Michael Strauss: Volition and Valuation

Volition and Valuation
A Phenomenology of Sensational,
Emotional and Conceptual Values
Michael Strauss
University Press of America, Inc.

Translated from the Hebrew manuscript by
Ruth Hadass-Vashitz
Contents
Preface xi
Introduction 1
Part I - Elementary Value Theory
Chapter 1 Valuative and Motivative Values 13

The distinction between them 13
Translation into the Suggested Terminology 18
Reducing Value to One of its Kinds 21
The Distinction between Positive and Negative
Valuative Values 22
The Distinction between a Full and an Empty Value 22
Positive and Negative Motives 24
Chapter 2 The Will 27

Volition and Motive 27
Establishing Valuative Values 29
Power of Judgment 30
Self-Deception 32
The Denial of the Will 34
Chapter 3 Value Properties and their Bearers 37

Neutral Knowledge or Pure Cognitive Content 37
Mixed Values and Pure Values 38
What a Value-Property Is 39
Value and the Value-Measuring Instrument 41
The Value-Bearer 42
Distinctive Marks 44
The Value-Proposition 46
Content and Form in a Proposition 47
The Demand that Cognition Precede Valuation 48
Value-Knowledge 49
Chapter 4 The Valuative Value: Modes of its Being 51

a. Crystallization 52
b. Values Implied by Valuations 52
c. Values Implied by the Form of Valuation 53
d. Values Implied by the Form of Cognition 54
e. The Individual Value 54
Feelings of Pleasure and Pain, Pleasantness and
Unpleasantness 56
Passivity 56
The Lack of Objectification 60
Emotion 63
Chapter 5 The Dimensions of Value 71

Victor Kraft on the Components of Value 71
The Possibility of Reduction to a Pair of Values 72
An Additional Dimension of Valuation 75
Chapter 6 Content and Form in Valuative Intention 79

The Distinction between Content and Form of
Intention in General 79
The Conscious and the Unconscious 82
Transitive and Reflective Intention 84
Observation of the Forms of Intention 86
Emotion as an Intentional Content 90
Preference 93
Society and Its Mode of Reality 94
Conjoint Intention towards the Same Meanings 97
Part II - The Division of Values and their Typology
Chapter 1 The Principle of Division 103
Chapter 2 The First Section: Valuation According to

Results. The End 109
Efficiency 110
The Proportion of a Sacrifice in the Present to a
Reward in the Future 112
The Individual as a Means to His Own Ends 113
vi
The Individual as a Means to Another's Ends 116
Goal-Oriented Speech 117
Interest and End 118
Chapter 3 The First Section: Valuation According to

Results. Caution 121
Chapter 4 The Second Section: Valuation According to the

Activity Itself. The Need 123
Feeling Valuation 123
Fullness 124
The Motive 124
A Given Value 125
The Degree of a Need 126
Distinctness of the Need 127
Contracting the Meaning of the Word "Need" 128
Can Anyone Know Better than I What Is Good
for Me? 130
The Division of Needs According to the Object 131
The Shape of a Value and Its Matter 132
Chapter 5 The Second Section: Valuations According to the

Activity Itself. Inclinations and Constraints 135
Chapter 6 The Second Section: Valuation According to the

Activity Itself. The Ideal 137
The Ideal Compared with the End 139
The Ideal Compared with the Need 140
Justice as an Ideal 142
Truth and Beauty as Ideals 145
The Game 145
Chapter 7 The Third Section: Valuation According to the

Activity's Factors. Valuation of Motives 149
Two Kinds of Motive Valuation 149
Values of Preference 151
Morality 153
Open and Closed Morality 155
Why Formal Morality Requires the Complement of

Material Morality 160
Summarizing the Issue of Motive Valuation 165
Chapter 8 The Third Section: Valuation According to the
vii
Activity's Factors. Valuative Values Directed
at Abilities 167
Chapter 9 Valuation of Humans. Emergence of Reflective

Motives 171
An Outline of the Division 176
Sections and Types of Values 176
Chapter 10 The Typological Approach and Reductionism 177
Part III - The Relative Weight of Values and Conflicts

between them
Chapter 1 Measuring Values 183

The Platonic Theory of Measurement 183
Measuring Valuative Values 185
Measuring by Means of Decisions 186
Chapter 2 Money 189

Money as a Cognitive Medium 190
Money as a Valuative Medium 194
Chapter 3 The Rate of Value Realization and Valuative

Grading 197
The Profile of a Valuative Value 197
Comparison of Values According to Height and
Strength 202
Dependence of a Value on another Value 203
Chapter 4 Reason and Conflicts 205

The Distinction between Rivalry and Opposition 205
Value-Stages 206
The Constitution of Values 208
Types of Opposition Between Values 213
Chapter 5 The Question of Radical Evil 215

Extensions of the Need for Self-Defense 217
Magic Redress of the Past 219
Competition and Envy 221
How the Conflict between Approval of Damage to
Others and Ethical Values is Resolved 222
Chapter 6 Tensions in the Moving-Calming Dimension 225
viii
Chapter 7 Goal-Orientation and Spontaneity 233
The Synthesis of Goal-Orientation and
Competitiveness 238
Chapter 8 The Oppositions between Justice, Freedom and

Other Values 241
Value's Place in a System and Its Essence 248
Conflicts and the Relation between What Should
Be and What Is 252
A Model for Opposition and Mutual Conditioning
in the Realization of Values 253
Chapter 9 Struggles Between the Will and Motivative

Values 257
Chapter 10 Repression 263
Chapter 11 Ideology 265

Simple Ideology - Justifying Actual Prevailing
Value-Systems 266
Compensating Ideology 270
Part IV - Objectivism and Subjectivism
Chapter 1 The Objectivist 275

Naive Objectivism 276
Reflective Objectivism 277
Popular Objectivism in the Sphere of Values 277
About Internalization and Externalization 279
Society 281
Evil as a Value-Property 282
Chapter 2 The Subjectivist 285
Chapter 3 The Validity of Values and the Question of their

Foundation 289
Disagreement and Relativity 289
The Theoretical Problem of Value Foundation 291
Chapter 4 Attempts to Solve the Problem of

Value-Foundation 293
Metaphysical Deduction of a Value from Cognition 293
The Derivation of Values from the Nature of Reason 295
ix
The Reduction of All Values to Given Values 296
Foundation in a Special Faculty of Knowledge 300
Hypostasis of Values 301
Chapter 5 Waiving the Attempt to Achieve Ultimate

Foundation 305
Chapter 6 The Ontological Status of Values, Relationism 313
Chapter 7 Phenomenology of Values 321
Epilogue 327
Glossary 329
Notes 333
Biblography 361
Index of Names 367
Index of Subjects 369
x
Preface
This book was first written in Hebrew in the years 1985-1991 The
Hebrew version was published by the Haifa University Press and
Zmora-Bitan Publishers in 1998.
The groundwork was influenced by my late teacher Nathan Roten-
streich and my late friend Michael Landmann. The book has greatly
benefited from remarks of friends and colleagues and from discussions
with them. These friends are Asnat and Oded Balaban, Aaron Ben
Ze'ev, Walter Brüstle, Torge Karlsruhen, Gideon Keren, and Ruth Lo-
rand. I am grateful to all of them.
I am extremely grateful to Ruth Hadass-Vashitz who translated the
manuscript into English. She took trouble to convey the precise mean-
ing of the original. I made some changes in the text after she had fin-
ished her work, and all responsibility for faults in the English text is
mine.
I would like to call the attention of the reader to the glossary that
explains the technical terms used in this book.
M. S., Jerusalem, 1999

Introduction
The phenomenology of values and valuation belongs to axiology, i.e.,

the general theory of value, and differs from the other parts of this
theory in its methods, not in the investigated object. The general the-
ory of value is concerned with a certain kind of relations prevailing
between a subject and its environment.
The subjective side of these relations consists of attitudes adopted
by people towards their environment and their own lives which are
embodied in their judgments, emotions, feelings and deeds. This
means that the theory of value is concerned with the stand people take
for or against something, and with the question how much and in what
ways they are mentally involved in taking their stand.
The objective side of these relations can be characterized as a cer-
tain kind of positions or statuses of the environment with regard to the
subject, namely, is it good or bad for the subject, rewarding or damag-
ing, just or unjust, pretty or ugly, loved or hated, etc. However, the
theory is not only concerned with status, but also with value-proper-
ties, some of which exhibit a much greater complexity than status.
Although the general theory of value addresses a broad range of
concerns, it does not encompass the full scope of consciousness. Its
domain is distinct from the following two:
(A) From cognitive thinking, that seeks to discover what exists or
existed without taking a stand towards it; to take a stand towards the
existing would mean going beyond it, as when it is measured by what
we wish, or what ought to be.
(B) From the exposition of essences, which is a free exposition of
contents with no concern for their existence (i.e., whether they are em-
bodied in something that exists) or for their cognitive status, and
without taking a stand towards them.
2 Volition and Valuation
Besides the domain of value there is, then, a cognitive domain, to

