Mediterranean Platforms Safety Improvement Project: Engineering Approach for Safety & Operability Improvement

P. Blotto, N. Abdelkarim, R. Adell Colomer, Eni E&P, M.Kallaf, D. Anelli, S. Kandil, C. Bottaro, A. Abd El Rahman, G. Del Carmine,Petrobel, L. Piazzi, SEI, S. Socci, RINA INDUSTRY
This paper was presented at the Offshore Mediterranean Conference and Exhibition in Ravenna, Italy, March 28-30, 2007. It was selected for presentation by the OMC 2007 Programme Committee following review of information contained in the abstract submitted by the authors. The Paper as presented at OMC 2007 has not been reviewed by the Programme Committee.

ABSTRACT
Achieving an offshore platform design that guarantees safe and reliable production operations usually is a challenging objective considering the complexity of meeting all the needs of Engineering, HSE, Operations and matching that with the economic investments constraints. Improving the safety and reliability of an existing platform represents a much greater challenge since the selection and implementation of the improvements has to take into account the difficulties related to the execution of offshore works, limitations of the existing installations and the need of minimising the production shutdown. In addition, since the objective of the revamping is not simply de-bottlenecking, due to production increase usually associated with increased reserves, the profitability of the Project is more difficult to be assessed. This challenge was put forth to Eni E&P Projects Development Department by Petrobel request for the improvement of the existing Mediterranean offshore gas platforms originally designed with the RULE (Reliable Unattended Low Energy) concept. With a request covering a list of ten platforms, a systematic approach was developed in order to identify the effective major risks in each of the platforms. Each offshore installation was analysed with a standard process aimed at responding to the safety and operability requirements specific to each of the installations operation and design. The paper presents the details of the methodology adopted on Petrobel Mediterranean Offshore platforms with the advantages, challenges and lessons learnt encountered in the implementation of the Safety Improvement process.

INTRODUCTION
Revamping projects by nature pose a challenge for engineering mainly related to the restrictions of the existing facilities and to the unavoidable impacts on production. This challenge is extended when the objective is not de-bottlenecking, as accustomed in revamping projects, but is the improvement of Safety & Operability of the existing facilities. The complexity of the objective is posed not only by the limitations related to the execution of offshore works, restrictions of the existing installations limiting shutdown of production, but also by the difficulty of assessing the profitability of such an objective. The provision of a standard approach to capture and identify all the various aspects of safety and operability that require intervention or remediation, applicable to all the offshore installations, was deemed necessary as the solution that would enable an effective engineering to be undertaken. 1

Project Initiation The Mediterranean Safety Improvement Project was initiated by Petrobel (PTB) in an effort to achieve an enhanced safety level for all the offshore installations in PTB Mediterranean concessions. Petrobel request was relevant to a list of ten platforms, installed between 1995 and 2002. Some of them had already undergone revamping and upgrading work to respond to the production increase needs. All the designated platforms were sharing some common points that could compromise the safety and effective operability of the platforms: 1. Most existing platforms were not covered by gas detection systems due to RULE (Reliable Unattended Low Energy) original design 2. They had limited power supply as it is currently provided by solar panels 3. The installed solenoid valves were not energized therefore not completely suitable for automatic PSD & ESD 4. Some installations where producing in excess of their original design rate 5. Most of these structures belong to the same concession and rely upon the same export network thus yielding to a crucial bottle-neck point 6. Some structures are normally manned in spite of the fact that the original design is for unmanned structures. 7. Connections to the onshore control system were not sufficient for an effective and reliable reaction

