West German Ostpolitik and the German Question Author(s): Gert Krell Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol.

28, No. 3 (Aug., 1991), pp. 311-323 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/424410 . Accessed: 18/04/2013 21:22
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? Journal of Peace Research, vol. 28, no. 3, 1991, pp. 311-323

West German Ostpolitikand the German Question*

GERT KRELL Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)
The specific problems of West German Ostpolitik during the Cold War and the period of detente have acquired new interest under the current conditions of radical systemic change. The various options pursued by the Federal Republic and their development provide criteria for an evaluation of the future course of the united Germany's foreign policy. The article starts with laying out the basic conditions of the FRG's Ostpolitik and their inherent contradictions: revisionism versus reconciliation, revisionism and the Cold War, the moral problems of the status quo. It then discusses four major variants: (1) military revisionism, which was never seriously considered; voluntary constraints form an important contrast to the foreign policy planning of the Weimar Republic; (2) revisionism from strength, the major strategy of the conservative governments in the 1950s and 1960s; (3) revisionism based on calculated weakness, the strategy followed by the SPD opposition; (4) the redefinition of the national question in the 1970s which prepared the ground for a new consensus in the 1980s about West integration and detente with the East. The development of West German Ostpolitik is characterized by the renunciation of force, the differentiation of revisionist aspirations, and the shift from classical power politics (policy of strength) to a policy of compromise and understanding. Thus the foundations for a new tradition of democratic foreign policy have been laid which the united Germany can build upon.

1. Historical Legacies and Structural Problems of West German Ostpolitik' Amidst the justified elation over the 1989 revolution in Eastern and Central Europe and over the unification of the FRG and GDR, the historical legacies and structural problems of West German Ostpolitik during the Cold War and the old period of detente seem already to have been all but forgotten. Yet a consideration of the dilemmas and options involved in that policy and of its evolution can provide criteria for assessing what chances of success the renewed unification of the two German states has and what risks it runs in foreign-policy terms. Three major problems formed the frame of reference for the Deutschland- and Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany and for all of its variants: the historical legacies, in particular the burdens of the Nazi crimes and World War II; the realities of the power rivalry and systemic conflict between East and West; the moral problems of the status quo. These basic conditions produced a number of demands, sometimes contradictory.
* An earlier version in German has been published as Krell (1990).

1.1 Revisionism vs. Reconciliation After World War II, the West Germans opted, of their own volition and for sound reasons, for a Westward orientation and a rejection of communism. But anti-communism formed a bridge with the past, not only for former Nazis. The animosity that existed between Germans and Poles goes back to the Middle Ages, and the power rivalry between Germans and Russians was one of the major preconditions of World War I. After 1945, almost all Germans were revisionist in the sense that they did not accept the territorial divisions of the country, and their revisionism was again directed mainly against the East.2 However, they also had to ask themselves whether the time had not come to make a decisive break in the circle of injustice that had determined the greater part of the history of the relations with the East. Poland and Russia had repeatedly been the object of German aggression. Prussia had taken an active part in the historical divisions of Poland and Hitler's Germany had enacted a further one, this time aimed at destroying not just the political but also the cultural, and indeed the physical base of the nation. Russia, although guilty of anti-Polish complicity, had twice experi-

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enced the brutality of German imperialism. The 1918 treaties of Brest-Litovsk were unvarnished military diktats, harsher almost than the Treaty of Versailles; and the plans of the German military elite heralded the much more terrible oppression and destruction of World War II. The West Germans used the theory of totalitarianism as a way of trying to reconcile their past responsibilities with their present, revisionist demands. Ironically, however, the longer the situation to be revised persisted, the more heavily the moral problems of revisionism weighed, particularly vis-a-vis Poland. In 1965 a memorandum published by the Protestant Church asked whether, given the legacy of the National Socialist period, there was not a political and indeed a legal objection to the demands for a full restoration of the territorial status as it existed in 1937 (von Schubert, 1978, pp. 299 ff.). And as far as Russia is concerned, the Germans had to acknowledge that policies which had twice set the two countries against each other in what amounted to wars of extermination could not be the correct ones. From this arose one of the specific, fundamental preconditions of West German Ostpolitik: the imperative of war prevention - a result of the nuclear revolution and of the Federal Republic's exposed position - was reinforced and extended by the political and moral imperative of reconciliation. But the question was, how could this approach be made to square with revisionist demands, and be made to do so without the aid of the theory of totalitarianism, which lumped together perpetrators and victims and put them on a par with each other? 1.2 Revisionism and the Cold War Germany's place and role in Europe after World War II were determined by three major factors. The first was the territorial reorganization which took place in Eastern Europe. It was historically almost inevitable, after all that had happened in the region before and after the Nazi period, that the Soviet Union, which, in concert with the Western powers, had defeated Germany in an unprovoked war and had achieved super-