which value-neutral sciences belong, and a domain of content exposi-
tion, concerned neither with cognitive nor valuative status, to which
the arts and mathematics belong.
Science can indeed be useful, and in this respect it is not value-
neutral, but this value-bound quality refers only to its own existence,
and not to its relationship towards its objects (or, to be more cautious,
it does not refer to the way it wishes to relate to its objects). Art may
be beautiful and thus not value-neutral. In this respect, art has a value-
character, but it is not its relation to its object (if it has one) which
possesses a value-character, since the work of art may be beautiful
without ascribing beauty to its object; for example: to paint a beautiful
picture does not imply its objects in a way that makes them beautiful.
The work of art can be value-neutral, since its task is not to ascribe
value-quality to its object (if it has one).
Early in the history of the human spirit, the three domains men-
tioned above were united, the unity being embodied in mythology. The
first to abandon this unity was the exposition of essences. It did so in
order to free itself from the constraints of both cognitive and value-
status. Cognition and valuation remained unified until the Renaissance,
and in everyday thinking they are unified to the present day. At the
beginning of the modern age, cognitive theoretical thinking was
released from these constraints and established itself as a science,
seeking value-neutrality.
As to the assertion that until the Renaissance there was no separa-
tion between cognitive and valuative thinking, consider whether
Plato's or Aristotle's theories are compatible with such a separation. In
Plato's philosophy values have the status of ideas, and ideas in general
possess a value-character. But ideas are also real, existing entities, and
it is therefore not only impossible to separate knowledge from values,
but also to separate them from art or mathematics.
In Aristotle's philosophy, teleology implies mutual assimilation of
cognition and valuation. It is obvious that every explanation according
to a natural end already includes a valuation according to this very
end. Aristotle sometimes praises nature for being a fine artisan, creat-
ing each thing for a specific and unique end (unlike human artisans,
who made the Delphic knife)1 and sometimes reproaches nature for
mistakes (as, for example, when a three-legged chick or a two-headed
calf are born).2 Pre-Renaissance theories never addressed the question
whether knowledge and valuation could be separated.
Let us now briefly examine how cognition and values relate to ac-
tion. Cognition, i.e., knowledge separated from valuation, is not prac-
tical, it cannot guide deeds, since cognition tells only what exists and
Introduction 3
not what action should be taken. Nor are values and valuations practi-
cally separated from cognition, since without knowledge of facts we
are not aware of a possible conflict between the realization of different
values; i.e., we do not know what we give up when we decide to ac-
complish a certain value; we do not know what means should be em-
ployed to achieve certain ends. Practical thinking, that is thinking
which guides our actions, is therefore a synthesis of cognition and
values. But one has to distinguish between a synthesis whose compo-
nents are distinct, and one in which they are not. The first kind of
synthesis unifies previously separated elements, whereas the second
lacks awareness of the pure, unmixed elements, and lacks cognizance
of the difference between them.
Everyday thinking is practical in its core and is therefore a synthe-
sis of cognition and values. Since it precedes science and theoretical
thinking in general, it does not incorporate awareness of the bounda-
ries between its own components. The sections of everyday thought
that are not practical in themselves, are ramifications arising from
practical thinking; these include feelings, emotions and notions taken
from the practical sphere. For this reason one and the same statement
of everyday thought frequently expresses both knowledge and
valuation, and it is often the case that no neutral word can be found to
denote something, and only words of praise or disapproval are
available (“stingy” and “thrifty” may describe the same person from
different valuative angles; the same can be said of “wasteful” and
“generous”). Often, when you listen to a discussion, it is difficult to
ascertain whether people argue about facts or about their valuation of
facts (and it may therefore happen that they are not valuing the same
state of affairs, and that the dispute has no object at all).
* *
*
Value-neutral knowledge first emerged at the beginning of the
modern age, its object was nature, but later it extended its domain to
include human beings. Since man cannot be known without his values,
and his behavior cannot be understood without knowing these, an
attempt at value-neutral knowledge of values themselves is indicated
— that is, their description and explanation without either recom-
mending or rejecting them. More precisely, there is a concern with the
way given values, i.e., those that pertain to the nature of humans are
recognized, with the ways by which non-given values are created and
established, and with the mode of applying and realizing values. In
short, the matter in hand are the forms of value thought.
Here we should distinguish between two levels of thought: first,

the level of values, where the intention is towards a specific value or
the value-character of a thing or an action, that is, to the content of
values; this level includes normative approaches; the second level is
that of meta-value, where the intention is towards the form of the
thought taking place on the first level, the value level. The first level is
of original, or transitive intention; the second is of reflection about the
forms the original intention assumes, and it includes meta-ethics. 3
Besides this difference regarding the object of thought, there is a dif-
ference between the two levels with regard to the approach, or the
manner of thinking. On the value-level, a stand towards something is
actually taken, whereas on the plane of meta-value a conceptually neu-
tral picture of the assumed position is drawn.
Using the word “value” on the first level, a person means only his
or her own value, while on the second level he may also mean a value
that others, but not he adhere to. Thus I would assert, for example, that
vengeance is a value, attaching to the word “vengeance” a meaning
thoroughly opposed to my own values, provided that I believe some-
one else considers vengeance to be a valid norm of behavior.
Once the word “value” was mainly used in economic life; since the
17th century the use of the word has been extended and it was intro-
duced into other realms of thought. In many cases the word “value”
and its derivatives replaced the word “good” and its derivatives, al-
though obviously the latter was not ousted. Instead of the good-bad
and the good-evil contrast, we now deal with the distinction between
positive and negative values, or between value and “disvalue.” In their
modern meaning, “value” and “valuation” are employed to describe
and analyze the phenomena of praise, recommendation, command,
blame, warning, prohibition, etc.
In meta-valuative usage, the term “value” is more appropriate than
the term “good” in two respects:
1. We speak about positive and negative values, and about value in
general as encompassing both; it is obviously inappropriate to refer to
positive and negative good, and to good in general as good-or-evil;
John Laird in his Idea of Value already addressed this point.4 It is not a
simple task to replace the word “value” in its meta-valuative usage by
a synonym. Let us, for instance, take the proposition, “Over the years
Smith changed most of his values in the domain of art,” and ask how
we can circumvent the use of the word “values” with the aid of the
word “good” in this case. We may try to insert into this proposition the
phrase “criteria for what he calls 'good'“ instead of “values,” and
obtain: “Over the years Smith changed most of the criteria for what he
calls 'good' in the domain of art.” It turns out:
Introduction 5
A. That in this meta-valuative context it is more convenient to use

“value” than a substitute.
B. That contrary to “value” the word “good” occurs in this context
in inverted commas, which is characteristic for a word normally used
on the valuative level, when it is mentioned on the meta-valuative
level.
C. That the substitution of the word “value” by a phrase, formu-
lated with the aid of the word “good,” involves some loss of meaning.
The mutual meaning relation of the words “good” and “value” may
be interpreted in the following way. The word “good” is a predicate of
things (situations or actions) in which a positive value is realized (and
the word “bad” is a predicate of something in which a negative value
is embodied), but on the other hand the essence of value is not ex-
hausted by its role as a method of calling things “good” or “bad.”
2. Contrary to “value,” “good” has no plural form.
* *
*
Neutral reflections on values were for sometime scattered in ethics
and aesthetics, in economics and psychology, in anthropology and
history. Only at the end of the 19th century, Alexius Meinong and
Christian von Ehrenfels (the discoverer of gestalt qualities) founded
the general theory of value, termed “axiology” by Wilbur Urban, who
introduced it to the English-speaking world. The intention was to
gather the scattered reflections under one roof.5 Two obstacles, which
we will briefly discuss, made the development of axiology slow and
intermittent:
1. It is difficult to understand values that contradict (in some ap-
plications) your own, namely, to understand the value-character of
contents adhered to by another person. Unless you understand these,
you cannot compare your own with other values, and you cannot ob-
serve their form.
Value-neutrality does certainly not require from a person research-
ing a certain topic to be himself neutral in any respect, but asks him to
discriminate between cognitive discourse on a subject matter and as-
suming an attitude towards it. However, neutrality in the discourse on
values also requires to treat of values not sustained by the person con-
ducting the discourse — and these are blind spots in ordinary observa-
tion; thus, the difficulty arises.
2. Axiology is a philosophical discipline, and philosophy has in
general not remained value-neutral with regard to the objects of its
analysis. On the contrary, frequently philosophical discussion some-
what resembles the session of a court of justice, which has to rule on a
charge of false pretenses against knowledge in general and science in

particular, or against any other object of philosophical discourse.
With regard to values, especially moral values, philosophy adopted
the task of providing them with foundations. Various ways were pro-
posed in order to accomplish this task, and there also were thinkers,
like Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche, who objected to morality
and its foundations. Both the foundation of — or the argumentation in
favor of — a value, and the objection to the same, are obviously not
value-neutral. To sum up, it was a tradition of philosophy to value its
subject matter.
The development of axiology is thus the attempt of a philosophical
discipline to remove itself from a certain tradition prevailing in
philosophy. Besides the difficulty involved in such an attempt, there
was a much simpler difficulty from the angle of motivation: meta-
valuative analysis was regarded as a corridor leading back to the arena
of values, and the analyst, being value-committed, was impatient dur-
ing his lengthy walk along this corridor.
On the other hand, certain phenomena aroused axiological curios-
ity. These were the value-conflicts: not only contrasts between differ-
ent cultures, but even contradictions within one and the same system
of values, that is to say, even within an individual's own system of
values. George Simmel, Nicolai Hartmann and Michael Landmann
analyzed these conflicts and antinomies.6 When a philosopher stum-
bles over antinomies taking place between his own values, the absence
of a solution pushes him from the valuative to the meta-valuative level.
* *
*
Let me present some examples to clarify the difference between

levels of thought. The name “utilitarianism” may designate two differ-
ent views. It may designate a certain system of values, which means:
something on the level of values themselves. In this case, the utilitar-
ian praises those who seek their benefit. He would say: perhaps there
are people who do not seek their own benefit, but they are fools and
are exploited by clever people, or they are powerless and make a merit
out of their weakness.
But the name “utilitarianism” may also refer to an axiological
view, i.e., a view belonging to the meta-valuative level. In this case the
utilitarian would say: there are no human beings that do not seek their
own benefit; utility is the only kind of existing value, or at least the
only kind of value which directs human action. In this case, the
utilitarian would not necessarily praise those who seek only their own
Introduction 7
benefit (and in his opinion, all humankind belongs to this category).

