The Bryant Advantage CCNP ROUTE Study Guide

Chris Bryant, CCIE #12933 www.thebryantadvantage.com

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The Remote Workplace, Part I: VPNs And IPSec

Overview
VPN Terminology Data Encryption Technologies Key Encryption Schemes The IPSec Architecture Configuring Site-to-Site VPNs Creating An IKE Policy Configuring Transform Sets Crypto ACLs Configuring Site-to-Site VPNs with SDM Dead Peer Detection GRE Over IPSec Tunnels Configuring GRE Over IPSec Tunnels with SDM Easy VPN Server and Client Configuring Easy VPN Server In SDM Configuring Easy VPN Client

In a previous section, we discussed different methods of allowing mobile users and remote offices communicate with a central location ("HQ"). These days, it's not enough to have communication - we need secure communication. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are a great way to secure these transmissions.

It's the "private" part of VPNs that brings us that security. Configuring VPNs gives us the opportunity to apply security to a connection that is using a shared technology such as Frame Relay - in other words, to treat this connection as though it were on a private network. What's A VPN? VPNs are often referred to as tunnels. We can apply security rules and policies to this tunnel without applying them to other WAN communications. For example, when we configure commands directly on the Serial0 interface, all communications using that interface are subject to those commands. When we create a VPN, it's actually seen as a separate interface - you'll see this when we configure one - and we can apply rules to the VPN that are not applied to other communications using Serial0. In the following exhibit, a VPN has been created between two routers. Security policies can be enforced on the VPN between those two routers without affecting any WAN communications involving the bottom router.

There are some VPN terms that are sometimes used interchangeably, but they don't refer to the same feature. Let's take a close look at these terms. VPNs offer three vital functions. Note that two of these occur at the receiver, and one at the sender. Data origin authentication allows the receiver to guarantee the source of the packet.

Encryption is just that - the sender encrypts the packets before sending them. If an intruder picks them off the wire, they will have no meaning.

Integrity is the receiver's ability to ensure that the data was not affected or altered in any fashion as it traveled across the VPN.

There are three different protocols we can use to create this tunnel. Originally defined in RFC 1701, Generic Routing Encapsulation enables a Cisco router to encapsulate a packet in an IP header. When the packet reaches the remote router, the header is stripped off. GRE's drawback is that there's no encryption scheme, and that's a pretty big drawback. Defined in RFC 2661, The Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) is actually a hybrid of Microsoft's Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) and Cisco's own Layer 2 Forwarding (L2F). Again, the major drawback is that L2TP doesn't have an encryption scheme either.

This giant flaw is corrected by IP Security, generally referred to as IPSec. IPSec does offer encryption along with authentication, and that's why you'll see more IPSec in today's networks than L2TP or GRE. That's also why we're going to spend the majority of this section working with IPSec. VPN Terminology Before we get to a more specific discussion of VPNs, there are some general terms you should know. We'll review the terms from the beginning of this section as well. Data Confidentiality means that only the devices that should see the data in an unencrypted form will see the data that way. Generally, this is achieved by one endpoint encrypting the data and sending it across the link in that fashion, with the second endpoint unencrypting the data. Data Integrity means that the recipient of the data can guarantee that the received data is the same as the transmitted data - in short, that the data was not altered during transport. Data Origin Authentication guarantees that the data originated from a specific endpoint. Anti-replay protection (sometimes just called "replay protection") protects against replay attacks, a malicious repeat and/or delay of a valid transmission. Replay attacks can begin innocently enough. In this example, Router C requests proof of identity from Router A. Router A responds with proof of identity.

The problem is, an Intruder is listening to the conversation and copies Router A's proof of identity.

After A and C are done with their conversation, the Intruder starts a

conversation with C, pretending to be A. When C asks for proof of identity, the Intruder submits A's ID, and C will accept it.

Anti-replay protection can use several different methods of defeating such an attack, including the one-time use of tokens for the proof of identity or by using sequence numbers; a repeated sequence number will be rejected. Data Encryption Technologies For data to be encrypted, it follows that something's got to perform this encryption! One such encryption tool is the Data Encryption Standard (DES). DES was developed in 1976, and a few problems have developed with DES since then. The main issue is that the key used by DES to encrypt data is only 56 bits in size. (A key is a random string of binary digits.) Thirty years ago, that was fine, but then again floppy disks used to be the largest storage unit any of us needed! Depending on which documentation you read, DES keys can be broken in any time frame from 24 hours to ten minutes. Triple DES (3DES) is just what it sounds like - the DES encryption procedure is run three times, with three different 56-bit DES keys. That's a total of 168 bits, but the effective security provided is considered to be only 112 bits. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is being rapidly adopted by governments and organizations around the world. AES can run on any Cisco router that has IPSec DES/3DES capability. The actual function of AES is far beyond the scope of this exam, but it really is quite fascinating. To me, anyway. If you'd like to take a peek at how it works .... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard Key Encryption Schemes Symmetric encryption is an algorithm where the key that is used for encryption is also used for decryption. Symmetric encryption is sometimes called secret key encryption. Variations of symmetric encryption include stream algorithms, where one bit or byte is encrypted/decrypted at a time, and block algorithms, where blocks of data are encrypted/decrypted as a whole. These data blocks are usually 64 bits in size. Both DES and 3DES use symmetric encryption.

