The New Scholasticism

Editor: John A. Oesrerle Associote Editor: Ralph M. Mclnerny Business Manoger: Jude Dougherty

Tfte l{ew
Volume

Schclasticism
Number
3

XLIV

S{.JMMER, 1970

Editoiol
Louis Dupr6

Consahonts: Ernan ll/[6[\ilntlin Ffarry A. Nielsen Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R. Elizabeth G. SaLnon Kenneth

Alden L. Fisher Doaald A. Gallagher Theodore E. James Jamec V. McGlynn, S. J.

Copy Editot: Jean

Table of Contents
Articles

L' Schr"itz

T.

Oeeterle

The Idea of Phenomenology. . . . . .Ilenrrx I{nmncenn 325 Some Medieval Anticipations of fnertia JarrPs F. O'BnrPn 3+5

AII manuscripts and books for review should be addressed to The Ediror, Tnn Nnw Scnor.asrrcrslr, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana
46556.

Faith Seeking Understancling: An Atheistic InterpretaIIr,rs Vnnwnv"elt tion.......

Review Article

372

Manuscripm should be typed double-spaced with footnotes preferably on a separate sheet. Prospective contributors are invited to request our style

Recent Trends

in Ethics

.. .Vnnnon J. Bounxp

396

from the editor. They should rerain a carbon copy of their manu. script for reference. A 100 to lbo word summ:uy is requested.
eheet

Discarsion Articles

Is Probability Inapplicable-in Principle-to the

Gocl-

New subscriptions and changes of address should be sent to Dr. Jude P. Dougherty, Treas., American Catholic philosophical Association, Catho.

Ilypothesis?..
Ilow Many Logics Are

....RosrnrA.Oaxns
J. Rouarvo

426

Iic University of America, Washington, D. C.

20012.

Id.entity-Statements and Bssentialism.I'ftcnapr'

There ?. . . . Josnpn

J' loux 43I

4+0

-: Published quarterly by
AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
109 Market Place, Baltimore, Maryland, ZlZ02 The Catholic University of America 'Washington,

Descartes' Ontological Arg'ument as Non-Causa1

Jeuns M. Ilurvrepn 4+9

Chronicle

D. C.

20017

The Secretary's Chronicle KerstrnrNp Rosn l[arqr-pn ron Gnonep F. Mcl,new, O. M. f.

460

fssued in Winter, Spring, Summer, and Autumn. Second class postage paid at

Baltimore, Maryland

L.i

II

Tabl,e

of Contents

Booh Comments

Vendler:

Li.ngui,sti,cs

in Philosophy

Kenny: The Fiae Wags: St. Thomas Aqainas' Proofs of God,'s Er'istence Frege: The Found,atiorts of Arithemeti,c Mrcsenr, J. Loux
Wittgenstein, Language and, Phi,losophy Dennett: Content and, Conscio,trs,ness: An Analysi,s of Mental Phenomena ... .Veuorl R. McKim
Shibles

The Idea of Phenomenology

by Martin Heidegger
469

translated by John N. Deely ond

Joseph A. Novak, with the ossistance of Eva D, Leo

47t
expend his chier principles-are first and attention on the consideration of thought rest wiil follow." are they not rightly laiil down . . a1l the ? . they or perhaps remark is by itseif suflicient indicate the capital to This interest following article, as it does of the coming philosophical principal philosophy, auctores one of the of contemporary from and at a time when the phrase " phenomenologically speaking " (or some equivalent) is a standard introduction to much of the

Church: Hume's Theory of tlue tlnderstand,i,ng

locke:

Problem,s amd, Perspectiues

..Every *uo,,,

.o,,3;::ii"t#"ff-.:",::"r,

Locke: Two Tructs on Goaeru,m,ent

Conupr,rus Ifudson : Ethical Intui,tioni,sm, Jones (ed.) : Approaches to Eth'i,cs.
Rhees : Wi,thout Answars

F. Dnr,anar
Donrvnr,r.y

lto

...Jonrv

+75

lVliddleton (ed.)

Belected Letters of Fri.edrich, Nietzsche

'W.

Devrn Sor,ouon

AnE Ttl

GrlI: Essa.ys on Ki,rkegaard, Ifartmann: Bartre's Ontology Schrag: Erperience and, Being: Prolegom,ena to a Future Ontologg. ....Rupor,prr J. Gnnnnn
Swinburne: Bpace and, Time Achinstein: Concepts of Bcience, A Phitosophi,cal
Analysi,s

currently circulated writings by professors in philosoph;'. L. What does it mean to say, "phenomenologically speaking . . ." not, indeed., as a mere fashionable incantation, but as a preliminary to a piece of philosophizing consistent with itself and groundecl in principle ? What, in other words, are the limits virtual to any
phenomenological philosophy precisely as such? Or (so as not to beg the issue with those, like Ileidegger, for whom phenomenology and philosophy are interchangeable designations), what is the power and limits of philosophy itself phenomenologically conceived ? The

478

Schlegel: Contpleteness
O'Toole

,im Bcience. . . .

