~ j

Military Review
~
Professional Journal of the US Army mL*:~
Senior Army Officersand DevelopingAreas . Armored Forces in the Middle East . An NM Sf.wial Fsatrw
East of the Andes . . . . . . . . . . COL Arne H. Eliasson,USA . . . . . Leo Heiman 3
11

COL John G. Waggener,USA

20
26
34
41
41
53
59
69

Vieiamese Marines in Joint Operations . Korea: Our Next Vietnam? . . , . . . . . . . . . . . .

. LTC Douglas T. Kane, USMC . . . LTC James M. Wroth, USA . . . . R. J. Hill

French Strategy After Oe Gaulle . Flexible Response in Perspective . SovietOfficer Courts of Honor . Sino40viet Attitudes . . . . . .

. COL Walter Beinke, USA . . VyacheslavP. Artemiev

COL Bryce F. Denno, USA, Ret . ,. COL John B. McKirrney, USA

The Armys Mi~atu~ AT&T . Armored Warfare

in Europe . . .

. CAPT F;tz von Wyszecki,Fed Rep of GermanyArmy . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . B. H. Liddell Hart . Peter 1.Gosztony

76
80
81i
91
97

Strategy ofa War .

Memoirs of Marshal Konev .

Thinking About Military Thinking . . MAJ J. L. Hillard, British Army, Ret Military Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

MilitaryBooks .

. 108

tThe VIEWS expressed in this megazine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessarily those of the US Army or the Commend and General Staff College.

Editorin Chief
COLDonaldJ. Delaney AssociateEditor COLJohn B. B. Trussell,Jr. ArmyWar College

AssistantEdit$r
LTCA. Leroy Covey Features Editor LTCRobertl G. Main ProductionEditor HelenM. Hall Spanish.American Editor
MAJJuan Hortafvlerly
BrazilianEditors LTC SamuelT. T. Primo LTCRomeroLepesqueur Publication Officer LTCEdwardA, Purcell Art and Oesign CharlesA. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW=Publkhed monthly by the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leav. enworth, Kansaa, m En&!lish,Spanish, and Portuguese. Use of funds for printing of Uris publication has been approved by Headquarters, Dearfment of the Army, 25 JuIY 1968. Second-class postage paid at /ort Leavenworth, Kansaa. Subscription rates $4.00 (US currency)a yaar in the Unitad States, llnited, StatSsmilitary post offices, andthose countries which are members of the Pan-American Postal ~IIIIJII (mcludmg Spaml; $5.00 a year in all other countrie~ single copy price 50 cents. Address subscwption mail to the Qook Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

SEIIIIOR
ARMY OFFICERS

A@gnmenf to Developing Areas

Colonel Arne H. Eliasson,

UwtedStates Armg

HE United States is currently involved in an extensive program to make her technological knowledge and finan cial resources available to the developing areas of the world. The hungry nations are eagerly grasping the opportunities afforded by this multiple assistance and are attempting to pull themselves into the 20th century, to make their standard of living comparable to more developed nations, and to attain a position of independence in the community of nations. This surge of development, which hae no parallel in history, has not been an entirely peaceful process. During times of turbulence, the modernizing nations are extr&mely vulnerable to subversion by dissident internal elements, exploitation by
NaremberlW8

\,

DEVELOPING AREAS selfish external powers, and deadly in fluence through Communist infiltra tion and insurgency. To help the nonindustrial countries carry out the revolution of moderniza tion and acquire the capability to solve their own problems remains a funda mental objective of the US foreign assistance program. A long period of security and rela tive atahility is required in order for technological and financial aid to be successf u] in promoting progress. Sta bility operations to promote security and progress in the modernization of less-favored nations have become the US Armys third principal mission. They include the whole spectrum of internal defense and development op erations. CountryTeams In each country receiving assistance from the United States, a Country Team is organized informally to co ordinate the Military Assistance Pro gram (MAP) with other assistance activities. The Country Team ie usu ally headed by the Ambassador or Chief of Diplomatic Mission. It nor mally includes Embassy officers and attach6e, including military attach6e, Colonel Arne H. Eliaeseni8 the US Army Attachi in Pakistan. He re ceived his Bachelors degree from the University of Omaha, in Nebraska, and is a graduate of the US Army Communal and General Staff College, and of the US Army War College, Carlisle Barrasks, Penne@ania. He served in Europe dumng World War II with the 16th ZnfantW; with the 8d Helicopter Detachment, Far East Command, Korea; with the 7th Army in Europe; with the Militam Assist arwe Command, Vietnam; and with the Ofice of the Director of Personnel, US Army Infantrg C ,ter, Fort Ben ntng, Georgia. 4

.,
the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) or Military Mission Chief, and the US Information Service Director. Military assistance acts to strength en a nations internal security in three ways: I e In training of the$nilitary forces, both by providing US instructors and advisors, and by training individuals in US-operated schools. e By providing weapons, equip ment, ammunition, and other mate riel. e By financing civic action proj ects in conjunction with the Agency for International Development. Within a country receiving military aid, MAAGs administer the assist ance program. In come countries, the military aeaistance organization may be designated as Service Training Missions, Defense Liaison Groups, Military Groups, or Military Mis sions. In others, the US military at tach6 is charged with responsibility for MAP administration. It ie in the best interest of the United States that US Army person nel who are involved in fighting in surgency, establishing security, and promoting development of the emerg ing nations be carefully selected and thoroughly trained. FASTProgram A program dezigned to provide selected Army officers with academic knowledge and practical experience of certain countries of the world is the Foreign Area Specialist Training Program (FASTP). Participants are fluent lingnists-able to read, write, and speak the major language of the area specialty. They study the total culture within the framework of the areas history, geography, sociology, economy, and politics.

Military
Review

DEVELOPING AREAS Because of the relatively high cost of training, both in terms of training time (shout four years) and money (approximately $21,000), theoretically, officers are required to remain in tbe program for the rest of their careers unless they are dropped for and are sought by senior officers in advisory positions. Because a FAS1P graduate ie a volunteer, and he and hip family have had prior expoeure to the cultural sheek which often comes when firet introduced to a developing foreign country, he posseeses

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1. Your current duty position(e) and a description of your duties and responaibllities te include length of time served. 2. Name(s) and a brief description of the country or countries in whwh you perform ,your duties. 3. To the best of your knowledge, what were the reasons for your selection for this assignment ? Did you volunteer? 4. What training did you receive prior to and specifically for this assign ment and, if applicable, what is your evaluation of this training? 5. What additional training do you believe would have benefited you prior to reporting to your present job? 6. What previous experience and training have gou had which you have found useful in this type of assignment? 7. Do you have a counterpart in the hoet countrys military establish ment? If so, please indicate nature and frequency of your contacts with him. 8. What are your communications problems, if any, due to different cultural background and language barriei ? 9. What functions are not currently performed by US military rep resentatives which you believe ehould be considered? 10. Please give any additional conclusions and recommendations that you have formed regarding the selection criteria; training content, procedures, and facilities; and other procedures and policies for preparing eenior otficcrs for developing area assignments. \ Figure 1. failure to remain qualified. At least every other assignment should be a tour of duty which utilizes their specialist training. In practice, this has not always been poeeible because of conflicting assignment requirementa, even though these officers represent those most highly qualified for overseae duties. Graduatee of FASTP are some of the most effective stability operators
Nswmber 1966

excellent potential for a successful advisory tour. Officers presently aseigned to MAAGs and missions are in a unique position to evaluate selection and assignment procedures and training pol iciee for stability operations. Therefore, their opinions were sought as an aid in etudying these problems. Questionnaires were mailed to approxi mately one-third of the colonels and 5

DEVELOPING AREIU lieutenant colonels eerving in MAAG and mission assignments. However, officers in Vietnam were not queried. Replies were received from 98 of ficers-a. 64-percent response. MAAG assignments have tradition ally heen considered unrewarding within a career pattern. However, w. missions, or occupying positions in a headquarter responsible for super vising advieory and assistance efforts, should have prior experience as a member of a MAAG or mission. They feel also that recurring advisory as signments should be made whenever possible and feasible. Oficers are

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US Ann

Most advisors stressed the importanceof knowingthe languageof the host country advisory and assistance duties now are considered by the Department of the Army as key roles in executing the Armys mission of restoring or establishing stability and insuring continuing progress in modernizing developing areas. These assignments require professional officers who are aware of the military relationship to the political, economic, social, and cultural structure. A number of M A 8G officers feel that officers commanding MAAGs or 6 usually more efficient and successful as advisors on their second and sub sequent tours. Although military ne cessity must govern, repetitive tours should not unduly handicap an of ficer by denying him essential career schools and other assignments neces sary to develop his potential value to the Army. There are some reservations, how ever. Assignment to some developing areas requires unusual initial expend itures for household goods, canned M6itary Review

DEVELOPING AREAS food, and specialized items such as transformers, space heaters, and vari ous electrical appliances. Education of children is often markedly dis rupted. There is often a lack of proper medical, dental, and other personal welfare support activities. Therefore, recurring assignments, even though normally desirable from a j ob-effec tivenesa point of view, must be evalu ated carefully. SelectionQualifications, The stated qualifications for selec tion for MAAG duty are high. Pro fessional experience, knowledge of tbe appropriate language, adaptability, and ability to instruct are considered. In addition, the officer must have an exemplary record of personal con duct, be physically qualified, and be graduated from the school courses appropriate fpr his grade and length of service. He muet not be on hla last tour prior to retirement nor have been passed over for promotion. The records of the officer and in. formation concerning his dependents are screened thoroughly prior to final determination. The chiefs, deputy chiefs, chiefs of the Army sections, and other selected officers of MAAGa and missions are nominated for ap proval through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. Approximately two-thirde of the respondents to the questionnaires stated what they thought were the reasons they had been selected for their present jobs. The largest num ber thought that they were chosen because of professional qualifications, specialized backgrounds, language pro ficiency, or previous experience in advisory-type assignments. Some felt they were selected because they were available or due an overseas tour.
Nowmber 1968

There were 17 percent who reported t~at they had volunteered for the current or a eimilar assignment com pared to 39 percent who stated that they had not volunteered. In between t~e two groups, ,but leaning toward thoee who did r+ volunteer, wae an additional 34 perFent who said they had accepted when offered the as signment. Current selection procedures have provided many enthusiastic, dedicated officers, competent in their particular fields and ready to do a good job. Incompetence is eeldom a complaint of overeeaa commander nor a reaeon for premature return of officers from a MAAG or mission assignment. When relief is requested, it is usually based on pereonal problems. OverseasRequisitions Requisitions-from overseas com mande continue to ask for highly qualified officers and for upgrading of qualification requirements. Thie may be a sign that some commanders are not satiefied. Several replies noted that reviews of promotion selection liets from lieutenant colonel to colo nel reveal a disproportionately large number of not eelected among those aeeigned to MAAGs and missions. Respondents emphasized that it ie in the best interest of the United States to send highly capable people to ~e veloping area assignments. This will be difficult, if not impossible, unlese senior officers feel that adviaory as signments contribute toward career development and enhance promotion possibilities. The total percentage of senior of ficers in advisory positione is rela tively small. Therefore, some respond ente suggested that eelection proce dures for advieory assignments be made comparable to those for military 7

DEVELOPING AREAS attach6snameIY, that criteria he established and announced, vacancies be advertised, and the most highly qualified applicants be selected. Technical competence and personal qualities of the officer were named as the most important factors contribut ing to a successfd MAAG tour. Technical competence is a product of all training and experience. Except for certain refresher courses con ducted by branch schools, military
:1. ... .
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e Military Assistance Institute in Arlington, Virginia. e Defense Language Institute conrses at the Presidio of Monterey, California, and in Washington, D. C, e National Interdepartmental Sem inar, Country Team Seminars on De velopment and Internal Defense, and other area and country seminars held at the Foreign Service Institute, Ar lington, Virginia. competence, area Professional

sPECW

Courses Attended

GOURSES

Euafuafion ExceUent U8efui Limited value

Military Assist.ante Institute Special Warfare Orientation or

Counterinsurgency Courses,
Special Warfare School
Civic Action or Civil Affairs Coursee, Civil Affairs School National Interdepartmental Seminar, Foreign Service Institute
Figure 2.

16

18

18

4 1 6

5 3 3

0
1

schools are generally programed as part of normal career development and not specifically for MAAG duty. However, the FASTP and certain other courses and schools contribute directly to adequate preparation for stability operations assignments: Training e Military Assistance Advisor Course and the Senior Of ficer Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare Orientation Course conducted at the John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. e Civil Affairs Functions Course, Civic Action Course, and Special Civic Action Advisor Course at the Civil Affairs School Fort Gordon, Georgia. 8

knowledge, language facility, and com munications and interpersonal skills are four necessary requirements for military assistance personnel to be successful in overseas operations. Most respondents felt that senior of ficers are handicapped if they are not technically qualified, lack linguistic ca pability to communicate their profes sional advice, or if they cannot under stand the people and the total culture of the area of assignment. Learning the area and the language of its people is important, but this knowledge does not, by itself, provide an adequate background. The most difficult category-communications and interpersonal skillshas received far less attention. WitaryReview

DEVELOPING AREAS Influencing }ocal officials to adopt dpty with a newly organized MAAG ideas and techniques that may be new or mission. The replies of other reto them is one of the chief functions spondents indicate the type of specialof MAAG and miseion pereonnel. Acized training received and the officers cording to the Human Resources Reevaluation of it, The results are tabusearch Office of George Washington lated in Figure 2. University, the failure of the advisor A number of officers who had atto: tended the Military Assistance Ineti . . . recognize the cultural differences tute felt that the instruction was too @Zected in the behavior, attitudes, broadly directed and that insufficient and inetitutio& of the recipients. has information was presented about the T,. ...- -,. ,., ,,$ -.!. ,-: .,*~r-*:,:2:::~:,..? ~~
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of Trmning More than 3 months

Arabic Farsi (Persian) French Greek Portuguese Spanish Total Figure 3. beena major factor in the lack of success of many of our efforts overseas. An officer may know a language, but etill not know what to say or when to say it. In order to impart his technical knowledge and to get it accepted, the advisor must know the necessary cross-cultural interaction skille so that he can communicate in a manner that will not be misunderstood. Twenty-four officers who answered the queetionnaire stated that they had received no specific schooling in preparation for their MAAG assignment. These were primarily individuals who were ordered overseae on short notice to fill a vacancy caused by an unex: peeted departure of an advisor or for
November 1968

1
2
2
1 3 9 15 1
1
18
23

specific countries to which the officers were aseigned. Some officers suggested that tbe area and cultural subjects presented at the Military Assistance Institute could be covered better in conjunction with language training. With regard to language trainin& respondents stationed in Libya, In dia, Pakistan, and the Philippine re ported that their counterparts and other personnel with whom they deal officially speak English. Others reported that many indigenous officer personnel speak English in the Repub lic of China, Ethiopia, Iran, and Thailand. In all other countriee, it ie normally necessary to speak tbe host language or use an interpreter. Fig ure 3 indicates the language training 9

IIEVELtlPINC AREAS completed by the respondents and the length of time in training. The officers who received instruc tion in Arabic and French, and eight of the nine who received less than three months instruction in Spanish, reported that the time allotted was not long enough to enable them to com municate adequately in the host lan guage. A number of officers recom mended that language training be given after completion of the other training for advisory assignments. In response to a question concern ing additional training that would have been beneficial, the respondents mentioned a variety of subjects and areas. Included were organization of tbe host military forces and culture and history of the host country. Re fresher training in branch subjects and counterinsurgency training also were mentioned. But by far the great est number of officers (55 percent) recommended language trainingeven those stationed in countries where many officials speak English. It also was proposed that the best way to teach cultural aspects, essential his tory of the country, and the govern mental structure was in conjunction with language training. On accompanied tours, the effective ness of an officers work is often af fected by his wifes adjustment to the strange environment. The impor tance of instruction for wives in linguistic skills, cultural background of the country, and on our foreign policies was stressed. Many respond ents concluded that it is essential for wives accompanying advisory person nel to speak the host language. Most cultural problems are encountered off the job-not on it. A short period of temporary duty to visit the country prior to assign ment and, preferably, prior to the spe cific area training, was recommended as an inexpensive way thoroughly to orient the individual concern ing living conditions, job require ments, and necessary cultural adjust ments. Most respondents felt that, in any event, the officer must make a detailed study of the country to which he is, assigned. Particular attention must be paid to economic and political conditions in addition to military as pects. Personal consultations with ap propriate desk officers in the Depart ments of State, Defense, and the Army might be included. It is apparent from the survey that experienced officers now serving in MAAG-type assignments feel that greater attention should be given to the selection and preparation of of ficers for MAAG duty. They are of the opinion that more of the Armys best officers should be selected, and that officers of proved effectiveness in MAAG assignments should receive repeated tours. They also stress the importance of knowing the local language and point out that the wives of at least the senior officers should also receive some instruction in the language, customs, and politics of the country.

10

Military Review

ARMORED FORCES

inthe MiddleEast
Leo Heiman HE rapid collapse of Sovietarmored Egyptian trained forces in the Middle East war in June 1967 remains a puzzle. In less than 60 hours, the numerically inferior Is raeli forces routed two enemy armored divisions, five tank brigades, and Up to a dozen armored artillery regiments. Aetual losses suffered by the Israelis were insignificant compsred to the de. cisive damage inflicted upon the en. emy, of the 1,1OOtanks and self-pro Title photo courtesy of Jac Weller. November1966

pelled armored assault guns committdd by the Egyptians in the Sinai and Gaza sectors, almost 800 were either de stroyed or captured intact. Nearly 2,500 armored vehicles tanks, armored cars, self-propelled guns, and armored personnel carriers (APCs)-were committed by both sides in what was one of historys de cisive armored battles. It Cwasthe third encounter between Israeli and Egyptian armored forces in 19 years, after the 1948 Palestine
11

ARMORED FORCES War and the 1956 Sinai campaign. Instead of improving over the years from experience and practical applica. tion of tactical lessons learned at great cost, the Egyptian armored forces de teriorated at a rate that paralleled
their equipment improvement. Composition of Forces

In 1948, the Egyptians had no ar mored brigades. Their mechanized bri gades were equipped with surplus Brit ieh Locust, Valentine, and Sherman tanks, a motley collection of armored cars, and hundreds of Bren carriers which were substitutes for APCS, but which were, in fact, inferior to jeeps. Yet they performed better than in either 1956 or 1967. In 1956, the Egyptians had a num ber of tank brigades and division-size armored formations equipped with So viet T3L/85s, SU1OOS, BTR1 62s, British Centurions and Archers, and with AMX French Super Shermans turrets. Performance in 1956 was still above that of 1967, when they had Soviet-type armored and mechanized divisions, with T5.4 and T55 tanks, JS3 heavies, and armadas of support ing, auxiliary, and engineering vehi cles supplied by the USSR. In 1956, one year after the first military agreement with the Soviet Union, tbe old order etill predominated in tbe officer corps, but the rahk-and fde soldiers and noncommissioned offiLeo Heiman, an Israeli foreign press correspondent, was born in Poland, studied in the Soviet Union, and fought with Soviet partisan forces againet the German Army for two years. He attended Munich Univer sit~, and went to Ierael in 1948 where he served in the army and uavsi for seven yearn. A freguent contributor to the MILITARY REVS.,+, he hcw writtsn several books: on military subjects.

cers had been trained by Soviet and Czechoslovak instructors. This appar ently contributed little to their polit ical awarenese and sociopatriotic mo tivation. In 1967, fifteen years after the Egyptian revolution and 12 yeare after the Cairo-Moscow agreement, the re sults stunned both friend and foe. Nearly 3,500 Egyptian officers and spe cialists had graduated from military, naval, and aviation schools, specialized training courses, and etaff academies in the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslo vakia. This wae followed and supple mented by tactical and technical in struction by hundreds of Soviet ex perts and advieors in the United Arab Republic (UAR).
Reasons for Failure

Since the results were worse than before, one might conclude that some thing is wrong with Soviet operational doctrine, tactical training methods, and the equipment itself. Israeli com manders say that Soviet doctrine is good for Soviets but bad for Arabs. Obviously, the lack of success goes much deeper than that. It illuminate tbe fact that doctrine, methods, and even weapons must be tailormade and adapted to each natione character, ter rain, climate, resources, socioeconomic factors, and scientific-technological po tential. The Israelis learned this in 1948 when their attempt to utilize British doctrine and methods cost them thou sands of casualties and several disas trous setbacks. It is no coincidence that the Israeli Army chiefs, all of whom had served as officers in the British Army in World War H, were subaequently replaced by veterane of Palmacb commando squads. The last Britiah-trained Israeli Chief of the !#iIitary Review

ARMOREO t

FORCES

General Staff was replaced in the 1950s by Palmach ve~eran General Moshe Dayan who scored the 1956 vic tory in Sinai. The 1967 triumph was achieved by Palmach veteran General Itzhak Rabin. Rabins successor as Chief of the General Staff, General Haim Bar-Lev, is another veteran of the Palmach commandos. SovietsTOE The two Egyptian armored divisions and five tank brigades which were crushedin the Sinai last year followed the Soviet ArmYs table of organiza tion and equipment (TOE) from tanks to shoelaces. This resulted in such il logical contradictions as an amphib ious capability in a desert, snow-clear ing equipment in a hot climate, me chanical saws in a wide-open terrain without trees, and tank-mounted bridges and pontone for rivers which did not exist. Meanwhile, basic equip ment for desert warfare was lacking. The#ewere no bulldozers, no bulldozer. tanks, and no tank transporters with out which armored campaigns are un thinkable in the Middle East. The TOE of a Soviet-trained Egyp tian armored division included one battalion of PT76 amphibious tanks and one battalion of BTR50P amphib ious APCS. The Soviet planners must have assumed that amphibious tanks can be ueed everywhere, with or with out rivers to cross. But Egyptian crews in the sealed, watertight vehi cles with inadequate ventilation were roasted in the desert sun. The JS.9heavy tanks which are now being replaced by the newer TIOS are an extremely effective weaponin eastern Europe. There, they can rum ble over peasant cottages, ftatten bun kers, cut a swath through forests, and absorb punishment. The Egyptians
Noremberlee8

used them to support their antitank artillery in action and were trained by their Soviet instructors to fight with turret hatchea closed. Tbe JS.9 heavies, and one must as sume tbe TIOS as well, are not equipped with airconditioning equip ment which is not needed in the cooler climate of eastern Europe. On the con trary, they are tightly sealed against radioactivity for combat missione un der conditions of nuclear warfare. There were no bombs in Sinai, but the sun was suffocatingly hot for the ,7.%9 crews. Their responees were so slug gieh and their rate of fire so slow that come JS.9 tanks were actually de stroyed or captured by unarmored jeep commandos using bazookas and grenades,
Bulldozers

The Israeli armored forces could not have scored their remarkable suc cesses on the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian battlefronts without bull- dozers and tank transporters. The Is raelis utilize bulldozers for almost any kind of mission, from clearing mine field and removing obstacles, to fill ing in ditches and deep gorges and blazing a trail up rugged mountain cIiffe for the tank columns to follow. Three types of bulldozers are used ip a campaign: Tankdozere of organic engineer ing companieeSherman tanke with bulldozer blades. Armored bulldozers of engineer ing battalionsheavy Caterpillar mod els with armored cabins. Commercial bulldozers of reserve units-civilian contractors and con struction syndicates. Trazzaporters are just as important ae bulldozers. Tanks moving on their own tracks damage the roads, wear
13

maintained tank is good for about 100 hours of actual combat driving before it needs minor rspairs or a major overhaul. Israeli tanks fought for 60 hours in Sinai, 50 hours in Jordan, and 40 hours in Syria. Had they moved up front under their -,-n power, rather than on transporters, they would have deprived themselves of valuable com 14

tractor-pulled 50-ton flatcars on rubber wheels. No Israeli tank was left with out a transporter to move it to the actual frontline deployment area. The situation was vastly different on the Egyptian side where not a single transporter was available. So viet tanks unloaded from ships at Al exandria or Port Said harbors pro ceeded by train to El Arish and El
Militafy Review

ARMORED Kantara East stations in Sinai and moved on their own tracks to deploy ment areas. Tank brigades stationed weat of the Suez Canal crossed hun dreds of miles of desert under their own power. They suffered so many mechanical breakdowns en route that some battalions arrived on the battle field at one-half to two-thirds of their authorized strength before a eingle shot had been fired. When bulldozer were needed, Egyptian tanks waited until engineering unite arrived. Easy Targeta But since engineering units seldom

FORCES

rodfs and fences witbout resorting to bulldozers. There are no rugged can yone, deep gorgee, rocky wadi river beds, escarpment, and mountain cliffs that must be cleared or negotiated with the aid of bulldozer blades. Lakes and rivers provide the main natural obstacleshence the emphasie on am phibious tanks and APCS. Basic Differences ~~ Soviet armored tactics, as applied by the Egyptians, aleo left much to be desired. The rigid divisional forms depended on efficient communication. But even when these were available, many Egyptians apparently lacked training in how to uee them. Moreover, it appears that there was a lack of un derstanding and appreciation concern ing tbe basic difference between an ar mored column, an armored convoy, and a task force advancing in column for mation in a desert campaign. To the uninitiated eye, all three may look the came. An armored column is an operational formation advancing along ite tactical axis in an organized pattern. It ie capable of giving battle on the move, straight ahead, or to either flank. An armored convoy is a logistic for mation advancing along a road. It can bean extra tank battalion moving up to reinforce a column, or trucks with petroleum, oils, and lubricants and ammunition escorted by armored ve hicles, engineering, auxiliary, or sup porting units moving to the battle area. It is protected on the move against aerial and commando attacks, but is not organized for regular bat tle against a major enemy force. A task force does not have to be armored, but it must be mechanized and Flghly mobile. It can advance along one axis or more. It can move
15

appeared where they were needed, Egyptian tanke operated along the roads-easy targets for Israeli fighter bombers. Lack of wheeled tank trans porters also precluded rapid move ment of forcee from one sector to an other. The overnight switchoverof Is raeli tank brigades from Jordan to Syria was made possible by columns of wheeled transporters which moved rapidly along the roads with priority over all other traffic. One probable reaeon for Soviet fail ure to provide bulldozers and trans porters for the Egyptian armored for mations is that the Soviets seldom use them. Soviet tanks are ueually moved by rail to deployment areas. Tbe east European rail network is much more developed than the road network so that nothing would be gained by switching over from railway flatcars to wheeled transporter. From Poland to Siberia, and from tbe Baltic to the Baikal, farms, villages, and even small towns are built of wood. The only buildinge of brick and stone are to be found in the cities. Heavy tanks, like the JS3 or 210, can eaeily flatten peasant cottages, smashtrees, and break through hedge
November1968

