ABBAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CORTES; November 10, 1989 FACTS - Petitioner Abbas, a representative of other taxpayers in Mindanao, filed

this petition to(1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional - The 1987 Constitution provides for regional autonomy through Article X, section 15 which provides that "there shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." - To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides: Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government. Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws. The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in

Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family, and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social and tourism development; (7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao." ISSUES 1. WON certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement. 2 .WON R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution. HELD 1. No, RA 6743 does not conflict with the Tripoli Agreement. SC finds it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under public international or internal Philippine law. The Constitution itself provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the

implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter. 2. No, R.A. No. 6734 does not violate 1987 Constitution. a. Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite. The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus: SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions. Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative

of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. b. Equal protection of the law Petitioner insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited. Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. SC cannot do this without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification. The guarantee of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself. c. Free exercise of religion Petitioner questions the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious

convictions. Judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist. In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. The Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.

SARMIENTO V MISON PADILLA; December 17, 1987 FACTS - Petitioners Sarmiento and Arcilla who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and Constitutional Law professors seeks to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. In addition, they would want to enjoin Budget Secretary Guillermo Carague from disbursing Misons salary and emoluments. The grounds for the petition was that Misons stay in Office is unconstitutional as there was no confirmation coming from the Commission on Appointments that is required by the Constitution. The Commission on Appointments was allowed to intervene in the court proceeding. - The case was considered justiciable given that there is great public interest such as the need for stability in public service. This disposed the question of whether this is the proper remedy to question respondents right to the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and also that of the legal standing of the petitioners. - The Constitutional Provision under careful examination is Article VII Section 16, which states that: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the

heads of the departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. ISSUE WON Misons stay in Office was Constitutional HELD - Yes it is constitutional. - Reading Article VII Section 16 there are 4 groups of officers who the President is able to appoint. The first group would be the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. The second group is composed of those officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. The third group are those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Lastly, the fourth group, are those officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. - To interpret the law the Justices went back in history to look at the previous constitutions, the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In the 1935 Constitution all appointments is subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments while this was removed in the 1973 Constitution wherein the President is able to appoint without the need for the approval of the Commission on Appointments. Both were problematic as the 1935 provision became a venue of horse-trading (used for political leverage) while the 1973 provision gave too much power to the President. The court held that the 1987 provision on appointment was the middle ground that was sought by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. - Looking through the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission they said that the clear and positive intent of the framers were to make those officers in the first sentence the individuals that are subject to the approval and confirmation of the Commission on Appointments while those on the second and third sentence need not seek such confirmation. Given that the position as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is not under those specified in the first sentence but the second, therefore petitioner Mison is not in need of the approval of the Commission on Appointments and thus should be able to exercise full authority and functions and be entitled to his salary and emoluments. Decision Petition DISMISSED. Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Sarmientoconcurring (11) Gutierrez, Cruz- dissenting (2) SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [dissent]

There is a need to look at the provision in its entirety. The focus of the records was merely on the first sentence of the provision and the not on the following sentences. Those are crucial given that the position in question falls under the latter. Also, the records of the Constitutional Commission are merely extrinsic aids and are at best persuasive only and not necessarily conclusive. In addition, strictly interpreting the third sentence may create an absurdity for it gives Congress the discretion of not creating a law that would give the President the power to appoint those who are lower in rank. An irony arises when those in a lower position require the approval of the Commission on Appointments while those who are higher in position would not.

TOLENTINO V SECRETARY OF FINANCE MENDOZA; August 25, 1994 FACTS - These are original actions in SC. Certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716. - RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system by amending National Internal Revenue Code. Bet Jul 22, 1992 and Aug 31, 1993, bills were introduced in House of Reps to amend NIRC relative to VAT. These were referred to House Ways and Means Committee w/c recommended for approval H No 11197. - H No. 11197 was considered on second rdg and was approved by House of Reps after third and final rdg. - It was sent to Senate and was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. The Committee submitted report recommending approval of S No 1630, submitted in substitution of S No 1129, taking into consideration PS Res No 734 and H No 11197 - Senate approved S No 1630 on second rdg, and on third rdg by affirmative votes of 13 and 1 abstention. - H No 11197 and S No 1630 were referred to conference committee w/c after meeting 4 times, recommended that HB in consolidation w/ SB be approved in accordance w/ bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees. The Conference Committee Bill was approved by House of Reps and Senate. The enrolled bill was presented to President who, on May 5, 1994 signed it. It became RA 7716. On May 12, it was published in 2

