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The Marketization of Foreign Cultural Policy: The Cultural Nationalism of the Competition State
Somogy Varga
In the past decade there has been an increasing awareness of the fact that cultural policy research was almost entirely devoted to issues concerning state-internal cultural policy, such as political strategies of institutions that regulate the dissemination of culture within the boundaries of a national state. While this narrow focus had the consequence that the issue of foreign cultural policy was neglected, the topic has received only marginally more interest from researchers interested in diplomacy, foreign policy, and international relations. This may be because foreign cultural policy in contrast to military and political activities is generally not regarded as a serious part of foreign policy.1 In addition, the relatively minor group of researchers from these disciplines who worked on foreign cultural policy was mainly interested in historical issues and questions of legal status. As a result, with few exceptions2 the body of research on German foreign cultural policy is mostly composed of historicaldescriptive studies, which are in many ways respectable, but demonstrate relatively modest analytical depth. This neglect is unfavourable for several reasons. First, it stands in contradiction to the fact that European states, especially after World War II, have conceived of foreign cultural policy as an important part of their foreign policies. For instance, in a German context, Willy Brandt in 1966 defined foreign cultural policy as the third pillar (dritte S aule) of foreign policy.3 Second, while the historical-descriptive approach to understanding foreign cultural policy may have its advantages in grasping traditional strategies and institutions of foreign cultural policy, it does not provide us with analytical tools that are adequate in our current situation in which (as we shall see) foreign cultural policy has become economized, de-politicized, and transformed to assist nation branding efforts. This paper aims to partially remedy the neglect of critical engagement with foreign cultural policy, and it directs focus on an essential tool of foreign cultural policy, namely the cultural institutes abroad. While France, Britain, Italy, etc. have a long tradition of foreign cultural policy that involves the maintenance of cultural institutions abroad, this paper will concentrate on the German Goethe-Institute, which is of special interest due to the complex history of modern Germany. The paper will start by re-constructing the development of Germanys foreign cultural policy with special focus on the Goethe-Institute, which is its most prominent institution. Particular attention will be paid to the transformation of state control measures, to the shift towards a radically new and economized concept of foreign cultural policy that has taken place since the 1990s, and to the consequences of such a shift. As it will be shown, a sustained theoretical examination of this particular tool of policy and a close look at its historical origins, development, and current transformations can uncover vital aspects that are at risk of being ignored by foreign policy researchers.

Cultural Nationalism
At the end of the nineteenth century, French foreign policy attempted to compensate for the decline of France as major world power and used foreign cultural policy as a means to secure
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political and economic supremacy over the areas once belonging to the Ottoman Empire. The Alliance Franc aise and Mission La que Franc aise were established and they began to function as tools to increase the usage of French language and knowledge of French culture in the Middle East. In the case of Germany, some systematic political support of German scientific and cultural institutions abroad had begun already before the foundation of the German state (D uwell 1976, 127). For instance, since 1859 the Prussian state has financially supported the Archaeological Institute in Rome. However, in contrast to France, in the same period in which French foreign cultural policy expanded, Germany had no comparable systematic foreign cultural political ambitions. In the light of the relatively short history of Germany as a politically and administratively integrated whole, the lack of systematic foreign cultural political ambitions is not surprising. Nonetheless, there were increasing measures to establish and maintain an effective connection between German governments and the many noticeably sizeable German ethnic communities that fell outside the German federated organization. After the Reichsgr undung in 1871, the foreign policy organ of the new German state (Ausw artige Amt)called into life by Bismarckbegan to systematically sponsor German schools abroad. The developing cultural nationalist current under the Kaiserreich has delivered decisive impetus in the creation of early organized initiatives like Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein (1881) and the later Verein f ur das Deutschtum im Ausland.4 These foreign cultural-political measures were to a large extent motivated by certain cultural nationalist aspirations.5 Friedrich Meinecke, an early twentieth-century German historian, has distinguished between two kinds of nationalism. State-nationalism is founded upon on the idea of the individuals commitment and sense of belonging to a community, mediated by his or her endorsement of the political principles of the nation. In contrast, the cultural nationalism that developed in this period in Germany was founded upon the idea that an individuals sense of belonging to a community can be explained by his or her belonging to a common heritage, language, customs, etc., which is independent of being politically united by a national state.6 In accord with this understanding, the new institutions abroad aimed to conserve the German nation by preserving the linguistic and cultural identity of those German groupings that were placed outside of the political borders of the German state. This particular cultural nationalism understanding of nationality attributed immense importance to language in the preservation of a cultural identity, which explains the relatively strong emphasis of foreign cultural politics on schools at the time. Unlike in the French case, the geographical placement of these institutions was not so much governed by geopolitical considerations, but largely by the locality of German groupings. However, this is not to say that the cultural nationalist ambitions were free of geopolitically motivated interests preserving these German communities as prospective tools of foreign policy.7 But importantly, under the ideological heading of cultural nationalism, state government made no significant attempts at taking direct control over the day-to-day activities of the various schools and institutes abroad. This changed dramatically with the outbreak of World War I.

Cultural Propaganda and Volkswerdung

The nature of German foreign cultural policy changed in the phase that led up to the outbreak of World War I. It is in this context that the term Ausw artige Kulturpolitik is coined by the influential historian Karl Lamprecht, who has called for an active foreign cultural policy that aims at the dissemination of German thought and the German national idea urgertum, abroad.8 Importantly, besides Lamprecht, other representatives of the Bildungsb
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such as Paul Rohrbach and Kurt Riezler, have all thought of such foreign cultural political measures as a promising alternative to hard-line Wilhelmine foreign politics, which has led to an increasing diplomatic isolation.9 Nevertheless, to fit the needs of war propaganda, the relatively loosely governed and reserved cultural policy transformed into one with an active and state-controlled interventionist agenda that intended to use culture to propagate a picture of Germany with foreign political benefits.10 With the outbreak of World War I, culture became increasingly thought of as a potential weapon of war,11 and new foreign cultural political strategies even aimed to integrate the German schools abroad into their cultural propaganda (hence the term Propagandaschulen).12 In the new political situation after World War I, the profile of foreign cultural policy underwent an additional change and its importance grew for several reasons. First, after the loss of traditional assets (such as the military machinery), foreign cultural policy was recognized as one of the few remaining political tools that Germany could still use to secure influence within the new political world-order.13 Second, in the aftermath of World War I, many were convinced that the German defeat was partly caused by an unsuccessful German foreign cultural policy (in the sense of cultural propaganda) that fell short in presenting the German cause persuasively to the international public.14 It is in such a context that within a decade after the end of World War I an organized state-funded foreign cultural policy emerged in Germany, as a combination of state institutions like the Cultural Department (Kulturabteilung) of Ausw artiges Amt and state-financed private organizations. These private organizations like the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), the Alexander-von-Humboldt-Stiftung and the Deutsche Akademie were all established in the early 1920s.15 The foundation of Deutsche Akademie was led by the idea that cultural propaganda that targets an international public could rebuild German prestige and win sympathy for the weakened country. The founders of Deutsche Akademie originally laid weight on the construction of an organization for German cultural propaganda and a center of Germandom in the service of an all-German-folk-consciousness (Gesamtdeutschen Selbstbewusstsein).16 While at first the Deutsche Akademie focused on German minorities outside Germany (Auslandsdeutsche), the famous secretary-general Franz Thierfelder convinced the presidency of the Academy to focus on the spreading of German language abroad. Thierfelder was persuaded that Frances effective foreign cultural policy was a result of its focus of spreading the French language and he maintained that the re-establishment of Germany as a major power would depend on a successful foreign cultural policy that secured German as the favored means of international communication in Europe. At the same time, the promotion of German language seemed a natural way to display German national identity abroad, sinceas Thierfelder argued language embodied national culture. It was to a large degree due to Thierfelders work that the Ausw artiges Amt recognized the Deutsche Akademie as a suitable institution for the promotion of the German language and began to systematically support its activities. However, Thierfelder was also persuaded that a successful foreign cultural policy depended on communicating a consistent cultural image abroad. Interestingly, in his speech at the 1930 congress of the Deutsche Akademie, Thierfelder maintained that this is an especially demanding task in the case of Germany. Being a relatively recent and culturally heterogeneous nation, German foreign cultural policy faced a more difficult challenge of communicating a consistent national image than other countries. As he noted, the dissimilar notions of German identity cannot be converted into a common currency. As Michels puts it:
France had successfully developed a national stereotype which was seen as a model for every cultivated person, Britain had managed to create a homogeneous, although superficial
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lifestyle, the USA stood for impressive achievements in technology which had started to transform everyday life, Italy had created Fascism as a political ideology which could be exported, and the USSR could be identified with Communism. What should Germany export as her culture?17