power status, should demand, and obtain, territorial changes. The second factor had to do with the problem of how the world might find a durable means of safeguarding itself against Germany. The translation of this security need into institutional terms by no means automatically implied the division of the country, although such a division indeed, on a permanent basis - in addition to the annexation of the eastern territories, was a possibility from the outset. It was the third factor - namely, the Cold War - which ensured that the division variant prevailed. The two remaining parts of Germany west of the Oder-Neisse line acquired crucial significance for the security of the new alliances, and, conversely, the alliances were crucial to their security. The German question thus became an integral part of the Cold War, and the chief parties to the conflict came to understand, through a process of probing, challenging and resisting, that acknowledgement of the status quo was a precondition for the Cold War's remaining truly cold. The German question was a serious problem throughout the Cold War; but while the Cold War was one of its preconditions, it also provided a solution to it. The division of the country and the integration of its two parts into the two camps on the basis of the status quo provided a safeguard against Germany and against the German question. Naturally, the Germans found such a definition of security problematic, although the ruling elites in the two parts had each consciously opted for their own side in the East-West conflict and the antagonism between the political systems.' The Cold War - and this is the irony of German revisionism - gave the Germans, and particularly the West Germans, so much new weight that for a while they were able to believe that they would escape paying the price for the war they had lost and for German crimes and that they would be able to restore the old Reich territory as it existed in 1937. One can go even further and say that without the Cold War the Germans might not even have succeeded in preserving their Western territory against French aspirations.

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The Cold War, for example, was one of the major factors that enabled West German revisionism - a revisionism with undertones of national liberation - to regain political influence;4 it was also the reason why reunification was bound to remain an illusion as long as the antagonism between East and West endured. The division of Germany was over-determined. In order to succeed, West German revisionism would have had to guarantee that it would not once again become a threat to the European order. This would have required a joint East-West solution to the problem of how Germany was to be controlled, a solution other than that offered by the Cold War. In the conditions imposed by this Cold War, however, such a solution was extremely difficult. The other option open to West German revisionism was to exploit the Cold War for its own ends. This required that the Soviet Union be prepared to accept a fundamental defeat and weakening of its position in the East-West conflict. Without a radical - and at the time not foreseeable - transformation of the international system, however, such a development was highly unlikely. 1.3 The Moral Problems of the Status Quo Even if West Germany had ended its special conflict with the East - or at least set it aside - this would not have meant that all the problems of Ostpolitik had been solved. Whatever happened, there would still have been the 'normal' conflict of ideologies, social systems and security. During the 1950s, this problem was inextricably linked to revisionism; as revisionism receded, other issues inevitably emerged: How was the problem of war prevention to be tackled long-term in a Europe characterized by structural asymmetries, both military and political? How could lasting reconciliation be achieved with a regime devoid of any real legitimacy, and with a superpower that had to resort to a form of colonialism in order to protect its security interests? Nazi Germany had inflicted great suffering on the Soviet Union; the Soviets' right to compensation could not be denied, not least on moral grounds. In fact, power politics

ensured that they received it anyway. The problem was that this compensation also satisfied Russo-Soviet imperialist interests, which in some cases predated the Nazi invasion or had even been pursued in direct cooperation with the Nazis. The pact between Hitler and Stalin resulted in various Soviet annexations, only some of which could be justified on ethnic grounds. The annexed areas were Sovietized, and socalled 'class enemies' or 'enemies of Russia' were deported or liquidated. However, to point out that there were such problems associated with the status quo was far harder for the Germans than for any other party involved in the East-West conflict. The Germans were not in a good position, either politically or morally, to start complaining about Soviet crimes and Soviet imperialism. Any German argument against the territorial status quo would inevitably raise the issue of German revisionism. What would this mean for Poland, which had been the victim of the imperialism of both its German and its Russian neighbour and which, after all its sacrifices, was unwilling under any circumstances to jeopardize its newly won territorial status? There were also the political-ideological and military asymmetries, and these affected Germany as well. An accommodation with the status quo in Europe meant an accommodation not only with gains made by Soviet imperialism, but also with the reality of communist domination in Eastern and Central Europe. That domination, besides being incompatible with many basic Western beliefs and values, could also be shown to run counter to the hopes and aspirations of the majority of East Germans and Eastern Europeans. The most decisive point of social confrontation in the East-West conflict was not the West's permanent revolution from below, but the East's permanent counter-revolution from above. And accommodation with the status quo also meant accommodation with superior military forces and with an offensive concept of defence that was not just destabilizing but actually advantageous to the East in security terms, or at least burdened the West with the political and military problems of