ARMORED

FORCES

in parallel columns, overlapping cOl umns, or interlocking columns, or it can move in one large single column. It is a fighting organization geared to the specific conditions of terrain, enemy presence, natural obstacles, and assigned mission. The Egyptian armored divisions, mechanized divisions, and tank bri gades moved in convoys only. Thus, it was often possible for one Israeli tank company, with 10 to 15 tanks, to ambush an enemy column many times its size. The Egyptian tanks often rammed one another, crushed jeepa and trucks, and contributed to the general chaos and disorder in an effort to deploy for action. They fought as single tanks without company-level coordination or guidance of a higher headquarters.
Flaw in Ooctrkses

vulnerable to smaller, but better or ganized, enemy formations. The Egyptian practice of digging in tanks, or confining them to reinforced revetments behind fortified positions or on reverse slopes of hills, may or may not have been influenced by So viet doctrines. By so doing, their ar mor was deprivsd of its main asset mobility. In most cases, the well. camouflaged tanks were not epotted by the Israelis who suffered losses when the first enemy salvo hit them. How ever, when the Egyptian tanks dis closed their positions by flashee from their firing, they were outflanked and bypassed, or destroyed, by the lighter and more mobile Ieraeli columne, and fighter bombers struck the revetments and dugouts, with napalm, rockets, bombs, and cannon fire. Even when the Egyptians had ul tramodern equipment, good positions, solid Ieadersbip, and many hours of preparation for battle, they often lacked adaptability, initiative, and tat. tical skill as demonstrated in the bat tle for a key road junction west of the Bir Gafgaffa airbase in Sinai. The Israeli tank battalion which overran the base was counterattacked by an Egyptian tank brigade. A small Israeli column of one com pany of Centurion tanke with 105 millimeter guns, two companies of armored .infantry, and smaller units of jeep commandos and combat engi neers moved out to secure the road junction and was ambushed by a bat talionof Egyptian 255 night-figbtiug tanks with infrared equipment, The Egyptians fired from both forks of secondary roads converging into the junction. Appraising the tactical situation in
Review Military

Part of this inherent weakness must be ascribed to a flaw in the Soviet armored doctrines. Documents and training manuals found by the Israelis in Syria and Sinai indicate that the Soviets prefer to deploy for action in their favorite linear formation before meeting the enemy. Their instructions teach commanders of armored forces to engage the enemy with the leading column alone, in case of a head-on clash, and deploy the remaining forces in the standard pattern. They have no column organization ready for 360 degree battle such as had been devel oped by the Israelis. From the Soviet point of view, there is no need for euch in the terrain of eastern Europe where derise forests, marshes, and rivers protect the flanks of mechanized forces. However, col umne not ready to rive battle under all circumstances m the deserts and open spaces of the Middle East are
16

ARMOREO

FORCES

conditions of total darkness, the Is. raeli commander ordered two of his tank platoons to deploy in a single line and stop, sending the third pla. -, toon ahead. Lackhg infrared equip ment, he wanted the enemy tanks to expose themselves first. As calculated, the moving tanks drew enemy fire, and the stationary Israeli tanks fired hack

p+cmers taken by jeep commandos disclosed they had been trained to fire at moving vehicles at night. Their in frared equipment could not distinguish between tanks and APCS. As a result, they thought new tanks were moving in all the time, and they failed to use visual observation. Artillery support for armored and

at the flashes, scoring some hits. The

Israelis then sent APCS into the gap, again drawing fire, and again scoring hits after firing back at the flashes. At dawn, over 30 T55 tanks were found destroyed, damaged, or aban donedintact at the cost of five Israeli tanks and some APCS. More impor tant, the vital road junction was con trolled and secured despite enemy su periority,and preparedness. Egyptian
Nmnbsr 1968

mechanized forces illustrated another deficiency in Soviet doctrine. Soviet doctrine is based on centralized ar tillery control with forward observere reporting to regiment and brigade. Fire miesions are assigned from higher headquarters. Standard patterne of fixed barrage, rolling barrage, or time on target concentrations are often used. This works well with hun dreds or thousands of artillery pieces 17

ARMORED

FORCES

massed along a sector of the battle front for tbe decisive breakthrough which must be preceded by prolonged artillery softening-up. This is neither possible nor appli cable in t e Middle East where no fixed ? need be breached, where mofrontlines

level. There was no centralized con trol over artillery, and each battery and battalion commander accompanied the task force chief in the command tank or halftrack, ready to provide supporting, protective, or tlanking fire on his own initiative without requir

C.urtew of author

Israeli Centurion bile forces do not remain in one place long enough to be hit, and where the war is one of rapid movement, flexi bility, and furious assaults. Israeli artillery was organized in units of self-propelled guns, or 120 millimeter mortars on APCS. It fol lowed armored columns and task forces in battalion-sized formations, splitting up into batteries to support smaller tank formations down to the company 18

tanks

in Sinai

ing the permission of higher head quarters. Egyptian battery and battal ion commanders lacked such authority. Another flaw in the Soviet armored doctrine as applied in the Middle East appears to be the division of tanks into breakthrough, supporting, and exploi tation roles. The Egyptians did not have the time or opportunity to test the Soviet tactical concepts. Training manuals and headquarters documents
Militafy Review

ARMOREO

FORCES

collected by the Israelis indicate the Soviets believe enemy lines must be assaulted by medium tanks supported by heavy tanks and self-propelled ar tillery from stationary positions. After .a gap is punched with artillery and fighter-bomber support, armored divi sions pour through it to advance to their next assigned objective. The Israelis do not believe in such division or any type of divieion which affects the integrity, unity, and col lective push of their armored forces. The Israeli doctrine in the 1967 war was based on the HRSH principle. These letters represent Hebrew words for breakthrough, pursuit, tanks against tanks, and destruction. The HRSH doctrine foresees using the same formations for all four taske rather than assigning different units for each intermediate stage. This is achieved by nonstop operation of available armored forces and conver sion of nonarmored units to mobile, mechanized units by adding armored halftracks, self-propelled artillery, and jeep commandos. The HRSH principle depende on the smooth work of supporting echelons which must move with the operational formations into direct combat. Tanks were repaired and casualties evacuated under enemy fire; fuel and ammuni tion supplied on the move; and the reshufflingof formation and their re assignment to other tacks were made without losing time. The Israelis do not believe in any division into light, medium, and heavy tanks and are looking forward to a universalbattle tank of the 1970s. They are not impressed with the giant strides made by antitank technique, including guided miseiles and TOW system+ They believe that the beet

atiitank weapon ie a tank, and the best protection against antitank fire is rapid movementand surprise. It is difficult to form accurate esti m~tea of future prospects. The So viets are reported to have replenished the UAR Armys armored equipment. However, as was amply demon strated by the 1967 war, equipment alone is not enough to fight a cam paign or even win a battle. Much more is needed, and it is doubtful whether the Soviet instructors, doctrine, and aid can bring about the desired changes in administration, indoctrina tion, morale, discipline, initiative, and flexibility-especially if they lack cer tain of these key factors. In the Israeli forces, barring unexpected develop ments, there will be no drastic changes of the HRSH doctrine. The emphasis will be on training, planning, and effi cient adminietration. The T55 emergas as the best Soviet tank provided the crews are trained to rely on their eyes from time to time, and not only on the infrared in struments. Lack of self-propelled ar tillery, mobile mortars, and proper ar tillery aseault columns cannot be alArmy doctrines. Thi~ se~ms unlikely. The Soviete claim there is nothing wrong with their doctrine or equi ment and blame the reactionary cha! acter of certain Egyptian officers for defeats in tbe 1967 war. For the West, and especially for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, the lessons of the 1967 ar mored campaigns muet be evidentto seek out the chinks and weaknesses. in the rigid Soviet doctrine and oppose them with a radically different set of conc~pts, tactics, military thought, and actual execution.

November1968

19

Aaw:s#edd%atbze

Colonel John G. Waggener,United States Arnw

NE-HALF of the 12 million Peruvians are not participating in their countrys so cial, economic, and cultural advances. These Peruvians, principally Indians living in the Andean Highlands, endure a marginal existence more harsh than the life enjoyed by their ancestors during the age of the Inca Empire. The Indians of the highlands form a society which is distinct and sepa rate from the Peruvian national society. The complex solutions to this principal problem of Peru, the peaceful revolution

required if the violent revolution is to be avoided, demand the well-directed applica. tion of all available resources of the Peru. vian nation. Increasingly since 1961, the government of Peru has turned to the armed forces to expand their participation in internal development operations. The highest priority is given to operations east of the Andes Mountains which bisect Peru from north to south, resulting in the forma. tion of three distinct Peruvian worlda the coast, the highlands, and the jungle.

PERUVIAN The world of the long, arid coastal plain is moving forward in the 20th century with a prosperous economy and a relatively pro gressive society. The highlands, or sierra, cradle a 17th-century agricultural society plagued with the population problems of the 20th century. The jungle remains a primi tive, underpopulated world awaiting develop ment by those who have the courage and the capability. The core of Parus profilams is centered with the social conditions of the five mil lion Indians who live in the sierra and with the inefficient agricultural aconomy to which they are bound. These people are largely illiterate, unskilled peasants who ratain the social customs and the agricultural methods of their ancestors. Their monetary income is so low, avaraging less than $50 per year, that they are effectively outside of the mon etary economy, thereby drastically reducing the Peruvian internal market for industrial production and commerce. Perus population has doubled since 1940, and, if the present trend continues, it will double again by 1991. There is neither food nor work available in the sierra to sustain any large increase in population. Fortunately, Peru possesses a large and untapped reserve east of the Andes. Eastern Peru, the Oriante, is naturally divided into two parts, the high jungle and the low jungle. The eastern slopes of the Andes and the interlying valleys form the high jungk% the remaining and larger area comprises the low jungla or the jungle proper. The high jungle offers the most immadiate eco nomic promise, The overriding prerequisite for successful economic development of the jungle regions is access. Demandable and relatively lowcost transportation must connact the produc tion r~gions Novnmbsr 19e8 in eastern Peru with the

CIVIC ACTION

m rkets in western Preu. The development oI eastern Peru requires, as a first step, a combination of highway, river, and air trans portation systems. +Perus armed forces are major a ici pants in the development of th P e trans portation systems, and in a broad range of other civic action operations. Starting in the 1920s, the military air service extended air transportation over the Andes Mountains into the jungle areas. They were the firat to extend ragular air trana port service to many settlements in the Oriente which had no other means of mod ern transport. As commercial aviation has expanded to serve the requirements of the high jungla settlements, the Peruvian Air Force has moved farther east to concentrate its de velopment effort in the low jungle. In co operation with local communities, the air force is engaged in a program of construct ing 17 airstrips capable of supporting C47 type aircraft.

Colonel John G. Waggener is Com manding O@eer of the b5th Engineer Group in Vietnam. He hohfe a B.S. from the US MilitaW Aco&mg, West Point, New York, and an M.S.E. from the Massachusetts Institute of Tech nology, Cambn.dge, Maesochueette. He gradmzted from the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force B e, Alabama, in 1961 and f~om the%S ArrnsI War CoUege, Carlisle Barracks, Penns@ania, in 1968. Hie aesig~ ments inclwde duty with the let I* fantm Division in Germany, with the 8th US Army in Korew, and with the 82d Airbosw Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and in the Dominican Republic. For more than three years, he was in Lima, Peru, ae Engitwer Advisor with the US ArrnrJ Mission an& as Civic Action O@cer with the US Militurar Group. 21

In 1%4, the air force ksurrciled its targest and most important civic action program. It air serv urrdertr?ok to provide hrtraregional ice to the entire Amazon Basin of Peru, a region as large as the state of Texas. Using C47 aircraft, the air force pilots fly three scheduled routes serving 20 jungle towns stretched out along 1,500 air route miles. Utilizing Catalina hydroplanes and amphibian aircraft; scheduled service is provided along November1966

tm

Mlw severai river krwrrs which have no airfields. In addition to the scheduled service, the air force provides nonscheduled or charter flight service, and emergency and medical suPPort flights. Highway construction is the Peruvian

fwttsto

Armys largest civic action program. .Sirrce 1947, the Peruvian Army has been engaged in cfinstructhrg penetration highways to provide access to several million acres of 23

PERUVIAN

CIVIC ACTION ministries provide medical, dental, sanit~ and agricultural support

cultivable land in the high jungle regions. Six engineer battalions and one separate company, backed by logistic and training organizations and supported with Depart ment of Nighways civilian engineers and civilian workers, constitute the major con struction forces working in the high jungle. These units are committed struction of six major roads to the con two in the

tion, educational,

to the people living along these rivers. Army engineer units employed in the high jungle and army garrisons stationed along the frontiers support community develop ment and provide limited public service sup port in their respective areas. Each army unit treats civilian patients and advises in preventive medicine. Schools operated at each battalion camp are attended by chil dren living nearby. Engineer units construct feeder roads linking villages and towns with the main penetration highways. In 1966, the army initiated a new Colo nization Program for the resettlement of colonists from the sierra into selected fron tier areas. The pilot. project, New Nazareth, is operating in northern Peru in a region recently opened by a major civic action highway. Based on the experience gained in this project, the army plans to extend colonization projects into other areas.

north, one in central Peru, and three in the southeast totaling 735 miles in length. Three of the roads will provide links to Amazon ports. Two roads were initiated to promote the stabilization of areas which were the centers of insurgency in 1962 and 1965. Fluvial Civic Service is the major military civic action program of the Peruvian Navy. Under this program, the navy provides a wide range of technical and public service support to zon Basin. larly patrol tributaries, the people who inhabit the Ama Using four gunboats which regu the Amazon River and its major navy technicians and the other

PERUVIAN

CIVIC ACTION

Ph,?tm courtau d nuth.,

Peruvian Army conscripts learn a trade

These support programs provide to the scattered residents of tha Amazon Basin their bast contact with end their most sig nificant form of support from the Peruvian Government, The armed forces provide a major social benefit to the nation by taking into the mili tary service large numbers of Indian. and mestizo youths, providing them an intensive social and civic education, and training many of them in military skills which will qualify them for employment after dis charge. In addition, the army conducts literacy training. The largest civic action training program is the Peruvian Armys Vocational Training Program Established in 1962, this program now includes five industrial training centers which conduct training in 17 carefully se lected vocational skills, one construction equipment training center, and one agricultural training center. These seven centers train approximately 4,500 men a year to fill a portion of Perus huge demand for skilled workers. Approximately two-thirds of men are Indians from the sierra or the gle, and many of the graduates are ployed in the development operations the jwv em pro

ceeding east of the Andes. Major services which directly su port development operations east of tha L des include aerial photography by the air forcq and mapping by the army. The navy and the air forte provide limited coverage of east ern Peru in hydrography and meteorology. The Peruvian armed forces are contribut ing not only to social and economic develop rnent, but also to the political unity of the P~ruvian nation. These internal developmers,t operations of the armed forces represent a major force for the stability and security of the cewntry.

Nwember 1968

25

Vietnamese

Marines

in Joint O~erations

LieutenantColonel DouglasT. Kane, United Stafes Marine Corps

EATURED on a national news network one! night in late 1967 was a report of an opera tion in the Mekong Delta area of South Vietnam involving elemente of a US Army division and a battalion of Vietnamese Marines. The opera tion resulted in a number of Viet Cong killed and the restoration to government control of the immediate area in which the operation had been conducted. The news reporter praised the combat efficiency of the Vietnamese Marinesa force which he said had heretofore been employed only ae palace guards in Saigon. The success of the operation

26

Military Review

VIETNAMESE

MARINES

wee such, the reporter stated, that both United States and Vietnamese officials were hopeful that similar joint operations could be conducted. He implied that both the combat ca pabilities of the palace guards and the success of the operation had been wholly unexpected and completely surprising. Military Maturity On the contrary, Vietnamese bat talions have been involved in largescale combat operations for the last five yeare. Since 1965, Vietnamese forces have conducted many succees frd operations with forcee from US Marine and Army divisions. But meet of the reporting of the war has in volved US units, The result is that the American public, despite the fact that the Vietnamese conflict is the most chronicled and photographed war in history, remains lees in formed about Vietnamese units in action. The Vietnamese forces are be coming increasingly effective in cOm bat operations, and there are many Lieutenant Colonel Dougkw T. Kane, United St@tee Marine Corpe, is with the Poli%yj Am@sis Branch, Marane Corps Headquarters, Washing ton, D. C. Other assignments include duty foith the Ist Marine Division in Korea: with the Historical Branch, Marine Corps Headquarters; and with the Militm~ Assistance Command in Vietnam. He holds a B.S. from South DakotaState College in Brookings and is a graduate of the US Man-ne Corps Commandand Staff College, Quantico, Virginti; the Armed Forces Staff Col lege, Norfolk, Virginia; and the US Armv War College, Carlisle Barracks, F%mt@vania. He ia coauthor of the Ieolation of Rabaul, History of U. S. Marine, Corps Operations in World War II, Volume 11. Nweinber 1968

ed couraging signs that they are at last reaching military maturity. As signment of Array Republic of Viet nam (ARVN) units to strategic de fe~sive positions formerly held by US forces and improved efforts by the Vietnamese forces in area paci fication programs are increasing evi dence of the changing nature of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). The marked progress achieved by the Vietnamese Marines ie typical of that which can be ac complished by other RVNAF units in combat operations in the future. Marine Corps (VN MC) of today, 15 years after its or ganization, is a poised, profession.al, and combat-tested unit with numer oue battle honors. From its original organization of a collection of Frenchtrained riverine or commando com paniee, tbe corps has moved steadily and efficiently into its preeent US Marine-type configuration of six battalion with appropriate head quarters and staff elements, artillery (both 105-millimeter and 75-milli meter), and combat support and com bat service support unite. M was dur ing its formative years that ~ the VNMC earned the title of palace guarde which is still appliedu~ fairly or nottoday. During the tumultuous and, con fused regime of President Ngo-dinhDiem, VNMC battalions were rushed during crisis periods to guard key in stallations such as Diems palace, the police and radio stations, and the rail terminal against possible coup at tempts. In 1963, however, Vietnamese Marines ewitched sides to play a majo~ role in Diems overthrow. The Marines later were the first government forces deployed to Hue 27
Palace Guards The Vietnamese

VIETNAMESE

MARINES

and Da Nang during the Buddhist crisis of April-June 1966. These troopswhose ranks contain ample representation of every religious, po litical, and ethnic group in Vietnam -exercised considerable restraint in quelling the so-called struggle forces with a minimum of loss of life to either side. An effective counterinsurgency

time for all battalions has risen to 59 percent in 1963, 83 percent in 1964, 88 percent in 1965, and over 90 percent in 1966. The Marines have maintained a steady kill ratio of nearly six Viet Cong and North Vietnamese for each Marine lost in battle. During this period, the Marines, as part of the strategic reserve of

force in the delta area since their organization in 1954, the Marines have been committed increasingly to field operations in other areas in the last few years. Deployment time has in creased also. In 1962, each of the then four bat talions of the Marine Brigade was committed to field combat operations or security missions in actively hos tile areas about ~ percent of the time. ln succeeding years, the aver age percentage of combat operational 28

the RVNAF, usually were committed as a reaction force in response to various critical military situations. Of late, however, the Vietnamese Marines have been assigned more and more to continue operations in conjunction with US forces. By com paring their former combat efficiency in counterinsurgency operations with their present proficiency in joint op erational efforts, their marked im provement becomes apparent. There is no question that two years Military Revlnw

.
VIETNAMESE MARINES
.! ago, ILLSobservers who watched a Vietnamese search-and-destroy 0P eration for the first time were ap palledat the apparent lack of direction or purpose in the tactical scheme. In most instances, a Vietnamese bat talion traversed its tactical area of responsibility in two straggling columns with virtually no flank pro tection-a type of formation referred to by advisors as a tactical front one man wide. A Walk in the Sun Search operation proceeded about as fast as the rate of march, with few stops for systematic, thorough searches.of the villages. Because this formation was easily avoided by any enemy forces who did ot choose to makea stand, most Vle tl amese opera tions were described ae a walk in the sun. These cautious search-and-destroy operationswhich lasted a maximum of three days, or as long as the pack-carried rice held outwere a direct inheritance from the French training which still influenced the Vietnamese, despite efforts by US ad visors. Theee tentative ventures into the field, followed by a return to de fended compounds, had little tactical effect. The Viet Cong drifted out of the area as the ARVN soldiere ap proached and drifted back in as the ARVN troops departed. Control of the area remained with the Viet Cong. Vietnamese Marines from Saigon, committedto such operations to assist the ARVN, were assigned to an ARVN division or regiment for con trol, The assignment of Saigon besed troops under the direction of another commander was hardly con ducive t? more than minimal coop eration. Hastily drawn plans given
Mmber

to {he Marines usually called for a three-day sweep into Viet Cong ter ritory in a move calculated to catch Viet Cong forces between the Marines anda blocking force of ARVN troops. Results seldom matched the opera tions expectations. Cooperation between United States and Vietnamese forces in early com bat operations was equally difficult to achieve except on a low level in volving mutual agreement between adjacent commanders without ref-, erence to higher headquarters. The Vietnamese, fierce defenders of their sovereignty and still smarting from years of subordination to the French, resisted any suggestion for a com b]ned command. Vietnamese forces op erated in adjoining tactical areas of responsibility, sometimes with mutual fire support. The maneuver schemes, however, were barely supporting and there was usually confusion on both sides about the location of flank]ng units.
Coordination Established

The action which established a new concept of cooperation was Opera tion Deckhouse V, an amphibious as sault by United States and Viet namese Marines against Kien ~oa Province in the Mekong Delta in January 1967. When a joint am-\ phibious operation was first proposed, the sticky question of shifting com mand of Vietnamese forces to the US amphibious task force commander loomed as an insurmountable obstacle. Furthermore, notification of the at tachment of VNMC units, once ashore, to an ARVN command in the delta area might have compromised the @ntire operation becauee of POS- sible security leaks. The Vietnamese Marines, eager to operate with the US Marines in
2a

1S68

VIETNAMESE

MARINES solved the problem echelon of another

mand post was adjacent to the com mand post of the 25th Division, and the VNMC staff shared many facil command and staff over the VNMC units which were to make the land]ng. . ities of the division staff. This ad he headquarters, ostensibly Tactical employment and objec tives of the Marine units were deter on a level with that of the US Marine mined in a joint conference of the landing force commander, satisfied the requirement that Vietnamese units division commander and the VNMC brigade commander. Division orders must be under the command and con were written with only an infor trol of Vietnamese. mation paragraph pertaining to Joint Commanq VNMC actions; the brigade com When visitors from the RVNAF mander simultaneously wrote lds own High Command flew to the am orders for the Vietnamese force. Daily phibious task force command sh~p for operational smnmaries included the re briefings, the command relationship sults of actions by both forces. was explained as a joint command, one of close cooperation and coordina ?&dual Benefit tion. This was true, except that the The Vietnamese knew that their tactical plan for both forces ashore fighting capabilities would be under was determined by the US com direct and close scrutiny from US ob mander, helicopter support for both servers in these operations. In order to insure maximum results, the bri. forces was directed by the tactical operations center afloat, and fire mis gade commander held preoperation sions of VNMC artillery ashore were briefings in which all battalion, com pany, and platoon commanders were approved by the supporting arme co ordination center afloat. enjoined to do as well as US forces The Navys logistic system sup or lose command. The amount of professional polish ported both forces, and all casualties which the Vietnamese acquired dur incurred by both Vietnamese and ing these operations was reflected di United States forces were returned rectly in improved execution of tac to naval facilities afloat for treat tical assignments, a better under. ment. Approval of some deeisions in standing of staff procedures, and new volving the Vietnamese Marines was ideas about Iogistilc support methods. obtained in advance from the VNMC These changes, which resulted from The force commander. landing c~ose observation of US forces in ac VNMC, once the ice had been broken, tion, were improvements which no went all the way. amount of advisor influence would Later, in February, the same or have been able to effect in a compa ganization directed Vietnamese Ma rable period of time. As the 25th Di rines in Operation JrwzctionCitV with vision commander had noted earlier, the US 25th Division in War Zone C mutual benefit resulted: (Tay Ninh Province). Instead of At first, both the US awd ARVN being controlled by the nearest soldiers felt uneasy fighting side by ARVN division commander, the ~ide. But mutual admiratwz and VNMC battalions T-we retained under camaraderie developed, awd tn two the command of a VNMC colonel as weeke of conztant operatioue, the brigade commander. The brigade corn.
suclr an assault, by superimposing

30

Militav Review

VIETNAMESE

MARINES

combhted f orcei had grown into a highly efficient team using successful methods. The neceseity for RVNAF units to engage in joint operations as a means of increasing their combat capabilities and improving their mil itary image may be questioned by

h mid-1966, after Premier Nguyen Cao Kye regime had weathered a twin threat of cou~ detd and civil war in the Buddhist uprieings in Hue and Da! Nang, South Vietnams political stability wae believed strong enough to assume a greater share of the pacification program. Up to this point,

US Ann

VietnameseMarinestake time out during an operation

those who see the role of local militarY forces ae a pacification force only. Such forces, it has been stated, should only be engaged in operations to re turn vital areas to government con trol and provide a military screen be hind which governmental procedures may be reestablished. It is in this ) arearevolutionary development. that RVNAF critics claim it has flunkedits major test.

.!