In a letter to Lamprecht, Reichschancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (whom Lamprecht was personally acquainted with) already in 1913 supported the idea that foreign cultural initiatives should be intensified, but also emphasized the same difficulty that Lamprecht pointed out in 1930:
We are not there yet. We are not confident and certain enough of our culture, our inner being, our national ideal. It probably lies in the nature of our individualistic and not yet well-balanced culture that it does not have the same evocative force as the British and French [ . . . ]18

So from the beginning, foreign cultural policy was characterized by both an inner and an outer oriented dimension: it aimed to solidify German prestige and win additional sympathy for the country (outer orientation) and to help actually create the national and cultural unity that it promoted outwards (inner orientation). As we shall see later, this two-dimensional effort also characterizes current foreign cultural policy. Under the Nazi regime, the Deutsche Akademie expanded to become the most important cultural propaganda institution of the Third Reich, although there was a dissonance between the Nazi ideology of race and Thierfelders conviction that the crucial factor in propagating German culture aboard and Volkswerdung was language (and not race). The idea of bringing German language to foreign ethnic groups stood in contrast to the Nazi conviction that, due to their racial and genetic makeup, other groups would not be capable of comprehending expressions of German culture. In the Goethe Year 1932, Thierfelder grounded the Goethe Institut zur Fortbildung ausl andischer Deutschlehrer within the framework of the Akademie. Still, the underlying strongly nationalist ideology that had fuelled the activities of the Deutsche Akademie from the beginning secured ample funding from the new regime. In fact, under the Nazi regime the Akademie grew exponentially, maintaining 250 language schools in both occupied and neutral countries by 1944.19 Such growth was of course paired with a complete politicization of the institute and far-reaching Nazi control of its everyday workings. Hitler even elevated the Akademie to the official organ in charge of securing that the German language would eventually become the world language. The expansion of the Akademie reached its peak in the last period of the war, under the leadership of Arthur Sey-Inquart, a former Reichskommissar of the occupied Netherlands appointed president by Goebbels. This appointment was one of the reasons why the Allies dissolved the Akademie in 1945 on grounds of being a Nazi institution.