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extended deterrence and the option of nuclear first-use. If it turned out, however, that an offensive strategy against the status quo not only increased the risk of war but actually decreased the long-term chances for change; if it turned out that the asymmetries mentioned were signs of weakness rather than of strength on the part of the Soviet Union; and if it turned out that, for historical and geostrategic reasons, the Soviet Union would not be able to normalize its relations with its Eastern European neighbours unless major changes were made to its political system, then a policy of reconciliation on the basis of the status quo could also be a moral policy, provided it upheld the legitimacy of democratic aspirations and insisted on respect for the requirements of military stability. The fact that even such a policy as this could cause embarrassment to the Eastern side, or at least could not prevent change, could then no longer legitimately be condemned as being disruptive of peace. 2. Political Options and Developments 2.1 Military Revisionism The military revisionism and imperialism characteristic of National Socialism did not appear out of the blue, nor did it completely disappear after Hitler's death and the defeat of the Wehrmacht. The ideology underlying the Ostpolitik of the last all-German government, under DOnitz, saw Germany as attempting to stem the Bolshevist tide that was sweeping westward. The simultaneous struggle against East and West had been too much for Germany. But was there perhaps a possibility of joining with the West and fighting communism under the banner of democracy? Such an option was not compatible with the anti-fascist coalition's view of itself, nor could it be. It was not in keeping, either, with the spirit in which the Germans themselves sought to make a new start. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic enjoins the Germans to work for unity and freedom, but also for peace and justice in the world.

Article 26 expressly prohibits military aggression. The majority of Germans were quick to learn the lesson history offered them, namely that if there was to be any chance of German divisions being revised, the option of another war of aggression had to be ruled out once and for all. In this sense too, Bonn (the Federal Republic) was distinct from Weimar (the Weimar Republic of 1919-32). Prevailing conditions undoubtedly reinforced this learning process. Renunciation of revision by military means was the basis for the integration of West Germany into the Western alliance and for its new sovereignty. The West Germans undertook, in the relevant treaties, to forgo the use of force in order to achieve German reunification or effect changes in the Federal Republic's borders. All disputes with other countries were to be resolved by peaceful means. The former occupation powers responded by granting their support for West Germany's revisionist aims insofar as these related to its claim to sole representation of the German people. This still left the possibility of a war of liberation as a response to an attack - a German MacArthur option, so to speak. The first detailed West German memorandum on military strategy, drafted by exWehrmacht officers in 1950 (the Himmeroder Memorandum), and the early reflections on defence of the SPD opposition leader Kurt Schumacher, a victim of Nazi persecution, both did indeed tend in this direction (von Schubert, 1978, pp. 74-79, 114-117; 1979, pp. 83-98). However, NATO never attained the requisite level of military capabilities to launch a comprehensive counter-offensive, and this trend in thinking remained a controversial one in Germany. Whereas in English the term 'forward defence' was used to describe NATO strategy, in German papers and in the German debate one finds the more restricted term 'Vorneverteidigung' (defence close to the border), as opposed to 'Vorwairtsverteidigung'. Indeed, the notion that the purely defensive orientation of NATO and of the Federal Republic should be clearly expressed in the organization, structure, and equipment of the Federal Army became

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one of the fundamental maxims of West German defence planning, quite apart from any arguments put forward by supporters of defensive defence. Official West German defence policy itself always claimed that the Federal Army did not - could not - threaten the Warsaw Pact and that the Soviet leadership had no cause to conclude otherwise. The critical reaction to AirLand Battle and to the US discussions about conventional retaliation was part of this tradition (see WeiBbuch, 1985, p. 30). 2.2 Western Integration and Ostpolitik from a Position of Strength Adenauer's historical experiences, his regional background, and his political instinct all pointed Westward. For him, reunification was not a substitute for integration into the West; only the latter promised security, the restoration of sovereignty and the safeguarding of freedom. None the less, he sought to reconcile Western integration with the goal of unity; he clung to the notion that opting for a particular side in the Cold War in no way implied that the seal was set on German division. In legal terms - this at least was the fiction the whole of Germany had already joined itself to the West. The Federal Republic was regarded as a fully fledged state, as the legal successor to the old Reich within the territorial boundaries of 31 December 1937; it had merely been robbed of a few provinces or Lander. For the various governments under Adenauer, and for the political forces that supported them, reunification was identical with the Anschluss or incorporation of the 'Soviet zone of occupation' and the reintegration of the provinces east of the Oder-Neisse, or at least of large sections of them. Such a reunification would not be achieved in collaboration with the Russians but would have to be pushed through against their will. For the Federal Republic to negotiate successfully on reunification, it was claimed, it had to join itself to the West, the West had to support Germany's aims, and the West had to be stronger than the Soviet Union. Daunted by the West's unity and by its political and military strength (in

