24.

G.R. Nos. 101127-31 August 7, 1992 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRESENCIA C. REYES, accused-appellant.

FACTS: In the cases at bar, appellant was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, in three cases for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 2 and two cases of estafa. On the three cases for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, appellant was convicted and sentenced to a total penalty of two years of imprisonment and to pay a total fine of P96,290.00. On the two indictments for estafa, in Criminal Case No. 86-51209 she was found guilty and sentenced to twenty-two years of reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties, to indemnify the complaining witness in the sum of P80,540.00 and to pay the cost, and other penalties. ISSUE: Whether a penalty higher than reclusion temporal but less than thirty (30) years may properly be categorized and considered as embraced within the penalty of reclusion perpetua? RULING: P.D. No. 818 declares that any penalty exceeding twenty (20) years, or the maximum duration of reclusion temporal, is within the range of reclusion perpetua. Article 70 of the Code lays down the rule on successive service of sentences where the culprit has to serve more than three penalties, provides, that "the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him," and "in applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties shall be computed at thirty years." The imputed duration of thirty years for reclusion perpetua, therefore, is only to serve as the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties. Since, however, in all the graduated scales of penalties in the Code, as set out in Articles 25, 70 and 71,reclusion perpetua is the penalty immediately next higher to reclusion temporal, it follows by necessary implication that the minimum of reclusion perpetua is twenty (20) years and one (1) day with a maximum duration thereafter to last for the rest of the convict's natural life although, pursuant to Article 70, it appears that the maximum period for the service of penalties shall not exceed forty (40) years. it would be legally absurd and violative of the scales of penalties in the Code to reckon the minimum of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years since there would thereby be a resultant lacuna whenever the penalty exceeds the maximum twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal but is less than thirty (30) years.

19. G.R. No. L-16392 January 30, 1965 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FORTUNATO MENDOZA, ET AL., defendants, LORENZO VILLANUEVA and COPIA MANSAKA, Defendants-Appellants. FACTS: The accused and the victim are all detained as prisoners in National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa, Rizal. The accused agreed to kill Paison. To gain entry to Brigade 3B where the victim is being detained, the accused disguised themselves as rancheros. After the accused stabbed the victim inside the toilet, Villanueva also severed his ear. The accused were all guilty of murder. ISSUE: What are the aggravating circumstances present in the commission of the crime?

RULING: It is clear that the crime committed was murder qualified by evident premeditation. Insofar as Lorenzo Villanueva's participation in the killing is concerned, the following aggravating circumstances were established beyond doubt at the trial: (1) Reiteration or habituality, since he was previously convicted of two crimes and for which he was in confinement, namely: robbery and evasion of sentence ;(2) ignominy or cruelty as he confessed to cutting off the ear of the deceased; (3) craft, in pretending to be "rancheros" to gain entry into Brigade 3B; and (4) that the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities. With respect to Copia Mansaka, the following aggravating circumstances have been conclusively proven at the trial: (1) Recidivism, having been previously convicted of murder and evasion of service of service sentence; (2) Craft, as above; and (3) that the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities, same as above.

28 and 29. [G.R. No. 142773. January 28, 2003] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM alias BONG (At Large), ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and RONALD DELIM alias BONG, accused-appellants. FACTS: The father of the accused adopted, and the family of the accused treated the accused as their relatives. On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, the family of the victim were preparing to have supper when the accused suddenly barged into the house and closed the door. Each of the three intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by the intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Modesto was found dead after several days and the accused were guilty of murder, all conspiring together. ISSUE: What are the aggravating circumstances present in the commission of the crime? RULING: Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved clearly and conclusively as the crime itself. Mere conjectures, suppositions or presumptions are utterly insufficient and cannot produce the effect of qualifying the crime. As this Court held: No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the condition of defendant. For treachery to be apprec iated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements: (a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted. Although the victim may have been defenseless at the time he was seized but there is no evidence as to the particulars of how he was assaulted and killed, treachery cannot be appreciated against the accused. In this case, the victim was defenseless when seized by Marlon and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to present any witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately before and when he was attacked and killed. It cannot be presumed that although he was defenseless when he was seized the victim was in the same situation when he was attacked, shot and stabbed by the malefactors. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely

use force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. It is necessary to show that the malefactors cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their superiority in strength. In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald deliberately took advantage of their numerical superiority when Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the malefactors outnumbered Modesto and were armed while Modesto was not does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical superioty and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed. In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of Homicide. Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearms was proven during the trial, there is no allegation in the Information that Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no license to possess the firearm. Lack of license to possess a firearm is an essential element of the crime of violation of PD1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a special aggravating circumstance in the felony of homicide or murder. Neither can dwelling, although proven, aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not alleged in the Information as required by Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court. Although this rule took effect on December 1, 2000, after the commission of the offense in this case, nonetheless it had been given retroactive effect considering that the rule is favorable to the accused. 26. G.R. No. L-21734 September 5, 1975 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABELARDO SUBlDO, defendant appellant. FACTS: This is an appeal on questions of law from the Orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 23041, entitled People of the Philippines versus Abelardo Subido, denying defendantappellant's motion for the cancellation of his appeal bond and declaring him to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine and indemnity. The decision of lower court, states, From the facts above stated the Court finds the accused guilty of libel and he is hereby sentenced to three (3) months of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson in the sum of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. while the decision of the trial court was modified by the Court of appeals stating, However, in the application of the penalty provided for the violation of the libel law, the courts are given discretion of whether or not both fine and imprisonment are to be imposed upon the offender. In the instant case, we believe, considering the attendant circumstances of the case that the imposition of the corresponding penalty should be tempered with judicial discretion. For this reason, we impose upon accused-appellant a fine of P500.00. Similarly, the amount of the indemnity to be paid by appellant to the offended party is reduced to P5,000.00. ISSUE: WON, accused is required to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency even when the judgment of the Court of Appeals have not expressly provided for such condition. RULING: Yes. Accordingly if according to the lower court's decision, the accused-appellant should suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine and the indemnity and the only modifications made by the Court of Appeals are to eliminate the three (3) months of arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity to the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00, then by force of logic and reason, the fine of P5000.00, the reduced indemnity of P5,000.00 and the subsidiary

imprisonment in case of insolvency should stand. Subsidiary imprisonment applies when the offender is insolvent as shown in the present case. The moment he cannot pay the fine that means he is insolvent and he must serve the same in form of subsidiary imprisonment. So accused-appellant has to choose to pay the fine or serve in jail.