The drawback to symmetric encryption is that the key is used for two purposes, making it that much easier for an intruder to discover the key. In contrast, asymmetric encryption involves two keys for both the sender and receiver. This public key encryption scheme involves a public and private key for each user. Before starting the actual encryption process, the public key should be certified by a third party called a Certificate Authority (CA). If "Dan" has a public key, the CA will make sure Dan is who he says he is, and the CA will then issue a digital certificate saying just that. The digital certificate is a combination of Dan's public key and the CA's private root key. The CA may be global, such as www.verisign.com, or it may be a CA in your very own organization. The key here (no pun intended) is that you better trust your CA, because the entire public key encryption process is built around the CA verifying users and their public keys.

Now that the CA has verified Dan and Bob, public key encryption can be put into use. In this example, Dan will send an email to Bob using PKE. Dan will actually use Bob's public key to encrypt the message. The email is then sent to Bob, who will use his private key to de-encrypt the email. Exchanging Secret Keys Over A Non-Secure Connection It seems like quite a Catch-22; to create the VPN, we need the endpoints to exchange secret keys, but since the VPN doesn't exist yet, the secret keys must be exchanged over a non-secure connection! The DiffieHellman algorithm allows the exchange of secret keys over a non-secure communications channel. Referred to in some documentation as exponential key agreement, this protocol was also designed in 1976 - but it's still in use today in networks around the world. The IPSec Architecture IPSec is a combination of three following protocols:

Authentication Header (AH), which authentication and securing data

defines

method

for

Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), which defines a method for authenticating, securing, and encrypting data Internet Key Exchange (IKE), which negotiates the security parameters and authentication keys The IPSec Packet Format

Defined in RFC 2402, Authentication Header (AH) offers solid security -- it provides data origin authentication as well as offering optional anti-replay protection. The drawback with AH is that the authentication it provides for the IP Header is not complete. That's because some of the IP fields can't be correctly predicted by the receiver - these are mutable fields which may change during transmission. AH will successfully protect the IP packet's payload, though, which is really what we're interested in. To sum it up, AH does offer: data origin authentication data integrity anti-replay protection (optional) AH does not offer data confidentiality. The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) does just that - as you can see from the IPSec packet illustration, there is an ESP Header and ESP Trailer surrounding, or encapsulating, the data. ESP offers all of the following: data origin authentication anti-replay protection data confidentiality Comparing AH and ESP, you might be wondering why you'd ever choose AH over ESP. Here are a few things to consider: ESP is more processor-intensive than AH. If your data does not require data confidentiality, AH may meet all your requirements. ESP requires strong cryptography, which isn't available and/or allowed everywhere. AH has no such requirement. Both ESP and AH can be run in one of two modes - Tunnel Mode and Transport Mode. In Tunnel mode, the entire IPSec process is

transparent to the end hosts; specialized IPSec gateway devices handle the IPSec workload. The tunnel mode process encrypts the entire IP packet, and then that encrypted packet is placed into another IP packet. That encapsulating packet will have the IP addresses configured on the tunnel endpoints, and it's those tunnel IP addresses that will be used to route the packet. Transport mode encrypts the IP payload, but the IPSec header is inserted directly after the IP header in the packet. As a result: There is no protection for the original IP address The original IP address will be used for routing Only data from the Transport layer up is protected by IPSec (easy enough to remember!) Configuring Site-to-Site IPSec VPNs Configuring a site-to-site VPN is basically a five-step process. Process Initialization via "interesting traffic" (as opposed to the usual, uninteresting kind, right?) IKE Phase 1 (IKE SA negotiation) IKE Phase 2 (IPSec SA negotiation) Data Transfer Tunnel Termination IPSec doesn't just start working by itself - it requires interesting traffic to be sent by a host. This interesting traffic initializes the IPSec process. A crypto access-list will define interesting traffic for our VPN. We'll configure one later in this section.

The routers will now enter IKE Phase I. Assuming we're running Main mode, there will be six messages overall. The initiator will first transmit proposals for the encryption and authentication schemes to be used. At this point, IKE's looking for an ISAKMP policy that's a match at both endpoints.

In the second exchange of IKE Phase I, the devices will exchange DiffieHellman public keys; from this point on, the rest of the negotiation is encrypted.

The initiator and recipient authenticate each other in the third exchange of Phase I, using an encrypted form of their IP addresses. The IKE SA is then established and Phase II can begin.

(If we had chosen to run IKE in Aggressive Mode, this would have been a three-message process. ) The initiator packets everything needed for the SA negotiation in the first message, including its Diffie-Hellman public key.

