IP - 15 - Calculations in Support of IP15-The Area Classification Code For Petroleum Installations - November 2001 PDF

Calculations in Support of
IP15: The Area Classification Code

for Petroleum Installations
November 2001
By
P. T. Roberts
OGCH/2
HSE Business Group
Shell Global Solutions (UK), Cheshire Innovation Park,
P.O. Box 1, Chester CH1 3SH, England
Report No. OP.00.47110
Published by
The Institute of Petroleum, London
A charitable company limited by guarantee
Copyright 2001 by The Institute of Petroleum, London:
A charitable company limited by guarantee. Registered No. 135273, England
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced by any means, or transmitted or translated into
a machine language without the written permission of the publisher.
ISBN 0 85293 339 8
Published by The Institute of Petroleum
Further copies can be obtained from Portland Press Ltd. Commerce Way,
Whitehall Industrial Estate, Colchester CO2 8HP, UK. Tel: +44 (0) 1206 796 351
email: sales@portlandpress.com
v
CONTENTS
Page
Foreword...................................................................................................................... vii
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... viii
Executive summary .................................................................................................... 1
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 2
2. Flammability limits for two phase releases .................................................. 3
3. Shape factors and hazard radii for pressurised releases ........................... 6
4. Hazard radii from vents .................................................................................. 10
4.1 Vents from the storage of petroleum products ......................................... 11
4.2 Process vents........................................................................................... 20
5. Evaporation from pools and sumps.............................................................. 22
5.1 Vapour pressure comparisons of some commonly used
Category C fluids...................................................................................... 27
6. Releases into confined areas......................................................................... 29
7. Discussion and conclusions.......................................................................... 34
8. References....................................................................................................... 35
Appendix A:
Methodology................................................................................................................ 37
Appendix B:
Preliminary investigation of hazard radii and shape factors for the
Revision of IP15: the Area classification code for petroleum installations .......... 40
vi
vii
FOREWORD
The Institute of Petroleum commissioned this report to address concern over the effect
of a release containing droplets or a mist on the dispersion distances determined by the
methodology used in IP publication A Risk-Based Approach to hazardous area
classification, 1998. The report also reviews flammability limits, evaporation from pools
and releases into confined areas.
The aim of this publication is to provide a record of the calculations, methodology and
assumptions used to calculate dispersion distances. It provides a traceable scientific
basis that will be applied to the 2
nd
edition of IP publication Model Code of Safe Practice
Part 15: Area Classification code for petroleum installations 1
st
edition, 1990.
Although it is believed that the adoption of the recommendations of this report will assist
the user, the Institute of Petroleum cannot accept any responsibility, of whatsoever kind,
for damage or loss, or alleged damage or loss, arising or otherwise occurring as a result
of the application of this report.
viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report was prepared by Dr Peter Roberts and Dr Les Shirvill and was reviewed by
members of the Institute of Petroleums Area Classification Working Group:
Phil Cleaver Advantica Technology
Howard Crowther Consultant (formerly BP)
Kieran Glynn BP
Alan Tyldesley Health and Safety Executive
Mick Wansborough Shell
The Institute wishes to record its appreciation of the work carried out by the members of
the group.
The Institute also wishes to record its thanks to the Health and Safety Executive for co-
sponsoring this research.
1
Calculations in Support of IP 15: The Area Classification
Code for Petroleum Installations
Executive Summary
The Area Classification Code for Petroleum Installations published by the Institute of
Petroleum (IP 15) offers guidance on the immediate area of hazard associated with the
normal processing and handling of petroleum products and is in very wide use.
A major revision of IP 15 is being prepared which aims not only to update the guidance
based upon best current practice but also to provide a traceable and scientific basis for the
guidance given. This latter is not a trivial task and necessarily depends to a great extent on
the methodology developed for assessing the consequences of accidental releases on a
large scale - much larger than would arise from normal processing and handling. The
quantification of hazard necessarily starts with specifying the type of material and the size of
release which is very much unknown in the case of small spills and leaks. Material types
have been simulated using 5 example fluid compositions coded (A, B, C, G and Gii)
following earlier work to update IP 15. Release rate values used here represent the lower
end of the hazardous release scale. These should be larger than arise in normal handling
and certainly should not be taken as indicative of the magnitude of acceptable spills. In all
circumstances the potential for spills to occur should be rigorously assessed and a full
hazard assessment carried out where necessary.
This note contributes a methodology and the physical basis for the deriving several guidance
parameters relating to:
- the characteristics of two-phase releases compared to single phase releases.
- the definition of shape factors for pressurised releases of both heavier than air and lighter
than air fluids (fluid categories A, B, C, Gi, Gii).
- the flammability limits for the fluids used as examples of categories A, B, C, Gi, Gii.
- hazards arising from the evaporation of category C fluids.
- releases into confined areas.
The major findings arising from this work are summarised below. It has generally been
possible to defend the key recommendations of IP 15 as conservative. Where revisions are
recommended these are strongly dependent on scenario and fluid type.
- The hazard radii for pressurised releases of category B and C fluids should be derived
assuming a mechanically generated flammable mist; previously gaseous releases were
assumed. The Hazard radii for category B and C fluids are increased relative to previous
guidance.
- Numeric flammability limits published in Annex D of A Risk-Based Approach to
Hazardous Area Classification for the category B and C fluids have been updated to take
account of the composition of the flammable mist; previously low vapour components
were assumed to rain-out and not contribute to the lower flammability limit evaluation.
- Shape factors for pressurised releases are revised to take better account of the role of
initial jet momentum on the jet trajectory. In particular the lighter than air gases (category
Gi and Gii fluids) are found to have qualitatively more similar shape factors to the two-
2
phase category A, B and C releases; previously buoyancy was assumed to dominate their
dispersion.
- Hazard radii for discharges from vents are evaluated. The hazard radius varies from
slightly smaller to slightly larger than that in the existing guidance depending on the
properties of the vented vapour.
- The composition of vapour from vents on storage facilities maintained at atmospheric
pressure may be variable (in composition, density and flammability) and the user of the
new guidance should be aware of the effect of this variability because of the
consequence for hazard radii.
- The example range of venting rate and vent sizes used in the guidance are not wholly
consistent with the assumption that the discharge takes place at atmospheric pressure.
The relationship between venting rate and pressure of discharge is investigated and a
value of 300 mb suggested as a threshold above which the consequences of pressure
should be assessed. This is of significance for multicomponent fluids where
condensation may occur.
- The existing guidance for liquid spillages is conservative, judged by the volatility of the
model category C fluid. The guidance is applicable to materials with approximately twice
the vapour generation rate of category C fluid under the specimen conditions. Relative
vapour pressures for some common hydrocarbon compounds are listed.
- The existing guidance for sumps is conservative, judged by the volatility of the model
category C.
- Vapour generation at the source of spillage of category C fluids is a potential hazard
dictated by the spill rate and conditions and not the rate of evaporation of the liquid pool.
The new guidance should emphasise the role of release conditions in determining the
initial vapour generation from spills of category C fluids.
- For releases into confined areas the relative size of spillage and building are of key
importance. The classification Adequate ventilation has been assessed with respect to
these parameters.
1. Introduction
Shell Global Solutions, on behalf of the Institute of Petroleum (IP), has worked to establish a
methodology by which certain guidance parameters in the IP 15 document can be calculated
from specific scenarios. The benefit is two-fold. Firstly, the existence of a methodology
enables the guidance to be independently verified, secondly, it allows an end user to derive
specific fluid and process dependent values in a consistent way when required. The
methodology closely follows that used for assessing the consequence of hazardous events.
Several of the scenarios adopted to illustrate the effect, say on hazard radius, of changing
release scenarios were found to produce events that in practice would require a formal
assessment of risk; i.e. they fall outwith the definition of normal processing and handling of
petroleum products. None of the discharge rates used in this report should be taken as
representing normal or acceptable routine practice.
This work took place in two stages. A preliminary investigation was carried out for Shell
(UK) in order to verify the hazard radii reported in A Risk-Based Approach to Hazardous
Area Classification, Institute of Petroleum, November 1998 and to see if the shape factors
reported in IP 15 were adequate.
- the values of the hazard radius for category B and category C fluids in the Risk-Based
Approach Document were too small, and the release scenarios unrealistic.
- the shape factors for lighter than air gases (category Gi and Gii fluids), and to a lesser
extent, the low vapour pressure category B and C fluids needed to be revised.
3
An abridged version of the report of this preliminary investigation is included as Appendix B
to this note. The major findings are restated in the body of this note.
The implied changes to key values in IP 15 were significant. The Institute of Petroleum
requested that Shell Global Solutions pursue 6 work items to verify and quantify the
necessary changes for the revision to IP 15 . These were (in short)
Work Item 1: To examine results of the AIChE Release modelling program and other recent
data and derive, if possible, an improved estimate of the flammability limit for high flash-point
releases (e.g. taking account droplet size, rain-out) that would allow the category C hazard
radii to be better assessed.
Work Item 2: To describe the method used to calculate the hazard radii; define the shape
factors for the fluid releases; state the hazard radii.
Work Item 3: Cross check the hazard radii for the process vents.
Work Item 4: Liquid Pools due to Spillage (section 5.11) To determine the hazard
radii/shape factor for shallow liquid pools.
Work item 5: Open Sumps and Interceptors (section 5.12) To determine the hazard
radii/shape factor for deep liquid pools by taking the steady state evaporation rate and a
steady dispersion calculation.
Work item 6: Propose a simple low momentum calculation method; implement this method
and use it to assess the external hazard for releases of category A and category B fluid
inside a building and evaluate the hazard radii.
Progress on these work items was reviewed. Specific scenarios were discussed and
amended in discussion with the Area Classification Committee of the IP to give the results
below. These results are in a form suitable for inclusion in the IP 15 revision.
A consequence of changes to some scenarios is that numeric values obtained in the original
investigation on behalf of Shell (UK)(Appendix B) are changed. Only values from the main
body of this note should be transferred to the new guidance.
Where possible publicly available and publicly evaluated hazard assessment models have
been used in this work.
2. Flammability Limits for Two Phase Releases.
A major advance in hazard assessment has been the development of models capable of
describing the dispersion of two-phase liquids. The AEROPLUME model is one example,
being part of the HGSYSTEM v3.0 (1995) suite of models developed by Shell for industry
consortia as publicly available tools subject to peer review and acting as a standard
benchmark in model evaluation exercises.
Two-phase releases can arise in two ways:
- by the atomisation accompanying the expansion and phase change of material that is
liquid under storage conditions of high pressure, and gaseous at atmospheric
temperature and pressure.
4
- by the mechanical break-up of a (volatile) liquid into small droplets and their subsequent
evaporation.
Mists of fine droplets and dust clouds of combustible material can be very highly flammable.
Unlike a gaseous mixture that is combustible only within narrow flammability limits each
droplet can act as a fuel source surrounded by a plentiful air supply. Mists are optically thick
and, once ignition has occurred, heat transfer by radiation very effectively preheats
droplets/particles distant from the ignition front. In extreme cases and especially for dust
clouds, this preheating is sufficient for auto-ignition to take place causing the cloud to burn
throughout its volume. This can be a much more vigorous process than a gas cloud fire
where a flame-front passes through the mixture.
The flammability hazard arising from a two-phase release depends in a complicated way
upon the ease of ignition of the fluid, the droplet size distribution and the concentration of
droplets and vapour in air. Unfortunately very little is known about precise flammability
criteria for mists arising from real releases. The summary guidance based upon a review
of available literature (Appendix B, Lees, 1998) is that the potential of a mist to burn should
be assessed: take all the droplets present in a volume, evaporate them and see if the
resulting vapour and air mixture lies within the known vapour phase flammability limits. The
easiest way to evaluate this is to use a mass based flammability limit (kg fuel/m
3
air) in place
of the standard and familiar volume based limit (m
3
fuel/m
3
air) used for vapours.
This definition of a flammability limit:
- has NO effect on hazard distances calculated for gaseous mixtures or two-phase
mixtures of very volatile components
i
.
- has a profound effect on the hazard distances calculated for the category B and category
C example fluids resulting in a substantial INCREASE in hazard radius over previous
advice based upon volumetric flammability limit values.
Not all of the liquid released from a pressurised source might remain airborne. Thus, loss of
fluid to the ground through rain-out may mitigate the hazard associated with two-phase
releases with a low volatility component. The question of rain-out has been investigated at
length by the Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical
Engineers by means of a series of experiments and an extended modelling exercise.
Unfortunately the problem has not been satisfactorily solved. The combined results of this
study are reported by Johnson and Woodward (1999) and expressed in software form as a
model, called Release.
The Release model does not account for all of the physical processes involved in two-phase
releases of low volatility materials and is strongly tuned to account for the results of the
experiments that were carried out. These experiments aimed to measure the total liquid
deposition from pressurised releases of several materials under a limited and non-ideal set
of environmental conditions. An obvious concern is that the validity of the model outside of
the range of the calibration data is unknown. The model performance is also poor in several
respects.