newspapers of gen circulation and it took effect on May 28. - RA 7716 amended 103 and made print media subject to VAT in all aspect of operations. However, Sec of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94 exempting circulation income of print media. Income fr advertisements are still subject to VAT. - Implementation was suspended until Jun 30 to allow time for registration of businesses. Implementation was stopped by TRO fr Court, by vote of 11 to 4. - Petitioners contend: Re: Art VI Sec 24 1. Although H No 11197 originated fr House of Reps, it was not passed by Senate but was consolidated w/ Senate version in the Conference Committee to produce the bill. The verb shall originate is qualified by the word exclusively. 2. The constitutional design is to limit Senates power in revenue bills to compensate for the grant to the Senate of treaty-ratifying power. 3. S No 1630 was passed no in substitution of H No 11197 but of another Senate bill (S No 1129). Senate merely took H No 11197 into consideration in enacting S No 1630. Re: Art VI Sec 26(2) 1. The second and third rdgs were on the same day, Mar 24, 1994. 2. The certification of urgency was invalid bec there was no emergency. The growing budget deficit was not an unusual condition in this country. 3. Also, it was S No 1630 that was certified urgent, not H No 11197. Re: BCC acted within its power 1. RA 7716 is the bill which the BCC prepared. BCC included provisions not found in the HB or SB and these were surreptitiously inserted. BCC met behind closed doors. 2. Incomplete remarks of members are marked in the stenographic notes by ellipses. 3. The Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in preparation of BCC Report because Report didnt contain detailed and explicit statement of changes 4. It is required that the Committees report undergo three rdgs in the two houses. - Petitioner Philippine Airlines Inc contends: Re: Art VI Sec 26(1) 1. Neither H No 11197 nor S No 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions fr payment of VAT and this was made only by the BCC. This was not reflected in the title. 2. Besides, amendment of PALs franchise may be made only by special law which will expressly amend the franchise (24 of PD 1590). - Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines contends:

Re: Art III Sec 1 1. Withdrawal of exemption of some cooperatives while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives not only goes against policy to promote cooperatives but also violate equal protection of law. Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends: 2. VAT will reduce mark up of its members by as much as 90%. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends: 3. VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation. - Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends: Re: Art III Sec 4 1. It questions law bec exemption previously granted to press under NIRC was withdrawn. Although exemption was subsequently restored, PPI says theres possibility that exemption may still be removed by mere revocation by Secretary of Finance. Also, there is still unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of VAT on gross receipts on advertisements. 2. RA 7716 singled out press for discriminatory treatment, giving broadcast media favored treatment. 3. Imposing VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000 is discriminatory. 4. The registration provision of the law is invalid when applied to the press. - Petitioner Philippine Bible Society contends: Re: Art III Sec 5 1. Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because that power is vested in Congress and the Secretarys duty is to execute the law and the removal of exemption of religious articles violates freedom of thought/conscience. - Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends: Re: Art III Sec 10 1. Imposition of VAT violates constitutional provision on no law impairing obligation of contracts - Petitioner Philippine Educational Publishers Association contends: Re: Art II Sec 17 1. Increase in price of books and educ materials will violate govt mandate to prioritize education ISSUES Procedural 1. WON theres violation of Art VI 24 of Consti (revenue bill originating exclusively fr House of Reps) 2. WON theres violation of Art VI 26(2) of Consti (three readings on separate days) 3. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee acted within its power