Project Scope & Key Objectives Definition Hence, the project scope was set to define and carry out all necessary activities to ensure that all the Mediterranean Offshore Platforms, Pipelines & Export Network are operating at an acceptable safe level from both design and risk management perspectives. The project aim is to ensure that the existent systems are and continue to operate both efficiently and adequately safe, with the following key objectives as main guidelines: Enhance the safety level while ensuring smooth operability. Increase overall uptime of the facilities by minimizing HSE operational risks Manage risks in operational and maintenance activities Verify the actual compliance of Mediterranean installations with International and Egyptian Health, Safety and Environmental legislation, codes and standards. Ascertain any potential HSE impact of construction, production, operations and decommissioning on the neighbouring environment and ensure that these are minimised. Developed Approach From both PTB request and the set objectives there were several points that Eni E&P had to take into considerations in order to pursue those objectives forth for the project: 1. Number of Installations Involved: The request covered 10 platforms, that even though they had common issues, they had their own peculiar risks to manage 2

2. Information Availability: in some cases, upgrading activities were carried out on the original design with no appropriate tracking. 3. Safety & Operability Risks: specific issues related to Safety & Operability risks were not clearly defined in the original request. 4. Economic Constraints: The objectives of the revamping are not associated with increased reserves and require both investment and possible production shutdown, consequently the revamping activities identified have to be highly optimised with its pertinent offshore works and production shutdown. With the above mentioned considerations, a systematic approach was developed in order to effectively identify and respond to the identified major risks expected at each individual platform. Each offshore installation was analysed with a standard process aimed at responding to the platforms specific safety requirements related to both operation and design. Three phases were identified to complete the safety improvement process (see Fig. 1): This approach has advantages, such as: revealed several

Platforms Assessment

Engineering Design Audit/ Re-Certification

Fig 1: Safety Improvement Process

1. Each installation undergoes this cycle to respond to the urgency of the request. 2. Each Installation has a risk identification process tailored to the specific nature of its operations which are expected to be carried out. 3. Each installation has is own dedicated team able to understand the installations specific concerns. 4. The specialists who participate in the assessment are also involved in the Engineering activities (Process, Piping & HCU); Each phase is briefly described as follows: 1. Offshore Platforms Assessment: Aimed at evaluating the status of the systems currently installed onboard installations in order to obtain a comprehensive and updated picture of the existing offshore facilities (including pipeline network) status. This includes a dedicated survey, producing as built documentation & process review, identification of early and remedial actions, a dedicated HAZOP workshop. 2. Engineering Design: Engineering activities for the implementation of all the necessary improvements as a result of the assessment process including the analysis of maintenance and test requirements. Based on the collected data/documentation and HAZOP recommendations, the design basis definition, the basic engineering design (process and safety review) and the Quantitative Risk Analysis were carried out. The phase also covers Detailed Engineering and the Procurement & Implementation Activities. 3. Audit/Re-Certification: Verification of the system safety and efficiency of the operability as an integrated system and, where applicable, offshore platforms fit for purpose Certification. 3

Phase 1: Offshore Platforms Assessment:

This Phase is divided in the following steps: Documentation Collection & Analysis: This comprises the gathering of all necessary information needed for the safety studies and engineering activities to follow. Dedicated Survey & Documentation Updating: This includes the acquisition and verification of necessary information for documentation updating. This step is crucial to obtain a comprehensive picture of the existing offshore facilities, including pipeline network with a primary identification of major and critical issues to be addressed. This, on its turn, contributes to the priority definition for Risk Assessment/Design Review process and to the identification of Early Remedial Actions.

Documentation Collection & Analysis Surveys & Documentation updating Early Remedial Actions Definition HAZOP

Fig 2: Offshore Platforms Assessment Phase

In addition, it allows the production of updated documentation covering P&IDs, Plot Plans, as built and operation manuals, which are fundamental for HAZOP, QRA, Feasibility and Engineering Activities. Early Remedial Actions Identification: It is crucial to identify the minimum necessary actions and safety precautions to operate the existing installations until the long term remedial activities, as a product of engineering, are fully implemented. Output of this phase comprises a list of identified risks, both on personnel and process, were immediate action is required, as for example Contingency Plans. The risks are highlighted and ranked according to the Eni E&P Division Events Risk Screening Matrix. Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) HAZOP is the tool chosen to systematically identify all the plant critical situations from a safety and operability stand point, in order to assess if adequate safeguards to prevent any plant upsets are in place. The HAZOP results form the basis of the scope of work for all the subsequent project activities. It sets the main areas of concern where the engineering should directly act upon in order to provide adequate response/solution, as it identifies where areas of both debottleneck and design change should be required. The objectives of the HAZOP studies developed along this Project are:

 identify hazards and operability problems related to the process that could directly threaten the health and safety of operating personnel, the integrity of plant assets, the environment or cause operational upsets; identify engineering and procedural safeguards already incorporated into the design that will reduce the likelihood or the severity of consequences related to the identified problems; evaluate the adequacy of the existing design provision and procedural safeguards; and recommend additional safeguards or operational procedures where necessary. The HAZOP team is a multidisciplinary team (including PTB Operators and ENI E&P Specialists) involved in process design, instrumentation and control, project, operations, HSE and maintenance of the facility, led by an independent consultant provided by ENI E&P. The HAZOP studies performed have identified, in some cases, numerous recommendations that should reduce potential safety or operability problems associated with the operations (process or utilities) of platforms and sea-lines, including the hazards deriving from jack-ups approaching the platform during work over campaigns. Some of these recommendations are similar for the different utility systems or process vessels since the design of the different platforms involved share similar process design and consequently similar operational problems. In the platforms analysed, there are some equipment, piping and instrumentation working in different conditions than foreseen in the original design. Several recommendations require to update/verify the original design in order to safely accommodate the present operating conditions. According to the experience gained in the HAZOPs already performed, the importance of full involvement of the operating personnel in the HAZOP sessions can not be overlooked. Their contribution to identify hazards (for process equipment, operating personnel and environment) and minimise the related risks, is crucial to give effective input to the engineering of the actual operating needs to be taken into consideration. The HAZOP was found to be an efficient tool at the Project start up but, at the same time, a demanding and complex task: to ensure its effectiveness, it is of paramount importance that all the parties involved in the meetings are fully committed to make it successful. In particular Operations Department has to be deeply involved to fill the gap due to the incompleteness of as built documentation (both topside facilities and sealines) and the uncertainties on the Operation and Maintenance philosophy (which includes logistics). In addition, the HAZOP study added the substantial advantage of direct identification of the areas of concern specific to our scope, thus providing a clear scope of work for Engineering activities and Operations & Maintenance Planning . An important improvement aspect was the establishment of a formal live document: the HAZOP Follow-up Report, which was set up for each installation, and where the status of recommendations and their specific response, owned by each of the concerned departments (Engineering, HSE and Operations) are reported. This is an important aspect that will contribute both to the final phase of the project (Auditing/Recertification), and also to the Project Close-out Report, where the performance achieved in all aspects of the project is summarised.

Phase 2: Engineering Design

This Phase is divided in the following steps: Design Basis Definition and Basic Engineering: The existing platforms covered by the Project were originally designed with the RULE concept and produces Miocene gas, rich of heavy hydrocarbon components. On the satellite wellhead platforms the gas coming from the wellheads is routed into a manifold and exported to the central complex of the field. In the central complex the gas produced by local wells is mixed with the gas received from the satellite wellhead platforms and treated into a first stage 3phase separator.
Basic Engineering Development

QRA

Basic Design Review Detailed Engineering Development Procurement Services & Implementation

Fig 3: Engineering Design Phase

The separated gas, hydrocarbon condensates and water are then exported to the onshore treatment plant through separate subsea pipelines. Glycol and corrosion inhibitor are injected both onboard the satellite platform and in the central complex. Pour point depressant is injected in the hydrocarbon condensates exported from the central complex to shore. The platforms are normally unmanned and remotely controlled from shore through a Distributed Control System using a radio link for data communications. The requested electric power is provided by photovoltaic panels as primary source and by a diesel generator as back-up. The substructure of the satellite platforms are constituted by a mono-pile whilst the central complex decks are supported by traditional 4-legged jacket. All the platforms are installed in a water depth ranging from 22 to 28m. In the specific case of the satellite platforms, the configuration of the substructure represents a constraint to the revamping project since it does not allow significantly extending the deck and increasing the platform payload. Also the revamping of the central complex platforms is heavily constrained by limitations on the space and on the maximum available payload. In this case the constraints are due to the fact that the production rates from the field exceeded the expectations and the platforms were already revamped in the past to cope with the production increases. The systems mainly interested by the Safety Improvement Project were: The shut down and blow down system The chemical injection system The instrument gas production system The Wellheads Hydraulic Control Panel and the Local Panels installed on the BDV and PSV The fire and gas detection system 6