Hobbes, for instance, is utilitarian in this sense, but he neither praises
nor especially respects the human species. He indeed asserts that
The Value, or Worth of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to
say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is
not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of
7
another.
Hobbes' somewhat biting style was probably not chosen in order to
astound the reader, but to express by means of style (instead of being
explicit) his disapproval (on the value level) of people's utilitarianism.
This disapproval does not diminish his meta-utilitarianism (i.e., his
adherence to the view that actually human beings seek only what helps
to achieve their ends).
As long as one deals with axiology one can neither agree nor dis-
agree with the utilitarian in the first sense (who belongs to the object
of axiological discourse, but does not participate in it).
Further, when someone tells us, for example, that he is a hedonist,
we should ask him: Are you trying to recommend pleasure seeking, or
do you rather claim that people seek only pleasures?
* *
*
This book is divided into four parts:
The first part presents some elementary work: basic distinctions
are drawn and molds prepared for the notions appearing in the
following parts.
Part II is concerned with the division of values into major classes
or into sections, and with the description of the characteristic types
around which values converge in each section. The prevailing divi-
sions were made out of concern about values, and not on the meta-
valuative level. The division into ethical, esthetical and logical values,
and the division into economic, social, political, religious, etc. values,
are neither made according to the structure of values nor the way they
are applied, but according to the domain of the objects in which these
values are applied. In this part I propose a division that arises from the
nature of values themselves.
The division of values is required in order to understand the con-
cept of value, that is, to be able to analyze it exhaustively, and this is
needed in order to examine the attempts to reduce values to a single
type or kind.
Part III deals with relations between values and their integration
into a system. First quantitative relations are analyzed, namely, the
measurement of values; whether they have a common denominator,
the exchange, the question of what money is, and what is expressed by
the price. Then there is an examination of the different ratings of
values as the ground for their order of preference. Finally the main
theme of this part: conflicts between values and attempts made by
reason to settle them. The attained settlements are not final or
satisfying. In the course of these attempts, different figures of reason
arise.
The problem of the objectivity or subjectivity of values is dealt
with in the last part: do values exist beyond human consciousness or
are they but caprices of human beings, independent of what exists
around them? I describe the different types of self-consciousness that
crystallize around objectivist and subjectivist answers. The philoso-
phical attempts made for the foundation of the values that seem to
need foundation is examined, since these attempts affected the devel-
opment of axiology. Finally, several clues are presented how to de-
velop the phenomenology of values.
* *
*
My own axiological view can be characterized as following:
It is pluralistic and integrative, since it does not try to explain val-
ues by reducing them to one kind (like utility and ends, or pleasure and
needs), but by examining their integration into a system that rec-
ognizes plurality in the configuration of values.
It is relational (or “relationist”), since it rejects both objectivism
and subjectivism and maintains that value is a relationship between
object and subject (or between the object-in-itself and the subject-in-
itself), a relationship which can be molded by the subject.
It is pragmatic, since it admits that there is no ultimate foundation
(or no properly laid foundation) of value. That is to say, this view
recognizes that value-thinking has to be content with the integration of
a value into a system, and with the demonstration of the sustainability
of the system, namely, the evidence that the system fulfills the role of
offering answers to the questions about how to approach the object and
how to treat it.
Finally, this view is phenomenological in the following senses:
(a) It treats the difference between cognitive thinking and value-
thinking not as an ontological difference between the objects of these
realms of thought, but as a difference in the mode of intentionality
towards the objects, a mode that leaves its mark on the latter (i.e., it
perceives this difference as the difference between phenomena of con-
sciousness).
(b) It suggests a way for axiology to bracket the validity of the
values being described.
Introduction 9
(c) It acknowledges that the observation of phenomena of con-

sciousness goes beyond empirical observation (which collects data for
their comparison in general, and for induction in particular), and has a
certain character of pure intuition (like Kant's approach), or intuition
of essences (like Husserl's approach), and that this observation is a
source of meta-valuative knowledge. The “intuition of essences” is
understood here as an observation of the typical.
Here I will add something regarding some metaphysical features of
this treatise. Cautious of hypostases and wary of Ockham's razor, phi-
losophers (especially in the second half of the 20th century) try to
avoid describing the objects of their discourse as substances, or in a
way that implies the object possesses the status of a substance, or the
status of a limb of a substance. Substance is mythological. Accord-
ingly, they award the object the status of an event or of a state. In line
with this position one has to avoid speaking of the will, and instead
speak of volitions; the volitions should be described as a kind of men-
tal states, or as mental events; events should receive preference over
activity because activity assumes an acting agent who belongs to the
realm of substance. In line with all this one should not mention “intel-
lect,” “faculty of observation,” etc.
From the angle of epistemology and ontology, there is some merit
in this abstinence. However, I do not believe that the ontological profit
compensates us for the inconvenience in the course of cognitive work
and for the reduction of its fertility. Accordingly, I do not intend to
accept these limitations in my discussion of axiology. Not only
substance is a pattern of cognition and not a structure of reality, but for
similar reasons the property, the event and the situation or the state are
also merely tools of the intellect when it sets out to cognize its objects.
If one ascribes them an ontological status, they become mythological
not less than substance. The intellect cannot abstain from the use of its
tools.
Substance is a kind of special intellectual glue, assigned to attach-
ing products of conceptual abstraction to each other, namely, factors
which only the intellect can separate. The intellect separates without
joining at the same time; it may separate A from B without joining it
simultaneously to C, and thus it creates the indefinite. With the aid of
substance it glues these indefinites once again together. The cat in
general has some color, but no definite color. When we attribute a
definite color to a specific cat we reconstruct it, i.e., we attach the cat
in general, which has some indefinite properties, to the affirmation of
definite properties and the negation of their alternatives (in the exam-
ple, alternative colors). In this reconstruction the cat must be a sub-
stance in the sense that it has to be made so that it can possess proper-
ties, or be the owner of properties, namely, that properties can attach

themselves to it.
We cannot describe a field of objects without the aid of substantial
patterns; without a description we have no basis from which to explain
the field of objects by laws, models or functions, namely, there is no
way to expose the internal order of this field. We do not employ sub-
stantial patterns because language imposes nouns on us, but on the
contrary, because thought needs these patterns, and in order to re-unite
what it separates, it needs the nouns.
PART I
Elementary Value Theory

Chapter 1
Valuative and Motivative Values
The distinction between them
The question what a value is can be answered by showing the dif-

ferent functions a value can fulfill. I will describe two such functions
and thus provide a heading, under which all other functions a value
can fulfill may, perhaps, be subsumed. The two functions are valuation
and motivation.
Valuation in its limited sense is the application of a value, crystal-
lized as a concept. For instance, I have a concept of justice, which I
apply to actions and their agents, when I say that these are either just
or unjust. When a value is applied to things, actions or agents, these
may be called “objects of valuation” (or simply “objects”).
Valuation in the wider sense means taking a stand or assuming an
attitude for or against something. This stand-taking need not be verbal;
it may also be emotional or sensational. The most elementary form of
an assumed attitude is feeling pleasure or pain, for through these
feelings we respond to objects; an object is pleasurable or painful,
tasty or repugnant. Whenever a person takes a stand, he or she values.
My use of the word “valuation” has, then, a wider range than common
usage. If someone finds a thing pleasurable, I say that he values it;
likewise, if someone finds a thing distasteful, I will also say that he
values it (in the sense that he has taken a stand on it).
Valuation that stems from judgment and is conveyed verbally may

express a position that exists only, or primarily, in a conceptual mode;
such a position comprises a set of notions which is often accompanied
by emotion (for instance, when an action is judged as just or unjust).
These types of valuation are tied to language. However, the verbal
expression of a valuation may also be the ex post facto expression of
an attitude which was originally pre-verbal or pre-predicative. I will
limit my discussion of elementary pre-verbal or pre-predicative valua-
tion, so that only the attitudes of subjects with linguistic abilities, who
in principle could report these attitudes, will be considered valuations.
Thus, because the data of axiology are the expressions of attitudes,
most significantly symbolic expressions.
Values also reside in the foundations of sensual valuation (e.g.
pleasure and pain) and emotional valuation (e.g. love and hatred), but
these are not crystallized as concepts, i.e., the valuing subject has no
definitions for these values. Valuations of this type are quasi-applica-
tions of the values residing in their foundations.
Accordingly, a value is a sensational, emotional or conceptual atti-
tude we adopt, or a stand we take towards things, people or actions.
The second function of values is to motivate people to action. One
value may motivate a person maintaining it to act justly, another value
may motivate him or her to eat something tasty. When fulfilling this
functions, a value appears as a desire, an aspiration, or a drive. Here
several questions arise. Does every entity, applied in valuation, actu-
ally motivate? And on the other hand, does every motive serve as a
foundation for valuation? In other words, does the same mental entity
fulfill both functions? Since axiology has no a priori answer to these
questions, it should employ a terminology that assumes no answer in
advance and ostensibly leaves them open. To do this one have to give
different names to bearers of different functions: The entity that serves
the valuation should have one name, while the motivating entity
should have another. I will call bearers of the first function “valuative
values,” and bearers of the second function “motivative values.” In
doing so, I make no assumption with regard to the question whether a
single entity bears both names (and both functions) or a separate entity
bears each name (and each function). Thus, I allow for the possibility
that some values may be valuative without being motivative, (as, for
instance, when a person contemplates a singular past event, which is
certain not to repeat itself), or motivative without being valuative. Yet,
I also allow for the possibility that the valuative and the motivative
characters are only aspects of one and the same content.
Valuative and Motivative Values 15
What motivates to action could simply be called “motive” instead