Towards Cultural Diplomacy

The fact that Thierfelder never joined the Nazi party, combined with his conviction of the equal value of cultures and his efforts to secure that foreign cultural policy was not reduced to simple aggressive propaganda ultimately led to his removal from the Akademie. But his efforts helped convince the allies that the Akademie originally opposed the Nazis and propagated an aim to be a democratic institution. It is with such a background that the Goethe-Institute was founded in August 1951.20 Simultaneously, a great number of the Akademies former personnel emphasized their opposition to the Nazi regime and thus obtained absolution, which allowed them to become a part of the new Goethe-Institute. The
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Allies soon discovered a potential partner in the new institute and released funds so that the Goethe-Institute could take over the Deutsche Akademie seat in Athens. Over the following couple of years, financial support from the government made possible its expansion. While the state to a large extent funded the Goethe-Institute it simultaneously secured control over the activities of the Institute via contracts. Meanwhile there was a growing recognition among politicians of the important potential of foreign cultural policy for the new German state. This led to the proclamation of foreign cultural policy as the third pillar of foreign policy.21 The status of the Goethe-Institute as a private institution matched the intentions of the new German state. As Thierfelder himself has noted, the state remote organizational form of the Goethe-Institute helped to neutralize the suspicion of a continuation of direct cultural propaganda.22 Understandably, the main goal of foreign cultural policy in the period immediately after World War II was to assist with the process of reconciliation with other countries, to create trust and prestige.23 Foreign cultural policy was thought of as an adequate means of achieving sympathy for the young German state.24 This view of foreign cultural policy continued until the 1990s. Franz Josef Strau regarded foreign cultural policy as Deutschland-Werbung,25 and Chancellor Kohl called it Angebot zur Selbstdarstellung unserer Nation im Ausland,26 and later, after the fall of the iron curtain, discovered the Goethe-Institute to be a valuable partner in an image campaign in Eastern Europe.27 This led to the expansion of the Goethe-Institute, which was allowed to take over DDR foreign cultural policy institutes.28 Accordingly, in 2001, looking back on 50 years of Goethe-Institute activities, president Hilmar Hoffmann maintained that the leitmotif of the last 50 years of work was to restore Germany as a cultural nation and to win back the cultural recognition of Germany.29 In the same vein, Leonhard30 retrospectively defined the raison d etre of the Goethe-Institute as the amelioration of Germanys reputation, a task that he argues the organization has succeeded in fulfilling.31 The realization of the potential of the Goethe-Institute in foreign policy matters (the third pillar) led to control efforts by the government, though such attempts did not aim to jeopardize the Institutes status as a private intermediary organization. To some extent, the extended control efforts can be made intelligible if one considers a shift in the very notion of culture. In the period leading up to the 1970s, the high, humanistic culture concept was replaced by a more inclusive sociological and anthropological concept of culture that besides cultural expressionsalso encompassed political, technological, and social issues.32 This was mirrored in the fact that the activities of the Goethe-Institutes now also included the dissemination of German social and political thought. In this period the state increasingly expanded its control over the Goethe-Institute, which was accomplished by two different means. On the one hand, the content of the contract between the state and the Goethe-Institute was reformulated. On the other, some of the tasks that were contractually defined became implemented into the statute (Satzung) itself. Governmental control options were maximized in the Goethe-Institute Statutes of 1976, the year when the state itself (represented by an appointed politician) was awarded ordinary membership.33 At the same time, a limited number of MPs (one representative of each faction in the Bundestag) and a representative from the culture ministry were admitted as extraordinary members. Also, the Government has, since 1969, been able to veto decisions taken by the General Assembly of the Goethe-Institute and any activities of the institutes abroad that conflict with the Foreign Ministrys guidelines for cultural policy. With the change of statute in 1976, that veto right was made part of the statute itself.34 In case of overriding political reasons there can be interference in regards to the performance or omission of
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an event.35 Besides, the choice of leaders in certain positionssuch as president, vicepresident, the leader of the Goethe central administration in Munich, financial and personnel managersmust be approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.36 Control measures were also introduced into the contract. The contract of 1969 aimed to secure a distance from the work of embassies and established that the Goethe-Institute premises should not be used by the embassy for foreign political work. However, the 1976 contract opened up this possibility.37 In 4 section 4 of the contract it is pointed out that the Goethe-Institutes abroad are obliged to be loyal to the local representative state (usually the embassy) (also 2 section 1).38 It is also laid down that the Goethe-Institutes abroad must present planned cultural activities to the embassies in the early phase of development, and that the complete schedule of cultural activities must be submitted to the embassy in good time so that objections can be articulated.39 Similarly, the Institutes must invite the ambassador to the events.40 The embassies have the right to object if they judge that certain events could damage Germanys reputation (e.g., a simplistic coverage of German internal political controversies) and to prevent the Goethe-Institute from entertaining connections to organizations or persons that are considered to be disadvantageous for the country.41 In all, these dual control measuresinternally through the states membership and externally through contractually formulated intervention optionssecured the state maximum legal influence. This influence manifested itself mostly negatively, in using the veto right to hinder what a Goethe-Institute carries out at a certain event. For instance, the foreign policy department kept the film Die Weisse Rose from appearing on the program schedule of Goethe-Institutes abroad. The argument was that the film contained allegations about the federal courts lack of critical reflection on sentences of resistance members. Commenting on this case, Prime Minister M ollemann declared that it is not foreign cultural policys task to finance the defamation of constitutional organs.42 However, there were also more positive measures that attempted to push the GoetheInstitute to address certain topics within their cultural activities. In 1994, the Goethe central administration notified the members of the science, literature, and history council that the State Department with great vigour (mit grossem Nachdruck) insisted that the GoetheInstitutes abroad include something about the German resistance against Hitler in their schedule.43 This attempt was taken up by the media, pointing out that such an approach contradicted the governments alleged respect for the autonomy of the Goethe-Institute.44 Another example that somehow lies between negative and positive measures is that sustained political efforts in the 1980s led to the downgrading of Wortprogramme (i.e., lectures and discussion programs that were considered dangerous because of their potentially politically charged nature). With such a background, in 1983 the decision was made that the Goethe-Institutes abroad can maximally use 20% of the residual funds from other categories to fund Wortprogramme.45 This was criticized for being a political intervention,46 a disciplining measure,47 and a sort of political stranglehold (politisches W urgegriff).48 Despite such efforts, in general, the German state made as little use as possible of its control possibilities, since it contradicted both the aim of a neutral foreign cultural policy carried out by autonomous agencies49 and the overarching aim in that period to present the country as a Cultural State (Kulturstaat), or Culture Nation.50 In this period from the end of the Second World War to the beginning of the 1990s, foreign cultural policy is best described under the heading of cultural diplomacy, with the ultimate political goal of regaining trust and securing political stability. Convinced that cultural and linguistic encounters could contribute to politically stable international

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relations, the communication of a particular idea of Germany as a Cultural State by foreign cultural policy was informed by this ultimate political aim. This is also reflected in the idea of a cooperative culture51 and a policy shift from teaching and unilateral cultural events to cooperative cultural programs. This new orientation followed the publication of the final report of the Bundestags Enquete-Commission that was given the task to rethink Germanys foreign cultural policy and remained unchanged until after the unification of Germany. Of course, the national image of the Federal Republic was to a certain extent conceived in contrast to the DDR, and foreign cultural policy of the unified Germany had to communicate a new image. But while foreign cultural policy was intensified in the beginning of the 1990s, the main cultural diplomacy approach continued building trust and assuring the world that the re-united Germanyjust as the Federal Republicdid not aspire to regional domination. Having said this, old-style measures were not completely abandoned. For instance, there was a relatively obvious competition between the British Council, the Goethe-Institute, and the French Institute to achieve linguistic dominance in both the new Eastern European democracies and ex-Soviet countries.52 In this period, the state secured itself the maximum possible amount of influence over what it recognized as instruments of foreign cultural policy through contracts, permanent membership, and political pressure. Quite remarkably, in the period leading up to current times, the tight grip and political stranglehold of the state tremendously lessened, while at the same time foreign cultural policy institutions like the Goethe-Institute were even more extensively becoming political-economical instruments. In what follows, we shall pay closer attention to some of the mechanisms of these tendencies that at first sight may seem opposed. As I will show, they become intelligible if we understand the redefinition of foreign cultural policy as a process within the transformation of the state itself.

Economization of Foreign Cultural Policy (2001-)

To understand the significant change that foreign cultural policy underwent, we have to bear in mind that the end of the Cold War and the transformative political events in Eastern Europe have changed the landscape of foreign cultural policy. In addition, supranational institutions have entered the field, increasingly taking on roles as coordinators of cultural cooperation and educational-academic exchange programs. In this new setting, traditional foreign policy instruments, such as cultural institutes abroad, had to rethink their roles. Additionally, in order to grasp the full scope of the change, we have to bear in mind that in this period a redefinition of the boundaries of the state and the political occurs. A useful instrument that seeks to capture these transformations in the dynamics of national politics is a theory that describes this shift as one that occurred from national states (with Keynesian welfare systems) to competition states that compete for foreign investment, tourism, export, and competent labor power.53 Within the debate on the changed role of the state in a globalized world that has been led by the social sciences for the last few decades, the proponents of the competition state theory have embraced a middle position between those who claim that globalization is dismantling the state and those who claim that the state maintains status quo. This middle position claims that globalization has changed but has not necessarily significantly diminished the role and activities of the state. To put it briefly, national states shifted from territorial organizations that rely on strategies involving state actors, institutions coordinated by an ensemble of bureaucratic structures, towards organizations that deploy corporate strategies.54 The nation state, particularly in its Keynesian appearance, invented security mechanisms to regulate