i
This applies to the category A (two-phase), Gi and Gii (gaseous) example fluids used in the IP 15
revision at the reference atmospheric conditions and release conditions therein.
5
Two versions of the model are supplied on CDROM by AIChE; an original model and a
corrected model. These have different functionality. The corrected model is intended for
end-use and is referred to hereafter in this report.
The Release model was reviewed by AEA Technology for the UK Health and Safety
Executive (Ramsdale and Tickle (2000)). We conclude from the AEAT report, together with
our less detailed investigation of the model, that:
- the Release model would over-predict rain-out by a substantial margin for category C
fluids.
We also believe that the relationship between over-pressure and rain-out is not robustly
developed and may not be extrapolated to conditions outside of the tests. With these
reservations in mind, but for completeness, we used the Release model to calculate rain-out
for cyclo-hexane using the conditions of release temperature, pressure and hole size used in
this study for the IP. Cyclo-hexane is the closest to a category C fluid of those tested.
We found that:
- mass flow rates calculated by the Release model as a function of hole size and pressure
were realistic.
- rain-out as a fraction of mass-flow rate was independent of hole size and a function of
pressure only. The calculated rain-out values were:
Pressure (bar) Rain-out (fraction of mass released)
5 0.98
10 0.44
50 0
100 0
Table 1 Results of the Release model for Cyclo-Hexane.
- the rain-out fraction did not depend upon the axial location in the jet.(input parameter ZJ)
We do not believe that the values in Table 1 are necessarily correct although they confirm
our intuition that pressurised releases should become atomised. Further the consensus of
the model reviewers is that Release overestimates the amount of rain-out. For the purposes
of this work we therefore assume that:
- rain-out of liquid from pressurised releases can be neglected in calculating hazard radii.
This is in accord with the concluding remarks (5.2) of the AEAT review which suggest that
low volatility materials should conservatively be treated as a mist. There must be a lower
limit to the drive pressure for which this is true and further work is needed to establish the
proper limits.
It does seem credible, from intuition and from Table 1, that the 5 bar pressure releases
would rain-out. However, if they do not form a flammable mist they would instead form an
initially coherent liquid jet. The throw of a liquid jet can be quite substantial and could
credibly extend the same distance as we calculate here for dispersed phase jets. A liquid jet
of gasoline, say, would present a contact hazard to electrical equipment on exposed
surfaces and also form a liquid pool on the ground that will flow away from the source. The
result on ignition would be a pool fire rather than a jet-fire or cloud deflagration. For these
reasons we retain the hazard radii for Category C fluid down to the 5 bar condition.
6
It is worth noting that, for flammable as opposed to toxic hazards, the Release model
prediction of total rain-out does require qualification as to at what distance from the source
the rain-out occurs. Clearly to mitigate the hazard this must be smaller than the calculated
hazard radius. For toxic hazards (evaluated at a long distance from the release point) only
the total released needs to be known.
The revision of the IP guidelines is based on model fluids for the five fluid categories. These
first appeared in the Addendum to IP 15: A Risk Based Approach to Hazardous Area
Classification. The fluid properties are quoted in Table 2. We note:
- The vapour phase flammability limits have been re-calculated and differ from those in the
risk-based addendum to IP 15. The derivation of those flammability limits is not known.
However, we infer that this is because of a changed assumption that all of the released
material might participate in a fire. Certainly the previously published values are
consistent with the assumption that only the light ends of the mixture would burn and
match those calculated for a pseudo-mixture of hydrocarbons smaller than C8.
Stream
component
(mol %)
Fluid
Cat. A
Fluid
Cat. B
Fluid
Cat. C
Fluid
Cat. G
(i)
Fluid
Cat. G
(ii)
Comp.
LFL
(vol %)
MW Boiling
point C
N
2
Nitrogen 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 - 28.01 -196
C
1
Methane 0.00 4.00 0.00 88.45 10.00 5.00 16.04 -161
C
2
Ethane 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.50 3.00 3.00 30.07 -87
C
3
Propane 70.00 6.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 2.10 44.09 -42
C
4
Butane 30.00 7.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.80 58.12 -1
C
5
Pentane 0.00 9.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 1.40 72.15 36
C
6
Hexane 0.00 11.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.20 86.17 69
C
7
Heptane 0.00 16.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.05 100.20 98
C
8
Octane 0.00 22.00 27.00 0.00 0.00 0.95 114.23 126
C
9
Nonane 0.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 128.26 151
C
10
Decane 0.00 25.00 38.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 142.28 173
H
2
O Water 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 - 18.02 100
Carbon
Dioxide
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 - 44.01 -78
(sub)
Hydrogen 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 4.00 2.02 -253
Average
MW
48.30 100.06 125.03 18.74 7.03
LFL (vol %) 2.00 1.05 0.86 4.6 4.00
LFL (kg/m
3
) 0.039 0.042 0.043 0.034 0.011
Table 2 Composition of the example category A,B,C, G(i) and G(ii) Fluids and their lower
flammability limits (LFL)
3. Shape Factors and Hazard Radii for Pressurised Releases
The major findings of this study, compared with earlier guidance are that:
- Pressurised releases give rise to an approximately spherical hazard zone
ii
for all
categories of fluid, except where the release comes into ground contact where the hazard
distance is extended.

ii
In the context of flammable hazards.
7
- Hazard radii for category B and category C fluids are substantially greater than those
quoted in the Addendum to IP 15: A Risk-Based Approach to Hazardous Area
Classification.
- The increase in hazard radius is due to the redefinition of flammability limit and not to
substantial differences in modelling changes.
The new shape factors are shown in Figure 1. The shape factor depends upon the height
of the release and the hazard radius.
8
R
1
Source
(a) Releases where H > R
1
+ 1
R
1
1

m
R2
Source
H
b) Releases where 1 < H s R
1
+ 1
Source
R
1
R2
1

m
c) Releases where H s 1
Figure 1 Shape Factors for Pressurised Releases
9
The key features are:
- Releases below a height (H) of 1 m are declared to be influenced by the ground and to
have a hazard radius R
2
.
- Releases above 1 m, but at heights below the hazard radius R
1
+ 1 m are declared to be
influenced by the ground if the release is directed downward and passes below 1 m.
- Releases at a height above the hazard radius R
1
+1 m are declared independent of the
ground.
The Hazard radii are given in
Table 3 for the primary radius R
1
and in Table 4 for the ground radius R
2
. For small
releases, giving a dimension R
1
not substantially larger than 1 m, the radii are similar.
The numerical values given in
Table 3 and Table 4 are specific to the example fluids. The release rate for these fluids is
only weakly dependent upon small variations in the assumed storage temperature about 20
C, which is chosen to reflect a daily average UK summer temperature. Other fluids may be
more sensitive to temperature changes.
Release flow rate
(kg/s)
Hazard radius R
1
(metres)
Fluid
Category
Release
pressure
Release hole diameter Release hole diameter
(bara) 1mm 2mm 5mm 10mm 1mm 2mm 5mm 10mm
A 5
*
0.01 0.04 0.3 1.0 2 4 8 14
10 0.01 0.06 0.4 1.5 2.5 4 9 16
50 0.03 0.14 0.9 3.5 2.5 5 11 20
100 0.05 0.2 1.20 5.0 2.5 5 11 22
B 5 0.01 0.04 0.30 1.0 2 4 8 14
10 0.02 0.07 0.40 1.7 2 4 9 16
50 0.04 0.15 1.0 4.0 2 4 10 19
100 0.06 0.2 1.4 5.5 2 4 10. 20
C 5 0.01 0.06 0.3 1.1 2 4 8 14
10 0.02 0.1 0.4 1.7 2.5 4.5 9 17
50 0.04 0.2 1.0 4.0 2.5 5 11 21
100 0.06 0.25 1.4 6 2.5 5 12 22
G(i) 5 0.001 0.002 0.02 0.06 < 1 < 1 <1.0 1.5
10 0.001 0.005 0.03 0.10 < 1 < 1 1.0 2
50 0.007 0.03 0.2 0.7 < 1 1.0 2.5 5
100 0.015 0.06 0.4 1.5 < 1 1.5 4.0 7
G(ii) 5 0.0004 0.001 0.01 0.04 < 1 <1 1.5 3
10 0.001 0.003 0.02 0.07 < 1 1 2 4
50 0.004 0.02 0.1 0.4 < 1 2 4 8
100 0.007 0.03 0.2 0.7 1 2 6 11
Table 3 Primary Hazard radius, R
1
for example releases. (Rounded figures)
*At the fluid storage temperature of 20
o
C the nominal discharge pressure of 5 bara is below
the saturated vapour pressure of the category A fluid. The saturated vapour pressure (6.8
bara) was used to calculate the discharge rate and dispersion.
10
Release flow rate
(kg/s)
Hazard radius R
2
(metres)
Fluid
Category
Release
pressure
Release hole diameter Release hole diameter
(bara) 1mm 2mm 5mm 10mm 1mm 2mm 5mm 10mm
A 5
*
0.01 0.04 0.3 1.0 2 4 16 40
10 0.01 0.06 0.4 1.5 2.5 4.5 20 50
50 0.03 0.14 0.9 3.5 3 5.5 20 50
100 0.05 0.2 1.2 5.0 3 6 20 50
B 5 0.01 0.04 0.3 1.0 2 4 14 40
10 0.02 0.07 0.4 1.7 2.5 4 16 40
50 0.04 0.15 1.0 4.0 2.5 5 17 40
100 0.06 0.2 1.4 5.5 3 5 17 40
C 5 0.01 0.06 0.3 1.1 2.5 4 20 50
10 0.02 0.1 0.4 1.7 2.5 4.5 21 50
50 0.04 0.2 1.0 4.0 3 5.5 21 50
100 0.06 0.25 1.4 6 3 6 21 50
G(i) 5 0.001 0.002 0.02 0.06 < 1 < 1 1.0 2
10 0.001 0.005 0.03 0.10 < 1 < 1 1.5 3
50 0.007 0.03 0.2 0.7 < 1 1.5 3.5 7
100 0.015 0.06 0.4 1.5 1.0 2.0 5 11
G(ii) 5 0.0004 0.001 0.01 0.04 < 1 < 1 2 4
10 0.001 0.003 0.02 0.07 < 1 1 2.5 5
50 0.004 0.02 0.1 0.4 1 2 6 11
100 0.007 0.03 0.2 0.7 2.0 3 8 14
Table 4 Hazard Radius at Ground level, R
2
, for the example releases
For larger releases R
2
can be approximated from R
1
using Table 5. The ratio decreases as
the release pressure increases because mixing improves.
Fluid Category R
2
/R
1
Low pressure High Pressure
A 3.0 2.2
B 2.6 2.0
C 3.5 2.0
G(i) 1.4 1.5
G(ii) 1.3 1.3
Table 5 Quick estimator for the hazard radius at ground level, R
2
.
4. Hazard Radii from vents
In this chapter we address hazard radii for discharges from vents using a standard matrix of
conditions and ambient conditions of neutral atmospheric stability and a temperature of
30 C. A vent is defined as a means of release of vapour at or near to atmospheric
pressure. This is distinct from the pressurised releases considered in section 3.
The results of the calculations for the storage of petroleum products are given in section 4.1
and for process vents in section 4.2. The main findings, which result from the use of the
prescribed matrix of conditions, are that:
11
- low flow rates through the larger orifices implies insufficient exit momentum to disperse
the vented material as a jet. The dispersion process then becomes dependent on the
detailed flow interaction at the vent tip. Downwash, contacting of material below the vent
height and dense vapours in the vicinity and below the vent exit are to be expected in
these cases.
- some combinations of venting rates and vent sizes are incompatible with the assumption
of discharge at atmospheric pressure.
- a guideline value of 300 mb for the pressure drop across a vent is suggested as an
upper bound to atmospheric pressure releases. Above this pressure account needs to
be taken of density changes due to pressure differences in calculating discharge rates for
ideal gases. The effect of pressure on vapour composition should be screened because
components of high flashpoint fluids may condense.
- Emissions from the storage of category B and category C fluids necessarily imply that the
fluid vapour are in some admixture with air or an inert gas. Hazard radii are derived for a
range of possible vapour compositions treated as ideal gases with molecular weights
between 48 and 100. The impact of vapour composition on flammability limits is also
taken approximately into account.
- The shape factor from the existing guidance is retained. The actual shape of the plume
from a vent varies from an upright jet, to a bent-over plume, to a plume subsiding below
the vent height depending upon the released gas composition, flow rate, vent size and
wind speed. With this complexity it is appropriate and conservative to retain a spherical
hazard radius around the exit plane.
- The hazard radii vary from just smaller to just larger than those in the existing guidance
depending upon the vapour composition and flammability limit.
- The existing guidance for process vents is in agreement with these results.
4.1. Vents from the Storage of Petroleum products
Section 3.2.5 of Revision 6 of IP 15 provides hazard radii for differing emission rates and
vent sizes for Class I, II(2) and III(2) materials. Model fluids are used to derive the hazard
radii. The composition of these fluids was given Table 2. It is assumed that the vents are
remote from any structure and, if attached, are elevated sufficiently for the dispersion to the
lower flammability limit to be unaffected by building induced flow. The comments below are
specifically addressed for the early stages of dispersion for flammability assessments. Other
problems, such as the assessment of odours, assessment of health impacts or
environmental impacts, require a more detailed treatment.
Work Item 3 is to verify/update the hazard radii given in the original report according to the
matrix given in Table 6 for materials in Categories B and C.
Vapour Emission Rate
(filling rate) m
3
/h
Vent diameter (mm)
50 80 100 250
250 x x x x
500 x x x x
1000 x x x x
2500 x x x x
Table 6. Matrix of vent flow rates and diameters used in this study
Flow from a vent is of vapour only and it is implicit that there is only a small pressure drop
across the vent. This contrasts with releases from pressurised containment which may
exhibit two-phase behaviour as well as density changes near to the discharge point.
12
Venting usually takes place in a vertical direction. Material vented upwards will rise above
the vent stack as a consequence of vertical momentum. As it mixes with the ambient air it
acquires horizontal momentum and bends over toward the horizontal. If the vented gas is
less dense than air it will then slowly rise, if it is heavier than air it will slowly subside. The
extent to which the plume path is affected by density differences depends upon the gas
properties, the venting rate and the prevailing atmospheric conditions.
The degree of plume rise in the immediate vicinity of the vent depends mainly upon the exit
momentum and hence on the fluid density as well as the exit velocity. However, most of the
modelling that has been carried out is for stack gas effluent and uses velocity based criteria
for design purposes. The most commonly applied rule is to guard against plume downwash.
Experiment shows that, when the exit velocity is less than 1.5 times the wind speed at the
vent height, the aerodynamic interaction between the wind and the vent stack causes the
pollutant to be drawn down into the near wake of the vent tip. This is called downwash and
results in a reduction in the height of release, extra mixing of the pollutant and contacting of
the pollutant with the external stack.
For releases where the flow rate is sufficient to fully avoid downwash then dilution to below
flammable concentrations will occur in the vicinity of the vent and through the mechanism of
jet mixing rather than ambient turbulence.
In order to be conservative we have neglect the effect of downwash on plume dilution. An
ambient wind speed of 2 m/s at the vent top is assumed for these calculations.
We observe that: for wind speeds greater than 2 m/s the plume trajectory will be flattened
toward the horizontal. The shape factor is thus conservative in the vertical for wind speeds
of 2 m/s and higher. For wind speeds less than 2 m/s the hazard will be above the vent
point so that the shape factor is conservative in the downwind direction. The hazard radii
given in this report take account of the contribution of the 2 m/s wind speed to the
downstream extent of the plume. This should render the estimation of hazard radius
conservative for lower wind speeds. In critical cases the user should check by calculation.
The shape factor given in the existing guidance is retained because it is conservative.
For very slow venting rates and under low-wind conditions denser than air gases might flow
down the outside of the vent pipe. The situation should not occur for simple vents, designed
with an adequate exit velocity. It is more likely to occur for large area vents on a structure.
There is no simple model available to treat this problem which needs experimental or
computational investigation on a case by case basis. The flow phenomenon is complicated
and may involve substantial mixing within the exit of the vent pipe. We believe that it is
necessary, but conservative, to retain the zone 2 classification outside of and beneath the
zone 1 hazard radius to account for this possibility.
Nominal exit velocities for the vent matrix are given in Table 7. These cover a large range.
We observe that:
- For the range of flow rates shown the 250 mm diameter vent in particular shows nominal
exit velocities below and close to 10 m/s. This implies downwash under common wind
conditions and so these vent combinations may not be realistic in practice for continuous
emissions.
- Exit velocities above 100 m/s are indicated for the 50 and 80 mm diameter vents at the
higher flow rates. The implications of this are assessed below for the different fluids.
13
(filling rate) m
3
/h
Exit Velocity m/s
Vent diameter (mm)
50 80 100 250