of “motivative value,” but then the linkage between motivation and
valuation may not get the required attention.
To the two roles or functions already mentioned — valuation and
motivation — a third role may be added: guidance. In other words, a
value can be said to guide or direct a person's actions. But this role is
actually filled by practical thought, which is a synthesis of valuative
values and value-neutral knowledge of facts. If, for instance, the valua-
tive value is a goal, then practical thought extracts from the neutral,
theoretical knowledge of facts the means that should be pursued, i.e.,
what is necessary to direct the action.
Let us further examine the nature and status of the four entities I
distinguish:
Valuative value Valuation (= valuing or adopting an

attitude towards an object)
Motivative value Motivation (= motivating or activating)
Valuing and motivating are real occurrences or states within the

subject. They occur within a particular person at a particular time.
Valuing and motivating (but neither valuative nor motivative values)
are observable; in other words, a person apprehends that she or he is
valuing or is motivated; in the typical cases a person is conscious that
he or she is taking a certain stand, or that he or she is motivated by
certain aspirations in a particular way or, for example, that he or she is
attracted or repelled by something. Each can examine his or her valua-
tions and motivations and study them. I do not intend to say that
people are always completely aware of their motivations and valua-
tions, for even what is in principle observable is not always immedi-
ately and fully apparent. My point is simply that we know about
valuation and motivation not only from conceptual analysis but also,
and primarily, from direct acquaintance.
The two kinds of values we have been discussing are themselves
neither processes, nor occurrences or states. They have no independent
appearance, they are not directly observed, but exclusively through the
mediation of valuation and activation.
Motivative values are a sort of inner power the subject reveals in
his actions. They can also be described as personality traits that are
responsible for certain functions, or as dispositions towards certain
actions. Motivative values may be expressed by the subject's wishes;
but a wish is not only motivating, it may also mold a valuation. Fur-
thermore, not every wish motivates to action.
Motivative values lack the immediate reality valuation and motiva-

tion have. But they are still real, individual entities, residing in a par-
ticular person at a particular time, and thus possess a certain strength
or intensity. They are changeable.
Valuative values, however, do not have this kind of reality. They
reside in no particular place or time, and they are not changeable. De-
scriptions of time and place do not apply to these values, i.e., they are
not suitable descriptors for them. A particular person at a particular
time may, of course, maintain a valuative value, recognize its validity,
apply it and (if it is accompanied by a corresponding motivative value)
even realize this valuative value in practice; and later the same person
may replace this value with another one. However, what changes when
the valuative value is replaced is not the value itself, but rather the
maintenance of values or the stock of values maintained by this par-
ticular person. Maintaining a valuative value, or adhering to it, may
possess a particular intensity (one may adhere to it more or less deci-
sively), but the valuative value itself is not subject to degrees of inten-
sity and is not changeable. The state of maintaining a value is a reality,
and in this sense its status is similar to that of motivative values. It has
causal relations with elements of its environment. Maintaining a value,
or adhering to it, is added as a fifth element to the domain of values I
have begun to describe:
Valuative value Maintaining it Valuing accordingly

(= adherence to it)
Motivative value Motivating
A person may therefore replace his values, even though a

particular value possesses some independence of being for him while
he maintains it and uses it in his valuations. A value, for example
justice, acquires the status of something unchangeable through
adherence and application by the individual, in complete contrast to
the valued object, which may, in principle, change. Until the particular
valuative value conflicts with some other valuative value in a field of
application, its validity is absolute.
We have to distinguish between the axiologist observing the ad-
herence to values, and the person he observes. The axiologist is con-
cerned with the form of the value, which is real and includes adherence
to the value, while the person being observed is entirely concerned
with the value's content. The intention of the observed person is di-
rected at the value on the original level of intentionality, and what is
intended on this level is the content of the value, whose validity is
universal and unlimited. Axiological reflection concerns the modes of

intentions, that is to say, the modes of the original, unreflective inten-
tion. Besides adherence to the value, these modes include the ways in
which it is applied and its place in the value system.
For naive first-level intention (not accompanied by reflection) the
valuative value is a Platonic idea. This is not a statement of the onto-
logical status of valuative values, but rather of their role in valuation
from the point of view of whoever maintains them. A valuative value's
role as an absolute is therefore constitutive for it, and not simply an
illusion of naive consciousness.
On the other hand, it is proper for reflection in general and axiol-
ogy in particular (both second-order endeavors) to speak of changes in
values and discuss their causes, so long as they do not overlook the
fact that these are but a single aspect of their object, i.e., consciousness
on the first level. Stated differently, in the limited sense their object is
only the form of the value. Just as there is a difference between the
concept of a chair and a chair (one cannot sit on the former), there is a
difference between the concept of axiological reflection about value-
thought and the thought itself.
Often a valuative value is not only incorporated in valuation, but
also in a special concept that belongs to the first level of intention, for
example, justice in the concept of justice; in this case the person main-
taining the value also has a definition (or a quasi-definition) for that
value. I will use the phrase “value concept” to refer to the first level
and not to the axiological concept (the concept of justice belongs to the
objects of axiological analysis, but is not a component of axiology
itself).
A value concept has also two aspects, content and form. In terms
of content, the value concept is identical with the value itself. A person
entertaining the concept of justice addresses justice itself qua
something of a particular nature, which is not a product of his own
will. He believes that he cannot alter what he takes to be justice, or
replace it with a different definition of justice. In terms of form, a
value concept is part of reality and is interconnected and interdepend-
ent with various aspects of reality. It is to the aspect of form that the
axiologist refers to when he says, for instance, that a particular person
or society has a certain justice concept. The axiologist refers to the
same formal aspect when he notes that individuals may change their
justice concept in order to accommodate it seamlessly within their set
of values, and that a value of a society or a culture may change in the
course of generations for various reasons.
In its original pre-reflective state, the mind turns outward, it at-
tends to the outside world and it is inclined to objectify what it con-
ceives, i.e., to regard it as part of the outside world. Furthermore, the

mind even tends to absolutize what it conceives, i.e., to regard it as
independent of the conceiving mind. This inclination prevails in the
cognitive as well as in the valuative realm. Objectification of sensual
and conceptual ideas is the function of a mechanism of the mind,
which establishes the content of ideas as an objective world, and
thereby establishes the mind itself as a subject facing the world, i.e., as
something that knows and values the world.
In reflection the mind turns inward, it attends to itself and thereby
also to the objectifying mechanism. It is now inclined to judge se-
verely what it has done in the first stage or on the first level. While for
a person in an original, pre-reflective state, his idea of justice has abso-
lute validity, on the reflective level he considers a network of relations
in which he himself was involved at the first stage, without having
then been aware of it. This gives him reasons to look at his own idea of
justice as changeable, and allows him to reflect on situations in which
the application of one of his values contradicts the application of
another of his own values. This, in its turn, gives him reasons to view
his own idea of justice as lacking unlimited validity.
An apparent contradiction emerges between the results of
reflective analysis and the pre-reflective mind. But from the
axiological point of view, neither objectification nor absolutization are
errors of a naive mind, nor is critical reflection devoid of results which
are and remain relevant for axiology. A mind that lacks the ability of
objectification would not only fail to establish itself as a subject, but
would also fail even to conceive of the idea of justice. Objectification
and absolutization are not to be considered mere opinions (of the naive
mind), but rather the functions of a mental mechanism which detaches
the subject from the object. Such a mechanism is necessary to
constitute the subject itself, as well as values like justice, which would
be inconceivable without the first, unreflective way of thinking. The
apparent contradiction is resolved when we note that reflection refers
to the form of the original level and not to its content. For example,
reflection refers to the adherence to a value, to its applications, to its
motivative power, but not to the content of the valuative value.
Translation into the Suggested Terminology
To clarify the distinction between motivative and valuative values,

we will translate a number of statements about values into the sug-
gested terminology.
Consider the statement that a person knows what is good or proper,