US forces had combined effective com bat operations with equally effective civic action programs while the Viet namese had done little. US eecurity operation, it was reasoned, did not establish Vietnamese Government control. Ae a result, more RVNAF units were programed for greater participation in the pacification plan. Th~ RVNAFS reluctance to as. sume these new tacks with any en 31

November 1968

VIETNAMESE

MARINES

i
the Vietnamese Marines and the
rural populace toward each other can
best be illustrated by two incidents.
In Operation Deckhouse V, a large
pig which was inadvertently killed by
US naval gunfire was bought on the
spot by the Vietnamese Marines as
a supplement to their rations. This
purchase provided a cash outlay that
brightened the unhappy owner, sur prised VNMC officers, and delighted
the advisors. In Operation Junction
City, the villagers who had received
tons of Viet Cong rice discovered by
Marines in War Zone C held a small
party with a band concert and re freshments for Marines after the op eration.

Measures Taken

thusiasm brought new disappoint ment and increased US criticism of RVNAF apathy w~lch seemed to stem from military arrogance and indif ference toward the peasants. The hard fact is that deployment of Viet namese Marines and other RVNAF units to operations in remote prOv inces had contributed materially to this criticism and negated any prog ress made by ARVN units in paci fication programs. The Saigon-based Marines, descending upon a refugeechoked province or district capital, markedly reduced the fresh food stocks of the already depleted area and created numerous small but ugly incidents over the allegedly iniiated price of beer and produce. Noted Such charges were a matter of distinct concern to tbe advisors, and the criticism was discussed openly and candidly with senior VNMC officers. Marked improvements were noted: foraging for food on opera tions was halted by quick action of platoon and company commanders, and a roving band of VNMC military police settled all price disputes usually in favor of the vendorbe fore large arguments developed. In later joint operations with US Marine units, ample stores of rice and Vietnamese C rations were stockpiled before an operation. Timely resupply of field troops eliminated the neces sity to forage for food. More im portantly, the Viet Cong rice caches which were uncovered by VNMC oP erationsand usual]y destroyed for lack of other means of disposalwere returned by US helicopters to the nearest village for distribution to refugees, thereby effective y revers ing the ,flow of food supplies. The difference in the attitude of
Improvements

Whether large-scale joint opera tions detract from the real role of in digenous military forces as paci fication agents of the government, and tend to escalate stability opera tions in major conflicts, is a question for debate. The experiences of such a force indicate that measures which will improve military and combat pro- . ficiency will also improve pacification efforts. The conclusions indicated are: e Joint operations which combine Vietnamese and United States forces in major operations to restore stabil ity within South Vietnam are feasible and desirable. The problem of com which was mand relationships, worked out on a tentative basis at lower levels and found acceptance on higher echelons, can be continued and improved by the mutual desire of both forces to achieve military supremacy over the enemy. e Joint operations conducted in Vietnam in the past succeeded be cause the US forces overcame their early reservations about Vietnamese Military Review

32

VIETNAMESE

MARINES

and possible combat capabilities security leaks to ehare wholeheartedly the tactical reeources which helped assure victories. The Vietnamese, challenged by the Americans to produce significant contributions, responded with a dedication and zeal unmatched in previoue operations against the enemy. Joint operations may eventually lead to a combined command etructure. A VNMC battalion ie assigned permanently to work with a brigade of the US 9th Division in 4th Corps, and the 25th ARVN Division is also involved in riverine operations with US forces. An even closer method of joint cooperation is employed in the 199th US Brigade which integrates companies of Vietnamese Rangers and US soldiers into supercompanics. . As combat proficiency of the RVNAF improves, the revolutionary developmentprogram will be speeded. The pacification program must be accomplished by Vietnamese forces if government influence over former Viet Cong areas is to be established. Military success by Vietnamese forces

w;]] convince the hamlet and village populace that the government troops not, only have the authority to adm@ister government policies and programs, but that they also have the re sources and strength to do so without interference from Viet Cong- forces. Military victories in which RVNAF units play a major role will be the primary manner in which government control can be projected both inwardly and outwardly. The jessons to be learned by the Vietnamese in observing and partici pating with the professional US forces in action against either major enemy units or insurgent forces will have lasting effects. Joint operations have already exhibited the increased RVNAF professionalism and growing confidence. Leadership in tbe officer and noncommissioned officer ranks has improved from the trairiing and examples provided by their US counterparts. The benefits to be received from further joint operations can only result in a greater degree of proficiency throughout the RVNAF and an eventual end to charges of ineptitude and incompetence.

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November 1968

33

Lieutenant Colonel James M. Wroth, UnitedStates Arm#

OR more than a year now, the tempo of North Korean incidents acrose the demilitarized zone (DMZ) has increased markedly. From the ar mistice in 1953 through October 1966, eight Americana were killed in Ko rean clashes. During the 12 months beginning in November 1966, more than two dozen Americane were killed

l!?

ualty increases have been experienced by the South Koreans who man all but 18 miles of the DMZ. Casualties, however, are but one in dication of the increased tempo of vio lence. In April 1967, Republic of Korea troops used artillery fire for the first time gince the truce to repel a Com munist incursion. This battle involved more than 100 men. In June, a US 2d Infantry Division barracks was dy namited near Koreas famed Freedom Bridge. September saw two South Ko rean trains blasted, one of which car 34
Militaq Review

KOREA
ried American ,military supplies. In October, NOrth Korean ar+dlery fire sounded for the firet time since 1953 when more than 50 rounds were fired at a South Korean army barracks. In January 1968, there were 31 North Korean military personnel dis covered by police in the outskirts of Seoul. They had infiltrated to assassi
nate South Korean President Chung Hee Park. In the ensuing battle, more than 10 people were killed. Two days

T~ *barrier includee heavy fencing, mmes, radar, and sophisticated detec tion gear. Guard poste are spotted along the barrier to catch infiltrators detected or delayed by its devices. Although no one can state conclu sively how effective the UN Command vigil has heen, eeveral hundred Com munist agents have been killed or cap tured since October 1966. No estimate can be made of the number evading capture.
North Korean Intentions

later,North Korean patrol boats seized the USS Pueblo. The vessel and its crew have been held ever since.
Security Tightened

New violence on the part of North

Korea hae caused new preparedness by United Nations Command person In the nel who guard South Korea.

area to the south of the military de marcation line, US and ROK troops have increased their vigil. Movement immediately couth of the DMZ is closely controlled, even during day light. Troops continuaKy patrol infil tration routes in mountainous areae. An anti-infiltration barrier has been constructed along the southern edge of the DMZ to help catch line-crossers. Lieutenant Colonel James M,, Wroth is with the Ofice of the Aseistant Sec retary of the ArmsI (FinarwiaZ Man agement), Washington, D. C. He re ceived his B.S. from the University of Nebrasku, Lincoln, and an M.B.A. from Syracuse University, New York. His assignments include dutg with the .lOth and 7th Infantry Divisions in Korea; the 9d Infantrgr Division Ar tillery in Germany; and with the Of fics of the Chief of Staf, .!7S ArmzI, Washington. He is a graduate of the US Armg Command and G neral Stuf College; the Armed Force 1 Staff CoZ lege, Norfolk, Virginia; a~d the US ArmIIWar College, Carlisle Barra&e, %m.q.dv,ania.
Nwember 1533

The ones who escape are important because they present the biggeet threat to Korean national security. This is not because they can sabotage another train or bomb another US barracks, but because of North Ko reas announced intention to foment a Vietnam-style insurgency in South Korea. Many infiltrators are dis patched specifically for this purpose. Along the DMZ, the usual intiltra tion pattern is for a group of ape cially trained guidee to lead two or three agents through the UN defenses. These groupa will fight if discovered. Once safely inside South Korea, the agents attempt to blend with the pop ulation while the guides return north. Similar tactics are used to land ag nts along South Koreaa extensive c 1ast line. Agents captured or killed hav $ been equipped with weapons, money, cameras, explosives, and propaganda materiel. Their missions have been terroriem, sabotage, and insurgency. Premier Kim Ii-sung made North Korean intentions abundantly clear in his report to the Central Committee of the Korean Workere (Communiet) Party on 5 October 1966. In tbe usual Commnnist jargon, Premier Klm called ~for actions, not worde, in the battle against US imperialism, pointed 35

KOREA

to the example of North Vietnams struggle to liberate South Vietnam, and called for more active assistance to the South Korean struggle. Increased infiltration and violence aPPear aimed at supporting the fol lowing goals to: o Foment insurgency in South Ko rea, using Viet Cong success as the example. e Reduce South Korean participa tion in the Vietnam war by creating trouble at home. o Support the Vietnamese Commu nists by diverting US attention and strength. e Divert attention of the North Korean people from their present eco nomic problems. Although unification under her rule is one of North Koreas long-range ob. jectives, it does not appear that cur rent violence is an attempt to resume open hostilities.
Guerrilla Warfare Prospects

North Korean Communists appar ently believe that the most likely way to unify Korea under their terms is by guerrilla warfare. In their view, now ie the time to build the base for insurgency. In 1962, Premier Kim called for peaceful reunification of Korea. His 1966 call omits the modi fier peaceful. Kim indicates that the Vietnamese example should be fol lowed. No longer are the North Ko rean Communists content to wait for revolution in the south to achieve re unification. This change reflects recognition of the political and economic progress achieved by South Korea during the past five years. Before 1963, Commu nist propaganda played heavily on poor economic conditiou. and dictatorial government in South Korea. North Ko 36

rean prosperity and freedom were contrasted with starvation and bru tality in the couth. During the past five years, however, South Korea has achieved a break through into true economic progress. New prosperity is most evident to the city dweller, but even the peasant farmer in his mud-walled home is see ing the benefits of chemical fertilizer and farm-to-market roads. The South Korean citizen has seen his economic well-being improve and expects to see further improvement from a contin uation of his present government. By Weetern standarde, personal freedom in South Korea continues to be limited. Anti-Communist laws grant the government powers which can be, and perhape are, used to sup press some legitimate dissent. How ever, this situation must be viewed in the context of a people accustomed to a thousand years of authoritarian rule, and it may be said that the climate for dissent continues to improve.
Popular Support

Popular eupport for the current gov. ernment was demonstrated in May 1967 when President Park was re elected for a second term. His 1.3 million-vote edge over former Pres ident Yun Po-sun was much wider than predicted. In 1963, when Park first defeated Yun, this margin was 150,000 votes. The extent of Parks 1967 victory has been attributed to political and economic progress dur ing his first term, including actions to help the farmers. The election saw a turnout of 85 percent of South Ko reas 14 million registered voters and was reported by UN observers to have been honestly conducted. Response to North Korean infiltra tors has been another measure of poPMilitary ReVkW

KOREA
uk+r Support , for the government. Many infiltrators have been captured or killed as a direct result of coop eration by local citizens. As long as suspicious strangers are reported to authorities, infiltrators will find it dif ficnlt to establieh guerrilla base areas in the Korean countryside. Thus, the t e late 1950s. However, several dif ferences exist between the two situa t tions, including the absence of sparsely populated jungle areas in Korea that cyn swallow the infdtrators. The cru c]al difference is popular support for the South Korean Government. As long as the government can retain the

Anti-infiltrationbarriers snd continuous patrolling aesist in the capture of North

Korean Iirre-croesers
lack of popular dissatisfaction within South Korea, which led North Korea toward guerrilla tivity, also mili tates against succe s of this activity. The current lack T f continuing guer rilla warfare in S&th Korea should not be interpreted as complete failure of the Communiet effort. Pyongyang sees the present as a time for build ing its forces in South Korea and saving large-scale guerrilla fighting for the time when these forces are stronger. In some ways, this plan is similar to the Viet amese situation in Y
November1968

support of its people, the guerrilla threat will be minimized. South Korea preeently has 45,0b0 troops fighting in South Vietnam. Thie number makes her contribution the largest of any nation except the United States or Vietnam. Addition ally, Korea is providing civilian work ers and aid teame. Korean troops in Vietnam have gained the reputation of being highly effective fighting men. By creating trouble at home, the North Kor&ans hope to limit South Korean participation in the Vietnam war.

KOREA

tions have increased, US force levels in Korea have been rebuilt. However, expectation by the North Korean Communists that the United States might find difficulty meeting simultaneous pressures on more than one front holds potential future con sequences. The Nc ~b Koreans might conclude that the US resolve to defend 38

economic problems at home may be one purpose of North Koreas in creased violence. North Korea is suf fering the typical woes of a Commu nist economic system. While Premier Kim was calling for more aggressive action toward the United States and South Korea, First Vice Premier Kim 11was telling North Koreans that their Military Review

tiORE#

seven-year ecqnomic plan would be three years late in achievement. When the country was divided, North Korea inherited most of the in dustrial facilities. South Korea, on tbe other hand, inherited most of the population. Thus, the north. started with a rudimentary industrial base and no population pressures, while the south began with h dense population and no industry. These factors caused many observers to predict that South Korea could not survive as an inde pendent nation. Indeed, she probably would not have s rvived without US P aid.
Economic Goals

~hich have haunted all Communist economies. Whatever the cauaes, this economic report admits major short falls throughout the economy. With t$eir economic situation worsening while South Koreaa improves, the North Korean leadere may be using the proved tactic of renewing border tensions to justify belt tightening at ,. home.
Otker Goals

North Korea now has lost her eco nomic advantage. During the period following the Korean War, and with considerable aid from both the USSR and Communist China, North Koreas economy developed reasonably well. In 1962, North Korea reported achieving self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, consid erable progrees in housing, and fulfill mentof industrial goals. In 1966, how ever, pleas were made to the North Korean people to cut back on food consumption, to be patient on housing, and to produce more in mining and industry. An increase in resources devoted to national defense was the major cause for delayed achievement of economic goals cited in North Koreas 1966 eco nomic report. A more likely reason was reduction in economic and mili tary assistance from the Soviet Union and Communist China, both of whom shifted their major attention and aid to Vietnam. In addition, the 1966 economic re port gives strong indications that the economy is suffering from poor plan ning and managementproblems
November19e8

North Korea has two other goals concerning the United States and South Korea which do not appear di rectly involved in the current trend to increased violence. These are to sever UN ties with South Korea and to remove US troops from South Ko rea. The United Nations has two ma jor ties with South Korea: UN efforts to establish a repre sentative government for a unified Ko- ~ rea, which have continued periodically, since before the Korean War. The UN label which has been worn by forces defending South Ko rea since the beginning of the Korean War. North Korea always has insisted that unification and the form of gov ernment in Korea are internal ques tions and, therefore, not withi the scope of the UN Ch+rter. Suppr rt of this position by other Commun t Y countries has precluded UN action on unification. Similarly, other Commu nist nations have called for the United Nations to withdraw its sanction from the forces defending South Korea. Po land included this demand in her gen eral debate speech to the UN General Assembly in October 1967. Knowing that North Korea has an nounced a policy of increased violence, and chaving seen the corresponding multiplication of border incidents, the ,!

39

KOREA
question now ie: What does this mean for the United St@es ? A mutual defense treaty binds the United States and the Republic of Ko rea. Additionally, the United States has invested several billion dollars in military and economic aid to the Re public of Korea. Deterring another Communist at tack on South Korea is the obvious US intereet. Under present conditions, the need to deter insurgency, or guer rilla warfare, is as great as the need to deter overt invasion. As illustrated by Vietnam, the US defense commit ment extends to defense against out side-eponsored Communist insurgency. For thie reason, the possibility of North Korea succeeding in her at tempts to start guerrilla warfare holds the potential of involving the US in another Vietnam-st y]e conflict. The United States hae her world prestige on the line in Korea because of the legacy of the Korean War, the investment of military and economic aid, and a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of Korea. Should the United States fail to see that Korea remains free and independent, US commitments around the world would lose their meaning. The Republic of Korea is becoming an example for other developing na tions of the benefits accruing from alignment with the United States. It is obvious that US assistance played a major role in making Korea what she is today. Thus, as Korea progresses economically and politically, other emerging nations are more likely to choose the way of democracy. Korea provides the United States with ueeful military bases in Aeia. Al though these base: .~e primarily for the defense of South Korea, their util
40

ity, in the event of war between the United Statee and Communist China, cannot be denied. The proximity of Korea to the Chinese mainland and her strategic location between China and Japan make desirable the retention of US base rights in the Republic of Korea. Korea is emerging as a leader among the developing nations of Asia. The best example of this is the role played by Korea in the founding and development of the Asian and Pacific Council. It is in the US interest to see this Asian leadership role filled by a nation sympathetic to US views. Continued Korean participation in the Vietnam war is one of the more important short-range US interests. This participation not only eases the military burden on the United States, but also demonstrates the concern of Asian nations with containing Com munist expansion. Disruption of South Koreas current political and ecofiomic progress would be a major victory for the Commu nists, and would seriously damage US interests in Asia. Active insurgency in Korea would interfere with eco nomic development since a climate of law and order is essential to com merce. Also, increased military ex penditures to combat insurgency would divert government resources from de velopment projects. North Korea has launched a cam paign of increased violence and infd tration. With continued political and economic progress in South Korea, Communist efforts are likely to result in little more than harassment. How ever, the United States, as well as South Korea, must keep watch to pre clude the serious implications inherent in North Korean actions.
Military Review

At

mm
.

From Znter

F,
tioncd Journal (C@ada)

Strategy After De Gaulle

R. J. HIR

The views expresssd in this article are those of the author and do not constitute the opiniows of the Defense. Research Board, Government of Canaifu, Ottawa.The Editor.
mutiegy L,Arm&. T,tle pbc.to

TTEMPTS to estimate the na ture of French strategy in the future suffer from difficulties common to all analyses of French policy at the present time. They turn on assees men@ of the nature of Gaullism and depend on evaluation of General
41

November1968

FRENCH

STRATEGY

Charles A. de Gaulles success in estab lishing his system of government in France. No one can say with absolute certainty that he fully understands Gaullist plans, or that he is able to set out all the priorities in French Govern ment policy, but each commentator must make some estimate of the situ ation if his argument is to have any claim to sophistication.
Twofold POtiCy

General de Gaulles policy appears to be twofold. In the short run, it seems to be concerned as much with the reconstruction of national unity as with foreign affairs; in the long run, with developing French power in the international community. The primary task is to create a state of equilibrium or balance within France by 1972, or as soon as possible thereafter, so that France may ad vance into the last quarter of the cen tury in unified service to her new legitimacy, the Fifth Republic. The political forces of the nation, the ad ministrative and military organs of the state, an~. even national doctrines must be coordinated to create the state of equilibriu~ without which Francf This article was condensed from the original, published in the IN TERNATIONAL JOURNAL (Canada) Spring 1968. Cop@ghted @ 1968 by the Cawadian Iwstitute of Iw ternatiomzl Affairs. Mr. Hill holds a B.S. from the London School of Economics awd an M.A. from the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Can ada. He has worked in journalism and business in Montreal and, since 1964, has besn a Defense Service Scientific Officer engaged in strategic stt!dies fov the De ferwe Research tioard, Govern ment of Canada, in Ottawa.

will return to the divisiveness of the past when De Gaulle departs the scene. French strategic doctrines in the next 10 years are likely to reflect not only the nations position within West. ern Europe and the Atlantic alliance, but also the Gaullist hope of creating national equilibrium in France. The provision of nuclear equipment to the armed forces, designed, in part, to reconcile the military establishment to the Fifth Republic, makes French adoption of some kind of nuclear strat. egy imperative. At the same time, General de Gaulles withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza tion to an autonomous role within the alliance involves, of necessity, reliance on a strategy of immediate nuclear response to threats against vital French interests in Western Europe.
Massive Retaliation

France argues that her nuclear strategy is derived from the doctrine of massive retaliation upheld by NATO in the days of John Foster Dulles. France refuses to coordinate her policies with the flexible re sponse doctrine she ascribee to the United States, but lacks the secondstrike capability required to make her nuclear forces truly credible as an in dependent deterrent. French nuclear forces can retaliate at present only against attacks mounted with conven tional weapons and are more likely to provoke enemies into preemptive strikes than to deter them from action. The French Governmente task, in the next few years, is to create the weapons required to support a truly credible massive retaliation strat egy. The first generation of her nu clear weapons, consisting of 62 Mi rage IV bombers, must be replaced by more sophisticated equipment. Militsry Review

FRENCH STRATEGY

Government.plans call for the crea tion of a second-generation force of land-based, medium-range ballistic missiles; a third-generation force of nuclear submarines, with a secondstrike capability; and several batteries of tactical nuclear weapons. But tbe costs and technical problems to be overcome remain formidable wh]le ma-

rjote, but a fi nal verdict on its missile program must await installation and regular firings from The Rerfoutabte and her sisters. , Thermonuclear warheads must also be built for the nuclear submarines as rapidly as possible although the government may be satisfied with im proved nuclear devices for an interim period. There is little doubt that French technicians will, in time, suc cessfully produce enough warheads to fit the 16 missiles to be placed in each nuclear submarine. The complete equipment of two nuclear submarine, however, is probably the most th@ the government can hope for by 1972.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Interavi. Mirage IV aircraft constitute Frances first-generationnuclear weapons system jor quantities of new conventional equipment must also be issued if the armed forces are not to become dis pirited and dissatisfied. The weapons program must not be allowed to jeop ardize government plans in tbe social and educational fields and, preferably, should be carried out without incur ring excessive inflation. The most spectacular part of tbe governments military reequipment program lies in the field of nuclear weaponry, France has registered some remark able achievements in the field of bal listics, but still must prove that she can successfully fire Pokzms-typemis siles from her nuclear submarines. A Pohzris-type missile is an extremely difficultweapon to develop. The French Government indicates that its techni cians have fired two-stage rockets suc cessfully from underwater caissons andthe experimental submarine Gym
Novemberla6a

In addition to stIategic nuclear weapons, the French Government has committed itself to a major program of tactical nuclear weapons construc tion whose implementation holds con siderable importance for the prestige of the army. The air force will have medium-range ballistic missiles by 1972; the navy will have nuclear sub marines; and the army will control batteries of tactical nuclear weapons as a key weapon in the armament of its new mechanized divisions. There is little doubt that Ffench will succeed in budding technicians the missiles for the tactical nucleqr weapons, but the miniaturized war heads present greater technical prob lems and may not be issued in any great quantities by 1972. The conventional weapons part of the governments military reequipment program is no less important than the nuclear, owing to the obsolescent na ture of much of the present materiel and the constantly increasing costs of replacement. The army, in partic ular, needs considerable quantities of

43

FRENCH

STRATEGY

new materiel. It is now divided into the Forces for Operational Defense of the Territory (DOT) of about 25 bat. talions whose duty is to defend the national territory against subversion or enemy paratroop drops, and a Force

fore 1972 while the navy acquires nine minesweepers and five corvettes. The low priority accorded to the construc tion of conventional naval vessels at the present time is being offset by the navys advancement to a leading posi tion among the national nuclear deter. rent forces.
Tbe Long Term

of Maneuver of 150,000 men for par ticipation in nuclear and mobile con ventional wars. The DOT is fairly satisfactorily equipped with the light weapons brought back from Algeria after 1962, but tbe Force of Maneuver still re quires large quantities of suitable weapons. Government plans call for the complete reequipment of the force by 1973. However, it is doubtful whether the program will be fulfilled by that time. The air force is scheduled to re ceive 110 J&age III fighter bombers and 40 Trqmsall transport aircraft be 44

The Gaullist search for equilibrium and national unity is not an end in itself, but only the first step in a process designed to elevate France in tbe international community. General de Gaulle doubtless bepes that the ef fects of his establishment of national unity, if it is established, will be felt, long after he has retired from power, in the military aqd strategic fields as much as in any other. France will need time to consolidate her power in the 1970s by completing the present armaments program and, perhaps, by building a small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, but may be ready to install new weap ons and fnrther military power in the 1980s and 1990s. She will probably have a population of about 75 million by the end of the century and may possess enough industrial and financisl power to construct some of the rockets, antimissile systems, and reconnais. sance satellites now under develop ment. While ballistic systems remain as expensive as the Polaris submarine or the Nike X antimissile project, France is unlikely to be able to compete in a truly effective way with the United States and the Soviet Union. But tech nology is changing rapidly, costs of de velopment change with the passage of time, and no one can be sure of the state of the military art a quarter of a century from now. Military Review

FRENCH STRATEGY

The success of Gaullist military poli. ties will be assured in the long term only if the French nation adopts a pragmatic approach as the basis for strategy. France must abjure the neo. Cartesian search for absolute princi ples in warfare which has so often afflicted her policies in the past. The kind of thinking which characterized national strategies at the outset of World War I, in the interwar years, and in the colonial campaigns in In dochina and Algeria must give way to doctrines based on the realities of tech. nology and the international environ ment. There must be no repetition of Plan XVII which caused 300,000 French casualties in August 1914 by its in sistence on the superiority of offensive spirit in warfare, even when pitting lightly armed troops against strongly fortified positione. There must be no renaissance of the Maginot Line men. tality with its complete commitment to the defensive. There must be no reversion to tbe attitudes of the coun terrevolutionary psychological warfare school which ignored basic demands for national independence in Algeria as it sought for the technical sources of victory in battle. The strategic theories of General Pierre M. Gallois, French Air Force, Retired, must be treated with reserve and employed only as a tool to justify some particular piece of Gaullist pol icy. General Gallois contends that any French nuclear force is valuable be cause nuclear weapons are the arbiter of the modern battlefield and can threaten an aggressor with losses al ways outweighing his potential gain. However,he finds his logic merely used by the, Gaullists to further their strictly political ends.
November1968

+ General de Gaulle has already given evidence of his pragmatic approach to strategy. His early theories of mechanized warfare are now famous fhr their realism while his policies since 1958 show a marked inclination .to bend doctrines to the diplomatic situation. In the last nine years, the government of the Fifth Republic has

Itanwi
Trsa8all C-160 medium militarytransport

totally eliminated the Algerian war and its attendant counterrevolutionary strategy as a factor in national poli tics, and thrice altered its stand on questions of military doctrine when it suited it to do so. The end of the Algerian war in 1962 coincided with a speech by US Secre tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at Ann Arbor, Michigan, in which he set out the fundamentals of the Kennedy administrations stratdgy of flexible response; and called on the United States European allies to & ordinate their military policies with the United States. General de Gaulle then gave some indication of his will ingness to coordinate policy, provided bis goal of establishing French he gemony in Western Europe was recog nized, by assisting in the creation of the France-German Treaty of Friend ship. The military clauses of the treaty called for a close harmonization of doctrines between the two nations 4s

