coun terinsurgency). c A Latin-American SFG (coun terinsurgency), comprised of four Special Forcee companies (counterin surgency). . A Base SFG (composite), com prised of two Special Forces compa niee (unconventional warfare) and two Special Forces companies (coun terinsurgency). Some internal reorganization within the present SFGS would also be ap propriate for the counterinsurgencytailored companies. Thus, the two
June 1965

demolitionists in the A Detachment could be replaced by enlieted engiueer specialists trained in civic action, and the detachment executive officer could be specifically trained as an area in telligence officer. Minimal Changez Several other counterinsurgencyoriented changes also appear neces sary, but they can be minimal. The augmentation, support, and backup forces for such a specialized coun terinsurgency organization must con tinue to come from all general-purpose US Army table of organization and equipment units. The current delimi tation of second and third-tier, areaoriented, and partially languagetrained brigade-size backup forces, however, is artificial and does not face up to tbe reality of an already over burdened training schedule. The backup force responsibility should be given to all deployed and continental United Statee-based tac tical units to provide a broader baee of support. There is nothing unique, new, or mysterious in thie task when it be comes necessary for US soldiers to start shooting at insurgents, or advis ing others to do so. This is the same personalized, dirty little war each and every rifle and bayonet eoldier has known and fought throughout our his tory. He has done it in junglee, swampe, mountains, and in the cold. And a US Army unit trained for lim ited and general war does have the capability to counter insurgents. The military aspects of counterin surgency are broad in purpose and scope. They are over-all military prob lems, and,. consequently, are the over all responsibility of the Army as a whole. They are as total as in general war.
15

WHISPERS

, ond and third-tier force structure tU ensure that the acceptance of this counterinsurgency responsibility in no way degrades our capability to wage general war. But, more pointedly, we must ensure the over-all US Army ea. pability to conduct effective counter. insurgency operations, and we must then use that capability, lest we lose the peoples war because we could not solve the paper war !

While it is clearly necessary and advisable to maintain a principal eoun teritx+urgency force to focus directly on the speeifie problems of counterin su rgency, and on uncofiventional war fare as well, it is wrong to separate by doctrine, implication, or design the wide-ranging capability and experi ence of the US Army as a total coun terinsurgency force< I believe we must reexamine our see.

INFORMATION OFFICER PROGRAM

The Army Information Officer Program outlinsd in Army Regulations 614-140 is designed to develop a nucleus of professionally trained officers with special background and aptitude in the information field. Most officers alternate in these assignments with others designed to maintain basic career branch qualifications. Other sources of information on this program are Department of the Army Pam phlet 600-3, June 1964, and the Executive for Carser Planning, Office of Person nel Operations, AT TN: Scientific and Technical Section ( OPXC), Washington, D. C. 20315.

16

Military Revie

URING World War II, German forces on the Eastern Front faced a serious dilemma. To keep sup ply routes open and to protect mili tary traffic against guerrilla attack, they either had to undertake extensive protection measures or risk a total collapse of their logistical support system. In effect, the security of the lines of comma nicat ions became the German Achilles heel. All roads used by the Germans were , ~bjects of guerrilla attack. Each morn mg local inhabitants, supervised by German soldiers, probed for mines. !Jevertheless, the mines took their toll md many convoys suffered heavy osses in men and motor vehicles. The individual German soldier Foundit difficult to adjust to the fact that each peasant and laborer, every

teacher, doctor, or lawyer, the woman who peeled potatoes for the soldiers, the girl who allowed herself to be drawn into a ccmversation, and even children who begged for bread might be his enemy, working with the guer rillas, carrying messages to them, or organizing nighttime dynamitings. He soon discovered that partisan war was a war wikbout sleep. At times, the damage inflicted by guerrillas was so great that the deIivery of supplies to and the strategic movements of the German forces were seriously threatened. In September 1943, for example, in the rear areas of the German Army Group Center, the guerrillas destroyed 74 bridges and carried out 737 assaults and am bushes on German convoys. In the same month the guerrillas made 32S

THE PROTECTION OF ROADS

Sk+vko N. B]ela]ac lune19S5

17

.
ROADS , and security sections. To facilitat tratlic service and to protect more ei fectively the installations and the con struetion work along a road and th convoys and supply columns which o! erated over it, the road was divide into road sections (Figure 1). Eat section of the road operated under sect ion commander who, assisted by small staff, directed the elements fo warning, a construction team, and th

assaults on ammunition dumps, air fields, and oth& installations, and cut tactical telephone lines at 3,600 places. This they accomplished in spite of the 122,37& German troops assigned to se curity duties. The German High Command even tually devised a system of protection which would work. Since the protec tion of the entire road network of an occupied area required a tremendous amount of forcesan average of 10 to 12 soldiers for each kilometer of road and 24 soldiers for one kilometer of railroad were considered hare min. , imum figures-the Germans decided to protect only those roads which were militarily indispensable. Organization The experiences gained by the Ger man Army may well have application today in South Vietnam, particularly if the Viet Cong forces gain, such strength that they could impose on the South Vietnamese a war in which major forces would he used. The South Vietnamese forces would then need more supplies than could be delivered by air, and it would have to be as sumed that the Viet Cong would have increased their air-interference capa bility. Land communications, then, would have gained in importance. A road selected for a Iine of com munication by the Germans would be given a designationname or number and put, under the direction of a road commander who, for that pur pose, had under him a road command comprised of s small staff and traffic

Road Defense Organization

Sam+ I&a

SICIION HUO@UN1L3S AND 61RRISON

SECTION 1A 2

Wmwmns sum $lCIIOMInmawmn

GhRRISOM

XC1!OM I&I

SfC1fOM
I!WOWRTIKS
m mmon

! Figure 1. troops for the protection of his w tion (Figure 2). The term protection for road and section commanders meant: The protection of columne and convoys against guerrilla attacks, raids, and ambushes. ,. Protection against guerrilla and saboteur activities of constriction Military Review

Slavko N. Rjelajac is a former colo nel of the R?yal Yugoslav Army. He has been emplo~ed by US agencies since 19.&9,and is presently with the Ojfiee of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Militar~ Operation; Department of the Army. 18

ROADS projects and installations vital for the maintenance Of road traffic. Warningagainst approaching enemy aircraft. Protection Lgainst enemy aviation was not their responsibility. Although the responsibility for protection of sections of roads rested on section commanders, the road com mander had the over-all responsibil ity for the security of the entire road. He was also responsible for time tablesa function performed by his traffic section. For secnrity reasons, The security of the roads was entrusted to military and paramilitary forces, including field gendarmerie. Mountain troops were used in the mountainous areas, What forces or combination of forces were used depended cm the type of forces available, the loyal sitnation, terrain, impor tance of the road, and on the aggres siveness of the guerrilla and sabo teurs. The table of organization of the forcee deployed for the protection of a particular road depended on the

Roadand SectionCommands m
I ROAO COMMANO: I

--r--d
SECTION IA.2 I I SECTION IA.3 I

SECTION IA.1.

SECTION COMMANO:

II

June 1$65

WARINN6 SECTION CONSTRUCTION SECTION

I I

SECTION COMMAND
WARNING SECTION CONSTRUCTION SECTION HOtOING GARRISON MOOIIE RESERVE ARMOREO SCOUT TEAMS

I I

SECTION COMMANO:
WARNINS SECTION
CONSTRUCTION SECTION
NO1OINS GARRISON

NO1OIN6 GARRISON MOOIIE RESERVE ARMOREO SCOUT TEAMS

MOBILERESERVE
ARMOREO SCOUTTEAMS

Figure 2. tbe columns passed each other only in the towns and villages found in the middle of each eection and which were protected by a holding garrison. length of the road sections, the number and vulnerability of construction objectssuch as bridges and installa tionsand on the local situation. 19

ROADS Thus, road section forces varied in size frorb one company to one regi ment. Each section command was com posed of ~suflicient personnel to form a garrison unit and a mobile reserve. The mobile reserve included specially trained reconnaissance teams, which operated on foot, and ar~ored scout car teams. In some cases, the road commander also had his own armored car teams which he used for protec tion when movement was required and as hia ready reserve for reinforce ments of section commands in a crit ical situation. Whenever possible, he would also have a small mobile re serve equipped with tracked vehicles or personnel carriers (Figure 3). Iiolding Garrison Each mobile reserve of a section command kept a small, well-artned combat team ready for immediate de ployment against an enemy attack un til the bulk of the reserve could be brought to the place of engagement. The force designated as a holding garrison had the responsibility of pro tecting and defending a specific lo cality. Field fortifications, barbed wire, electric fences, and mines were utilized, and the force was given ar tillery and mortars to ensure a capa bility of covering a zone of terrain with protective fire. The number and type of artillery and heavy infantry weapons would depend on the terrain conditions, the situation prevailing in the area, and the aggressiveness of the guerrillas. The holding garrison force was not permittedunder any conditionsto be deployed for any purpose other than defense of its lo cality (Figure 4). The mobiIe reserve of a road skc tion was used to repulse, an attack and pursue the enemy, for setting am 20 bushes, and for conducting clearin operations. The reconnaissance team which operated on foot had the mit sion of patrolling, discovering the al preach of the enemy, and of engagin

Elements of Section Command

Mu a
o
A

@hRRISON mom Rmm RECOHMNCS4UCI TEAMS OH!001

mm

(scum]

&J%iMoa!, w,, mm
Figure 3. the enemy until the mobile reserve or armored scout teams could arrive and intervene. The armored scout teams, usually composed of four, five, or more light or medium tanks depending ou terrain and f local conditions, patrolled the Military Review

Profeclionof a locality ~ // W ..

\\ \\ - I I

&
& m x

m MOBILE RESERVE GARRISON ARMORED SCOUT TEAM Figure 4. %

WARNING SECTION CONSTRUCTION SECTION OBSERVATIONPOST

km

1965

21

ROADS

the smaller part of its force again} the enemys front and by directing stronger part against his wings an flanks. In principle, the enemy was to t discovered and encountered as ft away as possible from the garriso and the road; tbe most effecth distance at which he could be dec $ecurih of a Convov

road and the adjacent terrain. Their mission ,was to discover the enemys approach in an a~ea close to the road, oppose the enemy force, and report the enem~s presence to the section and road commanders and to any mov ing columns and convoys. They were also responsible for protecting col nmns and convoys during passage through dangerous parts of their road section; for establishing liaison be tween garrisons in the event that other measnres failed or a garrison was isolated by the enemy; and for maintaining radio communications with the foot reconnaissance teams. Tactics Reconnaissance teams operating on foot constantly patrolled the area ad jacent to the garrison and road. At night, ambushes would be set up along the routes of the enemys m,ost probable approaches. Teams were dis patched to discover the enemy, report his presence to the garrison and armed scout teams, stop him, or delay his ad vance until the elements of the mobile reserve or armored scout team, or bothdepending on the strength of the enemy and seriousness of the sit uation+ould intervene. These teams deployed their civilian scouts and agents on a large perimeter far ahead of the area they patrolled and for which they were responsible. After receiving a report on the en emys approach, or if firing was heard, the holding garrison force would take position and open artillery or mortar fire if so requested by reconnaissance teams; fire would be opened automat ically if targets could be identified. Infantry heavy weapons had to be . ready to open fire when tbe targets appeared within their range. The ele ments of the mobile reserve hastened to the place of engagement by sending 22

DAN6ER

ZONE

2
i

*J

,$ \~ /

gii
{

1 1

SICIIR)N
SOW OKPUTOON

c r t t

f 1 1 ( i 1

Figure 5. sively engaged depended on the tc rain and the time needed for the m bile reserve to intervene. Effecti Mililafy Re~iew

ROADS barrage fire was an important defense element. The reconnaissance teams could ,gain time if they were sufficiently for ward. But if they were too far for ward, they risked isolation and de struction. For this reason, their tac tics were restricted to withdrawal and maintenance of contact with the en emy without decisive engagement. Their most important duty was to re port on the enemys strength and his direction of movement. Defensive Tactical Plan The road section commander, who also commanded the forces of his sec tion, was responsible for the defen sive tactical plan. Defensive artillery and heavy weapons had to be placed so that they would be capable of cov ering by fire all battle sections. A plan to counter an enemy attack at night required careful preparation the routes leading to each position to be used at night; the plan of barrage tires; signal communications; and the procedures that would be fpllowed in various situations. All of these re quired precise orders. Night ambush tactics were highly recommended to reconnaissance teame and forward ad vanced squads and platoons. Whenever aviation was available, the Germans used it for reconnais sance purposes, for observing traffic, and for warning against enemy at tack. Liaison with planes was main tained by the use of signals. It was noted, however, that the aircraft were often seriously handicapped by diffi cult terrain, cover, fog, low clouds, darkness, and inclement weather. In most instances, too, it was difficnlt for pilots to discover the guerrillas. Road columns were so organized that each had its own protection. This usually consisted of a platoon or a kine1965 company armed with automatic weap ons and mortar and transported on trucks or personnel carriers. The main body of the security platoon or company would move approximately 185 meters or more ahead of the col umn; a squad or platoon would be out another. 460 to 640 meters; and a rear echelon, composed of several mo torcyclists, 185 to 275 meters behind the column, would bring up the rear. A squad or platoon would move behind the column leader and his small staff (Figure 5). The leader of the column would stop from time to time to observe and listen for sounds of firing, for alarm signals from neighboring garrisons or reconnaissance teams, or for the mo tors of enemy planes. When approach ing a danger zone, if the zone was not already covered by an armored scout team or by elements of the mobile re serve, the column leader wmild stop his column and send forward a squad or platoon to reconnoiter or to take up defensive positions until the col umn had passed. After that, the squad or platoon would regain its place in the column. Protective Group If the column was attacked, the pro tective groupplatoon or cOmpany entered the action. In principle, the enemy was counterattacked and re pulsed as far away from the column as possible. The drivers and assistant drivers, and the military personnel being transported by the column, were organized into squads. These squads would leave the vehicles, group them selves behind cover, and attack the enemy. The dietance between trucks at a halt was set at three lengths so that, if attacked, fire would not spread from one truck to another. 23

ROARS The meeting and passing of COI. umns irr qarrow ,passages, woods, and othef places suitable for guerrilla at tack and ambush were avoided, The cars of private persons or military personnel were not permitted to travel tbe road alone, only with a column, Only generals and high-ranking geu eral staff officers were ex$luded from this regulation, but they had to be given special permission by the road or section commander. While en route, sleepiug in trucks was prohibited. Each man had to be alert with weap ons ready to fire. Drivers and assist ant drivers were given hand grenades for immediate use. If enemy aviation was active, traf fic moved at uight. In that case, the section commanders had to cover dan gerous sections with their forces by setting ambuehes and taking protec tive positions, and the garrison hold ing force had to open barrage fire on the shortest possible notice. In regard to the protection of road traffic, German philosophy consisted of offering the guerrillas little oppor tunity for ambushing and attacking German columns and of defeating those attempts if they were made. The +__

Germans believed that little could be done when an ambush had hasn ! sprung. Thus, their philosophy of pre. j vention waa given priority over a phi ! Iosophy of disentrapmentthe latter looked attractive only becanse it ap , peared to, he more economical. The system devised by the Germans : for protecting road traffic proveh to be effective and applicable to all typea of terrain. It called for protecting only selected ~oads which were mili. tarily indispensable. A similar system of road prot~ction should find application in South Viet- nam todav if maior forces are used 1 operation; last lo;ger, airlift is insufficient, and- the enemy has attained a significant air-interference capability. In South Vietnam, the protection of some selected roads, and parts of other roads, could have positive reper cussions on local economy and could reeult in creating favorable psycho logical and political attitudes on the part of the population. Rice crops, fnr example, could be delivered safely to city markets, unharassed by the Viet Cong. The confidence of tbe people would be gained because they would again have a feeling of security.

24

Military Reviev

ANDMILITARY OPERATIONS MONSOONS

Lieutenant Colonel Harlan G. Koch, United Mates Army

OUTHEAST Asia~ monsoonal climate probably affects military planning and operations for that re gion more than any other single factor. The annual northward march of the intertropical front from the Equator and its return are events that are aa predictable as interest on savings bonds. Although not technically accuJune

rate, it could be said that the front is pushed northward by the southwest monsoon and is ultimately ushered back to tbe south by the northeast \ monsoon. In brief, the cycle comprises the rainy southwest monsoon followed hy the cool and relatively dry northeast monsoon, which is then replaced by the hot season. Each of these seasons 25

1965

MONSOONS has special characteristics that pro foundly, affect, military operations. CoolSeason The northeast monsoon ia in full swing ilom mid-November through February, and it brings clear skies, Iitt[e rain, and cool nights to the Iarg. est part of southeast Asia. The soil of the countryside begin$ to dry and crack. Although temperatures may run into the nineties during the day, tbe climate of the northeast monsoon is the least enervating of the seasons. The smallest streams are slowly but inexorably reduced to trickles; road ways, tracks, and trails begin to pre sent their optimum capacities. In gen er?aI, this season provides the best conditions for operations by a modern military ground force. The coolest temperatures experi enced in southeast Asia are followed abruptly by the most torrid. The hot season lasts from early March through earty May, and the sweltering hea~ combined with high humidity is smothering, particularly in the close ness of dense jungle. While trees in Missouri drop their leaves during the fall and winter, the deciduous flora of southeast Asia drops its leaves during the hottest weather. Many trees, however, are evergreen and never shed their leaves. At this time, the extensive bamboo jungles turn yellow, leaving the jun gle floor Uttered with a carpet of

crackling leaves. In the jungle, Sield$ of ground fire are at their annual k aerial observation d; t maximum; ground targets in the jungle and di. s rectIy beneath aircraft is the moat$ P revealing. The smaller streams, no longer obstacles, become a series of moss-covered puddles; trafficability i! at its best when moving in the m stricted areas off roads, but convoy! on laterite-surfaced roada stir Up clouds of red choking duet. The larger rivers are at their low, est levels by May. Thie is the season when mountain tribes slash and burn new farming plots. Only a few square meters are usually intended to be burned free of vegetatio~, but often the tires will go unchecked, with little native concern, for many kilometers, This primitive and wasteful farming practice results in a smoky haze that extends over almost all of southeast Asia. The temperatures lower slightly just prior to the mid-May arrival of the southwest monsoon. When the rains arrive, the spell of maximum temperatures is broken and the south west monsoon hegins to build in in tensity. Southwest Monsoon For the largest part of southeast

Lieutenant Colonel Harlan G. Koch i8 sxecutive oficer to the Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief, Pacific, Honolulu. A Chinese-Mandarclz lin guist and a China Area Specialist, he - holds a Masters degree from the fJni versitgi of Illinois. His assignments tnclude duty in Korsa, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, and Laos.
26

Asia. the southwest monsoon arrives around the middle of May and lasts until mid-October. Everyone anxiously awaits its arrival to break the stitling heat; millions of farmers need its rain before they can muddIe their fields for the new crops. This rather brisk stream of warm wind has traveled hundreds of kilo meters from the Equator over warm waters and, consequent] y, arrives over southeast Asia saturated with moi~ ture. The rain is generally triggered in two ways: Military IleYie#

.
When it arrives over the hot nd it is ,pushed upward, sometimes ) more than 15,000 meters, where it rikes the cooler air, condenses, and reduces rainfall (convectional precip-

MONSOONS itation ) which normally occurs as scattered thunderstorms in varying intensity and area. This usually oc curs in the middle or late afternoon at which time the earth is warmest.

,. U
.., c I

*
:

Rmc,,ls a,rllow of warm. most ,outh.e,t monsoon N.rm,lly occurs m southeast Asta from nud May to m,d October followed by short translt,on and then coolest pet,od of ma year
Area% wh,ch ram,, southwest monsoon Areas wh,ch mcwve some mmfall as a result of the southwest nlo,oon the hulk of the,, ra,,tall as a result of the

>

I I

Figure 1.
km 1965 , 27

MONSOONS
When the moisture.laden wind strikes mountain ranges it is pushed upward rapidly toward the raiw-triggering cooler air. This normally resuite in keavy daily rainfall through-

out the mountains (orographic pre cipitation ). During the five months of rainfal read surfaces puddle, pothole, rut, an often become untrafticable. Stream

\~,J

\\ ~

=)

RepresentsaIrfbw of dominantlycool, dry northeastmonsoontiI mall! occurs in southeastAsia fmm early November to m$dMar
followed by hottest season nud March through early May Areas which recetve the bulk of thev ra,nlall as a ,esult of t

( .&l
\

ortheastmonsoon
Areas whrch rece,ve some ra,nfall as a result of the northe, mimo.

&LL_
Figure 2: 28

NOTE. All of Malaya fece)ves heavy rainfall throughout the year

iwth the most pronounced ramlall dv,mg [he northeast mon

Military Ileview

#
! ]eave their banks and inundate large ~greas; wooden bridges are swept , j away; foids are no longer fordable; I j and ricefields are muddled to where t \even foOt soldiers would find crose ~country movement through them an unprofitable enterprise. The large major rivers of south east Asia rarely overflow their banks daring the rainy season, hut they do reach their high watermarks around early November-after the rains have ceased. The smaller tributary rivers , frequently over flo\v subsequent to heavy rainfall. Jungle growth becomes luxuriant, and the canopy of leaf-bedecked trees nullifies aerial observation of ground movement over large areas. Forest offal becomes dank and is infested by subtle armies of terrestrial leeches. These leeches do not live in streams but, rather, wait on shrubs to be brushed onto unwary victimsani. reals or men. Insects swarm in clouds. Leather becomes moldy and bedding mildewsand there is little opportunity for a soldier to dry them. Variations At this time the farmers happily check their ripening fields, and the psrks and gardens of Rangoon and Saigon are luxuriant with tropical flowers. The rain-soaked countryside, however, does not offer a pleasant prospect to tbe soldier living and fight ing in the field. A few subregion, par ticularly Malaya and parts of penin sular Thailand, are affected by rain from both the northeast and south west moneoons and, consequently, re ceive rainfall throughout most of the year, Although climate conditions are ,generally the same throughout south east Asia, there are a few variations and special phenomena from country

MONSOONS to country which affect military op erations. Note the statistics of selected stations in the rainfall table for a better understanding of seasonal pre cipitation. Thailand In Thailand during the northeast monsoon, early morning fog often blankets interior valleys. This burns off by 0800. Haze and smoke also exist throughout tbe day, particularly in the north and northeast. This sterns from widespread burning of tbe jun gle by mountain tribes and becomes most pronounced by late March. Visibility is commonly reduced to two kilometers, occasionally to ]es~ than one kilometer, and severely re stricts nap-of-the-earth flying by highperformance aircraft. This condition holds true for most of southeast Asia north of the 12th Parallel. During the northeast monsoon, too, the west coast of the Gulf of Siam usually bas a heavy swell created by the northeast wind, while the reverse is true on the east coast. This condi tion reverses itself during the south west monsoon. It is interesting to note that, while the smaller streams commence filling rapidly at the beginning of the south,: west monsoon in mid-May and fre quently leave their banks during this rainy season, the larger rivers, like the Mekong and the Salween, have a timelag. For example, the Chao Ph raya of Thailand experiences its high est water at the beginning of the dry seasonNovemberand then grad ualIy recedes to its low point around the end of April, Soil trafficability also experiences this timelag. The flat lowlands may be covered with five or six inches of water in May and early June but may still be trafficable to vehicles.
29

lune 1965

MONSOONS RAINFALL (INCHES) AT SELECTEO STATIONS

*Affected by both northeast and southwest monsoon
Affected by .nertheast monsoon . + Indicates only trace of recorded rainfall
Gray color indicates period of most pronounced rainfall

HAGlANG TUYEN IXJANG HANOI HAIPHONG VINH 00NG HOI* HUE OA NANG QUANG NGAI QUI NHON* NHA TRANG* CAP PAOARAN PHAN TH157 KONTUM OALAT SNOUL SAIGON SOC TRANG CAMBODIA STUNG TRENG VAL d EMERAUOE PHNOM, PENH SIEMREAP LAOS LUANG PRABANG ~fEE: KHOUANG VI ENTIANE BAN HOUEI SAI SENO ATTOPEU THAILAND CHIANG MAI . PHITSANULOK UOON THANI KHORAT UBON BANGKOK PHUKET (ISLANO)* SONGKHLA* BURMA MYITKYINA lASHIO KENGTUNG MANOALAY LOIKAW TOUNGOO RANGOON TAVOY MALAYA BUTTERWORTH TRENGGANU KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE*

2 2 ; 2 2 4 2 ;. 1 t ! 1 t
t t

97
65
68
69
72
83
127
85
:;
56
30
48
74
72
;;
73

: t 1

2;:
55
58

1.1 tt 1 t t
6
6
9
? i
X? 5

t t

6 7 8 $ 8 it 4

t t t t t t d t 1 1 t 1 t ;
5

t t t t t t t t t t :

1
] 1 1
1 t

::
77
69
:? 100
50
54
57
47
62
54
88
93

7
t t t t t t t t
4
9
. it

$: m +
Figure S. .