The recipient responds with the acceptable parameters and authentication information, and its Diffie-Hellman public key. The initiator then sends a confirmation that it received that information, and we're done!

IKE Phase 2 has one mode, Quick mode. This is also a three-message process. The initiator proposes parameters for the IPSec SA, the recipient responds with a list of acceptable parameters, and the initiator then transmits a message that lets the responder know that message 2 was received and processed. This message is called proof of liveness.

With the IPSec SA in place, the hosts can now exchange data.

Once the data exchange is complete, the tunnel can be torn down. This tunnel termination can be configured to occur after a certain number of bytes have passed through the tunnel, or perhaps after the tunnel have been up for a certain number of seconds. But what if traffic is flowing through the tunnel at the same time the tunnel's supposed to be torn down? No fear - a new Security Association can be agreed upon while the existing one is still in place. Creating An IKE Policy Before configuring the IKE policy, make sure ISAKMP is enabled with the crypto isakmp enable command. It's supposed to be on by default, but we all know how that is!
R1(config)#crypto isakmp enable

To display the current IKE policies, run show crypto isakmp policy.
R1#show crypto isakmp policy Global IKE policy Default protection suite encryption algorithm: DES - Data Encryption Standard (56 bit keys). hash algorithm: Secure Hash Standard authentication method: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Signature Diffie-Hellman group: #1 (768 bit) lifetime: 86400 seconds, no volume limit

We're not going to use the default, however. We'll create a custom policy with the crypto isakmp policy command. Policies can be assigned priorities, as shown below by IOS Help. The lower the number, the higher the priority, with 1 being the highest priority. There is no default.
R1(config)#crypto isakmp policy ? <1-10000> Priority of protection suite R1(config)#crypto isakmp policy 100

IOS Help shows the options for the IKE policy.

The options for authentication are preshared keys, RSA Signature, and RSA Encryption. The default is RSA Signature. We'll configure the policy to use preshared keys.
R1(config-isakmp)#authentication ? pre-share Pre-Shared Key rsa-encr Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Encryption rsa-sig Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Signature R1(config-isakmp)#authentication pre-share

The options for encryption are DES, AES, and 3DES (TDES). The default is DES. We'll use 3DES.
R1(config-isakmp)#encryption ? 3des Three key triple DES aes AES - Advanced Encryption Standard. des DES - Data Encryption Standard (56 bit keys). R1(config-isakmp)#encryption 3des

We do have options for the Diffie-Hellman group, so we'll use group 5. The default is group 1.
R1(config-isakmp)#group ? 1 Diffie-Hellman group 1 2 Diffie-Hellman group 2 5 Diffie-Hellman group 5 R1(config-isakmp)#group

The hash algorithm will be either MD5 or SHA. The default is SHA, so we'll set the policy to MD5.
R1(config-isakmp)#hash ? md5 Message Digest 5 sha Secure Hash Standard R1(config-isakmp)#hash md5

Finally, we need to set the SA lifetime. The default is the maximum number of seconds, 86,400, which equals 24 hours. We'll set that to 42,400 seconds.
R1(config-isakmp)#lifetime ? <60-86400> lifetime in seconds R1(config-isakmp)#lifetime 42400

show crypto isakmp policy displays both policies on the router - the default and the one we just wrote.

The exact same policy has been configured on R3. R1 and R3 are on the same Serial segment, 172.12.12.0 /24, with their router number as the last octet.
R3(config)#crypto isakmp policy 100 R3(config-isakmp)#hash md5 R3(config-isakmp)#lifetime 42400 R3(config-isakmp)#group 5 R3(config-isakmp)#authentication pre-share R3(config-isakmp)#encryption 3des

When IKE Phase 1 negotiation begins, the initiator sends its policies to the receiver. The receiver will then attempt to find a match for that policy among its own policies, and the receiver starts this search with its lowest numbered policy. If that policy doesn't match, the receiver checks its next lowest numbered policy. It's vital to remember that just because the first policy comparison doesn't result in a match, the recipient will continue to search for a match. In the following example, R2 checks its own policies for a match with the policy sent by the initiator, R1. R2 begins with its lowest-numbered policy, 100. That policy requires SHA and the incoming policy names MD5, so there's no match. R2 then checks its Policy 200, which requires DES, and that does not match the incoming policy. Policy 300 matches all the requirements, so the negotiation is successful.

You'd think that all five values would have to match for the negotiation to be successful, but that's not quite true. Here's a list of the parameters

and what has to happen for successful negotiation. Hash: exact match Encryption: exact match Authentication: exact match DH Group number: exact match Lifetime: Remote peer policy must have lifetime equal to or less than initiator. If less, the lower value is used. Since our policies referred to preshared keys, we better create them! The crypto isakmp key command does this. Along with the key itself, the IP address of the remote peer must be configured. Watch the syntax with this command, as it differs between IOS versions. Not all versions have the 0 / 6 option you'll see below on R1. IOS Help shows that the options are slightly different between the IOS versions we're using. As a CCNP and world-class Cisco engineer, this is something you need to get used to. Trust me.