other words, superiority), and weighed down by the burden of the arms race and the cost of controlling and suppressing recalcitrant allies, the Soviets would listen to Western arguments and give way. However, the strategy of negotiating from strength - not consistently pursued even by Adenauer - was based on three questionable assumptions. The first was that the West really would fully support West German aspirations to reunification against the Soviet Union. The second was that the West really was stronger than the Soviet Union and that it could also make use of that strength. The third and most important condition was that the Soviets actually would submit to the rules of the game. How could such a policy be reconciled with the claims of peace and the imperative of stability? It was argued that it was not German revisionism but the division of Germany that was the major cause of tension in Europe. If the world wanted to achieve genuine detente, the division of Germany had to be ended. All political paths leading to a decrease in tension were subordinated to this argument. Until well into the 1960s, West German governments made their support for arms control conditional on progress on the German question. However, it soon became apparent that none of the three basic assumptions could be sustained. It is true that for a while the United States itself pursued a policy - or at least mouthed the rhetoric - of 'revisionism from a position of strength', but for the West as a whole the division of Germany was by no means such an obvious cause of tension in Europe. The support given to the West German claims was more a means to ensure integration into the West than an expression of truly revisionist tendencies. The imperative of war prevention, particularly with a nuclear stalemate looming, undermined the second basic assumption underlying the policy of negotiation from strength. As for Soviet reactions, it was already clear to many observers of the time that such a policy was not credible, indeed that it would actually bring about the opposite of that which it purported to achieve.5

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The Federal Republic's integration into the West and its reconciliation with France were the product of political prudence, but the price of Adenauer's Ostpolitik was high: the subversion of early Western attempts to secure detente and arms control; backing for a new and unrealistic revisionist tradition; and the continuation of an old tradition of hostility between Germany and Eastern Europe. Adenauer did not trust the political and historical judgement of his fellow Germans, but the ideology underlying the 'policy of strength' - the basis on which his conservative government's Ostpolitik was founded - certainly did nothing to improve it. The legacy of the Hitler era was denied, as was the fact that a clear majority of West Germans had opted - if one can say that they had opted at all - for security and freedom and had thus, at least in the short term, rejected reunification. The major flaw in the policy of strength was, finally, that it prolonged the tendency to miscalculate Soviet-Russian power and to overestimate Germany's options - a tendency rooted in the 19th century. Germany, so it was argued, would put political-military pressure on the Soviet Union; as a result, the Russians would be driven out of Central Europe, and Germany would once again become a great and respectable power - this time under the umbrella of US superiority and as a member of a liberal-democratic alliance. 2.3 Negotiated Revisionism and Calculated Weakness The chief argument of Adenauer's opponents was that reunification required the assent of the Soviet Union in one form or another. The Soviets, they said, would not give in to pressure, particularly if the outcome was a reunified and militarily strong Germany allied to the West. There were two alternatives to the policy of strength: that advanced by the SPD opposition, and that put forward by those who advocated a 'third way' for Germany or for Europe. After flirting briefly with the notion of Germany or Europe as a 'third force', the SPD leadership followed the other major parties in the Federal Republic and set its

course equally unequivocally Westward; and it was, or eventually became, equally unequivocally anti-communist. Yet the SPD did in fact want reunification - which, incidentally, would have made it the strongest political grouping in Germany. But it was faced with the same fundamental problems as the others, namely how to combine security and unity (even the majority of SPD supporters felt threatened by the Soviet Union); in other words, how to opt for the West without alienating the Russians. In addition, there was another tradition amongst the SPD clientele which the party leadership had to take into account, namely antimilitarism and neutralism. The SPD's early Ostpolitik was contradictory, like that of Adenauer's. Indeed in many respects it was more nationalist than the Chancellor's. It refused, in its own way, to acknowledge the realities of the Cold War, presenting vague collective security arrangements for Europe as an alternative. However, the SPD's move towards NATO began early. The leadership essentially accepted the necessity of making a military contribution to the Western alliance, provided that all remaining chances of reunification were carefully considered. Whereas Adenauer's strategy made Western integration a precondition and was founded on the incorporation of the Soviet zone through negotiation from strength, the SPD wanted to start by negotiating. It was a kind of two-track policy: the Federal Republic would use the prospect of military integration as a bargaining chip but would stay out of the European Defence Community (EDC) or NATO if the Soviets were prepared to forgo the GDR. For a while it seemed that the policy of calculated weakness could be successful. Stalin's 1952 Notes appeared to acquiesce in the proposed deal: reunification in return for forgoing Western integration. But even if the Soviet offers of 1952/53 were genuine and not merely tactical, the likelihood that an acceptable solution could have been negotiated must be regarded as minimal. Given the prevailing conditions, reunification was a risky option - for the Soviets, for the West, and indeed for the Germans