FRENCH STRATEGY

which implied that France would ac cept the basic tenets of US strategy, at least in the short term, since Ger man military forces depended almost completely on support from the United States. When Dr. Ludwig Erhard came to power in October 1963, however, and the France-German Treaty seemed un likely to provide France with the lead ership she desired in Western Enrope, General de Gaulle authorized the late General of the Army Charles Ailleret to state French support for a doctrine of immediate nuclear response. Since then, the French Government has twice shown its willingness to change its policies to suit its diplo matic goals. An anonymous article in Politigue fltrang~re in 1965, clearly written with government backing, proposed a new syetem for NATO in which the European members would be grouped under French leadership. Further, doctrines of deterrence were to be co ordinated by France and the United States, meaning that France would ad here to US doctrine since the United States could hardly be expedted to change her policies just to suit the Europeans. Then, in 1966, fihdy disillusioned with the prospects for a reform of NATO along lines satisfactory to his own policies, General de Gaulle with drew France from NATOs integrated military structure and once again au thorized his Ministers to proclaim the virtues of a strategy of immediate nuclear response. Time alone will tell whether General de Gaulles analysis of French require ments is correct, and whether the French nation wili, in fact, adopt a

pragmatic approach as the basis for its strategy. France may find oppor tunities to adjust her doctrines to ad vantage as the century proceeds, and it will be interesting to see whether she uses them. Doctrines of immedi ate nuclear response or massive re. taliation will probably need to be maintained throughout the 1976s, but afterward new strategies may prove more fruitful. The present French position is based on the belief that the Americans are obliged to defend Western Europe whether they like to or not in order to defend their own national interests, but recognizes that US commitments may change with alterations in weap ons and the international environment. The construction of expensive anti missile systems cmdd alter the inter national situation to Frances disad vantage while a cheapening in the costs of either missiles or antimissile might enable France to adopt a more independent stance. If the United States and the Soviet Union build heavy and costly antimissile systems, France may be forced to coordinate her strategy more closely with the United States because her nuclear de terrent forces can no longer maintain any claim to credibility. If, on the other hand, nuclear weap ons and antimissile systems become much cheaper and more effective, France might poseess enough indus trial power, either alone or in concert with other Western European powers, to establish quite credible deterrent forces. Whatever the exact outcome, strategy will need constant readjust ment to fit the political and technical environment if France wishes to pur sne a Gaullist destiny. &

M6its i Review

Colonel Walter Beinke, United States Arm~

E LIVE in a rapidly chang ing world, a world character ized by political upheaval, social tur moil, and economic revolution. In a world such as this, it is not difficult to perceive the necessity for frequent changes in our national policy objec tives. Likewise, the military strategy supporting our national policy objec tives must be revised frequently if it is to stay attuned with reality. During the years immediately fol lowing World War II, the United States enjoyed a position of unchal lengedmilitary supremacy. Early rec ognition of the expansionist goals of worldcommunism prompted a counter vailing strategy of contilnment.
November 1968

However, public reaction to the Ko rean War, reductions in tbe defense budget, and a US nuclear monppoly influenced a change to the strategy of massive retaliation. Whereas CO+ tainment had been oriented toward re sisting aggression, massive retaliation emphasized tbe deterrence of aggres sion by the threat of overwhelming military force. In 1961, the Secretary of Defense conducted a complete reappraisal of our military strategy. Intelligence es timates at that time indicated that the military power differential be tween the United States and the S,o viet Union, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons and delivery 47

FLEXIBLE

RESPONSE

means, had decreased considerably. In the event that deterrence failed, the damage that might be sustained by the United States was judged unac ceptably severe. Furthermore, our de fense posture to engage successfully in conventional nonnuclear warfare was questionable. It was in view of these considera tions that the single, all-out-response concept which highlighted the strategy of massive retaliation was replaced by a strategic doctrine which provided a wider range of options to our na tional leadersthe strategy of flex ible response. . What Is Flexible Response? Whenever a change in strategy is being contemplated, planners are faced with the remnants of ,the old strategy programs, forces, weapons, and al liancesand it is neither politically expedient nor economically advanta geous to discard them. Thus, at any given time, a mixture of strategies exists. Flexible response is no excep tion. It retains the nuclear deterrent concept of its predecessor strategy while, at the same time, increasing the role envisioned for general pur pose forces in the conduct of conven tional nonnuclear conflicts. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have deColonel Walter Beinke is with the 2d Field Force in Vietnam. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy, West Point, New York; the US Army Command and General Staff College; and the US Armg War College, Car lisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He has served with the 25th Infantry Divi sion in Japan, Korea, and Hawaii; with the 5th Region, US Army Air Defense Commamf. F.rt Sheridan, IUi nois; and with the Ojice, Chief of Research and Development, in Wash ington, D. C.
As

fined flexible response as the capabil ity of military forces for effective re action to any enemy threat or attack with actions appropriate and adapt able to the circumstances existing. It represents a balanced posture with ca pabilities for selective use of force at all levels of conflict, from stability op erations through large-scale conven tional warfare to general thermonu clear war. While deterrence of aggression re. mains fundamental to flexible response strategy, due recognition is given to the possibility that deterrence might not work nor be appropriate ina given situation. Accordingly, emphasis is placed on the controlled use of force freedom for the President to select and apply the amount and kind of force appropriate to the threat at hand.
National Security

Flexible response strategy is not based on a fixed concept of war. Its primary purpose is to deter war, but it recognizes the possibility of general nuclear war and assures an adequate defense posture if it should occur. At the same time, it recognizes the need for a capability to cope with situa tions short of general nuclear war and undertakes to maintain aforwardpos ture designed to keep such situations as far from the United States as pos sible. It permits our natilonal leaders a wide range of choices in determin ing the appropriate military reaction required to support our national in terests. The keynote of flexible response strategy is that, in the event deter rence fails, it provides the maximum number of options for subsequent ac tions. History is replete with examples of strategies which were so rigid that they could not be reconciled with the
Military Review

FLEXIBLE

RESPONSE

actual situation. The disastrous effects of an inflexible strategy were demon strated by the Germans in World War I with the Schlieffen plan and by the French in World War H when they depended on the Maginot Line. At the opposite end of the doctrinal spectrum, however, a strategy can be

ah ez post facto strategy. If flexible response strategy has an Achilles heel, it is likely to be its reliance on crisis management. ~When pursuing a strategy which is not sufficiently definitive, abnormal ex penditures of effort are required in times of crisis to establish a starting

ArmvNews ~t,e. The82dAkborne DNieiondemonstratedthe merits of flexible responeein their deploy ment ta the DominicanRepublic \ point for consideration of the partic so vague as to be no etrategy at all, ular problem at hand. From a practical and each event muet be treated as a viewpoint, there is a finite limit on the separatecrisis. The purpose of a strat number of crises our natilonal leaders egy is to provide a plan of action for are capable of handling simultanea number of circumstances which are OUSI y. Additionally, there is the everlikely to occur. Its merits can best be present danger that compartmental judgsd in relation to whether or ~ot ized thinkhg wiR engender what are tbe predicted events do, in fact, take essentially episodic solutions incon place and whether or not tbe forces sistent with our over-all national ob developedin their anticipation are ade. jectl%es. quate to cope with the situation. It is difficult; if not impossible, to evaluate On the other hand, the lack of a
November 19S8

49

FLEXIBLE

RESPONSE that of control. Inherent in the con cept of flexible response strategy is the controlled use of force, not only as a peacetime deterrent, but also during all levels of conflict, including a strategic nuclear exchange. While the United States has incorporated the necessary control measures into

definitive strategy may have some de terrent value which is our primary aim. If the target of our deterrence is aware of our capabilities, but is left in doubt as to our intentions, he may be equally as deterred as if he had re ceived a direct threat. However, there is evidence to sup-

us Arm

Failure of strategy to provide an early solution may lead to entrapmenton the escala tion ladder port a supposition that even we are not completely sure of our intentions. The strategic debate which bas eur faced such variations as counterforce, countervalue, damage-limiting, assured destruction, and escalation all of which fall within the purview of a flexible response strategylends credence to the argument that our present strategy i mbiguous. Another area open to question is
50

her military structure, there is no real assurance that our potential ad versaries have the capability or the desire to do the same. During the Cuban missile crisis a peacetime situationprecise control was exercised by both sides, essen tially at the diplomatic level. In Viet nama limited war situationthe United States has demonstrated her ability to maintain a high degree of
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RESPONSE

control over - conventional military forces. But what about a strategic nuclear exchange? Is it realistic to assume that the vast destruction sustained by both sides would not seriously impede their capabilities for command and control, as well as their ability to com municate with each other ? And what about our allies and the allies of our adversary? How does one nation ex ercise a high degree of control over the military forces of another friendly nation?
impact on Allies

tp the massive retaliation strategy while, at the same time, increasing the capabilities to wage lower levels of warfare. Although this posture enables t~e United States to respond discreetly to a wide range of situations, the Eu ropean member nations of NATO have yet to give their full support to the flexible response concept.
Consider Options

It must be recognized that it is not possible for the United States to change her strategy to any large de gree without such changes having some impact upon her allies. This was the dilemma in which tbe United States found herself when she decided to dkcard the concept of massive re taliation and adopt the doctrine of flexible response. On the one hand, our allies in newly emerging countries could look forward to increased assistance, even to the extent of US participation in low lev els of conflict. On the other hand, onr Western European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were somewhat reluctant to provide ade quate local forces. Not only were they strongly influenced by economic con siderations, but they believed that a conventionalbuildup might weaken the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, they argued that a con ventional war in Europe would offer little hope for success in view of the overwhelming superiority of the So viet forces. Basically, tbe flexible response strat egy prOvided for retention of the for midable nuclear strike forces inherent
November 1968

NATO unity has been founded on the belief that the United States pos sesses tbe capability and the will to react to a Soviet attack on Europe. Conventional forces have been viewed alternatively as a tripwire, shield, or firebreak, but never as the main thrust of NATO strategy. The mere fact that our flexible response strat egy permits consideration of options other than nuclear is viewed by many Europeans, and even som~ Americans, as an invitation to the Soviets to en gage in lower levels of aggression. This concern probably is overstated. The record indicates that in recent years the Soviet attitude has been one of cautilon. The United States still maintains forces in Europe prepared to fight a nuclear or nonnuclear war. Furthermore, the United K]ngdom and France have developed nuclear capa bilities, so it is doubtful that &e nu clear deterrent has been downgra~d from the Soviet viewpoint. The fact remains, however, that NATO lacks a unified strategy. What it does have, in effect, is two strate giesan official strategy of massive retaliation and a de facto strategy of flexible response. As a peace-keeping strategy, flex ible response has demonstrated its merits in such diverse situations as BerJin, Laos, Thailand, and the Do minican Republic. Its most notable
51

FLEXIBLE

RESPONSE

success was the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis. Although many factors may have influenced the Soviet deci sion to back down in Cuba, the fact remains that the United States pos sessed the appropriate means and the will to react, and the Soviets knew it. In retrospect, it is evident that we adopted the strategy of flexible re sponse without a full realization of its implications. Admittedly, there was a need for something other than nuclear strikes in answer to limited aggres sion, but our present strategy turns out to have some unique problems of its own. Unseen and largely unex amined, they may well plague us in the future. These problems are: e Flexible response is an extremely sophisticated strategy. It outlines a broad framework within which actions may be taken. In times of crisis, the lack of a more definitive strategy will no doubt place great strain on our na tional leaders. It is interesting to spec. ulate about how well a second crisis could have been managed during the Cuban missile situation. e The matter of control is always preeent. Conceptually, the controlled use of force represents an ideal solu tion. It is difficult to argue for the use of a sledge hammer when a fly swatter is appropriate. However, the controlled use of force in the real world is a complex matter, and, while recognized as being difficult at the lower levels of conflict, it may be com pletely infeasible at the higher levels of conflict. e There has been a deterioration of relations with our European allies, particularly France. As long as we pursue a flexible response strategy, this trend probably will continue.

e The criteria for response at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict is too open ended at the present time. Our increased capability permits in volvement in a wide variety of sit uations in newly emerging nations throughout the world. Unless these situations are approached from a po sition of military restraint, we soon can become overextended. Equally significant in our demo cratic eystem is the requirement for public support of our Governments actions. It may become increasingly difficult to convince the public that we should become involved militarily in some remote geographical area against an enemy we barely know. A floor needs to he constructed in our mili tary etrategya realistic minimum threshold for the commitment of US forces. e The opposition may not always quit at the first display of counterforce. If, aa in Vietnam, our flexible response fails to provide an early so lution, increased military pressure may be required, and then we are trapped on the escalation ladder. As our force commitments are increased in one area, our ability to respond elsewhere is degraded. Thus, options are decreaaed and the credibility of our deterrent is lowered. Once our forces are committed, it is imperative that operations be conducted at the level of intensity required to assure rapid victory and early disengagement. It is clear that once again we must conduct a reappraisal of our strategy. Obviously, massive retaliation was not a panacea, nor is flexible response. In view of our experience in Vietnam, we may become just as reluctant to invoke flexible response as we were earlier to employ massive retaliation.

52

Military Re?iew

~OFFICER COURTSOF HONOR

. .

in the Souiet Armed Forces

VyacheslavP. Artemiev

HE Soviet Officer Courts of Honor are separate from the regular judicial system, and are associated in no way with the organs of military justice. They are organiza tions of the officer corps, created by order of regiment, divi sion, and higher commanders. Each court is organized and acts in accordance with the Regulations on Oficw Courts of Honor, approved by the Ministry of Defense. The mission of a Court of Honor is to investigate the offenses of officers which discredit their rank, violate military honor, and which are inconsistent with the concept of morality. Courts of Honor investigate the discreditable actions of officers, not only in official circum stances, but in their private and family lives as well. Courts of Honor are established at headquarters of in dependent units, divisions, armies, training institutions, military districts, and in the directorates of the Ministry of Defense. There are separate Courts of Honor for junior officers, from the rank of junior lieutenant through captain, and for senior officers, from major through colonel. Special courts of honor are established a~,military district level for commanding officers of independent battalions, regimente,
November 1968

[ !

53

COURTS

OF HONOR

and brigades regardless of rank. Gen. era] officers are not brought before these courts. Tbe members of each court are selected by secret ballot. For junior officers, this is done at meetings of all junior and senior officers of the particular unit or staff. For senior officers, the selection occurs at meet ings of senior officers only. A corn. manding officer may not sit on a Court of Honor in bis own command. The selection of members usually takes place in the fall, at the beginning of the training year. Selected officers serve for a period of one year.
Composition of Court

Five active members and two alter nate members comprise a Court of Honor. The membership of a court which examines the cases of junior officers must contain one or two senior officers. The members choose a perma nent chairntan and a deputy chairman from among their number. The elec tion and subsequent composition of the court are announced in an order of the appropriate commander. Standing Courts of Honor do not exist for commanders of independent battalions, regiments, and brigades. They are created whenever needed for each individual case. The members of such a court are selected by brigade, division, and higher commanders and Vyaeheslav P. Artemiev is the au thor of Soviet Military Penal Units which appeared in the April 1968 is sue of the MILITARY REVIEW. .4 fmner oficer in the Soviet Army and a graduate of the Soviet War Col?ege (Fr-unze Military Academy), he is oc cwpied in researcli of the Soviet sys tem and has written eztewsively on the Soviet armed forces. This article was translated from the Russzan by Jerome S. Mass.

wminted b the military district. The immediate superiors of the accused of ficers may not select members of a court. Courts of Honor investigate the conduct of an officer only upon the request of the commander under whom the court is established, and only with the sanction of the offenders immedi ate commander, The immediate supe. rior of the offending officer and the court can propose to the senior com mander that the case be brought be. fore the court for investigation. The regiment or division commander, or the chief of an establishment, has the right to decide whether to turn over the case of an offending officer to the military courts, to handle the matter himself as a disciplinary measure, or to lay the case before the Court of Honor.
limitations

The Courts of Honor are limited in their competence to moral offenses which are not in violation of criminal codes or service regulations. As a so cial force, the Court of Honor is not intended to replace either disciplinary action or tbe punishment meted out by the military tribunal. A moral code which classifies offenses in violation of the honor of an officer does not exist. In the event that an offense is com mitted jointly by a junior and a sen ior officer, it is investigated by a Court of Honor for senior officers. Courts of Honor hear the offenders cases in the presence of as many officers as pOssi ble, but an officer may not attend a Court of Honor if he is of lower rank than the accused. Officers brought before a Court of Honor have the right to challenge for cause, and a member of tbe court also
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OF HONOR

the right to disqualify himself from the court. In the latter case, the court must rule on the validity of this self-disqualification. In the event that the officer on trial fails to appear at a session without a valid excuse, the court examines the case by default and passes sentence in his absence.
Open Hearing Court

The investigation of a case hy a of Honor usually is carried out in an open hearing. During the trial of an offending officer, it is common practice for attending fellow officers to make sharply critical statements.
These attending officers must -eh.---+efuses to admit his guilt. or he cOn . sders that the Officer-Court of Honor condemn the conduct of their omrade. d s not have the authority to interThey must ignore their pride nd for fere with his private life, especially in get common tact ii even the {m st in tbe case of family problems. The re timate matters associated with the of sult of an accused officer taking such fense of the officer on trial. As a rule, a poeition is a higher degree of punthese statements are carried to ab ishment invoked by the court, party surdity, connecting the offenders mis coercion, and appropriate entriee in hk deeds: efficiency report. It is far more prudent . . . with the international and iw to how to the established ritual. ternal position of the USSR under the conditions of hostile capitalistic encir. No Formal Documentation clement and threats Ori the part of the During tbe preliminary investiga. tion of the circumstances surrounding :99ve.SsiWe forces of toorld impevial. aem; with the required mode of con. the offense, as well as during the trial duct and moral make-up of a man in itself, there is no formal documenta a socialist society; with the tasks faction of the proceedings. Only a brief ing every Soviet person, and especially statement of the court session dnd the of7tcers, in realizing the creation of detailed verdict of the court are drawn a communist societ~ under the leaderup. During the investigation at! a ship of the Party. . . . Court of Honor, a delicate matter is the summoning and questioning of Such declarations are similar to the witnesses from among the accuseds highly political indictment of a Soviet superior or subordinate officers. prosecutor. The critical activeness of those officere in attendance is guarEnlisted men and civilians are not anteed in advance by the political and called before the court in session, but party organs of the military unit at they may be examined in advance, if which the court sessions take place. their evidence is important. Such eviIndividual officers secretly receive as-, dence, entered into the court record signments from the political organs or ~rnerelyjotted down hy the investi and party organizations to make stategating officer, is taken into account

rnents at some point during the hearfng. Particular zeal in mercilessly destructive criticis~ and implacability toward the offender are displayed by officers of the political service. Com manders make such critical statements as well. After the remarks of those in at tendance, the accused makes a final statement. He is supposed to be ruth. Iessly self-critical, to repent his misdeeds ardently, and, after scourging himself thoroughly, to promise never to commit such an act again. Occa sionally, the officer is stubbornhe

November 1968

55

ot a COUIt or ktOIIOr As many officers as possible attend Dpen hearings

sion. The verdict of a Court of Honor is decided by a simple majority through a show of hands. The court may decide to: @ Acquit. e Reprimand. e Announce a public censure. e Announce a severe public cen sure. o Petition the authorities to post pone normal promotion. o Draw up a petition requesting that the individual be reduced either in position or rank. te Petition that h- ~]e transferred to another military district. 56

mentation to the commander who had ordered the court proceedings initially. In a Court of Honor, no appeals are permitted against the verdict or the severity of the sentence. It is permis sible to appeal irregularities in the court proceedings. Appeals are per sonally directed to the commander, un der whose authority the court is es tablished, within three daye after the verdict has been announced. If the commander considers the appeal justi fied, or if he uncovers an irregularity, he has the right to set the verdict aside and order the chairman of the court to rehear the case.
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OF HONOR

If the sentence is to reduce an offi cer in rank or position, to transfer him to another military district, or to transfer him to the reserves, the corn. mander must refer the matter to higher echelons under established pro cedures. Although the sentence of a Court of Honor against a junior officer is announced to all officer personnel, a senior officers sentence is announced only to senior officers. But this deci sion rests with the commander of the regiment or division. If he does not consider it necessary, then the sen tence is not announced at all outside the formal court proceedings.
Organ of Sociaty

The Officer Court of Honor is sup posed to be an organ of society. There fore, the courts decision on each of fense is to reflect the independent opinion of the entire officer cadre and be a social evaluation of the offense. Those in command may not coerce the court or influence the verdict or the severity of the sentence in any way. Administrative machinations with re gard to Courts of Honor are intoler able. However, this is on]y the formal situation and is never observed in even the most insignificant cases. In practice, the unit commander, the deputy for political affairs, and the secretary of the party bureau jointly decide both the question of submitting the case to a Court of Honor and the sentence which the court is supposed to mete out. The court proceedings and the verdict are merelyformalities which carry out the will of those in command under the guise of social action. Although appeal of the courts ver dict is forhidden, the convicted officer retains the right to lodge a complaint
Novemberleee

ag inst the measures taken by his P commanding officer, even if these ac tions are based on the verdict of a Cou$t of Honor. These complaints are pe~missible only if the commander has exceeded his authority in the severity of the punishment. Even after the verdict and the sen tencing of the guilty officer by the Court of Honor, the case is not con cluded. An officer who is a member of the Communist Party or the Commu nist Youth League is inevitably faced with the pressures of the appropriate party organizations. If the officer is a regular party member, his offense is examined by the party bureau and at the general party meeting. The party reaches a verdict after taking into consideration the individuals prior service record, as well as his private life. Active Criticism

Those in attendance at a party meet ing during the examination of an of ficers personal case include officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates all the party members. Party de mocracy does not recognize officer eti quette, military subordination, human self-respect, or personai pride. Active criticism is held as evidence that the party member is a faithful befiever in party ideals. The accused officer is subjected Jo unceremonious questioning hy the full membership. Again there is the neces sity for mortifying self-chastisement, repentance, and promises. The party demands from its members compIete servility and obsequious submissive ness, regardless of the individual and his merits. Only such conduct can re duce the degree of party punishment. Not @y the offense, but the conduct of the offender at the party meeting, 57

COURTS

OF HONOR

determines the degree of party pun ishment. Party penalties can include varioue measures ranging from a simple warn ing and censure to expulsion from the party. The sentence imposed by an Officer Court of Honor or the disciplinary measures of a commanding officer do

not free the offending officer from ex amining the case and meting out pun ishment along party lines. Party pun ishment is always a parallel and ad ditional sentence. Every party penalty can he appealed through higher party echelons up to the Central Committee of the Commu. nist Party of the Soviet Union.