250 35 14 9 1
500 71 28 18 3
1000 141 55 35 6
2500 283 110 71 11
Table 7. Nominal exit velocity based on vent area (m/s). The shaded cells represent
combinations of vapour rate and vent diameter that need special consideration. Exit velocities
below 10 m/s in the top right of the table imply possible downwash effects. Exit velocities above
100 m/s in the bottom left imply a significant pressure forcing.
The exit velocity of the vented flow is illustrative but, because it is the exit momentum of the
flow that determines the rate of dispersion, the density of the effluent needs to be taken into
account as well.
We assume that the effluent is an ideal gas with properties evaluated at atmospheric
pressure. In reality any rate of discharge requires some driving force and a positive
pressure differential is the most common. We need to evaluate what a negligible pressure
is and how it affects the realistic range of vent sizes and venting rates for the different
category fluids. We also need to assess what are the likely properties of the material that is
vented. For liquid storage at atmospheric pressure the vapour space will necessarily be
occupied by some mixture of fluid vapour and air or fluid vapour and an inert gas. The
mixture composition should not be flammable but will be variable according to the filling level
and the history of changes in level, ambient conditions etc. Thus for vents :
- The vented mixture may vary in composition.
- The flammability limit and physical properties of the vapour may vary.
- For some conditions (high venting rates and small vents) it may be necessary to take
account of the effects of pressure on the release.
- If the release does not take place close to atmospheric pressure then the ideal gas
assumption may not be appropriate for mixtures with low vapour pressure components.
Because the effective molecular weight, and hence density, of the vented vapour is not
closely defined it is appropriate to make some example calculations using a range of values.
We assume
iii
that the average molecular weight of the gas vented from the storage of
category B and C fluids will lie in the range 48 - 100.
Figure 2 shows how the mixture molecular weight varies with dilution. For no-added air the
molecular weight is that of the pure vapour (Table 2) and as more and more air is added
then the mixture molecular weight tends to that of air (29) or if mixed with nitrogen (28).

iii
Note: because the model fluids are illustrative we have made no attempt to reconcile the example
ideal gas properties with the actual equilibrium air-vapour-liquid compositions of the model fluids at
atmospheric pressure and the reference temperature of 30 C used throughout this guidance
14
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
M
i
x
t
u
r
e

M
o
l
e
c
u
l
a
r

W
e
i
g
h
t
Mol fraction of Air in Mixture
Mean Molecular Weight for Mixtures of Category A, B, C fluids with Air, g/mol
MW 48 - A
MW 100 - B
MW 125 - C
Figure 2 The effect on mixture molecular weight of mixing category C (top), category B
(middle) and category A vapour with air assuming volatilisation of all components.
The upper flammability limits of the Category B and C fluids lie far to the right of Figure 2 as
shown in Table 8.
Fluid Upper Flammability Limit of vapour
%
Mol fraction Air in mixture
B 6.84 0.93
C 6.08 0.94
Table 8. Upper Flammability limits of Category B and C vapour. The mol fraction of air in the
vapour in a storage tank must be substantially less than these values to avoid
flammable/explosive mixtures.
The mixture molecular weight of 48 corresponds to the following mixtures, Table 9:
Fluid Type Mol Fraction Air Mol Fraction Fluid Vapour
A 0 1
B 0.72 0.28
C 0.81 0.19
Table 9: Equivalent mixtures for a vapour molecular wt of 48.
The Category B and C fluids Table 2 have a lower flammability limit falling into a narrow
range of 0.039-0.043 kg/m
3
, 0.86-2.0 %v. We also included Category A vapour as an
additional example in this sensitivity analysis although, of course, for practical reasons it is
not stored at atmospheric pressure and temperature.
15
As the pure vapour becomes diluted then the lower flammability limit of the mixture
increases. The effect of dilution on the flammability limit of the mixture is shown
qualitatively in Figure 3 where we have used Le Chateliers law and treated air as inert fuel
component. This is not strictly accurate for high dilutions but it does illustrate that lower
flammability limit increases as air is added. Only mixtures initially richer than the upper
flammability limit are considered which is why the mol fraction of air is terminated at 0.9.
0.1
1
10
100
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
M
i
x
t
u
r
e

L
o
w
e
r

F
l
a
m
m
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

L
i
m
i
t
,

%
Mol fraction of Air in Mixture
Lower Flammability Limit for Mixtures of Category A, B, C fluids with air, %
MW 48 - A
MW 100 - B
MW 125 - C
Figure 3. Lower Flammability limits of the three model fluids used in the Area Classification
guidance as a function of dilution with air. Only mixtures originally above the upper
flammability limit are considered.
We now verify and quantify the range of venting rates and vent diameters that qualify as
negligible pressure. Figure 4 shows the variation in mass-flow rate from a short pipe as
the applied pressure, expressed in millibar gauge, increases.
Specific calculations (points) were calculated for an ideal gas of molecular weight 48 and for
a pipe diameter of 50 mm. At low drive pressure the mass flow rate is proportional to the
square root of the applied pressure as would be expected from the Bernoulli equation for an
incompressible fluid i.e. keeping the density unchanged from its base value. A correlation
line
iv
is drawn to indicate this relationship. At high pressure the mass flow rate (points)
increases more quickly with increasing pressure than indicated by the correlation line. This
is because the increase in fluid density in the vent is significant. To identify a suitable cut-off
we compared the goodness of fit of the Bernoulli equation to the flow calculations. We found
that the fit became progressively worse as we included results for pressures above 300 mb.
Therefore we adopt 300 mb as marking the upper limit of negligible pressure.

iv
A correlation line was used for convenience. Equally the slope could be derived from the discharge
model for an ideal gas through a round hole using a discharge coefficient of 0.8. This was the basis
for the model calculations to which the regression line was fitted.
16
To see the consequence of this for the flow conditions in Table 6 we take the maximum flow
rate of 1.34 kg/s corresponding to the volume flow-rate of 2500 m
3
/h (evaluated at 1 atm.
pressure and 30 C) and plot this as a horizontal line on Figure 4. We then construct the
(incompressible) flow rates for the additional hole sizes of 80, 100 and 250 mm as parallel
lines to the 50 mm pipe calculations. Figure 4 shows that for pipes smaller than 80 mm
diameter the 2500 m
3
/h flow rate implies a drive pressure greater than 300 mb.
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
10
0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000
m
a
s
s

f
l
o
w

r
a
t
e

i
n

k
g
/
s
over-pressure, mb
Mass flow rate as a function of applied pressure
Mol. Wt 48
50 mm pipe
80 mm pipe
100 mm pipe
250 mm pipe
2500 m3/hr
Figure 4. Mass Flow rate through pipes of different diameter for an ideal gas of molecular
weight 48. Points denote calculations with a discharge model. Lines denote a correlation based
on drive pressures less than 300 mb. The horizontal line denotes the mass flow rate consistent
with a volume flow rate of 2500 m
3
/h at atmospheric pressure and 30 C.
Figure 5 shows the equivalent graph for a vapour of molecular weight 100. For the larger
molecular weight greater pressures are needed to achieve a given volumetric flow. We find
that pipe diameters smaller than 100 mm require a drive pressure greater than 300 mb to
achieve a flow rate of 2500 m
3
/h.
17
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
10
0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000
m
a
s
s

f
l
o
w

r
a
t
e

i
n

k
g
/
s
over-pressure, mb
Mass flow rate as a function of applied pressure
Mol. Wt. 100
50 mm pipe
80 mm pipe
100 mm pipe
250 mm pipe
2500 m3/hr
Figure 5. Mass Flow rate through pipes of different diameter for an ideal gas of molecular
weight 100. Points denote calculations with a discharge model. Lines denote a correlation
based on drive pressures less than 300 mb. The horizontal line denotes the mass flow rate
consistent with a volume flow rate of 2500 m
3
/h at atmospheric pressure and 30 C
These calculations suggest that for ideal gases a threshold of 300 mb is a suitable choice to
distinguish between vent flows where difference in the physical properties of the vapour
within the vent and at atmospheric pressure can be neglected. If the vent design implies
higher over-pressures then the implications for the possible change in properties of mixtures
with low vapour pressure components needs to be assessed.
Hazard radii were obtained for vertical discharges of an ideal gas with molecular weight in
the range 48 - 100 fluid. The effect of changing flammability limit was tested using values
appropriate to mixtures of category B and category C vapour with air and including category
A vapour as a worse case. Results are given in Table 10 and have been rounded. Values
marked with a double asterisks(**) are conservative, at such low exit velocities mixing is
dependent on the detail flow in the vent exit.
18
(filling rate) m
3
/h
Hazard radius, m
Vent diameter (mm)
50 80 100 250

250 2 2.0 2.5 3**
500 2.5 2.5 2.5 4
1000 3 3.5 3.5 6.
2500 4 5 5 7
a) Assuming category B vapour mixed with air. The shaded cells require a drive pressure
greater than 300 mb to achieve
(filling rate) m
3
/h
Hazard radius, m
Vent diameter (mm)
50 80 100 250

250 2 2.0 2 3**
500 2.5 2.5 2.5 4.0
1000 3.0 3.5 3.5 5.5
2500 4.0 5.0 5 6
b) Assuming category C vapour mixed with air. The shaded cells require a drive pressure
greater than 300 mb to achieve
(filling rate) m
3
/h
Hazard radius, m
Vent diameter (mm)
50 80 100 250