.Gany Gumrwc

480

z The Mystery of

Com,mitment

Menv Rosp Bannar, 482

Books Received
+8+

foliowing article, aibeit cryptic, brief, and (like Heidegger's Beirz und, Zeit) truncated, taken together r,vith the methodological discussion in the introductory chapterc of Sein und, Zeit, goes farther in our judgment than any comparable piece of phenomenological lore towarcl supplying an answer to these and related. questions. 2. However this may be, part and parcel of the interest of this piece is the light it throws on the nature of the phiiosophical difierences which finally separated the young Heidegger from his great master, Edmund llusserl. W'hen asked in 1922 to write the article on Phenomenology for 325

l*, i| !:{
.i

* a:t

ti.:
f,:
,

rf

326

IIarti,n

Heidegger
badly

Th,e

Idea of

Phenom,enologY

327

the 14th edition of the Encycloped,i,a Bri"tu,nnica, Ilusserl saw in the offer an opportunifir 1e t..oocile rvith his own methodological views and in their long-term interest the already divergent phenomenological stance adopted by the young lleidegger. r\ccordingly, he asked" I{eidegger to co-author lhe Bri,tannicq, article. The draft which lleidegger drew up in response to Husserl,s request is the text which The New Scholu,sticism is here making availabie for the first time in llnglish translation. The full tifle of lleidegger's draft ae it appears in Band IX of the Husserh,ana, pp.256-263, translates as foilows: "Attempt at a Second Formulation. fntroduction. The Idea of Phenomenology and of the Begress to Conscious Alvareness." It is called a " second formulation " because it is based on llusserl's own preliminary draft article, which was in Heiclegger's possession. It may weil be that the text as here translated was not dra'wn up entirely ab ouo hy I-Ieidegger, but that rather what Ileidegger dicl was to base himself as far as possible on the very rvorcling of Husserl's preliminary text (the greater part of the article would suggest this), making only a few modiflcations in it here and there, so that the textual critic with an eye to the strict canons of his profession might have some misgivings as to just whom should be singled out as the initiator of any given paragraph or line-although the reaaler acquainted with l{eidegger can have no doubt about the distinctive air and origin of the opening paragraphs, all in all the most clecisive section of the piece. (Ambiguities of the nature just indicated woulcl account for the wording of the footnote in the Hussediana, p. 256 of Band IX, explaining thal ', Diese Er'nleitung und Teii I, bis S. 263, ist von Heidegger red,igiertr, lemphasis supplied]. t'Redigieren " means " to edil, revise, or prepare for the pressr" rather than "to author.") But the only point of present interest is the fact that, however little or much lleidegger may have modified or contenteal himself with the rvording of Ilusserl,s own preliminary draf! the end result was a text acceptable as far as it went to lleidegger, but acceptable no longer to llusserl. This is indisputably sufficient, so far as any properly philosophical matters are at stake, to make Ileidegger the principal author-and. not merely a copy editor-of the piece here translatecl, however uncomfortable this determination may perforce leave the practitioners of textual criticism or the collectors of . Ilusserliana., Ileid.egger's attempted " second formulation,r, in short, farecl

for the purpose behind. its being undertaken at all, inasmuch rvith rejection ur ii *.t finally (after several exchanges) -on received its final copy under encyclopedia part, ancl the ilus*url's seconalaly importance flusserl's signature alone. Thence ilerives a of the way between parting final the it marks clraft: of tr.idugg.t's wrote, recently as Heidegger " on the basis Husserl, anil fleidegger to the adherence faithful more a I stil1 consiiler day this to ut of *t noting: worth is passage The of Phenomenology." principle
Dialogues

phenomenology nomenological method that preparecl the concept of ($ 7). and' Ti'me Being to the Introduction in explainetl

with Husserl provicled fhe immediate experience of the

phe-

. . the meaning and scope of the principle of Phethings themselves," became clear. As my familto the nomenology, grew, no longer merely through literature Phenomenology iar.ity wiih
Subsequent to this .
((

but by actual practice, the question about Being, aroused by Brentanots work, nevertheless remaineil ahvays in view. so it was that cloubt aroso

whether

or even as the transcendental ego. If, incieeil, Phenomeof letting things manifest themselves, shoulcl charaeterize the standarcl methocl of philosophy, and if from aneient times the guide-question of philosophy has perclurecl in the most cliverse forms as the question about the Being of beings, then Being had to remain the first ancl last thing-itself of thought.
consciousness,

the (( thing itseif " was to be characterizecl as intentional

nology, as the plocess

in Husserlts sense was elaboratecl into clistinctive philosophical position aceording to a pattern set by The Being-question, unfolded' in Descartes, Ka,ret, and Fichte. Sein, und Zeit, patted company with this philosophical position, antl that on the basis of what to this day I still consider a mole faithful adherence to the principle of Phenomenology. (From M. Ileicleggerts ((Vorwort" to IM. J. Richardsorls Heid,egger: Ihrough Phenorne' nol,ogg to Th,ouglr,t, pp. X-XIV, passi,rn.)

Meanwhile '( phenomenology "

'a

These remarks in turn point to a third reason for the importance of this little-known sketch by lleidegget of " The Idea of Phenomenology," speciflcally, the light it can throw on the question of the relation of the later writings by Heidegger to his early work, and to Being and Tima rn particular. Quite expressly lleidegger aleclares in the opening pages of his great book that "with the question of Being, our Investigation comes up against the fundamental question of philosophy . that must be treated Tthenomenologi,cally" (Sein und' Zei't, p. 2?).

3.

L&

...,{

l.,B

fl

i;l

328

ilIartin

Heid,egger
1e

The ld,ea of

Phenont'enologY

329

treating that object" (ibid.,

He declares that " Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. These terms characterize philosophy itself rvith regard to its object and its way of

a3 end " the generarity and vacuity of traditionat prriioro'ague phizing."

is just a way of accenting the subject-matter of philosophy, whereas " phenomenology " names the way of approach o" rnuthodology alone adequate to the treatment of this subject-matter in all philosophizing which has become ,, transparent to itself,r, i. e., grounded in principle and consistenily develop ed. ,, Only as phe_ nomenology is Ontology possible" (ibid., p. gb), because that is what philosophy itself xs-((1111iys1sal phenomenological ontology r: (ibirl., p.38). In the draft article here translated, written dir#tv after the appearance of Sei,n und, Zeit, Ileidegger cleclares ,ro t..'u emphatically thal" whaf, constitutes phenomenology is the clarification at last of the philosophical Being-questiol',-an historical first, be it noted-" and the [consequent] systematic restriction to the methodologically settlecl philosophical tas\r, thus bringing to

p.g8). The term,,ontology,,

ihus

his repudiation by Ilusserl, who did after all hold a kind ol notion on the term: all, including fleidegger, acknowledged' Iiorr.rl as having fatherecl the original phenomenological moveThe important letter from lleidegger which appears as the ,.VorwortJ' to Fr. Richardson's extensive book-review, Heid'egger: Througtt Pltenomanology to Thought, again provides the decisive his iestimony. with regard to the change or l(ahre that marks way, Heidegger is at pains to point out:
This change is not a consequence of altering the stanclpoint, much less of abandoning the issue, of ]ei,tr, und Ze,it. The thinking of fhe reversal (of) results from the fact that, I stayed with the matter-for-thought and Time" . . . (PP. XVI-XV[).
rl.er:-t.