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58

M5itary Review

From Orbis

* *

* *

Sine-Soviet Attitudes s TowardRevolutionary

Colonel Bryce F. Denno, United States Armu Retired

[
THE Soviets and the Chinese ~ Communists have stressed time and again their endorsement of just civil wars, especially in developing countries. To Communists of all persuasions, most civil wars of the type described variously as revolutionary war, peoples war, internal war, national wars of liberation, insurgency, or counterinsurgency are as . justified as the Crusades were to the Knights Templar. Sino,Soviet agreement on doctrine, however, finds erratic reflection in
November 1968

nractice. The Chinese Communists and the Soviets often disagree on whe~e and when revolutionary war should be fought, the way it should be fought, and especially the risk of escalation to be tolerated. These disagreements stem from differences in national objectives, attitudes toward war, experi ence with revolutionary war, and in terpretations of its nature. The objectives of the USSR and Communist China reflect the differ ence in their status as world powers, their positions within the Communist 59

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WAR

community, and their views of the world. The Soviet Union has been rec ognized as a great power for at least four decades; until recently, she was the unchallenged leader of world com munism. Communist China has yet to attain recognized great power status in modern times. Further, Chinas fail ure to achieve even the semblance of a boycott of the 23d Congress of tbe Communist Party of the Soviet Union revealed, with humiliating clarity, the gap between her ambitions for leader ship in the Communist world and her ability to fulfill them. Tbe Soviet view of the world ia much more sanguine than that of Com munist China. The USSRs 4,000 miles of border with China mark her sole physical contact with a hostile ma jor state. Communist China pic tures herself surrounded by formida ble enemies. The East and South China Seae appear not as obstacles, but as highways for foreign access to main land China. On Chinas northeastern and southern flanks are the Republic of Korea and parts of Southeast Asia which provide uncomfortably close imperialist beachheads on the Asian landmass. In Chinese Communist eyes, This articls was condensed from the original tohich appeared in OrtBm, No. 4 Winter 1968, pub lished by the Foreign Policy Re search Institute of the University of Psnns@ania. Copyrighted Q 1968 by the Trustees of the Uni versity of Pennsylvania. Colonel Denno, formerly Senior Advisor, Ist Vietnamese Corps, is Associate Director for Instruc tion, The Militarv Assistance In stitute, ArlingtwL, Virginia.
Enemy Bastions By contrast,

the Pacific isles of Okinawa, Taiwan. and the Philippines are enemy bas tions. A reeurgent Japan poses a growing potential threat. Overflights by Chi nese Nationalist aircraft and occa sional artillery fire from Quemoy and Matsu remind the Communists that Chiang Kai-shek awaits a propitious time for return to the mainland. Brit ish military facilities at Singapore provide a base for additional hostile forces, as do Australia and New Zea land. Behind the Himalayas lies a re armed India, smarting under the mem ory of recent Chinese aggressions along her borders. Above all 100methe threat of the Soviet Union.
Regain Territory

The realization that China once held, or at least dominated, much of the adjacent territory now occupied by enemies puts an edge of frustration on Chinese apprehension. The recap ture of lost territory, especially Tai wan, stands high on the list of Pe kings objectives. Expulsion of the Western (particularly American) mil itary and political presence from the Far East is a desirable prelude to eeizure of territory, as well as an end in itself. The probable ultimate aim is to regain Chinas status as the Middle Kingdom which she held hefore the disasters of the 19th century. Attain ment of a further objectiveleader ship of the worldwide Communist movementwill contribute to this ef fort. Soviet goals appear much more mod est and less belligerent. This does not mean that the Soviets have abandoned action to assist and hasten the his torically inevitable transformation of the world to socialism and communism.
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They have not outgrown their pench ant for overt and covert political mach ination. They can etill succumb to the temptation to play dangerously for high stakes ae in Cuba. They support revolution when it suits their interests as in Vietnam. Even when their in terests are marginal, they continue under obligation to give at least nom

~oclaim publicly. The second, eco nomic development of the Soviet Union, has political as well ae eco nomic potentialities in the struggle fdr Communist hegemony on a world wide scale. These two objectives are intimately interrelated, according to ,, the Soviets. The conflicting requirements of

Onegoal of the Soviet Union,economicdevelopment, has politicalas well as economic potentialities in the struggle for Communisthegemonyon a worldwidescale !
inal encouragement to COmmunist

apprOved revolt, if only to forestall Chineee accusations that they are shirking their Socialist responsibili ties. Two other goale, however, demand Soviet attention. One is overriding: avoidance of a thermonuclear world war III, the disastrous consequences of which the Soviets have probably al ways recognized privately, and now November 1968

avoiding situations which could lead to world war III, while encouraging -or at least appearing not to dis courageju st wars of revolution, prompted Nikita S. Khrushchev in January 1961 to draw a distinction among three categories of wars: world ware, local wars, and liberation wars an% popular uprieinge. World wars are anathema. Local wars, involving the confrontation of Communist and 61

REVOLUTIONARY

WAR

Western states, he warned, could easily lead to world wars; hence, they should be shunned. Wars of national libera tion, bowever, are usually justified and would be assisted, as well as en couraged, by the USSR.
Peoples Wars

The Chinese Communists, on the other band, have made it clear that they consider war with the imperial ists and their lackeys not only un avoidable but desirable. With sancti monious certitude, they reaffirm the orthodox Communist dogma that peo ples wars are an inevitable conse quence of equally inevitable imperialist aggression and oppression. Sneering at cowardly Soviet fears of thermonuclear world war III, the Chinese Communists point out that such a war has not yet developed from the many wars of national liberation that have occurred since World War H. They deem the use of nuclear weap ons by the United Stateswho is now vulnerable to nuclear retaliation-ex tremely unlikely in light of United States as well as world opinion. Even if thermonuclear world war III did break out, they say, the ulti mate result would be victory for so cialism; after all, World War I saw the birth of the Soviet Union, and World War 11 provided the opportu nity for additional Socialist nations to emerge. Meanwhile, in the Chinese Communist view, undue preoccupation with avoiding nuclear war can provoke increased imperialistic aggression. How serious are the Chinese Com munists in their professed disdain for the threat of nuclear war? To think that they underestimate tbe potency of thermonuclear weapons defies credu lity. Before the Sine-f *iet split, Chi nese scientists and military specialists 62

undoubtedly gained enough access to results of Soviet nuclear testing to ac quaint them with nuclear capability for devastation. Their own experimen tation now affords them firsthand knowledge. A much more likely explanation of Communist Chinas belittling of rm clear weapons is her conviction that they will not be used against China. Meanwhile, the nuclear standoff be tween the Soviet Union and the United States offers China a certain freedom of maneuver denied the great nuclear powers. These powers must weigh every military action or threat of ac tion with scrupulous care lest it in stigate escalation.
Stringent limitations

Although the Chinese Communists can thue operate with a certain lati tude in threatening war and even in making provocative military moves, there are stringent limitations, which they unquestionably recognize, on their actual use of military force. Their resumption of hostilities in Ko rea, a serious invasion of Vietnam or India, or an attack on Quemoy and Matsu could provoke a war under ground rules quite different from those during the Korean War. Then, the Chinese fought with copi ously supplied Soviet weapons and equipment. Reassured by a freshly signed Sine-Soviet Treaty of Friend ship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, they swarmed across the Yalu not only with their rear secured, but with at least an implied promise of Soviet as sistance in the event of threatened de feat. This promise was sufficient to deter the United States from bombing north of the Yalu. But 1968 is not 1950. If the Chinese were to initiate aggressive war
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which the USSR has expressly de clared not only to be contrary to her interests hut even a potential threat to ber survivalthey would do so at great hazard. Particularly would this be the case if the United States were involved as in Vietnam. The United States has made it pointedly clear that

th~ the Soviets virtually enddd, in 1960, the military and economic aid . they had provided China under the treaty casts doubt on their willingness to honor other mutual assistance pro grams agreed upon. Since 1960, the Soviets have been signaling, in unmistakable terms~their ,.

US Air For..

The Chinese Communists

must have some appreciation for the havoc US convent!onsl weapons could infllct on China

we would not again respect sanctuaries in mainland China as-we did during the Korean War. In the face of enemy retaliation which they had brought solely on themselves, it is doubtful whether the ChineseCommunists could expect help, or even sympathy, from the Soviets (unless, perhape, Chinas continued ex istence as a Communist state were threatened). This is tr~e despite the Sine-Soviet Treaty of 1950. The fact November 1966

unwillingness to assist the Chinese Communist pursuit of special aims and interests which go beyond the legitimate interests of the Communist world and which cannot be supported by the military power of the socialist camp. One of many such signals was Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovskys blunt assertion in January 1962 that Soviet military power would be used to defencd only those socialist states friendly to us. 63

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WAR

These considerations limit severely the use of military force by the Chi nese Communists to attain their goals. Unlike the Soviet Union, Communist China lacks the option of seeking po litical power through economic lever age. The debacle precipitated by the Great Leap Forward must have con vinced even the most fanatical that Chinas traditional answer to economic problemsmassed and regimented manpower+annot substitute for ex perience and time in building a mod ern economy. China has troqble mak ing ends meet domestically without finding funds for significant amounts of foreign aid.
Revolutionary War

In this dilemma, it seems reasonable to assume that Communist China views the promotion and support of revolutionary war in other countries as a promising, cheap, and relatively safe means of attaining some of her ambitious goals. Success in Vietnam, for instance, could result in elimina tion of the imperialist beachhead in Southeast Asia. Internal wars, even those receiving heavy clandestine suP port from China, would normally not involve a significant threat of reprisal against China herself. Further, the Communist takeover in China epitomizes successful revolu tion against great odds. The formula for revolutionary war which the Chi nese Communists developed during that struggle is, in their eyes, one of the most attractive exports they can offer to the developing world. The Soviets portray Chinese promo tion of revolutionary war purely as a stratagem to attain nationalistic objectives. The Chinese Communists championing of revohltionary war, in sist the Soviets, is: a4

. . . not based on conceru for world revolution, or concern for the further upsrwge of the national liberation movement. . . . This {s nothing but an attempt at acquiring, b~ means of flatteT~, a cheap popalaTitg among the Asian, AfTican, and Latin American peoples, at establishing ones hegem ony over them, and exploiting them for ones egotistic great-power pur poses. Interestingly enough, the Chinese accuse the USSR of playing precisely tbe same game-that is, acting in her national, rather than the international, interest. They have long since passed the stage of complaining that the So viets are failing to support wars of national liberation, or attempting to avoid becoming involved in them. Now, say the Chineee Communists, the So viets are actively collaborating with the Americans and other imperialists to defeat people conducting legitimate revolutionary war. The Chinese and Soviet charges that each state is act ing purely in its national interest have a ring of plausibility. Both could be right.
Contrast in Experience

The experience of the Chinese Com munists, who waged a protracted war for most of 22 years, differs diamet rically from that of Soviet Russia where, under V. 1. Lenins bold leader ship, the provisional government wae toppled in only two days. The Bolsheviks seized control ini tially in the cities. The urban worker provided the backbone of revolution. In the two-decade fight of the Chineee Communists, they had, of necessity, to depend primarily on the peasantry. The Soviets and Chinese also differ in their experience with guerrilla or partisan warfare. The major and most
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recent Soviet experience with this type of warfare occurred during World War II. Soviet propaganda notwithstand ing, guerrilla operations in that war do not constitute one of the prouder chapters of Russian martial history. This was true despite many factors favoring guerrilla war. For example, fast-moving German columns early in the war often bypassed Soviet units. Prevented from rejoining Soviet main forces, these units were available to fight behind the lines and to provide a nucleus around which partisan forces could rally. stemmed from the vast areas which the Germans seized, but could not begin to control adequately. Much of this expanse, es pecially in the central and northern sectors of the eastern theater of op erations, contained wooded marshes, lakes, and virgin forestsideal guer rilla country. But most of the 50 million people in enemy-occupied areas at the apogee of Germanys military effort were apa thetjc to Soviet attempts to arouse themagainst the invader. Some-espe cially in the Baltic States, Belorussia, and the Ukrainedisplayed, at least initially, sympathy for the Germans. In any event, no appreciable guerrilla resistance developed until almost a year after the Germans invaded the USSR. Eventually, as the war progressed, partisan operations. expanded. The partisans received massive external support in the way of ammunition, weapons, medical items, and even to bacco, liquor, and mail by air. Soviet aircraft often evacuated guerrilla wounded. They transported key indi viduals, such as guerrilla commandNovember 1968
Additional Advantage AnotIier advantage

ers,+ and sometimes even moved entire units. Despite the encouragement of this sort of support and the Soviet man power available in German-occupied territory, partisans never exceeded 4.5 percent of the Soviet armed f6rces op posing the Germans. Their contribu tions to the war effort were modest, and the Soviets never considered their guerrillas to play more than an ancil lary and supporting role to their con ventional military forces. Thus, in their domestic experience with revolutionary war, the Soviets attained a relatively quick victory, de pending on the nrban worker as their mainstay. Subsequently, in World Wai II, they stressed conventional military forces; guerrillas provided an ancil lary and not especially notewort~ contribution.

the Chinese Commu nists fought a prolonged and success ful war made possible by the peasant. Their guerrilla effort played a pre dominant role in attaining victory. Guerrilla forces insured the Commu nists survival, gave birth to conven tional forces, and supported subse quent conventional campaigns to a significant degree. These obviously differing experi~ ences should not be exaggerated when appraising current SinO-SOviet views of revolutionary war. Certainly, the Soviets recognize that successful rev olution may be protracted. Conversely, the Chinese would not disparage a revolution which displayed promise for quick success. The Soviets emphasized conven tion~ forces during World War H because they had them. The Chinese Communists stressed the importance as

Prolonged War By contrast,

REVOLUTIONARY

WAR

of guerrillas because they began with nothing else. Mao Tse-tung himself has emphasized the indispensability of conventional forces in attaining fi. nal victory. Again, neither Soviets nor Chinese would spurn the support of either peasant or urban worker, deem. ing both to be important contributors to their popular base. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to

of victory in the great war of resist ance against Japan. The article, en titled Long Live the Victory of the Peoples War, provided an authorita tive and current Chinese Communist statement concerning revolutionary war. After reviewing the strategy con ceived and employed against the Jap anese by Mao Tse-tung, Lin analyzed

~~;;;....., ..-. -------.-..-;... ,<::-,:

1
. ..... /

assume that their differing experi ences with revolutionary war have in fluenced Chinese and Soviet attitudes toward this type of war to some de gree, in conjunction with other factors discussed: national objectives, views of the world, and attitudes toward war iti general. In September 1965, the New China News Agency released the text of an article by Defense Ihmter Lin Piao commemorating the 20th anniversary 66

the strategys applicability to the cur rent world situation. In so doing, he seemed alternately cautious and belli cose. For instance, he stressed the in dispensability of self-reliance among a people staging internal war in these words: Revolution or peoples war in any cmmtry is the business of the massee in that cowntrti and should be carried owt primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way.
Military Revisw

REVOLUTIONARY

WAR

At the same time, Lin Piao dis paraged the nuclear weapons of the United States, declaring the spiritual atom bomb which the revolutionary peoplepossess to be a far more pow erful and useful weapon than the phys ical atom bomb. Meanwhile, he in sisted, History has proved and will goon proving that peoples war is the most effective weapon against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. In com bating this type of war, the United States has the support of the Khru shchev revisionists who are: . . . doing thsir utmost to spread all kinds of arguments agaiwst peo ples war, and, wherever they can, they arssckeming to undermine it by overt or.covert means.
Global Stage

So~iet letter, published by the Ham burg newspaper, Die Welt, appears an thentic; at least the Chinese Commu nists have so regarded it. It reads: *he concept of revolution as the struggle of the world village against the world cit~ is tantamount to the rejection of the leading role of the working class and constitutes a com plete revision of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the world historical mis sion of the working claes. Vietnam Testing Ground

Appealing to the developing coun tries, Lin stressed the importance of the peasant who had played such an indispensable role in Chinas revolu tion. After asserting that The coun tryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go for ward to final victory, he projected this principle to a global stage: Taking the entire globe, if North Amer;ca and Western Europe can be catted the cities of the toortd: then Asia, Africa and Latin America con stitute the rural areas of the world. . . . In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a pic ture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. This latter statement drew sharp retort from the Soviets in a secret letter which they sent to Communist Parties around the world shortly be. fore the 23d Congress of the Commu niet Party of the Soviet Union and aPrrarentlyleaked deliberately. The Nwsrnber 1968

If Lin Piaos article expounds Chi nese Communiet doctrine on revolu tionary war, Vietnam provides current expression of tbe doctrine in applica tion. The outcome of the struggle in Vietnam is of grave and major con cern to the Chinese. A US defeat would mean not only removal of an uncom fortably close Western military pres ence, but a dramatic vindication of the Mao Tse-tung formula for revolution ary war. The need for such a vindication be ~omes especially clear when one con siders the long and dreary succession of failures suffered by the Chinese in their attempts to export revolution. Their setbacks in Africa+specially in the Congo (Kinshasa) and Ghana were as complete as they were un expected. Africa had been considereil ripe for revolution of their brand. China badly needs a victory stem ming from a Mao Tse-tung type of revolutionary war in Vietnam. Her prestige in Asia and in the world Communist community is at stake. This is why Maoists in China recog nize Vietnam, aa does the United States (and probably the Soviet Union also)& as a testing ground for revo lutionary war. Communiet China hae displayed her 67

REVOLUTIONARY

WAR

anxiety concerning the course of the war on several occasions and in many ways. She has, for instance, urged the North Vietnamese to return to phase II (the purely guerrilla phase) in roil. itary operations and deliberately pro long the war. China has also discouraged attempts to initiate negotiation of the war, and her threat that she might enter North Vietnam in the event that country was confronted with a dictated peace could be interpreted as a warning to North Vietnam against suing for peace. Meanwhile, evidence continues to mount that a dispute over policy toward North Vietnam is at least one factor influencing the current general election within China. The Soviet Unions stakes in Viet nam are both smaller than those of the Chinese Communists and more am. biguous. Although the Soviet Union, like the United States, is a global power, her interests in Southeast Asia cannot be compared with her interests elsewher%in Eastern Europe or the Middle East, for instance. She would probably oppose US attempts to main tain a presence in Southeast Asia al though a case might he made that a continued and inconclusive contest there between the United States and China could work to Soviet advantage. The Soviets are, of course, com mitted to assist North Vietnam re gardless of their interests in South east Asia since to do otherwise would lend credence to Chinese propaganda that the Soviets and the United States are attempting to stifle the war effort of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has at least gone through the motions of at tempting to promote ,, ~gotiations for a peace settlement. There are several 68

possible explanations for such actions. One is that the risks and costs of the Vietnam war outweigh, in Soviet eyes, any possible returns. This examination of Chinese Com munist and Soviet pronouncements on, and actions toward, revolutionary war, especially in Vietnam, leads to three major conclusions. First, the Chinese are much more dependent on revolu tionary war as an instrument of for. eign policy than are the Soviets. Tbe latter possess a greater range and va riety of such instruments, among them the modern Soviet economy and the Soviet thermonuclear arsenal. Second, although both the Chinese and the Soviets support revolutionary war, their support differs in degree. The Soviets appear much more con cerned than the Chinese that revolu tionary war may escalate into nuclear war. This does not mean that the Chi nese do not also have reservations con cerning the applicability of revolution ary war in certain situations. Lin Piaos warning that the people of a country mus t be able to prosecute a 5 revolutionary war through their own efforts is an indication that they do. It is probable that Communist Chinas failures to export revolution account, at least in part, for this reservation. A final conclusion pertains to Viet nam, the most crucial example and test of revolutionary war extant. Of the major powers involved in Viet namthe United States, Communist China, and the Soviet Unionchina has most at stake for the reasons out lined above while Soviet stakes are am biguous. As long as the current leader ship continues in China, Chinas stake in Vietnam should have an important bearing on the future of negotiations and on the further course of the war. Military Reviaw

,. , .

The Armys Miniature AT&T

Colonel John B. McKinney, United States Armu

THE cmmn.nicrdions buildup in I Vietnam over the past three years has seen the A mys combat support signal streng h mushroom from a single signal attalion to a 20,000-man signal brig / de. The most significant communica ion achieve ment of this period as been the installation and oper tion of the Southeast Asia Wide and System (SEA WBS), an operat on conducted by the Army under th direction of the Defense Communic tiona Agency. 1
November 1966

Most of tbe combat support co~ munication capability that was in stalled during the early days of the communications buildup in Vietnam was provided through the use of trans portable equipmentshelter-mounted switchboards and multichannel tropo scatter, microwave, and very high frequency radios. This equipment is still in use in the Army Area Com munications System. As troop strength grew and dispersion increased the dis tances over which military leaders
69

ARMYS MINIATURE

AT&T

needed to communicate, it became evident that tactical equipment could not provide the number Of high-qual ity channels required to support a theater communication .system. Communications Milestone To meet expanding communication needs, both for quantity and quality, a decision was made by the US Mili tary Assistance Command, Vietnam, and the US Army, Vietnam, to employ fixed-plant equipment, normally not employed in a combat theater, and to install commercial multichannel radio systems. Responsibility to install, op erate, and maintain these facilities was assigned to the US Army Strategic Communications Command (USASTRATCOM). This decision was a major com munications milestone in military 0p erations because the extent to which these systems have been installed in Vietnam and Thailand is without Colonel John B. MeKinney is Direc tor of the Communications Depart ment at the US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. He is a grad uate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College, and holds an LL.B. from Southern Law School in Mem phis, Tennessee; an M.B.A. from Har vard Business School, Cambridge, and an M.S. from Massachusetts; George Washington University, Wash ington, D. C. Colonel MeKinneys as signments include serving as a member of the faculty of the US Army War College, and as Associate Editor of the MILITARY REVIEW;with the 1st Signal Brigade in Vietnam; and with the Weapons Syetems Evaluation Group, Ojice of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C. He is the author of Red Paper Tiger which appeared in the October 1967 issti. of the MILITARY REVIEW. 70

precedent. During no previous period in the history of the Armed Forces has so much commercial equipment been part of the ground commanders command and control network. To install, operate, and maintain the rapidly expanding SEA WBSas the combination of fixed-plant and transportable system is designated officially-and to operate and maintain the Army Area Communications System that extends the SEA WBS to the Armys combat forces, USA STRATCOM activated the 1st Signal Brigade on 1 April 1966. The dollar value of the SEA WBS and its sup porting fixed-plant facilities that have been installed by the 1st Signal Bri gade since the brigades activation, or were being constructed by it near the end of Fiscal Year 1968, is approxi mately 500 million dollars.
IWBCS Facilities

The backbone of the SEA WBS is the Integrated Wideband Communication System (IWBCS). The IWBCS which provides multichannel voice, teletypewriter, and data communica tionshas been designed especially for optimum performance in the Southeast Asia environment, It also has been provided with the flexibility needed to respond to ever-changing military command and control requirements. The IWBCS employs the most ad vanced techniques and equipment available on the communications equip ment market today. Included among the IWBCS facilities are high-quality, commercial microwave systems that function in line of sight, diffraction, or tropospheric scatter propagation modes. At key nodal points in the sys tem, the IWBCS connects with the Army Area Communications System thus extending SEA WBS circuits to
Military Re~ieW

ARMYS MINIATURE

AT&T

United States and FreeWorld tactical subscribers down to infantry brigade level. The IWBCS is being constructed in three phaeee. Phases I and II, pres ently being installed by Page Commu nication Engineers in Vietnam and by Philco-Ford in Thailand, were com pleted during Fiscal Year 1968. The eystems included in phases I and II, which provide the minor communica tions trunking capability in Southeast Asia, already are in operation. Ad ditional radio systems to extend the IWEWS to lower echelons are planned for phase HI which is scheduled for completion in mid-Fiecal Year 1969. The ZWBCS had 76 systems in op eration at 58 sites in Southeast Asia upon completion of phase II. Within the ZWBCS, as many as 240 voice fre quency channels are provided on a single troposcatter system. In fact, the IWBCS system between Saigon and Nha Trang is believed to be the worlds first operational 240-channel tropo spheric scatter system.
Unique Feature One of the unique features of the

to $epend on the nearby Army Repub lic of Vietnam (ARVN) combat unit commanders for infantry and fire power support if they are attacked. Co~versely, on several occasions, the mortars from the I WBCS sites atop Lang Bian and PrLine Mountains near Dalat and Vung Chua Mountain near Qui Nhon have come to the rescue of ARVN units under Viet Cong at tack.
Tandem Switcbhrg Centers

IWBCS in Vietnam has been a require ment, for technical reasons, to locate many IWBCS sites in territory in which the Viet Cong are active. Con sequently,the brigade not only bas had to concern itself with the installation and operation of remote mountaintop sitesa difficult logistic problem in iteelfbut the brigade also has been forced to provide physical security for these sites. Highly skilled military technical controllers have learned to become expert mortarmen, and site commanders have learned to operate tactical operation centers and build formidable defense perimeters. Site commanders alao have learned
November 1968

The ZWBCS primarly is a long-lines system. Dial central offices are used to serve local customers within a re stricted geographic area. An interface between the two funct~ons, there fore, is essential. Presently, this inter face is provided by manual long-dis tance switchboards, operated either by soldiers and airmen, or by female ci vilian operators. By October 1968, however, most of the manual longdistance switchboards in Vietnam and Thailand will be replaced by the South east Asia Tandem Switching Network, the most sophisticated telephone com munication system ever to be intro duced into a combat theater. The Southeast Asia Tandem Switch ing Network will include nine tandem switching centers (TSCS). Six TSCS will be located in Vietnam and three in Thailand. Each of the dial centrtd offices in Southeast Asia will be inter connected with the nearest tandem switching center, and each TSC will be connected by high-quality circuits to tbe other eight TSCS. When this system becomes operaticmal, any class A telephone subscriber will have direct dial accesa to any other class A sub scriber in Southeast Asia. TQe system will provide basically the same type of service to the military customers in Vietnam that the Ameri-

ARMYS MINIATURE

AT&T

can Telephone and Telegraph Com panys Direct Distance Dialing System provides to civilian customers in the United States. Tandem switching will be unique in combat theater com munications. In addition to providing a tradi tional long-distance telephone system,

For message and data handling in Southeast Asia, the 1st Signal Bri gade has installed three Automatic Digital Network (A UTODZN) switch ing centers located at Saigon and Nha Trang in Vietnam and at Korat in Thailand. The A UZODIN system is a worldwide interservice system de.