250 2.5 4.0 6.0 6**
500 3.5 3.5 4.5 6.5
1000 4.5 4.5 5.0 9
2500 6.5 7 7 13
c) Assuming pure category A vapour. The shaded cells require a drive pressure greater than
300 mb to achieve
Table 10. Hazard radii for a fluid of molecular weight 48 g/mol treated as an ideal gas and
three example flammability limits
The results show a trend for the hazard radius to increase as the lower flammability limit of
the mixture decreases as would be expected. The hazard radius values for the category B
and category C vapour/air mixtures are quite similar but substantially smaller than those for
the pure vapour category A simulation. This suggests that the dilution with air that
characterises an open venting system is key to reducing hazard distances and should be
taken account of in any specific site assessment.
Table 11 below gives results for a molecular weight 100 fluid, evaluated as a mixture of
category C fluid and air and as pure category B fluid. This is almost certainly an extreme
example but, when compared to Table 10, illustrates that as the molecular weight of the
19
mixture increases the hazard radius also increases for a fixed volume flow rate. We also
notice in the detailed calculations and showing in Table 11 that, for a fixed venting rate and
increasing vent diameter, the trajectory of the vent gases alters as the exit velocity
decreases. At low exit velocities the vent gases subside quite quickly after leaving the vent
and the downward path of the gases passes relatively close to the vent. The hazard radius,
measured from the exit plane to the point of dilution to LFL starts to decrease because of the
trajectory whereas, for lighter (but still dense) gases the vented material passes away from
the stack and the hazard radius increases as the exit velocity and hence the jet mixing
component of entrainment decreases.
When the molecular weight is as large as 100 g/mol then discharge from a vent sized 250
mm or larger has insufficient bulk velocity to disperse the gases according to the
assumptions made here.
In practice, and especially for substantially larger vents, such as hatches, complicated flow
interactions can take place in the actual opening with a dense gas flow preferentially around
the edges and a degree of inflow and mixing taking place inside the centre of the vent
opening. A different methodology, such as computational fluid dynamics or experimental
measurement must be used if the mixing within the geometric features of the holding vessel
is to be understood and quantified.
(filling rate) m
3
/h
Hazard radius, m
7 Vent diameter (mm)
50 80 100 250

250 4 6.5 6 n/a
500 5 5.5 8 n/a
1000 6.5 7 7 n/a
2500 9 10 10 11
a) Assuming category C vapour mixed with air
(filling rate) m
3
/h
Hazard radius, m
7 Vent diameter (mm)
50 80 100 250

250 3.5 6.5 6.0 n/a
500 5 6 8.5 n/a
1000 6.5 7 7.5 n/a
2500 9.5 10.5 10.5 11.5
**
b) Assuming pure category B vapour
Table 11. Hazard radii for a fluid of molecular weight 100 g/mol, treated as ideal gas. For
venting rates less than 2500 m
3
/h the vent of 250 mm diameter gives too small an exit velocity to
assure dilution of the gas and a down flow in the vicinity of the vent stack is to be expected.
Affected combinations of vent rate and vent size are marked as n/a.
In Table 10 and Table 11 we note that, for the highest flow rates and the smaller vent sizes,
the hazard radius is shaded. This denotes that more than 300 mb pressure drop is needed
to achieve this flowrate and a check on the vapour composition should be carried out to see
if condensation of any components is implied.
20
Comparison with section 3.2.5 of revision 6 of IP 15 shows that hazard radii range from just
below (molecular weight 48) to just above (molecular weight 100) the existing guidance
using flammability limits for category B and category C vapour diluted with air.
4.2. Process vents
Section 5.7 of Revision 6 describes releases from process vents to atmosphere. It is again
assumed that venting is restricted to vapour phase releases. Release rates in the guidance
and required for work item 3 follow the matrix shown in Table 12 within which the implied exit
velocities are included. We note that the range of values is extremely small compared with
those used above for vents from storage. This seems counter intuitive as one might expect
venting from a process to involve quite large flow rates.
m
3
/h
Exit Velocity
m/s
Vent diameter (mm)
50 100 250

10 1.5 0.5 0.1
100 14 3.5 1
250 35 9 1.5
Table 12. Matrix of conditions for assessing hazard radii from process vents and their
associated exit velocity. Shading denotes combinations prone to downwash.
The exit velocity from a vent should exceed the wind speed by a factor 1.5 if downwash is to
be avoided and exit velocities less than about 10 m/s may be assumed to give rise to
downwash under common meteorological conditions. Downwash is to be avoided as it can
lead to soiling and corrosion of the vent pipe and to low level exposure of structures and
personnel to the emitted gases.
Table 12 shows exit velocities very substantially less than 10 m/s for a majority of cases.
Where the exit velocity is less than 1 m/s some very complicated interactions between the
external flow and the pipe flow can occur. It is known that for lighter than air gases the
external flow can enter the vent pipe from above and that mixing can take place within the
vent pipe itself to a good degree. Experimental and/or computational fluid calculations are
needed to make accurate calculations for these cases.
Hazard radii are calculated in the same manner as for the vents from storage. The vented
fluid is assumed to be an ideal gas of molecular weight, 7, 19 and 48 corresponding to the
category G(ii), G(i), and A fluids used in the guidance.
The hazard radii are given in Tables 13-15 below. In view of our comments above with
respect to the overall low flow rates in the guidance we have included larger values in the
tables.
21
m
3
/h
Hazard radius, m
Vent diameter (mm)
50 100 250

10 < 2** < 2.5** < 5**
100 < 2** < 2.5** < 5**
250 2 3 < 5**
500 2 3 < 5**
1000 3 3.5 < 5**
2500 4.5 4.5 5.5
Table 13. Hazard radii for Fluid category G(ii) as ideal gas of Molecular weight 7 g/mol.
m
3
/h
Hazard radius, m
Vent diameter (mm)
50 100 250

10 < 1** < 2** < 4**
100 1 < 2** < 4**
250 1.5 2 < 4**
500 2 2 < 4**
1000 3 3 4
2500 4 4 5
Table 14. Hazard radii for Fluid category G(i) as ideal gas of Molecular weight 19 g/mol.
m
3
/h
Hazard radius, m
Vent diameter (mm)
50 100 250

10 2.5 < 4.5** < 6**
100 2 5 < 6**
250 2.5 6 < 6**
500 3.5 4.5 7
1000 4.5 5 9
2500 6.5 7 13
Table 15. Hazard radii for Fluid category A as ideal gas of Molecular weight 48 g/mol.
No solutions were obtainable for the smallest releases. The dilution is entirely dominated by
the flow interactions at the vent tip. We suggest that, to be conservative, the largest
calculated hazard radius for a given vent diameter is used. These values are indicated by a
double asterisk(**) in the tables.
The results are in agreement with those in the existing guidelines.
22
5. Evaporation from pools and sumps.
IP 15 provides good qualitative guidance on the evaporation and dispersion of vapour from
category B and C fluids discharged to pools and from sumps. This work sets out to derive
the relevant hazard radii as requested in work items 4 and 5.
The transient nature of a spill problem and the multicomponent nature of category C and B
fluids leads to a semantic problem when providing a reference document for the IP
guidance.
The hazard radius defined for a pool of specific size should reflect the hazard from the pool
itself and be independent of the manner of release of the fluid if it is to be of generic use.
Investigation of several scenarios leads to the conclusion that the evaporation rate of the
heavier components of category C fluid is very low under the reference conditions. The
evaporation rate of the lighter components on the other hand is rapid such that the maximum
vapour generation rate is actually dictated by amount and rate of release of the liquid.
Consequently we find that:
- the existing guidance for liquid spillages and for sumps is conservative in so far as it
applies to the hazard posed by the residual liquid in a spill of category C fluid. The
guidance is appropriate to a spill with an average double the evaporation rate of category
C fluid.
- the hazard arising early in a spill arises from the more volatile components and is dictated
by the conditions of the release rather than the size of the pool itself.
- the existing guidance may still be conservative because the transient nature of the vapour
release results in a rapidly dispersing puff of vapour rather than a large cloud. Some
scenario investigation suggests that releases would have to be large ones to present
substantial hazards and thus be more typical of incidents as opposed to more commonly
occurring events.
- evaporation from sumps will be less than from pools and therefore the existing guidance
is conservative for sumps as well. This is verified for releases of temperature 50
o
C.
In this section the basic phenomenology of liquid spills is described and the hazards
quantified.
We define:
- a pool to contain a shallow layer of liquid e.g. arising from the spillage of a category C
fluid onto a surface such as concrete.
- a sump to contain a much deeper layer of liquid; possibly floating upon a sub-layer of
water.
This distinction is necessary because the physical process of evaporation requires the
supply of energy equal to the latent heat of evaporation of the fluid. For a shallow layer this
energy can be obtained from the substrate by conduction. Clearly the availability of energy
depends on the actual depth of the pool, the temperature and physical properties of the
substrate and the external conditions but, for very shallow pools, evaporation will take place
at a rate determined by the ground temperature. For a deep layer this energy is obtained
from the internal energy of the spilled fluid. The temperature of the pool will drop until a heat
balance is reached between the evaporation rate and the total energy transfer to the liquid
by conduction and insolation. As the liquid cools then the evaporation rate decreases.
23
Clearly these are extremes and spills can behave as shallow or deep or have mixed
behaviour depending upon the fluid properties and spill conditions and whether or not the
spill is physically contained. For a given fluid we would generally expect a greater
evaporation rate from a shallow spill onto a warm substrate than from a deep pool. Implicit
in this expectation is some consideration as to how the fluid enters the pool or sump, how
long it remains there and what the time history of the event is.
A pool will originate with a breach in a tank or pipe containing liquid. As the spill
commences, liquid spreads out over the ground until it meets a restriction or until the pool
thickness has reached a limiting value determined by surface tension. While the spill is
spreading over warm ground the lighter components evaporate preferentially. There may
also be some vapour released at the early in the spill which adds to the overall vapour
generation rate. The rate of total evaporation increases until the pool stops spreading. If the
pool is unconfined then the vapour generation rate then falls quickly because the pool dries
out. If the spread of liquid is confined by a bund or similar then a finite depth of liquid
remains. The vapour generation rate will then remain constant or decline gradually in time
depending on the overall heat balance on the pool. When the pool reaches the minimum
depth then the evaporation rate will fall rapidly as the pool dries.
A sump may behave as a deep pool or may contain a residual amount of material that is
refreshed with new releases. If the fill-up rate exceeds the potential evaporation rate of the
fluid components then the sump will behave as a deep pool. If the fill up rate is smaller than
the evaporation rate of the lighter components then the sump will behave more like a shallow
pool.
For work items 4 and 5, hazard radii are sought for pools of 5, 10, 15 and 20 m diameter
v
formed by the retention of spilled materials by planned bunds, naturally occurring blockages
such as kerbs, or emergency measures.
There are a number of ways in which such pools can occur:
- A fixed volume of fluid could be spilled. If this is captured in bunds of the different sizes
above then the smallest pool will be deeper than the largest pool.
- A variable volume of fluid could be spilled. This could result in the different sized pools
having more similar depth.
Each of these scenarios will result in a different evaporation history. Quantifying all of the
possible scenarios is a large task. Before investigating some actual releases we consider
the simpler problem of steady state evaporation of a category C fluid.
Using the steady state modelling assumptions for the model category C fluid and for pools of
size 5 - 15 m it can be shown that the evaporation flux must exceed certain limits if the
existing guidance is correct. Some example hazard distances are given in Table 16. The
pool size is the length of the pool in the wind direction and the hazard distance is the
distance to LFL measured from the downward edge of the pool. Two values are given for
the hazard distance. The minimum value uses a lower flammability limit appropriate to the
lightest vapour components of a category C fluid. The maximum uses the lower flammability
limit appropriate to the heaviest components of a category C fluid, c.f. Table 2,

v
For practical reasons the hazard radii are calculated for square sources of equivalent area as
described in Appendix A: Methodology.
24
Evaporation Flux
(kg/m
2
/s)
Evaporation Rate
(kg/s)
Pool Size L
(m)
Min. Hazard
Distance D
(m)
Max. Hazard
Distance D
(m)
0.002 0.05 5 2.9 5.2
0.45 15 13.0 21
0.0015 0.04 5 0 3.2
0.36 15 7.5 14.5
0.001 0.03 5 0 0
0.23 15 0 0
Table 16. Hazard distance ranges for category C vapour from area sources
The existing guidance gives hazard distances for ranges of pool sizes, Table 17:
Pool Size L (m) Hazard distance D (m)
Less than 5 3
Between 5 and 10 7.5
Greater than 10 15
Table 17. Original Hazard distances from the Guidance.
Comparing Table 16 and Table 17 and taking the maximum hazard distance we see that the
existing guideline is equivalent to a source with an evaporation flux of between 0.0015 and
0.002 kg/m
2
/s depending upon the flammability limit that is used. Indeed, considering that
the more volatile components evaporate first, the existing guidance is equivalent of a source
decreasing in strength from a flux of 0.002 to 0.0015 kg/m
2
/s over the life of the spill.
These points are illustrated with some examples below:
Figure 6 shows the time dependent evaporation flux for 4.5 m
3
of category C fluid rapidly
dumped into a 15 m pool. This volume is chosen to adequately fill the pool and leave fluid
still present after a time of 30 minutes (1800 s). Details are given in the methodology
section, Appendix A.
The horizontal lines show the evaporation flux range 0.0015 - 0.002 kg/m
2
/s relevant to the
existing guidance. For the release the evaporation flux decreases from a value of 0.0012
kg/m
2
/s to a value of 0.0005 kg/m
2
/s after a time of 300 s. This marks the end of the period
in which the lighter components are evolved. Subsequently the evaporation rate is nearly
constant. In fact it shows a slight increase because the simulations assume noon-time
insolation and the pool is in fact warming slightly over the later period of the modelled spill.
Thus a rapid spill of category C fluid gives evaporation fluxes a fraction 0.6-0.4 smaller than
accounted for by the existing guidance.
25
0.0001
0.001
0.01
-200 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
e
v
a
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n