If Phase I is successful, an ISAKMP SA will be created. We can verify this with show crypto isakmp sa.
R3#show crypto isakmp sa dst src R3# state conn-id slot

As always, if the output of a show command shows nothing, there's nothing to show! The ISAKMP SA doesn't exist until the entire IPSec configuration is in place and interesting traffic has started the process. That's one frustrating thing about IPSec - there's a good deal of configuration, but you really can't test it until the entire thing is done.

Configuring The IPSec Transform Sets An IPSec Transform Set is simply a group of individual parameters that will enforce a security policy. The endpoints must agree exactly on which encryption and algorithms will be used to create the IPSec SA. If there's an exact match, the IPSec process continues; if there's no match, the process is terminated and the session torn down. As with ISAKMP policies, multiple transform sets can be configured and sent to a remote peer. The remote peer will compare each set received against its own transform sets, and when a match is found, the IPSec SA will be built. A transform set is built with the crypto ipsec transform-set command, as shown here on R3. Options are shown with IOS Help, and then the exact same transform set is configured on R1.

IPSec SA Lifetimes The default lifetime of an IPSec SA is 1 hour, but IOS Help reveals that the command that changes this value on a global basis sets the IPSec SA lifetime in seconds. Always use IOS Help to double-check the measuring unit in use by any given command. The below command sets this value to 30 minutes (1800 seconds). The SA lifetime can also be based on volume.

Crypto Access Lists Remember way back when I mentioned that interesting traffic triggers the IPSec process? We're finally getting to the part of IPSec that identifies this interesting traffic - crypto access lists. Crypto ACLs are used to define the traffic that is protected by IPSec.

While most of the Crypto ACLs you write will be configured to affect outbound traffic, they can also be configured to affect inbound traffic. Outbound crypto ACLs identify the traffic to be secured by IPSec, and traffic not named by the crypto ACL will be sent in clear text.

Inbound crypto ACLs can identify traffic that should have been protected by IPSec, but wasn't. Such traffic will be discarded.

Extended ACLs can serve as Crypto ACLs, but there's a major difference in operation between the two. With Extended ACLs, matched traffic is permitted and unmatched traffic denied (by the implicit deny). With Crypto ACLs, matched traffic is encrypted and unmatched traffic is unencrypted but still transmitted. If inbound Crypto ACLs are configured, unprotected traffic that matches the ACL is dropped - simply because it's unprotected. The trickiest part of writing Crypto ACLs for IPSec peers is making sure they're symmetrical rather than identical. Let's use the following network to show you what I mean.

To have traffic on R1's ethernet segment protected by IPSec if it's destined for the ethernet segment on R2, R1's ACL will look like this:
access-list 123 permit ip 172.10.1.0 0.0.0.255 172.10.5.0 0.0.0.255

For traffic on R2's ethernet segment to be protected by IPSec if it's destined for the ethernet segment on R1, R2's ACL will look like this:
access-list 123 permit ip 172.10.5.0 0.0.0.255 172.10.1.0 0.0.0.255

When you're configuring IPSec and concentrating on the many details we've discussed in this chapter, it's really easy to think "Hey, I'll just write the ACL on one router and then copy and paste it to the other." Always double-check your ACLs - if they're identical, there is a problem. We don't want the two ACLs to be an exact copy of each other - rather, we need them to be mirror images, exact reverses of each other. Once the Crypto ACLs are written, it's time to apply them to the appropriate interfaces. That's just one purpose of a Crypto Map. Let's look at the basic command to write a Crypto Map along with some options, courtesy of IOS Help.
R3(config)#crypto <1-65535> client isakmp isakmp-profile local-address map CCNP ? Sequence to insert into crypto map entry Specify client configuration settings Specify isakmp configuration settings Specify isakmp profile to use Interface to use for local address for this crypto map

R3(config)#crypto map CCNP 100 ? ipsec-isakmp IPSEC w/ISAKMP ipsec-manual IPSEC w/manual keying <cr> R3(config)#crypto map CCNP 100 ipsec-isakmp ? dynamic Enable dynamic crypto map support profile Enable crypto map as a crypto-profile <cr> R3(config)#crypto map CCNP 100 ipsec-isakmp R3(config-crypto-map)#

We've successfully created a crypto map named CCNP, sequence number 100, that will use ISAKMP to establish the IPSec Security Associations. We're now in crypto map configuration mode, where the ACL, peers, transform sets, and security association lifetime for this particular crypto map can be set. Any SA lifetime value configured here overrides the globally configured

value, but we'll leave that value alone for now.