The upgrade of the above systems was not only aimed to improve the safety of the plants but also to increase their efficiency, availability and reliability. The specific safety issues addressed by the Project were: The review and upgrade of the escape routes and means, including the installation of a totally enclosed life boat in the central complex. The installation of a Gas Detection System The review and upgrade of the safety and personal protective equipment. The key task of the Project was represented by the analysis and verification of the existing systems and the subsequent identification of the modifications which more suitably address the HAZOP recommendations. The selected solutions resulted from the compromise between the best technical solution and the need of meeting cost and space constraints. A huge analytic and conceptual work was performed to support plant improvements that in some cases led to minor modifications in terms of hardware but represented major changes in terms of plant management philosophy. The complexity and the peculiarity of the Project were also clearly reflected in its execution schedule. The duration of the engineering phase was in fact much longer than what is normally expected for the design of a new platform. The main challenge faced during the Project execution was represented by the fact that the platforms are very congested and there are only marginal possibilities for increasing the payload and the space for the installation of new facilities. Another challenge was represented by the difficulties in finding a complete set of the as-built documents and thus to have a clear idea of the platform configuration. The incompleteness of updated as built information was partially mitigated by performing site surveys but the time and economical constraints and the difficulties in accessing the platforms led to the decision of addressing during the survey only the following aspects: Completeness of safety and personal protection aids Detection of evident hazards for people safety As built of P&IDs As built of platform general plot plans As built of Hydraulic Control Units

Future similar projects would be more effective if a more strict cooperation and communication between the engineering team and the Operations is established at an early stage, having in mind that such kind of projects are also aimed to improve the operability and the maintainability of the plants. This goal can be achieved directly from the beginning of basic design phase (Concept Definition) only if the engineering team can have a clear understanding of the current operating philosophies and of the operative staff needs. Achievement of this goal could be further optimised if this communication is also included in the feasibility phase (Concept Selection).

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA): The aim of the activity has been the performing of a complete Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) process for Petrobel offshore platforms installed in the Mediterranean Sea, off the Egyptian coast. Quantitative Risk Assessment in the actual configuration A first phase has been developed, by means of a complete Risk Assessment management process, with a twofold aim: A systematic evaluation of the systems Risk Status in the present configuration, in terms of production capability, potential environmental impacts and involvement of operational and maintenance personnel in case of accidental events; Identification of technical and management criticalities, with reference to the present operational and management configurations, in order to support the definition of possible safety-related design and management improvements. The study has been performed following the ENI standard ENI E&P Division - HSE Integrated Management System, HSE Standards HSE Risk Management doc. No.1.3.0.0.3, as schematically represented in the following figure 4.

Fig 4:

Methodological approach and main steps of QRA

In order to support the assessment of the platform safety and to measure the efficacy of the improvements under discussion, a list of Reference Initiating Events (RIE), enveloping the main categories of hazards and the safety related issues, has been defined and assessed in detail, by application of all analytical steps and development of risk matrixes to be compared with acceptability criteria defined by ENI. At the end of the process of analysis, a final discussion on the risk assessment has been produced, in the form of an overview of the risk associated to the operation of the platforms in the present configuration, with reference to: the hazards and safety-related issues highlighted in the Hazard Identification phase, and 8

 the detailed quantitative risk evaluation analyses performed for the selected Reference Initiating events and related accidental scenarios. From a general point of view, several accidental sequences falls in the yellow part of the ENI risk matrixes, characterized by the necessity to apply an ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) approach, in order to evaluate by cost/benefit analyses the need for the of implementation of risk reduction measures. The accidental scenarios falling in this class of risk are mainly related to impact on personnel and on asset/production of platforms, and only in few cases to environment and reputation. A number of accidental sequences, mainly related to external leakage due to major rupture originated in the riser, falls in the "red" zone of the ENI risk matrixes, characterized by an intolerable risk, with particular reference to personnel and asset/production. A representation of distribution of risk categories is shown in the following figure 5.
Acceptable 7% ALARP Intolerable