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themselves. Many diplomats amongst the status of 1937 but only reunite the four former allies, and many Germans also, were former occupation zones. These considervery well aware of the risks, and voiced ations alone were bound to raise serious them. Stalin's overtures to nationalist doubts in the minds of Germany's former groups in Germany are an indication of adversaries. Both West and East wanted a these risks - risks which are only rarely Germany that was predictable and would tackled in any serious way by Adenauer's not once again get out of control. The more critics.6 At any rate, in the end Adenauer's the former Allies disagreed about the form Westpolitik was saved by the uprising in the and content of a reunified Germany, the GDR; that same event, however, signalled more they concentrated on stabilizing their the failure of his Ostpolitik. respective spheres of influence and preventAfter 1955 the SPD gradually realized ing possible encroachments by the other that negotiations would not lead to an early side. resolution of the problem of reunification. The party leadership then loosened the tie 2.4 The Redefinition of the National between security and unity and began to Question take an active part in the buildup of the new As early as 1955 it became clear that the Federal Army. It gradually accepted full in- Adenauer government's scheme of Ostpolitegration into the West, including the mili- tik was impracticable. But the conservatives tary aspect of this, but continued to hold to refused to acknowledge the true situation, the idea of reunification. Its strategy, how- despite the fact that the external conditions ever, differed from that of Adenauer's and that would ensure the success of the strategy could more easily be adapted to the general continued to deteriorate. In order to bring East-West trend towards rapprochement. revisionism more into line with international The SPD also regarded peace and disarma- developments during the 1960s, the more ment as being closely bound up with the flexible wing of the Christian Democrats German question, but whereas Adenauer tried out a new combination, in collaborfeared that detente and arms control would ation with the Free Democrats: Western undermine his policy of strength, the SPD integration and revisionism plus detente. viewed arms control or disarmament in EurThe basic assumption underlying the dual ope as beneficial in relation to achieving strategy of detente plus revisionism was as unity. Until well into the 1950s the party was follows: by means of an improvement in drafting various plans. The last of these relations with the Eastern European counonce again combined detente, disarmament tries, the latter would finally be convinced and reunification with collective security in a general atmosphere of decreasing tenarrangements for the countries of Central sion - that a united Germany was more Europe, who would then leave their likely to accord with their own interests than respective alliances (Haftendorn, 1983, a divided Germany, which constituted a permanent source of instability at the heart of pp. 91-104). The main problem with revisionism based Europe. As far as the relationship between on calculated weakness was that a united Ostpolitik and security was concerned, Germany would in all probability not be therefore, this new scheme also stuck to the weak, or at least would not remain so; and if old basic view that the reunification of Gerit did remain weak, it would be unstable, many was a precondition for peace and and, given the continuing East-West con- genuine detente. The policy of detente plus revisionism was frontation, would then also become a target for attempts at destabilization. If such a an attempt to isolate the GDR, not just - as Germany were internally stable, however, it had been the case until then - from the West would once again attempt to play East and and the Third World, but also from the West off against each other. For it would East. This was also the chief reason why this continue to be revisionist - assuming that policy failed. But things had begun to move reunification did not restore the territorial in Ostpolitik, and this movement was main-

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tained under the Grand Coalition. The close linking of arms control and disarmament to progress on the German question was relaxed, as was the Hallstein Doctrine and the West German claim to sole representation for all Germans. Instead of isolating the GDR, this doctrine had led to the increasing isolation of West German foreign policy. The foundations for change had been laid. None the less, the Grand Coalition also stuck to the central tenets of revisionism, in particular non-recognition of the GDR and the OderNeisse border, and by the end of the 1960s Ostpolitik at home and abroad had ground to a halt. The new SPD-FDP coalition, formed in 1969, along with the majority of West Germans, eventually accepted what Foreign Minister Gerhard Schr6der had once described as the 'so-called results of the Second World War'. This was the nub of the treaties concluded with the Soviet Union, Poland, and the GDR. In them, all parties to the agreement renounced not only all territorial claims against each other, but all territorial claims of any kind. Germany had committed itself to the renunciation of force on various occasions. What was new was the combination of this renunciation of force vis-a-vis the East with a recognition of the political and territorial realities. Even with this arrangement, the option of reunification was not definitively excluded, either politically or legally; constitutional considerations alone ruled this out. But this principle was now subordinated to a genuine acceptance of the status quo - a status quo which 'had to be stabilized in a form beneficial to us . . . as a modus vivendi for the sake of security' (Foreign Minister Scheel as quoted in Baring, 1984, p. 249). It is not at all untypical of West German Ostpolitik that someone who had emigrated and fought against the Nazi regime should have discharged the debt of the war and knelt at the Warsaw memorial commemorating the ghetto uprising.7 This time there was no 'stab in the back' myth - at least none that caused much of a stir. The reality of defeat and of the division of the world and the imperative of war prevention could

not be denied. But the need for reconciliation with the East also finally came to be accepted. If the Federal Republic wished to pursue an active foreign policy and make a constructive contribution to the development of East-West relations, it had to put an end to its special conflict with the East. With their Eastern treaties, the Germans formalized an understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union which had begun to take shape during the early 1960s as part of events surrounding the Berlin crisis. The Federal Republic redefined the link between security and the German question. The East had long insisted that the failure to acknowledge German division was a threat to peace and stability. For a time, the West had opposed this interpretation, but it had soon become clear that its own interests and the actual policy it pursued were much closer to it than the lip-service paid to revisionism might imply. The new paradox of West German Ostpolitik was that the only way of overcoming the realities of division was to begin by accepting them. Acceptance of the borders was a necessary precondition for surmounting them, and the acceptance if only provisional - of division into two distinct states was the only way left of preserving common national interests. Unity now implied trying to improve relations between the two German states and exercising joint responsibility. Active coexistence offered a new and more promising opportunity of reconciling the requirements of peace and security with the national question. It had taken the SPD about ten years to accept Western integration; after fifteen years, it began to accept the reality of division. The CDU, which had made integration the raison d'etre of the new republic, took more than twenty-five years to grasp the inevitable consequences of its own policy. In the discussion on the treaties with Moscow, Warsaw and the GDR, it clung to the old dogmas - though it did support the ratification of the treaties. These were rearguard actions, the last major one of which was the opposition to the CSCE process. Here too, the CDU changed its position. The dual approach of defence plus