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the relevant elements of market forces in order to protect what often has been referred to as national interest. However, with the rise of the competition state, the relationship between states and markets has been significantly re-defined. While the national/Keynesian state operated with a crucial distinction between the market as a dynamic mechanism and the hierarchically organized state that advances national interests, the distinction is collapsing as national interests are increasingly defined in economical terms.55 Not only the rhetoric, but also the logic of the economic company has shaped political action, with states increasingly integrating foreign and trade ministries into one departmentan organizational restructuring that reflected the propagation of a new commercial diplomacy. Also the German state has made first steps towards inaugurating establishments abroad that bring together government and business sectors.56 The ambition of the state to regulate territorial economies is progressively replaced by the aspiration to be incorporated into the flow of global finance as an advantageous investment location for more or less unregulated investment capital. The whole political vocabulary changes; not only are political issues described within the vocabulary of markets and marketing, but states increasingly understand themselves as companies that operate in a global marketplace of nations.57 For instance, in the German context foreign minister Klaus Kinkel in 1990 famously suggested that the state should be thought of as Corporation Germany (Unternehmen Deutschland). Consequently, states began deploying the marketing strategies of companies to emphasize their attractiveness.58 Marketing professionals like Philip Kotler, Wally Olins, and Simon Anholt were effective in arguing that due to their experience from work with the branding of companies and tourist destinations, and, due to the supposed intrinsic affinity between states and companies as players on a global market, their services were needed to maximize state attractiveness. Subsequently, states began to engage in nation branding processes led by these experts. For instance, Olins figured as one of the key initiators of the Cool Britannia nation branding-campaign under the Blair-Government that aimed at refashioning the rather dusty and industrial reputation of the UK.59 Olins, in cooperation with the German state television (ZDF), published the programmatic book Germany as a Global Brand (Deutschland als Globale Marke).60 Additionally, in 2002, the Brand Manifest for Germany (Markenmanifest f ur Deutschland) was published as a result of collaboration between the Goethe-Institute, corporations, and the Olins advertising agency. Germany developed a new Internet portal and a website with coherent corporate design which is explained as follows: The federal government becomes visible with a distinct identity through its corporate design: It determines their characteristic visual profile, creating a uniform basis for successful communication (my translation SV).61 The company trusted with this task (Meta Design) was also hired to co-brand Germany with the World Soccer Championships 2006 in Germany. In the German context, this new political landscape has resulted in new ways of thinking about foreign cultural policy. While the rethinking of foreign cultural policy involves a wide array of aspects, in the following I will focus on the process of its growing economization in the 1990s.

Foreign Cultural Policy in the Competition State

In the 1990s as the competition state started to emerge, state funding of the Goethe-Institute was radically reduced, leading to the closure of several Goethe-Institutes throughout Western Europe. However, what is of special significance in this period, is that decisions about institute

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closures were to a large extent taken on the basis of estimated investment factors and the amount of cash flow in that region.62 This marked the beginning of a new era in foreign cultural policy. Foreign minister Klaus Kinkel established the council Beirat zur Ausw artigen Amt in 1996 with the aim of introducing new foreign policy perspectives.63 The composition of the Goethe Council (president, business owners, and politicians) revealed and anticipated a new structure of foreign cultural policy that aimed at establishing a closer cooperation between the Goethe-Institutes and German firms targeting markets abroad. Following the same logic, in a Bundestag circular from February 20, 199664 Kinkel proposed to reform the film work of the Goethe Institute in a way that was increasingly coordinated with the efforts of Ausw artiges Amt to increase the sale of German films abroad. Kinkel changed the vocabulary of politics by re-defining the German state as Unternehmen Deutschland (corporation Germany), which strived towards bringing culture and commerce closer to each other. But he also changed the vocabulary by which the goals of foreign cultural policy were defined. He addressed foreign cultural policy as a means of Standortsicherung, as Dienstleistung65 and as something that can be measured in a kulturpolitische Kapitalrendite.66 Kinkel broke several taboos by openly arguing for a further instrumentalization of foreign cultural policy, by aggressively deploying marketing and PR vocabulary to describe its goals as advertising for Standort Deutschland, and by maintaining that culture is an essential part of the countrys brand abroad. Overall, the (rather radical) idea was that government, business, and quasi-independent cultural institutions were to be forged together into the Company Germany in which foreign cultural policy would become something like a branding organ.67 This indeed marks an important turning point in the German foreign cultural policy. While, as we have seen, up to this point foreign cultural policy aimed at regaining trust and securing political stability, based on the idea that cultural and linguistic encounters would eventually contribute to politically stable international relations.68 However, with Kinkel this changes. The politically stabilizing potential of cultural and linguistic encounters is downplayed and culture becomes one instrument among others to strategically advance the Standort by helping German companies abroad and by securing the investment of foreign capital. Kinkels rethinking of foreign cultural policy raised considerable criticism,69 but within the decade to follow its main principles silently gained wide acceptance, despite the fact that the new government and the new foreign minister Joschka Fischer was initially critical of what he called a mechanical instrumentalization of foreign cultural policy.70 Nonetheless, in the new millennium the economic discourse that Kinkel had invented has become more or less the customary way in which foreign cultural policy is addressed. For example, while the 2004 official report of the government on foreign cultural policy activities71 speaks of Sympathiewerbung f ur Deutschland as one of the goals of foreign cultural policy, Kinkels legacy is even more clear in the 2002 report of the government, which speaks of the goal of advertising for sympathy for Germany as in the case of the public image of the corporate identity of a modern company.72 This is not to say that the talk of foreign cultural policy as a means of achieving political stability is completely off the agenda. The 2006/2007 report of the government on foreign cultural policy does mention foreign cultural policy as helping lay the fundament for stabile international relations.73 Also, in the period that followed the terror attacks of September 11th , 2001, the Ausw artige Amt stressed the goal of a more substantial cultural presence in Islamic countries. But in spite of such reoccurring talk, the major focus of foreign cultural policy has clearly shifted to economically flourishing regions.74