1%
94
96

30

Military Reqiew

MONSOONS rhis is because the unplowed clayey ;oils have not yet become saturated #ith the SIOWIY penetrating water; ;his does not include muddled rice. ields. In the same vein, theee identical fields in NOvember and early Deeem ber (the dry season) may be bathed in sunshine and only dotted with spo radic puddles, yet they are quagmires to vehicles. This is because the satu rated clays require several weeks of dry weather to yield their absorbed water; in some cases a high water table must also have time to recede. Direct attack by typhoons is non existent in the main part of Thailand. On rare occasions typhoons have crossed the Gulf of Siam from the esst and have left a broad swath of destruction across the southern part of peninsular Thailand. These occur in late November and December, if at all. Some selected absolute maxi mum and absolute minimum temper atures are: ~, Udon Tbaniminimum, 37 de grees Fahrenheit in December; m~xi mum, 110 degrees Fahrenheit in April. Bangkokminimum, 53 degrees Fahrenheit in January; maximum, 104 degrees Fabrenbeit in May. Laos During the northeast monsoon in Laos, a pilot flying at high altitudea would encounter clear conditions, while during the eouthwest monsoon he would fly through broken cloude or overcast with occasional turbulence. Throughout the country there is ap proximately 40 percent cloud cover during the northeaet monsoon and 85 percent during the southweet mon eoon, to include thunderstorms top ping at up to 21,000 meters. The per centages are averages, of couree, and density varies from place to place, In northern Laos there ie early
hne 1965

morning fog in tbe valleye during the o cool season. Smoke and haze occur through the latter part of the cool seaaon and into the hot season in much the same manner ae in Thailand. During the rainy southwest mon soon, the clouds and frequent showers obscure mountaintop makhg lowIevel air operation quite hazardous. Tbe best time for air operations dur ing this season ia 0900 to 1100 after the morning fog has dissipated but prior to the normally expected ehower activity. Maximum absolute tempera tures have ranged from 110 degrees Fahrenheit in April to a minimum low of 32 degrees Fahrenheit in Jan uary at Luang Prabang. Rain affects Laos even more dras tically than it does Thailand, due pri. marily to primitive roads which only support from 200 to 600 tons per day during the dry season; there are no supporting railroads in Laos. During the wet season, Laotian roadways are plagued by landslides, waehouts, and surface deterioration. Leeches, mold, mildew, and other inconveniences are similar to those which occur in Thai land. North and South Vietnnm In Vietnam the coastal lowlands and adjacent mountain slopes extending from Vinb couth to Cap Padaran re ceive the largeet part of their rainfall from the northeast monsoon. Al though it may be the rainy seaaon in Saigon and Hanoi it will be the dry season at Hue. For most of southeaet Asia the northeast monsoon is a cool, dry wind which has traveled down from Siberia and across China; quite naturally, it imparts a cool dry climate. The north eaet winds that strike the coastal low lands of the two Vletnams have an opportunity, however, of crossing a few hundred kilometers of the warm
31

MONSOONS

an amphibious operation are consii. is aid humid South China Sea. By the ered, there is no one season that WOUI :; time the wimt reaches the coastline be entirely suitable. Heavy rains, trop it is no longer dry but is saturated ical storms, fog, haze, crachin weather, til with moisture. and typhoons would negate part oral Cr Another special condition occurs phases of an amphibious operation, which is known as the crachh-a January through June, however, a~ } $s: prolonged period, late November ?IY considered tbe best months. through early April, of widespread Absolute minimnm and maximua \rn fog and drizzle which ,primarily af temperatures for selected stations are !s fects the coastal lowlands of North and South Vietnam from the Red Hanoiminimum, 41 degre~ : u maximum :al Fahrenheit in January; China border to the vicinity of Nha 1 Trang. The crachin is characterized ., 107 degrees Fahrenheit in April. by a persistent low-level (610 to 1,220 Vinhminimum, 37 degrees;; meters thick) cIoud formation accom Fahrenheit in January; maximum, panied by light drizzle. This type of 107 degrees in April. N weather sometimes continues from . Quapg Ngaiminitaum, 49 de. h two to three days at a time. The grees Fahrenheit in February; maxi. ,,: crachin ~everely restricts many cate mum, 104 degrees Fahrenheit in May ~ gories of aerial operations. Kontumminimum, 38 degrees Typhoons occur every year in the Fahrenheit in December; maximu m, ~ city of Hue, the most frequent, focal 105 degrees Fahrenheit in March. ~ point. The heavy precipitation that Saigonminimum, 55 degrees normally accompanies typhoons ac Fahrenheit in January; maximum, counts for tbe inordinate amonnt of 105 degrees Fahrenheit in April. ~ annual rainfall at that city. Typhoons Carnbudia c strike most commonly along this coast The southwest monsoon arrives in ~ line from early September through Cambodia around mid-May and lasts ~ November; they drive in from the through early October. This is the ~ east and rapidly dissipate to rain season of heavy and frequent precipi. ~ storms when spoiled by the Annamite tation throughout tbe country. Humid. Mountain Range. ities are highest and cloudiness is at ; The southwest monsoon prevails its maximum. By midafternoon it is from mid-May through October. Ex not uncommon for cumulus clouds to cept for the eastern coastal areas, pre tower and top at over 18,000 meters. Amphibious operations would be af. ~ cipitation occurs with the greatest in fegted by moderate to high swells. tensity during this period. Heavy ocean swells south of Nha Trang ad During this season the jungles and versely affect amphibious operations, forests of Cambodia have the same but this part of the coastline presents characteristics affecting military OP excellent conditions for amphibious erations as were described for Thai land, Laos, and the two Vietnams. operations from January through Hundreds of square kilometers are May. inundated in the vicinity of Tonle Sap, North of Nha Trang to the an annual occurrence that is the re Red China border the worst 6cean suit of Mekong River backwater. The water is experienced from September T&le Sap, Cambodias largeat lake, through December. If ill phases of 32 Military Review
I

[!
&

MONSOONS rainless months of March, April, and early May. At this time, there ia strong solar radiation throughout the Iargeat part of southeast Asia and little cloud cover. Absolute maximum and minimum temperatures for aeIected stations are: Laebiominimum, 30 degrees Fahrenheit in December; maximum, 108 degrees Fahrenheit in March. Mandalayminimum, 44 degrees Fahrenheit in January; maximum, 1I4 degrees Fahrenheit in April and May. Rangoonminimum, 55 degrees Fahrenheit in January; maximum, 109 degrees Fahrenheit in May. MaIawr The largest part of Malaya and a part of peninsular Thailand are af fected, to some measure, by rainfall from both the northeast and tbe south weet monsoon. It is difficult to define clearly a change from one season to the other insofar as military capa bilities are concerned. Selected sta tions on tbe east coast ( Trengganu ), the weat coast ( Butterworth ), the in terior ( Kuala Lumpur), and the south ern tip (Singapore), each show an abundance of rainfallover 90 inches per year with a large amount falling in each month of the year. The north east monsoon brings tbe most rain to Malaya. Favorable weather for air-ground operations varies a great deal through out Malaya at any time of the year. The coasts and adjacent lowlands are tbe most favorable operational areas,; the interior valleys and mountains have early morning fog, while low clouds often persiet throughout the day. A special weather feature prevalent in Malaya, called the Sumatras/ etrikes from the southern tip to the 33

is a safety ~alv: which virtually elimi. Id nates flooding m the lower reaches of ~ t? Mekong River and, at the same ~,: time, provides Cambodia with a lu ,, crative internal fishery. ~ ] The cool and dry northeaet mon .t ]soonarrives in Cambodia around early INovember and persists until early or imid-March. During this period there m /. ,, :la little or no precipitation, tempera ,( tures are at their coolest, and skies are the cleareat of the year. Amphib !, IOUS operations are most practical at this time due to calm seaa along tbe ; : Cambodian coastline. The hot season exists from mid ,, !vfarcb through early May, with tbe : highest temperatures occurring in ; late April. At Phnom Penb, the high est recorded temperature is 107 deS grees Fahrenheit in April, while the , lowest is 53 degrees Fahrenheit in February. s Burma 1, The southwest monsoon in Burma commences in mid-May and advances over the entire country by the first week in June. This rainy eeason is 3 characterized by overcast skies, low : clouds, and daily intermittent light rain punctuated by occasional blind mg rainsqualls. Routes and trafica t ~i,ity areSimi]ar toThailands dur 1 ing this season. Both eurf and weather conditions, i at this time, cause any large-scale am . phibious operation to be exceedingly dangerous. Close-support air opera tions throughout Burma cannot be rehably scheduled during this season. The area of least rainfall is in the lowlands from 80 kilometers north to 160 kilometers south of Mandalay. During tbe northeast monsoon, all of Burma is nearly dry with clear
skies and relatively COOI temperatures,
This season ia followed by the hot

June

1965

MONSOONS . vicinity of Kuala Lumpur during the sonthwest monsoon season. These storms; whith normally strike at night, are characterized by a line squall, 50-knot gusts, and accompany ing thtfnderstorms which strike the coastline and then dissipate as they move iuland. All of southeast Asia provides the greatest facility for combined airground operations during the period of January through May. Although the southeast Asian rains commence in early May, the ofiroad soils are not yet waterlogged; landslides are not yet a deterring factor. By June the southwest monsoohs deteriorating ef- feets are beginning to be felt, While the skies are generally clear in November and December, the water logged ground is drying slowly. The largest rivers are deepest and are just beginning several months of steady recession. Deteriorated road ways am being cleared of debris and landslides. Village chiefs and national highway departments are repairing roadway base courses and surfaces. Some flooding of minor rivers still exists up to mid-November, although rains have ceased, By January the roadways and ma jor tracks have been sufficiently re stored; former lakelike lowlands now have only isolated puddles, and cracks appear in the earths surface. This condition exists from Lashio to Sai gon and from Bangkok to Hanoi. Only the coastal strip and border ing hills and mountains from Vinh, North Vietnam, to Cap Padaran,

South Vietnam, experience heavy man soonaI rains. Hanoi and the Red Rive Delta, not inclnded in the cosstd strip, provide a marginal exception This is their driest season, but an w casienal crachin will cloud the del and bring light drizzie. January through May is the be period for all-round military oper tions, and this season is particularl attractive to a modern force equipp~ with the latest sophisticated vehicle and weapons of war, to include clos air support. The period of June through ffecem ber is not desirable for man or bes in support of military operations. h infantry force, however, ,which is ta lored to p~imitive reads and trails, th can depend readily on animal an porter logistics, that has few organ motor vehicIes, and that can rely pr marily on the tactics and polishe techniques of the foot soldier, \v have less difficulty negotiating th quagmire of ooze, flooded fords, an dense foliage than will the hordes o trucks, tanks, heavy artillery, and th administrative tail of the moder military machine. To be sure, a large part of the tec nological gains of the modern forc must be shed in this primitive aren during the southwest monsoon. A support will not be dependable. Th modern force, which depends on tr mendous firepower in lieu of indivi uals, must then be prepared to mat the potentia[ aggressor man for mm in a battleground which is most co ducive to the aggressors tactics.

34

Military Revi

THEHUKBAIAHAP INSURGENCY

Robert Ross Smith

HE military measures the United States and the Philip ~ines undertook toward the end of world War II and for the first five fears after the end of that war failed ;Ostem the tide of insurgency in the Philippine Islands. Beginning in K)50, Iowever, the Philippine armed forces Nwsued certain military activities and ]rocedures which led ultimately to Fietory.
Iune 1965

A principal reason for the initia] failure of counterinsurgency activities from the days when the Hukbalahap first began to make trouble was the fact that purely military operations were overemphasized. Moreoverr dur ing the first five years of anti-Com munist operations, the military tasks were given primarily to a constabu lary force that was ill-equipped, poorly trained, and badly organized for the 35

,
THE HUKllAIAHAP task at hand. It was not much better when the army took over the resposmi bility for stamping out the Hukbala hap. Area Sw6eps For tbe first five or six years of counterinsurgency operations, the armed forces depended largely upon broad, area sweeps in regions where the Hukbalahap were known to be strong. E$,en during the first months after Ramcus Magsaysay became Sec retary of National Defense, the army continued to employ such tactics. Indications are that Magsaysay ini tially intended to sweep the Huk re gional commands one by one, depend ing upon the improved morale and etK ciency of the armed forces to succeed where previous sweep operations had failed. (Such a program would have fitted in well with Magsaysafs al leged early intention of exterminat irtg every Communist and HukbaIa hap member in the Philippines. ) The sweep tactica did inflict con siderable damage upon the Huks when conducted efficiently and enthusiasti cally, but they were not the final an swer. Large-unit sweeps normally gave themselves away, permitting the

is Hukbalahap to avoid contact anl thereby minimize casualties. More 1 over, tbe sweeps did not imrnobiliu \ ~ the Huks or press them into confinedI 1 areas, nor did they provide the armd J ~ forces with the constant offensive ini. ~ [ tiative which successful antiguerrih, [ warfare demanded. Once the reins of the Department of National Defense were firmly in his hands, Magsaysay began to chaage the apprnach to military activity. lie foresaw the compelling need for uni. fying the armed forces under a single command, and he decided that his most important firet tasks were to revital. ize the armed forces, rey~ore the con. fidence of the people m the army, gain civilian support for army opera. tions, provide protection to the peas. antry, and make the armed forces the friends rather than the oppressors of the people. The importance of these goals can. not be underestimated. Without theil realization, no military campaigns ir the Philippines, no matter how etli ciently conducted from the purel~ military point of view, could havf achieved more than temporary success Small-Unit Tactics
Certain aspects of this progran
helped Magsaysay abandon the large unit, area sweep technique and tm toward small-unit tactics. He becam convinced that area sweeps seldor yielded rewards commensurate wit the effort required. In addition, hi initial decision to provide the pea: antry with protection against Hukba ahap depredations tied dmvn so man troops that, until the armys expar sion was cnmpleted, effective sweel had to be limited in number an scope. Yet just as the Huks believed th: they must constantly attack to wi
Military Revie

This digest is an excerpt from an unpublished manuscript at the Office of the Chief of Military History, The Hukbalahap Insur gency: Economic, Politwal, and Mditary Factors, completed in 1963. Mr. Smith is a histnvian with the United States Army in the Pacifir. Formerlg with the Ofice of the Chief of Military History, he is the author of two volumes in the UNITED STATES ARMY rN WORLD WAR II series, includizzg Triu?nph in the Philippirres, published in 1963.
36

THE HUKBALAHAP so Magsaysay was convinced that only continuous ~ffensives on the part of government forces could reduce the Hukbalahap military threat to man ageable proportions. Magsaysay was able to muster sufficient strength to conduct a few orthodox sweep opera tions when the situation seemed pro. pitious. For the restto continue to ers, indeed, it appeared that Magsay says basic military philosophy was, It takes a guerrilla to catch a guer rilla. Actually, this is overstating the case quite a bit. Magsaysay never had any intention of turning the Philippine Army into a guerrilla force capable of conducting oirly small-unit, guer-

DurinK his term count erinsurgemy

as Defense campaign.

Secretary, tbe late He is show n here,

President Magsaysay reoriented from left, talklng to a third

the

rebel

wbo surrendered his weapon. harass the Hu ks constantly through mt as wide an area as possiblehe de :ided to concentrate on small-unit op xations. Just how much Magsaysays own ?oerrilla experience contributed to his decision to devote considerable atten tion to small-unit operations is un known, but he enthusiastically urged the armed forces to adopt more or less unorthodox tactics. To many observ hne 1965 rills-type operations. It was not until well into 1951, some six months after Magsaysay took office as Secretary of National Defense, that the Philippine Army really began to emphasize smaH unit actions and to make much use of what has popularlyif not entirely accurately ~been termed guerrillatype tactics against the Hukbalahap. Magsaysay was instituting nothing really new in military operations 37

THE HUKBALAHAP against the Huks. Small-unit opera tions qnd unpr~hodox tactics had al ready been employed with some suc cess against the Hukbalahap-Mag saYsaY~ly went further than had any of IS predecessors. Furthermore, his emphasis on small-unit actions stemmed from both manpower short ages and the nature of the manpower at hand. Bsttalion Combat Teams The Philippine Armys organiza tion, when Magss.ysay took over as Secretary of National Defense, was already geared to relatively small-unit operations. The armys basic unit was a rather independent and often largely self-sufficient battalion combat team (BCT). Normally, BCTS contained three rifle companies (smaller than an American rifle company), a heavy weapons company, a light recorprais sance company, various service ele ments, and, when the situation .war ranted, a battery of 105-millimeter howitzers and sufficient attached transportation to motorize the whole battalion, Ostensibly. the BCTS were ideal units forthe rough terrain of much of the Philippines. Properly handled they could be effective against large con centrations of insurgents, and they could be brought together to form larger groups, such as regiments, when the terrain or the situation de manded. From the beginning, the training of the BCTS was based upon the tac tical doctrine of the US Army. No
drastic changes were needed in that
doctrine for BCTS to operate effec tively against the Hukbalahap. The
. thanges made wereprimarily those re quired to increase flexibility and mo bility in order to cope with Hukbala bap hit-and-run tactics. For the most
part, Philippine Army training csaw e no drastic changes except for in. d creased emphasis on scouting and pa- s trolling, night operations, and squad g and platoon actions. i Commando-Type Units Once the concept of small-unit operations became more widespread and more firmly established among the Philippine armed forces, they began to employ commando-type units of squad or platoon size extensively against the Hukbalahap. Such units conducted h]t-and-run raids simllarto those of the Huks, undertook longrange reconnaissance and intelligence patrols, seized individual lfuk leaders, and gene;ally kept up a program of harassment. , The size of the commando units varied according to a teams particu lar mission. Atypical one might con sist of from 15to 20 erdisted men and one officer. Normally, all teams had one thing in common,heavy fire-i power for the size of the unit. Thus, atypical 15-man team would be found with two Browrzi?cg automatic rifles and at least four submachineguns. The teams usually carried a radio to maintain contact with higher head quarters. A camera was also often an important item of equipment, for Magsaysay was inclined to demand proof of claims of Huks killed. At first, most of the commando teams and other ad hoc small units operated in uniform, but it was a short and easy step for the teams to start moving around in civilian clothes, infiltrating among the local people, and passing themselves off as Huks. Again, such tactics were not new with Magsaysay, but had been used to a limited extent and with Iimited success before he became Secre tary of National Defense. The differ , Military Review : : ; i j

( ;

THE HUKBALAHAP mce was in the number of such disguised operations during the Mag saysay regime and the way the dis guised army units treated the civil ians. Sometimee, emall groups from a commando team might stay in a Huk mfested area for days, successfully covering their real purpose by de voting only a part of their time to assigned army missions. More often, however, commando teams tried to iwep in touch with uniformed rein forcements by radio or courier. By the same token, disguised com mando teams and their elements sel dom operated in a completely isolated manner, hut followed schedulee that would periodically bring them into contact with other units. Meticulous planning and coordination preceded each team operation to prevent one team from ehooting up another, and to keep uniformed units from annihi lating a team thinking it was a Huk
outfit.

Whatever the dangers and difficul ties, the guerrilla tactics began to pay dividende. For example, during the first few months that both uniformed and disguieed commando teams began to operate extensively, Philippine Army sourcee reported that Hukbala hap casualties rose 12 percent while army casualties fell off 25 percent. Too much should not be made of these statistics, however. By the time the employment of the disguised com mando teams became widespread, more orthodox tactice on the part of the revitalized army, coupled with the marked effect of Magsayeays civic ac tion programs, had also begun to make suhstantiaI inroads into Hukbalahap strength. Huke were getting harder to find and, beginning to Iose come confidence in their own military prow ess, sought to avoid combat. Unorthodox Tactics On the other hand, one aspect of the guerrilla-like tactics the army em ployed cannot be ignoredthe impres sion the unorthodox operations made upon Huk sympathizers or thoee in timidated by the Hukbalahap. When the peasantry discovered that the army was meeting and often beating the Hukbalahap with the Huks own tactics, respect for the army grew, fear of the Huks lessened, and reepect for the Hukbalahap dropped off. To many Filipinos, most of whom have an excellent eense of humor, the thought that the army was beating the Huks at their own game was so incongruous as to he amueing. This reaction exposed ihe hollowness of Hukbslahap boasts of military ability and laid the Huks open to ridicule. One way or another, the armys suc cess with guerrilla tactics so im pressed those who had adhered to the Hukbalahap cause that in many areae 39

Dangers and Difficulties The commando-type, dieguised op erations were always dangerousfor those teams unlucky enough to be dis covered and captured by the Huks, death was usually immediate and pain ful. On the other hand, in this type of clandestine, counterinsurgency war fare, the Philippine Army had advan tages no foreign troops could ever at tain. The army could always man its teams with natives of the region in which the teams were to operate, and, since eo many enlisted men came from the came general background as did the Huks, it was eaey to find men who could pass as peaeants. Indeed, the main problem wae often to make a well-trained soldier forget his military training and military habite so as to act like a Huk guerrilla in the field. km 1965

The successful use of merrilla tactics bv the Phiiimine Armv the nom. . . imnressed . . . Iace whichbegan furnishing- more information on the Huks National Defense was the intelligence system. The capture of the Commu nist Politburo in October 1950 was, of course, a real coup, but thereafter outstanding intelligence successes be came less fzequent. A coordinated pro gram for the interrogation of cap tured Huks did not exist, and inter rogation methods were generally crude and unsophisticated, to say the least. As often as not prisoners were simply held incommunicado in prison, interro gations seldom went beyond eliciting purely local military intelligence, beat ings were normal procedure for ex40

rehabilitation program, that prison. ers be treated kindly whenever possi. ble, and began taking disciplinary ac tion against armed forces units that unnecessarily knocked prisoners about. At the same time, there was consider. able improvement in the dissemina. tion of military intelligence gleaned from prisoners, and the civil affairs officers attached to army units stepped into the interrogation process to get information useful for the armed forces psychological warfare program against the Hukbalahap. The improvement in the treatment Military Review

THE HUKBAI.AHAP .. of prisoners had, in itself, a definite Psychological effect. As word spread thattOrttIre, starvation, and general abusewere no longer condoned, sur renders increased, especially among peasants who were lukewarm to the Hukcause, had been impressed into Hokbalahap ranks, or were simply tiredof the whole business. and Treachery A final, somewhat unorthodox mo dus opermfi Magsaysay employed with some success was to enlist cap tured Huks in his cause. Perhaps the mostoutstanding example of this P1OY concerned Panay Island, second only to central Luzon as a stronghold of I Hukinfluence. Magsaysay sent a Huk leader, who badsurrendered, back to Panay with aforce of some 20 other ex-Huks and threeenlisted men from army intelli gence. For three months the clandes tine force operated in a manner that elieited the respect and confidence of thereal Hukbalahap leaders ou Panay, md culminated its activities with a by invitation only barbecue during ~which many of the most important members of the Huk high command m Panay were killed or captured. It !!as a b]Ow from which the Hukbala bap organization on Panay never re covered. Deceit and treacheryfavorite u,eapons of the Hukbalahapwere thus the tactics that Magsaysay em ployed when he deemed the situation \~arranted it. Such methods were in ~linewith other unorthodox tactics the , Philippine armed forces used from [ timeto time. But in the end, the Huk balahap military forces were beaten to the groundleaving aside the ef , feet of the civic action programs I?rge]Y by more orthodox means.
Deceit

mal warfare was the emphasis on the use of squad and platoon.size units. ln this small-unit warfare, the Philip. pine armed forces generally found that the most remunerative tactics were: constant offensive pressure, relentless pursuit, surprise, high mobility, and careful attention to security. Logis tically, the most remunerative tactics the army could employ were to force Huk military units into mountainous areas in order to cut them off from their food and other supplies. Cumulative Effects The effect of the revitalized mili tary operations, coupled with the civic action programs, was cumulative. 13e tween April 1950 and the end of 1951 Philippine armed forces acquired, by either capture or surrender, only about 4,500 Hukbalahap arme of all types, while in the period JanuaryMarch 1952 over 4,000 Huk weapons were either captured or turned in. By that time, the Huks had lost about half of tbe armament they possessed two years earlier. Casualties intlicted upon the Huk balahap also had a cumulative effect.
Thirty-five to 40 percent of the armed
Huks who had been in the field in 1950 had either been killed, captured, or had surrendered by April 1952. This meant that the Hukbalahap felt more keenly each succeeding casualty. Although the Hukbalahap menace was not yet finished by the spring of 1952, the combined military and civic action programs under Magsaysay rendered the tack ahead much easier. The accomplishments to that date, combined with Magsaysays growing popularity and political strength, en abled the armed forces to start rede ploying its units purely upon the basis of tactical needs rather than having so much strength immobilized in de 41

The only major difference from nor

hoe1965

TIIEIIUKBALAIIAP ,, fensive garrisons as the result of po liticaf praasures or the demands of peasant protection. The new freedom of deployment likewi~e permitted the armed forcee to return, when it eeemed profitable, to the employment of larger units in area sweeps. The pace of offensive op. eratione increased, and the availabil ity of additional force~ ( botb as the result of army expansion and the free ing of unite from static defensive roles) permitted constant surveillance of large areas. One result of the stepped-up pace of operations in 1952 was that, b~ the end of the year, there was a marked decrease in the number of army units that could be profitably employed in anti-Hukbalahap mifitary activity. This circumstance had, in turn, an advantageous effect upon other aspects of tbe counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippinesmore troops were available to participate in civic action programs. By mid-1953 operations were some times taking i+ ludicrous turnan en tire BCT trying to capture or kill a small party of six or seven Huks dodg ing around tbe swamps near Mount Arayat. By the time Luis Taruc surrendered in May 1954, the military arm of the Communiststhe Hukbalabap-bad been reducad to little more than a nuisance. The 2,000 armed men tbe Huke could muster by the time of tbe e[ections, in the falI of 1955 could no longer be considered a military force or even bonafide guerrillas. For the most part, the remnant bands were acting like bandits, seeking only to sustain themselves. Police, action, not military cam paigns, sufficed to bold tbe Huk -bands in check, although army units con tinued patrolling and concentrated for 42 operations against Huk groups of sig, ~ nificant size. They also kept garrism! throughout the countryside to ensuo that no revival of Hukbalahap mili. tary activity could take place. The Magsaysay program succeeded in the Philippines because Magsayw,r judiciously combined military SUi civic action. The salient features of the Magsaysay program were: Dynamic, aggressive, and dedi. cated leadership motivated by a deeply ingrained belief in democracy and t conviction that succees was .possibb against the Hukbalahap threat. Thi leadership Magsaysay himself pro. vialed, and to this extent tbe succw againet -Communist insurgency in thf Philippines during tbe period 1950.54 can be termed a one-man chow. The realization that military M tion. alone, mo matter how etficientlj conducted, could never provide a per manent solution to tbe basic causes 01 dissident movements in tbe Pbifip pines. A civic action program, con ducted almost entirely in the begin ning by the armed forces, dedicate( to tbe goals of restoring the people: confidence in their government and i] the armed forces. 8 A realistic, honest, and etlicientl: run settlement program that not onl; attacked land tenure problems in sue] areas as the central plains of Luzorn but also provided a program for tb rehabilitation of actual or potentit dissidents. The revitalization of the demol alized armed forces into an effecth fighting machine that, through a jt dicious combination of orthodox an unorthodox tactics, and with empbed on small-unit operations, could destm the Communist military threat am when necessary, beat the Hukbalaha zt tbe game of guerrilla warfare.