;l
fi.{

"Being

|?

Further:
one neeil only observe the simple fact that in sein und zei,t the problem is set up outsicle the sphere of subjectivism . . . for it to become strikingly clear that the((Being" into which Sein und, Ze'it inqu\red' cannot long re*ain something that the human subject posits. . ' ' As a result, .o.o in the initial steps of the Being-question in Sein wnd, Zedt tho:ught is called upon to undergo a change the movement of which cor-responds with the reversal (pp. XVIII-XVIX).
'':

{;'

i;i

,{

fim

,;d

The point of calling attention to these early remarks is thar they_express a judgment against traditional philosophizing (i.e., all philosophy prior to the early German phenomenjogirui *oo._ ment as stemming from TTusserl and, indirecily, Breitano), to_ gether with a forthright statement of the importance o phenomenology which holds for the whoie of lleidegger,s thought from Bein und, Zeit Lo the immediate present: a juigment ani a statement dtich He'id,egger neaer toole baclc or mod,if,ed,, except perhaps to fix them more strongly through his actual philosophizing. r ft is true that with the famous Kehre oL ., reyersal ,, in his lhgught after 1980, first evidenced clearly perhaps in the Ei,n_ filhru:LS in die X[etaphysilc, Heidegger,s break with Husserl is so compiete that he gradually foregoes so much as expricit ,uf.ruo.. to phenomenology, and even abandons its ., recognized t.r_io_ " ology. Nonetheless, it_ is a thorough misunderJaoairrg oJ- io rcalize that and how these later writings, even more purely and rigorously than the early writings, are conceiveil ,"d in a perspective through and through phenomenologicar.";i..;; rreidee.ger makes it quite clear in various places (e. g., b"trr*rrr;i, Bprache, p. 21) that he abandoned. the label ;pfr*"*."Jfr*1" even as he deveroped its genuine climensions, rargery o"t or a.i.riii*

'os !:l 'i3

'.t'1j

And he adds quite clearly, strongly, unmistalrably: " the reversal is a play within the matter itself. Neither did I invent it, nor does it affect my thought alone " (i'bid.). In effect Heidegger is saying that anyone who understands the question of Being and the methodological approach alone proper to it would, if he successfully pursueil the question, be forced to make-or rather to " unclergo "the same shift that clistinguishes the later (" Ileidegger II ") as against the early (" Heidegger I ") writings by Heidegger. It is in this sense that the question and method set forth in the introductory chapters oI Sein und Zeit are constants in the philosophizing of llartin lleidegger. They remain constant throug'hout his way of thought, and indeed define its ownmost character. That is why an approach to the philosophy of l{artin Ileidegger in terms of his idea of phenomenology is in the way of grasping, with a single effort of thought both the internal structure of that philosophy and the general answer which Heidegger formulates in answer to the widespread uncertainty evidenced today as to the nature of the uniquely philosophical task.

bi--_

330

Martin

Heid,egger

Th,e ld'ea

of

PVuenom'anologg

331

importance which we have just sketched as attaching to this obseure but quite crucial ilocument from lleidegger's early years, thus, is not the sort of importance that has, as it were, genetic signifi.cance in IJeiclegger's " pelsonal " philosophical development. The whole Britannica afrair would be peripherai within any such psgch,ological perspective, and it is doubtful, in such terms, whether l{eidegger attached a crucial signiflcance to the draft in itself-a small effort to say the least, by contrast with

4. The three-fold

Vol' I' pp' ?nd' ed' (The- Ilague' 1965)' n,rllenol,ogical Moaent'ent, to io'"-nda'4gu') Through' P'h'enomenologg 2?9 ff. Richardson, here article teference to the
Th,ough,t,pp. 1?8-?9,

hanslated' Ralph A.

convincing account yet made form probabiy the clearest l-'Huiatggt" [ .':''.' rleidegger's Retreat Jrom , lreid egger y u..u-" 6"utui"r" given at St' Xavier College' a Transcultural Structuru of ;; Heideggei's omission of the onticChicago, 19661 "Tht
Ontological Structure

y"*tii;-

-;;;t iutti"g t[tlt "'"ma'kublt essays' taken together of how

the just releaseal portions o! Bein und, Ze'i,t-or would remember the circumstances of the affair with any particular clarity. The sketched tri-aspectual import is not for that reason any the less independent and real (it is at no point limned in the terms of psychological genesis), and may perhaps be summarized at this point in a single sentence: If Ileidegger is correct in contending that the break of his thoug'ht with that of l{usserl (and with the larger phenomenologica] movement generally) was ilictated by a more faithful ad.herence to the principle of phenomenology, then an understanding of Heidegger's thought in terms of his idea itself of phenomenology should suggest to us something a good deal more
decisive than one man's opinion as to the nature of the philosophical

oilu"l"," giin ut the Duquesne University t tg66' and subsequently revised lleidegger Symposio* i" tftt f"ff

" in Destroved' Metaphysics?" ((The substantially; and- "Uu* Uuidugger Deelv's article on Listening,z (196?), i3-40' John N' of Oilristian Philosophy" Situation of Ileidegge";;h- Tradition on esp' pp' t5s-14!' (1e6?),