R1(config)#crypto map CCNP 100 ipsec-isakmp % NOTE: This new crypto map will remain disabled until a peer and a valid access list have been configured. R1(config-crypto-map)#match address 123 R1(config-crypto-map)#set peer 172.12.123.2 R1(config-crypto-map)#set transform-set R1_TRANSFORM_SET

R1(config-crypto-map)#interface serial 0/1 R1(config-if)#crypto map CCNP R1(config-if)# *Apr 1 17:27:04.807: %CRYPTO-6-ISAKMP_ON_OFF: ISAKMP is ON

R3(config)#crypto map CCNP 100 ipsec-isakmp R3(config-crypto-map)#match address 123 R3(config-crypto-map)#set peer 172.12.12.1 R3(config-crypto-map)#set transform-set R3_TRANSFORM_SET R3(config-crypto-map)#set security-association lifetime ? kilobytes Volume-based key duration seconds Time-based key duration R3(config)#int s0/1 R3(config-if)#crypto map CCNP R3(config-if)# *Mar 1 04:10:12.260: %CRYPTO-6-ISAKMP_ON_OFF: ISAKMP is ON

Before sending interesting traffic to start the entire process, we'll enable debug crypto ipsec on R3 to allow us to see the details of the SA negotiations. Near the bottom of the debug output, you can see that two separate unidirectional SAs have been built.
R3#debug crypto ipsec Crypto IPSEC debugging is on R3#ping 172.12.12.1 Type escape sequence to abort. Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 172.12.12.1, timeout is 2 seconds: *Jun 6 23:51:14.999: IPSEC(sa_request): , (key eng. msg.) OUTBOUND local= 172.12.12.3, remote= 172.12.12.1, protocol= AH, transform= ah-md5-hmac (Tunnel), lifedur= 1800s and 4608000kb, spi= 0x91791CF(152539599), conn_id= 0, keysize= 0, flags= 0x400A. *Jun 6 23:51:17.579: IPSEC(validate_proposal_request): proposal part #1, (key eng. msg.) INBOUND local= 172.12.12.3, remote= 172.12.12.1, protocol= AH, transform= ah-md5-hmac (Tunnel), lifedur= 0s and 0kb, spi= 0x0(0), conn_id= 0, keysize= 0, flags= 0x2 *Jun 6 23:51:17.583: Crypto mapdb : proxy_match src addr : 172.12.12.3 dst addr : 172.12.12.1 protocol : 0 src port : 0 dst port : 0 *Jun 6 23:51:17.591: IPSEC(key_engine): got a queue event with 2 kei messages *Jun 6 23:51:17.591: IPSEC(initialize_sas): , (key eng. msg.) INBOUND local= 172.12.12.3, remote= 172.12.12.1, protocol= AH, transform= ah-md5-hmac (Tunnel), lifedur= 1800s and 4608000kb, spi= 0x91791CF(152539599).!!! Success rate is 60 percent (3/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 48/49/52 ms R2#, conn_id= 0, keysize= 0, flags= 0x2 *Jun 6 23:51:17.591: IPSEC(initialize_sas): ,

(key eng. msg.) OUTBOUND local= 172.12.12.3, remote= 172.12.12.1, protocol= AH, transform= ah-md5-hmac (Tunnel), lifedur= 1800s and 4608000kb, spi= 0x945FCBB6(2489306038), conn_id= 0, keysize= 0, flags= 0xA *Jun 6 23:51:17.595: Crypto mapdb : proxy_match src addr : 172.12.12.3 dst addr : 172.12.12.1 protocol : 0 src port : 0 dst port : 0 *Jun 6 23:51:17.595: IPSEC(crypto_ipsec_sa_find_ident_head): reconnecting with the same proxies and 172.12.12.1 *Jun 6 23:51:17.595: IPSec: Flow_switching Allocated flow for sibling 80000002 *Jun 6 23:51:17.595: IPSEC(policy_db_add_ident): src 172.12.12.3, dest 172.12. 12.1, dest_port 0 *Jun 6 23:51:17.599: IPSEC(create_sa): sa created, (sa) sa_dest= 172.12.12.3, sa_proto= 51, sa_sp i= 0x91791CF(152539599), sa_trans= ah-md5-hmac , sa_conn_id= 2001 *Jun 6 23:51:17.599: IPSEC(create_sa): sa created, (sa) sa_dest= 172.12.12.1, sa_proto= 51, sa_spi= 0x945FCBB6(2489306038), sa_trans= ah-md5-hmac , sa_conn_id= 2002

By running show crypto isakmp sa, we can see that the SA is in place and is active.
R2#show crypto isakmp sa dst src 172.12.123.1 172.12.123.2 state QM_IDLE conn-id 1 slot 0 status ACTIVE