Military neie

Lieutenant

Colonel

Emmett l?. Arnold United Staten Armp

ATO

Infrastructure

Success Story

NATO Photo
1965

NORTH Atlantic Treaty Or ganization military staff officer may pick up his telephone, dial an operator, and ask for Oslo, Naples, Bonn, London, or any one of hundreds of distant places. Instantly he is con nected to his desired party. At the same time, modern jet aircraft land or take off from one or several NATO airfields somewhere in Allied Com mand Europe. How is this possible? By NATO infrastructure. The word infrastructure itself has been borrowed from the French, who first used it in connection with their railway system to denote such basic works as roadbeds, embankments, bridges, and tunnels. NATO adopted the term to include all those fixed in stallations which are necessary for the deployment and operation of the armed forcesinstallations like air fields, war headquarters, pipelines, naval bases, and ground environment systems. The term common infrastructure is used to differentiate between those installations funded in common by all NATO nations for peacetime training or wartime use and those installations solely for use of national forces and

iNFRASTRUCTURE thus paid for out of national budgets (Figdre 1). NATO infrastructure is important to the United States. It helps provide for otfr Nations defenses on both sides of the Atlantic, since US forces use facilities which are funded in common by all NATO nations, and it represents a sizable monetary investPRINCIPAL COMMlllEE$ tiom who were determined to combb their capabilities for defense again the aggressive threat of the Sovi{ bloc. These nations proved that ew highly technical arrd complex systen and facilities can be worked out i common when motivation is provid( by a common danger. Each nation does provide and !

L 11

11 I n

OFTHE NATO COUNCIL

I 1 I ARMNKHIs COMMIIIU

I
I I

NORTH &TUNT!C COWL

1 I I 1( ~,p[,,fl~ Scmct lmj;m):::nL NATO e COMMlllU COMMill[t + !Niwsmcluni PAYMENTS NRWCE m Pnosms COORDINATION cowmu Jo;l;yyk

la ;;:s INS Y

avwM4 B8D6K1 COMMITTEE

MIUlfiRV 8uD6F1 COMMITK1

. c1

sE8!OB CM EMU6ENCY PLANNIH6 COMMI1lU

Figure 1.

The United States has shared expenditure of more than 3.4 dollars in the over-all effort. monetary investment alone is sufficient to cause many political and economic problems, but iNATO infra structure is truly one of the success stories contributing to the very free dom the West enjoys today. It was undertaken by the North Atlantic na

ment. in the billion The

nance its own tactical formations accordance with agreed force goal This includes headquarters below t] arm y group or equivalent level. To infrastructure generally concerns t] fixed, wartime requirementswi sbme exceptionswhereas the day-t d~y operating expenses are cared f by the military budget. How, then, does the system worl Initially, the several nations agr upon a cost-sharing period ad a co: sharing formula, with each nati{ contributing in accordance with i ability to do so based on its gross n tional product and other special co siderations, Rather than negotiati] on the formula each year, a cost-sha

Lieut enunt Colonel Emmett R. A rmold, a student at the United States ArntU War College, received a B.S. de gree from the Unitwr-sit~ of Maryland, and hokfs a Master of Business Ad ministration degree from George , Washington University. He was pre viously assigned as In frastructctr.e Of ,ficer (Telecommunications) at Su prwwze Headquarters, A,flied Powers, Europe.
44

: Win. COmmatId, r P. G M. R](l.d,ik$, ,,lf .trefu.e The [{wkb,,r,e <,f NATO,,, MAtarY 1 I!,,,,. Mxy 1903, DII 57.60.

Military

Revie

INFRASTRUCTURE
jng periodgenerally four or five yearsis agreed to. The contributive capacity of the var ious nations varies from less than one percent to over 30 percent. The United States and West Germany to gether contribute more than half; these two nations are similarly two big users Of common infrastructure, andtheir use approximates their con tributions (Figure 2). Each yearly program is known as a slice. Slice 1, for example, was the for the year 1950. As the na program tions agree on a specific cost-sharing period, they also tentatively agree on

The NATO Infrastructure Commit tee, along with its subcommitteethe Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee-assures technical and fi nancial supervision wf the inf restruc ture program. The committee chair man is a member of the Secretary GeneraIs staff. Membership on the. committee includes a national repre- sentative from each NATO country; a representative of the Standing Group; and a representative of the Supreme Allied Commander (Europe or Atlantic) for projects or subjects of the latters concern. Generally, meetings are held each Tuesday morn-

NATO

Photo

.4 NATO airfield in western France which was constructed nnder the NATO infra structure program hy common funds and is used hy member nations of tbe alliance a budgetary limit. This amount is arbitrary, but it is based on experience and estimates of requirements by the military commanders. The amount can be exceeded only with the specific approval of all the members. lime1965 ing, but additional sessions are sched uled as required. For infrastructure projects, justiti cation is usually the task of the host nation acting in concert with the na tion that is to use the facility. The 45

INFRASTRUCTURE representative of the Supreme Allied Commander must justify the project from the military viewpoint, while a technical representative from the In tetmational Staff of the Secretary General must justify it from that standpoint. There is little dissent for a majority of thg projects; unanimous approvals are required. Projects which cannck he resolved readily are entered on a subsequent agenda agreement unti) can be ing submitted to the NATO Ctwnci Each program passes through se, era] sereeninge and is approved by t} Council; nations then submit reques! for the necessary funds to comple{ the projects. The Infrastructure Pa: ments and Progress Committee lu been established to serve this purpos After preparing a cost estimate f{ a particular project, the host natic submits that estimate simultaneous to the regional command and the S1

Ii

n 1

11 M x

R(

INFRASTRUCTURE COST-SHARING FORMULA (PERCENT) Slice I Slic$s 11to VI Slices VII to XI Slices XII to XV (Current Year (Current Years (Cnrrent Years (Current Years 1961to 1964) 1956 to 1960) 1951to 1955) 1950) 13.18

Country Belgium Canada Denmark France West Germany Greece Iceland Italy Luxembourg. Netherlands Norway Portugal Turkey United Kingdom United States

..
45.26

5.462 6.021 2.767 15.041 :;5

..
-.15 13.64

2+27

.155 3.889 2.28 .146 1.371 12.75S 43.679 Fignre 2.

4.39 6.15 .2.63 11.87 13.72 .87 -. 5.61 .17 3.51 2.19 .28 1.75 9.88 36.9S

4.24 5.15 2.S7 12. 20. .67 ;97 .17 3.83 2.37 .284 1.1 10.5 30.85

reached. Frequently, a delegate comes instructed from bis government and must await word before consent can be given. In these instances, the delegate usually places a confirmation on the projectmeaning that as soon as his authorities confirm support, he will let tbe committee know. If his government disagrees altogether, he places a reservation on the project. With rare exceptions, reservations are resolved prior to tbe program be46

and preme Allied Commaader the Secretary Generals Internatior Staff. If the estimate is approw fnnds are released to the host nati which then proceeds with interr tional competitive bidding and co tractual and construction arraru ments.
All Pro,ects . . which NATO Day. more tl 60 Derce.t .?. wbject t. i.tern.ticmal mmp tive biddtns. thus %,.,. x .[1 NATO n.tions m rmt.n, ty to get the cmtmct. ExceDtims m.st mive unanimous approval of the P@mmms

Prom,,. Cmm,tk+.

Military

REV

iNFRASTRUCTURE Each change to the approved orig [al pro.iect must be coordinated with Id approved by the Paymente and regress Committee. When tbe pro.iect has been comIeted to the satisfaction of the host nd user nations, a joint final accept nce inspection is conducted by repre mtatives of the Secretary General, le Supreme Allied Commander ( Eu )pe or Atlantic), and host and user atinns. After acceptance, tbe facil ,y becomes NATO property under the dministration of the host nation With financed through maintenance being he NATO military budget or by tbe ost or user nation according to the ategnry and rules agreed upon. The infrastructure programs have rovided NATO military commanders /ith some 200 airfieIds capabIe of ac epting the most mndern aircraft. hese fields are complete with neces ry suppnrt facilities such as fuel torage and electronic devices to per !it day and night operation in all ~eather. In addition, the programs have also Irnvided: A fuel pipeline eystem which supports the concept of forward strategyforward defense of NATO land and sea areae.
Naval bases and ammunition storage to support fleets in all regions. communications net s Modern works stretching from the northern part of Norway to the eastern fron tiers of Turkey. These include war headquarter facilities; additions and improvements to communications fa cilities in every country; and systems capable of operating with seaborne nuclear weapona forces, Pokzms sub marines, or even a multilateral force. Training areas and facilities land, sea, and air operations.

for

Hundreds of missile sites, stor age facilities, navigational aids, air defense installations, and radar early warning sites.

NATO common infrastructure has helped weld together a deterrent which bae stopped Communist aggres sion in tbe Atlantic area and has served ae a vehicle to prove to the skeptics what 15 nations can do when they work together in harmony with a common purpose.

lnne1965

41

PROBLEMS ALONG

Eug?.ne Hinterho@

HE two flanks. of the E Atlantic Treaty Organim similar in many ways, abound multitude of military and pol problems. Since the end of World WaI Western military and political alysts have .gener@&a a~r.eed Soviet aggre~sio~~mi~~ aonsi9 either localized aW&&eek]ng lin objectives and presenting the dej era with ~:~ait
accompli, or a n ~ ot%msive ,F~~ would emplo XIoutde, . P@@s manenver dir(

NATOSFLANKS ,e light of this spirit of interde ndenee, without which the most hborate military plans remain aca imic abstractions, the problems of th NATO flanks are not insuperable. lrthern Flank The northern part of the NATO lfense system, designated AF ORTH (Allied Forces, Northern urope), extends from the northern p of Norway to the southern bor. a of Schleswig-HoIstein on the Jut nd Peninsula, with the frontline tout 1,900 kilometers long. Its de notation is already a matter of ,ntroversy. The Ieadlng British mil ary writer, Captain B. H. LiddeIl art, warned in 1960 that the .esent boundary between Northern urope and Central Europe is bad ctically and strategically. He feels would have made more sense to tend the boundary southward to e line of Bremen and the Aller iver. Liddell Hart also suggests that the !fense of the land approaches to the 3altic gateway should be entrusted the British Army of the Rhine 3AOR), which ought to he moved mthward from its preeent sector so that its left flank rests on the Baltic coast, covering the approaches through Schleswig-Holstein to the Jutland Pe ninsula. A similar suggestion was pnt forward by British Field Marehal Sir Claude Auchinleck. These suggestions met with strong opposition in BAOR circles- for logistical reasons. Although we cannot know for cer tain, it seems logical that the Soviets will try to move their Baltic Fleet into the North Sea, and then move both their Arctic and Baltic Fleets into the Atlantic. This task coutd be accom plished by uncorking the Danish Straits and by establishing submarine bases in the Narvik-Troms6 region along the western coast of Norway, some 1,300 kilometers west of the Soviet main base at Murmansk. North Brigade At present, the 300-kilometer-long northernmost NATO frontier is guarded near Kirkenea by two rein forced companies from the North brigade which is deployed several kilo meters to the rear in the area of Bar dufoss, not far from Narvik. Behind them lies the vast, empty, undefend ed province of Finnmark. In case of a Soviet push, the North brigade would have more urgent tasksa than coming to the assistance of its out lying companies; it would have to pre vent Soviet attempts to land in any one of many fiords. Under the circumstances, a Soviet drive toward the Narvik-Troms6 fiords, combined with amphibious op erations, would be a textbook ma neuver crowned with easy success. Furthermore, quick reinforcement in this area would be difficult since there is only one small airfield in Bar dufoss, and this could easily be ren dered useless by a few Soviet bombs or seized by Soviet ,paratroopers. 49

This article was digested from the original which appeared in ORBIS, No. s Fall 1964, pub lished by the Foreign Policy Re sea~ch Institute of the Univer sity of Penns@ar2ia. Copy righted Q 1964 by the Trustees of the University of Pennsyl Hinterhoff is the Founder and Secretary of the Militar~ Commen tutors Circle in London and is the author of The Warsaw Part wlt ich appeared in the June 1962 issue of the ilIILITARY ~E
VIEW.
vania. Mr.

Ie 1965

NATOS FLANKS This points up the difficulties of defense on tbc northern flank. The obyious solution would be to station more troops in that forward area. NorwW has one active brigade sit uated in northern Norway and units of less than brigade strength in soutberm Norway. In case of rnobiIization she can raise 10 more bri gades and a local militia. Under present circumstances, however, there appears to be no chance for any in. creaee in the armed forces or the military budget, especially in view of the much-heralded East-West tervention would take the form of ~ ! landing by marines, perhaps under / the nmbrella of the Supreme Allied ~ Commander, Atlantics strike fleet, consisting of five or six carriers, each carrying some 100 aircraft. The naval s Swordthruet and Teamw exercises, ork, held off the shores of northern Norway in September 1960 and Oc tober 1964, dealt with such tactio~] ~ . situations.
Msin Thrust ..

d&Yente.
Amphibious Force As a token of NATO solidarity, a NATO brigade with adequate trans portation might be stationed in Nor way, of course, but it is unlikely that Norway would ever permit the stationing of foreign troops or bases on Norwegian soil in peacetime. The same situation governs NATOs de fense of Denmark. In view of these obstacles, a suggestion made hy Liddell Hart in his book, Deterrent or Defense, deserves close scrutiny: . . . the bsst anewer to the danger of a surprise attack would be a ffoat

ing fire brigade-n amphibious force, based upon harbours in No.th ern Germany or those in the North British islarufe, which could throw strong and well coordinated reinforce ments of marines ashore at short
notice. Taken alone, Norways position in the face of overwhelming Soviet power is hopeless. Yet nothing could be more dangerous to the cohesion of NATO indeed, to its whole raison d4tre than to permit the Soviets to encroach upon northernmost Norway without drawing a deliberate and selective response. The most likely NATO in 50

From the Soviet point of view, op. erations in northern Norway would be of an auxiiiary or diversionary na. ture. No doubt the main thrust would be directed against the Danish Straits and their land approaches. Should the Soviets succeed in breaking through the Straits, some 70 of their subma. rines could penetrate into the AtIan. tic, and if these were joined by 140 submarines belonging to the Soviet Arctic Fleet30 of which are nuclear the effect upon the battle of the Atlantic would be significant. The large strength of the Baltic Fleet con. firms that it has been designed more for offensive operations than for pro. tecting the long Baltic coastline. Whether such an ambitious Soviet plan could ever succeed is another question; it has been a problem of in. tense studies and war games on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The flatlands of Schleswig-Holstein have been viewed as the Achilles heel of NATOs northern front. The sokr tion might be to build a deep zone fortified with minefield and saturated with modern antitank weapons to pr~ vent a Soviet armored blitzkrieg. The Germans have been hostile to this idea of a deep, fortified zone. Ap parently to the German public, the building of fortifications, even of a fi&ld type, would amount to recogni

: ~ < -: : ; : 2

NATOS FLANKS

Iune 1965

51

NATOS

FLANKS

tion of the division of Germany as permanent and, ipso facto, to renun citition of the fundamental goal of German national policy: reunification. West Germany has, for the same rea son, objected to any plan for regional disarmamentin particular, disen gagementbecause it would imply of ficial recognition of tbq present fron tiers. Although not a member of NATO, Sweden, by reason of geography, is an important factor in the defense of Western Europe-and, by reason of her neutrality, a major problem. The Swedish Government realizes, how- ever, that an attack on Sweden can only come from the East. Since the end of World War II the government has been preparing for such a con tingency to avoid having to improvise defenses as it was forced to do. in the two World Wars. Southern Flank The southern NATO flank, called A FSOUTH ( AIIied Forces, Southern comprises Italy, Greece, Europe), Turkey, and the Mediterranean, with a frontline of some 2,700 kilometers. Along this highly sensitive flank, NATO likewise faces many military and political problems. The Middle East has been the target of successful Soviet Penetration efforts. This leap. frogging over the Western defense system is attributable, in large part, to the chronic Arab-Israeli conflict. Should this explosive situation erupt into a shooting war, the Soviets would have a new opportunity for active in terference in the area. Furthermore, the solidarity of NATO has been se verely tested and found wanting in the seeond Cyprus crisis. According to tbe report pre<ented to the General Assembly of the West ern European Union on 29 April 1961, 52

by the Rapporteur of its Committee, Mr. Goedhardt,

Defense Pre of tii ~

Netherlands: The main objectives of Soviet strut. An egg ia the Mediterranean would h he the elimination of allied nuclear de. ~ livery capabilities, the securing of the ~~ Turkish Straits and the occupation of ~n the South European countries. An d. to tempt >;, the Soviet Union to achiew fnet these objettiues would mean the be. pas ?Sr ginning of World War III. . . . The main thrust . . . would cow ;; through Bulgaria to Greece aied Tur. key to try to control the Straits. . . . y In any kind of sea war, the real threat n comes frpm submarines.h
t Submarines Yet the Soviet Black Sea Fleet , should it succeed in breaking through p the Straits, would find itself in a posi 1; tion similar to that of the Baltic Flee tt facing the deployed allied nava l.~ task forces waiting for it. Submarines f must be reckoned with more seriousl Y! here than in the north, because man y~ of them could slip through either the ], [ Gibraltar Straits or the Suez Cans the Iatter under the benevolent eye s of President Nasser of the United Arab Republic. Fortunately for the West, as a re- ~ suit of tiny Albanias quarrel with the USSR, the former Soviet subm8. rine base on Saseno Island, opposite Vlone, has been disbanded. On the other hand, because of Soviet politlcd penetration into many countries of the Middle East and North Afri ca, Soviet submarines may have at theu rts disposal facilities in several PO along Africas Mediterranean coaSt. Soviet strategy would undoubte lily aim at seizing the nutlets to give its Black Sea Fleet access to the Medi. terraneaa. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, SU Military fieri~w

NATOSFLANKS ~?eme Allied Commander, Europe, speakingat the 9th General Assembly of the Atl&ntic Treaty Association in Ankaraon 19 September 1963, viewed , thesituation more optimistically: Southern Europe eorwtitutes ,,. slavia, thus hoping to make her armed forces dependent on Western supplies. The Soviete likewise have not been idle. Foreign Minister Andrei Gro mykos May 1962 visit to Belgrade was followed by Soviet orders placed with Yugoslav shipyards for some 25 tankers; a subsequent exchange of vieits b~ President Tito and Premier Khrushchev took place against a back ground of improving trade and cul tural relationa. Speculation about Yugoslavias likely course of action in the event of war in Europe continues to be one of the prime concerns of military ana lysts on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The fact that each year students of the British Imperial Defense College visit Yugoslavia on a conducted tour is an indication of the importance attached to this nation by Western govern ments. As long as Yugoslavia eerves as a strong buffer on the north, Italy, for all practical purposes, faces no seri ous strategic problems. Her army, equipped with US materiel and with tactical nuclear support, is a modern and mobile fighting force.
~yprus

! NATOSright flank. NATOs strength , in this key area is a major obstacle to w attempt at strategic envelop ? srertt of NATO on the south. . . . our . position here would render any Com wmist offensive against Central Eu , ropeseriously vulnerable to a counter : Moleon its left flank. Similarly, a Communist offensive into the Middle ; East would leave itself exposed on its right.
Complicating Fatter Southern Europe thus constitutes a , potential threat to a Soviet offensive as well as against m centraI Europe, ~ the USSRs soft underbelly. Yet , Yugoslavia remains a complicating j factor along NATOs southern flank. , Today, neutral Yugoslavia, with 30 , divisions and hundreds of thousands of veterans and reservists ready to defend her territorial integrity, plays ; the role of an armed buffer between , , theWarsaw Pact countries and Italy. A Soviet thrust through Yugoslavia .: m the direction of Italy would pin ~ ifownmany Soviet Army divisions in a difficult guerrilla-type campaign , against the Yugoslavs. On the other hand, should Yugosla i via move toward closer cooperation f uiththe Soviet Union and participate .wtively in a future war on the side ; of the Warsaw Pact, this development ; \voulddramatically reverse the whole strategic situation on NATOs south ; em flank. The United States has sought since 3 1950to forestall a return to the Com munist bloc by Belgrade by pouring economic and military aid into Yugo

The most urgent and complex prob lems are those faced by Greece and Turkey: the growing contlict in Cy prus could push both countries, against war. their will, into a shooting Greeces most vulnerable frontier, in Thrace, prevents her northern Com munist neighbor, Bulgaria, from gain ing access to the Aegean Sea, only some 30 kilometers to the south. This is the most likely direction of an en emy thrust, and the Soviet Unions success in this sector would also effect a physical breach between the Greek and Turkish forces deployed in the area. 53

June 1965

NATOSFLANKS Another ~nemy offensive might he directed at Turkish Thrace, with the Dardanelles as the prize. This area, unlike Schleswig-Holstein, is heavily fortified and defended by the elite 1st Turkfsh Army. The remainder of this sector is the very long Black Sea coast line, open to an amphibious operation, and eastern Turkey, where the fron tier runs over difficult and well-forti. fied mountain ranges. The armed forces of AFSOUTH comprise 24 divisions in peacetime, with some 15 more available after mo bilization. Apart from the nuclear support of the US Southern European Task Force brigade in Italy, they can also rely on the powerful support of ~200 aircraft with nuclear capabilities, flying from the carriers of the US 6th Fleet. These planes can reach the southern regions of the USSR and her satellites. The presence of the 6th Fleet on NATOs southern flank rep resents one of the most important dif ferences between this and the north ern flank. Surface Fleet The main task of the 6th Fleet would he to execute a nuclear strike in coordination with NATO plans; its nuclear capability has been enhanced by the assignment to NATO of three US Polar% submarines, each with 16 missiles. However, in case of a gen eral nuclear war fought with inter continental missiles, the situation of tbe fleet could become precarious since vessels could be located within a matter of hours by hostile recon naissance means. If the Mediterra nean then becomes unsafe for surface vessels, as some believe may be the case, the only warships capable of re maining and operating in this area would be Polaris submarines. This emphasizes the importance of Spain 54 in

MediterranenS defem Th the Although not a NATO memb.u,elk Spain, nevertheless, has been ini ~gr rectly linked with NATO as a rest ~~ of a bilateral military treaty with t~ ~Cb United States. In spite of her ambig th uous relationship to NATO, Spain at avo her Canary Islands are woven itl f d NATOs defense system. The com iet bined naval exercise, Riptide 111,Dm I , ticipated in by British, United St% and French Fleets, was held off th~ shores of Spain in 1962, and th! United States-Spanish amphibious ex. ercise, .Steel Pike, was held off Huelw in October 1964. The bilateral treaty has allowed tit United .States to estab}ish on Spanish soil three major airbases; a large na. val base in Rota, near CAdiz; and various ancillary installations. Thes e bases in Spain have assumed eve n more significance since the abandon . ment of US bases in Morocco in 1968. Another US back, in Dhabran, Ssudi Arabia, has also been given UP, and the fate of Wheelus Air Base in Libya hangs in the balance. East Tensions Peace and stability in the southern NATO Command area are dependent upon developments in the Middle Eaet, where a strong tendency to settle dif. ferences by resorting to war still ex. ists. The forces deployed on botb sides of the Arab-Israeli borders are mud larger than they were during the Bat tle of El Alamein. Even more impm tant is the aggressive mood instilled into the Arab masses by Nassers pol icies and statements. If EgyptiaI troops are disengaged from Yeme] following a ditente in that part of th( world, it will increase the pressure al Israel, as well as on the Arab sheik doms in the Persian Gulf which enjo! ~ritains protection.
Middle

Military Redo

NA1OS FLANKS Phenorthern NATO flank appears

akerand mOre vulnerable to Soviet
;ression jhan tbe southern one. In
! south there are more natural ob cles, such as the mountain ranges
the Caucaeus and in Thrace which
torthe defenders, whereas the areas
direct confrontation with the SO.
t Army in the north are predomi ]tly flat, suitable for lightning ar red thrusts.
[t would seem at firet glance, then,
Itthe southern flank is better suited
a sustained defense, due partly the terrain but even more to tbe nter effort made by the NATO al ; in tbe area-especially by Tur /, the hinge between the NATO and mtralTreaty Organization alliancee. rthermore, the defenses of the Med tranean have been enhanced by the xence of foreign troops and bases i the powerful US 6th Fleet. Yet there is an atmosphere of nearserenity prevailing in the capitals of Scandinavia, baaed on good neigh bor relations with the Soviet Union. By contrast, there is, in the south, a feeling of anxiety resulting from the Cyprus crisis, a situation which could have serious ramifications for West ern defeimes in tbe Mediterranean. Both NATO flanks are unstable and vulnerable to direct and indirect So viet aggression. Yet their defenses must be considered interdependent and not ae isolated problems. There is no doubt that the countries on NA TOS flanks retain an unqualified faith in tbe NATO alliance and in the US determination to stand by her com mitments to her allies, So long as this faith is sustained by US policies and military capabilities, there are grounds for confidence.