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detente, based on the Ostpolitik treaties of the early 1970s, became the cornerstone of West German security policy. Of course there were shifts of emphasis, but the policy survived the fall of the social-liberal coalition. The famous Harmel Report had laid the foundations of the dual approach for the Atlantic Alliance; the Eastern treaties enabled the Federal Republic not merely to support this policy but to become one of the most active advocates of detente. The two-pillar concept soon won broad support amongst the West German political leadership and public. Detente was regarded as a necessary complement to defence, or, increasingly, as a possible substitute for it. Defence plus detente is the basic philosophy underlying both the socialliberal and liberal-conservative White Papers on security. In the words of Foreign Minister Genscher, who himself has become the political symbol of continuity:
The ambivalence of the Harmel strategy, which regards the Soviet Union as adversary and negotiating partner at the same time, is based on the ambivalence of life itself. Detente is geared to the overriding interest of East and West: that of preventing nuclear war (1982, p. 47).

from German history and from the prevailing political and geographic constellation. The policy of engaging in dialogue with the GDR was presented as a West German contribution to an active European peace policy; and Honecker's visit in September 1987 - during which he was accorded all honours dictated by protocol - was the clearest illustration of the changes in the conservative camp, and also of the continuity in recent West German Ostpolitik. Of course there were still differences in attitude over such things as the 1937 borders or the question of whether to retain the goal of unity in principle or give it up completely. The latest developments have brought about a surprising process of clarification in this area, and a convergence of the different strands of (West) German Ostpolitik. The recent turn of events, which no group or individual could have foreseen, has finally dissolved the dilemmas of West German Ostpolitik: reconciliation has become compatible with Germany's revised national aspirations. 3. The German Question and the Current Transformation of the East-West conflict One advantage of having East-West relations based on the geographical, political, military and ideological division of the world was that it regulated the distribution of influence and power between the superpowers in Europe and kept the German question at bay. The problem with this division was that, even in its detente variant, it offered only limited and politically fragile stability. Limited, because it could take only partial account of the aspirations to freedom of those peoples living under the reality of socialism; politically fragile, because ultimately it remained a form of detente based on continuing antagonism and because the alliance structure on the Eastern side was maintained by force. Viewed against the background of 20thcentury European history, the breakup of this structure is nothing short of revolutionary. The process of reform in the Soviet Union and the revolution in Eastern and Central Europe have opened up the way for

In addition to war prevention, the second major purpose of the dual approach was to mitigate the effects of the division of Europe, for example in the form of tangible benefits for the Germans on both sides of the demarcation line and, beyond this, for the stability and viability of Berlin. The third motive was the hope that detente and cooperation might create favourable conditions for 'evolutionary change' in the East - in so far as developments in the Soviet Union, or the GDR, could be influenced at all from the outside. The degree of consensus that emerged on these matters during the 1980s is highly significant when one recalls the intense debates, indeed the political crises, which the Federal Republic experienced in the early years of Ostpolitik under Brandt and Scheel. It was not long before the liberalconservative government also began to talk of the two German states as having a special responsibility in regard to peace and stability at the centre of Europe, arising, it said,

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radical changes not only in East-West relations but in world politics as a whole. The risks involved in these processes are, however, undeniable. The central challenge facing politics in East and West is to manage the two-fold transformation of the system i.e. the collapse of socialism and the mutation of the East-West conflict in Europe and between the superpowers - in a way that avoids violent outbreaks and reversals. The paramount question for Europe is how stable that kind of politics can be which foresakes the problematic but familiar and simple - and above all dominating - superstructure of the East-West conflict whilst evoking the complex (and bloody) past of European national history. Will this past continue to be a critical reference point for an active pan-European style of politics, or will it reveal this kind of politics to be a sham? One of the potential risk factors inherent in the dual transformation of the system continues to be the problem of German influence at the centre of Europe. Because of the changes in the international political constellation, the German question no longer has anywhere near the importance it had during the second empire or the Weimar Republic, and the form in which it poses itself today is also different from that in which it posed itself in 1945, or during the Cold War, or in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the fact that the German question continues to be discussed is proof that it persists even under changed circumstances. The notion that a unified German nationstate might present problems for stability and peace is not something dreamt up by socialist propaganda. The problem arises from German history, or more precisely, from the German inability to use its position and potential with circumspection. The painful experiences which the nations of Europe have had with German imperialism and German racism remain, understandably, fresh in their memories. It is imperative, both morally and from the point of view of enlightened self-interest, that Germans on both sides of the former border confront this problem. Ouite apart from the more specific secur-