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The Goethe-Institute has been attentive of the growing economization of foreign cultural policy and has adapted quite creatively to the new circumstances without much political pressure. In 2001, the Goethe-Institute in Madrid instigated a tight collaboration with the embassy and German companies represented in Spain. Later that year the parties signed the statute document for Fundaci on Espa na Goethe. According to Peitz, the talks at the celebration that followed the signature emphasized collaboration between culture, politics, and business as a new and innovative form of intercultural understanding. The ambassador addressed a vision for future cultural policy that would involve the establishment of German houses in the various capitals, bringing together government, companies, and cultural institutions under one roof.75 The president of the Goethe-Institute, who was present at the occasion, welcomed this trend and expressed his hopes that the Madrid example would serve as a model for other GoetheInstitutes. But the president revealed even bigger plans. He made public that he had begun to collect funding from companies to create Foundation Goethe Institute. In this foundation, companies can become council members by paying an annual membership fee. The GoetheInstitutes would maintain their exclusive right to propose cultural projects, but ultimately the councilin which the institution does not have voting rightswould make the final decision. In return the Council would not be allowed to make proposals. Also, every company that spent more than 5 million euro would be able to add its name to a Goethe-Institute of their choice. In several ways this approach has succeeded. Daimler-Chrysler in Singapore agreed to cooperate and to provide the 23 Asian Goethe-Institutes 750,000 Euros from 2001 to 2003. And both the Madrid and Barcelona Goethe-Institutes managed to double the size of their budgets. In the midst of such structural changes and the process of re-thinking its role, in August 2002 the Goethe-Institute published a book with the title Brand Manifest for Germany (Markenmanifest f ur Deutschland), which was sent out to all Goethe-Institutes abroad. The book was the result of the collaboration between the Goethe-Institute, companies, and the Olins advertising agencya continuation of a similar cooperation between Olins agency and the state television ZDF in 1999. The Brand Manifest for Germany proposed the implementation of a national brand that is condensed in the core idea We are Playmakers (Wir mind Spielmacher). The idea was that this brand could be freely deployed by German companies, national institutions, foreign cultural policy institutions, but also by individuals to help strengthen their sense of national identity. In a neoliberal fashion, the manifest draws a parallel between institutions and individual bodies as subjects competing in markets and asserts that in order to succeed in competition, both Germany, its institutions, political parties, churches, and individual citizens must understand themselves as Spielmacher.76 In a letter from the Goethe-Institute head of communications to all institute leaders, the nation branding project was presented as one of importance for the future of the institute.77 The foreword of the book, written by the Institute Secretary General Prof. Dr. Leonhard, outlined the challenge that Standort Deutschland faces and, to overcome the current crisis, he envisaged a re-motivation of country (Ruck durch das Land) with help from a strong national brand. He underlined the crucial affinity between a nation branding process that aims at branding Germany abroad and the original mission of the GoetheInstitute.78 The direction of the Goethe-Institute demonstrated a clear intention to take up an active role in a nation branding process. This is also illustrated by the letters final sentence We [ . . . ] would be delighted if you [the heads of Goethe-Institutes abroad] would accept

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the documentation as an opportunity and consider the inclusion of its statements in your work (my translation).79

Cultural Nationalism to Commercial Nationalism

When considering the various strategies of German foreign cultural policy highlighted in this paper, it is obvious that the communication of a national image has been an ongoing issue. But crucially, it resurfaces in very different manners. In the initial stages of German foreign cultural policy almost a century ago, Lamprecht, Thierfelder, and Reichschancellor von Bethmann Hollweg all emphasized that communicating a consistent cultural image abroad was a vital issue, while they simultaneously recognized that in carrying out this task German foreign cultural policy faced a more difficult challenge than other countries. They all believed that, being a relatively recent and culturally heterogeneous nation, German national identity cannot be converted into a common currency. Clearly this was considered to be a serious problem in the period characterized by cultural nationalism that ran up until the Second World War. However, the paradigmatic change in foreign cultural policy after the Second World War from cultural nationalism (guided by national ideals) to cultural diplomacy (guided by political ideals) diminished the size of this problem. While considerable efforts were made to communicate a certain image of Germany as a Cultural State (Kulturstaat) or as a Culture Nation, the strategies stopped short of attempting to convert German identity into a communicable common currency. And this in spite of the fact that during this period the state secured itself the maximum possible amount of influence over foreign cultural policy instruments through contracts, permanent membership, and political pressure. The fact that no sustained efforts were deployed to convert German identity into a common currency is intelligible if one recalls that the underlying idea informing foreign cultural policy was that cultural and linguistic encounters would eventually contribute to politically stable international relations. The form of foreign cultural policy that I have tried to capture under the heading of cultural diplomacy promoted the political interest of relationship and trust building, and the communication of a particular idea of Germany as a Cultural State by foreign cultural policy was guided by the primary goal of regaining trust and securing political stability. Therefore, much foreign cultural-political work attempted to identify cultural, historical, and political elements that were shared and targeted individual members of foreign countries as citizens. This meant that there was a relatively large amount of elbowroom or relative freedom to communicate the identity of a Cultural State without having to convert German identity into a specific, narrow, and clearly communicable common currency. Additionally, the appearance of such elbowroom has partly been sustained by the broadening of the concept of culture that occurred during this period. Nonetheless, this radically changed in the 1990s with the emergence of a new foreign cultural policy within the competition state. The genuine political interest that characterized the decades after the Second World War was replaced by an economic one and with this the focus shifted from relationship- and trust-building to brand-image management. Branding is a one-way strategic communication that tends to focus on a core message, leaving little room for both an open encounter and dialogue and for a less narrow definition of what national culture amounts to. The crucial feature of branding is differentiation, uniqueness that can differentiate the actual product from competing ones. Therefore, instead of the earlier emphasis on shared cultural, historical, and political aspects, branding strategies always aim at finding the narrow, unique asset of the particular (national) identity. Additionally,

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another crucial change was that foreign cultural policy as nation branding targeted individual members of foreign countries, not as citizens but as consumers. In the midst of such a transformation and economization of foreign cultural policy, the old issue of foreign cultural policy, the specific challenge of communicating a consistent German national identity abroad, resurfaced. While the period of cultural diplomacy was characterized by elbowroom, a foreign cultural policy that applies nation branding strategies must find and communicate a consistent, narrow, and unique asset of the particular (national) identity. At first sight, this challenge seems identical to the one the founding fathers of German foreign cultural policy faced almost a century ago. Recall that Thierfelder lamented that being a relatively recent and culturally heterogeneous nation, German foreign cultural policy is confronted with an almost insurmountable challenge of communicating a consistent national image. It is quite obvious that the German unification complicated matters of national identity and has to a large extent hindered the solidification of a particular homogenous identity. So the question is again: what should Germany export as its identity? A closer look at the nation branding campaigns that the Goethe-Institute has been involved in provides a rather surprising answer to this question. To be brief, German national identity is simply re-described within the vocabulary of neo-liberalism. In the publications of the nation branding campaign, old German national identity is characterized by a certain mentality (Vollkaskomentalit at),80 by too much reliance on welfare state structures, by too much thoughtfulness and a too rigid handling of national identity. In contrary, the new Playmaker-identity is self-reliant, risk-taking,81 and cool, as opposed to thoughtful. Other crucial characteristics include increased flexibility and playfulness in handling issues of identity and the passionate devotion to constantly working on optimizing its own identity.82 It is not difficult to see that the main attributes of the Playmaker-stateself-responsibility, courage, risk-taking, flexibility, and willingness to permanently work on self-identityare identical with those of the ideal subject of neoliberal thought that Foucault has termed the entrepreneur of himself.83 While I have devoted considerable attention elsewhere to this curious parallel between the state and the individual as subjects competing for interest on various markets, in this context it is important to notice how this reformulation of national identity in flexible brand-terms really solves the problem. Or, to put it differently, the problem what should Germany export as her identity? is prevented from even occurring. Germany is risk-taking, flexible, and willing to permanently re-work and change itselfwhat more could markets ask? Instead of communicating something like a national culture (or rather important aspects of it), this commercial nationalism really boils down to the communication of neoliberal values in the disguise of national identity. Commercial nationalism is the cultural nationalism of the competition state. In such a scenario, we may speculate about how the concept of national identity itself is affected by commercial nationalism sustained by foreign cultural policy. On the one hand, one may argue that while migration and global mobility, supranational institutions, and increasing global communication are creating a cultural setting in which the maintenance of homogeneous national identities is becoming increasingly impossible, the reiteration of national identities in market terms may contribute to the retention of some of their solidity. On the other hand, given the background of the content of the nation branding initiatives, it looks rather as if national identity is additionally weakened and emptied out to make room for the communication of neoliberal values. While an ample answer to this question would itself merit a paper of its own, in the following section I will close by reflecting on what the transformations analyzed so far may reveal about not just foreign policy, but about the domain of the political.
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The Expansion of the Political?