US Ann

The Integrated

Wideband Communication

System site at Nha Trang, Vietnam

the IWBCS also furnishes trunks for a Southeast Asia secure telephone sys tem. This permits commanders and key staff officers of the principal head quarters in Southeast Asia to discuss classified matters with each other on a real-time basis. A 1imited secure tele phone system has existed in Vietnam and Thailand for the past two years, hut the present system wae expanded and improved greatly during the past year. 72

signed to transmit digital data and normal message traffic of all priorities and security classifications. The new A UTODZN switches will replace three semiautomatic data re lay switches presently in operation in Southeast Asia. The A UTODLV switches also transmit most of the out-of-country message traffic pre viously handled by conventional tape relay centers. Two of the principal advantages that will accrue to the Military Review

ARMYS MINIATURE

AT&T

customers of A UTODIN in Vietnam and Thailand are greatly improved speed of transmission and a decreased number of transmission errors. The installation of the three A UTO DIN switches was completed by the spring of 1968. The A fJTOD2N switch ing center at Korat is operated and maintained by the US Air Forces 1974th Communications Group. The two A UTODIN switchee in Vietnam are operated by the 1st Signal Bri gade. SatelliteCommunications To connect the SEA WBS into the worldwide defense communications system, the 1st Signal Brigade relies heavily on satellite communications. The brigade operates and maintains two satellite ground stations in Viet nam as part of the Defense Com munications Satellite System (DCSS). The DC.SS employs equatorial, nearsynchronous, low-power satellites to provide worldwide coverage. The bri gades ground terminal at Tan Son Nhut Airbase, on the outskirts of Saigon, provides 11 telephone circuits to Hawaii, and the satellite terminal to at Nha Trang provides 11 circuits Okinawa. In addition to operating DCSS satellite terminals, the brigade also operates satellite circuits between Thailand and Hawaii. These are leased by the Def..se Communications Sys tem from the 3MSAT Corporation. Vietnam extensions of the circuits, which terminate in Thailand, are pro. vialed over military microwave and cable facilities. The vakre of satellite communica tion to the war effort in Southeast Asia was proved conclusively during the last week in August and the first week in September 1967. During that
November 196e

~riod, the transpacific cable was cut between the Philippines and Guam. Satellite circuits carried the heavy operational traffic load with such ease that most of the military subscribers in Vietnam and Thailand were un aware that the cable had been cut.
Personnel Problems

The introduction of commercial, state-of -the-art, multichannel radio systems and theaterwide tandem switching into Southeast Asia has caused the 1st Signal Brigade many personnel probleme. Foremost has been the dificult task of operating a highly sophisticated commercial telephone system with junior officers and enlisted men who have been in the Army less than a year when they arrive in the theater. These soldiers come to South east Asia from th< US Army Signal School at Fort Monmouth, New Jer sey, and have had little or no oppor tunity to obtain prior practical expe rience in systems operation. School-trained radio repairmen have learned how to maintain and repair the UVBCS radio, channeling, and power equipment, but have not been equally adept at mastering the more difficult techniques of circuit restora tion. Because circuits frequently pass through technical control facilities at several nodal points in the 2WBI.?S system, circuit restoration must be a coordinated effort. Each technical con troller must work closely with several other technical controllers and have intimate knowledge of the capabilities and shortcomings of the many types of ancillary equipment used in circuit engineering. Such knowledge comes only with experience. Ae, an interim solution to the prob lem=of operating and maintaining the .SEAWBS with inexperienced military 73

ARMYS MINIATURE

AT&T

personnel, the US Army Communica tions Systems Agency has negotiated operation and maintenance contracts with the two IwBCS prime contrac tors. These contracts task the com panies to provide a limited number of skilled civilian technicians at each IWBCS site to assist military per sonnel in circuit restoration and to provide on-the-job training for the soldier technicians. As a long-range solution to the per sonnel skill problem, the US Army Signal School at Fort Monmouth has developed a comprehensive technical controllers course. It also has installed a sophisticated training aid for stu dent use during the course. This train. ing aid includes all items of equipment to be found in the SEAWBS system. In addition, the Signal School has de veloped a circuit simulator that du plicates the sometimes chaotic condi tions that exist during periods of cir cuit restoration. It is anticipated that soon most of the contractor operations and fiainten~nce personnel no longer will be needed.
Logistics Support

parts and facilities for the repair and calibration of test equipment have been provided by the IWBCS prime contractors. A long-range solution to the logis. tics problem is now in sight. A list of the systems peculiar spare parts has been compiled. The list is based on experience factors determined by the 1st Signal Brigade from its operation of the IWBCS in Southeast Asia over the past year, plus recommendations from the prime contractors. In addi tion, Federal stock numbers are being assigned to each of the commercial parts so that they can be identified for procurement purposes.
Special Handling

Another major problem in the opera tion of the IWBCS has been the lim ited responsiveness of the logistic sYs tem to provide unique IWBCS repair parts and to meet test equipment main tenance and calibration requirements of the ZWBCS. The Armys logistic system in Southeast Asia works well for the distribution of hulk supplies and for maintenance parts commonto tactical communication equipment. The system has not had time, how ever, to establish the procedures re quired to supply the IWBCS with the parts and test equipmpnt needed to keep it operating reliably. Conse quently, as an interim measure, spare 74

Distribution of these parts will re quire the Army to establish stream lined procedures. The IWBCS parts are to be used primarily by a single customer, the 1st Signal Brigade. Tbe parts consist primarily of replaceable modules and subassemblies that con tain hundreds of transistors, micromodules, and other components. These high-cost modules are fragile and have not been designed for rugged field use nor for normal depot processing. Con sequently, they require special han dling. To provide this special handling, the US Army is considering establish ing three Army maintenance support facilities (AMSFS) in Southeast Asia. TWO AMSFS will be located in Vietnam and one in Thailand. Tbe AMSFe will forward requisitions for unique IWBCS parts directly to tbe national communications-electronics inventory control point in Philadel phia, Pennsylvania. In many instances, the manufacturer will ship the parts directly to one or more of the AMSFS. When the AMSFS become operational, Military Review

.
ARMYS MINIATURE AT&T

most of the ZWBCS logistic probleme should be solved. The SEAWBS and its associated se. cure voice, tandem switching, AUTO DIN, and satellite networks provide a high-quality, high-capacity, long- lines system for Southeast Asia. Over these networks are carried a volume of voice, meseage, and data traffic that far exceeds the maximum capabilities of tbe US Armys transportable tec tical systems. Without the SEA WBS, effective command and control from the Commander, US Millitary As sistance Command, Vietnam, down through the chain of command to infantry brigades, fighter squadrons, depots, ports, and provincial advisors, would be limited and, in many in. stances, would be almost nonexistent. The commercial facilities that the 1st Signal Brigade is installing in Vietnam might appear, at first glance, to be far greater than needed to meet the Armys normal requirements in a combat theater. This observation, however, would be inaccurate for sev-

reasons. In Vietnam, the commu ). nications zone and the field armye area of operations are merged. Addi tionally, the SEA WBS supports the lon@ines requirements of the Air Force, the Navy, the US Agency for International Development, the Ma rinee, Civil Operations and Revolu tionary Development Support, and the Free World Military Forces. The coun trywide Army advisory effort also places great demands on the system. Thus, the SEAWBS is a theater com munication system rather than a thea ter army syetem. The magnitude of the military longlines communication requirements far exceeds the limited capabilities of the commercial communication systems to be found in much of Southeast Asia. The 1st Signal Brigade, to satisfy these requirements, therefore, has had to install, operate, and maintain a commercial quality long-lines eyetem. When the program is completed in October 1968, it will be the most sophisticated military communications system the world has ever seen. era

COMMENTS INVITED

The Military rial published. Review welcomes your comments on any mate viewpoint or a new line of thought of your ideas. If you why not write an article an acceptable article. An opposite

will assist us and may lead to publication are an authority on a certain subject, for our consideration?

If you have only an idea, query us; per

haps we can assist you in developing

November 1966

75

Trends central

in
Europe

Captain Fritz von Wyszecki, Federal Republic of Germanu Armg

HE six-day war in the Middle East proved once more that tanks are still the commanders arm of decision. Of course, the tank and its tactics and techniques are changing continuously, and it is worthwhile to compare trends in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact countries. First, however, we need to consider the materiel available to each side. Tanks and armored vehicles in NATO are largely dominated by US designs. The medium battle tanks, M47 and M48, still form the backhme of armored troops in most NATO countries, but re placement by M60 and other types is underway. 76 Military Rwisw

ARMORED

WARFARE

These tanks are distinguished by high tirepower and fairly good mobil ity. Their armor protection is rela tively light, but firepower and mobil ity are considered to be more impor tant on todays battlefield. Two serious disadvantages of the MM and M48 tanks, however, are their enormous fuel consumption and high technical standards which make maintenance and repair expensive.
NATO TypeS

Neither the M.47 nor the M48 is equippedwith chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR ) protective ventila. tioq and they are incapable of deep fording, submerging, or floating. The M60, on the other hand, is equipped with a diesel engine with a lower fuel consumption and is capable of deep fording and submerging. It also bas an efficient CBR protective ventilation system and is outfitted with infrared and white searchlights and optics. Its horsepower-to-weight ratio, however, is only 16.2 horsepower per ton which is less than that required for a modern battle tank. The British Centuribn and Chieftai?t have remarkably great firepower and their armor is thicker than that of other NATO tanks, but they are rather heavy and slow. Both tanks are equipped with infrared and white searchlights and optics. The Chieftain is currently found in British units Captain Fritz von Wyezecki, Fed eraZ Republic of Germany Army, is on the staff of Kampftruppenschule II where he haa aleo served as an in 8tTUCt0r for cadets. A member of the army 8ince 1956, he luz8 been a pbtoon leader and company commami?er in a tank battalion and has attended the ~~u~ae Grade O@ers PreparatoW ,.
Nnvemher 1968

only, but the Centurion is now used &.o by Denmark and the Netherlands. The most modern tank in NATO units is the German Leopard. It com bines great firepower with high me-: bility and adequate armor protection. It has a high power-to-weight ratio of 21 horsepower per ton. In addition to use in the Buwde8wehr, it will be used also by Belgium, and negotiations with other countries are pending. All NATO countries have dropped the concept of a heavy surveillance tank, and they have made great efforts to improve the water mobility of their armored forces and their capability for night operations. Engine design and development is concentrated on the multifuel engine.
Warsaw Pact Characteristics

In the Warsaw Pact countries, there is, in contrast to NATO, an apparent purity of types of armored vehicles. Only Soviet tanks are found in the Warsaw Pact armiee. They include the T9.4, T54, T55, T62, JS2, JSS, and TIO. While the T34, JS2, and JS3 are no longer found in first echelon units, they are still used in great numbers in second echelon formations. Only the T54, T55, and T62 answer the requirements for a modern battle tank. They are equipped with infrared and white searchlights and stabilizing systems and are capable of deep fo*d ing and submerging. The range of their searchlights and the quality of their stabilizing systems are consid ered inferior to the corresponding Western models, however. At present, the Warsaw Pact countries can deploy approximately 55,000 tanks, many of which are 10 to 15 years old. A modern mechanized army needs not only tanks, but also other armored veh~cleeto move infantry on the battle
77

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WARFARE

field and for self-propelled artillery. Here, NATO is far in front in quality, but, unfortunately, also in variety. The most common type of armored personnel carrier (APC) in the NATO forces is the US MII.3. Similar to the Mll$ is the Britieh AFV4%?. Com pletely different from theee are the French AMX-VTP and the German

are equipped with tbe tracked APC BTR50P. The Warsaw Pact forces also lag well behind NATO in equip. ping their artillery with armor-pro. tected, self-propelled weapons. In reconnaissance vehicles, the War saw Pact enjoys a slight equipment advantage over NATO. The PT76 and the BTR40P are both excellent, fully

HS30. But even the old halftrack M2 is still in use, as well as a few Out dated, armor-protected, wheeled vehi cles. The Warsaw Pact countries retain wheeled vehicles for infantry carriers in all but the highest priority units. Tbe old BTR152 developed in 1944-46 is still the transport vehicle in most of the motorized rifle regimente, al though it is being replaced by the f3TR60P in rifle divisions of the 1st Strategic Echelon. The motorized rifle battalions of Soviet ai .,im-ed divisions and certain other high-priority units 78

amphibious vehicles to which NATO has nothing in the field comparable at the present time. Both sides continue research and development in tanks and other ar mored vehicles, but no revolutionary breakthrough appears in view. Margi nal gains may be made in multifuel engines, navigational and fire control systems, and in the use of missiles instead of conventional ammunition. But since all nations still possess a great number of tanks of conventional design, we shall probably see the fa miliar types for quite a long time. Tbe Military Review

ARMOREO

WARFARE

progressive mechanization of other arms, as well as the current movement of antitank weapons, have lessened most of the advantage which the tank enjoyed during World War II. There fore, it is the task of the tactician to determine the best way to employ the existing weapon systems to reestab lish this advantage. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, great stress is being given to allowing the subordinate commander the great est flexibility y in tactical procedures. The higher commande~ assigns the ob jective only, leaving all details of im plementation to the subordinates dis cretion. Tactical doctrine of the Warsaw Pact forces is based, of course, on Soviet concepts. This is still similar to that of the German Army of 1941, but modified by considerations of nu clear warfare. Marshal Vasili D. SokoIovsky, as the leading spokesman on Soviet strategy, prescribes a two-phase attack. Massive nuclear strikes on preplanned objective are followed in phase II by airborne strikes in the enemys rear together with massed ar mor attacks to mop up combat forma tions remaining in contact. All Warsaw Pact armies are drilled in this mode of warfare. The depth for a day of attack is given as ahout 62 miles. Of course, defense also is taught, but it is called only a phase of transition between two attacks. The tactical concept of the Warsaw Pact armies is dictated by strategic plan ning. This planning is based on at tack with exploitation of heavy nuclear fires. Consequently, equipment, organi zation, and training of all Warsaw Pact armies is designed accordingly.

#here appears to be no perceptible change for the future. The Soviets are working hard to increase the mobility of their forces. This applies not only to the area of command and control, but to improve ment of signal equipment, to training where cooperation between air force, armor, and paratroopers is practiced again and againand to equipment, where everything possible is done to improve the day-and-night mobility of all mechanized units. It is difficult to make a valid state ment on the trend of tactical doctrine in the West. We know that it is diffi cult for NATO to reach a joint stra tegic concept, and member nations are far away from unification of tactical concepts. However, certain trends are evident. Within their financial limits, all NATO countries are striving for bet ter mobility of their ground forces. Training cooperation between army and air force is continuously improv ing. This also applies to air mobility of army units. Water mobility, which ia well developed in the Warsaw Pact armies, is rapidly improving in NATO. The fighting of armored infantry, while remaining within the pro ection of their APCS, which was ~lways practiced in the German Army, fi~ds more and more friends in the allied nations. This means that combat power and mobility of our mixed armored units are better than those of com parable Soviet ones. Soviet infantry must still dismount for combat and, therefore, the speed of attack becomes considerably slower. The key to suc cess is increased mobility. The hope now is that tbe financial obstacles are not~too high.

November 1966

79

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Strategy of a W~P
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From An Cosantc5ir (Ireland)

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B. H. Liddell Hart

HE most critical stroke in the six-day war of 1967 was the first, the air stroke-or, in modern parlance, the airstrike. The details were revealed soon after the event, presumably with the permission of Is raeli censors who had been extremely, and in some respects absurdly, secre tive in 1956. 80

Besides the combined calculation and subtlety of a plan that paralyzed the whole of the numerically superior Egyptian Air Force at the outset, the staggering ground turnaround time of the Israelis, barely seven and a half minutes, was itself a great contribu tion to surprise. It enabled many of the Israeli pilots to start on a second

Reviet M6itary

,-,7---

-.

y
STRATEGY OF A WAR

sortie within an hour, and make eight sorties in the day compared with the Egyptian reckoning that they might manage to do two. It is no wonder that Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to disguise his debacle by asserting that United States and British aircraft had reinforced the Israelis. Numerous reports have emphasized the effect of the way that the Israeli air attack came in from unexpected directions, and how upsetting that proved.
Operational Analysis A general point of more significance

was brought out in an operational analysis of the campaign in a Voice of Israel broadcast on 15 July 1967 by Colonel J. L. Wallach (Professor of War Studies at the University of Tel Aviv who was reactivated in May for duty with the general staff ) : The first point I would like to make is the prime importance of the Israeli Air Forces [IAFs] actions in de strogtng the hostile air forces and gahzing air superiority ovev the bat tlefiekle. There wae nothing new in the method itself of attacking the err emy airfields in order to deetroy a maximal numbev of airplanes on the Thie arttile was condeueed from the origiual, publiehed in AN COSANT61R (Repnblic of Irs laud) April 1968. B. H. Liddell Hart served in France during Wortd War I and retired from odive duty in 1927. He has been military correspond ent of the London Daily Tele graph and the London Times, and military editor of the Encycloped ia Britannica. He is the author of numerous books, including two volumes of Memoirs and Strategy The Indirect Approach. November 1968

g $ouwd and in order to render the runwags useless for a certain pemod of time. . . . But what waz really out standing on 5th June, 1967, was the fa~t that IAF had &ccomplished the of its mieskm in lese than main part three hours. . . . The key to this phe nomenon maII be found in the high technical level of the fome, tehich en ables the mazimat utilization of its planse, inthehigh standard of its ~ lots and in their courage, but also in the fact that in the IAF there ie no gulf, so charactenetic in most air forces throughout the wortd, between ground staff on the one hand and jlying personnel on the other. IAF hae suc ceeded in welding together both branches of the service into ow fam ilg, in which one respects the fu?w tlons of the other. . . .
Armored Forces

Colonel Wallach then went on to discues and emphasize the no less impor tant part played by the armored forces in reaping the effect of theairetroke: Among the ground forces the w ority belongs without any doubt to the Armored Corps. . . . The IDF [Is raeli defeuse forces] grasped the im po7tatwe of armor . . . in the Siuai campaign of 1956. Since theh this corpe htw been etrengthsned aud im proved. Its excellent technical level &z abled it to cawy out a diversified range of combat missiom: break-through through f ortijied enemy localities; en circling movements over terrain nor mally considered ae uniwoeeable by ar mor; combat of armor againet armor, while utilizing to tk? titmost the ele mente of movement and fire and pur suit of a withdrawing enemy in order to @lock his route of retTeat. . . . However, not less important than the tschnical expertness was the

et

STRATEGY

OF A WAR

method of deploging armor. This was mostlg done in the largest concentra. tions and thus ~sshock power was brought to the best advantage. Si multaneously the mobility of the Ar mored Corps was used to the utmost. In accordance with the best tradition

expressed in the phrase Follow me! The execution of thie principle ie not easg at all. Its realization has cost in the past, as well as in the present cam naign, the lives of some of the best commanders. But on the other hand this phenomenon presente the key to the secret of IDFs 61an. There is no surpriee that it prevaile over armies in which commander lead their troops from the rear and in which the ofi. cers are the first to despair and give up battle and abandon their subordi nates. . . .
Composition of Groupings

Air Form md .9P...

Digest

Brigadier

Hod, Chief of the Israeli Air Force

General Mordecai

of armor opm-atiows . . . the Armored Corps dashed forward without paying much attention to ite flanks and rear, knowing that sooner or later the fate of flanks and rear will be decided by the deep penetration into the rear of the enemy dispoeitiows, leading to the collapse of the enemys resieting power. There wos an incessant dash ing forward . . . which prevented the enemye proper evaluation of the eitu ation and his reaching balanced deci sions. . . . Long ago, before the Sinai campaign of 1956, the IDF had ~.dided upon the principle of troop leadership which ie 82

Colonel Wallach then emphasized how much the Israelis had profited by organizing their formation in combat teame of a variable pattern, termed an Ugdah, instead of in a fixed size and rigid pattern divisions. The composition of these combat groupinge varied in accordance with the particular tack allotted to them, and alao the way that the battle de veloped. Extra strengthin armor, infantry, or artillerywas added or subtracted without destroying any organic framework and without impos ing a stop for re-grouping. This or ganizational flexibility had produced the maximal operational flexibility. The whole course of the Israeli cam paign, a perfect blitzkrieg, was of par ticular interest to me becauae it was the best demonstration yet of the the ory of the strategy of indirect ap proach, and in its eubtler sense of seeking and exploiting the line of least expectation-a theory evolved nearly 40 years ago. The Germans, to my chagrin, ap plied it in 1940 under General Heinz Guderians inspiration and influence. But even Guderian or Field Marehal Erwin Rommel, generoue as they were
Military Review

STRATEGY

OF A WAR

in acknowledgment, did not grasp the subtler side of it as well as the Israeli leadera have done since 1948. With each test, the Israelis have improved -contradicting the experience of his tory that armies learn only from de feat not victory. What struck me moat in their latest campaign, compared with the second

,.

evidently believed to he impass able.* It came as more of a surprise to the Egyptians because thk, route had not been used or attempted in 1956. It was found that only a company with a few antitank guns was cover ing this route-and was soon overrun. That was fortunate since the main

t tians

.,

in 1956, was the significant develon ment of the Israeli plan and opera tions in combining the strategic offen sive with the tactical defensivein getting around the back of the Egyp tians in Sinai after the opening pene. tratione and, by blocklng their lines of retreat, forcing them to attack in trying to escape. It was also significant that the cen ter division under Brigadier Gen eral Avrabam Yoffe, which estahlisbed the main blocking position at the Mitla Pass, gained its initial penetration of the frontier line by taking a route through sand dunes that the EgypNovmrber 1968

armored force on the coastal route under Brigadier General Isra61 Tal met much tougher resistance than in 1956-until Yoffes armored fokce brought its flank and rear leverage to bear. General Yoffes division was equipped with modernized Centurion tanks armed with the 105-millimeter gun, and he reported that these proved more effective than the T54 (and even

earliest .bwk %X%%%

It fulSlled m axiom1
however

had deduced in my o the histmy of atrate%y, and often formidable. are in.

h.,.ntb km dmto.vaw .md km .nc.rtcim thm ittn hazards. cmditicmm an more $h:b~ticka W=All ~mm.tibz., than calculable, th-e Of hum.m resist.mam.

83

STRATEGY

OF A WAR

the latest 255 Soviet tank) used by the Egyptians. Brigadier General Ariel (Arik) Sharons division on the left was also deployed and employed in a dualpronged way. With the deceptive use of dummy tanks, it conveyed the im-

Egyptian divisions, were under the control of Brigadier General Yeshaya hou Gavieh who was in charge of the Southern Command. In sum, the plan wae a superb application of the strat egy of indirect approach, and its cor ollary of choosing the line of least

I?ttenlia

A damaged Soviet-built pression that it was aiming at a dash through Quntilla to the Gulf of Aqaba and the capture of Sharm cl-Sheik, as in 1956, whereas it was actually thrusting westward to Suez. Although it dld not achieve as spectacular a bag of prisoners as the other two divisions, its distracting effect made an inval uable contribution to the success and rapidity of their westward drive to the Suez Canal. The three Israeli ~li~~isions on the Sinai front, which had to face seven 84

T55 tank in the Sinai

expectations, to throw the opponent off balance. On the Jordanian f rent, rugged and more constricted, there was less scope for maneuver, and the handicaps were greater because of the Israelis desire to occupy the whole city of Jerusalem as soon as possible. Moreover, they had not expected that King Hussein would actually take the offensive in aid of Nasser in view of the way that Nasser had cowed dissension in Jordan. Military Review

STRATEGY

OF A WAR

The cramping conditions around Jerusalem, and the unexpectedness of King Huseeins active intervention in the war, hindered any such wide and subtle maneuvering as that car ried on the southern front in Sinai. Moreover, when this Jordanian offen sive intervention became clear, the Is raelis intense emotional urge to seize the opportunity of regaining posses sion of Jerusalem as a whole was a handicap on any subtle strategy. Even so, the operation was carried out hy a series of local flanking moves with an armored brigade, a paratroop bri gade, and an infantry brigade. Despite stiff resistance from the Jordanian troops, the Israelia achieved their prime objective by nightfall on the thh-d day while exploiting their success by the speedy capture of Jer icho on the west bank of the Jordan and Hebron, south of Jerusalem. MeanwhiIe,the four brigades of the Northern Command overran the north ern part of .Jordan west of the river by two pincer moves, each of an in direct type and culminating in a rear attack. Their swift s~ccess was greatly helped by the way they unhalanced their opponents dispositions, as well as by the air forces help in disrupt ing the opponents efforts to regroup his forces. In the next and final stage of the warstarting on 9 Jnne-the Israelis switched their northern effort againet the Syrian forces whose artillery had

he& battering the Israeli settlements around and north of the Sea of Galilee. Time was short because of the cease fir~ for which the United Nations Assembly was calling. So, here again, the time factor was a handicap on effective use of the indirect approach and maneuver. Thus, the Israeli moves were nar rower and more direct than they need otherwise have been, and their losses consequently heavier. Nevertheless, they succeeded in clearing the heights by the second evening. They could eas ily have driven on into Damascus by the third day but for the cease-fire. If they had driven on eastward far enough to reach the area inhabited by the Druzes, they might have helped to establish an independent state there that could have been a buffer between Syria and Jordanto the benefit of the latter and the future of the Middle East. As to the postwar situation and the question of a peace settlement, the ex perience of the past 20 yearsand, indeed, the last half centurys history of the Middle Eastshows all too clearly that little can be expected from negotiations, but only from tim and stability. Any settlement is likI ly to take a long time, and it is foolish f r / the Western Powers to indulge m hopes of hastening the process-either from altruism or shortsighted concern for their own short-term interests.