ity problems raised by the existence of a unified German state, there is the question of the influence that would be exerted, in terms of power politics, by the combined powers of the old FRG and GDR. Can one not imagine other ways in which they might disrupt peace - if one takes peace to mean more than just the absence of war? Might a united Germany, confident of its power and national identity, not apply pressure on its neighbours by other means? When Polish colleagues voice concern, what they are primarily thinking nowadays is the problem of the economic asymmetry in German relations with Eastern Europe, and thus also the risk of dependency, which, in the case of Poland in particular, could be a highly sensitive issue. A number of factors, however, indicate that the united Germany will be a loyal and peaceable member of the pan-European community of nations now developing. The first point to mention in this connection is the basic consensus in German foreign policy. One of the earliest features of this consensus has been the renunciation of force - an external consequence of Germany's defeat, of the new power constellation and nuclear revolution, and an internal consequence of German foreign policy's bloody past. It was clear even to the early revisionist forces that the military option was gone for good. This realization marks an important break with German tradition. The Weimar Republic, for example, had never definitively excluded the use of force particularly against Poland - even in its more moderate variants; for a large section of the conservative ruling classes, such a 'passage at arms' was only a question of time. The second major step forward has been the gradual differentiation in revisionist hopes and demands - i.e. the stage-by-stage 'renunciation' of claims to the territories east of the Oder and Neisse. The path here led from the 'Three-way division - never!' slogan, via the Protestant Church's 1965 memorandum and the controversies over the treaties concluded with the East in the early 1970s, to the acceptance of the German-Polish borders as self-evident by prac-

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tically all Germans, including the political elite. The recognition that, in view of the brutal way in which the Germans themselves had forced the course of history, there was nothing further to be sought here and that instead, both on moral grounds and on grounds of political realism, a new start must be made, building on the results of past history, can already be detected in rudimentary form in Adenauer's own inconsistencies. A lengthy and difficult process of debate and reconciliation, both domestically and with the outside world, was needed before this realization became generally accepted. Finally, the very real prospect of the renewed unification of the two German half-states has removed the remaining reservations which in any case had more to do with tactics than with principle. The third step, finally, was the transition from power to compromise in German Ostpolitik. At the outset it was imagined that political pressure from the West could move the Soviet Union to adjust the effects of World War II - a war waged, and finally lost, by Germany itself and conducted, particularly in the East, as a war of aggression and extermination. There then followed a kind of rapprochement with the USSR and Eastern Europe, but the GDR continued to be excluded from detente until the advent of the new Ostpolitik. Ultimately, however, it came to be accepted that German interests were most likely to be realized through a policy of understanding. The commitment of both German states to arms control within the framework of cooperative structures - not, as in the Weimar Republic, as a cloak for revisionist aspirations - was the clearest indication of the new orientation. In addition to all this there is the fact that the Federal Republic is now firmly integrated into the West. Even if the bond provided by the military alliance should one day disappear - one of its original functions was to keep Germany under control - the possibility of a German special way, between East and West, is very slight. Integration embraces far more than the military dimension; it applies above all to the economic and cultural fields, but increasingly also to the political domain. At a time

of globally increasing interdependence, Western Europe and the whole North Atlantic region form one of the most closely integrated areas of the world. Transnational interconnections and the number of supranational authorities in Europe will increase further, and a complete political and military withdrawal of the United States from Europe is not under discussion, even in the longer term. The process of integration undergone by German foreign policy is a feature not confined to Western Europe and the North Atlantic; it now embraces the whole of Europe - albeit in more moderate form. The CSCE process can produce just the kind of stabilization that Europe did not manage to achieve in the interwar period. In fifteen years this process has far exceeded the achievements of the League of Nations in the fields of confidence-building, reduction in tension and cooperation, and it has managed to do this in spite of the rift between the political systems. The Germans are benefiting from this process, and it now enjoys almost unanimous support, the conservatives' initial reservations having been rapidly dispelled. As the antagonism between the systems recedes, the CSCE will acquire even greater significance. The integrating effects described will also affect the united Germany. The Federal Republic has been a functioning Westernstyle democracy, and there is a good chance that the united Germany will also produce a stable democracy, even taking into account the Stalinist legacy which has yet to be worked through. In this connection, and viewed against the background of the history of German unification in the 19th century (the failure of the democratic national movement, unification 'from above' and via wars against Denmark, Austria-Hungary and France), the peaceful, democratic and defensive character of this union is of particular significance. As far as the influence of a newly united Germany is concerned, it cannot be disputed that geographically it will continue to form the heart of the centre of Europe, albeit not in so dominating a fashion as before - and even after - World War 1. The