QM_IDLE is what we do want to see; here are a few other potential messages we don't want to see, along with a quick explanation of each courtesy of Cisco's website. A common error message is MM_NO_STATE, and if you think that sounds bad, you're right! This indicates a fundamental problem with Phase I, most likely a mismatch of attributes between peers. MM_KEY_EXCH can indicate a misconfiguration of the peer's IP address, and this message can also be generated by a misconfigured pre-shared key. Two other excellent IPSec troubleshooting commands are show crypto map and show crypto ipsec transform-set.
R2#show crypto map Crypto Map "CCNP" 100 ipsec-isakmp Peer = 172.12.123.1 Extended IP access list 123 access-list 123 permit ip host 172.12.123.2 host 172.12.123.1 Current peer: 172.12.123.1 Security association lifetime: 4608000 kilobytes/1800 seconds PFS (Y/N): N Transform sets={ R2_TRANSFORM_SET, } Interfaces using crypto map CCNP: Serial0/1

R2#show crypto ipsec transform-set Transform set R3_TRANSFORM_SET: { ah-md5-hmac will negotiate = { Tunnel, }, Transform set R2_TRANSFORM_SET: { ah-md5-hmac will negotiate = { Tunnel, },

To let you see what the IPSec process looks like when the SA expires, I left the debug running until the one we built in this chapter expired. *Jun
7 00:48:18.270: reached, exp iring in 111 seconds IPSEC(lifetime_expiry): SA lifetime threshold

*Jun 7 00:50:10.074: IPSEC(key_engine): got a queue event with 1 kei messages *Jun 7 00:50:10.074: IPSEC(key_engine_delete_sas): rec'd delete notify from ISA KMP *Jun 7 00:50:10.078: IPSEC(key_engine_delete_sas): delete SA with spi 0x877193D *Jun 7 00:50:10.086: IPSEC(delete_sa): deleting SA, sa_spi= 0xF8BA8F2(260810994), sa_trans= ah-md5-hmac , sa_conn_id= 2003, *Jun 7 00:50:10.086: IPSEC(delete_sa): deleting SA sa_spi= 0x877193DD(2272367581), sa_trans= ah-md5-hmac , sa_conn_id= 2004, (identity) local= 172.12.123.2, remote= 172.12.123.1, *Jun 7 00:50:10.090: IPSec: Flow_switching Deallocated flow for sibling 8000000

A Warning About ACLs And IPSec As you work with more complex combinations of Cisco technologies, you're going to have to be very careful with your access lists. You should especially be careful with port ranges in ACLs, because you can always block ports that are needed by network services or applications. This is particularly true with IPSec, because three primary IPSec protocols use ports that must not be blocked by ACLs: ESP, protocol number 50 AH, protocol number 51 IKE, UDP port 500 Make sure your network's ACLs are not inadvertently blocking these ports and protocol numbers anywhere you have IPSec running. To review, here's the process we used to create this site-to-site IPSec VPN: Created the ISAKMP policy Created the IPSec transform set Defined interesting traffic with the crypto access-list Created the crypto map - AND applied it to the proper interface Made sure our ACLs allowed the appropriate port numbers

The Return Of GRE The Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunneling has actually made a comeback, since GRE can do things that IPSec can't do, and vice versa. We used to love GRE's multiprotocol capabilities, but that's not as important to us in today's networks as it once was. Combined with a lack of strong security features, GRE was pretty much dead for quite a while. IPSec is very secure, but it does have drawbacks. Originally, IPSec couldn't carry multicast traffic, and you may still run into some trouble with that in the field - the first IOS release that allowed IPSec to carry multicast traffic was 12.2(4)T, and there are plenty of routers out there running an earlier IOS. The latest IOS versions can't handle all multicast traffic, however. Multicast traffic generated by OSPF and EIGRP can't be carried by basic IPSec - we've got to run a combination of IPSec and GRE, commonly called GRE over IPSec. By combining GRE and IPSec, each protocol helps to compensate for the other's limitation: IPSec adds data integrity and confidentiality that GRE does not offer GRE offers the ability to carry routing protocol traffic, which IPSec does not offer Why call it "GRE over IPSec" rather than "IPSec over GRE"? Because the GRE encapsulation happens first, and then that encapsulation is encapsulated again, by IPSec. In effect, we have a GRE tunnel inside an IPSec tunnel. Our old friends tunnel mode and transport mode are still around as well. Interestingly enough, Cisco's website recommends the use of transport mode over tunnel mode with GRE over IPSec. Using transport mode results in less total overhead, and we're all in favor of that! To review Just as with a site-to-site VPN, the crypto ACL indicates the traffic to be encrypted GRE over IPSec allows the transmission of dynamic routing protocol multicast traffic Whether you use the CLI or SDM, always make sure to apply the crypto map to the interface! Hey, that's enough talking about GRE over IPSec. Let's configure it with SDM! Configuring A GRE Tunnel Over IPSec Via SDM (PDQ) As always, we'll start by clicking the Configure button, and from there choose VPN.

From the main VPN window, we'll select Site-to-Site VPN. The Site-toSite VPN window gives us two main choices:

When I choose the GRE over IPSec option, this illustration is shown.