but does the opposite: A drug addict, for instance, who values drug
consumption negatively, but keeps using drugs. This statement tells us
that while the valuative value rejects the deed, the motivative value
accepts it. If we look at the state of this person, we discover two
additional factors, not mentioned by the statement or its translation.
For one, the valuation is not exclusively negative: The addict values
drug consumption as pleasant, or at least as less unpleasant than doing
without; on the sensational level he values the deed positively. The
second factor is the negative motivation regarding drug consumption:
If the addict not merely says that he values the deed negatively, but is
convinced of its evil, he may try to wean himself away; such an at-
tempt is motivated by a negative valuation of the habit, even if it ul-
timately fails. The above statement and its translation remain valid, but
only with regard to their sum total: The entire valuation totals
rejection, while the entire motivation totals acceptance. Our terminol-
ogy enables us to describe the subtler lines of opposition within the
systems of valuation and motivation in the same terms we employed to
express the difference between “know” and “do.”
We will now address the demand underlying morality, set forth in
Kant's Categorical Imperative. With certain deviations from the Kan-
tian version,8 it may be formulated in this manner: Act but according
to a rule that fulfills the following condition; it would not oppose your
wish, that (if it be the case) everybody will adhere to the same rule.
The wish is not discussed here as a motivative value, since you are
not asked whether you are prepared to influence others in order to
change their behavior. The wish will be revealed by the satisfaction or
dissatisfaction you experience when everyone behaves in a certain
manner. It is necessary that no dissatisfaction be generated by the fact
of a certain trait appearing in the behavior of all people; dissatisfaction
equals negative valuation. The condition inherent to the moral demand
is therefore that you do not value negatively the possibility for the rule
under consideration to become a universal standard of behavior.
The actual practice of behavior represents a certain motivative
value, while the valuation of this practice represents adherence to a
certain valuative value. If we consider the universality of this practice
from the angle of its relation to each individual, be it whoever it is
(and whatever his or her position towards the valuing person is), and
not from the angle of its dissemination, we arrive at a simple formula-
tion: Act according to a motivation, whose prevalence with others,
whoever they are, you value positively; or, in a more comprehensive
and precise formulation: Act only in accordance with a motivative
value, whose prevalence with others, whoever they are, you do not
value negatively.
The demand we analyze means therefore to accommodate motiva-
tive values to valuative values. This is a valuative value in itself, as-
signed to value motivations according to their consonance with valua-
tive values. It is feasible that this special valuative value may also be
accompanied by a matching motivation, namely, a motivation to cause
change or to mold motivative values.
The following objection arises. When we base morality on adapt-
ing the motivative to the valuative value, the issue of universality as
well as the issue of the other person fade-out: I am required to adapt
my own motivation to my own valuative value, independent of anyone
else's behavior. The answer is that the question of the other person's
behavior, or everyone's behavior, serves as a technique of thought that
isolates the valuative from the motivative value; its aim is to prevent
partiality in applying valuative values; it prevents the user of the
technique from applying one valuative value to his or her own
motivation, while applying a different valuative value to the same
motivation when it appears in another person. The technique instructs
us: Check how you value this motivation in another person, in order to
learn how to value it in yourself. Thus, we avoid a specious adaptation
which would result from the choice of a valuative value post-factum,
aiming to accommodate a given motivation. So far with regard to the
technique; if we dismiss it from our thought, the residue is a negative
valuation of discordance between motivation and valuative value.
One could also argue that rule and motive are not identical, and
therefore it is not appropriate to consider the examination of a practical
rule as the valuation of a motivative value. The answer is that a motive
has an individual existence, and the same motive, implanted in two
persons, is not precisely the same anymore; hence, these are two
motives, but they embody one rule, namely, they follow the same
pattern. Accordingly, the technique of thought experiment demands
that the person wishing to value a motive and to represent it by a prac-
tical rule, implant the same motive experimentally (i.e., in thought)
within someone else.
Neither this analysis nor its translation venture to enrich the theory
of morality, nor do they intend to replace accepted formulations by a
new one. Their aim is to assist axiology in discussing the moral mode
of valuation.
To further clarify our terminology, we will employ some
characteristic usage of the terms “hypocrisy” and “cynicism.” Both are
negative valuation terms, describing a certain relation between
valuative values and motives. The hypocrite hides his or her motives
and masquerades as a person whose motives match accepted values.

He/she declares adherence to especially lofty valuative values and
passes severe judgments on others. When they cause obvious injury to
other people, they do so out of concern for them, to save their victims
from an even harsher fate. The cynic condemns the hypocrite and
despairs of matching motivative to valuative values; he denies the
validity of valuative values which do not fit motives. On the face of it,
the hypocrite uses his valuative values as motives, the cynic employs
his motives as valuative values.
Reducing Value to One of its Kinds
The question arises whether it is possible to reduce value to one of

its kinds, namely, the motivative or the valuative value. One aspect of
the question is this: Is it possible to consider one kind of value as its
substance and the other as a mere phenomenon of the same? From a
different angle, the question asks whether it is possible to regard one
kind as the cause and the other as its result. The difference in character
between the two kinds makes it possible for a reduction to valuative
value to lean towards Platonic idealism, or at least towards objectiv-
ism, while the reduction to motivative value would lean towards natu-
ralism, or at least towards subjectivism. The debate over this matter
arose among the founders of axiology at its very beginnings: Christian
von Ehrenfels supports reduction to the motivative value, the aspira-
tion, while Alexius Meinong sees the fundamental manifestation of a
value in pleasure and distress, as opposed to aspiration. With time
Meinong became aware of the objectivist implications of his claim and
subsequently developed them explicitly.9
The intrinsic affinity between motivative and valuative values in-
vites reduction attempts. On the other hand, we have found that the
differences between valuative values and their mode of existence, and
motivative values and their mode of existence, are multiple and pro-
found; they reflect the multiple facets of the human being. Reduction
not only disregards the differences and impoverishes the theory by
shrinking and blurring its object; reduction also presents an utterly
one-sided picture of the human being. Numerous conflicts within the
sphere of valuative values arise from the basic conflict between these
and motivative, and this conflict can not appear in the reductionist
picture.
The Distinction between Positive and Negative

Valuative Values
When a person values something as bad, the valuation arises from

a specific evil; we will address this evil as “negative value.” Murder,
for instance, is a negative value; in contrast, not to murder (or to avoid
murder) is a positive value (or a positive valuative value). Injustice is a
negative value as against justice, which is a positive value. Against
every negative value there is at least one positive value, and against
every positive at least one negative value. The positive and the nega-
tive are a pair of values (murder and the avoidance of murder are a pair
and so are tasty and not tasty); we say that each is a “correlate” of the
other (or “a complementary value”).
One could argue against the above that condemnation of murder as
well as praise for avoiding it arise from the same content; crystallized,
this content yields the same notion, i.e., one and the same value. Ac-
cordingly, condemnation of a deed, or praise for its avoidance should
not be considered two values, nor should praise of a deed or condem-
nation of its avoidance be so considered; these should be taken as
positive and negative sections of the same value, two halves of a single
valuative scale.
One may use both kinds of terminology (the “idiom of pairs” and
“the idiom of sections”), as long as we are able to translate one into the
other.
It is quite possible that a certain valuative scale will not comprise a
zero point between good and bad, plus and minus; such a scale has
only better (which is the lesser evil) and worse (which is the lesser
good). Here good and bad are just pointers on the scale. There is no
boundary between the positive and negative sections this scale repre-
sents; one may say that it has only one section.
A value has more than two sections, for instance, when good
stands for a golden mean, flanked by negative sections; in this case we
arrive at three sections.
The Distinction between a Full and an Empty Value
When a value refers to an act and its correlate to avoiding the act;
when it refers to being the object of a certain act and its correlate to
not being the object of this act; when a value refers to an event and its
correlate to the event's non-occurrence, or when it refers to a thing and
its correlate to the non-existence of this thing; if a value is bound up
with feelings or emotions and its correlate with their absence — the
first of each pair will be addressed as “full” and second as “empty.” In
terms of “sections” the first section of these values is full and the sec-
ond empty. When we address a pleasant or good action, the positive
section will be full and the negative empty. While addressing an un-
pleasant or bad action, the negative section will be full, the positive
empty.
Not to murder is an empty, positive value; to murder is a full,
negative value. In other words: The full section of the value “murder”
is negative, the empty section is positive. To avoid aiding a hungry
person represents a negative, empty value.
A remark with regard to the names of values: The name of the
value not to murder (or “avoiding murder”) is negative, and so are the
names of values like “injustice” or “not to aid a hungry person.” It is
possible that the names usually attach themselves to the full section
whose negation (“not” or the prefixes “un,” “in” etc.) designates its
empty counterpart.
To demonstrate the usage of our terminology we will translate a
philosophical thesis into these terms. Schopenhauer believes that
pleasure is but the absence or the cancellation of suffering, and joy the
absence of sorrow. We can therefore reproduce this claim by saying
that pleasure and joy are empty values. It is possible that in Schopen-
hauer's view all positive values are empty, at least with regard to emo-
tion and feeling.
According to one theological thesis only good exists, while evil is
but the absence of good — it manifests itself through the non-exis-
tence of something else. Formulating this theory in our terms, we
would say that only positive values are ontologically full, while nega-
tive values are ontologically empty.
It is difficult to imagine a state in which a value is empty in all its
sections and from all possible angles. On the other hand, one can eas-
ily imagine a value to be full in all its sections from one particular
angle — the feeling angle, for instance; to be felt for better and for
worse, as is the case with the necessity to eat: The positive section
makes itself felt in pleasure while eating and the following satiety; the
negative section is manifest in hunger. The positive part is felt posi-
tively and the negative part negatively — that is to say that with regard
to feeling both sections are full.
The wish to live (in terms of pairs) is a full value when life pos-
sesses a certain quality. In a case of mere survival, however, in
particular if all other values are subjected to it, the same value is
empty.
One may smoke, without enjoying it but suffer without it. This
goes to show that notwithstanding the positive feeling valuation of the
act and the negative valuation of its absence, the value referring to this
act is empty in its positive section and full in its negative section from
the valuatively relevant angle (the angle of pleasure or suffering). This
is a feeling-value concerning pleasure and suffering, the relevant angle
therefore being the presence or absence of pleasure and the presence or
absence of suffering. Here the absence of a positive act reveals itself as
full and its presence as empty — a case that agrees with
Schopenhauer's theory.
Positive and Negative Motives
Only a single motive corresponds to a valuative value which has