4. WON theres violation of Art VI 26(1) of Consti (only one subject which is expressed in title) / WON amendment of 103 of NIRC is fairly embraced in title of RA 7716 although no mention is made therein Substantive: 5. WON Art III 1 (deprivation of life/liberty/property; equal protection) is violated 6. WON Art III 4 (freedom of speech/expression/press) is violated 7. WON Art III 5 (free exercise of religion) is violated 8. WON Art III 10 (no law impairing obligation of contracts) is violated 9. WON Art VI 28(1) (uniform/equitable; evolve progressive system of taxation) is violated 10. WON Art VI 28(3) (church/parsonage etc. for religious purpose exempt) is violated 11. WON Art II 17 (govt priority on education, science and tech) is violated HELD - Not all are judicially cognizable, bec not all Consti provisions are self executing. Other govt depts. are also charged w/ enforcement of Consti. Procedural Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of the RA must be resolved in its favor. An enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. This is not to say that the enrolled bill doctrine is absolute. But where allegations are nothing more than surreptitiously inserting provisions, SC declines going behind enrolled copy of bill. SC gives due respect to other branches of govt. 1. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 24 a. Its not the law but the revenue bill which is required to originate exclusively in the House of Reps. A bill originating in House may undergo extensive changes in Senate. To insist that a revenue statute (and not the bill) must be the same as the House bill would deny the Senates power to concur with and propose amendments. It would violate coequality of the legislative power of the two houses. b. Legislative power is issue here. Treaty-ratifying power is not legislative power but an exercise of check on executive power. c. Theres no difference bet Senate preserving house bill then writing its own version on one hand and on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the subject matter. Consti simply says that its the initiative for filing the bill that must come fr House of Reps. The Reps are expected to be more sensitive to the local needs. Nor does Consti prohibit filing in Senate of substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of bill fr House so long as action by Senate is withheld pending receipt of House

bill. It was only after Senate rcvd H No 11197 that legislation in respect of it began w/ referral to Senate Committee on Ways and Means. 2. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(2) a. It was because Pres certified S No 1630 as urgent. This certification dispensed w/ printing and rdg the bill on separate days. The phrase except when the President certifies to the necessity qualifies two stated conditions: (1) the bill has passed 3 rdgs on separate days and (2) it has been printed in final form and distributed 3 days before finally approved. To construe that the except clause dispenses only with printing would violate grammar rules and would also negate the necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill. Example is RA 5440 which had 2 nd and 3 rd rdgs on the same day after bill had been certified urgent. b. No Senator controverted factual basis of the certification and this should not be rvwd by the Court. c. It was S No 1630 that Senate was considering. When matter was before the House, Pres likewise certified H No 9210 then pending. 3. YES the BCC acted within its power a. Give and take often marks the proceedings of BCC. There was also nothing unusual in the executive sessions of the BCC. Under congressional rules, BCCs are not expected to make material changes but this is a difficult provision to enforce. The result could be a third version, considered an amendment in nature of substitute, the only requirement that the 3 rd version be germane to subject of the HB and SB. It is w/in power of BCC to include an entirely new provision. After all, report of BCC is not final and still needed approval of both houses to be valid. b. This could have been caused by stenographers limitations or to incoherence that sometimes characterize conversations. c. Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is standard practice in bill-drafting. Also, SC is not proper forum for these internal rules. d. If this were the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. That requirement must be construed only to mean bills introduced for the first time in either house, not the BCC report. 4. NO, there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)

a. Since the title states that the purpose is to expand the VAT system, one way is to widen the base by withdrawing some exemptions. To insist that PD 1590 in addition to 103 of NIRC be mentioned in title, would be to insist that title of a bill be a complete index of its content. b. That was just to prevent amendment by an inconsistent statute. And under Consti, grant of franchise for operation of public utility is subject to amendment, alteration, repeal by Congress when common good requires. Substantive - as RA 7716 merely expands base of VAT as provided in the orig VAT law, debate on wisdom of law should be in Congress. 5. NO there is no clear showing that Art III Sec 1 is violated - When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands respect; when property is imperiled, lawmakers judgment prevails. a. This is actually a policy argument. b. This is a mere allegation. c. This is also short of evidence. 6. NO Art III Sec a is not violated a. Theres no violation of press freedom. The press is not immune fr general regulation by the State. b. Its not that it is being singled out, but only because of removal of exemption previously granted to it by law. Also, the law would be discriminatory if the only privilege withdrawn is that to the press. But that is not the case. The statute applies to a wide range of goods and services. c. It has not been shown that the class subject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. This limit does not apply to press alone but to all sales. d. The fixed amount of P1000 is for defraying part of the cost of registration. Registration is a central feature of the VAT system. It is a mere administrative fee, not a fee on exercise of privilege or right. 7. NO Art III Sec 5 is not violated a. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious org. 8. NO Art III Sec 10 is not violated a. Parties to a contract cant fetter exercise of taxing power of State. Essential attributes of sovereign is read into contracts as a basic postulate of legal order. 9. VAT distributes tax burden to as many goods and svcs as possible, particularly to those w/in reach of higher income grps. Business establishments with annual gross sales of < P500,000 are exempted. Also, regressivity is not a negative standard. What is required is that we evolve a progressive taxation