-222-36 i;" i;' Th,omist, Xiir iifl.""*.""togy u, the medium of tttu Being-question" draws ex-

plicitly on lleideggt'l*-l'Idee
translated.. (This stuiy nu'

task; specifically, it should indicate to us the limits virtual to any phenomenological philosophy which is consi,stent wi,th i,tsel,f and, ground,ed, in pri,nci,plB. In our judgment it would seem possible to express in just such terms the essential superiority of lteideggerean phenomenology over every other form. This last suggestion is not without certain general considerations to recommend it. Is it not true that what has characterized every great thinker has been an abiiity to lay holcl of an idea and follow through its implications relentlessly ? The characteristic of a

thinker, and of a philosophical thinlcer in particular, is the ability ideas bare in their ultimate import. (And the assertoric limitation of each philosophical genius to one iclea often proves to be but a wistful projection of one philosopher,s limitation on to others . . .). 5. A few bibliographical references pertinent to the matters indicated seems in order. W-alter Biemel gives a good many details of historical and speculative interest in his discussion of .. rlusserls Encyclopaerli,a Britannica Artil<el und Heideggers Anmerlrungen daza," Ti,ldschrift uoor Philosophie,XII (i9b0), 246-90. Some dis_ eussion can also be found in H. Spiegelbergrs suryey of The phe_

to lay

soon' The basic into a book which tr<intf"fff wili be published connection, is p".r.ot io th. thesis of both the uoot uoa tire article, departs from that the Heideggerean toot'ptio" of Phenomenology key a$pects the of basis th-t the Husserleun .oo..ptio" precisely oo d'i'ffers from Ilusserl'sin which Heidegger's'noti"" "t " das Sein " the " Intentionalitht des still more from BrentloA'-to"ttption of to' the classical returns rather Bewusstseins " urLA og,i's with, or subsequently and' notion of " esse infu#ionale " as first formulated Aristotelian of developed in the Arabic and I''atin traditions Philosophi'cus Cursus in 163? with the commentarie, "ot*inutiog Poinsot.) of Jean 6. Sinaily, before passing into the text itself of the translation' is in a worcl on the termlt ologi and devices of the translation
ord,er.

tl*t

d-er Phbnomenologie ' '" hete been much clarified and expanded

text are far as clevices go, all words italicized in the German marks' Words emset off in the truo.Ii'tioo by d.ouble quotation -letters are. ptturired in the German ty ttte wid'e-spacing of |3re double quotation italicized. Words set ofi in ttt" German text by single quotation marks' Using these marks are here set off by "typogtapttical emphases o{ Ileidegger's conventions, the various translation' English this in German are paralleled Sofarasterminologygoes,throughoutthistranslation"being" (withthelowercase""*"b"listheconsistentrend"eringofthe
So

i;'il

332

Martin

Heid,egger

The ld,ea of PhenomenologY

the upper case
<(

333

German (' Seiende," whereas ., Being

,, (with

of the "ontological

covers the world of physical nature-whatever, in Aristotelian terms, fits into the ten categories-including technology (the category habitus). "Sein,, on the contrary cannot be constrained to the categories of physicai substantiality, but is bound up in a unique way with the awareness and unity proper to psychic life: duu SEIN des Seiendes, Ileidegger can illustrate uniquely in German, ist das SEIN des BewusstSEINs und SelbstbewusstSElNs (cf. Was ist Metapltgsilc, Einleitung, p. 16). It is thus a notion, the whole meaning of which first comes by way of opposition to the order of physical reality-., das Sein ist das Nichts,, (from the standpoint of substantiality and its modifications)-the whole poiut
difference.r,

consistently transiates the German .. Sein.r, This usage is fairlv general in l{eidegger studies, and better than the clumsy neologisms sometimes coined, because-in our judgment-the Seiende (being)7 Sein (Being) ciistinction is fairly straightforward. ,.Seiende,,

B rr)

tt we consistently rendered as conscious lleidegger was exprssing his own- concepurv'-aren.*s " whetever to t' truo*luting it as cons-ciousness " only rvhere he referred

The term

t( Bewusstsein

"

l;orr,

philosopher's doctrinen.*o**tr.io in the context of some other we sought to keep -before it tfrit case, that of Kant. In this way, Iot fleidegger' ti, r.ua.r's mind that the Sein in Bewusstsein, of the psychic as such (cf' W. J. Richard,j.u.rt.. the very d,epths ?'Thu Plutu of the Unconscious in l{eidegger"' of siudy ,oo'. "of "io nou I 6 5-l' E ri,st entia"l, P sy chol o g y an d' P sy ch'i'atry' Y [1 Ih" R rri'r*
265-290). t' Grunclsii, tzlich," " fundamentaler" and " prinzipielle " all three ,, the other two occur are rendered as funclamental; " but whereas gtundsiitzlich" ,putr.fy and are always renderecl " fundamental," " the basis of principle," ,*ror, .u"t time with the full sense of " on t'in principle'" " Form"' ancl is translated in every case trut one as

on nuances of contexf we translated either " pattern " or depending -but ,,iotm,,, usually as pattern (though the difference is slight).

value-content of the occurrence (Errebnis), and an .*puiiuo." rooted in a direct impression or stimuration in which the presence l1 th. thing experienced certifies itself in its independence (Erfahrung). very roughln it courd be said that Eriebnis accents the subjective dimension or ramifi.cations of an experience as such, whereas Erfahrung accents the objective aspect or core which founds an experience. The convention of translating Erlebnis as t'_Experience " (upper case .. E ,r) and Erfahrung as ;, experience, (lower case " e") did not,seem to us adequaie for indicating this distinction-which is not artogether straightforward-and. we"chose instead to always tran-qlate ., Erfahrurig, with a phrase buili around the term (< to undergo,r, using the word .. erperilnce ,, as the translation of ., Erlebnis.r, Thus, for example, tlie perception of a family heirloom in its character as a physical stimulus would be an Erfahrung whereas -its being p.rc.iv.d as an heirjoom of my familv would be an Erlebnis. 1rn. example has its dnfi.i*ci*s, particuiarly as Erfahrung is not restricted io the order of externai apprehensions; th9r9 can egually be ..innere prfahrung.,r)