only one full section. For instance, the person who smokes without
enjoying it has a single motive: To avoid non-smoking. There is no
difference between sections in this motive. The motive to avoid non-
smoking virtually (not altogether) fulfills the same function a motive
to smoke would; both lead to the same act (although there is probably
a difference in the quality of the act).
A motive should be classified as “positive” or “negative”
according to which section of a valuative value is full from the angle
relevant to this value. In the smoker's case only the negative section is
full — he or she suffers from not smoking; the desire to smoke is
actually a desire to avoid non-smoking and may be considered
negative: This individual smokes because of a negative motive.
This individual does not enjoy smoking, but does not suffer from it
either. We could also imagine a person suffering from something he or
she does, who would suffer even more from avoiding the deed; this
person, of course, also acts on account of a negative motive.
The paradigm of actions arising from negative motive is flight.
Flight means actively avoiding to be in a certain place; being there
constitutes a felt, real and full evil.
A positive motive is therefore the one that corresponds to the full,
positive section of a valuative value, the negative that corresponding to
the full, negative section. The empty section of a valuative value has
no corresponding motive. A valuative value (which has two sections)
whose sections are both full will be matched by two motives that make
up a pair. For instance, Reuben likes meat, enjoys eating it and suffers
when not consuming meat. Reuben has two motives to consume meat
and in general, it will be difficult to differentiate between them.
However, should a feeling of hunger annoy Reuben while he is
preoccupied with his work and should he, in consequence, eat

absentmindedly and in a hurry, even though he consumes his favorite
dish, we could say that he acts on the negative and not on the positive
motive (escape from irritating hunger). The positive valuation of eat-
ing was empty at the time and thus not attended by a motive.
It turns out that when an act possesses a pair of motives, only spe-
cial circumstances may isolate one of them temporarily, canceling the
other.
Speaking of motives, I will not refer to the notion of sections, nor
will I say that Reuben's eating-motive consists of a positive and a
negative section. Doing so we would — in opposition to Ockham's
wish — unnecessarily deal with multiple entities whenever a valuative
value has only one full section. The following difference should be
noted: In terms of sections — a “section” obviously assumes the exis-
tence of another section; in terms of pairs — a “value” does not as-
sume the existence of another value that pairs with it.
The distinction between positive and negative motives helps to
explain the notion of sacrifice. To offer a sacrifice for something
means overcoming negative motives, namely, positive motives over-
come the resistance of negative ones. I sacrifice something towards an
end: My wish to achieve this end is the positive motive; however, to
realize it I need means, so that the wish has to overcome my resistance
to employing these means — for instance, my resistance to getting up
early to work.
The positive motive manifests itself in the attraction to something
or in clinging to an prevailing situation; the negative motive is felt as
an urge to break out of the existing situation or to flee from something.
Sometimes adherence to a status quo ante may, however, appear as
a negative motive, that is to say, the desire to avoid a bad situation, or
a situation that is worse than the current one; for instance, avoiding
danger is a kind of breaking out, not from an already prevailing situa-
tion, but from a situation into which one is about to slide.
Chapter 2
The Will
Volition and Motive
The task of the will is to regulate the relationship between the per-
son, its owner, and his/her environment. It controls observation, the
intellect and the motorial system in their relation to the environment; it
issues commands and supervises their implementation; these com-
mands are acts of the will or, which is the same, volitions.
With regard to values, the will mediates between valuative and
motivative values. We can emphasize its particularity by delineating
the working of the will in a somewhat rough outline, i.e., formulate it
in a way that requires some qualification; we may say that the will
frequently imposes — and has the tendency to impose — the valuative
value upon the motive, namely, the valuative value as far as it consists
of a directive for action, upon the motive from the aspect of its power,
or from the aspect of the direction it indicates. The will may modify
the motive: increase or decrease its power in relation to rival motives,
or divert it into a channel that corresponds to the said directive, i.e., the
valuative value; to wit, it may change the motive's direction to a
certain extent.
The will shapes the system of motives whenever a conflict
between two values arises within the individual, and under given
circumstances the realization of one value foils realization of the other.
Here the will takes a decision, namely resolves the conflict by virtue of
preference-values which constitute a certain kind of value, designed to
guide the will. It may decide against the stronger motive. Will power
indeed reveals itself when its owner acts against the stronger motive,
or in other words: against the motive that was stronger before the will
intervened. The latter formulation is to be preferred: an action should
never be described as opposed to motive, but as matching the balance
of motives fashioned by the will.
Here a measure of doubt may come forth: whether volition is not
but one motive among others, the decision no shaping of a set of mo-
tives by the will, but a certain victory of one motive over the other.
The answer lies in the difference between volition and motivative val-
ues. Volition is an intentional act, while the motivative value is a force
that has magnitude and a direction towards some kind of deeds. The
motive reveals itself before the decision regarding the conflict between
values takes place. The motive is felt as the aspiration for an action or
its result, namely as an urge to break out of a certain situation, or as an
attraction to a captivating action (or to an action necessary to achieve
other captivating actions). The aspiration or attraction is felt in the
course of thinking about what captivates the mind. This feeling
accompanies acts of thought, but it is not a specific act in itself; it
accompanies intentional acts but it is no intentional act in itself.
Feeling the motive, like the motive itself, pertains only to the form of
intention, while volition also pertains to intentional content. More
precisely: Volition is a fully intentional act, possessing its own content
and a particular form. My volition with regard to a certain deed
constitutes the content of this act, what I intend, my intent (we shall
thus name a crystal of content, which can be repeatedly intended). Yet,
its being an act of volition constitutes a form of intention. The act
itself, as distinct from the content, pertains to the form of intention.
Volition is a certain kind of intentional acts.
However, the difference between volition and motive arises not
only from their mode of existence, but also from their nature: Motives
may oppose each other, namely, the same person has different aspira-
tions; under given circumstances the realization of one may prevent
realization of others; opposition between motives is conscious and
does not prevent their existence; volitions, on the other hand, may not
oppose each other; to wit, if a person realizes that action according to
one of her volitions will frustrate another action, arising from another
volition, she will abandon one of them; if she is uncertain which to
cancel, she will suspend both.
The distinction between reason and cause may serve to describe
the will. Whenever the will adapts a motive to a valuative value, when
The Will 29
it chooses between incompatible guide-lines that arise from different