As we have seen, until the 1990s the state secured itself the maximum possible amount of influence over its instruments of foreign cultural policy through contracts, permanent membership, and political pressure. Additionally, we have also noted that from the middle of the 1990s to the present day, parallel to decreasing state funding, the tight grip of the state tremendously loosens. Now it would be customary to decipher this development in purely negative terms, with the state becoming increasingly defenseless and superseded in the face of global flows of investment capital. However, in the theoretical perspective defended here, neither decreasing state funding nor the diminishment of direct state control warrants the conclusion that the state is significantly losing ground. Instead, it may be argued that with the reduction of funding and direct control, and with the incitement to nation branding initiatives, the state simply successfully adopts a new role as a competition state. But furthermore, we may even argue that this development, rather than revealing the reduction of the state, bears testimony of the expansion of the field of potential state intervention. Peter van Ham has put forward that besides traditional political activities, politicians will have to train themselves in brand asset management. Their tasks will include finding a brand niche for their state, engaging in competitive marketing, assuring customer satisfaction, and most of all, creating brand loyalty.84 Taking this line of thought further, we may argue that foreign cultural-political measures such as nation branding illustrate that the field of politics expands to encompass techniques that traditionally belonged to the sphere of companies. While many independent factors speak in favor of the acceptability of the expansion of the political within the competition state,85 when applying it to make intelligible the transformation of foreign cultural policy relevant explanatory gains emerge. Within this optic, what otherwise seemed puzzling becomes intelligible, namely that foreign cultural policy institutions like the Goethe-Institute are simultaneously subjected to less political pressure while becoming instruments of the state to a more extensive degree than earlier. But whether we see this development as the reduction or as the expansion of the political, there is little doubt that an important dimension of foreign cultural policy is lost. The immanent potential of cultural and linguistic encounters as helping to contribute to creating trust, political stability, and peaceful international relations is downplayed, while culture and identitynow shaped and re-fashioned after market demandbecome instruments to strategically advance the Standort. In this case, the problem is not just that foreign cultural policy once again is reduced to the unilateral export of some national culture, since what is communicated in the new initiatives is not even a projection of some national culture, but simply sets forth the reigning values of neoliberalism. Thus, (arguably even more criticizable than in the case of the unilateral export of national culture) as marketization and nation branding transform the norms of foreign cultural policy, cultural exchange is being reduced to little more than the exchange of contingent neoliberal vocabulary.

Concluding Remarks
Starting out this investigation, I have noted that foreign cultural policy research has been neglected. Cultural policy research has primarily focused on measures and institutions in charge of the dissemination of culture within the boundaries of a national state, while foreign policy researchers have been focused on the (legal) status and core activities of cultural institutes abroad. Consequently, existing research on German foreign cultural policy is mostly historical-descriptive, which, besides obvious advantages, does not provide us with
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analytical tools to fully grasp the economized foreign cultural policy that relies on nation branding efforts to promote Standort Deutschland. With the aim of making initial steps towards remedying this neglect, I have re-constructed the development and the transformation of the principle goals and practices of German foreign cultural policy with special focus on the Goethe-Institute. Particular attention was paid to the transformation towards a radically new and economized concept of foreign cultural policy that has taken place since the mid 1990s, parallel to the emergence of the competition state. One crucial aspect is that the genuinely political aim to generate trust, political stability, and peaceful international relations with the means of foreign cultural policy is replaced by an economic aim. As foreign cultural policy turns into branding strategies, the emphasis shifts from shared cultural, historical, and political aspects to unidirectional flows of the communication of differentiation, leaving little room for open encounter and dialogue. In this, the new strategies bear disturbing resemblances to ones that dominated the late 19th and early 20th century, with the modification that cultural nationalism is now replaced by commercial nationalism. Also, with their participation in nation branding initiatives, cultural policy institutions like the Goethe-Institute now actively contribute to sustaining economic nationalism and the marketization of national identity, becoming instruments of the state to a more extensive degree than earlier. Subsequently, I have argued that such transformation reflects not the shrinking of the political, but rather its successful adaptation, and not the demise of the state, but rather its successful assumption of a new role as competition state. The issues raised in this paper show that the subject matter, in spite of little sustained interest, is worthy of further investigation. Theoretical scrutiny into the field of foreign cultural policyand particularly the intersection between the cultural efforts of the nationstate and the pursuit of its economic interestsmay help us come to understand unique aspects of political and cultural transformations that risk going unnoticed by researchers of either cultural policy or foreign policy.
NOTES 1. Shaun Riordan, The New Diplomacy, Themes for the 21st Century (Cambridge: Polity, 2003). 2. Karl-Sebastian Schulte, Ausw artige Kulturpolitik im politischem System der BDR Konzeptionsgehalt, Organisationsprinzipien und Strukturneuralgien eines atypischen Politikfeldes am Ende der 13. Legislaturperiode (Berlin: Verlag f ur Wissenschaft und Forschung, 2000); Volker Rittberger and Verena Andrei, Macht, Profit und Interessen Ausw artige Kulturpolitik und Auenpolitiktheorien. In Maa, KurtJ urgen (Hg.) Kultur- und Auenpolitik. Handbuch f ur Studium und Praxis (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005): 23-30; R. H ulsse, The Catwalk Power: Germanys New Foreign Image Policy, Journal of International Relations and Development 12, no. 3 (2009): 293316. 3. Hans Arnold, Kulturexport als Politik? Aspekte deutscher ausw artiger Politik, T ubingen 1976. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Ausw artigen Kulturpolitik 2004 2002/2006/2007, 2324; Hansgert Peisert, Ausw artige Kulturpolitik der BRD, in Aspekte der ausw artigen Kulturpolitik in Entwicklungsl andern, Die Dritte Welt, ed., Wolfgang Freund and Uwe Simson (Sonderheft, Meisenheim am Glan 1972), 117. 4. Peter Walkenhorst, Nation Volk Rasse: Radikaler Nationalismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich 18901914 (G ottingen : Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), ch.1. 5. Barthold C. Witte, Die ausw artige Kultur- und Sprachpolitik des vereinten Deutschland. Erwartungen, Chancen, Probleme, Deusch als Fremdsprache 40, no. 2 (2003): 7279; Kurt D uwell, Deutschlands ausw artige Kulturpolitik 19181932. Grundlinien und Dokumente (K oln/Wien: B ohlau, 1976); Nicole P. Eversdijk, Kultur als politisches Werbemittel : ein Beitrag zur deutschen kultur- und pressepolitischen Arbeit in den Niederlanden w ahrend des Ersten Weltkrieges, (M unster: Waxmann, 2010). 6. David Brown, Are there Good and Bad Nationalisms? Nations and Nationalism 5, no. 2 (1999): 281-30. 7. Gregory Paschalidis, Exporting national culture: histories of Cultural Institutes abroad, International Journal of Cultural Policy 15 (2009): 275289.