27%

65%

Fig 5: Distribution (%) of risk categories for the analysed accidental scenarios of RIE 16 (PF Aegypodes)

The following considerations has been done, resulting from the above analysis: the distribution shown in figure 5 has confirmed that operation of platforms under study is characterised by a level of risk (with reference to impact on personnel, asset/production, environment and reputation) substantially acceptable and adequate in relation to the industrial field (Oil&Gas offshore domain, with extraction and process of high quantities of potentially flammable and explosive substances in critical conditions in terms of flows and pressures), even if some unacceptable sequence and several ALARP accidental sequences can be expected and carefully evaluated; several accidental sequences are characterised by extended consequences (direct involvement in jet fires flames, indirect thermal radiation, overpressures by explosions, etc.) all over the platforms, especially when correlated to significant ruptures: this is mainly due to the high pressures and high flow rates characterising the gas involved in the extraction process; In particular, all the intolerable risks are referred to impacts on assets/production; the severe involvement of personnel in the effects of accidental sequences is obviously important but is not so relevant in some of the analysed cases, since the presence of people onboard is quite rare (unmanned platforms); extended structural damages may be expected, due to the extensions and dimensions of physical phenomena and to the high density of instruments and equipments present on the platforms decks: this implies major damages also in case of minor ruptures/leakages leading to partial involvements of the platforms in the area affected by the physical effects; Final qualitative considerations about the expected reduction of the risks associated with the possible design and management improvement (mitigation and/or prevention of hazardous scenarios), have been additionally provided, in order to better support the evaluation of the benefits of new foreseen configurations, developed in the subsequent Phase II.

Phase II Risk Mitigation Measures A second phase of the study (Phase II) has been developed in order to discuss and (when applicable) to evaluate the impact in terms of risk reduction of a number of main design improvements (Risk Mitigation Measures RMM), highlighted in the different phases of QRA Phase I and/or already proposed in the design and engineering improvement program. For all the main RMM the following considerations have been done: impact of the RMM on the Incidental Sequences, identified in QRA Phase I, in terms of modifications to Event Tree and Fault Tree structures (which represent escalation of initial ents); qualitative evaluation (when feasible/applicable) of the positive impact on risk (risk reduction) arising from the implementation of the proposed improvements; further considerations about technical issues to be deeply investigated in the following basic design phase and discussion of possible alternative technical solutions for the improvements. As an example, the figures 6 and 7 show the expected impacts of Improvement 1 (Reinstating of communication and remote control of platforms by CCR) and Improvement 4 (reinstating of HIPPS system) on risk matrixes associated to two main reference initiating events.

Fig 6: Risk-based discussion of improvement 1 (Reinstating of communication and remote control of PFs by CCR Finally, it is important to highlight that all the previous considerations allow the prioritisation of selected improvements by assignment of priority indexes based on the level of expected risk reduction.

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Fig 7:

Risk-based discussion Improvement 4 (Reinstating of HIPPS system)