After clicking Launch the selected task, we're given some reminders of why we're using GRE - good review material for your exam, too!

The next screen asks us for some required GRE-over-IPSec information, namely the tunnel source and destination and the address of the tunnel itself. Note that for the source, we can specify either the interface or the IP address, where the only option for destination is the IP address.

Did you notice the Details button in the previous screen? Clicking that gives you quite a bit of information regarding that interface. We don't have any of these features on this interface, but if we did, it's good information to have in mind for the tunnel config.

Now back to the config! We're not going to create a backup tunnel, but the next screen gives us the option to do so.

The next window prompts us for the pre-shared key or to indicate the use of digital certificates.

The next window is the IKE Proposal selection area, and we'll accept the

default IKE policy.

The next window is the Transform Set selection area, and we'll accept the default there as well.

We're then prompted to identify the routing protocol that will run over the tunnel.

Earlier in this section, we had the opportunity to create a backup tunnel. If you're running a routing protocol over the tunnels, you may need to alter some metrics so that one tunnel is preferred over the other. For EIGRP, for example, I'd suggest working with the delay option rather than the other metrics as it's easier to get the result you want. With static

routing, you could alter the AD of the routes with the distance option. We now have the option of tunneling all traffic, or using Split Tunneling to send select traffic through the tunnel. We'll enable ST here and configure traffic destined for 10.0.0.0 /8 to use the tunnel.

Real-world note: By default, using Split Tunneling with NAT and PAT on the same router can cause problems. Cisco's website offers several solutions to this issue, should you run into that problem in the real world. As always, we're presented with a Summary of the configuration we've chosen.

At this point, the VPN is down, since we haven't configured the other side of it!

We need an exact reverse of this configuration - a mirror image - to place on the downstream router. SDM has a great tool to create this mirror at the verrrrrry bottom of the screen - the Generate Mirror button! Real-world note: If you can't find something in SDM, always look at the very bottom of the screen.

After clicking Generate Mirror, we get that mirror configuration, along with warnings about how this config should be used only as a guide and should not be pasted into the remote router.

Since we're in a lab environment, I'm going to do just what they told me not to do, and save this config and then paste it into the downstream router. Here's the mirror configuration:
crypto isakmp policy 1 authentication pre-share encr 3des hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400 exit crypto isakmp key secretkey address 172.31.1.1 crypto ipsec transform-set ESP-3DES-SHA esp-sha-hmac esp-3des mode tunnel exit ip access-list extended SDM_1 remark SDM_ACL Category=4 permit gre host 10.2.1.2 host 172.31.1.1 exit crypto map SDM_CMAP_1 1 ipsec-isakmp description Apply the crypto map on the peer router's interface having IP address 10.2.1.2 that connects to this router. set transform-set ESP-3DES-SHA set peer 172.31.1.1

match address SDM_1 set security-association lifetime seconds 3600 set security-association lifetime kilobytes 4608000 exit

After copying that config to the downstream router, I applied that crypto map to the physical interface and created a tunnel interface manually:
interface Tunnel0 ip address 10.1.1.2 255.255.255.0 ip mtu 1420 tunnel source FastEthernet0/1 tunnel destination 10.2.1.1

Going back to the original router, the Edit Site-to-Site VPN screen shows the VPN is now up.

What's So "Easy" About Easy VPN? Easy VPN consists of the following: Easy VPN Server Easy VPN Remote Sounds easy enough! Seriously, the real benefit of Easy VPN is that security policies written at the Server level can then be pushed out to Clients. As a result, the Clients have the most up-to-date policies without the network admins - that's you and me - having to visit them individually. Quite a few different Cisco devices can act as Easy VPN Servers. I will not list each here, but here are the more common ones: VPN 3000 concentrators Cisco 7500,7200,7100,3600,2600,1700 routers w/ 12.2(8)T IOS Many Cisco 800 series routers running 12.2(8)T or later The Easy VPN Remote device can be a Cisco router, PIX, or VPN concentrator as well. "Easy VPN Remote" devices are often referred to as "Easy VPN Clients", and that's how I'll refer to them for the rest of this video. For your exam and when reading Cisco documentation, remember that "Remote" and "Client" refer to the same device. The basics of the VPN construction will look familiar at this point! First, the Client will send ISAKMP proposals to the Server, and the Server responds with the acceptance of a matching proposal. After the policy acceptance, the ISAKMP SA is in place.

The next step is a little different from what we've seen in other VPNs. The Server will now send a challenge to the Client, prompting the Client to send a username and password to the Server.

We can use several methods to set up this authentication: Local (using the username/password command) RADIUS TACACS Xauth (Extended Authentication) We'll take a closer look at RADIUS and TACACS in another section, but keep in mind that we can use these security protocols in addition to local authentication. Once the Client has successfully authenticated, the process enters Mode configuration. At this stage, the Client requests the necessary configuration details from the Server.