Sendinyour CHANGEOF ADDRESS

To assure uninterrupted delivery of your Military Review, be sure to submit prompt] y both your old and new address-four weeks in advance, if possible. Address to Military Review Subscription Service, Book Depart ment, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, ,! Kansas 66027.

55

. .

THEANGUISH OFNORMANDY
Mineman Second Class David H. HoIt,

UmtedStates Navg The views expressed in this arti cle are the authors and are not nec essarily those of the Department of the Army, Department 0$ the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.Editor.

-N
56

ORMANDY is no longdr only a pleasant sector of France. It has become a historic reflection of

World War II in Europe, a sytr of the drive and determination of Allies in their fight for freedom, ; to many, the proof of the reality general war. For those who were p ent in 1944, Normandy is a pierc memory of death, destruction, suf ingand, perhaps, gratification the success of such extreme effort Offshore, Allied navies faced cm

Military Re

NORMANDY their severest teats of the war. Under water mine warfare and the ingenuity of German ordnaneemen turned the surrounding waters of Normandy into .arr area of anguishand near tragedy for the Allied invasion forces. The invasion of Normandy actually began on 5 June 1944, as over 4,OOO British, Canadian, and United States shipsmassed on the coast of England, amultitude of men and shipe compris ing the largest invasion force ever gsthered in the history of man. A1 Iied intelligence had estimated that thousands of underwater mines pro tected the shorelines of the enemy, . and that in the preceding months the Germans had placed hundreds more in the Bay of the Seine and the Eng lish Channel. Psychological Effect The psychological effect of these \\,eapons lying in the path of the in vasion force had resulted in the build up of a fleet of minesweepers and other antimining ships. It was their task to clear (to sweep) the way and destroy enemy mines so that the Al lied Fleet could invade with minimum ; nsk and maximum success. Otherwise, : the minefield could easily stop the ~ invasion fleet hefore a single shot crossed the enemys stand. On,5 June 1944 at 0555, a US mine ~ w~eePinrx swadron of 11 ships sortied , from Torbay, England. They rendez voused with the main Allied sweep ~] force of 385 British, Canadian, and ,e other United States ships on tbe way d, tn Normandy. The force of little ships ,f broke into open water, battled their s-[ =avid way into the stormy seae, and faced the fact that no open waters were safe, that they were now obligated to the situation. There was one consolationBritish Sweep Unit 14 had made a sweep of the Channel the day hefore, clearing a great number of mines from the vicinity of Englands assembly ports. The task remained of clearing 10 ap proach channels, each 73o meters wide, from the shores of England to assembly points off Normandy. Off Course Commander Henry Plander, US Navy, took Sweep Squadron 3 to the front and, ahoard the USS Stafl, led the crossing. Following in her wake or at flank]ng positions were 10 other fleet minesweepers. Every ship had its position to hold in the formation. A disciplined course was not expected in such miserable weather, however, and a conflicting current of six knots or more put such a stress on naviga tion that at times some ships were off course as much as 40 degrees. Lieutenant Commander Heyward, aboard the USS Tide, estimated hls course tolerance and concluded that if he was off course very far, then the British sweep flotilla that bad cleared the area the day before would surely have been just as far astray. Possibly, then, the area was not as safe from mines as could be expected. He probably was not the only man in the fleet that realized this, but the fact was not commonly known among the crews. The crossing went slowly and the day was uneventful. Then, at 1610, a French gunboat patrolling the south Channel boundaries warned the out ward column, YOU are heading out of channel. The unit acknowledged the call and fought hard to maintain 57

H. Holf, a m<neman second g! clas,$,ha$ $er-~ed on a~ti~e d@ ~,ith the US Navy for five years. He & as signed to the Weapoks Department, US Naval Air Station, North Island, sun Diego, California.

4he

19S5

NORMANDY its proper cwrse. A failure to adhere to the schedule would cause incalcula. ble delay and confusion that possibly would have the various following force% at a mid-Channel standstill. In the dreariness of the late after noon, evening meals were served aboard the, ships. The VSS OspreV flanked her sister ships in the outer most column, and Lieutenant Swimm, commanding her, had the meal piped down at 1700 while he and his navi gator kept a carefully plotted course on the bridge. It was beginning to get dark now, seas spilled over her bow, and it was a problem for anyone, to spot much in the water, let alone a mine just beneath the surface. Lights went on below decks, and the off-duty sailors sipped hot black coffee after coming below from tbe cold, wet deck. It was becoming monotonous, and all hands were eager to reach the Normandy coast. First Casualty At 1757 a cry from tbe bridge look out broke the monotony. Mine ! Mine ! he yelled. But the warning was not in time and the USS Osprey was engulfed in a burst of fire. Blaz ing, the Osprey took a port list quickly: uncontrollable, she broke col umn. At 1815 sbe disappeared among the swells, the first casualty of tbe Normandy invaaion operations. An hour later, a US sweeper spotted a floating mine near the path of a British ship. Warned quickly, the British vessel swung clear of the weapon and d~stroyed it with gunfire. Aboard tbe USS .Stafl, the force commander reviewed the tedious op erations that lay ahead. They were to cut through a concentrated minefield in the Bay of tbe Seine some 4S kilo meters offshore of the assault beaches, then clear tbe assault channels to 58

within 11 kilometers of the shore, From that point up to about sewn ; kilometers out, a large area had b : be made safe for the bulk of tbe firt ~, support ships and bombardment sta. fir tions. This area and the sector to the or rear of it had to be completely clear of mines because it was also the as. b sembly point for the invasion trans. , tr ports, battleships, troop landing craft, e and all the initial invasion fleet. The sweeper squadrons saw no great ; danger from the Germans, except for the mines. Their hardest task, and most dangerous one, lay in the mis. 1 sion of clearing inshore bombardment atatiorm and sweeping ,landhg craft assault lanes from the fire support area all the way to the enemy beach, This had to be done under the cover of darkness and before the arrival of the main fleet. And then, from the time the inva sion started until the enemy was pushed many kilometers inland, they had to keep the waters clear. Night I settIed on tbe fleet, and a full moon, somewhat hazed by the miserable weather, barely illuminated the little ships pounding through the Channel waves. Lack of Mines
On and the northern were horizon, reflected gunfir e: on th e explosions

low-clinging

clouds, indicating that Sweep Units 1 and 2 of British and Canadian ships were on their way in to their assigned beachea some 64 kilometers away. In reports, British Sweep Unit 2 confirmed the gunfire. Surprisingly enough, the British re ports revealed no mines in tbe area that they had swept. Either Allied intelligence was mistaken or the Ger mans had mined every bit of water between England and Normandy ex cipt there. I
ReYiaw Military

NORMANOY While the British tried to figure here the mines were, the US sweeper Iuadcons began a clearance run of le fire support area off Omaha Beach. hey began just prior to midnight and Dishedtheir run shortly before 0100 m6 June-D-day. They had no mis ipsand no mines. They had no ,ouble with the German shore batzries. Like the British, the US squadrons ere surprised at the Iack of mines. [onths after the invasion they would and sank the weapon at a preset time. The invasion had been delayed late in May by the weather, and, oblig ingly, thousands of the German mines deactivated and sank only a few days before the invasion forces came into the area. The danger was lessened greatly, but not completely eliminated. No iooner had the fleet minesweep ers completed their clearance run of the fire support area than their little brothersthe yard minesweepers joined in, and the combined squadrons

! n :(
1

I 1( ,1 ? I t II 1 ( I
I

I I
I ( I

US Arnw [embersof an American landing party lend helping hands to other members of their organization whose landing craft had been sunk off Utah Beach
et Iepth

the answer as old records and probing found thousands of minessunk and inactive. Allied intel igence had been accurate; the euemy lad planted mines in every crmceivaIlearea, but with a safety device intailed that automatically deactivated m 1965

initiated

the

assault

sweep

to

the

beaches. It had to be a precision op eration with cooperated maneuver of all involved ships. From 24 kilometers out they cleared the way through dangerous waters to within a kilometer of the beaches 59

NORMANDY no interference. Completing thk headon d?ive, the? turned paraIleI to the landing beiches and began the closeashore sweep of landing craft lanes. It was 0330; still no German gunfire. The sound of the little sweepers breaking the waves was the only un usual sound in the entire beach area. Strips Retreat Tbe lead squadron passed the gun emplacements on the Saint Marcouf Islands, and for two more hours they paraded up and down. Then the sky began to lighten as dawn approached. At 0540, as the fleet sweepers passed Saint Vaaet for the second or third time, the German guns came to life and turned the coast ablaze with gun fire. A barrage of shells rained down among the squadrons and they turned quickly to elude the explosions. Zig zagging, running fast and slow, the ships retreated toward the safety of deep water. It was a one-sided battle with the odds against the little ships. Then, as suddenly as it began, the shelling quit. It started again, but not at the mine sweepers. The new German target was a British cruiser, the HMS Black Prince, which had singly rushed in to divert the German fire. Now, she was engaged in a deadly duel and was throwing everything she had at the gun emplacements. Tbe sweepers re treated past her as the Black PrirIce laid a heavy smokescreen and followed the squadrons out. Dawn was at hand now as the mine sweepers moved safely back to the fire s,~pport area. The Black Prince turned off to join her battle group, and the battle of Normandy was about to be gin, as thousands of Allied ships ap peared in the surrounding w?ters. At 0630 a 40-minute bombardment began as battleships, cruisers, and 60

rocket ships opened fire. The sky fillei with Allied bombers and fighters. Bs fore the bombardment ceased, the first wave of invasion treeps and ground equipment was on its way in. Gun dueling along the beaches took a heavy toll on the landing craft, but tbe majority landed and dug in. Es. tort vessels turned about and set a course for deep water again. Oiw, about four kilometers out, hit a mim which nearly blew her in half. In an adjacent area, another escort vessel was blown some four meters in the air and fell back in shatterei pieces. Landing craft began blowing up on both sides of her, and it soon becamq clear that the area was hew ily mined.

New-Type Mines The area hsd been swept the night before, but the Germans had slipped a newer type mine into their defenses, one that rested on the bottom and ex ploded by tbe metallic intluence of close-by ships. One large landing craft, with a cargo of supplies and ammunition, disintegrated only me. ters from the beach. Then, almost in three landing craft, tan order, kr O ( LCTS) exploded, leaving their carg of tanks and men just off the beach .8 In the waves that followed, nine mor e !b LCTS and two landing craft, infantr e (large) LCI (L) swent down, Th score was high that first day. The next day, D-day plus 1, sm the amphibious operations swing into a full-scale replenishment drive, as everything from ground troops to heavy tanks were put ashore by the Allied Fleet. Merchant shipping be. gan to arrive from England in great profusion. The conditions afloat were still W. der a stress of mined waters, and th? ,transport Susan B. Atzt?zorzy, with

Militsry Ru[W

NORMANDY ersthree went down from mine bursts. The sweeper forces worked a dozen locations on 7 June, with only a few, ships (except the Tide) shaken by blasts: They made a high score for their operations29 mines detonated, and a large area marked aa safe or unsafe- for the shipping navigation. Mines Unyielding The invasion was fast becoming a victory for the assault troops, but at sea the mines were not ready to yield. Probably one of the more tragic of the minings was the HMS Mivzster, a British tug. She was nowhere near the established danger zone, and it was during noon meal, while all hands other than lookouts and wheel watches were below decks, that a mine blew up directly below her midsection. The crew had less than a breath before the Mitisfer was on her way downshe sank in 27 seconds, trapping 70 men in her bull. 1.ST 499, with a full load of suP plies and important replenishment for the forces ashore, was sunk by an other direct-hit explosion not far from the Minster. Most of her crew escaped, but valuable logistics support was lost not to mention the loss of an impor tant ship. By 9 June the invasion forces had moved well inland and appeared well lodged. The tension of the invasion had eased somewhat. But in an area previously consid ered safe, mines began to take a new toll; several landing craft were blown up wfhile others were heavily dam aged. The minesweepers were called back in and previous sweep reports were reviewed. It was certain that the area had been well cleared in the preceding days, and the presence of German mines could only mean that 61

! 2,317 troops aboard, hit a mine at e 0760, becoming the first casualty of Stjthe second day. The captain of the ]dj$bip acted quickly in the situation, moving the entire troop complement ]k to the high side of the ship, keeping ut it on an even keel. This saved many a. :fives and large quantities of assault a equipment; all hands were taken off k before she went under. n~ Allied sweepers, split into small groups of four and five ships, were Irl assigned to sweep the entire coastline in Ofthe invasion and the seaward vicin ei ~ty. In many areas, mines were located u .n soon as the sweepers went to work; on in others, the sweepers were not as w successful. The USS Tide hit a wellplaced mine, and the ensuing explo mon ripped her to pieces, virtually ,bt kikng or wounding the entire crew.

ed Well Camouflaged es Off Carbonnet Banka, the German :x. mines were camouflaged and so well of hl(fd~n~n the b~tt~m that lookouts m aboardlanding craft and supply boats nd ~ou]dnot spot the wre~p~ns. By now, 1+ thesound of ~ mine going off in the in ~~saultarea ~a~ ~omm~nplace, ad n!+everyone recognized the fate of an go LCT as she and her men went upin :h ~ column of explosive sm~k~. TWO jr e more LcT,s Soon follo~l.ed her to the .fl bottom b e Inst.
\vith

men and equipment

all

A handing ship, tank ( LST), with $~y undreds of tons of gear aboard, had to s hit that sent her quivering, but she as managed to stay afloat and land her to :argo. Later that day in the same h! wea, the Norwegian destroyer SZ,e?I X. leer was hit hard. Soon to follow her 21 WNthe Tug 283. Both ships made it o a repair ship and stayed afloat, but m they~vere out of ~~tion for sometime be after!vard. Carbonnet Banks also itk provedtO be a bad place for destroy.

NORYAANOY the enemy had found a way to replen ish his fields. By sortirtg out reports from the various sweeping operations and the activities of patrol craft, the sweep ers %ere able to pinpoint the areas that poesibly had been replenished by the Germans. The minecraft recleared the areas, turning up more than 20 undetonated mines. AJlied patrol craft and destroyers were given the task of making certain that German surface craft would not get a second crack at replenishing the fields, but this did not stop enemy aircraft. In the weeks that followed, many mines were re placed in Norrnandye waters. Minesweepers conducted a vigorous operation that cleared a vast area and kept the mine danger to a minimum. But even these efforts could not corn. pletely eliminate the hazard. There were 12 ships actually sunk,, most of them small landing craft, although a British destroyer and an American heavy freighter went down after a series of hits, Another 25 vessele were damaged, including six minesweepers, three destroyers, and a number of merchant chips. BY this time, the Allied invasion of Europe appeared more and more suc cessful. German mine warfare had shown a shocking effectiveness by in flicting a heavy rate of damage and death, but it was not enongh. 1hl mines had slowed WIPPIY and replo 1 ishment, had stopped many troops a~ equipment hefore either had reschd shore, and had nearly choked the in. vasion waves in some areas. The toll was disheartening+ ships sunk; dozens of landing crd eliminated, with the majority of thei crews and cargo; and over 80 ship heavily damaged, with 30 put out of operational order. The minesweepers had accomplish!i an amazing feat during the .f ew shon weeks of invasion. Off Utah Beach they had scored 261 mines actually dt stroyed by mine units; at Omab Beach. 291 mines d@atroyed. In th t adjacent areas, many more mim were disposed of or detonated. Mine warfare is a proved am~ deadly system. As practiced by the Germans off the Normandy beaches in June 1944, it accounted for thousand! of Allied soldiers and eailars eithtr killed or wounded. But the Germa~ mines were defeated by a force of little ships manned by men to whom mines were a business. Despite losses, they remained unyielding, and it waa largely as a result of their efforts that thousands of Allied fighting men and tons of equipment were put ashore, and stayed ashore.

62

Military RUi$l

1 11 :

r;

h 11

h 1( ti ( a t r a t
3 n

h 0!

HE INTER-AMERICAN MLITARY FORCE

!utenant Colonel Harold R. Aaron,

10 N vi Ir 0(
pl

United States Armg

Theviews e.qrres$ed in this arti e are the authors and are not nec essarilythose of the Department of LeArmy, Department of De fenee, ~ the V. .S. Army Command and eneral Staff College.Editor. r
HE idea of establishing an international military force for : in the Western Hemisphere is not w. It bas gained little support, howx, from the policymakers of the

United States or Latin America in the past decade. During the past few years, the rise of Cuban subversion and Soviet infil tration in the hemisphere have called for both a political as well as a mili tary response to ensure the protec tion Of the United Statee and the hem isphere as a whole. While the political reaction has been a collective and uni fied action by most etates of the hem 63

kl

e 1965

INTER-AMERICAN

FORCE

6
concept of the international mili
force and added that, while it,
heard many reasons why such a
could not be established, appar
little energy had been expend
find means as to bow the force
be created.
1n 1960 the executive branch cot ducted a feasibility study of the w. cept, an action taken in response ({ a congressional proposal made in l%!
that Latin-American grant militaq

isphere, the military response has been largely a unilateral response. ,T\vo basii facts explain why the mil ]tary response has been unilateral: US military forces have been im mediately available for deployment. An integrated international mil itary staff and military force that mu Id respond to the security require ments of the inter-American system huve been lacking.
Recognize Deficiency

[h]th the executive :ind legislative branches of the LXS Government have recognized this seriolts deficiency and have showm some interest In an intW nntional military force and its possi bilities. The Congress over the past few years has expressed a stcong in terest in the idea. In Section 502 of the International Development Act of 1961, for example, the Congress gave this advice to the President:

aid be drastically curtailed and th! proceeds or savings from the curtai ment used to provide an inter-Amec ican defense force. Roy R. Rubottm Jr., the then Assistant Secretary 01 State. for Inter-Afierican Affam, gave some indication of the problem, that would be encountered:

Itis the sense of the Congrwss that eon t ribution toward an important peace u,ould be made by the establish ment undcv the Organization of Amer ican States of an international mili tary force.
In a 1963 report to the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs again indorsed the

Lieutenant Colorcel Harokt R. Aaron is Senior Aide to the Commander {n Chief, United Natiorrs Command, Ko rea. He holds a Ph. D, degree from Georgetown University; was gradu ated from the Nafional War College; and has served with the Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy, Deputy Cb ief of Stafl for Military Opemztions, Department of the Army: and with the Once of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He is the author of Guerrilla War in Cuba which appeared in the May 1965 issue of the MILITARY RE
VIEW. 64

[f we should decide that the estak lish?}lent of such a force would be M the best interests of the Inter-itme? ican system and the United States, ti P political and military merits of tie proposal would havk to be considere i fully and favorably by other member i of the Organization of Amerwon States. Such a force could %ot be @ s. tablished within existing Inter-Anie r. ican arrangements but would requi rt the conclusion of nem internation 0: r. agreements at an appropriate lnte American conference.
Willingness

Before any international agreemed can be reached, therefore, the govern ments of the member states must be willing to establish a force that is! either earmarked for internatio ml hemispheric military duty Or can be, placed on a standby basis. To date, ~ most of the hemispheric states have! shown little inclination to modify the! Charter of the Organization of Amer.~ ican States ( OAS ) for tbe purpose of * establishing such a force. Most Latin. , MlitaryReview

INTER-AMERICAN lerican Governments seem unwill ~to expand the present role of their iitar~ forces since progress is being ,de in keeping those forces apolit I in domestic affairs. [f the charter were to be amended, ivever, the future roles of the Ad-

FORCE

in Washington, is older than the C)AS. It has grown slowly in responsibility over the past two decades, but re mains a military council without the authority to plan and supervise prompt military responses. Within the OAS framework, the

SUPREME 0R61VI OF THE

lNTER.AMERICiN OIFENSE BOARD

F1.gure 1. Defense Committee ( ADC) nposed of senior military represen i~es of the member statesand the ,er-American Defense Board (IA I) would have to be considered Igure 1). Since its creation in 1948, ADC has never been utilized by OAS, and particularly by the forn ministers when they were con ied, to resolve serious issues, alIugh major military problems were ltral to some of those issues.
ory

IADB is not subordinate to the Coun cil of the organization, the most ac tive political organ operating within the policies established by the InterAmerican Conference, or to the Meet ing of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. As a result of its position and its terms of reference, the IADB is not as closely allied with the Council as it could be in reaching the solution to todays important po litico-military problems. The IADBs main task has been the development of a general military 65

rhe IADB, composed of military lresentatives of each state on duty ! 1965 .