The QRA study for Petrobel offshore platforms installed in the Mediterranean Sea, that is still ongoing for some installations, is revealing to be a very powerful tool as a support to engineering design as a support to the selection, development and prioritisation of main design improvements by means of a risk-based approach. Moreover, QRA can be used for the evaluation of the expected impacts in terms of risk reduction. The application of the QRA process for the first group of installations, concluded in 2006, allowed to highlight several important considerations not only in terms of specific risk issues and possible design improvements, but also several important methodological issues to be deepened and/or improved in the successive studies presently in progress, for example: the need for a better understanding and characterisation of possible human-related external events (impacts or additional possibility of ignition by vessels and or helicopters during approaching operations, effective presence of personnel onboard for maintenance and operational purposes, etc.); the adoption of more reliable databases specifically developed in the offshore field (ref. HSE, Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases, Statistics 2001); the opportunity to better characterise the ignition probabilities, accounting for expected release rates and considering credibility factors such as manned/unmanned status of platforms and related foreseen jobs, wind direction towards ignition sources, presence of effective ignition sources (hot works, electric equipment, helicopter approach etc.); All these issues have been detailed and applied in the new QRA studies presently in progress; they are showing very positive impacts on the methodological approach and on the results in terms of risk evaluation and discussion of possible risk mitigation measures. The most advanced phase of the project is currently undergoing the Basic Design Review for Petrobel endorsement of the Basic Design (Concept Definition) in order to proceed to the Detailed Engineering Development Phase (Execution). The following paragraph details the future phases planned to be carried out in the project. Detailed Engineering: The project then is to proceed for the issue and preparation of all relevant documentation for construction and supply specifications for the equipment to be replaced/added. The output of this phase is Supply Specifications Documentation for Construction Maintenance specifications

Procurement Services & Implementation: Procurement & Implementation Phase covers the Tender out for the new equipment necessary for the upgrading activities. This ranges from Technical Evaluation of bidders offers and relevant Technical Follow-up to the activities of Inspection & Expediting for the final execution of the revamping activities.

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Phase 3: Audit/Re-Certification
The third and final foreseen phase of the project includes the verification of the system safety and efficiency of the operability as an integrated system and, where applicable, fit for purpose Certification. These audit activities will verify that all the recommendations defined in safety improvement activities have been correctly implemented and meet the project intents. The auditing activities will be carried out on site, through both meeting with the various Petrobel departments involved (Engineering, Maintenance, HSE, etc.) and conducting surveys on the platforms themselves. The activities will include, but not be limited to: Check of Drawing and P&Ids updating; Check of Material Certificates, Test Reports, etc. On site Inspections for checking the plants and safety systems improvements Certification/ReCertification of new components (where required) The audit activities result is the emission of a report in which the gap between the proposed activities and their effective implementation is highlighted.

CONCLUSIONS
Handling Safety & Operability issues of existing plants is a complicated process for engineering and consequence implementation. The approach outlined in this paper represents the systematic approach adopted to handle such complicated process implementation for the existing issues of Petrobel platforms. The methodology adopted for the execution of the engineering was found quite efficient and effective. In particular the HAZOP was found to be an appropriate tool for analyzing in a punctual and exhaustive manner the existing systems. Additionally, the HAZOP represented a good occasion for transferring from the operators to the engineering team useful information on the actual configuration of the systems and on the operative procedures currently in place. In addition, considering that Safety and Operability were the predefined requirements of the different project phases, Effective risk management is ensured.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Special Acknowledgment for Petrobel for launching the Mediterranean Platforms Safety Improvement Project.

REFERENCES
HAZOP ISO Reference RINA Rules - RES.11/E- Rules for the classification of steel fixed platforms (2004) "Integrated HSE Management System Organization and HSE Guidelines" Doc. N1.3.0.03 Safety Management Hazard Identification Report. Doc MQ9208C1 DNV, Offshore Reliability Data OREDA 92 and OREDA 97 EGIG database, 5th Report of the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group 1970-2001, December 2002 API, Risk Based Inspection Base Resource Document - Publication 581, May 2000 Prediction of Vessel and Piping Failure Rates in Chemical Process Plants using the Thomas model, Medhekar, Process Safety Progress, vol. 12, April 1993 E&P Forum, Risk Assessment Data Directory, 1996 TNO, Yellow Book: Methods for the calculation of physical effects due to releases of hazardous materials (liquids and gases), 3rd edition, 1997 HSE, Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases, Statistics 2000 Lees F., Loss prevention in the process industries, 2nd edition 1996 http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ipcsneng/nengsyn.html

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