The point of lhe difference in sense between the various forms of " Erlebnis " and of ,. Erfahmng, is a litfle more difficult to capture. Both translate into the English .. experiencer' yet there is in the (philosophicai) German the difference between uo o..o"rence of consciousness, distinguished bv an immediacy and stimulation of feeling wherein a man is caught up in the meaning and

" we renilerecl alternatively as " constit'utionr" " Verfassungt'condition.tt " \Yeise" we took as synonymous with or '(sLal,e." as " mode " or " wa'y't' " Modus " and rendered,tt them indifferently t' Gebiet as t'tegion " Ganze" tt Feld spherer" as ,tt " rendered we " tt totality.' t'Ablauf of " comhas the sense always text the in as " pletion." n L.ib1i.hkuit " ancl " Kiirperlichkeit " we translated. alrespectively' t'Art" we *uy, u* ttcorporeality " uldc< corporalityr" (( ,errde"ed alternatively as "species ') o! kindr" reserving "typ"" for translating forms of " Typik; " but " Gallang" also occurs once calling {or transiation as "kinc['" Forms of "Wissenschaff"' are rendered sometimes as " science " (tt scientifict') , " knowleilger" and " system(atic)." " Gestalt " as usecl in this text can consistentIy be translated. as " frame,t' t'Zusammenhangt' took on seven nuances in contexts shading from the more physical to the more psychical-from " hierarchizaliontt (fot: " Stufenzusammenhilnge ")
to tt association

tt relation " to '( consistencies to " cohetence." The various forms of "erfassen" translatecl as variants either of ttcomprehend" or (more frequently) " apprehend " (as in " Erfassungstendenz"), depending on context. tt tr'aktisch " and " {aktischer " become
simply " de faclo."
The phrase " IJmwendung des Blickes " was particularly troublett some. W'e rentlered it once as shift in perspectiver" usually as " re-

"

to

tt interconne clion

t' to

tt

interelation

"

to " cor-

b..

al

334

Mart'in Heid,egger

The ld,ea of Phen'ornenologY

335

flective turn of sight' " reflective turning of the gazer, or soqg similar phrase. The related. expression .. Blickwendung, we rexd.ered as '( turn of sight." Of particular importance for translation is Heidegger,s explicit identification of " Seele" ("seelisch,,) and,,psychisch,, (r.p.y_ chisch") as synonymous. We have appended a note at the point in the text where this is explicit. There are other points of terminology that might be mentioned. of course, but these highlights may be sufficient to suggest to the captious scholar that we were not unmindful of the lexation vexations which always beset the work of translation. (rt is also worth observing that they do not differ in kind from the difficulties of paraphrasing within any one language, i. e., that they are not unique to translation, as is sometimes pretended.) Anyone who can "uoiu. the text better is welcome to do so; but the rendition depends in the end on one's grasp of the phiiosophicai matter-at-issue, and
are confident on this score. turn accordingly to the text of Heidegger,s Varsuch, einer zweiten Bearbeitung. Einl,eitung. Die ld,ee d,er phiinomenologie und, d,er Riickgang auf clas Bewusstsein.
w-e

W"e

The universe of beings is the sphere {rom which the positive of nature, history, space, secure at any given time their regional o'bjects. Directed straight to beings, they take over in iheir totaiity the analysis of a1l that is. Thus there seems t' bo nothing left for philosophy, which fron. antiquity ranks as the foundational science. But does not Greek philosoph;, from its decisive beginnings make precisely . being , the obiect o{ inquiry ? Assuredly : yet not so as to define this or that being, but rather in order to understand. being as bei,ng, that is, wi[ respect to its Being. This way of setting up the question and therewith the answers remained for a rong time shro,'ded in obscurities. Yet already in the beginnings a curious ambivalence fein Merkwiirdiges] appears. philosophy seeks the erucidation of Being through a consideration of the thoughf of being (Parmen'id,es). Plato's unveiling of the rdeas takes its oriental
sciences

of the soul with itself' don from the n'uon'ologue (" logos ") originate in view o{ the predicative The Aristotel'iam categories o{ reason' Descw'tes recognition fdas aussagend'e Erkennen] res cogitans'" ."nilttt "ulbli*n".l liirst Philosophy on the '( sphere of' conK-*t', transcendental problematic moves in the Is this shift in perspective [Umsc'i,ousness fBewusstseins]' consciousness arbitrary or wendung d.es Blickes] from being to of that which' under is it periapu d.*und"d by the peculiarity to as the Problem the title of Being, is constantly attended principle fgrundArea of philosophy ? The clarification in to consritzliche] of the necessity for regression fRiickgangs] d'eterexplicit radical and scious awareness fBewusstsein], the proced'uraI steps of mination of the ltray or path and of the Iniictsu"g], the fundamental fprinzipielle] thi. ".t"ogression and systematic fsystematische] exploration of "i""o-.""iption subjectivity which is opened up along this the sphere -bu"k of pure constitutes Phenome' ouuy fRiickgang] : such is r'vhat Being-probootogy. The fnal clariflcation of the philosophical (( back " [die lem and the methodical retrenchment or cutting methodische Zuriickfiihrung] to the systematically fwissenYague geneschaftlich] settled philosophical task overcomes the of rality and vacuity of traclitional philosophizing' The stating conform the question, methodical research, and interpretation o{ to the fund.auental arrangement fprinzipiellen Gliederung]
preciselythe'being'ofpositivityaccordingtoallofitskinds over by una gt*a"r. But has not this same task been taken
radical laying psy.Ulology since the time o{ Locke? Does not a than a of the foundation of philosophy require something other