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8. D uwell, Deutschlands ausw artige Kulturpolitik, 15; 17; Roger Chickering, Karl Lamprecht. A German Academic Life (18561915) (Highlands: New Jersey, 1993). 9. Eckard Michels, Deutsch als Weltsprache? Franz Thierfelder, the Deutsche Akademie in Munich and the Promotion of the German Language Abroad, 19231945, German History 22, no. 2 (2004): 206227. 10. J urgen Kloosterhuis, Deutsche ausw artige Kulturpolitik und ihre Tr agergruppen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg in D. D uwell, and Werner Link Link, ed., Deutsche ausw artige Kulturpolitik seit 1871. Beitr age zur Geschichte der Kulturpolitik (Vol. 1, K oln und Wien, 1981), 736; J urgen Kloosterhuis, Friedliche Imperialisten. Deutsche Auslandsvereine und ausw artige Kulturpolitik, 19061918 (Frankfurt a. M., 1994). 11. R. Martinus Emge, Ausw artige Kulturpolitik. Eine soziologische Analyse einiger ihrer Funktionen, Bedingungen und Formen, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1965), 59; P. Grupp, Voraussetzungen und Praxis deutscher amtlicher Kulturpropaganda in den neutralen Staaten w ahrend des Ersten Weltkrieges in W. Michalka, ed. Der Erste Weltkrieg. Wirkung, Wahrnehmung, Analyse, Weyarn (Weyarn : Seehamer Verlag 1997) 799824; Kloosterhuis, Friedliche Imperialisten. 12. See D uwell, Deutschlands ausw artige Kulturpolitik, 65. 13. Donald Howly Norton, Karl Haushofer and the German Academy, 19251945 in Central European History, 1 (1968): 8099. 14. Such a view was among others propagated by the influential General Erich Ludendorff. Adolf Hitler also embraced this explanation, and it found expression in his Mein Kampf, which was written parallel to these events in a prison in Munich. See Michels, Deutsch als Weltsprache? and Eckard Michels, Von der Deutschen Akademie zum Goethe-Institut: Sprach- und auswartige Kulturpolitik 1923 1960 (Munich: Oldenbug Wissenschaftsverlag, 2005). 15. D uwell, Deutschlads ausw artige Kulturpolitik, 104153. 16. Norton, Karl Haushofer and the German Academy, 82. 17. Michels, Deutsch als Weltsprache? 216. 18. My translation, original quoted in Eversdijk, Kulturals politisches Werbemittel, 41; see also R udiger vom Bruch, Weltpolitik als Kulturmission. Ausw artige Kulturpolitik und Bildungsb urgertum in Deutschland am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges (Paderborn: Sch oningh, 1982), 149150; D uwell, Deutschlands ausw artige Kulturpolitik, 19; and Kloisterhuus, Friedliche Imperialisten, 12) 19. Emge, Ausw artige Kulturpolitik; Michels, Von der Deutschen Akademie zum Goethe-Institut. 20. Steffen R. Kathe, Kulturpolitik um jeden Preis. Die Geschichte des Goethe-Instituts von 1951 bis 1990, (M unchen: Meidenbauer, 2005), 8192; Emge Ausw artige Kulturpolitik, 9194. 21. Arnold, Kulturexport als Politik?, 2324; Peisert, Ausw artige Kulturpolitik der BRD, 117. 22. Franz Thierfelder, Kulturpolitik im neuen Stil, Aussenpolitik 2 (1951): 218; Lothar Romain, Mit Goethe durch die Jahre, Aspekte der ausw artigen Kulturpolitik in Entwicklungsl andern, Die Dritte Welt, ed. Wolfgang Freund and Uwe Simson (Sonderheft: Meisenheim am Glan, 1972), 71. 23. Peisert, Ausw artige Kulturpolitik der BRD, 119. 24. Andrea Schulz, Paarstaatliche Verwaltungstr ager, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2000), 57; Uwe Simson, Unterentwickelte Regionen und ausw artige Kulturpolitik, in Aspekte der ausw artigen Kulturpolitik in Entwicklungsl andern, Die Dritte Welt, ed. Wolfgang Freund and Uwe Simson (Sonderheft: Meisenheim am Glan, 1972), 2123; Bundestag Drucksache, 4/2888, December 16, 1964. 25. Rolf Michaelis, Kultur als Staatsreklame, Die Zeit, June 20, 1986. 26. Bundestag Protocolls, 10/253, December 4, 1986: 19661. 27. Renate Schostack, Z ogern vor dem groen Sprung, FAZ, June 15, 1990; Gernot Sittner, Der Kanzler entdeckt einen Verb undeten, SZ, November 23, 1990. 28. Kathe, Kulturpolitik um jeden Preis, 363366. 29. Hilmar Hoffmann, Von der R uckgewinnung der Glaubw urdigkeit, in Murnau. Manila, Minsk, ed. Helga Kauen (M unchen: Goethe Institut, 2001), 7. 30. Joachim-Felix Leonhard, Indledning, in Markenmanifest f ur Deutschland, (London: Wolff Olins, 2002), 5. 31. While research into the history of foreign cultural policy has focused on the outer presentation and amelioration of the image of Germany (it is not difficult to see that parallel to the outer exposure of Germany), foreign cultural policy also pursued the inner oriented goal of Vergangenheitsbew altigung and a normalization of German national identity. Simson, Unterentwickelte Regionen und ausw artige Kulturpolitik, 2123. artige Kulturver32. Bundestags Drucksachen, 7/4121, October 7, 1975, 8; 15; Michael Kilian, Ausw waltung zwischen Kultureller Autonomie und staatlicher Lenkung, in Kulturverwaltungsrecht im Wandel, ed. Hans-J org Dittmann and Armin Manfred (Stuttgart: Boorberg, 1981), 120; Bundestags Drucksachen, 10/2236, October 31, 1984, 29.