valuative values, and strengthens the preferred motive, the will turns a
reason into a cause. I believe it is also correct to say that what serves
as a medium for turning reason into cause is the will. To explain this
proposition further, we offer the following remark: “Reason” within
this statement could, of course, be replaced by “argument” or “consid-
eration.” Neither should the phrase “turn into” (in “turns reason into
cause”) be taken literally: the reason does not cease to be a reason after
being “turned into” a cause. And as for the “cause”: the proposition is
valid with regard to a purposeful, attracting cause, when the
preferment of a positive motive is being considered as well as with
regard to an active, impelling cause, when thought is given to the
extrication from a prevailing predicament, i.e., to deliberations
supporting a negative motive.
Establishing Valuative Values
The roles of the will are not limited to the sphere of motivative
values. The will participates in the constitution of valuative values.
Reason may create the content of a valuative value; it cannot provide
its status. The will complements reason's creation by establishing the
value, thus according reason's product its actual status. The valuative
value's actual status is embodied in its applications, namely in valua-
tions; it is therefore embodied in attitudes a person assumes towards
situations, deeds, the objects of deeds and towards other persons. The
unfolding of a new value-content alone, comprehension of this content
alone, fails to award it the status of a valuative value. The award of
such a status represents a change of the subject.
In order to arrive at practical decisions, the will has to transcend
the entire sphere of values and take into account a picture of the situa-
tion, as it is transmitted by the cognitive work of the intellect; thus,
because in deciding the will has to rely on a synthesis of known facts
and values; each element of the synthesis does not in itself demand a
practical conclusion, namely neither generates positive or negative
imperatives; or in any case, no categorical imperatives, but at the ut-
most, hypothetical ones.
Power of Judgment
The will, then, goes beyond the sphere of values, assuming the role
of a cognitive power of judgment;10 it does so when it receives
products of the cognitive work carried out by the intellect. Reception
here is not passive on part of the will; it occurs while a certain shaping
is taking place. The results of the cognitive work possess a certain
degree of probability, lower than one (namely, lower than a hundred
percent). This statement is true at least regarding the products which
interest the will. As a power of judgment the will has to determine a
threshold-degree of probability, above which it is going to confirm the
products of understanding as a situation-picture fit to guide activity;
results whose degree of probability falls below the threshold may, for
example, lead to an instruction for the intellect to continue working on
the same task.
The need to serve practical decision-making (including the
decision whether already to decide a practical question) prompts the
power of judgment to divide the cognitive results of the intellect's
work into three groups: (1) the “yes” and “almost certain” group; (2)
the “no” and “unreasonable” group, and in-between, (3) the “perhaps”
group. If it would not have to serve decision-making, the power of
judgment would divide the possible judgments on the situation-picture
painted by the intellect into more than three groups; for instance, it
would leave room for an additional group between the “yes” and
“perhaps” groups (when required, a person indeed does so, but in a
less skilled manner).
The height of the “yes” group threshold (granted confirmation by
the power of judgment) i.e., the border between this and the “perhaps”
group, is determined by the degree of risk attached to the deliberated
deed, as well as by the amount of resources it demands: The greater
the risk, the higher the degree of probability required from proposi-
tions concerning facts.
Assembling the beliefs in three groups creates something like gaps
in the continuity of degrees of belief. When the intellect's considera-
tions in favor of a certain conceptual situation-picture accumulate and
rise a little above the threshold, a person tends to feel over-confident in
the accuracy of this situation-picture. Increased confidence helps him
to act decisively and energetically, notwithstanding the presence of
uncertainty.
One should notice that the very pondering the intellect always
tends to pursue, entails the sacrifice of resources. As human resources
are limited, it is open to question whether one should allocate addi-
tional strength and time to gain information which might merely con-
The Will 31
firm once again what was already assumed, or whether the risk of ac-
tion is not great, and one should act on the grounds of the information
already achieved. The fear to miss a chance may at times also induce a
lowering of the confidence threshold.
On the other hand, the classification of some situation-picture in
the “perhaps” group, i.e., the group of doubtful cases, may involve
under-confidence: a lower degree of confidence (or subjective
certainty) than justified by the reasons (or objective certainty). This
will occur when, for example, the reasons favoring the situation-
picture justify a level of certainty but slightly beneath the required
threshold.11
Spinoza, in one of his letters interpreting Descartes, confronts the
claim, that as the source of error is the will's expansion over a much
larger area than that of the intellect (or the understanding), this expan-
sion constitutes a flaw or fault in human personality-structure. He
says:
As to your second difficulty, I say with Descartes, that if we can-
not extend our will beyond the bounds of our extremely limited un-
derstanding, we shall be most wretched — it will not be in our power
to eat even a crust of bread, or to walk a step, or to go on living, for all
things are uncertain and full of peril.12
Should man inquire profoundly into the composition of a slice of
bread in front of him and into its qualities, and refrain from eating it
before he achieves complete certainty, he would be miserable; to avoid
this, the will adds a supplement to the degree of established confidence
in the proposition that this slice of bread is edible, or reduces it by a
deduction of confidence. It creates a gap between the entirely doubtful
and the nearly certain.
The intellect's tendency in its cognitive work is not congruent with
the will's pragmatic tendency in its role as a cognitive power of judg-
ment. Spinoza's correspondent considered this non-congruence a flaw
in personality-structure, because he adopted the intellect's viewpoint.
The same is true for the phrase “bad calibration” (discalibration),
which designates non-congruence between the degree of confidence
and probability. From the will's vantagepoint, the prevailing
calibration is good.
In the sphere of the intellect, the proceedings leading to the result
of its work are generally conscious as well as the results themselves,
because the intellect is being supervised by the will. In other words:
The intellect's broad unfolding in the field of awareness comes to fa-
cilitate its supervision by the will. In the sphere of the will, however,
its decisions are frequently conscious, while the ways by which it ar-
rives at these do not unfold in consciousness. In such cases, a person
knows what he or she wants, but not why. Procedures of the will are
conscious but to a limited extent, because the will is not subject to
supervision. Being itself a supervisor, the will is from the outset not
designed to be supervised. This is especially valid when the will serves
as a cognitive power of judgment. As the process by which the will,
serving as a power of judgment, determines the degree of confidence is
not conscious, procedures that enhance confidence (or in other cases
reduce it) take sometimes place, even though the matter in hand is not
practical, does not require decision-making, and therefore lacks the
necessity to divide into three (in order to decide “yes” or “no” or to
postpone decision).
When the probability of a proposition, dealing with facts based on
already gained information, is close to 50%, and the time events allow
a person in order to decide is short, the latter has no choice but to de-
cide whether to act in a certain way or to avoid action by gambling.
For instance, we need two objects out of three available ones in order
to execute a certain task. If for the time being we fail to see which are
better suited and which less, there are two ways open to us: to devote
additional time to learn their properties, or to choose two irrespectively
of their suitability, according to some other criterion that may be
utterly irrelevant (like throwing a coin or dice); what is required of this
criterion is for its application not to consume a great deal of time and
that the results of this application be clear and unequivocal. This kind
of will also appears in “larger letters,” to use Plato's allegory,13
(sometimes excessively large) in the social arena. Jonathan Swift de-
scribes it in the method of appointing ministers in Lilliput: There are
numerous suitable candidates and they are asked to dance on a tight-
rope; the few that succeed assume the coveted position. The applica-
tion is not time consuming, it amuses the audience and what matters
most, the result is unequivocal: whoever falls off is rejected.
Gambling is a craft in which the will reveals its arbitrariness,
namely, its independence. However, people may shroud the arbitrari-
ness of their choices post-factum in a sheath of rationality, and deny
the irrelevancy of the criteria they employed.
Self-Deception
In the common case, then, the will relies on the intellect, though
rounding off the degree of verification in this or that direction. In pre-
sumably less common cases the will acts independently, namely,
gambles. It is, however, also possible that there are cases in which the
will dictates the results of the intellect's work, i.e., these paradoxical
cases in which a person deceives him/herself. Obviously, the phrase
The Will 33
“self-deception” should not be taken literally. In other words, the as-

sumption that the deceiver and the deceived are fully identical is
meaningless. It is therefore requisite to assume that one section of a
personality impinges upon another section of the same personality in a
manner corresponding to deception.14
It seems that self-deception should be understood solely as a case
in which the will “deceives” the intellect . It is not, however, to be seen
as if the will knew the truth and hid it from the intellect — as is the
case with real deception (when a person deceives someone else). The
matter goes this way: The will determines a belief without permitting
the intellect to examine the issue. It charges the intellect with the task
to find arguments in favor of this belief, thus casting it in the role of an
attorney bound to defend and not to judge his client — at the same
time trying to appear convinced of what he is out to convince others.
Yet, in contradistinction to the metaphorical client, the will does not
know the truth either, nor is it interested in this case to correct its
ignorance. If the truth corresponds to the will's verdict, well enough —
if it does not, alas for the truth. The will adjudicates here with the aim
to prevent conflicts within the personal value-system, paying but little
attention to knowledge. A married man may, for instance, ask his
intellect for evidence that his spouse does not betray him, and the wife
may request evidence that her spouse does not betray her.15 The fox's
will orders evidence from its intellect that the grapes are sour, and
therefore avoiding the vineyard will saved him unnecessary effort and
risk. The intellect in itself, namely according to its own inclination, is
impartial and does not presuppose something that needs to be proven.
If the Freudian claim about repression is right, then in our terms
something like the following could take place: a person's will decides
that its owner harbors no forbidden wish; it shifts attention away from
topics and contexts conducive to the explicit arousal of this wish; if the
latter nevertheless sneaks into the area of attention, the will orders the
intellect to explain it away — to deny in a reasoned and rational
manner that the forbidden wish exists. If the will succeeds in this en-
deavor, it saves itself conflicts; if it fails, it may increase them and the
suffering they entail. In this case, the will “deceives” the intellect's
reflection about motivative values.
Yet, in a certain sense the will, while “deceiving” its owner, is
aware of the truth — thus justifying the metaphor. The will knows
(i.e., operates on the basis of this assumption) that if the truth is such
and such, and if we were aware of it, distress would follow. As afore-
said, the will does not know that this is, in fact, the truth, and it pre-
vents its owner from examining the matter impartially. If the decision-
making process were conscious, the will would not be able to hide
anything and the metaphor, which implies hiding, would not present
itself. We may come closer to the truth by saying that something hides
within the will, than by saying that the will hides something. In an
entirely different sense and with less justification we could perhaps
say, that sometimes the will itself “is deceived” by subordinate factors,
when these evade the supervision it exercises over them. We shall
return to this matter further on (in the second and the third part).
If matters, indeed, stand as proposed here, it is doubtful whether
the saying that a person is owner of his or her will fits the relationship
between the will and other personality-components.
There are elements in the human personality whose action can be
commanded by the will: the intellect, observation and the motor-sys-
tem. There are other elements the will cannot command but may influ-
ence. Emotion is among the latter. The will influences emotion in two
ways.
First — the will can determine which emotion a person is going to
experience — by determining a belief concerning facts that arouse an
emotional reaction. I decide, for instance, that so and so presumably
did a certain deed. The decision is taken in the light of a certain find-
ing by the intellect, and this in its turn arouses my emotional reaction
according to the nature of the deed in question. In this case, the will
did not influence the manner of my emotional reaction. The will drew
the stimulant for my emotional reaction either from a cognitive ten-
dency (and the reaction emerged as a marginal result of the will's ac-
tion), or from the tendency to arouse such a reaction.
Emotion is subject to the will's influence in an additional (second)
manner — when the latter determines and establishes one of the values
created by reason; this value plays its part in the application and the
creation of guiding-lines, striking root in the human being and induc-
ing change in the manner of emotional reaction — so that realization
of the new value will involve joy, and its non-realization sorrow.
The will influences the location of emotion within the individual
value-system, in particular through its influence on the power of the
motive that involves emotion commands. An aspiration involving any
kind of emotion is placed in the order of priorities shaped by the will,
and this placement influences the status of the emotion at issue.
The Denial of the Will
Most of the 20th century philosophical and psychological literature

