Husserl Notes 9/29/05 Mehodological notes and preliminaries. 63. Eidetic investigations: opening an infinite field.

. Phenomenology as presuppositionless first philosophy. 64. Phenomenologists self-exclusion as an empirical agent. Parallel to self-exclusion of scientist or mathematician. Method of seizing on essences: If phenomenology, then, is to be entirely a science within the limits of mere immediate Inution, a purely descriptive eidetic science, then what is universal of its procedure is already given as something obvious. It must expose to its view events of pure consciousness as examples and make them perfectly clear; within the limits of this clarity it must analyze and seize upon their essences, trace with insight the essential interconnections, formulate what is beheld in faithful conceptual expressions which allow their sense to be prescribed purely by what is beheld or generically seen; and so forth. (p. 150). Clarity and givenness. Vagure presentation. The method of clear seizing upon essences.; role of free phantasy in generating examples for seizing upon essences. Cf. Geometry. But the field of phenomenology (stream of consciousness) is not a mathematical manifold. Descriptive rather than axiomatic. Exactness of ideal concepts distinguished from distinguishability of generic (though non-exact) concepts.

Noesis and Noema In LI, Husserl distinguished between the real act and its ideal (intentional) contents. Intentional contents were treated as the ideal species of real acts; and real contents, such as sensed colors and sounds, were distinguished from intentional contents (what the act is intentionally directed toward) . Now he applies the terminology of noesis and noema to further specify, and partially modify, these relations. Noesis: The concrete-complete intentive mental process. [Including both hyletic and sense-giving moments]; The real mental process including its sense-bestowing acts of perceiving, attending, etc, and its real hyletic moments.

Noema: The intended as intended. [The intentional character and content]. On the one side therefore, we have to discriminate the parts and moments which we find by an analysis of the really inherent pertaining to mental processes, whereby we deal with the mental process as an object like any other, inquiring about its pieces or nonselfsufficient moments really inherent in it which make it up. But on the other side, the intentive mental process is consciousness of something, and it is so according to its essence, e.g., into what is to be declared as a matter of essential necessity about the side of this of something (p. 213, section 88). Perception, for example, has its noema, most basically its perceptual sense, i.e., the perceived as perceived. Similarly the current case of remembering has its remembered as remembered, just as its remembered, precisely as it is meant, intended to in the remembering; again, the judging has the judged as judged, liking has the liked as liked, and so forth. In every case the nomatic correlate, which is called sense here (in a very extended signification) is to be taken precisely as it inheres immanentally in the mental process of perceiving, of judging, of liking; and so forth; that is, just as it is offered to us when we inquire purely into this mental process itself. (p. 214, section 88). -The noesis is distinguished from the noema as the perceiving is distinguished from the perceived (as it is perceived), etc. -Apple tree: the noema is the object as intended; put in inverted commas to indicate the effect of the epoche; remains even if it turns out to be a hallucination (and thus claims about the noema are not claims about the spatiotemporal object (object simpliciter), even if they coincide): The tree simpliciter, the physical thing belonging to Nature, is nothing less than this perceived tree as perceived which, as perceptual sense, inseparably belongs to the perception. The tree simpliciter can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense the sense of this perception, something belonging necessarily to its essence cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties. (p. 216) -The phenomenological epoche allows the noematic sense to be distinguished from the object simpliciter. But it is not a question of two realities. There is only one reality in every case. Structure of the noema and complex noematic correlates: -Distinguish between noematic core or content and various characters (attending to, perceiving, judging, etc.). Both together make up the noesis. Law of correlation: There can be no noetic moment without a noematic moment specifically belonging to it. (p. 226, section 93).

-In the case of judgment, noesis is the making of the judgment and the noema is the judgment made. (PART of this judgment is the judgment in the sense of pure logic (p. 229) The Hyletic and Noetic Moments are the Really Inherent Moments; the Noematic Moments are the Really Non-Inherent Moments. -Example: the tree. Really inherent moments of our mental processes include the sensed-colors (the sense data); these sense-data are animated by noetic moments (construals; sense-bestowings) when we direct the Ego toward the object; thus both the hyletic moments and the animating construals belong to the really inherent composition of the mental process. (p. 238). Distinct from this is the noematic given object. [which is also to be distinguished from the object simpliciter]. -Both the noemata and the noetic consciousness can be considered eidetically. Eidetic reflection shows their correlation (p. 241). A parallelism between noesis and noema is indeed the case, but it is such that one must describe the formations on both sides and in their essentially mutual correspondence. The noematic is the field of unities, the noetic is the field of constituting multiplicities. (p. 242). Considering the noematic core more closely: Each noema has a content, that is to say, its sense, and is related through it to its object. -Example: the tree is intended as a physical thing; a colored thing; a plant, etc. The totality of these determinations of the object as the object, as prediciates, are the noematic sense. -Beyond this there is the noematic object, the determinable X., the pure X in abstraction from its predicates. (p. 314) -NOW, different SENSES can relate to the same Object (determinable X). (p. 315) -The X, or positum, may be one-membered or many-membered, etc. -Reflection on senses gets us pure apophantic forms; universal doctrine of senses of all possible sorts.; but phenomenology keeps in mind also the entwinement of these essences with their noetic and noematic contexts. Now: Each and everything is eidetically prescribed no matter how far we stretch the framework of inquiry, no matter on which level of universality and

particularity we also move be it even on the level of the lowest concretions. As the sphere of mental processes is rigorously conformable to law according to its transcendental essential structure, so that possible essential formation according to noesis and noema is firmly determined in it, just as any possible figure to be inscribed in space is determined by the essence of space according to unconditionally valid laws. What is called possibility (eidetic existence) in both cases is, therefore, absolutely necessary possibility, an absolutely firm member in an absolutely firm framework of an eidetic system. To achieve scientific cognition is its goal, i.e., to theoretically stamp and control it so that it becomes a system of concepts and statements of laws which have their source in the pure intuition of essences. (pp. 323-324; section 135).

Five Models of the Noema Neo-phenomenalist model (Gurwitsch; New School): The noema is a perceptual appearance of the object perceived. The object perceived is itself a complex of such appearances, the ideal totality of all such appearances. (cf. Berkeley). Intentional object model (Ingarden): The noema is the intentional object of the act. Intentional objects, generally, have real being, though this being may be dependent on consciousness. Content-as-sense model (Follesdal, Dreyfus, McIntyre, David Smith (California school)): Noematic sense is a kind of meaning or sense, distinct in kind from both the act and is real object. A noema is the complex of this sense and a thetic character or act quality (imagining, perceiving, judging, etc.) One and the same real object can be intended through various noematic senses. Analogy to Freges conception of sense. Contents are genuine objects, existing outside space and time (Platonistic). Aspect model (Sokolowski, Drummond): Noema is the object as intended in the act, and thus is an aspect or abstract moment of the real object itself. Noema only becomes apparent through a special phenomenological modification of attitude. Aristotelian model (Mulligan, Barry Smith, Willard): Adheres to the position of Logical Investigations. Ideal contents are species of real acts what is held in common by various real acts that mean the same rather than separate objects.