system. 10. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious org. 11. NO there is no violation of Art II Sec 17 a. Same reason/ratio under issues on free speech/press. Decision Petitions are dismissed. Notes VAT is levied on sale, barter/exchange of goods and svcs. Then, its equal to 10% of gross selling price BENGZON V DRILON GUTIERREZ; April 15, 1992 FACTS - Petition to review the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Fiscal Year 1992 - Petitioners are retired justices of the SC and the CA who were receiving monthly pensions under RA No.910 as amended by RA No. 1797 - Respondents Drilon et al are sued in their official capacities of the Executive, involved in the implementation of the release of funds under the GAA - RA910 was enacted in 1953 to provide retirement pensions to Justices of the SC and the CA who have rendered service at least 2o years either in the judiciary or in any branch of govt, or in, both, or having attained the age of 70, or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office; he shall receive until his death the salary which he has received at the time of his retirement - RA910 was amended by RA1797. Identical retirement benefits were given to Consti Commissions and the AFP, under RA1568, as amended by RA3595, and PD578, respectively - Marcos issued successive decrees which automatically readjusted the retirement pensions of military officers and enlisted men. But those in the judiciary and the Consti Commissions were not included in this automatic readjustment, as Marcos repealed the automatic readjustment provisions (Section 3-a of RA1797 and RA3595) for the judiciary and the Consti Commissions - Realizing this unfairness, Congress in 1990 sought to reenact the repealed provisions by approving a bill on the matter (HB16297 and SB740) - Pres. Aquino vetoed the HB on the ground that it would erode the foundation of the policy on standardization of compensation under the Salary Standardization Law, RA6758 - On the other hand, retired CA justices Barcelona and Enriquez filed a petition for readjustment of their pensions in accordance with RA1797 by reasoning out that PD644 repealing RA1797 did not take effect as there was no valid publication pursuant to Tanada v

Tuvera, supposedly promulgated in 1975 but published only in the OG in 1983; Court authorized it as a result - As a result of the resolution by the Court, Congress included in the GAA appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of adjusted pensions rates for the retired justices - In Jan 1992, President vetoed portions of Section 1, and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provision for the SC and the Lower Courts on the ground that the President vetoed the HB on the matter already, and such appropriation would erode the policy of salary standardization ISSUE WON the veto by the president of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pension of the retired Justices of the SC and the CA HELD - The President did not veto items but provisions of the law in the GAA. - While veto power is generally all or nothing, vetoing the entire bill or none at all, it does not hold when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills. o The Constitution has a item veto power to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure; only a particular item or items may be vetoed o Item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts; it is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill o The President did not veto the general fund adjustment of 500M, to meet certain obligations WHICH is an ITEM. oWhat she vetoed were provisions methods and systems placed by Congress to insure that obligations would be paid when they fell due oThus, augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement benefits is a provision and not an item o Actually, what she really vetoed were RA1797 and the Resolution of the SC dated Nov 1991. WHICH SHE CANNOT VETO. - The repealing decrees (PD644) of Marcos re taking away the automatic readjustment for the judiciary never became valid law because it was never published, pursuant to the Tanada v Tuvera doctrine; RA 1797 was never repealed and there was no need for an HB in 1990 to restore it so even the presidents veto of the HB does not even have any effect in the continuing

implementation of the law - The Veto by the president trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary o Guaranty of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require o Power to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding highest rates authorized by law o Veto is tantamount to dictating to the judiciary how its funds should be utilized - The Justices have a right to their pensions pursuant to RA1797 o The purpose retirement laws like such is to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and retire with relative security

ASSOCIATION V ENRIQUEZ QUIASON; August 19, 1994 FACTS - House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. - On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act No. 7663 16 , the General Appropriation Act (GAA) of 1994. On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes. - In G.R. No. 113105, Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) et al. prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article 41 on the Countrywide Development Fund or pork barrels, the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, (b) Article 48 on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount appropriated under said Article 48 in excess of the P37.9 B allocated for the DECS; and (c) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994 - In G.R. No. 113174, 16 Senators question: (1) the constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR),