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consepsycholory o{ pure conscious subjectivity methodically within iolot "po" and restricted- to that which we und'ergo olo"**lou* [innere Er ahrung] only ? Fundamental fgrundsii'tzliche] deliberation on the object and method of mere psychology however can make evident that it is in principle [grundsritzlich]

notinthepositiontoestablishfoundationsforphilosophyasa

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336

Martin

Heid,egger

T'ha ld,ea

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Pltenontenol'ogg

937

conscious awareness, which

schaft] of pure subjectivity. rt is the yeahzution of the idea of Phenomenology as scientifc [wissenschaftlicher] philosophy. conversely the transcend.entai knowledge of conscious awareness secures for the first time the co*plete insight into the essence of pure psychology, its fundamental ffundamentale] function and the comditions of its possiblity. The fdea of a pure psycho,logy All experiences in rvhich we have a relation directed to objects (underg'oing [Erfahren], thinking, wanting, evaluating) admit of a turn of sight lor a reflective gaze,, (Biickweidung)], through which they themselves becoie objects. The diverse modes of experience are revealed. as that wherein everything which we stand in relation to comes to light tsich zeigt], t appears'' The experiences therefore are ca'ed phenomena. The reflective turning o{ the gaze [Die Umwenar_g a.* Blickes] on to them,. the undergoing [Erfahrung] and determination of the experiences simply as such is the piino_uoologi_ cal attitude. fn this manner of speaking the term ,, phenomenological " is still used in a preriminary iuor". w-ith the reflec-

knowiedge fpositive wissenschaft] of conscious awareness refers back to the transcendentar knowredge ftranszendentale'w'isserr-

varying sureness and clarity, extends back therefore beyond the region of, the pure psychic into the sphere of pure subjectivity' Because in this fsubjectivity] the Being of art that which for the subject can be experienced in a difieren t wzy, the transcend,ent in the broadest sense, is constituted, it is calred transcendenlal subjectivity. The pure psycho,logy as positive

of the Being of their regions of Being. The regression to all philosophy searches for with

such, leaves untouched the question which concerns all fpositive science] in the same way, namely the question of the meaning

science' For it is itserf positive science lpositive wissenschaft] and, in keeping with the research-mode of positive science

as

phenomena a universal dve turning of the gaze toward the investiturk opuo* op, ou-"ly, to systematically fsystematisch] grades' {orms' gut" th" varieties of experiences, their typical und'e-rind hie"a"chization fsiufenzusammenhdnge]' and to itself in [ein in stand fthem] as fforminS] a totality closed we trans' sich geschlossenes Ganzes]' Turned to experiencest into psychic'* pure fo"-1h" ways of, behavior of the 'soul,' the in looking toward the object. it is callecl pure psychic because all psychic functions experiences as such one looks away frorn in the sense of the organization of, corporeality fleibl'ichkeit]' that is to say, away from the psychophysical' The above the access to the mentioned phenomenological attitude secures of pure psychic and makes possible the thematic investigation th" .u*" in the sense of a pure psycho'logy' The clarification of the id-ea of a pur"e [Au-fkkirung] of the understancling o{ three questions: fsychology requires the answ'ering 1. What is prope to fgehort] the object o{ the pure psychology;

2..Whichisthewayodaccessandma.nipulationthatthis
object demands according to its proper cond-ition fVerfassung]
;

3. What is the function in principle

the pure psYchologY ?

fgrund.shtzliche] of

of tlt'e Ptr're Psychology' By what is the being, which thro'ngh the phenomenological turn of sight becomes the object, generally characterized' as (in the such ? In all pure psychic [seelischen] experiences perception of something, in the recollection of something, in the judging imaginiog of something, in delighting in sorrething, in
Th,e Obiect
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* Note here lleitlegger's explicit equation of 'clie verhaltungsweisen iler , to . d.as rein psychische ,: . Den Erlebnissen zugewendet machen

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338

Martin Heidegger
one

The ld,ea of Phanornenol'ogg

339

about something; in wanting something, in hoping for somethingi etc.) there lies originally a being-directed toward. . . Experiences arc intentional. This referring-to . . . is linked to the psychic not just subsequently and occasionally as an arbitrary relation, as though experiences could be what they are without the intentional reference. Rather, with the intention. ality of experiences the essential structure of the pure psychic manifests itself. The totality of a coherence of experience [Erlebniszusammenhangs] of a psychic fseelischen] life exists at any given time in the sense of a seif (an f) and as such it lives in de facto [faktisch] communion fGemeinschaft] with others. The pure psychic proyes for that reason accessible both in what the isolated sel{ undergoes [Selbsterfahrung] and in what is undergone intersubjectively in contact with an extraneous or foreign psychic tife fin der intersubjektiven Erfahrung fremden Seelenlebens]. Each of tho experiences which reveal thenaselves in what the self undergoes [in der seibster{ah'ung] has for itself initiaily its own essential form or pattern fWesensfonn] with possible modes of modification which are proper to it. The perception for instance od a cube has this one thing even in the originating perceptive glimpse [Blick]. Nevertheless it is not in its character as experience a simple empty having-here fDa-haben] of the thing. Tho thing presents itself in the perception rather through manifold t ways of appearance., The correlation fZusammenhang] o{ these, which directly constitutes the perception in the first place, has its own proper type and its own typical regulation of its completion. The modes of appearance in the recollection of this same thing are the same and yet inflected in the manner proper to memory. Moreover difierences and grades of clarity show up, of relative d.eterminateness and indeterminateness o{ comprehension [Erfassens], such as temporal perspective, attentiveness, etc. Such is the case in an opinion consciously judged fdas in einem urteil Geurteilte]

judging time as evident, another time as not evident. The as something random or as not evident can for its part occur the experiences ol be explained step by step. Correspond'ingly, hidd'en [p"o] wanting and evaluating are always unities of

t In such exesiablishecl ffundierenclen] ways of appearance'' not appear does neriences however that which is experienced" general' as simply as ldentrca-t and clifierent, ind"ivid"ual and serviceable' as being, being and not being, possibiy and probably genuine bruotifol, good, but it proaes itself as true or untrue, The essential patterns fWesensformen] of the

or spurious.