This information can include: IP address information (required) internal DNS and WINS server addresses split tunneling configuration information Split tunneling allows the Client to have a secure tunnel to the Server and simultaneous non-secure connections to other networks. Once Mode configuration is completed, the Reverse Route Injection stage begins. According to Cisco's website, "Reverse route injection (RRI) is the

ability for static routes to be automatically inserted into the routing process for those networks and hosts protected by a remote tunnel endpoint". After RRI, we're almost there! IPSec Quick Mode then negotiates the IPSec SA, and we're all set. Configuring Easy VPN Server In SDM We'll start our Easy VPN server config by clicking the VPN button in the Configure section of SDM.

You'll see a list of topics under "VPN", and we'll select Easy VPN Server.

The description screen shows the following. Note the prerequisite task.

There's a link to enable AAA on that screen, so I'll click that. Note that the Enable Easy VPN button is grayed out since AAA is not yet enabled.

After clicking the enable AAA link, we're presented with this message:

We do want to enable AAA, so we'll click Yes and move on.

Once the AAA commands are delivered, we can enable Easy VPN Server.

Welcome to the Easy VPN Server Wizard! Good exam review material on this screen as well!

Here's the next window:

The interface facing the workstation is Fast 0/0, so I'll choose that in the drop-down box. We'll use pre-shared keys as well, but you see that we can use key, digital certificates, or both. After making those selections, the next window asks us for the IKE proposal. We could create custom policies by clicking Add, but here we'll use the default.

The Transform Set selection window is next, and we'll accept the default there as well.

The next window prompts us for the group authorization method, and we'll use local authentication only.

I like the summary description here. Actually, if you don't have a RADIUS or TACACS server in your network, the local database is the only option you have! In the next window, we'll indicate local authentication for users.

In the next window, we'll click Add since a group has not yet been created.

The Add Group Policy window opens to the following tab, and you can see the information I entered for yourself. Note the pre-shared key appears as a series of asterisks.

We'll enable Split Tunneling, which is disabled by default. When I clicked that check box, the Enter the protected subnets selection window enabled. I'll click Add and enter the 10.0.0.0 network with a wildcard mask of 0.255.255.255.

The policy has been added.

At the bottom of this screen, note that you can specify an idle timer for the tunnel.

Finally, we're presented with the Summary window.

After clicking Finish at the bottom of that screen, the commands are delivered to the router, and the Easy VPN Server side of the configuration is complete! Configuring The Easy VPN Client

Now to the workstation! I'll launch the Cisco VPN Client and click New.

I'll enter the IP address of the Easy VPN Server, along with the group name and password (which again appears only as a series of asterisks). Group Authentication is selected by default. We're not going to configure Mutual Group Authentication, but if we chose that option, we'd need to import a valid root certificate.

Now the HQ connection appears under Connection Entry. I'll click Connect, and we'll be prompted for a username / password combination that I configured before the lab began.

The connection is then completed! Note that a lock now appears next to

the HQ connection, the message Connected to HQ appears in the bottom left of the window, and the overall connection time appears in the bottom right of the window.

You can also test the connection from the Server side. Go to the Edit Easy VPN Server screen....

.. and at the very bottom of the screen, select Test Easy VPN Server.

Click Start in the Troubleshooting VPN screen, and you'll get check marks when all is well. If something isn't well, you'll get some great information on the issue here. This is the first place I check when a VPN configuration isn't working correctly.

You'll also receive the following confirmation that all is well.

Let's look at an SDM screen we haven't visited yet - the Monitor screen. Just click the Monitor button at the top of SDM, and you're there.

This screen has buttons on the left-hand side as well. Naturally, we'll select VPN Status.

The IPSec Tunnels tab verifies that the tunnel is up.

The Easy VPN Server tab verifies it as well, along with the number of encrypted and decrypted packets.

The IKE SA tab shows the SA is in QM_IDLE mode, which is just what we want!

Other Easy VPN Options In the Easy VPN Client software, you'll see an option for transparent tunneling. When you have a router serving as a firewall that also happens to be between the Easy VPN Client and Server, you'll want to enable this option. Why? That gateway is likely running NAT and/or PAT, and that can be a problem for Easy VPN. Enabling transparent tunneling enables us to work around potential issues with NAT and PAT. On the same tab in SDM, you'll see an option to Allow Local LAN Access. If this is enabled on both the Server and Client, access to local network files, printers, and other resources is allowed without going through the tunnel. A Note About NAT Easy VPN Client does support NAT and PAT, but with a twist. According to Cisco documentation, Client will autoconfigure the necessary NAT and PAT commands and access-lists; the admin only needs to configure our old friends ip nat inside and ip nat outside. So what's the catch? Actually, there are two of them: The autoconfigured NAT, PAT, and access-list commands will not appear in the starting and running configurations. Thankfully, you can see them with the show access-list and show ip nat statistics commands. You must remove any pre-existing NAT and PAT configuration before configuring Easy VPN Remote.
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