November 1968

85

I Peter I. Gosztony

Over the pact three years, Sov<et marshals of World War 11 fame have broken into print with their mem oirs, frequently contradicting ear lier histories of the Great Patriotic War. The latest of these memoirs to appea~ are those of Marshal Ko nev, originally published in install ments in Moscow awd now avaifable in a French tran.slation.-Editor. NE of the outstanding World War II commanders of the Red o ArmY was Marshal G~~keSoviet Union Ivan Stepanovich Konev. Trained in 86

the artillery in the army of the czar, he took part, at the age of 20, in the Bolshevik Revolution. He fought in Siberia as a police commissar against Alekeandr V. Kokhak and the Czech legion and, under the leadership of Mikhail N. Tukhacheveky, aided in putting down the revolt of the Kronehtadt sailors of 1921. Following this victory over the Kronshtadt rebels, Konev returned to Moscow feeling he had done his share of fighting and had thereby gained the right to aspire to come peaceful civil employment. However, the politMilitaryReview

KONEVS

MEMOIRS

ical high command of the Red Army decidedhe should continue ae a soldier. In hie memoirs which were recently published in Moscow, the 71-year-old veteran renders a clear and enlighten ing account of the fateful year of 1945 as eeen through the eyes of an army group commander.
Konev Commands

Konev had been raised to the rank of marshal in the spring of 1944 after proving his ability in numerous bat tlee on the German-Soviet frout. In May, he took command over the 1st Ukrainian Front (army group) and with it wae the first to tread on Ger man soil. In January 1945, the 1st Ukrainian Front formed the left wing of the groupmentof three army groups which constituted the Red Army and which bad the task of liberating Poland, of occupying the eastern part of Ger many, and of taking Berlin. Of the three marshalsKonev, Georgi K. Zhukov, and Konetantin Rokossovsky it was Konev who commanded these operations the most actively. At the end of November 19.4.4, I was ordered to come to Moscow with my plan of operations. In the presenze of the members of the National De fense Commission, I had to submit it there to Stalin. I still remember well how Stalin attentively studied this Peter I. Gos.stony is Director of the Swis8 East Europe Library Fonmfa tion, Bern, Switzerland. A graduate of the University of Buh%pest, Hun garg, he took part in the 1956 revolu tion as an o@er of the Hungarian Peoplee A~y, He eecaped to the West, aud studied at the University of Zurich, Switzerland, where he grad nated in 1962. This article was trans lated from the German by MT. LaVergne Dale, Leavenworth, Kansas.
November1968

He devoted partkxdar attention to a etudy of the mape which showed the Silesian induetmalarea. Here, the various enterprises with their fo.cto rief, mines, ware-houees and other i% dustrial establishment were indicated close upon one another. They coedd constitute an obstacle in the impend ing maneuvere of our attacking forces. This industrial area with its tremeq doue size and etrength was even ver~ impressive on the map. This was rec ognized o.leo. by Stalin who ran his finger arowid the induetrcal area on the map and epoke only a single word: Gold! Konev understood immediately. The Sileeian industrial area was to fal] unharmed into the hands of the Red Army. As he stated: I Be~au~e this area, an old Polish ter ritor~, would by righte accrue to Po land, we worked out our plan of opera tions in such a wag that our forces would not directly attack the indets trial area, but ~oould go around it on the north and south respectively.
p~n. Red Army Attack

On 12 January 1945, the Red Army stdrted its great attack from the Vis tula. Konevs 1st Ukrainian Front of eight field armiee had more than3,660 tanks and aseault guns and morelthan 17,000 other gune of various calibers at ite dispoeal, and was supported b% 2,580 planes. It spread its attack over a front of 160 milee and by 17 January had succeeded in breaking through the German defense and in pushing ahead to a depth of from 75 to 90 miles. The marshal notes with respect, in connec tion with this, that the moral strength of his opponents was far from broken at this time. According to the etatemente of Ger man prisoners, the view gensrdlg pre

KONEVS

MEMOIRS

vailed among both soldiers and oficers that the Allies would be defeated in the Ardennes and forced to make a separate peace. After this, the Wehr macht would turn its entire strength eastward. These reports were still widely prevalent even in January when the German attack in the Ardennes had already been halted for a long time.
Industrial Area Occupied Konev had suc By 29 January,

ceeded in occupying the Silesian in dustrial area. In order to obtain pos session of the industrial facilities in tact, the Soviets even permitted strong German forces to pull out to the west. Many of the plants were still operat ing when Soviet troops reached them. Their production was then continued under Soviet protection. In February, the 1st Ukrainian Front continued its operation. In hard fighting, Konev succeeded in getting the greater part of Silesia into the hands of the Red Army. However, the situation did not shape up as they had hoped it would. The Germans, al though suffering heavy losses, were able quick]y to establish the defense on the Oder, redispose their forces, and organize an active defense. Never theless, the 1st Ukrainian Front to gether with the let Belorussian Front, under Zhukov, fought their way ahead to the Neisse line and were within 65 to 95 miles of Berlin. Although the marshal would not mention names, he does, in his mem oirs, assume a position with regard to the question raised by Marshal Vasili I. Chuikov of why the Red Army, at the end of February 1945, suddenly halted its operations. This pause lasted from 2.4 FebruaW to 16 APl. Duri,.U this time, the

USSR filled out divisions, brought about order in the rear area of the Red Army, finished or improved rail way lines and airfields, and took care of the supply of the troops on the front. But the main reason for the pause in the operations lay else where. We were troubled by the reports that the Germans were not going to accept the loss of the SWesian industrial area and were massing strong fo7ces on our southern wing. By all appearances, they wished to win back the second Rukr district!
Plan la Oroppad As a matter of fact, the Wehrmacht

did have this intention. General Heinz Guderian and the German Army High Command urged this plan. It was even more important since, with the Ruhr district in ruins, the loss of the Si lesian industrial area had come as a deathblow to the German war econ omy. Adolf Hitler, however, decided differently. The 6th SS Panzer Army, one of the best equipped German ar mies, was to be employed not for Silesia, but for Hungary for the re taking of Budapest. All of Guderians arguments were in vain. Hitler would not alIow his mind to be changed, and the plan for retaking Silesia was dropped. The Soviets knew nothing of this. Konev says: Stalin wae constantly worried abcxd our south wing. He called several times bg telephone and directed my attew tion to the threat by the Germans. Be lieve me; he implored, during one of hie conversations, the Germans will not remain satisfied with the loss of Silesia and it can happen that it will be taken away from you! Thereupon, I considerably strengthened our sonth ern front and began an operation in
Military Review

88

KONEVS

MEMOIRS

the Racib6rz area the aim of which wee the deetnwtion of the German de. feuse in, the Opole-Rac{b6rz dietrict. The Berlin operation of the Red Army assumes a primary place in the memoirs of Marshal Konev. On 1 April 1945, Stalin received Konev and Zhukov in the Kremlin. He informed the two marshals that the Western Powers had already made preparation to take Ber/in. Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery wae to lead the opera tion. Stalin wanted this prize for the Red Army and wae aesured by both marshale that they could reach Berlin sooner than the Anglo-Americans.
Zhukov 6iien Task

They then received the order to work out, on the spot, the operation plan for taking Berlin. Zhukov, Sta lins favorite, was given the task. Ko nev, to his great regret, was to pnsh south of Berlin, cut through the Ger mandefenses, and meet the Americane at the Elbe. He could, however, pic ture that, if the right wing of the front made good progress, the situa tion would permit him to attack Ber lin from the south and thus take a di rect part in the fighting for this city. Stalin spurred both marshals on to taking Berlin as quickly as possible. The occupation of Hitlers capital city was for him a matter of prestige. He let the juncture point of the two fronte be eo indicated on the map that, on the third day after the great attack on Berlin, either Zhukov or Konev, de pending on the circumstances, could complete the seizure of Berlin. However, at this time in MOSCOW, it was not the matter of prestige alone that dictated what was to be done. The Soviete, according to Konev, seriously feared that a separate peace would be establie~ed between Hit]er and the
November 1968

W~atern Powers which would, then, make it possible for the Germans to direct their efforts against the Red Army alone. Todav, it ie a histortcd fait that Hitler aud his entourage did not suc ceed in making a separate peace with the Anglo-Americans. We did not, at that time, want to believe that our Alliee would take such a step. But at that time, when not OZIY numerous facts with regard to this nwtter were in our possession, but our heads also were full of rumors, we had no right to give any thought to the possibility of a sepaTate peace. These circum stances contributed to the significance of the Bertin operations. Offensive Operation

Early in the morning of 16 April 1945, Zhukovs offeneive operation against Berlin began. On the same day, Konev also began the attack with his 1st Ukrainian Front. According to his directives, be had between 10 and 12 days to gain possession of the BeelitzWittenberg region, reach the Elbe, and take Dreeden. Konev writes that: I, for my part, also added to this directive: Care & to be taken that the possibility eholl exist to take part jointly wtth our right wing in the op eratiom of the Ist Belorussian hront against Berlin. The marshal did not wish to lea~e Berlin solely to his rival Zhukov. Con sequently, he gronped his armies in euch a way that he could direct them at any time to the north, in the direc tion of the German capital city. As a matter of fact, Zhukovs opera tion did not go forward as rapidly as Stalin had hoped. The Germans de fended tbemselvea bitterly. Konev was more~eucceesful.His forces crossed the Neiese and on the third day of the 89

KONEVS

MEMOIRS

attack had already plunged more than 30 miles westward. On the evening of this day, Konev spoke again with Sta lin and announced his successes. Sta lin replied that Zhukov was still occu pied with the breakthrough of the German defense. Stalin then asked if Zhukovs mobile forces could not be regrouped over onto Konevs front in order to go on from there against Berlin. Konev replied: Comrade Stalin, that would take a great deal of time. . . . It is not nsces sary for the troops of the Ist Belorus sian Front to be engaged in our iweak through sector. Our position is favor able. We have enough forces and are in a position to lead both of our ar mored armies against Berlin. Stalin, after some silence, gave Ko nev hie consent. From the south, Ko nev sent his armored and infantry armies toward Berlin. Zossen, the nerve center of the German Wehr macht, was taken and Cottbus was reached. The Germans put up bitter resistance and few prisoners were brought in. Konev tried to reach Ber lin ahead of Zhukov. On 25 April, Ko nevs armies did reach Berlin. The marshal calculated the number of the defenders at more than 200,000 soldiers and possibly higher. In reality, they numbered 92,000. However, Zhu kovs troops had also reached the city from the east and the north, and the field had to be turned over to Stalinfe favorite general. Konev wae bitter but, since an order wae an order, he reluctantly turned over taking the center of Berlin to Zhukov. Konev says that the greateet diffi culty in the Battle of Berlin came from the antiaircraft bunkers which were invulnerable to artillevy fire. The anti aircraft batteries on their roofs were 90

used against the tanke and infantry, and protecting troops were equipped antitank with panzer fauats-an rocket launcher. The Peoples Assault Battalions, consisting largely of very old or very young men, were plenti fully provided with these weapons, and they fought bitterly. Konev statee: Even during the last hours of the fighting, they showed more courage and endurance than many well-trained soldiers. There existed a state of mind u%hichI can only describe us hysterical, sacrificial rage. These people, many of whom were mere children, had some how the hope that they. still, at the last minute, could bring about a miracle, On 2 May, Berlin surrendered and Konev was aseigned the task of seiz ing Prague. US forces were making preparations to assist the city in the liberation. To do so, however, Stalins consent was needed eince Czechoslova kia, by agreement, lay in the Soviet zone of operation. Although Soviet troops were much farther from the Czech capital than General George S. Pattons 3d Army, and their route led through the Erz Gebirge Mountains and more than one million men of the German Central Army Group, the So viet dictator was determined that the Soviets would liberate Prague. With the crumbling of general re sistance, Konev reached Prague in four days. Here, he was not obliged to share victory with Zhukov. Konev describes in detail the meeting with US forcee, tbe taking of Dresden, and the capture of General Andrei A. Vlaseov. He refrains from any criti cism of Stalin and confines himself solely to relating his combat experi ences. His memoirs add to the grow ing amount of credible Soviet history of World War II. Military Review

bout

Military Thinking
Major J. L. HWrd, British Arm% Ret;red HINKING may be described as an art whkh is based on phi losophy, psychology, and logic. Aris totle further classified thinking into speculative and practical. The end of speculative thinkhg is science or knowledge; the end of practical think ing is results. Military thinking is con cernedwith both types, but this article will be limited to practical thhkhrg. Practical thinking is exemplified in
November1968

the British Army by what is called the appreciation of the situation and, in the US Army, the estimate of the situation. There are minor differences in each procedure, but these are not relevant when considering these ap preciations as processes of thinking. Everybody thinks, but it is gener ally agreed that those who have con scious knowledge and control over the thinking process are more likely to 91

MILITARY

THINKING

be successful than those who have not. Conscious knowledge enables con. trol. Without it th&e can be no con scious method, and method is usually regarded as desirable.
Two Factors

Tbe form of the appreciation of tbe situation ie ueualIy as shown on the chart. All practical thinking is limited or conditioned by two factore. One of these is tbe desire for a result or end. This corresponds to the ob ject or mieeitm. The other factor ie tbe actual circumstances in which the end is to be achieved. The circumstances correspond to in formation about own troops and the enemy. It is hard to substantiate the order of the British type of apprecia tion in its consideration of informa tion about own troops and the enemy prior to the object. Such pieces of in formation are really factors, just as much as are ground and space. Tbe prior importance of the object is that it should control the whole thinking process and direct the mind to search for only those factors which are rel evant to the problem or, in this case, object. It is generally agreed that part of the natural mechanism of the mind is Major J. L, Hillard, British Awny, Rstirsd, is Commissioner of ths Es sential Services Corps for the Hong Kong Government. He served with the Indian Army in Burma during World War II, and subsequently saw service in Frenzh Indochina with the British forcee, and in India during the par tition in 1947. He transferred to the British Armu in 1948, and served in Malaya {n 1949-50 during the emer gency. His art{cle, Countersubvereion in Urban Areas, appeared in the September 1967 issne of the MILITARY REVIEW. 92

association, by which the idea tends to recall either an analogous idea or an idea with which it was previously associated in tilme and place. There fore, if the object is a withdrawal, the mind will tend to recall those fac tors about withdrawal which are as sociated with it. In the case of in formation about own troops, it should lead to consideration of the availabil ity of long-range artillery and tanks. The object: therefore, forms the frame of reference against which every factor is to be evaluated. Any situation, when it first presents itself, may be described as a mass of confusion. Initially, in looking at a landscape, we are aware merely of sensory impressions. These impres sions have to be intellectualized. They have to be verbalized or brought un der concepts which are instruments for dealing with a situation. The total situation has to be broken up and analyzed into its component parts.
Deductions Great stress in the British Army

is laid, however, not only on this anal ysis of tbe factors, but also on the drawing of deduction from them. The term deduction often puzzles many people. A practical illustration involv ing a forested area may clarify its meaning. In analyzing a situation, a green area on a map may be concep tualized as a forest. The object is a withdrawal. Knowledge supplies a theory and principles to he observed in a withdrawal among which is in cluded the availability y of covered lines of retreat. The pro&ss of thought and deduction is: e From observation of the situs tion, a wooded area is recognized. e Woods make good covered lines of retreat. This is knowledge or theory
1

Military Review

MILITARY THINKING

aDDliedto the facts of the situation. .. The green area on the map is a possible line of retreat. This is de duction. The point requiring stress here is the importance of knowledge. Without knowledge of the principles or theory of withdrawal tactics, the value of the forest for what it is. in this situation. add not have been discovered. Al~ .. 1. Information a. Own troops b. Enemy 2. Object 3. Factors a. Ground b. Time and Space c. Other d. Courses Open e. Consideration of Courses deduction, therefore, presupposes a theory against which the fact-is eval uated. The consideration of all the factors should continue in this manner. This consideration will, in turn, initiate and guide the search for other factors which may not have come to mind initially. The relative strength of the enemy tanks in comparison with our own tank strength will enhance the search for natural antitank obstacles. A common mistake in the considera tion of factors is to overlook the fact that euch examinations must be as comprehensive as possible and that no important factors should be omitted. In the illustration, the failure to notice that the forest was heavily mined or fronted by a lake or river would be to neglect an important and relevant factor which might thereby lead to failure to achieve the object. November 1968

~ plan might have been made which did not conform to reality or which did not fit the facts of the situation; hence, it would fail.
Analysis Emphasized

The courses open part Of an ap. preciation is often given the least at tention although it is the most impor tant part. Up to this point, the em phasis is on analyais. The emphasis is correct because it is impossible for the mind to think about more than one item at a time. We should, as far as possible, divide problems into parts. However, such divieion necessarily in troduces a certain falsification. In real life, most things are interconnected, and certain philosophers would say that everything is interconnected and that the whole truth lies only in the absolute. For practical purposes, it is not necessary for military thinkers to go to this extreme, but it is important to see items in relation to each other. We see only individual things. We see the red of a rose. A few days later, we see the brown of a rose after it has died. But we do not see the rela tion between the red of the rose and the brown of the rose unless we men tally connect both these facts. I Items are often related as anteced ent and consequent or a cause and bf fect, but we must discover thk+ rela tion for ourselves. In our example of withdrawal, if the enemy has a much stronger tank force than ours, this factor takes on an entirely different significance according to whether there is or is not suitable ground for tank operations. If there is such ground, our ability to withdraw will be ~uch impeded. The importance of lines of defense providing natural anti tank obstacles will be enhanced, as 03

MILITARY THINKING
9

will be the need for antitank weap ons.. The significance of the factors, therefore, cannot be seen in isolation, but only in relation to each other. Usually, it is thought that most ani mals have no power of imagination and can work only by habit learned from trial and error. Man, however, has the power of forward mental con struction of eventsimagination. He can represent to himself ideally what would happen if he took certain steps. He is not therehy tied to his present situation, but can mentally construct the future by symbolic imagination us ing either words or images. It is this mental projection which a military thinker must do in the courses open phase of appreciation. He has to combine or make a synthe sis of the various factors in different ways until he finds a combination of means which leads to the desired end. In practical thinking, the end is the desired object, but this end is limited in accordance with the facts of the situation.
A Syllogism

In the example ahout the use of a woods as a covered line of retreat, the term woods was the mediating or middle term which connected the green area on a map and the term good covered line of retreat. The actual syllogism, however, is only the form of exposition and not that of discovery. The art of discovering the conclusion of the syllogism consists in thinking, on the one hand, of all the I possible types of good covered lines of retreat and trying to find in the factual situation presented something of this type. In this case, it was woods.
Dialectical Procedure

In the working out and elaboration of the consequences of the various pro posed courses, much use is made of deduction. Deduction may be in the form of the syllogism as in the exam ple about the use of a woods for a covered line of retreat. In simple lan guage, a syllogism consists of three statements, of which two statements are known as the premises and the third statement is the conclusion. The two premises each consist of two terms, with one term, known as the middle, being common to each premise. The conclusion consists of the other two terms which have been joined by the third common t- ,,1 which acts as the mediating link.

Here again, in this phase, the im portance of knowledge is manifest. In making appreciations, it is a common mistake of beginners to think that their pattern of thought should fol low the pattern of exposition. This is not the case at all. In discovery, the mind darts forward and back ward in an irregular manner, seizing upon some suggestion, trying it out, discarding it, and seizing upon an. other until it finds one which fits the situation. The procedure is dialectical. Cer tain tentative proposals are made and their consequences worked out. If the proposals bridge the gap between what is given, on the one hand, and the end, on the other hand, they are accepted. The matter viewed in this light is rather like the solving of a geometrical problem, ,Deduction also, however, may be of a systematic nature which means it is based either upon the way elements are in nature or the way they have been made artificially. If water is poured from a glass, it is a well-known fact that it will fall downward be cause that is the way of nature. If it
Military Review

MILITARY THINKING

is desired for guns to get into action, a military man knows that, in certain circumstances, the process +11 take half an hour because they have to move to a certain area, survey in, and complete other necessary details. Time and space calculations are of the same type. Therefore, given the sye tem and certain initial data, we can make certain other deductions.
Pros and Cons

The next item in the process of appreciation is the consideration of the proe and cone of the varioue coursee. This consideration involves subjecting them to criticism. This crit icism may be carried out by the plan ner himself ae an internal dialogue or by another party. If it appears probable that none of tbe proposed courses will achieve the object, then the trouble may be due to the lack of skill of the planners. Alternatively, such a failure may indicate that the object is too ambitious and should be changed. The courses also, however, must be examined for their own intrinsic merit. First, it should be seen if the proposed cmrse agrees with the facts, that they contain no error, and that no important facts have been omitted. Second, it should be seen if the pro posed course is consistent with other statements. Criticism may be made against the course either directly by attacking the reasons for it, or indirectly by attack ing the results of the proposed course and showing that these are unaccept able. In the direct attack, it may be shown that either the reasons are false or that the course does not follow logicaljy from them. Three types of argument are possible along these lines: Nwember 1966

~ Faulty reasoning. This results in invalid deduction of conclusions from facts or purely logical errors such as in this battle, the tanks preceded in fankry in attack and were successful; therefore, in every battle, the tanks should precede infantry in attack. Faulty theory. This fault is espe cially likely to occur in military theory because soldiers are not continually en gaged in wars. The accepted theory may be that, in close country, the tanke should, follow infantry in at tack. This theory has been inductively drawn out of the experience of many battles, but may, nevertheless, not he applicable in the special circumstances or without qualification. Faulty application of theory. Principles necessarily have to he stated in general terme, otherwise they would not be applicable to other cases. Their very generality, however, can be the cause of error. For instance, it may be true that a major advance cannot be carried out through thick jungle because of administrative difficulties. However, the question is how thick must the jungle be to be too thick for such an advance. If the jungle is not sufficiently thick, the case does not fall under the principle. Here, there Iis a failure to make distinctions where dis tinctions are required. \ In the formation of such argumente, we may accept our opponents reasons as true and then show that unaccept able consequences follow from them when we bring these reasons into con nection with some other. principle ac knowledged by both parties to be true.

However, disagreement as to the courses to be adopted will often re mainweven after this procedure has been followed. Thie disagreement will arise when one party places emphasis 95

MILITARY

THINKING

on some principles as the starting point for its reasons and another party stresses other principles, with both principle or sets of principles con flicting. Both parties may then try to justify their position by deriving their position from even higher level prin ciples. One party may succeed in per suading the other party that its course is right by carrying the argument backward to a principle on which they both agree. In the example of withdrawal, one party may reason that, because of our inferior tank strength, the lines of withdrawal must be acroes tank obsta cles such as rivers. Another party may claim that, because of our own in feriority in the air, and, therefore, the danger of tbe destruction of tbe bridges over which such a withdrawal must be made, the lines of withdrawal should avoid crossing rivers. Again, during the withdrawal, one party may advocate the blowing of bridges be cause it is important that they do not fall undamaged into enemy hands. An other party might argue that the blow ing of bridges should be delayed since much of tbe withdrawing force is still on the enemys side. In this stage of the argument, we

have Dassed out of the realm of sci entific facts with their objectivity into the realm of values which, in the final analysis, are not susceptible of proof, but are a matter of choice although not arbitrary choice. All principles condition each other. The great planner is the one who can assess the right value to be put on each principle. Each party will make its own assessment, but neither party can prove by logic alone that ite course is right. The process of appreciating cannot, therefore, be reduced entirely to a logical procedure. Valuation, and hence opinion, will also be present. It is important to remember the findings of modern ethical philoso phers who believe that the good exists when the good consequences outweigh the bad consequences. There will usu ally be no course of action which is completely good. Every course will have its disadvantages as well as its advantages. The good course will be that which achieves the aim with the greatest balance of good consequences over bad consequences. The ultimate test of the soundness of the reasoning will be whether the plan works in practice.

96

Military Review

..

.-.

MBLHARY

Parawing Glider

>.,.

UNITED STATES

Prisoner-of-War Identification Kits

This parawing glider, which was dropped from a plane, is steered by a ground-based radio beacon and can carry high-priority cargo to troops

A$-Iw Naus Features

with pinpoint accuracy. The delivery system can be released from altitudes as high as 30,000 feet at distances up to 12 miles from its target.Army News Features. b

The Army is looking at ideas for prisoner-of-war (PW) identification kits that will prevent captured troops or suspected partisans from switching names to confuse interrogation and confinement. Tropic tests are being performed for the US Army Combat Develop ments Command (USACDC) to de termine which concept meets its es sential and desirable characteristics for wristbands and the device for tamper-proof attachment. Most sought after is a band that will clearly show when it has been removed or altered in any way. It must also be water proof and must resist normal wear, tear, and discoloration for about one year. In addition to preventing prisoners from concealing or falsifying their true identities, the bands and banding devices may have secondary ubes in aseuring identification of casualties, stragglers, internees, and, in some Jp. erations, the entire populations of vii. Iages or cities. The equipment will be issued to the military police PW processing com panies, PW enclosures sectione, and PW camp units. With Vietnam and similar wars in mind, USACDC specifies that an ac ceptable band be one that cannot be us~ by a prisoner as a weapon, sig naling device, or be hidden.US Army release. 97

November 1968

MILITARY

NOTES of Airmolsile Oivisions Metal V! Fence Stops Erosion

Designations

The Army has announced the desig nation for ite two airmobile divisione, each currently serving in Vietnam. The 10lst Air Cavalry Division is designated the 10lst Airborne Divi sion (Airmobile) and the 1st Air Cavalry Division is the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Elements of di visionsfor example, maneuver bat talionswill add the suffix (Airmo bile) to their current designation. DOD releaee.
Microfilming of Computer Output

The Air Force Syetems Command is inv@igating the best way to keep coil around landing pads for vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft from eroding. One solution, which suc cessfully diffuses engine blast, is an in verted V fence of porous metal. Measuring less than 16 inches high, the fence is placed between the air craft and edge of a VTOL landing pad. The fence uermits some of the engine

The Army has completed a year of testing a new project designed to im prove the flow of computer informa tion by recording computer output on high-speed microfilm instead of paper. Called the Nonimpact Printing Proj ect, the new system is being tested at three prototype sitee. The use of microfilm resulted in major improvements at the three sites during the first year of operation. Tbe system freed more than 11,000 hours of computer time; eliminated more than 50 million pages of printed pa per, and has proved to be a sound medium for the worldwide distribu tion of supPly management data. The direct microfilming of computer output in support of the broad epec trum of automated information sys teme offers a means of curbing and controlling paper costs. One of the potential Army micro film applications is the conversion of cataloge, regulations, and manuals to microfilm. Also, Army commands over seas may use microfilm techniques in communications zones, inventory con trol centers, and mai:,r depots for a wide variety of supply problems. Army News Features.
9B

US Air Fomx

Engineer

inspects

porous metal fence

blast to. flow through and deflects some upward at a 45-degree angle. In this way, tbe force of an engine downblast is diffused before it reaches the edge of the landing pad, prevent ing erosion of the surrounding soil. Without a fence, the landing pad would have to be 100 feet wide or more to keep soil at the edgeof the pad from eroding and creating hazards. The prime advantage of using the fence is that landing pad areas for VTOL aircraft can be reduced from 100 to 50 feet in diameter, in addition to eliminating adjacent soil erosion. US Air Force release. Military Ilevtew

..
MILITARY Driverless J~eps NOTES

Artists concept of operation of remote-controlled, mine.detecting jesp shows drivqr at safe dktance from vehicle as it sweeps road for mines

A $370,000 contract for prototype remote radio control systems to be in stalled in vehicles has been awarded by the Army. The manufacturere system will en able a single operator at a remote location to start the vehicle, disengage and engage the clutch, shift forward and reverse, advance and retard the throttle, eteer the vehicle, and apply the brakee.

The system will consist of two in dependently powered unitsthe oper ators, control pack and a truckmounted transceiver. It will allow op eration of the jeep-mounted mine detector by an operator from any dis tance up to 300 yards away. The opera tor will control the mine detector with his~backpack transmitter and chestmounted, remote-control unit.News release. 99

leee November

MILITARY NOTES Nike X Development Office

Nike X Development Office (NXDO) has been created by the Army with the mission of insuring that the .Senti?zelballistic-missile defense system can adapt to changing threats. Located at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, the NXDO is a field agency of the US Army Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency, which is
A

headquartered in Washington, D. C. The new reeearch agency will be organized into five divisions, each supporting separate technology areas: ra dar development, systems requirement and threat studies, missile development, reentry physics and range meas urement research, and optical systems development.DOD release.

Maverick klksile

The Air Forces Maverick missile heads for its target in this artists con cept showing how the weapon would he used operationally. The new miseile is a highly accurate, television-guided, air-to-surface weapon designed to knock out enemy tanks, armored vehicles, and field fortifications. In operation, the pilot selects a target on a television screen in his cockpit, locks the missiles guidance system on it, and launches the missile. The pilot can then leave the area while the missile continues on its way to the target, guided by an electro-optical television homing device in its nose. The Maverick is designed for use by tactical aircraft, including the A-7, F-J, and F-III series. The Air Force recently awarded a contract to develop, teet; and produce the Maverick (MR, Apr 1967, p 98) .News release.