INTER-AMERICAN

FORCE CSO), explained the relationship ~ his commands planning with that of the OAS:

Plan fOr inter-American defense. The outline plan has been necessarily brotid in scope and does not spell out ~pecitic tasks for tbe military forces of the member states. It can only por tray[a general recognition of the mil itary forces of the member countries while it points out to the various gov ernments that some inter-American defense planning is, neeessary. Tbe recognition of the military forces, while salutary in the late 1950s, needs revitalization now when the emphasis in Latin America is on establishing strong internal security forces to prO-

The OAS . . . is not a mititar~ bod~ It is a political bodg. And any mi~, tary decisions which arise out of u tions ?ohich it may take have to ~, directed by the individual goven ments. I do what the .JCS tell nit What 1 do is U. S. planning. I don sit down with any Latin Amer{oan, to draw any combined plans.
A little later in his testimony, Gen eral OMeara stated that no militw planning bodysuch as one found i]

0
*
I

OF CONSULTATION
OF
MINISIW!S
OF FORU6N
AHAIRS

MKXNG

Q
INTIR4M[RIC1N
CONFfRfNCE

AOVISORY OEFENSI COMMITTEE

INTER.AMERICIN MILITARY
STAFF

INTIR.AMERICRN MILITARY
fORCL

Figure tect the states from the export of Cas troist guerrillas and subversives. In recent @timony before the Con gress, General Andrew P. OMeara, the then Commander in Chief, - United States. Southern Command (USCIN

2. Snpreme Headquarters, Allied POT ers, Europe-existed where you dra specific tactical plans involving sp citic earmarked forces and have S!J citic commanders named. , The lack of specific tactical pbv
Wilitary Reril

66

INTER-AMERICAN

FORCE

ical direction and control. During seri. ous situations this control would be assumed by the foreign ministers when they would be convened as the Organ of Consultation (Figure 2). The Inter-American Conferenc& by meane of a resolution, should call upon all states to earmark forces and ma terial within their capabilities to meet the requirements of the Council or the Organ of Consultation. These requirementsdeveloped in detail by the military staff-could range from a few officers and enlisted men to act as observers in the event of border dis putes to the assembly of hemispheric task forces for more serious threats. The new military staff could then be gin to plan in specific terms, using the forces of specific countries, rather than in the broad generalities of the past. Ioint Exercises Until this goal is achievedand it may be another decadethe method utilized by tbe United States in ccm ducting joint exercises could be adopted to develnp :1 collecti},e mili tary capability. This \\ mild involve the expansiOn and combination of present joint mnneuvew in \\hich United and States Latin-American air, ground, and na\ful forces have partic ipated in nwault or reinforcement mllltary exercises. A maneuver staff could be created ttnd est:lhlishecl in the Panama Canal Zone to prepare nnd conduct exer cises :IS prescribed annually by the ADC ~vlthin the gllidance of the Coun cil of the OAS. The director of tbe staff, a Lntin Americnn, would have US(IN(XO as a deputy, His staff of approximately 50 air, naval, and ground off]cers \vould be obtained vol tlnturily from the military servikes of the member states for a three-year pe 67

lNTEi-AMERICAN

FORCE military force is not an impossi task. It can evolve slowly until utility- and flexibility is recognized, it can be created as rapidly as membership desiree. It can be m; tained under collective political c trol; it can be created on a volunt baais by,tboee states desiring to do and it can become a means of inmv ing the professionalism of La American military forces and of veloping a much-needed and broa international outlook. Initiative and a positive. appr~ are needed by the politicaI and n tary leaders of the Latin-Ameri member states. Most,i~f +1, ther{ the need for tbe poht]cal leaders the OAS to have confidence in t] ability to create and control a de able military mechanism. They must develop a collective sense of responsl. bility for the security of tbe hemis. phere. The United States must alSO take steps to foster this collective sense of hemispheric responsibility. The inter. American force must be largely of Latin makeup and operation, with the United States providing nnly those forces, weapone, and materiel not within Latin-American capabilities and in response to hemisphere re quirements. These US forces should not be as extensive as if only US fnrces are employed. There are no more critical areas in the Free WorId than Latin Amer ica. It is an area that must remain free. An international military force created for use in the Western Hemis. phere would help tn ensure that free. dom.

riod commencing in July of the first year of est,abIisbment. Eventually, onethird of the officers would be replaced each year to provide continuity. IX January of each year, an air, sea, and ground exercise of one weeks du ration would be held involving the military units of those states desir ing to participate. Exercise areas wouId be rotated from the Caribbean to the Atlantic and to the Pacific over a three-year period. This would make it possible for the earmarked military forces of each state to participate at least once in the exercises as a reeult of their proxianity to the exercise area. By 1 April of each year, a command post exercise of about three days du ration would test the communications and staff participation of the high military staffs of the member states at their respective capitals. The ob jective of this exercise would also be as prescribed by the ADC. Both exercises would have the pri mary task of developing and execut ing plans for those general military contingencies that the Council and ADC would deem likely to face the inter-American system in the near fu ture. They wnuld be a means of test ing the politico-military coordination required during a period of teneion in which certain earmarked forces would be mcbilized and concentrated. Although only a training staff would exist, it would have the experi ence and the capability to plan and direct military operations of varied types within a short period of time. The creation of an inter-American

.
68
Military Rwie[

AO Tse-tung, the Marxist, may believe in the objective and in itable forces of history, but Mao e politician, general, and revolu mary has argued that Communist ccess depends on the subjective fac r of leadership. Two sets of attitudes which eai military officer should bring s professional experience can be rred from the policy statement lineae Communist Ieadere: how Ie1965 the to in of the

officer relates

himself to the Commu nist Party as director of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), and how he

This article was digested from the original, published in THE CHINA QUARTERLY (Great Brit ain) April-June 1964. The author is Aesistant Pro fessor in the Department of Pol itics, and Research Associate in the Center of International Stud ies, Princeton University. 69

THE 6tsO0 .OFFICER manages his command responsibili ties.,These two sets of attitudes func. ~ ti.en as criteka by which the party evaluates its officer corps and designs the officer training programs. To the extent that these two sets of attitudea do not articulate smoothly, they indi cate antagonism between the party and the officer corps. The party requires. all individuals in positions of authority to regard themselves as docile tools. The officer cannot adhere to what the party has called non-organisational viewpoints or, specifically, Ieftwing infantilism that is, rejection of temporary corn: promises by the party; and rightwing OppOrtunismthat is. opposition to party directives because of local con ditions, personal values, or the morale of subordinates. Thus, the officer is always liable to criticism from the party. The party deliberately puts the officer in a vise which forces him to accept ciitieism and education at any time. If he re sponds appropriately, he is considered to have the pi-oletarian world outlook. If he does not, he is considered in LIU Shao-chis phrase to be a thoroughly had egg. Responsibility Commanders actually have respon sibilities and command authority, probably because the party realizes that commanders who must refer all matters, big and small, to superior officers would never succeed. Although his areas of responsibility and spheres of power are never clearly defined, the commander is expected to accept re sponsibility within them in the amount which the party decides is proper at its pleasure. To carry out his responsibilities, the officer is supposed to exhibit prag matism, planning, and system. The 70

to ( party defines pragmatism as adjust. pol ment to fact and as opposed tO m@. bet anistic exeeution of ordera. By plan. pea ning, the party means that one shouli prepare several plans4ne to exploit J success, one to minimize the effeek ~fi of a defeat, and one to meet a chansei SW situation. be{ It is difficult to see how an officer U4 can act as a docile tool of the party and still exercise command responsk bility; how he can implement orders, unmodified, and, at the same time, ad. just to tbe immediate situation. How. I ever, since part y requirements are 80 fluid, the degree of antagonism be. tween the two varies from period to period. Guerrilla warfaie before 1949 minimized the tension, eince the party 1 realized that if ita commanders were to survive they needed a significant amount of autonomy. Consequently, it defined docility as tbe pragmatic ex ! ercise of autonomy. After 1949 the party substituted conventional for guerrilla war, changed from an insnrgent to an in. cumbent movement, and began tn draw military personnel less from idealists and disaffected peasants and more from the educated and urban middle class, It also began to create ,~ officers who considered themselves more professional military adminis trators and teehnical specialists than g political revolutionaries. , Control 1 The first two changes led the party ~ ; to feel that it could exert tighter con trol over the officer corps; the last , two changes, that it must exert such ,, control. In other words, the definition ~ of the political set of attitudes did not change, but the ability of the party to make officers behave in ac cordance with the definition did change. When the officer was required Mitary RevieW i

-l

THE 6000
in terms of both of these political and technical ideals, conflict between: the two ideal patterns ap peared. The political cemponent of the Chi neseCommunist definition of tbe good officer has remained relatively con ]tant, but tbe technical demands have beencompounded, Officer training pro grams before 1944 had to cope with to operate

OFFICER

Finally, there wae a chronic shortage of mechanical military equipment which limited the technical content of training programs. The cumulative effects of these four factors on officer training programs were: a training period which never exceec@i several months; a curricu lum in which the percentage of politi cal training time was never less than

rhis Chinese Communist officer becams a bayonet instructor during tbe war with Japan when officer training was primitive. He still teaches bayonet fighting. ]evei-al difficulties. The officer corps wffered a casualty rate of more than iO percent each yearand the rate ,vasmuch higher before the Sino-Jap mese War. After 1937 the 8th Route and New kh Route Armies expanded numeri cally, and by 1943 this expansion reached explosive proportions. Poten tial officers came from combat units, many of which were fighting in the kontline. These three factors forced theparty to create new cadres rapidly. kne1985 30 percent; a curriculum which spe cialized only in technical military and political training; and a student body which was recruited from active mem bers of the armed forces. In 1933-34 the 3,000 students at the Jui-chin Red Military Academy who had been recalled from the front were trained as political commanders and political commissary for regiments. The party also claims that these men were trained in artillery, engineer ing, air def errse, and chemical war 71

THE GOOO OFFICER fare. The pr~mitive state of Communist war material, however, raises doubts about the credibility of this statement. When the academy was reestab lished at Yenan in 1936, only about 800 students were enrolled in its four to six-month program. We know that, of four sections of students, two were composed of platoon, company, and squad commanders, and new vohm teers, and a third section was com posed of battalion, regiment, and divi sion commanders and commissary. Of the 10 courses on record, only three could be considered technical; the. other seven were poIiticaL A Potitical Curriculum In July 1938 the name of the acad emy was changed to that of the AntiJapanese Military Acsdemy, the course was extended to seven and a half months, and the number of train. ees was reported to have increased to between 5,000 and 6,000. The curric ulum, however, remained essentially political. Of the 15 courses known to us, onjy two can be considered as technicaIguerrilla warfare tactics and mapmaking. Tbe military academies multiplied in conjunction with the Communist base areas, and by the end of 1941 the academy system had five branches. Courses varied from three to six months, and the content of the cur riculum varied according to the type of position which the student was sup posed to occupy at the end of his course. Candidates for command posi tions were said to have devoted from 60 to 70 percent of their course time to tactical studies and practical exer cises in mobile warfare and the rest to political studies. The course fo! the commissar trainees reversed these proportions of time. ,. However, regardless of the natun of the course, educational equipme~~ such as books and blackboards wer8 scarce and primitive; instructors wew untrained and numerically insufi. cient; and many students were illiter. ate. There is evidence that officer training in Chinese Communist mifi. tary academies up to 1944 was pri. marily composed of political indoctri. nation, physical exerciee, discipline d and morale-building techniques, an basic tactical maxims.

11 rule a t{ Kor viet tear

equ ~

of t incl Ilic
Ho!

ten

gro Captured Eqoipmeirt the Between 1944 and 1949 the part y ~bl received large amounta of mechanize d to : equipment which the Soyiets had cap. ~, tured fr~m the Japanese and the PLA. ,! had seized from the Nationalist ar- , mica. This made technical training more feasible. The appropriate re. J sponse of the academies would have \ been to increase the duration of the ., program and the proportion of tech., 1 nical courses. However, with the more than fivefold increase in the size of the PLA and with many recruits be. ing Nationalist or pro-Japanese sol- diers, many more politically reliable officers were needed. Here, the appropriate response of the academies would have been to limit the duration of the program and~ increase the proportion of political h training courees. Unfortunately, we : knOw little -about the way in which the c ;

party hapdled this dilemma. We do sl know that in 1944 the Yenan Academy \ O @ extended its couree to two years, but,
because were any, of force large needed actually time. numbers urgently, trained of few for know organized new officere if officers, this that in length an air ,, t{ :

s]

We also
was

~ A

Man- ~F s churia, probably using equipment capn tured from the Japanese and tbe Naa tionalists. 1
school Military

12

Review

THE GOOD OFFICER In the first five years of Communist rule in China, the FLA fought against a technically superior enemy in the Korean War, and benefited from So viet technical advisory and teaching teams and modern Soviet military equipment. The appropriate response of the academies would have been to increase the proportion of their tech nical courses and to diversify them. However, other factors limited this tendency.
Becauee ground of of the the poor technical and students back

in the academies, the teachers were un ableto teach and their students unable to absorb complex ekills. The need for a large officer corps to staff the still
teachers

six and a maximum of 24 months. By the end of 1950, other academies had been organized in Harbin, Siranghai, and Nanking. Armored corps cadets trained for eight months, navy and air force cadete for two years, and mili tary scientists for five years. Staff Of ficers ~raveled to the Soviet Union for advanced training. A Japanese source estimates that by 1952 tbe academies were producing 40,000 junior officers a year. The main land press, however, raises serious questions about the quality of their technical training, particularly in tbe schools for the newly created navy and air force. Soviet advisory missions were unable to complete the faculties of the Air Forcd Academy at Kai massu and the Peoplee Naval Acad emy at Dairen: the students were rel atively uneducated and tbe equipment inefficient and insufficient. Specialization In the late 1950s the Soviet Union recalled her technical advisory mis sions from China, embargoed military equipment to China, and withheld mil itary support for Chinese foreign pol icy. During this same period, staff po sitions and entire military units be. came increasingly specialized. As a result, the party epeeded up its man ufacture of complex weapons and in tensified the technical training of the officer corps. On the other hand, at this time, the Soviets intrigued with high-ranking Chines: officers; specialization within the armed forces encouraged the pro fessional identity of the officer corps; and the communes and economic fail ures aggravated the peasant relatives of the officers. These situations im petled the party in the opposite direc tion: to intensify political indoctri nation. 73

Indoctrination in political theory, cur rent events, and party policies is in cluded in every course of instruction . swollen PLA aggravated the shortage of trained teachers. Finally, the party ~expected that the Soviet military shield would compensate for Chinae technical deficiencies. In 1949 the North China Military I Administrative University Opened in Peking under General Yeh Chien-ying. Supposedly, 6,000 students, limited to middle school graduates, were enrolled at the university for a minimum of
me 1965

THE GOOD OFFICER After 1954 the army was half its 1949-54 size, and the number of its troop< engaged in combat was small. This allowed the party to reduce the officer corps to about 300,000 and, therefcfre, to reduce the number of officers who had to be trained. Officers also became available for study and
teaching. enrolled Finally, the individuals who

Academy of Military Sciences in Pe. king acted as graduate schools for th~ other military academies. Many of the 64 were specialist schools in infantry, artillery, armnred forces, naval, engi. neering, air defense, medical, admin. istrative, logistics, finance, chemical warfare, signal, and ordnance train. ing. Political Training Although we have no specific infer. mation about the technical curricu lum, we can infer from the kind of school the extent of the technical ed ucation in each school. At least until 1958, the curriculums of the 64 schools were essentially technics). In late1957 the party criticized the political attitudes of officer cadets and tried to correct for the neglect of ideological and political work. For example, at the Peking Military Acad. emy, the proportion of time devoted to formal political courses increased from 16 to 20 percent. Political com missary were assigned to each course and political directors to each class, and political theory, current events, and policies were to be incorporated throughout the whole course, During tbe history of the Chinese Communist movement, the party has complicated the technical skills re quired of the good officer and inter preted the political requirements less flexibly. The 1958 rectification cam paign in the Peking Military Academy ~emonstrates the partys attempt to establish a stable and complementary relationship between its various requirements of the good officer. The partys criticism of the products of the officer training programsfor ex ample, the officer-to-the-ranks cam paignsindicates its lack of success in this endeavor. Specifically, since late 1957 the party has felt compelled

to @ ~ien and @& ~iyi A] ~~~

polit

in the training programs dur ing this period had a higher level of technical military skills, because the career officers had been through pre vious programs, and new officers had been specifically selected for their pre vious education. Education and Promotion At the beginning of this period, the party gave formal priority to tech nical military knowledge. In 1955 col lege students were ordered to train for a reserve lieutenant title and to ussume the corresponding duty.Sinee Chinese higher education concentrated on the applied sciences, this regula tion was obviously designed to chan nel scientifically educated people into the officer corps. That same year officer commissions were made dependent on the level of professional education. Graduates of the higher military schools qualified as captains, and graduates of secondary level military schools qualified as lieu tenants. These regulations made it clear to veteran officers that promo tion was linked with technical educa tion. By 1961 it least 75 military training institutions had been established. SixtY-four of them concentrated on logistics and military operations, and 11 concentrated on the education of commissary. The General Staff and War College in Nanking, the Geqeral Military Academy in Harbin, and the Military Research Institute and tbe 74

.{

P _

~ ~ ~

THE COOD OFFICER ;Oattack the most technically profi cient officers (military specialists ind intellectuals) usuaIly the new ]Ricerswho enter the academies from tivilian universities. Although the Chinese Communist :ase does not demonstrate that the ]olitical and the technological requirements of a modern authoritarian system can never articulate smoothly, the recent and pronounced tension be tween the party and the PLA officers raises questions about whether such a system can create both a politically reliable and technologically modern officer -corps.

. I
+
f
,4

Ine 1965

15

I SOVIETTACTICS
ON THE
NUCLEAR
BATTLEFIELD
MaJOrGeneral V. Rezmchenko
and
Crdmrel A. S]dorenko
.%uiet Armu

This article demonstrates Soviet thinking concernirzg the nature of nuclear battle. Of particular signif icance are the concepts fo~ the use of nuclear roeapons as independent means for achieving success in cOmbat, and the emphasis upon meeting engagements.Editor.

I l

HE nuclear weapon is radicaily different from the fire of con ventional weapons, both in the nature
of its destructive action and in its
ability to solve combat missions. It
is common knowledge that the de structive factor in the fire of conven.
tional weapons is a direct striking or
mechanical action as a result of a hit
on the target by a shell, splinters, or
a bullet. The nuclear weapon bas the
combined destructive effect of the
shock wave, the thermal effect, and
radiation. Consequently, earlier con cepts of fire do not apply to the nu clear weapon, because they fail to
consider all the destructive factors of
the nuclear weapon.

76

conventional means, and the role of fire support of maneuver units cannot be assigned to nuclear weapons. This ability of the tactical nuciear weapon to solve important combat missione independently alters the very natnre of combined-arms combat. It is no longer simply combat by meeb anized infantry, tanks, artillery, and aviation which can solve tactical prob lems, but it is primarily nuclear weap ons and highly maneuverable coordi nated actions of combined-arme for. mations, units, and subunits. A rapid maneuver, in conjunction with nuclear

The most important difference is that conventional firearms can inflict on the enemy only partial losses which are spread out over a comparatively lengthy period. In past wars, losses of 20 to 30 percent, if sustained grad ually by a unit, have been insufficient to put it out of action, and have led only to a reduction in strength. This is why the number of units, as well
as the bat stant, number throughout of elements an entire of remained battle. the com con formation, usually

The nuclear weapon has such vast destructive power, however, that al most instantly it can put OLit Of ac tion complete subunits, units, and ele ments of the combat formation. This means that the nuclear weapon does not simply increase the power of fire, as we formerly understood it, but also setsas an independent means nf elim inating groups of forcee and solving other important tactical problems. In view of this the nuclear weapon can not be treated the same as the fire of hllw1965

SOVIET TACTICS fire thrusts and headlong attacks, the essence of modern combat. is

.The skillful use of a nuclear weapon in combat enables one to increase the relative strength of ones own forces and t~ achieve the destruction of the enemy in a short time. Springing from this is the need for commanders to have a thorough knowledge of the com bat properties and capabilities of the nuclear weapon and of the means of delivering it to the target, and to at tain skill in rapidly analyzing the sit uation and making use of the results of this weapon. High Maneuverability A characteristic feature of modern combat is its high maneuverability. A deep nuclear strike against the en emy, the creation of breaches and gaps in his combat formations, and the absence of a continuous front, all make it possible for combat acdoirs to be carried out at a high temp~, with the use of diverse forms of maneuver. The complek mechanization of troops has significantly increased the possibility of exploiting the results of nuclear strikes, switching forces from one direction to another, building Up forces where the greatest degree of succees ie achieved, and of attacking the enemy from the line of march im mediately bebind nuclear strikes. Under these conditions those me thodically measured actions by troops which played a role in the last war are com@etely out of place. They neither exploit the possibilities of modern weapons and combat equip-

ment nor make it possible to US! vel them effectively. tla Movement, marches, and various 1 mobile forms of war will be of w. po preme importance in combat. Troops iru will often have to switch, in a short Sig time, from one type of combat to S,n. b other, from actions in deployed corn. W bat formations to a rapid advance in ba columns. m There will be an extremely irregu. w lar development of combat actions de This will be caused by the use of m . ill clear weapons, the highly maneuver ql . able character of modern combat, the u fact that it is conducted along specifi ql c directions, and the use of airborne C landings Frontlines, & we under .rr stood them in former times when com -M bat actions developed from line to Iin s, with close lateral contact between ad. ~ jacent units, will assuredly no ]onger ,, exist. s 0 Focused Action , The desire of both sides to utilize e gaps or bre,aches formed by nucleat f strikes for the purpose of a rapid ad. t vance will lead to deep dovetailed pent etrations. Combat actions will fre quently take on a focal character. Units and formations will be forced to carry out combat actions with open flanks and with bypassed enemy forces in their rear. 4 The irregularity and focal charac ter of combat actions, along with ab- ~ rmpt and rapid changes in the situa tion, increase the significance of the independence and initiative of com manders operating in different direc- i tions, and emphasize the need for se curing the gape between ones own troops and their flanks and rear, At tbe same time, these conditions re quire a boldness of action which ap preaches insolence, forceful deep pen etration, and an extensive use of en
Military Reviw

This article was translated and digested from the original, ZVEZOA published in IIRASPJAYA (USSR) 12 February 1964, un der the title, Taktika na SovVs rnenvwm Etapel
78

sOVIET TACTICS
tO strike the enemy in his flank and rear. Under modern conditions the im portance of the time factor for achiev ing success in combat has increased significantly. It is no longer days and hours, but minutes and even seconds mhich can decide the outcome of com bat. This makes it necessary for corn. manders to respond quickly to a sit uation, and to be prompt in making decisions. Combat missions must be quickly passed on to the troops and quickly accomplished. A rapid and completely independent reaction is re quired from a commander when he re ceives information on enemy nuclear means. veloprnent

a defending army. It is conducted along required axes with an extensive use of maneuver. It appears that the principle of massed men and means on a main axis will be achieved in a different fashion than in the last war. Breaking Through a Defense There will also be a different way of breaking through the enemys de fense. The method used will no longer be that of gnawing through as was the case in past wars. The defense will be dealt nuclear strikes and will then be attacked from the line of march, at high tempo, by tank and mechanized troops. The chief method of switching to an offensive, it seems, will be an of fensive from the line of march. De ployment into combat formations and the transition to the offensive will be carried out without any pause on the attack line, the intention being to prevent the enemy from inflicting nu clear and artillery blows. In annihilating snrviving enemy pockets of resistance, mechanized troops will operate together with tanks, generally without dismounting from their combat vehicles. An attack in dismounted formation will be rare. Infantry tactics based on the opera. tion of a wave of infantrymen will give way to the new tactics of infantry in armored personnel carriers. The use of nuclear weapons will create favorable conditions for the rapid advance of troops. They should be able to utilize quickly the results of nuclear weapons, penetrate boldly through breaches in the enemys com bat formations, avoid both frontal at tacks on strongpoints and straight line movements, carry out flexible ma neuvers, and deal decisive blows to the enemys flank and rear.