(e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU's) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's); and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service. 16 Entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" - In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Romulo and Taada together with the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a nonstock domestic corporation, sued as taxpayers, challenging the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriations for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefor. - In G.R. No. 113888, Senators Romulo and Taada contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA). - In view of the importance and novelty of most of the issues raised in the four petitions, the Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae. G.R. No. 113105 ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing 17 Substantive 2. WON the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) or pork barrels is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of a law 3. WON the act of Congress giving debt service and not education 18 as the highest priority in the allocation of budget unconstitutional 4. WON the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category is unconstitutional, as it is contrary to Article VI Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution 19

HELD Procedural 1. A member of Congress has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or any other 17 While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits. 18 Article XIV Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution states that: "The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment." 19 "No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations." act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress. Reasoning: Ponencia relied on precedent (Gonzales v. Macaraig) and a US case (United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co) as secondary source to recognize legal standing. Then in forming the ratio decidendi, it again relied on US cases as secondary sources (Coleman v. Miller, Holtzman v. Schlesinger) as well as the opinion of Justice Fernando as Amicus Curiae. Substantive 2. The power of appropriation lodged in Congress carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be. Reasoning: The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries" It was Congress

itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation. Executive function under the CDF involves implementation of the priority projects specified in the law. The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President. Hence, under Article 48 of the GAA of 1994, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the CDF, it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory. 3. The constitutional provision which directs the State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education is merely directory. Reasoning: It relied on precedence, Guingona, Jr. v. Carague. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education it does not thereby follow that Congress is deprived of its power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. 4. The members only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating expenses but it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives who shall approve the realignment. Decision Procedural 1. Petitioners, as members of Congress have locus standi Substantive 2. No. The CDF is not an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, hence constitutional 3. No. Congress act is not unconstitutional. It simply exercises its power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. 4. No. It is not unconstitutional. G.R. No. 113105 G.R. No. 113174 ISSUE WON veto of the special provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994 in the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire P86.3 B for said purpose is unconstitutional Or, simply put: WON the President exceeded the itemveto power accorded by the Constitution 20 HELD Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered an inappropriate provision 21 which can be vetoed separately from an

item. Reasoning: The issue, according to the ponencia is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. Hence, it used this case as precedent. It also cited another case, Henry v. Edwards to support its ratio. Citing Gonzales: As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Citing Henry v. Edwards: When the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as 'items' for purposes of the Governor's (Presidents) item veto power over general appropriation bills. Decision Yes. The President vetoed the entire paragraph 1 of the Special Provision of the item on debt service, including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." The said provisos, being appropriate provisions since they germane to and have a direct connection with the item on debt service, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of said provisions is void. G.R. No. 113174 G.R. No. 113766 G.R. No. 113888 20 Article VI Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution states that: The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but veto shall mot affect the item or items to which he does not object. 21 Also included in the category of inappropriate provisions which are intended to amend our laws, because clearly these laws have no place in an appropriations bill, and therefore unconstitutional. ISSUES 1. WON the veto for revolving funds of State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) is unconstitutional 2. WON the veto of the provision in the appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways on 70% (administrative) / 30% (contract) ratio for road

maintenance is unconstitutional 3. WON the veto of the provision on purchase of medicines by AFP is unconstitutional 4. WON the veto of special provisions on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment is unconstitutional 5. WON the veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds is unconstitutional 6. WON the Presidents directive that the implementation of the Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential approval is tantamount to an administrative embargo of the congressional will to implement the Constitution's command to dissolve the CAFGU's, therefore unconstitutional (Issue on Impoundment 22 ) 7. WON veto of the President setting conditions or guidelines in the appropriations for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, DPWH and CHR is unconstitutional HELD [1] to [5] Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered an inappropriate provision which can be vetoed separately from an item 23 Reasoning: Same ratio decidendi from the issue in the previous section is applied in the 5 issues in this section. Hence the reasoning for the ratio is the same as well. (Notice how the ratio is applied in the ruling or dispositive) 6. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate substantive bill. Reasoning: The ponencia simply cited notes from journals 24 in discussing the issue of Impoundment to support his reasoning in the present case. 7. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized by Congress is simply an 22 This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound is put in issue. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress.