f
l
u
x

k
g
/
m
2
/
s
time from spill start, s
Spill rate 0.45 m3/s
15m pool 10 s
2.e-3
1.5e-3
Figure 6. Evaporation rate of a rapid dump of category C fluid
Figure 7 shows the effect of spilling the same volume over the longer period of 300 s. Again
there is no special significance to the choice of a volume of 4.5 m
3
other than that this is
sufficient to adequately fill a pool of 15 m diameter.
Here three stages of the spill can be seen. There is an initial high rate as the liquid spreads
to fill the pool and is passing over a hot concrete substrate. The liquid quickly reaches the
bund walls and the pool depth starts to increase. The vapour generation rate falls because
the substrate and pool are cooled by the evaporation. The evaporation of the light
components of the newly spilled fluid is visible as a plateau lasting just longer than the 300 s
of the actual spill. Thereafter the evaporation rate falls again to give results similar to those
for the rapid spill.
26
0.0001
0.001
0.01
-200 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
e
v
a
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n

f
l
u
x

k
g
/
m
2
/
s
Spill rate 0.015 m3/s
15m pool 300 s
2.e-3
1.5e-3
Figure 7. Time history of a five minute spill of 4.5 m
3
of category C fluid.
For sumps there is a concern that hot liquid may be introduced. Figure 8 shows that
preheating the fluid to 50 C from 20 C enhances the vapour rate in the early spill stages
by a factor of about two. Even so it only reaches the 0.002 kg/m
2
/s value for the few
seconds in which the liquid spreads to cover the pool. For a sump, where liquid is being
added to existing material, this initial transient would be absent. It is notable that over a half-
hour period the effect of the initial temperature difference on evaporation rate has
disappeared.
27
0.0001
0.001
0.01
-200 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
e
v
a
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n