MeetingEngagements There has been a sharp rise in the role of meeting engagements, which will be more frequent than before and sometimes may even predominate over other types of combat action. This is due to the firmness of the aims of each side and the improved opportuni ties for attaining them if offensive ac tion is undertaken. Meeting engagements will occur when one meets counterattacking groups or advancing reserves. They will be characterized by an intense struggle to seize and retain the initia tive, a rapid approach of the two sides, attiicks from the line of march with simultaneous deployment from col umns, and freedom of maneuver. On the basis of reconnaissance data and accurate calculations, one must be able to foresee the possibility of a meeting engagement, dispose ones men and means in proper columns, delay the enemy and inflict nuclear and fire strikes, and switch to the attack. A radical change is taking place in the character of an offensive against kme 1965

, SOVIET TACTICS In the course of an offensive, par tieula+y whil~ repelling eounterah tacks by superior enemy forces or foh lowing an unsuccessful meeting en gagem~nt, units and formation may have to go over to the defensive. A switch to the defensive, being a tem porary and forced measure, will more often than not be carried out under enemy prese.ure. In these condition~ the defense will be organized quickly and will be based on nuclear weapons, conventional fires, obstacles, extensive maneuvers, and counterattacks.

combat has become a complicated 1

matter.
1 The realization of firm, flexible, and uninterrupted control of troops at the I present time is unthinkable without the extensive use of technical meals 1
of control. The use of these means and the improvement in the working meth. ~y and staffs permit lmmovemen in the control of .. troops and an increase in the mobil. ity and eff activeness of modern corn. bat means. Because of the large number d troops who take part in modern com The availability of nuclear weapons allowe defending troops to repel an i bined-arms combat, there is a larg{ expenditure of materielparticularl~ attack by euperior enemy forces and fuels, lubricants, and ammunition to completely disrupt. the attack be Their well-timed delivery to tbe troop fore switching rapidly to the offensive. ie made difficult by the ground am In modern combat, questions of con aerial situation. In addition to that trol of troops must be resolved in a much materiel may be destroyed b! new way. The commander needs more nuclear strikes while still in storage and better information in order to This makes it necessary to bring : make decisions. Much importance has new approach to the organization o been added to anticipation, which is rear services in combab. unthinkable witbout well-organized re The nature of modern war als, connaissance and a knowledge of tbe makes new demands on the education nature of modern combat, equipment, training, discipline, and physical con and the organization and tactics of dition of Soviet soldiers. The mail his own and the enemys troops. force in war always was, and remains Combat decisions and coordination men. , of troops, n~w aa never before, depend (
Thus, the revolution in militar,
on many complicated tacticat compu affairs has brought about radica
tations. The very cqncept of coordina changes in tactics. This process o
tion of troops in combat has changed. transformation is continuing withou
The main factor in it is the synchro a break. In order to keep up wit]
nized use of conventional weapons of modern requiremente, commander
destruction along with nuclear strikes, must constantly perfect their militar
and the rapid utilization of their re skill, seek new methods of conductin,
sults by com~lned-arms units and sub combat actions, and steadfastly rais
units. The maintenance of uninter the combat readiness of troops an
rupted communications and constant their ability to accomplish any mili
tary mission,
coordination among troops during

80

Military Revie

ARMORED PERSONNEL ICARRIERS

INCE World War II the Soviet Army has advertised itself as be ing mechanized and highly mobile. A fascination for mobility in warfare, however, can be traced to the very in ception of the Red ArmY and its lead

CaptainW!lliam E. Odom, United States Armg

ership in the civil war of 1918-20 a fascination that was nurtured by the secret German military missions to the Soviet Union in the 1920a and forced to fruition in the counterof fensive against the German invasion in World War II. In tbe postwar years the trend has continued. Today, even the basic Soviet infantry division has

IN THE SOVIET ARMY

km f96i 81

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS given way to an entirely rifle division. . motorized $ ploiting gaps and bypassing resist. ante could be had which dismoun~ assaults; could not possibly enjoy. In spite of their World War II ex. periencee, it does not appear that the Soviets clearly answered this queetion for themselves until the past few years. Their tardiness is not surpris. ing if it is remembered that, under Stalin, Soviet military thought mzde only a few marked advances after the war. OnIy when Khrushchevs de-Sts. Ionization process got underway did Soviet officers openly begin to cow sider the full implications of the use of nuclear weapone in strategy and tactiee. But as awareness of the iru pact of these new weapons, especially tactical nuclear weapons, gained a wider appreciation in the Soviet Army, old doctrine began to face new scrutiny. Modernizing It is in the nameof modernizing for the nuclear battlefield that the ques tion of doctrine for armored carriers has been raised. In the fall of 1961 two Soviet ofticers published an arti cle in Vo~errnyy Vyestnik which out lined certain new doctrinal concepts governing offensive action by motor ized infantry units. The authors de. voted no small attention to the matter of armored carriers and unequivocally pronounced them to be fighting vehi. cles. In the attack, they insisted that , . . . armored carriers are transformed from a means of transport into battle vehicles. They supported their view by otTer ing the cogent observation that the increased tempo of attack and the added firepower provided by the car riers made carrier asssnlts imperative. Of course, they said, in the face of a stubborn defense, the infantry would be forced to dismount and con.
Militsrz Review

Tratisport or Assault Although motorizing every elemen~ of the infantry division has not wrought the upheaval in tactics that the introduction of tank units brought about, it has compelled Soviet mili tary thinkers to answer a funda mental question: Doez the motorized division employ the zame tactical dot. trine formerly used by the infantry division ? Implicit in this question is a more specific one: Is the armored carrier in which the Soviet infantry is now mounted a means of transport, ~ or iz it a fighting vehicle? If the armored personnel carrier is viewed primarily as a means of trans portation, the mobility of the division is certainly enhanced. The division can move swiftly to join a concentra tion for an attack, it can be shifted quickly in the defense, and it enjoys considerable protection against the blast and radiation of nuclear weap bnz. If the division dismounts for an as sault, however, it finds itself with the same limitations imposed on the for mer infantry division. Even though it arrives on the hattletieId earlier, for instance, it attacks no faster. On the other hand, if the carrier is viewed as an assault or fighting vehicle, the nature of the attack changes. The tempo is increased and is only limited by the speed of the armored formations. A fluidlt y in ex-

Captaiti William E. Odom is a Rus sian linguist currently assigned in Germany. He holds a MUsteT8 degree from Columbia Utzz%evsity where he studied at the Russian Inetitute. His article, %okolovskys Strategy Re visited, appeared in the October 1964 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.
82

ARMOREO PERSONNEL duct a conventional assault, But they believed that the disorder induced in the enemys defenses by the nuclear etrikes would more often than not make a mounted assault desirable. Since the authors admitted that some officers denied that attacks could be carried out in mounted formations, we may surmise that a uniform doctrine had not yet been impressed on the officer corps ae a whole before 1961. The editors called for a discussion of the authors viewe; for the better part of 1962 a series of replies aPpeared. If diepute wae mild, those who . heartily approved conducting aseaults

CARRIERS

did not feel that one carrier for each platoon exploited the concept. He went on to reeommend that every equad should have its own carrier. Although the Soviets have made some concession to the demand for an increase in the number of organic carriers. judging from the contemporary discussion of motorized infantry offensive tactics, the goal of one carrier per squad hae not been met. In train ing exerciees two carriers are nOrmally identified ae a platoon-size formation. It ehould be kept in mind, however, that Soviet platoone, companies, and hattalione are generally emaller than

in carriera raieed a question that is enlightening on the belatedness of putting the new doctrine into effect. As one colonel complained no one doubta that the contemporary armored carrier is a fighting vehicle, but he

their counterparts in Western armies. One or two carriers per platoon, therefore, ie not as cramped a situation as it first appears to be. Some of the believers of the new mounted attack doctrine went so far 03

km 1965

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS as to say that a change in branch des ignation was implied in tbe mounted concept. The Russian expression for infantry literally means foot mOv ing, whereas the new name, motor ized riffle, expresses the changed na ture of infantry tacticsriflemen at tacking in motor vehicles. one author insisted in the same vein that tbe term battie line must now. designate an assault line formation of carriers be cause the alternative expression, a line of carriers, spoke only of the vehicles and failed to convey the fact that troops i?ould be mounted in them and might fight from them. No Obviations To be sure, the spontaneity and genuineness of the 1961 article and of the responses is duuM f ul. F.ven as the replies were published, other ar ticles appeared on offensive tactics for motorized rifle unit. in which the new doctrine mm taken for granted. Attentiun wus turned to the pr.,c tical problems of its implementntilm seuting arrangements In the c:lr rier, dismounting drills, and tech. niques for firing on the move. Rut for IILIr purposes, it i+ not so lmpur t:lnt to discover ho\v gl:ully received the new doctrine ~vas us it is tn note that since its offering there h:~ve been no deviations frnm It. Ruther, there given has been intensified attention to the use of carriers as assault vehi cles. In fact, it appears that consider able experimentation has been carried out in ari effort to maximize their
fighting It viet article was author capability. to this purpose that himself a in So an addressed

sively that in a line-abreast forma. tion, such fire, because it is main~ flank directed, forces the, neighboring carriers to button up for protection againet stray rounds end ricochets, thus denying access to the vehicular mounted maehinegun. Without the machinegun, the depth of the assault. line fire toward the enemy is greatly reduced, not to mention that earrier$ cannot engage targets to tbe direct front except with the machinegun. Therefore, deeper and more effective fire by carriers in this formatjon can be gwined mainly by employing vehic. tilur machineguns and only those rifle men who can fire directly over the front deck of the carriek. Other articles in recent months httve also discussed control of carrier fire in general; the problems of de -: \\,hen to dismount in the at tiding tack, if at ali: methods of attack with :Ind \\ ithout tanks: and the use of :imphibim]s carriers in forcing water < ,bst acles. Although there are details and techniques that have not been fully clarified, a coherent picture of the Soviet doctrine currently in prac t ice does emerge from the sum of the writ ing. Major Points With regard to methods of attack, they are remarkably similar to thOse advucated by US doctrine. Carriers may attuck u ith tanks, they may follow the tanks, or they may be integrated in the tank formation; tbes may attack in con\rerging directions; or they mny attack alone. In all instances, the attuck may be mrmnted or dismounted, depending upon the nature of tbe defense. Tbe question nf exactly when to dismount remains ripen. While it is generally agreed that each situation will dictate the decision in particular, the ,

que ~Q* de~

dec

+&

., >

~~ ! ! c \ 1 ;

~, ~ ( ~ I ! } 1 ; 1
~

in the spring of 1964 when he examined in great detail the advan tages of and limitations on indiv~dual weapon tire through the battle ports of the carrier. He concluded persua 84

Review M!litary

ARMORELI PERSONNEL Iuestion of who will decide the matis not clear. At least one author Ieclared.that the platoon leader may [ecide; there has also been mention

CARRIERS

er

to bypass it than to dismount and overcome it, To minimize assaults on foot and to maintain the pace of the offensive, it has been suggested that

. -.
. . .
.--7 .. +--< -.-. .- ~ -. -z. # * ------ A&
: e---b * ,.. >?* .
-..,

.
-*

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)ther Soviet articles in recent months have discussed the use of amphibious armored personnel carriers to force water obstacles if retaining this prerogative in the lands of a higher commander. Nonetheless, the implications of Dismounting for an attack are fully Iwpreciated. Soviet articles repeatedly )oint out that speed and maneuver ~bility are greatly reduced when mops leave their carriers. In the So ,iet image of the effects of nuclear veapons on the defense, there is little iace for dismounted troops when bey can remain in their carriers. iven when organized defense is found till intact, it may be more profitable one1965 small groupsmen from one or two carriersmay dismount temporarily, defeat a target or position, and quickly remount to join the formation wbieb has not stopped. Techniques and control of fire from carriers has also been a lively topic. Beyond tiring small arms, stress is placed on throwing grenades from carriers in an effective way, usually on the order of the vehicle com mander. It is also clearIy realized that to utilize fully the carrier-mounted machinegun, the gunner must be 85

ARMOREO PERSOWIEL CARRIERS trained to fire on the move, and he must also know how to fire in suP port of disrn~unted infantry. Numer ous schemes for range training and for t~aining exercises are offered to impart these skills. It has heen argued, too, that the squad leader cannot service the ma chinegun oh the carrier because, in the event he must dismount, a replace ment gunner would not be oriented with respect to targets and the direc tion of attack. Too, night attacks are considered as normal operations. Only grenade throwing from tbe carrier may be increased due to the restricted visibility for firing small arms. The Soviets believe that the first step in fire control is to divide the targets between tanks and carriers. How this delineation is to be made during an assault is not clear, but it appears an assumption is made that
thick-skin be matter manders fire, the gets. and use will are control of tracers and solve thin-sk]n readily, itself. \vill to be responsible by targets and Vehicle for designate voice thus can the com carrier and tar distinguished

The fire support role of carriers for dismounted assaults is not theo retically neglected, although, as some writers observe, commanders tend to forget that they have this firepower at hand. In addition to speed and maneuver ability, protection from residuaI radi ation is given as an important reason for placing emphasis on fighting from the carriers. Naturally, because car riers afford considerable protection through speed of movement and ar mored cover, remaining mounted is considered desirable. Generally speaking, then, the So

viets view armored carriers as off,, . ing three major assets: They are fighting vehicles. They are also a means of tratn portatiorr. They provid~ appreciable prot~ tion against nuclear radiation on t~ battlefield. A US reader cannot help but t struck by tbe idea that much Sovi{ thinking is either based on US ta, tical doctrine br is purely a reaetic to it. In arguing whether or not a mored formations should stop for c ordination before crossing the line , departure, one Soviet author point{ out that this halt is, exactly wh weapon$ like Davy Crockett are d signed to target on. Terms such forward edge of the defense, descri tions of a fluid battle area, bypassi] strong points, and the like, all betr: a certain US influence. Soviet doctrine for motorized ri elements tells us much about thf views on motorized divisions. Un they implemented the idea of fighti from the carrier, offensive speed tbe face of any resistance was lik( to be similar to what it had been World War IL Tbe capability to f ploit a fluid situation has clearly be increased. Implicit in this conclusion, course, is the assumption that sm unit leadership in the Soviet Army of the caliber necessary to carry ( swift and deep penetrations, f quently changing directions of atta operating on fragmentary orders, a daring to exploit fleeting opportu ties. It certainly did not gain t reputation in World War II on a broad scale.

86

MiIilary Re!

Colonel Donovan P. YeueIl, Jr., United States

Armg, Retired

fi HANGE in Soviet militarv uolU icy has been fermenting f& ~ev eral years. Lndoubtedly, the whole Communist coalition is now in a cOm plex traumaa trauma of which we shouldbe chary. The removal of Nikita S. Khrushchev, the continued Soviet exploits in space, the growing Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile and worldwide submarine threats, the ceaseless Sine-Soviet waging of sub versive wars of national liberation, and the Chinese Communists admis sinn to the nuclear club, all will add Upto doubt. Yet, the Free World can expect, perhaps, a clearer picture of what is real change and what is fiction. Whether cant Cumrrmnist June 1965 or not there is any signifi say, the connection military between,

power

complex

and tbe Moscow-Peking rift remains to be seen. It behooves us to delve deeply into whether and what changes there are, and then to interpret them prudently. The Free World has a fair compe tence for analyzing the separate parts of the economic, ideological, political, and operational military facets of the power complex. There are, however, few accomplished analysts of inte grated grand strategy, of the pro tracted conflict of our time, and of shifts in high-level military policy in particular. Yet, as the current turbu lence becomes open season for specula tion on the true meaning of this hi atus period, the bulk of tbe vocal savants will have backgrounds remote from tbe subject. Glib, ready analyses will come from academicians, Krem 87

SOVIET STRATEGY linologists, politicians, scientists, and jour~alists,. @ reinforced by other armchair strategists. Little will he said initially by the smallz fraction of sound and serious studente of the elusive art of etrategic intelligence. The virtual handful of hktorians and military anaIysts who comprise our resource of real ezper tise will not be heard, mainly because they know that for awhile there is nothing conclusive that can be known. Our more reliable strategic evaluators reaiize from experience that to sound off until the elusive bits and pieces of valid intelligence can be fitted int~ a meaningful pattern is not only irre sponsible but could be disastrous. Indications No one can say for certain what the present situation portends. The Com munist are, indeed, inscrutable no matter what their propaganda may say. Little can be done, however, to induce silence or even cauti~n into those pundits who will interpret so freely and variously that the man in the s~ieet will be hopelessly confused and the statesman most hewiidered. What can be done is for the mili tary professionals and some gifted nonexpert typesplus those in a se lect few of the think factories and in the amorphous intelligence com munity who wish responsibly for a sound course of national actionto deai with the events as they unfold. These better anaiyets should question vigorously and challenge the easy an. swers that are already flowing from the self-styled experts. They also must enjoin the peddiers of easy solutions not to play to the grandstand.

( a B O
P ~

Donovan P. Yeuell, Jr., United States Army, Retired, has since 1960 been in advanced program planning in the aerospace industry ~ and a consultant on rnilifary-techrao logical problems. He holds a Masters degree from George fow?c University, and is a graduate of the V. S. -Army Command and General Staff College and the U. S. Army War Collsge.
=1

Sad Examples f{ Recent history ie full of sad SK. amples of faulty interpretations and reaction to strategic developments, The evente eurromrding the Koran i Conflict; the Congo; the Hungarian uprieirrg; southeast Asia; the missile gap; the Ekwiet achievement of sore? vestige of a deployed ballistic missile \ defense; the incredible gambit of SQ d viet missiles in Cuba; and the unex. 1 petted burgeoning of Soviet nuclea r submarinesthese need only be men . \ tioned to indicate the problem. We: have bungled over using what we; knew, often because of incorrect or; pat interpretation. Our leaders either jumped at wrong conclusions or dem onstrated poor confidence in them , eelves and the Ameri~an public. It seems almost a national charac teristic that we do not make use of what we know, even when the national interests may be at stake. What is needed in the present critical period : is thisthe United States should de- I mand the highest quality from the ex- ! pert analysts of all forms of intelli gence and then rely upon them until proved wrong. Let the amateurs play sleuth for the public if they must, but < let them not play with the countrys ~ interests. We cannot afford to have in- tellectuai parlor games when trying ~ to G2 worid politics. A recent case in point, relating to ! the present situation, will illustrate. \ For several years now there has been ~ considerable attention paid to a snp- ! posed military dialogue underway in the Soviet Union. , . The central exhibit has been a book ~
,

88

MilitatyReview

SOVIET STRATEGY edited by Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, ex-Chief of the Soviet General Staff. By virtual acceptance of the validity of Sokolovskys work, the seekers of panaceas have urbanely explained away the whole range of Soviet policy for dealing with everything from biers in strategic intelligence that we have taken everything into acconnt, there is some reason to doubt this. Settling between what is real and what is declaratory in Communist pronouncement is like solving a tough detective story. In this recent

A rmvNews Fectwea The United States should seek a balanced mix of armed power capable of responding selectively across the full spectrum of Communist military capabilities

wars tactical

of liberation, nuclear

to conventional operations, exchange control and to

and all-out to

thermonuclear the finieb from

a fight world

to wrest

of the

Like beauty in the capitalists. the eye of the beholder, the book means many things to many men, It is reasonable to suggest that the So viets might be stepping well out of character to make our job so easy as to tell all in one book, or even in many books. The point is that we do not know what to believe; we have a long way to go before we can decipher those
maaters they and can of duplicity assess both with the the ease that capabilities

Soviet military dialogue, the real is sues are further confounded by a rash of collateral evidence. Although noth ing compares in stature with the Soko lovsky book, many other indicators, from sources that may be more mean ingful, tend to contradict, ignore, or denigrate that publication. The trick is to know which of the flow of Soviet utterances to believe.

intentions of our open society. AItbough I have been assured by dab

For the most part, Weetern inter pretation of the Soviet military doc trine disputeif there ie one at aH is at least as baffling as Communist duplicity at its best. Our experts are sOmewhat aware that other noieee have been made besides thoee in the Sokolovsky book. However, when the best in Western opinion is added up,
89

June 1965

sovlET 5nATEGY this single hook-out of a discordant collection of possible evidenc+has been swalloiwd almost whole. After two years it is still common to find Ameri$an reviews of reviews, not only of Sokolovsky but of what one expert thinks of other experts views of it all. This kind of merry chase can lead one far from the truth. Prudence In terms of cold war conflict, the Soviet Union may have opened up some of her society to Western view, but not much. The Soviets may be as fearful of nuclear war as we are and want to appear as more peaceable char-. acters. But there is little to suggest that they want to make our strategic planners happy with some free intelli gence. After so many past mistakes in interpreting Soviet intentions, one would expect prudence on the part of US military analysts. Itis not surprising that th~ Soko lovsky book concentrates oar total war, ranging in scope from nuclear gen eral destruction of an opponents en tire warmaking potential, to deci sive operations of ground and naval forces, to guerrilla and political war fare, subversion, and terror. This is, after all, simply an up-to-date and more sophisticated version of West ern strategic thought, post-World War II. It also conforms to the Soviet view of a total Communist world. Although the USSR has not in modern times launched a major war in the tradi tional seirse, she could hardly he ex pected to lag behind in incorporating or dealing with the main features of our doctrine. A striking feature of the Sokolov sky treatise is that it does not pro. claim the doctrine of strategic nu clear attack in the abstract Iangnage of military theory. Rather, it is aimed 90 specifically and in detail at the West ern alliance. It is almost as if to frighten us with our own conceptk Meanwhile, the actual conduct of Corn. munist indirect war goes forward without hesitancy at many points around tbe globe. Which line of their expansionism should we acceptthe open challenge of all-out war or their actual practice of probing and stealth? Hardly anyone in authority seems to have stopped to question Sokolov skys book seriously. Americans should be able to feel confident that such a publication is carefully and ob jectively analyzed. This important, but possibly ambiguous, work deals almost @irely with advertising a So viet acceptance of strategic nuclear war accompanied by the auxiliary op. erations of conventional forces during the mopup period; only a glancing blow is made at the local, the para. military, and the insurgency opera. tions, even thougti these have been, in fact, the main instrument of Commu. nist aggression since 1945. Intentions The problem is to determine what one may accept from open publics. tions as being valid, and what may be a cover or diversion. In recent years it bas become more plausible to find true Soviet intentions in Soviet ut terances than during tbe paranoid era of Stalin. But still the interpretation of what is declaratory and what is rea calls for a considerable skill in de ciphering Communist dialectic am propaganda techniques. In developing a facility at such in terpreting, it is worthwhile to 100i at other than the military facets Oi Soviet world politics. In line witi sound principles of the protracted con flict for worid domination, the non rpilitary groundwork for future ac Military Reviw

SOVIET STRATEGY tion appears to have been well laid beforehand. Some two or three years before the Sokoloveky book, for exam ple, its counterpartein real political warfare guidance to the Communist Partiesbegan to appear in Soviet open literature along with declaratory protestation of peaceful coexistence. Often these were Soviet academic journals in economics, foreign affairs, or sociology. C[oaked by a hoet of declaratory statements and achievement in the diplomatic, scientific, and economic fields, the Communist politico-military probes into Latin America, Africa, and tbe Far East were all clearly sig naled in journals. The plot on the Sokolovsky work thickeus around several other tomes of Soviet doctrine that are notable for their lack of mention about this book which the West has heralded as gos ! pel. It should be no surprise that the truth from Moscow might not appear 100 percent in a form directly and conveniently aimed at Western minds. k stands to reaeon that the Commn niets generally would prefer ue to be so literal or so preoccupied with somef thing else that we will be unaware of their true intention. i Chain of Events t Let us consider the following chain of evente: Shortly after the Sokolovsky book was published in Moscow in Au ~ fust 1962, bnt before it was heralded 3 m We5tern translations, a emaller but ; authoritative booklet appeared deal , ing with the same subject. This trea tise made no reference to the Sokolov 1 sky work. Thie second book wae by ! colonel s. A, Tyushkevich, published early in 1963 in Krrzsnavrz Zwsda (Red Star). It made no appreciable raention of IocaI wars. Although the author dealt with much of the same subject matter as Sokolovskys more dietinguished experte, he saw fit to ignore his ostensibly euperior doc trinaires. The Tyushkeyich critiqqe was noteworthy also because for the first time it laid out the possibilities of ac-cidental war. Was he simply try ing to reinforce Sokolovsky, or was he trying to set his own work up as a strawman ? Why did Tynshkevich re fer assidi~usly to Western writers on the same subject, yet ignore hie own high oracle ? At approximately the same time, a series of two articles, The USSR Armed Forcee in the Contemporary State, also appeared in Red Star. These were written by an air force of ficer Lieutenant General N. Sbytov, and, taking only paeeing notice of the Tyushkevich piece, proclaimed the might of the Soviet armed forces to deal with a rocket-dominated nuclear war. But Sbytov also ignored any ref erence to Sokolovskys more exteneive and presumably more authoritative treatment of the same subject. Sbytov also bypassed the matter of local or limited wars. Yet, he reiterated the main themes of Sokolovskys more ex haustive tract. What is wrong with Sokolovsky in this picture? In September 1963 Sbytov pub lished another treatise in small book form. In effect, this wae an indirect review and rejection of Sokolovekys all-out nuclear war theory. But why did it wait for one year and one month to appear? And why not repudiate Sokolovsky head on? This little docu ment may be a key to the Sokolovsky mystery case because Sbytov, a senior official in the active high command of the Soviet armed forces, focused al most exclusively on the USSRs need to cope with the problems of local and

km 1965

SOVIET STRATEtiY limiied warfare. This book, if it follows ,th~ pattern of Communist switches in doctrine or of clarifying the real meaning of propaganda gam bits, yirtualIy repudiates the placing of emphasis on regular and nuclear forces by not mentioning Sokolovskys ostensibly creditable and credible book. Sbytov even bypasses himself; he ignores his own irticles on the same theme and chooses the Tyushke vich treatment to derogate. This could be at least a triple-cross operation. Out of all this it is clear that some thing is inconsistent in the Free Worlds view of Sowet military dot. trine. These and related events need to be taken together; none standing alone speaks for itself. Historically, there is nothing unusual in the device of setting up a respected spokesman ( Sokolovsky ) for public consumption nrrd then using a debate between a mi nor member of tbe nobility ( Tyushke vich ) and a higher court chamberlain ( Sbytov ) to communicate the true word to the believers.
As a general rule, real differences of Soviet policy simply do not come into tbe open, and the repudiation technique is one familiar to students of Communist dialectic,! evolution. Not much is clear about all this, except that nothing seems clear. But there is enough room to wonder if the Sokolovsky big war doctrine is any more or less worthy of serious con sideration than the Sbytov summons to the call of proxy and limited war fare.

flexible forces. But the real issue is whether or not we shall be psychoIog. ically prepared to employ whatever force it takes to prevent COmmunist aggression in different fOrms. The United States is unbeatable, but only if sbe is intelligent in interpreting such matters. We can lose in any kind of actiw hostilities if we are caught unread~ to meet the next Communist thrust Time is pressing if the Soviets art intending to go more vigorously tn ward either the nuclear or tbe lncs war ends of the spectrum of conflict or somewhere in between. Just th( time of translating and analyzinj what they say and write could handi cap our reactions, even if we properl: interpreted these guileful adversaries How much more urgent it become: when our machinery lacks the wit am responsiveness to assess what we hav, avaikihle. It would make much sense for th, Soviets to convince us that strategi nuclear warfare is really their mail preoccupation. Should the Unite States accept this theme, it could s extend our defense expenditures an, shape our thinking that neither th ability nor the state of mind to de: with lesser forms of conflict wnul, abide w,ith us. Is not such a gambi more in keeping with Communist PSI chological tactics than the openhande signaling of their true intentions i openhanded publications? This discussion does not pass judg ment on whether th[ Soviets are com mitted to a, total nuclear war posture, to local warfare, or to their version of controlled and flexible response, A more basic question raised here is th}s Are we equipped with and do our leaders use the machinery to know what the West should believe ?