It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of Funds, Harvard Law Review) 23 Note that this ratio is also applied in issue [6] aside from the ratio which I formulated there. This can be implied from, Again we state: a provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws. Hence, this is an inappropriate provision which can be vetoed separately. 24 Notes: Impoundment of Funds, Harvard Law Review; Notes: Presidential Impoundment Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, Georgetown Law Journal; Notes Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, Yale Law Journal exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that laws are faithfully executed. Decision 1. No. There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions. 2. Yes. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended - 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. 3. Yes. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item. 4. No. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. 5. No. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) 25 and 29(1) 26 of the Article VI of the Constitution. Thus veto is not unconstitutional. 6. No. The provision in an appropriations act cannot be

used to repeal or amend other laws. Impliedly, this is an inappropriate provision which can be vetoed separately. 7. No. By setting guidelines or conditions in his veto, the President is simply exercising his constitutional duty to implement the laws faithfully. Dispositive Petitions DISMISSED, except with respect with respect to [1] G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and [2] G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the 2 nd paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of appropriation for the DPWH; and (b) Special Provision 25 "No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations." 26 "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law" No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the AFP which is GRANTED. Voting: 14 Concur, 1 Dissent SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA [concur and dissent] - I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms the Court's decision in Gonzalez v. Macaraig - An inappropriate provision is still as provision, not an item and therefore outside the veto power of the Executive. VITUG [concur] - I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the President and his colleagues, would have

the best feel on the needs of their own respective constituents. It is not objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible.

GUINGONA V CARAGUE GANCAYCO; April 22, 1991 FACTS - The 1990 budget consisted of P98.4B in automatic appropriation (86.8 going to debt service) and P155.3 from the General Appropriations Act or a total of P233.5B; only P27B was allotted for DECS. Petitioners, as members of the Senate, question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the said budget as provided for by Presidential Decrees 81, 117, and 1967. - Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary to Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of the Constitution. And as provided by Art. 7 of the Civil Code, when statutes run contrary to the Constitution, it shall be void. - They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are no longer operative since they became functus oficio after President Marcos was ousted. With a new congress replacing the one man-legislature, new legislation regarding appropriation should be passed. Current appropriation, operating on no laws therefore, would be unenforceable. - Moreover, they contend that assuming arguendo that the said decrees did not expire with the ouster of Marcos, after adoption of the 1987 Constitution, said decrees were inconsistent with Sec. 24, Article VI of the Constitution which stated that: Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said

decrees violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service. - SolGen argues, on the other hand, that automatic appropriation provides flexibility: ". . . First, for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market conditions by redeeming high interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could lighten our outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-to-debt or other such schemes. Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising from any deviation from what has been previously programmed. The annual debt service estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based on a mathematical set or matrix or, in layman's parlance, `basket' of foreign exchange and interest rate assumption's which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time this comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened, only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediate-payment even before due dates. - Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person of Marcos."

ISSUES 1. WON appropriation of P86.8B for debt service as compared to its appropriation of P27.7B for education in violation of Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution. The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment. 2. WON the Presidential Decrees are still operative, and if they are, do they violate Sec. 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitutional. 3. WON there was undue delegation of legislative power by automatic appropriation. HELD 1. The Court disagrees that Congress hands are hamstrung by the provision provided. There are other imperatives of national interest that it must attend to; the amount allotted to education, 27.8B, is the highest in all department budgets thereby complying with the mandate of having the highest priority as stated above. The enormous national debt, incurred by the previous administration, however, still needs to be paid. Not only for the sake of honor but because the national economy is itself at stake. Thus, if Congress allotted more for debt service such an appropriation cannot be considered by this Court as unconstitutional. 2. Yes, they are still operative. The transitory provision provided in Sec. 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that: All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. - This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked. - Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by

implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated. 3. No. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefore as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country. - Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury. SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [dissent] He sees that an essential requirement for valid appropriation is that the sum authorized for release should be determinate or determinable. The Presidential Decrees do not satisfy this requirement. As to the ponencias reference to legislative parameters provided by law, Cruz says no such regulatory boundaries exist. PADILLA [dissent] - He agrees with Cruz but furthers the argument by saying that Sec. 29(1)Article VI implies that a law enacted by Congress (and approved by the President)

appropriating a particular sum or sums must be made before payment from the Treasury can be made. Laws should be construed in light of current laws and not those made by a one-man legislative branch. - Besides, these decrees issued by President Marcos relative to debt service were tailored for the periods covered by said decrees. Today it is Congress that should determine and approve the proper appropriations for debt servicing, as this is a matter of policy that, in his opinion, pertains to the legislative department, as the policy-determining body of the Government.