100

Military Review

MILITARY

NOTES

, -,
StarlightSCOpe Aids Ship Navigation An image-intensification device de veloped by the Army for land use may also prove a boon in ship naviga tion, as well as reduce the rescue time for survivors from a shipwreck. In two tests conducted by the US ArmY Mobility Equipment Research and De velopment Center, Fort Belvoir, Vir ginia, results have indicated that the Starlight scope would be of great value in the nighttime navigation of ships (MR, Aug 1968, pp 102-103). The Stmliglzt scope is an imageintensification device developed by the Army. It utilizes a special electron tube to intensify the natural low level of starlight, moonlight, or skyglow to produce a visible image. It cannot be readily detected by the enemy eince it requires no artificial radiation. Tests were conducted as part of a program to improve navigation of the Armys marine fleet, particularly beach discharge lighters. A standard Starlight scope was mounted on a standard pelorus ring and dropped over the gyrocompass in the pilot room of a ship operating at night in Chesa peake Bay. In one test, the Starlight scope was able to pick up light from a lighthouse which waa well below the horizon and enabled the pilot to keep on iourse. This was much beyond the coverage of the ships radar. In a second test, at more than twice the distance, it also picked up light from a lighthouse. Identification was possible from the coded flashee. The pelorus contributed bearing readings for direct helmsman use and also a second reading for triangulation. Although not tested in this reepect, tbe Starlight scope ie a tool that offers possibilities in nighttime sea rescues. A flashlight is part of the November 1968 strthdard equipment for lifeboata, and, in the event of a shipwreck, the light could be flashed skyward in SOS coded signals. Shipa equipped with the Star light scope, even though great dis tances away, would be able to pick up the light and, therehy, be guided directly to the lifeboat.US Army release.

HelicopterNiglr.Speed

lifting

System

A new high-speed system for lifting troops from jungles and swamps to hovering helicopters has been demon strated in Massachusetts at the Army

- = = . =
z
US Amu

A CE-47 Chinook helicopter Sifts a man

zbozrd with a new high-speed system liftin k

Natick Laboratories. In the demon stration, cargo, litters, and personnel were lifted and lowered from a CH-.47 Chinook helicopter 100 feet above the ground. Twenty infantrymen can be hauled aboard in four minutes versus up to 40 minutes for the same number to climb the presently used !t%oopem Ladder.-Newa release.
101

MILITARY NOTES C-5A Galaxy Air-Orop System Air-Transportable Trailer Workshop

A contract to engineer and develop the largest air-drop energy transfer mechanism ever built for use aboard the C-5A GalaxV transport has been awarded by the Army. Tbe system will he used to pull 25-ton loads from the aircraft for parachute air drop. The concept calls for a coupling mechanism which will sustain 75,000 pound loads (maximum of 50,000 pounds multiplied by 1.5-G force) to pull the load along the cargo bay and clear of the aft ramp under the force of extraction parachutes. When the load is clear, the coupling must re spond to only a 100-pound-force actua tion to deploy the eight 100-foot-diam eter drop parachute cluster by remov ing its packing shroud. Utilizing new low-friction bearing technology, the mechanism also will embody manual and automatic con trols to release the extraction para chutes in case of cargo jamming. News release.
Nike Hercules Sites to Be Closed Nike Hercules firing Twenty-three

An air-transportable aluminum trailer workshop for aircraft repair in the field will soon be placed in serv ice by the Marine Corps. The airborne armament mainte nance trailer is a four-wheel flatbed, 12 feet 10 inches long and six feet

R.u.o[da M,t&

CmIm,W

wide. The trailer can be air trans ported to forward SATS (Short Air field for Tactical Support) fields. From these fields, it can be towed by most Marine vehicles over rough terrain to areas where it is needed.News re. lease. 900 UH-lHHueys Ordered The Army recently awarded a crm tract for an additional 900 UH-IH Huey helicopters. The latest order calls for delivery of the helicopter in 1970. The UH-lH is an improved vereion of the UH-1 D helicopter.News item.
Iroquois Ordered Twin-Engine A twin-engine version of the UIf-1

sites and seven headquarters installa tions will be closed. In addition, two double battery sites will be reduced to a single battery each. After careful study, these sites, in 12 states, were found to contribute least to the effectiveness of the defense of the continental United States. It was originally planned to close some of these sites by the summer of 1970. The closing was speeded to help meet the Defense Departments share of the limitations imposed by the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968. It is expected that 18.8 million dollars will be saved by tbew closings in Fis cal Year 1969 and 54 million dollars in each succeeding year.DOD release.
102

Iroquois helicopter bas been ordered by the Air Force. The twin-engine hel icopter, designated UH-IN, will be a configuration of the VH-lH model which is being produced for the Army. Seventy-six UH-lN helicopters have been ordered; deliveries will begin in November 1969.News release. Military Re!iew

MILITARY Promotions to Grade? E-8 and E-9

NOTES

requisite for promotion, and will inThe Army will centralize promotions sure that the best qualified noncom of noncommissioned officers to grades missioned officers are advanced to E-8 and E-9 in 1969. Tbe new pro. grades E-8 and E-9. cedure will roughly parallel the eysThe new syetem will insure that terncurrently used to promote officers the individual is considered for Armyto field grades, and will insure an wide vacancies in the grades of E-8 equitable and uniform procedure for and E-9 rather than for the limited promotion to E-8 and E-9 on an Armyones occurring under the old eystem wide baeis. The system will eliminate the re- , of local promoting authority. Each soldier will be competing with others quirement for a position vacancy to in the same skills and knowledge. exist in the noncommissioned officers US Army release. current unit of assignment, as a preAluminum Unhreraal Enginaer Tractors

Reu.olda Metda ConaPamI

Two Universal Engineer Tractors ( UETS) undergo service test at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The aluminum combat construction machine, weighing 31,500 pounds,eerves as a bulldozer, grader, scraper, dump truck, and cargo and troop carrier. Air droppable and amphibious, the vehicle ii 20 feet long and nine feet wide. On land, the UET can move along at 30 miles an hour under the power of its 285-horsepower diesel engine. The single engine also provides power for the other operations of the vehicle.News release.
November196S 1

10s

MILITARY NOTES

FkebeeNAchieves Supersonic Speed The advanced F%-ebee II jet aerial target reached a speed in excess of 695 knots in its first supersonic flight recently. Air launched at an altitude of 14,000 feet, the I%ebee IT climbed to a 36, 000-foot altitude, leveled off, and was flown supersonically until parachute recovery was commanded. A Navy hel icopter retrieved the target and re turned it to base. The new jet target made its first flight in January when it was flown

Bushmaster Autematic Cannon Development of a new automatic cannon, nicknamed Bushmaster, to be employed on a new family of Army combat vehicles, has been announced by the US Army Weapons Command. This new weapon will be the successor to some caliber .50 machheguns and the M139 20-millimeter gun. It is anticipated that initial con tracts will be awarded in early 1969, and production is scheduled for the mid-1970s. The Bushmaster system will include the new automatic cannon, ammuni tion, and feed system. It is expected that the new weapon will be 20 milli meters or larger. The new system will permit the gunner to select the type of ammunition which will be the most eftective against the target being en gaged. The ammunition will have in creased range and lethality. In addition to its use on the Armys new family of combat vehicles, the Bushmaster may also be used by other services.US Army release.

Rotor Blade PropellerReseareb

Rum A.rmm.timd Firebee 11 Comp.nv

aerial rocket

speeds up to 478 knots. Flight testing of the highly sophis ticated aerial target is scheduled for completion in December. FVrebee II is designed to iiy at a maximum speed of Mach 1.5 (868 knots). It can perform target mis sions at altitudes of 50 feet to 60,000 feet. The advanced target is currently scheduled to he phased into fleet op erations in 1970 for use as a target for fleet surface an .Iir units.News release.
at subsonic le4

A contract to investigate rotor blade propellers for advanced vertical and short takeoff and landing aircraft has been awarded to a US manufacturer by the Army and the National Aero nautics and Space Administration (NASA). The project is part of a cooperative research program being conducted by NASA and the French National Office of Aerospace Research. Scale model wind-tunnel testing, to be supported by the manufacturers representatives, will take place in France and the United States. The objeet is to deter mine perf orrnance of rotor blade pro peller in speeds ranging from zero to 520 miles an hour.News release.

MILITARYNOTES
Panama Canal

oceangoing chipsan average of about 40 a daypaesed throughthe Panama Canal during Fis cal Year 1968, a. lo-percent jump over Fiscal Year 1967 and a record high in canal traffic. For the first time, the canal handled more than 100 million tons of cargo in a eingle year wh]ch
Some 14,800

amounts to 105 million long tons. Much of the sharp traffic rise W8S due to movements to and from Asia, including the Vietnam area. Cloeing of the Suez Canal was responsible for some rerouting of Aeia-hound traffic through the Panama Canal.-State Department release.

Heavylift Helicopter

A heavy lift helicopter (HLH) capable of transporting 20 tO 30-tOn pay loads is one of eeveral advanced helicopter configurations being developed by a US manufacturer. The three-engine, tandem-rotor HLH would be able to cruise at 130 knots with an external payload and meet all current operational requirements of the US military services. These requirements include aircraft recovery, offehore unloadlng, transport of medical units, command poets, en gineering and communications equipment, and eupplies. Maximum gross weights of the manufacturere HLH designs range from 72,500 to 117,000 pounds. By comparison, the ~aximum design gross weight of todays largest heavy lift helicopter, the CH-.47C f%rzook, is 45,700 pounds. News release. Nwmrbor 1S89
105

MILITARYNOTES AUSTRALIA New WeaponSight

A revolutionary system of sighting direct-fire weapons, known as the Auxarmes-Chivem Universal DayNight weapon sight, has been devel oped in Australia. The system is undergoing military field trials, and unofficial reports indi cate good performance, especially in hitting targets under adverse light conditions. Results are said to be seven times better than by other systems; the sight provides speed and accuracy of fire even by untrained recruits. News release.

FRANCE New Structureof Army Divisions

The structure of the current French Army division is to undergo a change. The new division will have a strength of 14,000 men compared to 20,000 in the current structure. The French field forces will be corn. posed of 15 identical mechanized bri gades organized in five divisions of three brigades each. Each brigade will include: e One mechanized regiment of two armored squadrons equipped with AMX19 90-millimeter gun light tanks and two battalions of mechanized in fantry. e One medium armored regiment of three squadrons equipped with AMX90 tanks and one squadron of mechanized infantry. e One regiment of self-propelled, 155-millimeter guns. @ Headquarters and support unite. In addition to the three brigades, each division will include: e One air defense regiment with twin, 30-millimeter automatic guns and Rollanrt missiles. o One mechanized combat engineer regiment. e One signal regiment. e One light aircraft unit. Later, Pluton missiles with nuclear warheads and a range of about 70 miles will be added to each division. e Logistic and maintenance units. The five 1970 divisions will be or ganized in two corps. Activation of the new division is scheduled prior to the end of 1969. However, owing to delays in the production of new arma ments and equipment, one brigade in each division will he equipped with wheeled vehicles for a few yeare. Revue Militaire Ginirate. military Revi!W

BRAZIL New Aircraft

The prototype of a new two-engine aircraft, called Bandeirante, designed and built in Brazil, will be tested this year. The aircrafts main feature is its versatility. The Bandeirante, a turboprop, can be used to carry passenger and cargo and for training, aerial photography,

Re.ista

Awondutic.

Bandeironte

aircraft

and medical evacuation. It will have a range of 1,000 miles, a speed of about 225 knots, and will he capable of oP erating with a variety of aviation fuel. The aircraft will % able to operate from semiprepared fields.-News item.

106

MILITARY

NOTES

DENMARK?

Swedish DrakenFightersOrdered

SwsiWsh Air Force J-35 Draksn

The Royal Dani&h Air Force will procure23 J-s5XD Draken fighter aircraft under a contract signed between the Danieh Ministry of Defense and the Swedish manufacturer. The aircraft, delivery of which will start in 1970, are to supplement the DaniehAir Forces F-IO@ Super Subre fighterbombers. Denmark also considered French and United States offere before selecting the J-.95XD. Denmark has an option to buy an
Shipbuilding Industry

additional 23 Druken aircraft to re place RF-84F photoreconnaissance air craft. A decieion on this purchase is expected in late 1968. Of the aircraft now purchaeed, 20 are eingle-seat fighter bombere, and three are two-seat trainers. The Swedieh Air Force has ordered more than 500 Drrzken aircraft of various configuration. Service life of the Dnzken is eetimated at abou 15 f years.Armed Forces Management.

JAPAN

The Japanese shipbuilding industry hae led the world in the tonnage of ships Iauncbed for the past 12 years. In 1967, Japan launched 7,497,000 grosstons, or 48 percent of thez.worlds total, followed by Sweden, the United Kingdom,West Germany, France, and Norway. Thereare more than 1,000 shipyards in Japan, of which 27 are major ones ownedand operated by 14 shipbuilders.
Mwshw 1336

The 14 leaders account for 90 percent of the natione chip completions. At the beginning of 1968, Japan had a two-year backlog. As a result of a new welding method that serves to cut a ships weight and construction time, a 200,000-deadweight-ton tanker, for example, can be co~pleted in a period of two or three months in a building dock. Japan Report.

la7

MILITARY

. , =---- .- : , .. . ... ...

-e . .

BOOKS

TOTALITARIAN RULE. its Nature and Char acteristics. By Hans Buchheim. Translated From the German by Ruth Hein. With Annota tions by Kurt P. Tauber and the Translator. 112 Pages. Wesleyan University Press, Mid. dletown, Cmsn., 1968.$4.50.

WESTMORELANO: The inevitable General. By Ernest B. Furgurson. 342 Pages. little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., and Toronto, Can., 1966.$6.95.
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LTC JACKG. CALLAWAY, USA

BY MAJ HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., USA In terms especially relevant to the Marcusian new left movement so popu@ with todays students, Dr. Buch helm has written a useful primer on totalitarianism. , Stripping away the camouflage of $olemics which surrounds fascism and communism, he finds their inner reali ties similar. The insidious formulas devised to insure the support of the uncommitted masses are laid bare. Dr. Buchheim laye most of the blame for the rise of totalitarianiem, which he isolates as a more dangerous 20th century variant of authoritarianism, on the sociotechnological society of the 19th and 20th centuries with their idealistic, scientific formulas to ex plain every aspect of human life. This scientific truth is the hallmark of the totalitarian who must impose this immutable truth on others through control of every aspect of human life. The end is not the authoritarian goal of absolute rule, but that of creating a new superior man and a new society. The author believes that man is not as malleable as the totalitarians be lieve, and that by going against the grain of human nature, totalitarianism carries within it tit- seeds of its own ultimate destruction.
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A Biography of any man in mid. career is a quicksilverish thing. When he is a general in midwar, the problem is compounded. This biography was undertaken without the initiative or encouragement on the part of General William C. Weetmoreland. It is not a ghostwritten autobiography, and it is not an authorized biography. Mr. Furgurson is White House cor respondent for the Baltimore Sun and has been on several reportorial assign ments in South Vietnam. It does not purport to be the ineide story of his [ Westmorelands] leader ship in Vietnam, but rather is a re porters account of where he came from, how he got there, what equip. m ent he acquired along the way, and how it has applied to the unprece dented task he faced on arrival in
is not a definitive work. It lists but does not discuss the major deci sions that have been made or signifi cantly influenced by General West moreland. The narrative does, how ever, contain enough detail to reveal the major leadership characteristics, and the industrious, energetic will to succeed, excel, and contribute that are hallmarks of the US Armys Chief of Staff, and it does provide an ineight into how he thinks and works. Military Review Saigon. This

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I MILITARY BOOKS

THE REFERENCE NANDBOOK OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WORLO. Second Edition.

Edtiedby Robert C. Sellers. 215 Pages. RobertC. Sellers& Associates, Garden City, N. Y.,1968.$14.95.
A handy reference on the armed forces in more than 118 countries. In cludedis information on defenee budg ets, strength figure:, equipment in each service, military assistance, and defense agreements
HE6R0

BA@BARY OENERAL: The life of William H. Eaton. By Samual Edwards. 277 Pages.Pren tires-Hall,Inc., Englawood Cliffs, N.J., 1968.
$6.95.

BY MAJ DENNISS. FARLEY, USA This is a biography of one of Amer icas early and forgotten heroes who distinguished himself while serving in the Barbary nations of North Af rica during the late 1700s and early 1800e. Written by the author of such books as, The Naked Maja, and 55 DaIIs to Peking, Barbarg General pro vides the reader with an interesting look into the life of the man who many have termed as America]e Lawrence of Arabia. This book is recommended for mil itary readers with an interest in American history between the Revolu tionary War and the War of 1812. THE VAA6S0 RAIO: The Commando Attack That Changed the Course of World War Il. ,By Joseph N. Oevhrs, Jr. 222 Pages. Chilton Co.,Philadelphia,Pa.,New York, and London, Eng., 1967.$4.50. BY ROBINHIGHAM The Vaageo Raid was one of those minor actions during World Wdr II which helped change the course of history. An attack by a small forc~ upon the Germane in Norway, it had international political repercussions which convinced the Norwegians and the Britieh that such pinpricks caueed more harm than good. The author has assiduously inter viewed or contacted many of the sur vivors and has pieced together an exciting story of a minor action in all ita d~t+ls. Whether such amphibious operations will ever again take place is a matter of epeculation.

TROOPSOF ANTEBEUUMLOUISIANA. A Historyof tire Battalionof Free Men of

Color. BY Roland C. McConnell. 143 Pages. Louisiana State University Press, Baton ,. Rouge,La,,1968.$5.00. BY MAJ JAhiEe E. 3XNHWMOND, USA This scholarly and extensively doc umentedvolume covers the history of Louisianaefiret Negro unit which had its historical precedents in the com panies initially organized under the French during the Indian rebellion of 1729and which later fought under the Spanish. During the first decade following the US acquisition of the Louieiana Territory, the continued existence of this unit was the subject of political controversy. In 1812, at the insistence of Governor William C. Claiborne, the unit was officially created by the Lou isiana Legislature ae the Battalion of Free Men of Color. In 1814, this volunteer militia bat talion was enrolled into Federal serv icealong with a second, like battalion by General Andrew Jackson at the Battle of New Orleane. Their service was exemplary; both battalions occu pied key positions in the frontline of defense where they fought like des peradoes and deserved distinguished praisej
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MILITARY

BOOKS

YEAR OF THE HORSEVIETNAM. Ist Air Cavalry in the Highlands. By lieutenant Colonel Kenneth D. Mertel, United States Army. 380 Pages. Exposition Press, Inc., New York, 1968.$10.00.

BY MAJ JOHN W. CRANCER, USA

This is the odyssey of the 1st Bat talion Airborne, 8th Cavalry. Ger minating from the concept of air mobile warfare, the unit was formed, equipped, trained, and sent to Vietnam

in less than two and a half months. This period of preparation and the battalions first nine months in Viet nam are related by its commander. Many fascinating details about the employment of airmobile units are presented. The reader gains insight into the introduction of US troop units into Vietnam while they try to build a secure, livable base and, at the same time, find and dest~.oy the elusive Viet Cong. The mobile opera tions of this battalion and their pace and frequency give the reader an ex cellent feel forthe type warfare being conducted in Vietnams Central High lands.
NEGOTIATING WITH THE CHINESE COM MUNISTS: The United Ststes Experience, 1953-1967. By Kenneth T. Young. 461 Pages. Mcfiraw-HiN Booir Co., New York, Toronto, London, and Sydney, Aus., 1968.$10.95. BY MAJ RICHARD O. BoesGsTaoM, USA

appraisal of the future which such meetings might bring. Even though the actual substance of the meetings is classified, the author has compiledan amazing array of detail from unclassified sources. Substantive data on issues over Tai. wan, the repatriation of Americans held in Chinese prisons, and nuclear disarmament and Vietnam, to name but a few, are covered in this highly interesting and informative work. Many will bedisappointed with the story of the ambassadorial talks be cause of their meager direct results yet they may play a more critical role in our future.
INTEGRATION OF THE NEGRO IN THE U.S. ARMEO FORCES. By Richard J. Stillman N. 167 Pages. Frederick. Praeger, krc.,New

York, Washington, and London, Eng.,1988,

$10.00.
BY MAJ RONALD B. STEVENS, USA As the son of a US Army colonel, the author has lived at numerous military bases in the United States and in Europe and has observed tirst hand the integration of the Negro in the US Armed Forces. The book begins with a considera tion of the political influences affect ing integration of the Armed Forces and how these influences became mili tary policy onthe use of the Negro in theeervices. Their successes and fail ures as both service and combat troops are discussed. Of particular interest are the personal evaluations of Negro soldiers by senior commanders of segregated and integrated units. The gradual movement from segre gation to integration from 1940 through 1953 and the influencing fsc tors are presented in some detail. Not overlooked is the problem of segrega tion just outside the post gate.
Military Review

United States Only Free World Government Able to Immediately Begin Negotiations With Red China. An impossible headline? No. Since August 1955, Ambassadors of the United States and Communist China have held more than 130 secret meet ings at Geneva and Warsaw which have come to be known as the Am bassadorial Talk,. Mr. Youngs book is the story of these talks and his
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MILITARY BOOKS TKE ESSENCE OF SECURITY.Reflections in BY Robert S. McNamara. 176 Paces. ,- Office.
, Harper i Row, Inc.,New York, Evanston,;nd London, Eng., 1968.$4.95. BYMAJ THOMAS J. KERVER, USA

Subtitled Reflections in Office: this volumetouchee on what Mr. McNa mara believes were the most impor tant decisione he had to face. He cov ers the spectrum of what he calls the principles and philosophy by which I have directed the activities of the Defense Establishment. Those expecting to find qccounts of in-fightingwhich preceded I controver sial decision will be disappointed, for they do not appear here. Instead, the authorassesses the value of programs for which he was responsible, and at tempts to defend them. Of particular interest is Mr. Mc Namarasevaluation of the Soviet and Chinese threats. Concerning Europe andthe Soviet threat, he contends that an increasing strategic mobility capa bility. coupled with the growing strength- of other North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations make it necessary for the United States to maintainin Europe only those forces for which there is a clear military re quirement. He maintains that China is cautious to avoid any action that might end in a nuclear clash with the UnitedStates, however wild her words. . . .,, Not surprisingly, Mr. McNamara views the present US defense posture as basically sound and arguee that US security can best he preserved by: . Aid~ng developing nations which are willing to help themselves. . Enckmraging more activity by countries capable of sharing interna tional peacekeeping responsibilities. Mak]ng a concerted effort to reNawmbw lge8

ducp the risk of conflict with nations such as the USSR and China. In spite of its brevity, the book goes beyond a discussion of US de fense policies and presents arguments for such varied causes as a better edu. cational system in Europe, the need for open housing, the responsibilities of the Defense Department to educate servicemen, and the importance of pre paring noncareer military- personnel for a productive life as civilians after diecharge. THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. American Society of International Law. EdNedby Richard A. Falk. B33 Pages. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N~J., 1968.$15.00. BY COL THOMASH. REESE,USA This is an unusual collection of published articles, background essays, and timely legal appraisals of the current world order. It is distin guished by the high quality of its writing, the prominence of its con tributors, and the magnitude of its discussion of the American presence in Vietnam. In this book, reasonable men pos sessing professional competence give serious and balanced consideration to the legal issues arising out of [the US involvement in Vietnam to arrive at contrary conclusions. Most of the! disagreement converge on one under lying question: Is it legally justifiable to treat the Vietnam war aa a civil war or as a peculiar modern species of international war? Presented are articles and essays by contributors such as Walt W. Rostow, Quincy Wright, John Norton Moore, Dean Rusk, and U Thant in three cate gories which are entitled: A Frame work for Legal Inquiry, Legal Per spectives, and World Perspectives.

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MILITARY BOOKS THE SPANISN ARMADA. By Michael Lewis. 216 Pages. Thomas Y. CroweN Co- New York, 1900. Published in the United States 1968.$6.95. BY LTC FSANCISA. IANNI, USA The author, for years a Professor of History at the Royal Naval College in England, presente a thorough analysis of the defeat of the Spanish Fleet in 1588. Personalities, equip ment, training, and doctrine of the two contending forces are examined and combined in a scholarly fashion to show their impact on the battles eventual outcome. SUERILLAS: A History and Analysis from Napoleons Time to the 1960s. By Arthur CampbaN. 344 Pages. Tha John Oay Co., Inc., New York, 1967. $B.95. BY LTC JAMESM. NEIL, USA Arthur Campbell, a lieutenant colo nel in the British Army, gained first hand experience with guerrilla war fare in Burma, Malaya, and Cyprns. This book traces guerrilla warfare from its use against Napoleon Bonaparte in Spain, from 1807 to 1813, to its use in Algeria through 1961. The author covers many guerrilla actions during the period and devotes separate sectione to the most significant. The concluding chapters summa rize successful revolution and counter revolution. They outline key points from the guerrilla campaigns of the 19th and 20th centuriee and provide recommended approaches for both the revolutionary and the defending na tionThis work is especially valuable for the individual with a small library who wants, in one volume, a brief history of significant guerrilla actions and a well-presented summary of tech niques for both revolution and counter revolution.
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CNURCNILL ANO THE MONTGOMERY MYTH. By R. w. Thompson. 276 PageS. M. Evans& Co., Inc., New York, 1967.$5,95. BY COL TIMOTHY F. CLIFFOSU, USAR Thla case history of the Montgom. ery Myth analyzes how Prime Min. ister Winston S. ChurWill developed the legend of Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery. To satisfy Britains need of a conquering hero in the dark days of August 1942, the author claims the Prime Minister deliberately ma. nipulated public relations and devel oped an image of Monty as an in vincible hero. The author tells how leaders were shutlled and, partly by accident, Mont gomery was chosen to become Brit aina champion. General officers mem. oirs and oslicial records are cited to show the substantial performance of General Claude Auchinleck, the prior leader opposing Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. From the same sources, Montgomerys less impressive record, although based on enormously in creased British strength, is compiled for comparison. The result is a judg ment of Montgomery not found in standard reference books. A century ago, Thomas Carlyle wrote that a hero is the fortunate co incidence of the right man at the right moment. Thompson would have the reader believe that Monty the Hero is a coincidence of the wrong man and deliberate manipulation of public & lations. The book ends ae Montgomery lCSVW the Sth ArmY to accept command of British forces for Operation Over. tord. World War H buffs will find this a zarefully documented account, com pletely at odds with most prior WIN ing and with public opinion.
MiliirY R8*