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Gert Krell and West Germany and the revision of the OderNeisse border is part of the process which I describe. The important asymmetry here consisted in the fact that the basic line taken by the Federal Republic was supported by a large majority of the general public, whereas the course opted for by the GDR leadership was rejected by an equally large majority of East Germans. The East German communists had their own ideas on the liberation of West Germany, enunciated in their most aggressive form in the early days of the Korean war. See, for example, the speech by Carlo Schmid during the Bundestag debate of 3/4 April 1952, as quoted in von Schubert (1978), pp. 176-177. See, for example, Steininger (1985). He explains in great detail why the Western powers were so concerned at the prospect of a united neutralized German state, but his interpretation is quite inconsistent. On the one hand he shows outrage at the duplicity of the Western allies over the division of Germany; on the other he criticizes Adenauer for not having tried to play the East off against the West. The Rapallo complex, which he mentions, does not account fully for Western reactions; the West had, after all, been faced with a pact between Hitler and Stalin and had reacted nervously throughout the war to any signs of rapprochement between Germany and Russia. Brandt quotes a reporter who wrote the following about the event: 'And then he kneels: who need not kneel kneels for all those who should but do not because they dare not or cannot or cannot dare' (Brandt, 1989, p. 214, my translation.)

Germans' economic potential will increase further with unification. Yet here too one must keep things in perspective. All the statistics indicate that German influence in Europe is considerable but nowhere near constituting dominance - particularly when one considers that superpower potential outside the central region (in a qualitatively different form compared to the interwar period) is linked to Europe and has an effect on it. In addition, the economic reconstruction of the former GDR will tie up energies for years to come and will impose extra demands on the process of ecological reorganization. Thus we are left with the well-founded hope that the new common sense and restraint in German foreign policy will persist even through difficult times. The influence of the German nucleus in Europe need not automatically have dire consequences. Germany's exposed position was no more inevitable than was its endangerment of its neighbours; both were the result of bad politics, not the product of geographical location or size. Why should the two newly united German states not play the productive and constructive role - in East and West, for Europe and the Germans themselves - of which German history also provides many examples. Conditions, both external and internal, have, at any rate, never been so favourable. The continued anchoring of Germany in the West and the new treaty with the Soviet Union are ideal morning gifts for the reunified country. Germany now has the historical opportunity to become a testing ground for the peaceful healing-over of a Europe that is still not one, politically, economically or psychologically.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

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NOTES
1. I make no strict distinction between Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik; I use the latter term in its broadest sense. 2. I do not include the question of the Saar here. I use the term 'revisionism' in the narrow sense implied in 'Three-way division - never!', an early FDP electoral slogan, although I realize that this term has many different - and in some cases problematic historical and topical connotations. The distinction between the revision of the division between East

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West German Ostpolitik and the German Question Grundfragen der deutschen Auflenpolitik seit 1871.

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Note vom 10. Miirz 1952 und die Wiedervereinigung. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. - KontinuiBerlin-Bonn:Dietz. Andreas, 1984.'Revisionismus Hillgruber, der Weimarer St6kl, Gunter, 1970. Osteuropa und die Deutschen: tit und Wandelin der Aul3enpolitik Geschichte und Gegenwart einer spannungsreichen Republik',pp. 59-85 in A. Hillgruber,Die Last der Nation. Fiinf Beitriige iiber Deutschland und die Nachbarschaft.Munich: Deutscher TaschenbuchDeutschen.Diisseldorf:Droste. verlag. Krell, Gert, 1990. 'Die Ostpolitikder Bundesrepublik Volkmann, Hans-Erich, 1988. 'Die sozialdemokratische innerparteiliche Deutschlandund dei deutsche Frage', Aus Politik Diskussion uiberSicherheit, und Beitgeschichte, vol. 40, no. 29, pp. 23-34. und deutscheEinheit (1953-55)', pp. Entspannung 153-177 in Bruno Thess & Hans-ErichVolkmann, Loth, Wilfried, 1989. Die Teilung der Welt 1941-1955, 2nd ed. Munich:DeutscherTaschenbuchverlag. eds, Zwischen Kaltem Krieg und Entspannung: Loth, Wilfried, 1989. Ost-West-Konflikt und deutsche Nolte, Ernst, 1985. Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg, von Schubert, Klaus, 1978. Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Dokumentation 1945von Schubert, Klaus, 1979. Sicherheitspolitikder Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Dokumentation 1945-1977,

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Frage.Munich:DeutscherTaschenbuchverlag. 2nd ed. Munich: Piper.

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Boppard:Boldt.

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vol. 2. Cologne:Wissenschaft und Politik.

GERT KRELL, b. 1945, Dr. phil. in Political Science (University of Frankfurt, 1976), Dr. phil. habil. in International Relations (University of Giessen, 1984); Executive Director, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (1986-90). Most recent book, edited together with Egon Bahr & Johannes Schwerdtfeger: Friedensgutachten 1990 (Lit Verlag, 1990).

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