possible individual experiences are embedded' though in a type of co rtext psychic s;ntheses and completions within a closed' It has as totality tho essential fseelischen Zusammenhangs]. fo"m [wesensform] of a psychic life of an individ.ual self as such. This fself] exists on the basis of its enduring convictions, of decisions, habits, qualities of character' And this totality the habituality of the self reveals in turn essential patterns of formation [Wesensformen d.er Genesis], of its proximately activity] for [jeweiligen] possible activity, which [fo'rmative its part remains stratified. in the associative interconnections o{ happening [Ge[Zusammenhiinge] whose specific pattern schehensfo,m] is one rrith that fformative activity] through typical successive references. The self lives de faclo aI any given time in communion with others. social acts (addressing another, agreeing with him, dominating his will, etc') have not only their own proper pattern as experiences of groupst tribes, corporations, and alliances, but also their own type of happening, of efiect (power and powerlessness), of development and decline (history fGeschichte]). This totality o{ the life of the inclivid.ual in possible communings fGemeinschaften], in itsel{ constmcted. intentionally through and thro,ugh, constitutes the entire sphere of the pure psychic. fn what way is sure access to this region accomplished, and which is the manner of its

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3+0

Martin

Heid,egger
accessible as

The ld,ea of PhenomenologY

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2.

The

Me{;h,od,

of tlte Pure Psychology.

The essential components of the method determine themselves from the basic constitution [Grundverfassung] and species o{ the Being of the object. If the pure psychic is essentially intentional and aceessible in the first instance irr what the individuai self undergoes [der Selbsterfahrung des Einzelnen], [then] the phenorirenological turn of sig'ht toward experiences must be executed. suchwise that these show themselves in their intentionality and become g6mprehensible with reference to their type. The access to the intentional being according to its basic state [Grundverfassung] is effectecl by
way of, the phenonoenological-psychotrogicai reduct,i,on. Remaining in the reductive attitrde the eid,etic analysis of the pure psychic is carried out, that is to say, the exposure of the essentiai structures o the individual species of experience, their patterns of interconnection and happening [Zusammenhangs- und Geschehensformen]. rnasmuch as the psychic becomes aecessible in what the seif und.ergoes both alone and in connpany with others [in der Selbsterfahrung und intersubjektiven Erfahrung], the reduction is articulated [gliedert sich] according to the egological and the intersubjective.

a) The Phenomenological-psychological Reduction. The reflective turn of sight away from the unconsid.ered
percep'tion of, say, a thing of nature, toward. this perceiving itself has the peculiarity that in it the apprehensive tendency which previously was directed at the thing draws back fvom th,e unconsidered perception in order to direct itself to the nerceiv-

that which it is, that is to say, as perception of the thing. The thing of nature itself is indeed essentially neYer the possible object of a psychological reflection, yet shows itself igainst the reducing gaze o\ the perceiving, since this [perceiving] is essentially perception of the thing. The thing belongs to the perception as that which is perceived. The intentional relation of the perceiving to be sure is not a {ree-floating (( relation directed into a vacuum, but as intentio " it has an ((intentum essentially beionging to it. Whether the very thing " perceived" in the perception is present or not, the intentional assumption of the perception is nevertheless, accord'ing to its own apprehensive meaning, directecl to the being as physically at hand. Every perceptual illusion makes this clear. Onlv because the perceiving as intentional essentially has its " intentum " can it be modified in the direction of a deceptiot about something. Owing to the per{ormance of the reduction the full intentional content of an experience becomes originally visible' Since then al1 pure experiences and their interconnections are intentionally corxtructed, the reduction guarantees the universal access to the pure psychic, that is to say, to the p'h,enotnena. 'What becomes Ilence the reduction is called phenomenological. primarily accessible in the execution of the phenomenological reduction is however the pure psychic as a de facto aniqlne coherence of, experience of the current [jeweiligen] self' Beyond the characteristic descriptive of this (on each occasion) unique experience completion fErlebnisabiaufes], is a genuinely scientific, that is, objectively valid, recognition of the psychic now possible?

ing as such. This device (reduction) for following up

the

apprehensive tendency [Diese Rtickfiihrung (Reduktion) der Erfassungstendenz] from within the perception and the transposition o the apprehension unto the perceiving so 1itt1e changes the perceptio.o, that the reduction makes the perception directly

b)

The Eidetic Analysis.

intentionality constitutes the basic state of all pure experiences and is different in relation to the separate kinds of experience [Erlebnisgattungen], then the laying bare o{ that

ff

342

Martin

Heid,egger

which belongs, for example, to a perception as such, to a wanting as such, in every case according to their full intentional structural content, emerges as a possible and necessary task. The reductive attitude toward. the pure psychic, which [pure psychic] presents itself at the outset as a de facto ind,ividuai
experience.coherence [Erlebniszusammenhang], must thus pre-