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33. Goethe-Institute Statute, (1976) 3 section 3, in Schulz, Paarstaatliche Verwaltungstr ager, 34. Goethe-Institute Statute, 6 section 8; 7 section 9, 2, in Schultz, Paarstaatliche Verwaltungstr ager, 46. 35. Goethe-Institute Statute, 8 section 5 36. Goethe-Institute Statute, 7 section 1g, 7 section 9, 5 37. Goethe-Institute Contract with the State, (1976), 4 section 8 of the contract in Paarstaatliche Verwaltungstr ager by Andrea Schulz (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2000). 38. Also Goethe-Institute Contract with the State, 2 section 1. 39. Ibid., 4 section 7. 40. Ibid., 4 section 10. 41. Ibid., 4 section 6; Schultz Paarstaatliche Verwaltungstr ager, 42; Bundestags Drucksachen, 10/2236, October 31, 1984, 2829. 42. Bundestag Protocolls, 10/11, August 6, 1983. 43. W. Sch utze, Wenn und wo Interesse besteht, in SZ, May 10, 1994. 44. Bundestags Drucksachen, 12/6504, December 22, 1993. For a detailed review of all cases see Schultz, Paarstaatliche Verwaltungstr ager, 193218. 45. Goethe-Institut Jahrbuch 91/92 (M unchen: Goethe-Institut, 1992), 238 . 46. Schwab-Feusch, Sparsamkeit mit politischen Auflagen? in FAZ, October 24, 1983; Spiegel, Heino statt Heine, in Der Spiegel 47 (1983); Faz, Wie zwischen Hammer und Ambo, FAZ, November 25, 1983. 47. Joachim-Felix Leonhard, Finger weg von Goethe! in Die Zeit, December 2, 1983. 48. Joachim-Felix Leonhard, Deutscher Geist in Gefahr, in Die Zeit, December 9, 1983. 49. Bundestag Protocolls, 7/239, May 7, 1976. 50. Schulz, Paarstaatliche Verwaltungstr ager, 53; Hoffmann, Von der R uckgewinnung der Glaubw urdigkeit, 7; Bundestags Drucksachen, 10/2236, 29. 51. Bundestags Drucksachen, 7/239, May 7, 1976, 16739. 52. Paschalidis, Exporting National Culture. 53. Philip G. Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future of the State, (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1990). Cerny, Restructuring the Political Arena: Globalization and the Paradoxes of the Competition State, in Globalization and its Critics, ed. Randall Germain (London: Macmillan, 1999). 54. Philip G. Cerny and Mark Evans, New Labour, Globalization, and the Competition State (Working Paper, 2000). 55. Sami Moisio, From Enmity to Rivalry? Notes on National Identity Politics in Competition States, Scottish Geographical Journal 124 (March 2008): 7895; Daniel Horsfall, From Competition State to Competition States? Policy Studies 31, no. 1 (2010): 5776. 56. Christiane Peitz, Der Flirt von Madrid, Der Tagesspiegel, July 3, 2001. 57. Tore Fougner, The State, International Competitiveness and Neoliberal Globalization: Is there a Future Beyond The Competition State? Review of International Studies 32 (2006): 165185; Cerny, Restructuring the Political Arena. 58. Peter Van Ham, The Rise Of The Brand State, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2001) www.foreignaffairs.org; Wolf Olins, Trading Identities: Why Countries and Companies are Taking on Each Others Roles (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 1999); E. Potter, Branding Canada: The Renaissance of Canadas Commercial Diplomacy, International Studies Perspectives 5 (2004): 5560. 59. Gy orgy Szondi, Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences, Discussion papers in Diplomacy (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2008), 142. 60. Wally Olins, Deutschland als globale Marke, M unchen: GI, 1999). 61. Die Bundesregierung: Das Corporate Design der Bundesregierung, accessed 10.10 2007 http://styleguide.bundesregierung.de/Webs/SG/DE/Homepage/home.html. 62. Gernot Sittner, Sparpolitik an der Grenzen des Zumutbaren, in SZ, April 16, 1998; Rolf Michaelis, Im Schatten der Ignoranten, in Die Zeit, April 19, 1996; W. Weinrautner, Der neue Imperativ: F orderung der Wirtschaft, Handelsblatt, September 5, 1997; Joschka Fischer, Elephant speckt ab, in SZ, November 27, 1997. 63. Kinkel, Speech at the Symposium of B orsenvereins des Deutschen Buchhandels 15.1.1996, in Internationale Politik 51 (1996): 98; Weinrautner, Der neue Imperativ. 64. Bundestags Drucksachen, 13/3823, February 20, 1996, 4. 65. Ibid., 22.

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66. Kinkel, Speech at the Symposium, 98; Bundestags Drucksachen, 13/4863, June 12, 1996, 4. The idea won from support Chancellor Kohl, see Bundestag Protocolls, 13/110, June 13, 1996, 968284 and met no resistance, not even from the left in the parliament: Ibid., 9678. 67. See Kinkel Speech at the Symposium, 97; Michaelis, Im Schatten der Ignoranten; Weinrautner, Der neue Imperativ. 68. H ulsse, The Catwalk Power; Karl-Sebastian Schulte, Ausw artige Kulturpolitik im politischem System der BDR Konzeptionsgehalt, Organisationsprinzipien und Strukturneuralgien eines atypischen Politikfeldes am Ende der 13. Legislaturperiode (Berlin: Verlag f ur Wissenschaft und Forschung, 2000). 69. Schulte, Ausw artige Kulturpolitik. 70. Um es ganz klar zu sagen: Ich halte nichts von einer mechanischen Instrumentalisierung der Ausw artigen Kulturpolitik zur Wirtschaftsf orderung oder zur Standortsicherung. From Joschka Fischer, Interview with J. Fischer by Sebastian K orbe, Zeitschrift f ur KulturAustausch 4/1998 71. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Ausw artigen Kulturpolitik, 2004, 5, accessed October, 2011, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Broschueren/Uebersicht_node.html. 72. Sympathiewerbung f ur Deutschland im Sinne der Auendarstellung der corporate identity eines modernen Unternehmens. 73. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Ausw artigen Kulturpolitik, 2002; 2004; 2006, 5, accessed October 2011, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Broschueren/Uebersicht_node.html. 74. Wolfgang Schneider, Vom Export zum Netzwerk, vom Event zur Intervention. Zum Wandel Ausw artiger Kulturpolitik, Ausw artige Kulturpolitik. Dialog als Auftrag Partnerschaft als Prinzip, (Bonn: Umbruch, 2008), 1331. 75. Peitz, Der Flirt von Madrid. 76. Markenmanifest f ur Deutschland (2002), 47. An internally published book on Branding Germany and the result of cooperation between the Goethe-Institute and Wally Olins advertisement company. 77. Klaus Krischok, Intern letter from Klaus Krischok, July 4, 2002, sent to all Goethe-Institute leaders. 78. Leonhard, Einleitung. 79. Krischok, Intern letter. 80. Markenmanifest f ur Deutschland, 15. 81. Ibid., 41. 82. Ibid., 43; 44. 83. Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Coll` ege de France, 197879, trans. by G. Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 226. Foucault argues that neo-liberalism contains a theory of homo economicus, but one in which the subject is not at all a partner of exchange. Homo economicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself. This is true to the extent that, in practice, the stake in all neo-liberal analyses is the replacement every time of homo economicus as partner of exchange with a homo economicus as entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings (226). 84. Peter van Ham, The Rise of the Brand State, in Foreign Affaires 80, 5 (2001): 1. 85. See also Nikolas Rose, Powers of freedom: Reframing political thought (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Somogy Varga is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Memphis. He did his PhD at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of Frankfurt am Main (supervisor: Axel Honneth), where he also worked at the Institute of Social Research. He did postdoctoral research at the Institute of Cognitive Science at the University of Osnabr uck and at the Centre for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen. His primary areas of research are philosophy of psychiatry/mind, moral psychology, social philosophy and critical theory.

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