The United States, of course, should seek a balanced mix of armed power capable of responding selectively across the full spectrum of Commu nist military capabilities. Perhaps we do have a fair Mend of varied and

92

Military

Review

Richard P. Weinert

INCE 1 July 1949 the United States Army Advisory Group, Korea ( KMAG ) has been engaged in building a modern army in South Korea. Today, the Republic of Ko rea Army is the fourth largest in the world and plays an important part in defending the Free World in the Far East. In both war and peace, KMAG has struggled against numerous problems to form an effective fighting force. What few members of KMAG realize, however, is that many of those problems are not unique to 20th-century Ko rea, for KMAG is not the first US military advisory group to function in the Land of the Morning Calm. Almost 80 years ago Korea was the scene of one of the first American attempts at government-sponsored military assistance to a fo:-eign country. The story of that American military mis sion to Korea is intimately involved in the troubled history of that country and the American diplomatic attitude prior to the Japanese annexation in 1910. The first Westerners had arrived in Korea in 1653 when a Dutch ship was wrecl$ed on Quelpart Islandnow known as CheJu and more famous as the site of Korean War prisoner-of-war camps. During the 19th century an increasing number of attempts were made by several West 1965 93

KMAG ern Powers to open Korea to trade. Both France and the United States used their naval forces to take puni titie action against the Koreans, and in 1871 US Marines stormed a Korean fort; the US naval units were even tually withdrawn without seriously affecting Korean isolation. For an other decade Korea remained the Her mit Kingdom. The Japanese were the first to break, Koreas isolation. Although, for cen turies, Korea had been theoretically a vassal state of China, the Chinese actually exercised little control. In 1875 the Koreans made the mistake of firing on a Japanese warship; this gave Japan the excuse for finally ex erting enough force to make Korea, in 1876, ratify a treaty opening diplo matic relations. The effect of the treaty was to recognize Korea as an independent nation. New Difficulties Korean politics, at best, had always been chaotic, but the introduction of the Japanese created new difficulties. A struggle for power had been going on for years between the ex-Regent, Prince Tai-wunwho also happened to be the father of the Kingand the members of the Min family, to which the Queen belonged. In addition to this, there was a growing liberal fac tion among tbe educated Koreans who desired greater contact with the out side world and sweeping reforms at home. At first the Queen and the libera]! joined together to back the introdw. tion of Japanese influence into Korei. In 1882 the liberals persuaded Khg Ko-jong to selert 200 young men and engage a Japanese officer to drill them in military tactics. At the same time, another group of 14 young men was sent to Japan to study at a Tokyo roil. itary school. To back up Japanese in fluence, a Legation guard of severs hundred troops was sent to Seoul. 11 soon became evident, however, thai as the liberal reforms were carrie( out, the power of the Mins wduld de crease. The Mins increasingly becam{ identified with the conservative party 1 Mutiny . Unfortunately for the first effort a Korean military reform, while the 20( students were plentifully fed an{ clothed, the Royal Guard of some 3,70( men was neglected and finally reache, the point of near starvation. Officia corruption drove the Royal Guard t mutiny. The Japanese instructor wa murdered in the street and the othe Japaneee driven from the city.

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Using the mutinous soldiers, Print tr< Tai-wun seized the King and drov re out the Queens party. A force of som de 3,000 Chinese soldiers soon arrived a Seoul and put down the mutiny, mar W aging to trick the ex-Regent and shi him off to Tientsin. The Queen an ta her followers then returned and agai bt took over the government. With the help of China, and indi rectly recognizing Chinese suzerainty Richard P. Weinert is a historian over Korea, Commodore R. W. Sbu with the Current History Branch, Of fice of the Chief of Military History, feldt of the US Navy made a treaty Department of the Army. He received with Korea in May 1882 which opened his Masters degree from American the country for the first time to Amer University, was assigned for Jive years icans. The Koreans, and especially the . to the Ofice of Military Archives of Khg, were quick to realize that the the National Archives, and is - also United States was probably the least serving as Secretary of the American likdy Western nation to try and take Military Institute.

co)

94

Military fkwiew

KMAG
over Korea. For this reason, the Ko reans, as soon as the formal diplo matic relations were opened, began to request American technical assistance in modernizing the country. On 19 October 1883 Minister Lu cius H. Foote reported to the State Department that the King of Korea desired a US officer to instruct and drill his troops and was willing to confer on such an instructor the sec ond military rank in the Kingdom. As an indication that serious. military re forms were contemplated, the Korean Government purchased 4,000 breechIoading ritles in the United Statee. Ths King anxiously awaited a reply to his request as the Chinese and Jap anese more and more openly contended for control of the country, and several other nations had expressed an in terest in taking over the military in struction of the army. In 1884 the Korean military stu dents returned from the Tokyo mili tary school. In the autumn of 1884 t\velve of these students, with tbe backing of the Japanese, attempted a coup against the Mins, but Chinese troops again intervened to crush the rebellion; seven of the military stu dents were killed.

make the decision, promptly passed the buck. Sheridan was not one to eby from taking a position, and promptly re plied: I cannot favor a proposition which

embraces the idea of permitting an ofieer of our army to be detailed to duty in some foreign country which does not inure to the benefit of our military sev-vice. Regardless then of the question of crdtiuating our rela. tions with Cores, an~ oficer who ac cepts such serv$ce should res{gn his commission, and in view of the fact that the King of Cores seems to de u,ho ma~ be stilt re sire an officer tained in our service, I am obliged to say there is no one whom I would designate.
Consent of Congress Lincoln phrased his reply to FreIinghuysen a little more politely and stated that under Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution, no active officer could accept a position under a for eign ruler without tbe consent of Con gress. The State Department took another tack, and in January 1885 wrote Lin coln that before replying to Foote it would like tbe War Department to re. quest permission for the miseion from Congress. Lincoln promptly fired back that only the President could ask Con gress, and since it was the State De partments problem, it was their re sponsibility to ask the President. The State Department tried this, and President Chester Arthur for warded tbe request to Congress. Con gress promptly lost the request in the legislative shuffle and nothing more was heard of it, In September 1885 Ensign George C. Foulk, who had moved up to charg6 daffaires from naval attach6 in Seoul, wrote Wash 95

Wonderment Tbe Koreans may have been inscru table Orientals to most Americans, but what was transpiring in Wash 1 ington would have left the Koreans wondering about tbe Occidentals, too. The State Department naturally had referred Footes dispatch to the War Department. On 6 November 1884, no reply having been received, Secretary of State Frederick T. Frelinghuysen inquired what Secretary of War Rob ert T. Lhrcvln intended to do about the matter. Lincoln, intending that General Philip H. Sheridan should 1 J~1965

KMAG ington that th; Koreans were still making military preparations and waiting for the American instructors. P. G. von Mollendorf, a German who wae qdvisor to the Korean Foreign Office, apparently tried to block some of these military purchases, but Foulk arranged to buy six Gatlirtg guns and a supply of ammunition for the Ko rean Government, Fotdk reported that only the Capital Guards of four bat talions were organized in Western style and were well practiced with riflee, uniformed, and well garrisoned, but sadly ira need of training in the manual of arma, company and platoon drill, and fighting tactics, Tire War Department filed this report without comment. No Action In October 1886 Foulk wrote that the King almost daily sent an army officer to inquire about when the in structors were coming. The Koreans could not wait much longer and were considering a German offer. The State Department again requeeted Congress for authority to send the miesion. The Senate Committee on Military Affairs reported favorably on the resolution, but the Senate once again took no ac tion. In 1887 Frederick Schwatka, a former lieutenant in the US Army, expressed interest in the job; nothing came of this, Jn February of that same year, Minister William W. Rockhill ex plained t~e cause of the delay to the Koreans, wbo agreed that they did not require a Regular Army officer as long as the instructor was competent. Rockhill forwarded to Washington the terms of compensation offered by the . Koreans. In June the Koreans sent word that the Ruseians were vev in terested in the job, but were being held off with the State Department promise of instructors. Another re quest for Regular officers was sen~t, Congress. For some strange reason, the fac that the Koreans had withdrawn thei original request for Regular officer was ignored by the War Departmen! In September the War Department in formed the State Department that i had no authority to do anything unt Congress acted. The State Departmen replied that the Koreans were not nol asking for Regulars and, in view of th failure of Congress to act, wanted t know if the War Department had an~ one competent to recommend. Shel idan was still not interested and ton the posifion that the Koreans were m offering adequate compensation to a tract anyone worthwhile. In November the Secretary of Stat ha was able to say that the Koreans
increased No the compensation &ere, he ad wn ,! c1 H tad ;Om. he 037: :0101 :urr her ~rici for serv tes~ whe

ferf A his wae par

188 par notl

reply was received to this lettc and the State Department again i] qu ired in December. With no more e cuses available, Sheridan on 13 DI cember 1887 endorsed tbe letter: . . . with the recommendation th[

Colonel Wm. McE. Dve of this cit~ 1 designated as Chief lnstrwcto~ az Major E. H. Cummins of Alezandri Va. and Major J. G. Lee of Ph ilade phia, Penna., as Assistant Irmtructor
Interesting Figure Nothing is known of the bacl crounds of Cummirrs and Lee. bl William McEntire Dye is one of the meet interesting military figures of the period. A West Pointer, he had graduated in 1853, standing two above Sheridan. During the Civil War he had served as colonel of the 20th Iowa Infantry and as acting brigade com mander, receiving the brevet of brig adier general. Dye had risen to the rahk of major in the 4th Infantry in

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Military Review
1

KMAG the Regular Army after the war, but had been discharged in 1870 at his ownrequest when the size of the Army had been reduced. of trouble. The oflicere were nIJW treated to a taste of Korean bureauc racy, and they haggled with the Ko reans until 9 May, when a two-year contract waa finally eigned. By June a class of about 40 young men had been selected and uniformed and were receivjng daily instruction to prepare them ae drill officere.

He then went to Egypt where he had joined many former Union and Confederate officers in the service of the Khedive. For five years between 1E73 and 1878 he had served as a colonel in the Egyptian Army. Re Difficulties Begin turning to the United States, he had Trouble between the advisors and then been Superintendent of the Dis the Koreans began almost immedL trict of Columbia Metropolitan Police ately. Under the terms of the contract for three years before he took a civil the adviaore salaries were to be paid service positiion with the Pension Bu monthly in advance, In June, Minister reau. He was eerving in that position Hugh A. Dinsmore complained to the vhen the Korean aesigmnent was of Korean Foreign Office that no salaries fered. had heen paid, that the house given Although Sheridan had finally given to Dye and Cummins had no water, his approval, the State Department and that soldiers had not been de was not notified. When the State De tailed as orderlies for tbe inetructore. partment again inquired in January Dye wae accustomed to foreign ar 1888what wae happening, a War De mies, but Lee and Cummine appar. partment clerk with bureaucratic logic entIy eoured on the job almost from noted: tbe start. I do not see what the State Depavt The Korean@ were still interested.in went have to do with the 3 persons modernizing the ordnance of their mil suggested by Gent. Sheridan. These itary forcee. The War Department, gentlemen have been treating person this time apparently without any de h the Covean Minister arrang ally wit laying tactice, furnished riflee and ing their own terms, compensation, ammunition used by the US Army, etc. This Dept. does not accredit these The Koreans then requeeted the de ojicers. scriptions and plans of American tor. pedoesin actuality, minesand an krival
officer to serve as instructor in their Despite the bureaucratic enarl, the three US military advieors arrived in use. The requeet wae relayed to the Seoulon 7 April 1888, Soon after their Navy Department, but the State De arrival in Seoul, F. J. H. Nieustead partment commented that before any ~ joined the advisory group. Nieustead more instructors were cent some sub stantial reerdts ehould be obtained had served in the US Navy and then from thoee already on the scene. lb had een connected with the Consulate ~ at Kobe, Japan. Friction had beerr building in tbe But the long delay had greatly advisory group, krnd Major Lee soon confidence in the became the center of raging contro 1 shaken Korean versy. In February 1889 the State De United States, and it appeared to the partment was informed that Lee was Koreans that the United Statee was accused of reading the confidential anuncertain friend to lean on in time I , hire1965 97

if

KMAG dispatches in the Legation. Lee also had a passion for writing letters to the editoi. Iri both American and Eng lish-language Chinese newspapers he attacked Korean officials, members of the L~gation, and other members of the advisory group. Services Terminated On 18 September 1889 Dye notified Lee and Cummins that their services had been terminated by the Korean Government. Cummins discharge seems to have come about because of a general disregard for his duties and an overfondness for the bottle. Lee was neglecting hk duties for his vit- riolic literary efforts. There then ensued a lengthy cor respondence between Minister Dinsmore, whose antipathy for Lee was evident, and the Korean Foreign Of fice. Not until February 1891, and after Lee had advanced some outra geous claims, could Dinsmore Anally pressure the Koreans into paying what was due the two officers, and they at last left the country. The military advisory effort encoun tered other difficulties. Two major problems, which were to plague their KMAG successors in later years, nul lified the efforts of Dye and Nieu stead: The advisors could not speak Ko rean, and the Koreans could not speak English, despite the efforts of the Royal English School which was founded in 1886 with three US teach ers. Too, Dye and his assistant could advise, but they could not command tbe Korean troops; the Korean officers were totally ignorant of drill or strat egy and had little control over their men. Chaos was growing in Korea. The conservative faction in Korea, increasingly supported by the Min 98 family and the Chinese, had taken eon. trol of the governinent. RevORs, sp$ radically broke out in the provinces, with apparent Chinese approval, and the Korean Army proved powerless to restore order.

~t,e Qe(

Miu IJfd wun Que anw Growing Concern The situation caused growing con. ~ tern in Japan, and when the Koreans nigl called in Chinege troops to quell the was revolts, the Japanese sent in more Dye troops to protect their nationals, snd the thsn used them to capture Seoul. The proi gua Min faction was expelled and Prime Tai-wun, suddenly finding himself an and the same side as the liberals, was am) wez brought hack hy the Jappnese to form Wti a government. Ew Fighting broke out between the Japanese and Chinese in July 1894, fro and by the end of the year, the Chi? pn nese troops had been driven from the country, the rebellious forces had been for of crushed, and the Japanese had firm his control of the Korean Government. sta The reform movement was rapidly ~* pushed, the conservative ex-Regent rez serving only as a figurehead. an( Japanese control of the government Go also affected the Korean Army and for th{ all practical purposes ended tbe use fulness of the Dye mission. The five : regiments in Seoul, which bad been ~h independent and separate commands, ** now were placed under the controI of fa a new War Department and reorga~ nized. The tactics they had been ~ ~f taught, which must have, in part, been ; th influenced by Dye, were dropped and I Japanese tactics introduced. From g, that time on, the two remaining US cc advisors limited their efforts to the ~ palace guard. C( In 1895 Korea threw off the last vestiges of Chinese suzerainty. That summer Count Inouye, the Japaueae i Minister who had managed to preserve ~ Military Review J

KMAG at least a semblance of peace with the Queen, was replaced by Viecount Miura, a reactionary and bloodthirsty officiaL The influence of Prince Tai wun immediately increased and the Queenbegan openly to oppoee the Jap aneee-backed government. Miura waa a direct man. On the night of 8 October 1895 the Queen was murdered in the palace. General Dye appears to have been aware of the plot and to have done his best to protect the royal family, but the guards at the palace had been reduced and tbe Japanese carted off the palace ammunition and most of the good weapons, leaving only rusty guns which lacked locks, caps, and bayonets. Evsn Dyes own weapons were stolen from hie quarters. The terrified King, now a virtual prisoner of the Japaneee and fearing for bis life, requested a trusted group of American civilians, in addition to hie own two American officere, to stand guard nightly, On the night of 28 November a large group of Ko reans attempted to etorm the palace and free the King. The pro-Japanese Government minieters, fearing that they would meet the fate of so many previoue Korean politician, tried to seize the King and use him for a shield, but were beaten off by the Americans. The attack on the palace failed. In the following February, the King and Crown Prince slipped out of the palace and sought sanctuary in the Russian Legation. With tbe defeat of China, the strug gle for power in Korea shifted to a contest between Rueeia and Japan. General Dye, seeing that nothing more could be done in Korea, returned to the United Statee in 1896, bringing to an end the first US military advis ory miesion to Korea. In October 1896 Dr. Horace N. Al len, the American charg~ daffaires, reported that the Korean Ambassador to the coronation of Czar Nicholas II had returned with a Russian military miseion consisting of a colonel, sur geon, two lieutenants, and 10 noncom missioned officers. For the time being, tbe Japanese had been thwarted. Within 10 years, though, they would expel the Russians and bring an end to Korean independence. The military miseion to Korea had not been an official US undertaking, but it did have the full support and de facto sponsorship of the State De partment. At the came time, the US Government aided Korea with teach ers and agricultural improvements. The failure of US p$dicy in Korea dur ing this period, and so indirectly a cause of the failure of the military mission, was the refusal of the United States to become involved in the de teriorating political situation in the peninsula. Throughout the period, the United States showed a dieposition to stand aside in the face of the interna tional struggle for Korea and to rec ognize tbe ascendancy of any success ful power. The failure of the United States to follow a firm policy as a new balance of power arose in the Far Eaet was to bear bitter fruit in 1941 and again in 1950. Today, KMAG and the firm stand taken by the United States when the independence of the Republic of Korea was threatened chow how far we have progreased in meeting our responsibilitiee in Asia.

June1965

99

still A 2ve ese

ies,

UNITED ROTC Scholarship The Departments of the Army and Air Force have established a new Re. serve Officers Training Corps ( fiOTC ) schcdarship program whkh will provide financial assistance to 2,000 qualified students beginning in Sep tember 1965. Authority for the new program is the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 (Public Law 88-647), signed by the President 13 October 1964. Beginning this fall, the Army will award 400 four-year scholarships to first-year students and 600 two-year scholarships to seleeted studen~s who have already completed their second year of the Army ROTC program. The Air Force will offer 1,000 scholar ships t,o selected juniors in its fouryear ROTC program. Both services are working on plans to expand the program to other classes. The new scholarships will pay stu dents $50 a month plus their tuition, texthooks, and laboratory fees. Upon graduation from college and success ful completion of their ROTC studies, the scholarship students are required to accept, if offered, either a Regular or Reserve commission as a second lieutenant and to serve at least four years on active duty. The Navy has had a similar scholar ship program since 1947.DOD release.
The ylLITARV SP...lb1U1tY for REVIEW

STATES Instrument Trainer The Army recentIy conducted iti first preproduetion review of a new fixed-wing, twin-engine instrument trainer. Designated the B-55 Baron by th(
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The Baron from competitive evaluation amoni three airframe manufacturers. Th selection followed an aircraft evalua tion test program conducted by th Army Aviation Test Board. Tbe new aircraft will be used a a primary twin-engine inetrumen trainer by the Army Aviation Scho( Instrument Training Division at For Rucker, Alabama. It is reported that the first fiv trainers are scheduled to be delivere to the Army in August 1965.New release.

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Cmm.d in the MI LIT.4RY NOTES section of thk r.. a...ry of Infom:tbn .o.tai..d
b Iimtio. lmIISare rmntod .s . .erv#.e t. ~he readers. NO offi.i.l md.rrmn.nt of the views. wini..s. O, f ..t.al Stat enw.ts is intended .The Ed.tor.

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100

Military Revie

MILITARY NOTES Distillation Unit A mobile sea water distillation unit, developed by the US Army Engineer Research and Development Laborato ries, has been type classified by the Army following extensive tests (MR, Nov 1962, P 100). Type classification earmarks equipment for military pro curement as the need arises. The 3,000-pound aluminum unit can be trailer mounted or airlifted by hel icopter. It produces drinking water from the sea or brackieh water at a rate of 150 gaIlons per hour, and can drinking water from also supply
chemically nated and radioactively contami sources.

Trailing Rotor A new aircraft that could take off and hover like a helicopter and fly at speeds of a jet airplane has been de signed recently by an aircraft manu facturer. Engineers calI it a trailing rotor desigrf, because helicopter-type rotor bladee mounted at the wingtips could be folded in flight to trailing posi tions behind streamlined pods. Helicopter-type rotor systems at the wingtipe would provide vertical take-

The new plant requires leas fuel than other transportable distillation units because it uses the latent heat of vaporization to heat incoming sea
water. When it enters the Army sup ply system,

it will replace three distil lation modeIs.US Army release.

Turbocharger For Standard Engines Turbocharging is being investi gated at the US Army Engineer Re search and Development Laboratories 1 as a means of increasing the power output and altitude capability of the 10 and 20-horsepower military stand ard engines. In experiments, the 20-horsepower model, which has a standard maxi mum rating of 35 horsepower at sea $ level, was fitted with a small modified : commercial turbocharger to utilize ; normally discarded exhaust heat en ergy. The engine achieved a maximum output of 32 horsepower when oper ated at an altitude of 3,000 meters. Without supercharging it loses power and develops only 25 horsepower at tbe high altitude. Investigations of supercharging ~ possibilities are continuing.US ! Army release.

BellHdicoptw

Cont!J.w

off and landing capability, and fan jet engines mounted beneath the wings would power the aircraft in level cruise flight. After takeoff the rotors could be pivoted backward 90 degrees to con vert tbe aircraft to cruise and highspeed flight. Drag from the trailing rotore would be low. Speed would be determined primarily by tbe amount of thrust from the fan jet engines. A related concept was described in the MILITARY REVIEW, March 1965, page 99.News release. 101

kme 1965

MILITARY NOTES Assault Craft

,.

. .

Lo.khee&C.lzforni.