The ld,ea of Phenom'enologY

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scind from or disregard fabsehen] aIi psychic facticity. This linitia]ly given psychic f.acticiby] serves only exemplarily as basis for the free variation of possibilities. Thus for example the phenomenologicai analysis of the perception of spatial things is in no wly a report about, the perceptions de facto occwring or empiricaily anticipated, but is the laying bare of, the necessary structural system without which a synthesis of manifold perceptions as perception of one and the same thing would" be unthinkable. The exhibiting of the psychic effected in the reductive posture has in view accordingly the iru;ari.snt standing out within the variations, the necessary pattern-style (Eidos) of the experience. The reductive attitude toward the psychic functions therefore in the manner of an eidetic analysis of the phenomena. The scientific exploration of the pure psychic, the pure psychology, can be rcalized only as reductiae-eidet'i,c, as phenomenological. The phenomenological psychology is descri,ptine. That means: the essential structures of the psychic are made to stand out from it by direct intuition in the method of variation. All phenomenological concepts and propositions require direct verifications upon the phenomena themselves. fnsof,ar as the reduction in the sense charaeJwized, secures the access only to one's own psychic lifo fSeelenieben], it is calied egologi,cal. Yet because each self stand,s with others in empathic association [Einfiihlungszusarnmenhang] constituted within intersubjective experiences, a necessary amplification of the egological reduction by means of the intersubjecti,ae is required. The phenomenology of empathy, which must be treated in its compass! by the clarification of the manrler in which empathic

of my pure psychic coherence are able to develop in the mode of consentient feinstimmig'er] verification, leads not only towards the description of syntheses of this type as that fi. e., as a description] of my soul. What here establishes itsel{ in a speciflc evidence-frame is the co-er'i'stence of' a concrete other self indicatecl consequently and with evel' new determinations of content-along with a corporality [Koryerlichkeit] experienced rvithin my sphere of conscious awareness fronc the outset and of a niece with it' But this foreign self on the other hand. is not here fron the o'utset in the same way as one's own [self] in its singular foriginalen] relation to ofs co'rpolality. The carrying through o{ the phenomenological recluction in my real and possible validation of a , foreign, psychic life in the eviclence-patterl o{ consentaneous
[einstimmiger] empathy is the intersubjective reduction' From' the basis of the egological reduction it makes the foreign psychic life in its primord_ial self-certification accessible within its pure
psyehic consistencies [Zusammenhringen]'

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TIte Funct'ion i'n Princi'ple lgrund'siitzlichef of the Pure PsycVuologY.

The recluction opens the way to the pure psychic as such' The eid"etic analysis unveils in its essential coherences the recluctively accessible along this way. The former is i'n'd'ispensa' ble, t}le latter the constitutive element adecluuting fhinreichende] along with the former the method of, pure psychology. According'ly, in the reductive eidetic investigation of the puro psychic, the cleterminations which belong to the pure psychic as such, that is to say, the ground; concepts of psychology, arise inso{ar as it [i. e., psychology] has, as empirical knowledge of the psychophysical totality of concrete man, its central domain in the pure psychic life as such. Pure psychology supplies the necessary a-prioristic fundament for empirical psychology with regard to the purely psychicai [Seeli.sche]. Just as a systematic

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344

Ma,rti,n Heid;egger

as such is

fsystematischen] unveiiing of the essential patterns of a nature required fcr the establishment of an , exact, empirical

natural scieace, without u'hich [unveiling] nattre, more specifi-

Some Meclieval Anticipations of Inertia

by lames F. O'Btien

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cally, [a] space-time franrc, motion, change, physicai substantiali6', and causality could not be thought; so also a scientifically fwissenscha{t1ich] ' exacl,' psycho ogy recluires an unveiling of the a-priori type [Typik], without which [unveiling] the f (equally the we), conscious awareness, the objectivity of consciousness and consequently a psychic life as such-with all the differences and essentially possible forms of syntheses which are inseparable from the idea of an individually and communally psychical totaiity-could not be thought.* Althoug.h the psychophysical interrelation [or ('set up ,' (Zasammenhang) ] as such has its o,rvn a-priori which has not yet been determined by means of the purely psychological ground-co rcepts, the psychophysical a-priori still requires in principle such an orientation with respect to the a-priori of, the pure psychic.
Instdtwte

I
FIE IDEA OF inertia is a to,uchsto re to a philosophy of nature. N. R' Hanson noted recently, only geared to Too often the inteilectual excitement of science seems However there a're statements' researoh in eontemporarT physics. ave rewarding in hypotheses ancl theories of classical science that now thu**ulru*-*ithout having to be referred to the agonies that

Newton's flrst confound quantum theory ancl cosmology, speciflcally, a logician of Iaw of motion-the law of inertia-which has everything science eould clesire.l

for

Phi,losoplt i,oal Reseorch, Ch,i.cago, Illinois.

one can also add. that the larv is filled with meaning {or any metaphysics which wili be relevant not only to the world of but also'to the mind. trained' in science as it exists "*pu"i"n"u tod-ay. It neecl only be recalled that Newton's law of lnertia and the general ideas about motion which either led to its formulation, were deduced from it, or are at least compatilrle with it, constitute a major reason for the rejection of Aristotelian-Thomistic type philosophies o{ natule since the seventeenth century. There is no doubt that the law led Newton and others to ideas about God's relation to the physical world quite different from those of the medievals, such as Aquinas, perhaps most obviously in terms of His conservation of things in their being and concurrence in their activity' ft has also played a key role in greatly diminishing the persuasive power of the
1N. R, Ilanson, "Newton's First Law: A Philosopher's Door into Natural Philosophy," in Begond, The frd'ge of Oertacntg, etlitecl by Robert G. Colodny (Eisays ,in Conternltorarg Sci,ence anr1 Phi1oso,th,g, Yo1. 2, university of Pittsburgh series in the Philosophy of science [Englewootl Ciifis, N. J., 19651 ), p.5. See also N. R. Ilanson, "The T'aw of Inertiar A Philosopher's Touchstone," Plr,ilosoplty of Soi'en'oe,30 (1963)'
345

{'

senschaft

Cf. Heitlegger's remarks on ., den vollen existenzialen Begriff der Wis" in Bein und, Zeot, pp. 862-368.