f
l
u
x

k
g
/
m
2
/
s
Spill rate 0.015 m3/s Storage Temperature 50 C
15m pool 300 s
2.e-3
1.5e-3
Figure 8. Time history of evaporation for liquid initially at 50 C. The liquid in the pool rapidly
cools so that the residual evaporation rate is similar to the other cases.
These calculations show that in so far as the evaporation of the model category C fluid is
concerned the existing guidance is conservative with respect to the evaporation of the bulk
of the fluid. They also show that the manner of discharge itself (rate, amount) coupled to the
initial volatilisation of light components determines the early peak in vapour rate. This
cannot be characterised simply in terms of a pool dimension. For the example we have
used here - the release of 4.5 m
3
of fluid into a 15 m bund over time scales of 10 to 300 s -
which perhaps is not an unreasonable scenario, the guidance is conservative even for this
initial spill period. Larger spill possibilities would likely occur as incidents and thus require
explicit modelling.
5.1. Vapour pressure comparisons of some commonly used Category C fluids.
Table 18 shows the vapour pressures of some hydrocarbons (C7+) relative to n-octane.
Liquid Spill Hazard for all of these compounds exceeds that of n-octane and specific account
of volatility must be taken into account when the ratio exceeds 2.
Name Formula Vapour Pressure
relative to n-octane
at 30 C
n-octane C8H18 1
cis 1,2-dimethylcyclohexane C8H16 1.02
3-vinylcyclohexene C8H12 1.09
2,2,4-trimethylhexane C9H20 1.13
isopropyl cyclopentane C8H16 1.14
di-sec-butyl ether C8H18O 1.15
2,2,5-trimethylhexane C9H20 1.17
trans-2-octene C8H16 1.19
28
octene-1 C8H16 1.23
tra 1,3-dimethylcyclohexane C8H16 1.24
2-methyl bicyclo 221 heptane C8H14 1.29
tra 1,2-dimethylcyclohexane C8H16 1.35
3-methyl heptane C8H18 1.38
2-methyl-1-heptene C8H16 1.39
2,4-heptadiene C7H12 1.41
3-ethyl hexane C8H18 1.42
1,7-octadiyne C8H10 1.43
2-methyl heptane C8H18 1.45
1,7-octadiene C8H14 1.49
cycloheptane C7H14 1.52
3,4-dimethylhexane C8H18 1.52
1,1-dimethylcyclohexane C8H16 1.58
3-methyl 3-ethyl pentane C8H18 1.6
2-methyl 3-ethyl pentane C8H18 1.67
di-tert-butyl peroxide C8H18O2 1.78
2,3,3-trimethylpentane C8H18 1.87
1,1,2-trimethyl cyclopentane C8H16 1.93
toluene C7H8 1.98
1,6-heptadiyne C7H8 2.38
2,4,4-trimethyl pentene-2 C8H16 2.5
heptyne-1 C7H12 2.73
2,2,3,3-tetramethylbutane C8H18 2.73
ethyl cyclopentane C7H14 2.75
2,4,4-trime-1-pentene C8H16 3.06
n-heptane C7H16 3.15
cis-2-heptene C7H14 3.15
methyl cyclohexane C7H14 3.17
trans-2-heptene C7H14 3.21
cis 1,2-dimethylcyclopentane C7H14 3.24
trans-3-heptene C7H14 3.5
cis-3-heptene C7H14 3.52
heptene-1 C7H14 3.86
3-ethyl pentane C7H16 3.97
3-methyl hexane C7H16 4.21
2-methyl-1-hexene C7H14 4.22
tra 1,2-dimethylcyclopentane C7H14 4.35
29
tra 1,3-dimethylcyclopentane C7H14 4.39
2-methyl hexane C7H16 4.49
cis 1,3-dimethylcyclopentane C7H14 4.56
2,3-dimethylpentane C7H16 4.68
1,1-dimethylcyclopentane C7H14 5.12
2,2,3-trimethylbutane C7H16 6.85
Table 18 vapour pressures of some hydrocarbons (C7+) relative to n-octane
6. Releases into confined areas.
A release of flammable material into a confined space, such as a building, is potentially an
extremely hazardous event. Ignition may lead to the development of over-pressure causing
structural damage to the enclosure and neighbouring buildings. Consequently, any events
leading to a sustained release of flammable material should not be considered as normal
operation but be subject to a detailed consequence analysis.
For the purposes of area classification there is a need to quantify the difference between an
event definitely leading to a hazardous condition and an event that is potentially hazardous
but which might be managed by precautionary action such as the active control of ignition
sources near to the point of handling of flammable material.
A key concern is how to assess the conditions under which a release might escape a
building at a flammable concentration and require external ignition prevention precautions.
General guidance for the safe ventilation of building enclosures given in IP 15 is, quite
soundly given by dividing activities that may lead to releases into categories requiring
different grades of ventilation. Grades of ventilation are then parameterised by the air
change rate, o, expressed as the number of times per hour that the air in the building is
changed. Four categories are identified:
Adequate
Ventilation:
To quickly reduce possibly flammable concentrations to safe
concentrations in the event of a leak or spillage, and following
action to stop the fluid source, 12 air changes per hour is
recommended.
Dilution Ventilation: Forced ventilation at sufficient rate to limit the formation of a
gas volume at a concentration of 20% of the Lower
Flammability limit is recommended. Typically dilution
ventilation will be vigorous (30 - 90 air changes per hour) and
the output diverted to vents.
Local Artificial
Ventilation:
The use of either small scale dilution ventilation (use of
extractors etc.) or an enhancement of flow in obstructed areas
to attain adequate ventilation is recommended.
30
Overpressure
Ventilation:
Prevention of the ingress of flammable material to a confined
area by maintaining an over-pressure within it is
recommended for cases where buildings are close to potential
sources but do not contain sources themselves.
Of these categories we need only to try to quantify the first, Adequate Ventilation as
applying generally to small spills. The Dilution Ventilation rate needs to be specially
designed for each application. Local Artificial Ventilation is essentially the same as
Adequate Ventilation for small enclosures within a larger confined workplace, unless the
effluent is ducted to a vent in which case it is an example of Dilution Ventilation.
Overpressure ventilation precludes the need for assessment.
What does adequate ventilation mean in terms of a release? Let V be the ventilated
volume. Consider the volume to be well mixed then the concentration within the enclosure
of a gaseous flammable material released at time 0 at a constant rate m
-
kg/s is given by a
simple mass balance:
o V
dC
dt
m VC =
-
where o s
-1
, is the air change rate, kg/m
3
, is the density of the flammable gas and C m
3
/m
3
is the volumetric (molar) concentration. This equation has the solution:
( ) C
m
V
e
t
=
-
o
o
1
for initial conditions C = 0 when t = 0.
The maximum concentration (volume fraction) that can occur throughout the well mixed
volume is given by:
C
m
V
max
=
-
o
To estimate some values for the leak rate than would give rise to flammable concentrations
in an enclosure we can take some typical values:
For a dense gas:
V = 1000 m
3
corresponding to a building with typical dimension
10 m.
= 2 kg/m
3
density of the flammable gas e.g Cat A.
o = 12/3600 = 0.0033 s
-1
an adequate ventilation rate of 12 changes per
hour:
| | C
max
. , . e 0 02 010
a typical flammable limit range, [LFL,UFL] by
volume fraction
.
31
from which we find that | | m
-
e 013 0 66 . , . kg/s. A factor 2 variation on these end range values
would be a reasonable uncertainty to apply. The time taken to reach 90% of maximum
concentration is ~700 s.
Thus, to round figures, if the gas is well mixed, a release of ~ 0.1 kg/s could give rise to
potentially flammable conditions through an adequately ventilated building, of volume 1,000
m
3
, on a time scale of ~700 s. This would be an extremely hazardous condition. Larger
releases might lead to potential flammable regions outside of the building because the
material leaving would be above the lower flammability limit for the gas. Certainly a release
as large as ~ I kg/s, capable of filling the building to the upper flammability limit should not
be tolerated.
The basic premise of the ventilation calculation is that the volume should be well mixed.
Mixedness will not occur through the ventilation flow itself as the implied ventilation wind
speed is very small, of order 33 mm/s assuming a typical building length-scale of 10 m.
Some other stirring mechanism is needed.
If we consider the pressurised releases treated in section 3, then a release rate of ~ 0.1 kg/s
for a category A or B fluid could arise for a hole size as small as 2 mm for pressures below
50 bar. The hazard radius for an unconfined release of this magnitude is ~ 5 m which is half
the characteristic length scale of the example building and the order of magnitude of the free
path of a centrally placed release. The hazard radius is also the distance over which the
unconfined jet entrains enough air to dilute the mass flow to the LFL. This entrainment is
comparable to the circulation in the building and it is thus reasonable to propose that the
volume of air passing through the building can be well mixed by a pressurised release.
For a lighter than air gas:
We can rework the above example for the category G(i) and G(ii) gases. We have:
V = 1000 m
3
corresponding to a building with typical dimension
10 m.
= 0.78, 0.29 kg/m
3
corresponding to a category G(i) and G(ii) gases
respectively.
o = 12/3600 = 0.0033 s
-1
an adequate ventilation rate of 12 changes per
hour:
C
LFL
= 0.046, 0.04 m
3
/m
3
LFL for category G(i) and G(ii) gases respectively.
.
giving m
-
= 012 . , 0.04 kg/s for category G(i) and G(ii) fluids respectively.
From these simple arguments we can deduce that quite small pressurised releases of the
type used to underpin the hazard radius recommendations for unconfined releases and of
size ~ 0.1 kg/s could result in the establishment of a flammable mixture within a 1000 m
3
building having a ventilation rate of 12 air changes per hour for Category A and G(i) fluids,
and a somewhat lower value of ~ 0.04 kg/s for category G(ii) fluid.
32
External Hazards
The implication of this is that there may be an efflux of flammable material from the buildings
for releases of order 01
1000
.
V
kg/s for category A and G(i); 0 04
1000
.
V
kg/s for category G(ii)
gases where V is the volume adequately ventilated. The fate of this material needs to be
assessed.
Flow and mixing around buildings
Flow and dispersion are strongly influenced by the building shape and orientation to the
wind. Buildings are classified as bluff rather than streamlined bodies and this greatly
complicates the description of the flow. Consequently here is a large body of work reporting
the study of flow and dispersion in building wakes.(e.g. Castro & Robins, 1977; Hosker,
1979; Britter, Hunt & Puttock, 1976; Snyder and Lawson, 1994).
The main feature of a bluff rather than a streamlined body is that the wind flow cannot pass
smoothly around the body but instead separates from the upwind edges of the body. This
forms a region along the sides and behind the body in which pressure is reduced. The
pressure difference across this region causes the separated flow from each edge and side of
the body to curve towards each other and eventually intercept to form a recirculation region
behind the body in which the mean flow is actually reversing as fluid is returned towards the
low pressure regions. Depending on the shape of the body this region can extend back up
the building sides to the building front. The flow within the recirculation region is highly time
varying and unsteady.
It was originally thought that the recirculation region was a closed "bubble" bounded by a
separation streamline and that material was transported in and out of the region by turbulent
mixing across this boundary. This remains a useful simplification of the flow but it is now
known that transfer of material in and out of the recirculation region is not limited to
turbulent transport across the boundary. Material is also advected into the region along
entering mean streamlines and advected out via vertical spiral vortices or through
entrainment by horseshoe vortices. The entire recirculation region may even collapse
intermittently causing all the contents to be flushed downstream.
There is no simple and accurate way of assessing the fate of material released into the wake
of a building. Dispersion models in regulatory use (ADMS, ISC, AERMOD) recognise that
significant mixing takes place in a building wake and this can reduce concentrations
downwind of the building by up to an order of magnitude compared with an unconfined
release. The models do not attempt to describe events in the near wake and treat this as a
well-stirred region of constant concentration i.e. any material leaving the building is predicted
to undergo a step change in concentration.
The models should not be used closer to the building than 3-5 times the extent of the
recirculation zone. Typically the extent of the recirculation zone for squat shaped buildings
scales as the building height and for tall thin buildings it scales as the building width. For a
building of characteristic dimension 10 m this imposes an a region of modelling uncertainty
of 30-50 m. This is of greater extent than the present guidelines for the external hazard
radii.
An alternative to regulatory models is to use experimentation or Computational Fluid
Dynamics to explore some release scenarios. The disadvantage, in addition to that of cost,
is that generalisation of the results is difficult. This particular problem is also difficult to solve
with computational methods because of the physical complexity of the problem and the
requirement for validation.
33
What can we say about the external hazard zone?
i) An external hazard zone will only exist if the release within the building is sufficiently large
to raise concentrations within the building above the LFL. For a building of size ~ 1000
m
3
this implies pressurised releases have to exceed ~ 0.1 kg/s and assumes that the
releases take place within the body of the building.
ii) The efflux from the building will comprise a flow of volume oV ~ 3.33 m
3
/s for a building of
size ~ 1000 m
3
and with adequate ventilation and take place through the normal
ventilation openings in the building fabric.
iii) The efflux is a relatively small flow and will be mixed into the recirculation zone behind the
building in the presence of wind. This mixing process is a result of highly unsteady flow
and is wind speed and wind direction dependent but is highly effective.
iv) Hazardous areas will be restricted to the immediate vicinity of vent openings and the
building fabric.
If releases are significantly larger than 0.1 kg/s then a greater hazard will pertain.
For slightly higher flow rates then, if the efflux buoyancy (positive or negative) is not
negligibly small then it will influence the dynamics of the ventilation flow. Specifically it will
preferentially direct hazards to roof or floor and enhance ventilation and if the buoyancy
driven outflow exceeds the ventilation flow a counter flow (additional ventilation) will be
induced.
For much larger flow rates then specific cases need to be considered. Containment and
building effects will keep external concentrations low but events that create an opening in
the fabric of the building, such as opening a door, that make greater ventilation possible
would lead to the outflow of flammable material presenting a localised hazard.
Recommendations:
Enclosure of facilities handling flammable materials should be subject to a hazard
assessment to determine the level of adequate ventilation.
The adequate ventilation recommended in the existing guidance is appropriate to
pressurised releases of Cat A, G(i) fluid of up to ~ 0.1 kg/s for a 1000 m
3
building provided
that the reaction time to respond to a leak is less than ~ 700s.
For an adequately ventilated building the hazard zone is confined to the immediate building
fabric. Escaping vapour will be rapidly entrained and mixed into the recirculation zone
behind the building. This is a region of unsteady but average reverse flow toward the
building at ground level and can be considered to extend to a dimension given by the
smaller of the building height or width. Conventional dispersion models are only accurate at
about 3 -5 times this distance for neutrally buoyant releases.
If ventilation is not adequate then hazard zones will extend at ground level or roof level
depending on the buoyancy of the release. Buoyancy driven flow around vents/openings will
probably enhance the ventilation flow.
34
If ventilation is far from adequate then changing the open area of the building may result in a
large volume of potentially flammable material.
The present guidance is conservative as far as shape factors are concerned but should
relate the size of release and the volume of the building in some more explicit way.
Notes:
The case where a release takes place in a doorway arose in discussion and, by implication,
exists in the present guidelines. The ventilation rate for structures with open doorways will
probably be higher than the 12 changes per hour considered as adequate ventilation.
7. Discussion and Conclusions
In this work we have used tools, developed to investigate the consequence of major
releases, to quantify appropriate guidance for the Area Classification of Petroleum
Installations. The quantification of hazard necessarily starts with specifying the type of
material and the size of release which is very much unknown in the case of small spills and
leaks. Material types have been simulated using 5 example fluid compositions coded (A, B,
C, G(i) and G(ii) following earlier work to update IP 15 and published as an addendum a
Risk Based Approach to Area Classification. That work utilised some very large flow rates
that certainly exceeded any definition of normal spillage. The release rate values used here
necessarily represent the lower end of the hazardous release scale. These should be
larger than arise in normal handling and certainly should not be taken as indicative of the
magnitude of acceptable spills. In all circumstances the potential for spills to occur should
be rigorously assessed and a full hazard assessment carried out where necessary.
It has generally been possible to defend the key recommendations of IP 15 as conservative.
Where revisions are recommended these are strongly dependent on scenario and fluid type.
The major findings of the study are that:
- The hazard radii for pressurised releases of category B and C fluids should be derived
assuming a mechanically generated flammable mist; previously gaseous releases were
assumed. The Hazard radii for category B and C fluids are increased relative to previous
guidance.
- Numeric flammability limits published in Annex D of A Risk-Based Approach to
Hazardous Area Classification for the category B and C fluids have been updated to take
account of the composition of the flammable mist; previously low vapour components
were assumed to rain-out and not contribute to the lower flammability limit evaluation.
- Shape factors for pressurised releases are revised to take better account of the role of
initial jet momentum on the jet trajectory. In particular the lighter than air gases (category
G(i) and G(ii) fluids) are found to have qualitatively more similar shape factors to the two-
phase category A, B and C releases; previously buoyancy was assumed to dominate their
dispersion.
- Hazard radii for discharges from vents are evaluated. The hazard radius varies from
slightly smaller to slightly larger than that in the existing guidance depending on the
properties of the vented vapour.
- The composition of vapour from vents on storage facilities maintained at atmospheric
pressure may be variable (in composition, density and flammability) and the user of the
new guidance should be aware of the effect of this variability because of the
consequence for hazard radii.
35
- The example range of venting rate and vent sizes used in the guidance are not wholly
consistent with the assumption that the discharge takes place at atmospheric pressure.
The relationship between venting rate and pressure of discharge is investigated and a
value of 300 mb suggested as a threshold above which the consequences of pressure
should be assessed. This is of significance for multicomponent fluids where
condensation may occur.
- The existing guidance for liquid spillages is conservative, judged by the volatility of the
model category C fluid. The guidance is applicable to materials with approximately twice
the vapour generation rate of category C fluid under the specimen conditions. Relative
vapour pressures for some common hydrocarbon compounds are listed.
- The existing guidance for sumps is conservative, judged by the volatility of the model
category C fluid.
- Vapour generation at the source of spillage of Category C fluids is a potential hazard
dictated by the spill rate and conditions and not the rate of evaporation of the liquid pool.
The new guidance should emphasise the role of release conditions in determining the
initial vapour generation from spills of category C fluids.
- For releases into confined areas the relative size of spillage and building are of key
importance. The classification Adequate Ventilation has been assessed with respect to
these parameters.
The major uncertainties remaining are:
- The role of liquid rain-out in influencing flammability hazards for releases from low (~ 5
bar) processes.
- How properly to advise the effect of different fluid compositions in hazards.
- How to properly balance guidance for area classification and necessary procedures for
hazard assessment.
8. References
A Risk-Based Approach to Hazardous Area Classification, Institute of Petroleum, November
1998.
Shell FRED 3.1 User and Technical Manual, Shell Global Solutions, (2000).
HGSYSTEM v3.0; Technical Reference. Shell Global Solutions (1996) available in
electronic form (pdf) at http://www.hgsystem.com/.
Johnson D.W. and Woodward J.L.; Release: a model with data to predict Aerosol Rainout in
Accidental Releases. AIChE. (1999).
Ramsdale S., Tickle G. Review of Release rain-out model and the Center for Chemical
Process Safety (CCPS) data, Contract Research report 277/2000, Publ. HSE Books.
Lees F. Loss prevention in the Process Industries, ed 2. Publ. Butterworth/Heinemann,
1996.
Bearman P.W., 1972, "Some Recent Measurements of the Flow Around Bluff Bodies in
Smooth and Turbulent Streams", Paper presented at a synopsium on external flows,
University of Bristol.
36
Britter, R.E. Hunt, J.C.R. and Puttock, J.S., 1976, "Predicting Pollution Concentrations Near
Buildings and Hills." Presented at the Institution of Measurements and Control Conference
on Systems and Models in Air and Water Pollution, London, Sep 22-24, pp 7-1 to 7-15.
Castro, I.P., & Robins, A.G., 1977, "The Flow Around a Surface-Mounted Cube in Uniform
and Turbulent Streams", J. Fluid Mech., vol. 79, part 2, pp. 307-335.
Hosker, R.P., 1979, "Empirical Estimation of Wake Cavity Size Behind Block Type
Structures." In the reprints of Fourth Symposium on Turbulence, Diffusion and Air Pollution,
Reno, NV, Jan. 15-18, pp 603-609.
Snyder, W.H. and Lawson, R.E., Jr., 1994, "Wind tunnel measurements of flow fields in the
vicinity of buildings", Reprint vol.: 8th AMS Conf. on Appl. Air Poll. Meteor., with AWMA, Jan.
23-28, Nashville, TN.
37
Appendix A: Methodology
A1. Calculating Flammability limits.
The flammability limit of a mixture, L (%v), should therefore be computed by first using Le
Chateliers law to establish the volumetric flammability limit of a vapour only mixture:
1
L
y
L
i
i
=
_
Where y
i
denotes the mol fraction of the species i and L
i
the species vapour phase
flammability limit. This flammability limit can then be converted to a mass-based criteria -
most simply by the assumption of an ideal gas whereby the mixture density is given by:
mix i i
y M
P
RT
=
_
kg/m
3
where M
i
are the species molecular weights, P the pressure, R the ideal gas constant and T
the temperature.
The mass based limit is.
L
L
m mix
=
100
kg/m
3
The calculation procedure for flammability limits is embodied in the Shell FRED 3.0 (and
higher) software tool available from Shell Global Solutions.
A2. Calculating hazard radii for pressurised releases.
Hazard radii need to be calculated using a multicomponent and multi-phase dispersion
model. Shell Global Solutions has developed such a capability as part of HGSYSTEM which
is a set of dispersion models, developed at the specification of industry consortia, and made
publicly available via the internet. HGSYSTEM has been used as a reference model in
model evaluation exercises and the model components set a standard against which
commercial models are tested. Model vendors should be able to relate the performance and
physical basis of their models to HGSYSTEM.
The calculations used the fluid properties given in Table 2 of the main report and the
following conditions:
Storage Temperature - 20 C
Ambient Temperature - 30 C
Wind Speed - 2 m/s
Stability Class - D
Roughness - 0.03 m
Horizontal Release @ 5 m for R
1
Horizontal Release @ 1 m for R
2
38
Of these the surface roughness length 0.03 m has been increased from the value of 0.003 m
used in the original guidance. The 2-phase jet calculations used for the hazard radii are not
sensitive to this parameter so the change is semantic rather than critical. A value of 0.003 m
is appropriate to extremely flat terrain with even and low lying vegetation. This is not
characteristic of process sites where values as large as 0.3 m could in some circumstances
be justified. The choice of 0.03 m is at the lower end of realistic values for process sites and
is conservative. The role of roughness length in dispersion models is to characterise the
ambient turbulence. This is the dominant mixing mechanism for low-momentum releases.
For convenience, and following the methodology in the previous update to IP 15, the
discharge rates were calculated using the Shell Global Solutions Generalised Release
Model (GENREL) incorporated in FRED 3.1 and setting pipe friction to be negligible. The
HGSYSTEM model AEROPLUME has a simpler release model and, for two phase releases,
generates a range of possible mass flow rates for a set of input conditions rather than a
single value. The GENREL and AEROPLUME suggested rates are, for most mixtures,
comparable.
The hazard radii were calculated using the two-phase jet dispersion model AEROPLUME.
AEROPLUME calculates cross-sectional average concentrations. The hazard radius R
1
should be taken as the distance at which the average concentration has fallen to a value of
0.7 LFL. The hazard radius R
1
should be taken as the distance at which the average
concentration has fallen to a value of 0.5 LFL. This arises because the hazard radius is
evaluated with respect to the maximum concentration in the jet and the relationship between
the maximum and average jet concentrations depends upon the shape of the concentration
profile.
Within FRED 3.1 the AEROPLUME results are automatically processed to take account of
the concentration profiles and give hazard radii directly and in a manner transparent to the
user. We note that a key result of this study, that a mass-based flammability limit should be
used for two-phase flow calculations; is not implemented in the post-processor tools
supplied with HGSYSTEM 3.0. The post-processor PROFILE from v 3.0 should not be
used for high flash-point fluids.
A3. Calculating Hazard Radii for vents.
Ambient conditions for calculating the hazard radii for vents were the same as for the
pressurised releases. The key feature of the vent flows is that they are assumed to be ideal
gases, i.e. no account is taken of the potential for two phase flow.
The dispersion calculations were carried out using AEROPLUME assuming a vertical
release. The hazard radius was defined as:
( )
( ) R Z H X = +
2 2
where H was the assumed vent height of 10 m and Z, X the vertical and downstream co-
ordinates of the point of maximum concentration in the jet equal to the flammability limit.
This is the centroid position of the jet calculated by AEROPLUME with an average
concentration equal to 0.7 LFL.
39
A4. Calculating pool evaporation and dispersion
The pool evaporation calculations were carried out using the liquid spills model LPOOL
which is part of HGSYSTEM. LPOOL is an implementation of the ExxonMobil Liquid Spills
Model LSM90. It takes account of the multicomponent evaporation of material either spilled
into a bund or onto an unconstrained surface.
The basis of pool evaporation models is set out in Lees (1996). The evaporation rate is
based on a forced convection analogy and increases with wind speed and with pool area.
For non-boiling pools the evaporation rate increases with the vapour pressure of the spilled
liquid. A pool model adds a liquid spread, a heat balance and a component balance to the
base evaporation correlation.
For consistency with the other hazard radii a wind speed of 2 m/s wind speed and an
ambient temperature of 30 C was used. To enhance the evaporation rate further,
maximum insolation (spill at mid-day, cloudless sky) was assumed. The insolation factors in
LPOOL are conservative (high) for mid-latitudes.
As noted in the text, pool evaporation is a transient process that gives rise to a time-varying
gas cloud. In particular we found that the highest evaporation rates came during the first
moments of the spill when the lightest components were evaporating.
Calculations made using the HGSYSTEM unsteady dense gas dispersion model HEGADAS-
T showed that the vapour cloud dispersed extremely quickly and, with the target conditions,
it was not possible to attain the hazard radii in the previous guidance.
We then carried out a sensitivity test with the HGSYSTEM steady state dense gas
dispersion model HEGADAS-S to determine what continuous release rates of dense gas
would be consistent with the existing guidance. We found, as given in the main text, that
these rates are higher than the vapour rates for category C spills.
40
Appendix B:
Preliminary Investigation of Hazard Radii and Shape Factors
for the revision of IP15: the Area Classification Code for
Petroleum Installations.
Summary
As part of the revision of the Institute of Petroleum publication Area Classification Code for
Petroleum Installations, more commonly known as IP 15, dispersion calculations were
carried out to cross check tables D3.2 and D3.3 of the publication A risk-based Approach
to Hazardous Area Classification.
The objectives of revisiting the calculations were twofold:
- To provide a subset of results more in line with petroleum installation needs.
- To verify shape factors for releases - especially those representing a refinery hydrogen
stream.
In repeating the calculations it was noted that the usual practice of specifying flammability
limits in terms of volumetric concentrations for gases leads to possibly incorrect and too low
estimates of hazard distances for class B and class C liquids. These are materials that have
high flash points at ambient conditions but may be placed under high pressure when
pumped from one location to another. The leak of high pressure liquid may give rise to a
flammable mist or, in any event, lead to the jetting of potentially flammable liquid over
distances much greater than those given in the present IP 15 guidance.
This note describes the revised calculations and discusses the problem of how to assess the
hazard range for high flash-point fluids. The calculations in this report were carried out with
the HGSYSTEM models DATAPROP, AEROPLUME and PROFILE to facilitate the
presentation of the many results. These models are equivalent to the components of the
FRED model version 2.3.
As a result of this work the definition of flammable limit used in deriving contours with the
software package FRED has been changed. FRED versions 3.0 and higher are compatible
with these results.
B1. Introduction
Hazardous area classification requires that an assessment be made of the extent of the
zone enclosing an operational area where flammable materials are handled and where small
leaks might occur unnoticed for a short period of time. With this knowledge precautionary
steps can be taken to reduce the potential for ignition, for example by placing constraints on
electrical installations.
The Institute of Petroleum (IP) publication: A risk-based Approach to Hazardous Area
Classification adopted (in Annex D) tables of hazardous distances from an internal Shell
source, which contained calculations made with the FRED dispersion model, version 2.1,
that were appropriate to an exploration and production environment where high pressures
and hence high flow rates are the norm. These tables included events that would only arise
as a result of mechanical damage on a petroleum refinery and which would in any case
demand an emergency response. Including these events as part of advice on Area
41
Classification gives a misleading impression of the hazard distance to be associated with
normal operation.
This work was intended to rework the content of current IP publication advice and verify that
the shape factors (Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 of IP 15) for dense and buoyant gas releases
were realistic. It was expected that the advice would be essentially unchanged. However, It
was noticed that the published data gave very small (more than ten times smaller) hazard
distances for the Class C
vi
fluid, compared with the Class A fluid; for example:
Release Conditions Hazard radius (m)
Pressure (bar) Diameter (mm) category A category C
100 10 39 3
Table B.1 Extract from Annex D of A Risk Based Approach to Hazardous Area
Classification
Physical intuition suggests that, to take the example above, a the hazard radius of 3 m is far
too small compared with the likely throw of a non-volatile but flammable liquid jet driven by
a 100 bar pressure through a 10 mm hole. There have been discussions and project
proposals to investigate the throw of water jets for area clarification and electrical safety
purposes and unpublished work carried out for ICI has shown that small holes and low drive
pressures can effectively transport material well beyond the present category C fluid
guideline distances.
Pressurised releases can also atomise material with a high flash-point to give rise to mists
that are flammable. The flammability limits for fine aerosols are akin to those for vapours
although there is a paucity of informational data in the literature. It is believed that, in
general, the flammability limit of fine aerosols, when expressed as the mass of fuel per unit
volume, is similar to the flammability of the vapour alone (Lees, F.J. Loss Prevention in the
Process Industries, 2
nd
ed., vol. 2, section 16.4.3). This is significant because it is common
practice is to use volumetric units to express flammability limits for gases and for mixtures of
gases. For a given mass concentration the equivalent volume fraction is substantially
reduced in the presence of a small liquid component because of the very large density
difference between the two phases. The use of a volumetric criterion for evaluating the
hazard distance may therefore be misleading when two-phase mixtures are involved and,
worse, give too small an estimate of the hazard distance.
In this note we compare the use of mass and volume based flammability criteria for
establishing hazard zones on the assumption that releases of high flashpoint material will
form a flammable mist and hence that their hazard can be addressed in a comparable
manner to gaseous and low flash-point 2-phase releases. The issue remains of whether
more coherent jets exist and are able to deliver flammable liquid to an even more distant
target but we do not attempt to quantify this here.
We should also comment upon the mitigating effect of liquid droplet rainout from jet
releases. For high flashpoint liquids that are atomised and ejected as jets the process of
droplet collision will lead to a growth in the droplet size with time and the subsequent
deposition of liquid. An extensive body of work has been carried out for single component
fluids by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) and a release model
developed to predict the loss of liquid from such events (Johnson, D.W., Woodward, J.L.,
Release: A model with data to predict Aerosol Rainout in Accidental Releases, AIChE,
1999). For area classification purposes we are considering material transport over very
short distances and with transit times of a few seconds and over trajectories that are