COWJIO

Standing on retractable skis, a research landing speed in shallow water. The vehicle is the test bed meter-per-hour assault boat that would skim smoothly of troops. A new waterjet propulsion system provides

craft is tested at big for a proposed 11O-kik over the sea with a km the power.DA releas(

Task IXMTAC A new research project, Task COM the feasibility of using electropulse: 2AC, designed to improve the control for communicating information. Th( a small-unit leader has over his men Wstem Presently being considered wil in combat situations where normal utilize separate radio frequency trans communication methods might be im mitter and receiver units. Each re possible, has been launched by the Hu ceiver will be able to transduce m man Resources Research Office (Humdio signals into electropulses, whici would then be relayed to electrode: RRO ) at Fort Benning, Georgia. Scientists will attempt to develop a embedded in a belt or vest-type gar tactual communication system in ment. which messages are transmitted be The tactual communication systen tween the leader and his men hy to be developed in this project may have application in many military op means of electropulses applied dicectly to the skin. erations, not solely in infantry combat operations.News item. Recent rctsearch has demonstrated 102

Militafy Review

MILITARY NOTSS Grenade Launcher A turret-mounted, 40-miRimeter grenade launcher, designed specifically for helicopters, has been developed for the Army. Designated the Jf5 subsystem, the weapon is being installed on UH-lB and JJH-ID helicopters. It can deliver suppressive fire on ground targets at a rate of 200 rounds per minute at drofoil systems and retraction meth ods. The L VHX-2 uses surf ace-pierp-

FMC

C.mmratwJn

The LVffX-2 Ylys at 35 knots ing foils, which are self-stabilizifig, and a vertical foil system.News re lease. Amphibious Earthmover An all-purpose amphibious earthmover is being tested at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, by the US Army Engineer Research and Development Labora tories. The experimental vehicle can travel across water or rough terrain to reach construction sites. The trac

Grenade launcher mnunted at the for ward end of a UH-I helicopter rsnges up to 1,500 meters. The weapon can be fired by either the pilot or co pilOt.News item.
lVHX-2

A hydrofoil landing vehicle desig nated the LVHX-2 is currently under test by the Marine Corps. It, is one of two development pro grams which are investigating the use of hydrofoils for high-speed, sh]p-to shore transportation during amphibi- . ous assault operations. The other pro gram is the LVHX-1 (MR. Mar 1965, p 97). The LVHX-2 is a four-wheel vehi cle with a five-ton cargo capacity. It can fly at 35 knots, cruise as a con ventional boat at 12 knots, and travel on land at 40 miles per hour. Basic LVffX-I June 1965 differences and LVHX-2 between are in the the
hy

tnr has front and rear-powered axles, with universal mounting plates to ac commodate a wide variety of attach ments. Engineers can make a bucket loader, road grader, bulldozer, water or fuel tank, or cargo or troop carrier by varying components of the basic threesection machine.DA release.
103

MILITARY NOTES SV-S Spacestdp The &Ir Force has released draw ings of the SV-5, a maneuvering re entry vehicle to be rased for heat and
Preparing a task inventoryw outline of major job duties and tasks Making decisions as to whicl tasks will be taught and what level o proficiency a student will be require{ to attain. Preparing a detailed task de scription. Identifying the knowledge an, skill components involved in each tsi and synthesizing them into a hierw chical organization. Reviewing and revising eac specific objective.News item:

ava T spa an

isw pub
w or

wm( :alls ;yst, TI proc carr stro rine ters mor unit fore dest rim rem the 1 spa pro Ian me tec TV/ am ma

he 1

reentry the

tests

from surface.

orbital

altitudes

to

The spaceship is a winglese, V-shaped pIane with a flat bottom, round top, and a vertical tail. DOD release.
earths

Training Objectives A new research bulletin, designed to help military personnel develop well-defined training objective, was recently publiehed by the Human Re sources Research Office (HumRRO ). The Development of Training Ob jectives (RB 11) is the first of a series of such publications covering general accounts of military training technol ogy. The author, Dr. Robert G. Smith, Jr., HumRRO representative at Head quarters, US Continental Army Com mand, says there are three major steps in the development of a program of instruction: determination of ob jectives, selection of training content and methods, and quality control by proficiency testing. Major steps in de veloping training objectives are: Conducting a system analysis to provide a context for studying a par ticular job. 104

TA-4E Jet Trainer A two-place training yersion of th A-4E S@hawk attack bomber ha been ordered by the Navy for use s an advanced jet trainer. Skyhawlm are firstline combat ail craft on many carriers today and ha~ been extensively used in southeaj Asia. The new trainer will be phase into service following a minimum dt

of s

ton
Doqhd A,,mzjt C.nnPa

Drawing of the T.4-4E trainer. Thirt five have been ordered by the NS.VY. velopment program. It operates from either landing fields or carrier decks and can readily be used in combat if desired. The TA-4E will have a speed of 675 miles per hour and will cruise at 500. Ite maximum range with external fuel wiR be 2,000 miles.News item.
t MMary

de: 1,

po! w tal ! en Ca s wi

\ in g co ar

Review Ill

MILITARY NOTES SPAIN

Naval Plans

,
27 land-based antisubmarine aircraft are scheduled to be activated for the protection of tbe Spanish trade routes. Projected for coaetal defense mis sions are 16 light frigates and 30 hel icopters which will also be assigned submarine defense tasks. Coastal de fense forces include eight submarines of the French DaphnJ class and 20 coastal minesweepers of the US 131ue bird class. In the event of war 80 ad ditional auxiliary minesweepers (con verted fishing cutters) will be em ployed on coastal defense dutiea. News item. THE NETHERIANllS
Military Vehicles
The Dutch Government has placed an order for a number of military ve hicles produced by a US firm. The bulk of the order was for the light-

The following emoficial report on Spains naval program is based upon a news item h thti February 1965 issue Oj Wehrkunde (Federal l?e pablic of Germany) .Editor.
Within the framework of the ma jor modernization program for her armed forces, Spains naval program calls for buildup of her forces along thelines of the so-called building bloc h

procurement of two medium aircraft carriers, two light cruisers, eight deeight subma e stroyere, 40 frigates, rines, 60 minesweepers, 48 helicop 9 3 ters, 27 antisubmarine aircraft, and more than 100 transport and landing units. The reorganization of the naval ? : forceswhich currently comprise 27 t destroyers, 20 frigates, nine subma 1 rines, 25 minesweepers, and a number of auxiliary and landing craftis the result of extensive studies made in the United States. The future responsibilities of the Spanish Navy will, in addition to the protection of the coasts of the main . kindand tbe communication routes to overseas territories, include the pro tection of Spains merchant shipping. Two tack forces-each consisting of one aircraft carrier of up to 20,000 tons, one light cruiser of approxi i mately 3,500 tons, and four 3,200-ton ! destroyersform the nncleus. ~ For landing operations two trans ports will be assigned to each of the : twotask forces. Two such vessels were tsken over from the US Navy at the end of last year. They are capable of carrying a full-strength regiment with heavy weapons and smaller land ing craft. Six convoy groups-each i heavy escort ships

system. The 10-year program includes the

FMC Corrm.ati.n

Command snd recomraisssnce vehicle with 20-millimeter weapon weight aluminum command and recon naissance vehicle ( MR, Aug 1964, p 101). Also inclnded in the order were quantities of Ml f 3 armored personnel carriers, 6f106 mortar carriers, and i$f577 command post vehicles.News release. 105

~OmPri~i~g two

: and two light frigates,

and a total of

; June1965

MILITARY tiom AUSTRALIA F1 Srrbmacldmegrm First delivery of the new Austra lian-designed FI nine-millimeter gub machinegun has been made to the army for troop testing. The new weapon weighs two and a half pounds less than the Owen machine carbine which it replaces. It has a rate of fire of 600 rounds per minute. The FI does not climb from the line of fire and can be used in one unsupported hand, like a pistol. All parts are interchangeable. News releaee. FRANCE Armed Forces In 1970 The French military organization is composed of a etrategic nuclear force, a force of maneuver, and Oper. ational Defense of the Territory (DOT) forces. Approximately 11 bil lion dollars will be spent on tveapon systems during the next five years to provide increased capabilities to each of these forces. Major goals for strategic weapon systems are: completion of the stra tegic air force armed with nuclear airborne, antiaircraft, mrd antitank typea. The goal !s for the three sew. ices to be fully armed with nuclear weapons by 1973. For conventional units, studies will concentrate on a nnmber of selecte[ programs. These include vertical take off landing aircraft, light armored ve

Panhard AML combat car with 90-milli meter gun hicles, antitank and antiaircraft mis siles, and radar systems. Strategic Nuclear Force By 1970 the strategic nuclear fore should be in a transitional stage First-generation Mirage IV aircraf
will the be phased out starting of in nuclear 1968 mis second generation

. : .-.. .*..-. ..*--Gillois mobile bridge bombs and Mirage IV planes; deployment of 2,000-mile-range ballistic missilee; completion of one nuclear submarine armed with 16 ballistic missiles; and military apace studies. For tactical nuclear weapons; plans are being made to develop improved missiles for battlefield use, including
106 sile-lannching submarines

partly complete; will be deployed sites. Force The force of the following from the three

will b and ballistic missile at scattered hardene

of Maneuver maneuver will includ major contribution services: eix army d

, Military Reeie

MILITANY NOTES

Semi,. et d,Infomatm

de Praae Photo.

The naval Etendard tisions-five mechanized and one light ntervention division; two aircraft :arriers; one helicopter carrier; two :ruisers; a missile-launching frigate; 10destroyers and dual-purpose frig tes; 21 submarines; 100 minesweep
ers; 730 aircraft; and 200 surface-to-

IV fighter bomber surface and surface-to-air missilee of various types. DCJTForceR The DOT forces will include: one Alpine brigade; five combat car regi. ments: and 20 commando infantry regiments.News release. ISRAEL More Submarines The Israeli Navy plans to acquire two British submarines, the Totem and the Turpin of the 12 T class. Both vessels were constructed during the last year of World War II and have since been rebnilt. Guns and external tubes were removed and a snorkel tube was added. The vessele have six torpedo tubes, four forward and two aft. Each carries 20 homing torpedoe. In 1960 the Israeli Navy purchased two British submarines of the ~ class, the Sanguine and the Spri~ger. News item. 107

WEST GERMANY low Antitank Cannon A new German 90-millimeter anti ank cannon is scheduled for troop ests and evaluation. It is powered by I 1,500-cubic-centimeter engine and lees not require a self-propelled munt or prime mover. The system an be operated by one man who ;teers the four-ton, self-propelled canIon into position. During changes of ]osition tbe weapon attains speeds of 1P to 25 kilometers per hour. The canIon, whose caliber corresponds with he NAT(3 standard, is credited with ~range of 2,OOOmeters .News item. nne1965 ,

y
:k~
IY

UNCOMMON VALOR. The Exciting Story of the Army. Edited by JamesM.Mprrill.512 Pages. Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, 111.,191i4. $6.95. BY LTCOL DAVIDL, JONES, USA There have been several collections of military action vignettes published during the past decade, starting with. Russell A. Gugeler~ Combat Actiorrs

in Korea.
What distinguishes Uncommon Val or from the rest is that it was written by the participants. It is a potpourri of the emotions of soldiers during their ntoments of greatest stress, ex pressed in their own words. From the labored sentence; of a trio of minutemen at Lexington and Concord to the moving passages of MacArthurs farewell to the corps of cadets, Mr. Merrill has presented a cross section of the US Army in ac tion throughout its first 187 years. Despite the title, not all of these stories are of uncommon valor. Many are of ordinary soldiers doing the fighting that soldiers are expected to do. What is uncommon is the remark able fortitude which each brings to bear ontheproblem atharrd. The hobks real worth lies in its authenticity. Each action is recounted, often from several points of view, in the spoken words, correspondence, and official records of the day. The resuit is stimulating reading. From it emerges the reassurance that. the American soldier continues to prove equal to his job. 1n8

A he : :uer RUSSIA AT WAR 1941-1945. BY Alexamdu n-ov Werth. 1,100 Pages. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., md : Jve ! New Ynrk, 1964.$10.00. Tb GOLDENTHAL, USA FiY COL fVfITOHEL Jis This lengthy but magnificent book 3 m is the first one written in English Iveap purporting to describe the vast pane. tier rama of this great power locked in Df its gigantic death struggle with NW tiol Germany. are The author, an English journalist we: who spent most of the war in the So. far viet Union; appears well qualified to 1 produce a work of such epic propor. Iluc tions. He has already written several we: books on the same subject. These ron books and his meticulously kept de. tro tailed diary apparently have been mu amalgamated with official historie$ clei and pertinent military memoirs to pro. I drrce this saga. brL Included are accounts of militar~ cle operations, historical coverage of ; far events, analyses and evaluations of :,tol forces and trends, and an account of } we the heroic behavior of the Russian str people under repeated disasters, Mr. : fir Werth is at his best in explaining the 1Tr Russian people in human terms and !Lh why they performed so magnificently ~ even under the barbarous Stalin re- th, gime. His historical coverage and , analyses of forces and trends are ex- m : so cellent. The description of military opera- : c tions may lack sufficient detail for the t ~~ serious military history student, but : 111 it is, nonetheless, a worthwhile of power and scope.
book j j ~~,

i
h h
Military Review.

-..#Jh

MILITARY BOOKS CONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN THE NUCLEAR ME, BY Oflo Heilhrunn. 164 Pages. Freder itk A. Praeger, Inc., New York: 1665.$5.75. By LT~COL ARTHUR A. OLSON,

USA A well-documented analysis wherein

the author, a recognized authority on guerrilkaand rear warfare techniques, provides the reader with a pragmatic .vndscholarly treatment of a provoca tive subject. The underlying theme throughout this study is twofold: first, that in a nuclear engagement the nuclear weapon is the overriding considera tionand determines the entire concept of warfare; and second, in conven tional warfare where nuclear powers are involved, the threat of the nuclear weapon determines the concept of war fare. The author points out that in a nuclear war the troops support the weapon, whereas in a conventional conflict the weapons support the troops. Accordingly, the armed forces must be trained to employ both nu clear and conventional weapons. In this research effort, Mr. Heil brunn analyzes the influence of nu clear doctrine on conventional war : fare and evolves a modern concept for ~ conventional warfare. He skillfully weaves into his analysis the current strategic and tactical posture of the i United States, the North Atlantic ~ Treaty Organization, and the Soviet 1 ~;Union. ~{ As a result of his analysis the au thor crrncludee that: : The troops fighting a conventional WVagainst a nuclear power must be

mobile oper&tions . . . the fire-power of both sides will be almost equal, and since mobile defence must be con ducted offensively, the defertce is nearly as exposed as the attacker. The weight of the attack would be very much redured and possibl~ be irrsufji~ient. if the attacker would not deplou part of his forces in the en emy rear, and this is what Soviet doctrine envisages; it foresees jre quent air movement of troops to the oprmnertts rear.
Mr. Heilbrunn says that fighting in the enemy rear is essential for con ventional as well as nuclear war. All troops, therefore, should he trained in the techniques involved in rear warfare. This hook is strongly recommended for all military readers. THE FORTRESS THAT NEVER WAS. The Myth of Hitlers Bavarian Stronghold. By Rodney & Mhrott. 206 Pages. HoIt, Rinehart & win. ston, inc., New York, 1964. $4.95.
BY MAJ BOBBIE J. PINKERTON,

USA

A succinct appraisal of the inter play of political and military consid erations which influenced Allied strat egy during the final months of World War II in Europe. Mr. Minott, a Professor of History at Stanford University, presents an interesting and well-documented anal ysis of the impact Germanys mythical national redoubt had on the decieion to forego the seizure of Berlin and Prague in order to accomplish the military objective of concluding the wrar as soon as possible. The book ends with an unusual in dictment of US intelligence procedures followed in World War H. It is an excellent addition to the many his tories of World War 11 and one hased upon detailed research. 109

w deployed as if they were fighting u nuclear war, that is they must be dirpersed over a greatly extended hat tlefield. The con ve?ttional war against a nu [ clearpower. is characterized by purely

: ! ; !

he 1965

MILITARY BOOKS OICTitTNARY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. Edited by Joseph Ounner. 585 Pages. The Philo sophical Library, Inc., New York, 1964. $10.00. The, terms and definitions used in the fields of political science, govern ment, and politics are clarified by 195 political scientists in this reference book. Also included are cbncise biogra phies of statesmen, some containing subjective evaluation. The volume should be especially useful to students of political science. THE COMPLETE WAR MEMOIRS OF CHARLES OE GAULLE. By Charles de Gaulle. Volume L THE CALL TO HONOUR 1940-1942. Trans lated From the French by Jonathan Griffkr. 1955. Volume N. UNITY 1942.1944. Trans lated lay Richard Howard. 1959. Volume III. SALVATION 1944-1946. Translated by Rich ard Howard. 1960. 1,048 Pages. $imon & Schuster, Inc., New York. $12.50. ,
f3Y

THE ECONOMIC PATTERN OF tdOOERN GM tHANG MANY. By Norman J. G. Pounds. 133 Pag!s, lINITy Rand McNally & Co., Inc., Chicago, Ill., 1981,w. 24 Baltim $4.95.
BY COL BOBERT R. COREY,

USA

An excellent, concise presentation of the factors responsible for the tre. Thi mendous resurgence of the German ~iOu from economy. Dr. Pounds, Chairman of the De mOn partment of Geography at Indiana them University, heavily weights his VIII.Ofth~ ume with a discussing of the bene. Polic ficiai effects of German natural r% Hopk sources and terrain. This approsch Th(

I
ester

145 [

LT COL ALBERT N. GARLAND, USA

For the first time, Charles de Gaulle~s three Ivolumes of memoirs originally published a number of yefirs ago and covering the period from 1940 to 1946are brought to gether urider one cover. . ,Nothing has been omitted from the original narratives, and so we have a handy reference to the political and phiIosopbical development of one of tbe worlds great figures of our time. Perhaps, too, it is wise to recall these words, wiitten in the mid-1950s: . . . France is not really keraelf urr

tends to minimize a detailed discus. w~i0 siun of economic policies. However, Wie the co fitrolled free economy ini. wn~ tiated by Chancellor Ludwig Erharri orse] opin in 1949 is clearly developed. This volh me makes a strong case force for the permanent role of the Ger. Th man economy in Europe; 28 photo.~II Ith graphs and 15 charts and graphs ma.i wOb terially aid in the appreciation of Ger.! ~let( mrre manys current economic position, ent~

THE BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN. Oecision in )le i Qots Desert. LTy CorreNi Barnett. 90 Pages. The! f I ,whi Macmillan Co., New York, 1964.$2.95. BY MAJ
JACK G. CALLAWAY,

USA

,,~n)

I@ss in tke front rank; that only oust enterprises are capable of counterbal ancing the ferments of dispereal tollich are irrberen t in lzer people; tltat our country .. must aim llig~ and }1oU itself straigkt. . . . France can not be France a9it7tout greatness.
Ilti

The author of Tke Desert Generak Ca has produced an incisive account of Jms some of World War 11s maj~r strug- T~e glesthe first and second Battles of ems Alamein and tbe Battle of Alam i uni Half a. The text is focused on why~ wes and how the battles were fought, the&N stakes involved, and the results. General Montgomerys extreme cau- 10 . f7 tion is criticized; Rommels daring loos and Auchinlecks inventiveness and W1 foresight are praised. The book avoids [JOna details, but succeeds in conveying a Ma broad but sound understanding of lng her these historic events. 1

Military
Review Itm

Ii

MILITARY BOOKS IHANGING EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE uNITY

OF THE WEST. Edited by Arnold Wolf ms.242 Fages. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1964. $6.DO clothbound IZ,45 paperbound.
BY ROBERT 1 ThiS timely J. BOWER

NUMBER 7: Alexander Hamiltons Secret Attempts to Control American Foreign PoL icy. With Supporting Documents. By ulian P. Boyd. 166 Pages. Princeton Uni ) ersity Press, Princeton, N. J., 1964.$4.00. BY LT COL BROOKS E. KLSiBER, USAR

presentation

of

, [houghtful analysis and opinion stems from discussions held in Washington ~mong 40 specialists, almost half of themfrom Europe, under the auspices of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, an affiliate of Johns IIopkins University. The prospects for the West in a PW1OCI of changing relations with the $oviet Union are discussed from many Oointsof view. There is no party line orschool solution here; differences of opinionare presented with clarity and !orce. The current difc??te is analyzed ,\lth special attentiosr to one of its ~probable chief causesthe Sino-So \ietdispute. The consequences of the mrent drift of East-West affairs for entral Europe are discussed. The roots, objectives, and contradictions de Gaulles policies trhich stem in large part from the ostensible lessening of East-West tenWn) are also investigated. Careful attention is given to the wospei+s for the North Atlantic Treaty organization and the prob has lying in the path of renewing $ unity in Europe. Misgivings are ex ~~~essedabout both n~~lear and ~~n ~~ent ioal approaches to the military ~problem of Europe. The best hope is expressed for a I looseconstellation of Atlantic States, krequi ring ccmcessions and confidence ~o,al} sides. fhe United states Wo,d ! inaintain a special relationship, be. f,, free to take a hard line whenever fg
~her truly vita] interests were at stake.

Durifig his first administration, George Washington suffered from di vided counsel regarding diplomatic and economic policies: Thomas JefferSOO, Secretary of State, favored close relations with the old ally, France; Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury. felt that ties with Great Rritain should predominate. In this small volume, Julian P. Iloyd, editor of the monumental se ries, The Papers of Tliomas Jeffmson,

discloses the manner in which Hamil

ton intrigued with a British intelli gence agent in an attempt to commit the country to a policy oriented to ward Great Britain, in contradiction with the one officially agreed upon. Tbe title, Nun/her 7, comes from the cipher used by the agent, Major George Beckwith, to identify Hamil ton in messages to his superiors. Hamiltons duplicity at first consisted of secret meetings with Beckwith and, later, deliberate misrepresentations of Beckwiths statements regarding the position of the British Govern ment toward the United States. This volume represents a master ful job of historical detective work. It h~d its impetus in the remarkable discrepancies which the author found in accounts by Hamilton and Beckwith of their mutual conversations. By disclosing the handicaps under which President Washington carried out his du[ies, Professor Boyd has made a valuable contribution to an understanding of our Nations for eign policy during this crucial period.

he 1965

111

MILITARY BOOKS

DEPARTMENT 1965 CONTEMPORARY

OF

THE

ARMY READING LIST

MILITARY

Title and Year On War (1959) _.___ .-.____ -____-_-_ --.---_ ---_ ----------

Author

Raymond AroI Policy and Power: Two Centuries of Ruhl Barttet American Foreign Relations (1963)* -----------------------Duter Space: Prospects for Man and Society f1962) -----------------------------Lincoln P. Bloom$eZd, Edito Arms Control, Disarmament, and Donald G. Brennan, Eddo National Security (1961) ---------------------Strategy in the Missile Age (1959) -------------------------Bernard Brodi [mage of Amerira (1959) ________________________ Raymond L. Bruckberge Geography and World Politics (1959) -----------------------Lzmile Curko! Power and International Relations (1962) -------------------In& L. Claud rwentieth Century China ?1964)* . ----------------------O. Edmund Club, Conflict in the Shadows: Th. ..- N=*IWO ------ and Politics of Guerrilla War (1963) ---------------------Jwnes E. Gas mit~d War-a~d American Policy (1964)* ---- Segmour .7. Deitcftma! Lir .. . . Defense ......
The vrazt 01 Inr,emgerxe (IYt,i+)-------. . ------------------

How Russia Is Ruled. Revised Edition (1963 ) ---------------Merk Fainw ~outheast Asia in Qgitqd Sta~@ Policy ~1$)63)~ -- AT== _:,___ Rz&eU ~: ~ifkb Gountermsurgency Wariare: Theory and Practice (1954)= . ----- tJavtd Gah.d Scientists and National Policy-Making (1964)* _-.- . . ______ Robert Gitpirz art
Christopher Command Wright, Editor

Allen Dzdle

Decisions (1959) -----------_________ . . Kent R. Gree@?td, Edito The Economics of Defense in the Nucleax Age (1960) ---- Charles J. Hitch am
Roland N. McKea

The Common Defense: Strategi... Programs in National Politi< m (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . .._ Samuel P. Huntin@o On Thermonuclear War (1960) __--.. ----__ ..--_ - . . . . ..-J_-.. Herman Kak rhe McNamara Strategy (1964)* -------------------William W. Kaufmaw The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Pokey (1961) -------------------Henr v A. Kissiwge International Politics in a Revolutionary Age (1964)* ---------W. W. Kwlsk The,Ageof Overkill: A Preface to World Politics (1962) -------- --- Max Leme .:. ..----. Arms and the State: Civil-Mi~i*=.V AICY (1958) -------------Walter illdhs and Other Elements in National Po ;uerrilla Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist G Movements, 1941-19P ~~Q~9~ Franklin M. Osanka, Edito NATO, the EntanglingK Alhance (1962) -------------------Robert E. O.woo The Dvnamics of International Politics (1962} -----Norman J. Padelford-an
. ,-, -,

.... ...-.
me

.....-.

. .

MarshaU ena: 160) ----------------------

A.

Robinson Walt

and W.

Other ffostot

Politic-al Economv of Naiio&l

Securitv:

A Studv of the
James R. .%hlesingf D. SokolovskU, Edttc .- Maxwell D. Tayk

I
112

..

:ions (1964)

nenc LYO. ,mmit tee on Foreign Relntiw (1962)* -------------Barbara War --------------------Sidneu Warre

Brxks

new

to th,s

list.

Military Re~ . .