vi
Model fluid compositions are given in Table B2,
42
determined almost entirely by the initial jet momentum and orientation. To give conservative
estimates of the hazard zone it is reasonable to assume that liquid droplet rainout in the
vicinity of the source is a second order effect. For the larger releases that appear in risk
assessment scenarios where fluid transport times of several minutes may occur, the AIChE
work should be reviewed to see if accounting for droplet rainout makes a substantial
difference to model predictions.
B2. Calculation Procedure.
Of necessity only a limited number of variables can be considered in this investigation. The
area classification process is NOT a full hazard assessment which takes account of the
range of meteorological and process conditions, release events etc. Accordingly a single set
of release conditions was chosen and these are the same as those used in the IP addendum
A risk-based Approach to Hazardous Area Classification with the exception that the
surface roughness length has been increased by a factor of 10 from an unreasonable
overland value to a value that is still low (by a factor of 10) compared to that used for
process sites. This has no significant effect on any of the calculations but makes for a more
physically realistic input data set.
The fluid compositions used are given in Table B2 and the base calculation conditions in
Table B3. The two parameters in Table B3 that were varied to investigate the shape of the
hazardous zone were the release orientation and the release height.
A reduced set of operating conditions were assumed. Four drive pressures (100, 50, 10, 5)
bara. and five hole sizes (1, 2, 5, 10 , 20) mm (as diameters). The shape factors for the
releases were calculated using the largest hole size and the greatest drive pressure.
43
Stream
Component
(mol perc)
Cat. A Cat. B Cat. C Cat. G
(I)
Cat. G
(ii)
Comp.
LFL
MW Boiling
point
o
C
N
2
Nitrogen 0 0 0 2 2 - 28.01 -196
C
1
Methane 0 4 0 88.45 10 5.3 16.04 -161
C
2
Ethane 0 0 0 4.5 3 3 30.07 -87
C
3
Propane 70 6 1 3 3 2.2 44.09 -42
C
4
Butane 30 7 1 1 1 1.86 58.12 -1
C
5
Ethane 0 9 2 1 0 1.50 72.15 36
C
6
Hexane 0 11 3 0 0 1.2 86.17 69
C
7
Heptane 0 16 3 0 0 1.2 100.20 98
C
8
Octane 0 22 27 0 0 0.95 114.23 126
C
9
Nonane 0 0 25 0 0 0.83 128.26 151
C
10
Decane 0 25 38 0 0 0.77 142.28 173
H
2
O Water 0 0 0 0.05 0 - 18.02 100
CO
2
0 0 0 0 1 - 44.01 -78(sub)
Hydrogen 0 0 0 0 80 4.1 2.02 -253
Average
MW
48.3 100.06 125.03 18.74 7.03
LFL (vol%) 2.09 1.70 1.52 4.82 4.03
Table B.2 - Definition of category Fluids and their properties. The vapour phase
mixture flammability limits are taken from the IP addendum publication and were
evaluated using Le Chateliers Law.
Standard conditions Base Case values Range of values
Ambient temperature 20
o
C
Relative humidity 70 %
Wind speed 2 m/s
Reference Height 10.0 m
Stability class D
Surface roughness 0.03 m
Sample time 18.75 s (~ instantaneous)
Release height 1.0 m 0 to 15 m
Reservoir Temperature 20
o
C
Release angle (relative to horizontal) 0
o
-30
o
to 90
o
Table B.3 - Base parameters for the calculation
Release rates for the five test fluids were evaluated using the Generalised Release Model
from FRED 2.3 and assuming negligible friction losses from any pipe runs. The release
rates calculated in this way have proved more consistent than the default release rate used
by the Aeroplume model which is a literature correlation for two phase flow. Aeroplume also
has a built in two phase discharge mode, used for advice purposes under normal program
execution, and this usually agrees to within a few percent of the Generalised Release Model
predictions.
As expected it was found that the release mass flux per unit area was hole size independent
for the release conditions and the release rates are plotted as a function of hole size and
pressure for each of the fluids in Figure B2. The results are straightforward except for
category A fluid at the lowest drive pressure. Here the standardised 5 bar drive pressure at
ambient temperature is below the saturated vapour pressure of propane and above the
44
bubble point of propane
vii
. This means that in a vessel the category A vessel would exist as
discrete two phases giving three discharge scenarios: a vapour only release of a propane
rich vapour; a liquid only release of a butane rich butane/propane mix and a two phase
release; all depending on the location of the release point. Any significant length of piping
between the storage vessel and the release would favour a two phase release because
dissolved propane would vaporise in the pipe as the pressure decreases. We have
therefore carried out two sets of calculations for this low pressure scenario. A high mass
rate discharge of a 45:55 propane/butane mixture corresponding to the liquid phase
composition of the 70:30 propane/butane total mixture and a low mass rate discharge of the
original 70:30 propane/butane mixture as a 2 phase release. Figure B1 shows mass flow
rates for both circumstances.
0.1
1
10
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
R
e
l
e
a
s
e

R
a
t
e

k
g
/
s
Hole size (dia.), mm
Release Rate as a function of hole size and drive pressure
Category A Fluid
100 bar
50 bar
10 bar
5 bar - liquid
5 bar - 2 phase
Figure B.1: Release rate as a function of hole size and drive pressure for each of the five
conditions, category A fluid.

vii
In the Addendum to IP 15 it was recognised but not explicitly stated that the 5 bar scenario was
ambiguous. The approach there was to decrease the ambient temperature for this run and hence the
saturation vapour pressure of propane.
45
0.1
1
10
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
R
e
l
e
a
s
e

R
a
t
e

k
g
/
s
Category B Fluid
100 bar
50 bar
10 bar
5 bar
0.1
1
10
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
R
e
l
e
a
s
e

R
a
t
e

k
g
/
s
Category C Fluid
100 bar
50 bar
10 bar
5 bar
Figure B.2: Release rate as a function of hole size and drive pressure for each of the conditions,
categories B and C fluids.
46
0.1
1
10
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
R
e
l
e
a
s
e

R
a
t
e

k
g
/
s
Category G(i) Fluid
100 bar
50 bar
10 bar
5 bar
0.1
1
10
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
R
e
l
e
a
s
e

R
a
t
e

k
g
/
s
Category G(ii) Fluid
100 bar
50 bar
10 bar
5 bar
Figure B.3 - Release rate as a function of hole size and drive pressure for each of the conditions,
categories G(i) and G(ii) fluids.
47
The AEROPLUME model was run using automatically generated input files for the different
operating conditions. AEROPLUME outputs a cross-sectional average jet concentration. To
derive concentration contours the output of the AEROPLUME model can be post-processed
using the PROFILE program. This superposes a Gaussian profile upon the AEROPLUME
results and constructs the required contour. This is the normal operating procedure in the
FRED model where the results are automatically displayed as a graphic and the underlying
calculations are not visible to the user.
It is important to note that PROFILE assumes a ground-reflected Gaussian distribution which
means that the relationship between the maximum plume concentration and the average
plume concentration depends upon the height of the plume above ground. Where we are
just interested in the furthest extent of the maximum LFL concentration from the source we
can estimate this directly from AEROPLUME by calculating the distance to a slightly smaller
concentration. The ratios are shown in Table B.4.
Peak Concentration Averaged Concentration
Elevated Plume LFL 0.7 LFL
Grounded Plume LFL 0.5 LFL
Table B.4 : Equivalence between peak and averaged concentrations in the HGSYSTEM and
FRED models.
B3. Effect of using mass and concentration based LFL criteria:
The mass equivalent LFL was derived from the vapour properties in Table B.2 by multiplying
the vapour phase volume fraction by the vapour phase material density assuming an ideal
gas, one atmosphere pressure and the ambient temperature.
The downwind LFL position on a mass and on a volume basis was determined by linear
interpolation of distance between bounding entries in the AEROPLUME output file and using
the ratios given in Table B.4. This is adequate for the purposes of this study.
Figure B.4 shows a composite of all results for a 1 m horizontal release. The distance to
LFL calculated using the mass concentration and the distance to LFL using the volume
fraction criteria are plotted against each other.
- For the two gas mixtures (category G(i) and G(ii) ) the flammability limits equivalent and
an identity results.
In the presence of a liquid phase, volumetric concentrations underestimate the amount of
flammable material present because the contribution of liquid to volume is negligible. We
see:
- For the low flashpoint material (fluid A) sufficient liquid has evaporated for the jet to be
wholly gaseous at LFL so the two flammability definitions and calculated LFL distances
are equivalent
- For fluid category B the volume based definition noticeably understates the hazard
distance by ~ 30%.
- For fluid category C there is almost an order of magnitude difference in the hazard
radius.
48
0.1
1
10
100
0.1 1 10 100
D
i
s
t
a
n
c
e

t
o

L
F
L

u
s
i
n
g

v
o
l
u
m
e

f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
Distance to LFL using mass concentration
Influence of fluid type on LFL definition
A
B
C
Gi
Gii
Figure B.4 : Effect of using mass concentration and volume concentration definitions on
distance to LFL for the five fluids.
This is a significant finding. It suggests that using volume based flammability criteria to
derive distances to LFL may lead to underestimating the hazard of two-phase releases.
To illustrate this more clearly on a linear scale. Figure B.5 shows some example shape
factor calculations for the category B fluid. An elevated release (15 m height) is assumed
and calculations carried out for different release directions. The resulting overlapping cigar-
shaped contours are results that would be obtained by following normal practice and using
volumetric limits (e.g. with the FRED 2.3 model). The points show where the maximum
distance to LFL occurs using the mass based criterion.
49
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 10 20 30 40 50
H
e
i
g
h
t
,

m
Downwind distance, m
IsoConcentration contours for CATB fluid, 100 bara, 20 mm hole
Releases at different inclinations
Values from Aeroplume
Figure B.5 - Visual Example of the difference in using volumetric (contours) and mass
concentration definitions (points) for the LFL of a category B fluid.
B.4 Shape factors
Shape factors for the hazardous area are based on calculations of jet dispersion in different
directions and the existing classification advice implicitly assumes that, because of the
effects of body forces, the shape factor for buoyant releases is different to that for dense gas
releases.
This work shows that the hazard radius for the different fluids is determined by jet
momentum rather than body forces, but that there is an effect of the ground on entrainment
which is different for dense and for buoyant releases.
Figure B.6 shows the shape factor for a category A fluid released from a 1 m height
(maximum flow rates are used in all of these calculations). It is assumed that the wind
direction is from the left of the picture. For a category A fluid there is no effect of liquid load
on the calculation procedure and we have included both the full iso-concentration contours
as would be obtained using the FRED model and the points derived from the AEROPLUME
model using the mass concentration definition of LFL.
For releases that do not touch the ground the hazard range is essentially a flattened circular
locus. An increasing wind speed would flatten the shape further by decreasing the vertical
penetration of the jet because the contribution to entrainment from cross-wind mixing is
increased.
50
For releases that do touch the ground the dispersion distance is increased on two counts:
- Within the assumptions of the jet model, the overall entrainment is reduced. Initially the
perimeter area of the jet is reduced by the physical presence of the ground and then, as it
spreads out over the ground and slows down, the entrainment is inhibited by the density
difference between the plume and the air.
- The reflected Gaussian shape of the concentration distribution means that the ratio of the
peak concentration to the average concentration within the jet changes when the jet hits
the ground. For an elevated plume the peak concentration is ~1.42 times greater than
the average concentration across the plume and occurs on the plume centroid. For a
grounded plume the peak concentration is ~ 2 times the averaged concentration and
occurs at the ground. The locus of points from AEROPLUME shown in Figure B.6 reflect
this assumption.
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 20 40 60 80 100
H
e
i
g
h
t
,

m
IsoConcentration contours for CATA fluid, 100 bara, 20 mm hole
Centroid Values from Aeroplume
Peak Values from Aeroplume
Figure B.6 : LFL isopleths for a category A fluid released at angles from -20 to 90 degrees to
the horizontal and centroid position of LFL from Aeroplume (points). The ground level LFL
concentration position from Aeroplume for the three lowest trajectory releases are shown as
vertical bars.
These two factors substantially increase the hazard distance for horizontal releases near to
the ground. This methodology is conservative because extra mixing caused by the friction
between the jet and the ground is neglected. Also it results in a step change increase in
hazard radius for releases that only just touch the ground as shown in Figure B.7 below.
51
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 20 40 60 80 100
H
e
i
g
h
t
,

m
IsoConcentration contours for CATA fluid, 100 bara, 20 mm hole
Values from Aeroplume
Peak Values from Aeroplume
Figure B.7 : Shape factor for an elevated release of category A fluid
Figure B.7 shows the effect of increasing the release height to 15 m. Calculations to the
required concentrations can only be made for release angles greater than -20 degrees with
the present version of the AEROPLUME model which does not model steep impacts of high
momentum jets. We do not expect these steeper impacts to lead to greater dispersion
distances as the impact will lead to the generation of additional turbulence which will
increase the mixing rate.
Figure B.8 shows the shape factor for the release of category G(i) fluid from a height of 1 m
We find that the distance to LFL along the plume centroid is nearly independent of release
angle.
The distance to LFL at the ground for those releases that hit the ground is again greater than
that of the elevated jet so that the overall shape factor is similar to that of a dense gas
release. The effect of the ground is less dramatic because the spreading fluid is less dense
than the air and is convectively unstable. This means that entrainment into the grounded
lighter than air gas is greater than it would be for a dense gas. Consequently the hazard
distance at the ground is not as great.
52
0
5
10
15
20
0 5 10 15 20
Height, m
IsoConcentration contours for CATG(i) fluid, 100 bara, 20 mm
Releases at 90, 70, 50, 30, 10, 0,-10 degrees from the horizontal
Centroid Values from Aeroplume
Ground level Values from Aeroplume
Figure B.8 : Shape factor for the category G(i) Fluid. Points are centroid distance to LFL and
the vertical bars show the ground level distance to LFL for the two lowest trajectory releases.
The category G(ii) fluid is markedly more buoyant than the category G(i) fluid and to
investigate whether the extra buoyancy significantly modifies the shape factor these have
been derived for release heights of 1m, 5 m, 10 m and 15 m.
Figure B.9 shows that, for a 1 m release height the results are qualitatively very similar to
those for a category G(i) fluid. The grounded jets entrain air more efficiently because the
flow is more unstable and there is less enhancement of the distance to LFL at the ground..
Increasing the release height to 5 m barely alters the shape factor. As the release height is
increased to 10 m the basic shape is still maintained with a downward directed jet at -30
degrees hitting the ground before diluting to LFL. The ground footprint is very similar to that
for the 1 m release. Increasing the release height to 15 m again results in a fan shaped
hazard range that is almost symmetric about the release height showing that, in the absence
of ground contact, the hazard radius is determined by the jet orientation. This contrasts with
Figure 6.3 of the IP 15 publication that suggests that there is a smaller hazard zone below
the release point than above it.
53
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Height, m
LFL Concentration contours for CATG(ii) fluid
100 bara, 20 mm hole
Centroid LFL position from Aeroplume
Groundlevel LFL from Aeroplume
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Height, m
Release height: 1 m
Release height: 5 m
54
Figure B.9 : Shape Factors for a release of Cat. G(ii) fluid released from a height of 1 m, 5m , 10 m and 15
m above the ground. Points indicate the plume centroid position at LFL and the vertical bars the ground level
distance to LFL for the three lowest trajectories all derived from the Aeroplume model. The isopleths are
calculated with the Profile model and are equivalent to the output from the FRED 2.3 model.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
H
e
i
g
h
t
,
m
Release height: 10 m
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
H
e
i
g
h
t
,
m
Release height: 15 m
55
B.5 Hazard Radii
The calculations carried out for each of the releases suggest that for elevated jets the shape
factor should comprise a semi-spherical hazard zone evaluated as the distance to LFL on
the plume centroid for a horizontal jet in the downwind direction. The calculations given in
Tables B.5 & B.6 show that the effect of the ground is significant for low level releases of all
materials and therefore the shape factor should be extended at the ground.
Distance to LFL at the plume centroid height for a 1 m high horizontal release, m
Fluid Category Pressure
(bara)
20 mm 10 mm 5mm 2 mm 1mm

A 100 59.6 27.8 11.1 4.0 2.0
50 59.8 28.0 10.9 3.9 2.0
10 60.2 28.4 10.8 3.4 1.8
5 63.5 29.2 10.9 3.1 1.7
B 100 39.2 17.4 7.0 2.9 1.5
50 39.0 17.2 6.7 2.8 1.4
10 30.0 12.5 5.0 2.1 1.1
5 23.4 8.6 3.9 1.7 0.9
C 100 36.6 16.0 6.6 2.7 1.4
50 36.7 16.0 6.4 2.7 1.4
10 37.0 16.4 5.8 2.5 1.3
5 37.2 16.6 5.3 2.4 1.3
G(i) 100 13.2 6.4 3.3 1.3 0.7
50 8.4 4.2 2.1 0.9 0.4
10 3.5 1.8 0.9 0.4 0.2
5 2.6 1.3 0.7 0.3 0.2
G(ii) 100 15.6 9.3 4.9 2.0 1.0
50 12.3 6.8 3.5 1.4 0.7
10 6.3 3.3 1.6 0.7 0.3
5 4.7 2.4 1.2 0.5 0.3
Table B.5 : Summary of Distances to LFL at the plume centroid height for the horizontal
release from a height of 1 m.
56
Distance to the LFL at Ground Level for a 1 m high horizontal release, m.
Fluid Category Pressure
(bara)
20 mm 10 mm 5mm 2 mm 1mm

A 100 83.0 39.8 17.1 5.1 2.7
50 83.1 40.2 17.1 4.9 2.6
10 85.5 41.0 17.2 4.1 2.3
5 93.5 42.7 17.3 3.7 2.1
B 100 54.6 25.2 9.9 3.8 1.9
50 54.2 25.0 9.6 3.6 1.9
10 42.0 18.8 6.3 2.7 1.4
5 33.1 13.8 4.8 2.1 1.1
C 100 50.7 23.2 9.1 3.5 1.8
50 50.9 23.4 8.8 3.4 1.8
10 51.0 23.8 8.4 3.1 1.6
5 52.3 24.0 8.3 2.9 1.6
G(i) 100 18.7 9.2 4.4 1.8 0.9
50 12.0 5.7 2.9 1.2 0.6
10 4.9 2.5 1.2 0.5 0.3
5 3.6 1.8 0.9 0.4 0.2
G(ii) 100 21.3 12.8 6.6 2.8 1.4
50 16.7 9.3 4.7 2.0 1.0
10 8.6 4.4 2.3 0.9 0.5
5 6.3 3.2 1.7 0.7 0.4
Table B.6 : Distance to LFL at ground level for the horizontal release from a height of 1 m.
B6. Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to verify shape factors and to cross check tables D3.2 and
D3.3. of the publication A risk-based Approach to Hazardous Area Classification with a set
of conditions more in line with petroleum installation needs.
Dispersion calculations were carried out for 5 types of fluids (Categories A, B, C, G(i) and
G(ii)) under a range of pressure and release rate conditions.
We found that:
The usual practice of specifying flammability limits in terms of volumetric concentrations for
gases leads to possibly incorrect and too low estimates of hazard distances for class B and
class C liquids. These are materials that have high flash points at ambient conditions but
may be placed under high pressure when pumped from one location to another. The leak of
high pressure liquid may give rise to a flammable mist or, in any event, lead to the jetting of
potentially flammable liquid over distances much greater than those given in the present IP
15 guidance.
Shape factors for the hazardous area, based on calculations of jet dispersion in different
directions, show that the hazard radius for the different fluids is determined by jet momentum
rather than body forces. Consequently, the shape factor for buoyant releases is qualitatively
similar to that for dense gas releases.
57
For releases that do not touch the ground, the hazard radius is nearly independent of
release angle and the hazard range is essentially a circular locus, slightly flattened at the top
owing to the wind. For a buoyant elevated release, the hazard radius is almost symmetric
about the release height. This contrasts with Figure 6.3 of the IP15 publication that suggests
that there is a smaller hazard zone below the release point than above it.
We recommend that:
Mass based flammability criteria should be used for multiphase releases. The Shell Global
Solutions FRED model (version 3.0 and higher) has been modified on this basis.
The shape factor should comprise a semi-spherical hazard zone evaluated as the distance
to LFL on the plume centroid height for a horizontal jet in the downwind direction. There
should be an extra margin of allowance for grounded jets.

IP - 15 - Calculations in Support of IP15-The Area Classification Code For Petroleum Installations - November 2001 PDF

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Calculations in Support of

IP15: The Area Classification Code

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