took pains to describe the human mind without the aid of the word
“will” and its derivatives. Gilbert Ryle voiced the prevailing trend. In
The Will 35
general, the will was only discussed within a special section of dis-
course, namely the traditional question concerning necessity and free
will. The mind with no will — as it appears in psychology and phi-
losophy — is intellectual; it consists of the intellect and its offshoots
(offshoots like observation, emotion or decision-making). The mind is
a sophisticated computer with an addition of an emotional ornament.
However, the question arises who operates the computer or who uses
it, what kind of capacities it has are employed and to what ends. And
indeed, psychology senses that a work-place is created within the
mind-mechanisms it describes; this work-place seems for the time
being to employ “little people,” homunculi, residing within the human
being: they press a button, activate a mechanism of sensory absorption
or of some intellectual activity, receive the requested message, stop the
operation and press a button in order to start another activity. And until
the will is restored to its place, its substitutes will never be out of a job.
The more psychology perfects its description of the mind as a system
of mechanisms, the less the burden imposed upon the homunculi —
but it is far from being removed from their small shoulders.
When one psychologist (A) charges another psychologist (B) with
having illegally employed a homunculus in his enterprise, the accusa-
tion has to be examined from three angles: If psychologist A means
that various mechanisms, like sensory perception, cognition or moti-
vation, should be fully automatic and in no need of a guiding hand —
then A is mistaken, because the models psychology designs need not
be more sophisticated than human mind as it actually is — and the
mind stands in need of the will. If, however, psychologist A wishes to
say that the homunculus works too hard for B, or that the latter em-
ploys too many homunculi — i.e., the machinery in B's enterprise is
not up-to-date and a better alternative is available — then A has a case.
The third viewpoint concerns substitution of the will: for as long as the
will is not in the picture, there is an empty space, recognizable by what
fills it up, which is but a temporary replacement.
There is room here for the question whether the sight of homunculi
speeding along the corridors of the mind bears evidence to these two
factors alone — inadequacy of the mechanism (and therefore much
work in operating it), and mainly, absence of the will — or whether it
demonstrates the discrepancy in self-knowledge between the mind as it
is known by itself as an object and the real mind that knows itself — a
discrepancy the human mind cannot eradicate.
Popular thought and its idioms of everyday speech employ the
word “will” and its derivatives in order to describe phenomena that
cannot be properly described in other terms. The phenomenological
approach in axiology has to acknowledge these phenomena, to
describe the full span of their specificity and avoid reducing and
limiting them to activities of the intellect.
To consider judgment in general, including cognitive judgment, as
an activity of the will is a Cartesian view. In an argument against it,
the word “to believe” and its derivatives (“belief” etc.) are more
congenial than the word “to judge” and its derivatives. Judgment
appears as active, believing as passive. Adjudication shapes the
substance of discussion while believing appears as an act of accepting
the intellect's products, the acquiescence in their being as they are and
not different. The category “judgment” is therefore congenial to a
Cartesian position, while the category “belief” is congenial to an
intellectualist position. We will then employ the word “to believe” in
formulating a claim against the position proposed here. Can I decide to
believe from now on something different from what I believed up to
now, and can I implement this decision.16 Can I decide to change my
belief in a matter of facts — for instance, decide that it is night, even
though I see daylight, and can I implement this decision (i.e., begin
believing something opposed to what I actually believe now); these
rhetorical questions apparently demonstrate that belief is not subject to
the will. However, usually a person does not want to believe but what
the intellect (which relies on observation) bears witness to. The will as
an adjudicating power usually but processes the intellect's products,
orders supplements from the intellect and sometimes even urges it on.
The aim of processing is to serve decision-making. That is to say, that
the will is not inclined to disown the intellect, but to harness it. The ex-
periment suggested by the instruction to believe it is night while you
actually see daylight, does not show but that the will is not free to turn
itself into an object of experiments or games (irrespectively of whether
it is free or not in other aspects).
Chapter 3
Value Properties and their Bearers
Neutral Knowledge or Pure Cognitive Content
Should we describe the mathematical proportions between the

parts of a cake and name the parts in reference to who receives them,
we would arrive at a neutral description. Neutral will also be such a
description of a distribution of bread among hungry people. As neither
the recipients of the helpings, nor the person who describes the matter,
nor those who listen to the description or read it are (usually) indiffer-
ent with regard to this proportion, they will value it for better or for
worse. That is to say, they are not neutral in relation to this state of
affairs, thus making it difficult to claim that the latter is itself neutral in
relation to them. If this state of affairs is not fictitious, it would also be
hard to claim that the fact in which it was realized, what we described
by way of mathematics, is neutral. If I oppose a certain state of affairs,
is the latter neutral in relation to me? And if it is not neutral, then no
content and no state of affairs, which are valued for better or for
worse, seem to be neutral from the outset.
This problem has to be clarified in the following manner. Only the
description and the explanation may be fully neutral; the object, or the
objective situation, or the state of affairs, are not neutral but in the
sense that it is possible to report and explain them neutrally; they are
neutral only as far as they can be covered by a neutral report.
Here another question could arise. Valuation itself and the adher-
ence to values can be reported neutrally, namely at the meta-valuative
level. It follows that any thought-content may be reported neutrally,
and therefore the division between neutral and valuative is annulled. I
will be challenged that I passed from altogether non-neutral sphere of
reality into the sphere of thinking, where any content could be neutral;
a division between neutral and non-neutral does not prevail within one
of this spheres.
To defend ourselves against this challenge we have to qualify the
aforesaid in the following manner: Content is neutral if, and as far as it
is possible to transmit it by a neutral report on its own intentional level.
The proportion between the parts of the cake and the proportion
between the powers of their recipients, as well as the relation between
these, can be fully covered by a neutral report, and in this sense, we
will call them “neutral.” To this end, there is no need to reflect upon
the report. Our valuative response to these proportions cannot be
transmitted neutrally on its own intentional level but only by reflection
upon it, or better, upon its form, and we will therefore call it “non-
neutral.”
The distinction between levels of intention is not made ad-hoc, in
order to defend the distinction between what is valuative and what is
value-neutral. Reflection upon a certain thought has an object which is
different from the object of this thought; the reflection dwells upon the
ways of this thought and its patterns and not upon its object. In other
words: The reflection aims at the form of the original intention; it is
not a continuation of the original intention, because it aims at a differ-
ent object. The reflective is not a continuation of the transitive.
A neutral content is not always cognitive (for instance, in art the
content may be value-neutral without being cognitive). On the other
hand, knowledge is not always neutral. We call “cognitive” only the
neutral part of knowledge.
Mixed Values and Pure Values
A value is mixed when besides the valuative element it also con-

tains a cognitive element. The manner in which these elements are
integrated differs according to the nature of the valuative element. For
example, a goal that a person establishes for him/herself, is a value that
usually contains a reasoned supposition that this goal is achievable.
This supposition is a cognitive element; it is neutral in the sense that
another person, who is indifferent to this goal, may judge, whether it is
achievable according to his own knowledge, and his judgment may be
Value Properties and their Bearers 39
better than that of the person who established the goal. (Let us repeat:
In some other sense this element of knowledge is not neutral — i.e.,
the value-system does not consider it neutral, nor is the person who
establishes the goal indifferent with regard to this element). Obviously,
the goal also contains approval of its achievement, i.e., a purely
valuative factor, thus making it a mixed value.
As an example of a pure value, one may offer the wish, which
could embody the pleasure-principle in its opposition to the reality-
principle (within the system of Freudian concepts).
What a Value-Property Is
A value-property is the embodiment of a valuation by the valued

object, namely, an objectified valuation; one may, however, look at
any valuation the other way round, namely, as recognition of a value-
property, or as its subjective reconstruction, i.e., a subjectified value-
reality. In both cases, we observe the itinerary between subject and
object, once in this direction and once in the other.
Let us take a few examples of value-properties. A deed involving
pleasure: the value-property of this deed is its being pleasurable (as
mentioned above, deeds belong among objects). The property of a
tasty dish is to arouse a feeling of tastiness in certain humans. The
sympathy I feel for a certain person represents his or her value-
property to be likeable in my eyes. A woman's beauty is her value-
property. The justice realized in a personal deed is the value-property
of this deed.
The content of a value-property is not fully identical with its
matching valuation. If we take the elementary valuation, pleasure, and
compare it with the value-property of a commodity, we will find that
some entirely equal units of this commodity, namely, equal also in
their value-properties, afford pleasure of varying quality and degree to
a person aware of his feelings, who consumes them one by one. Let us
say that he is offered five units of a fruit he has never tasted before and
senses the full taste only while eating the second unit — yet the fifth
unit will already be less tasty than the fourth, so that each unit will
have a different taste. This person ate the fruit units, which were ar-
ranged in a row, from right to left. Had he eaten them in opposite or-
der, the first unit on the left would have had the taste that the first unit
on the right actually had. That is to say that the feeling valuation of the
fruit differs regarding different units, while their value-properties are
identical; valuation changes in the course of consumption, while the
value-property remains constant. In the course of objectification a
number of subjective factors, bound up with the state of the individual

at a certain moment, are omitted. In other words: These factors are
added in the course of subjectification.
Intellectual, i.e., conceptual valuation bridges this gap, because it
is conscious of the route it passes when it creates the idea of a value-
property; it also reflects about its own procedure, no matter whether
this reflection interprets the procedure objectively or subjectively.
The manner in which the value-property relates to motive resem-
bles the manner in which it relates to valuation. The value-property
may also be an appeal the object aims at us by its very presence, thus
arousing the motivative value in us. That is to say, the value-property,
which is an appeal, is somewhat close to a motive that is the arousal of
a motivative value. But from another angle there is a difference: the
wish to receive an additional unit of fruit changes considerably and
loses power within the same individual in the course of eating; accord-
ingly the readiness to make some sacrifice for the sake of an additional
unit, decreases. This means that motive, like valuation, contains a host
of transient individual factors, which are not components of the value-
property.
In a single, isolated try-out, a person going through it does not yet
experience the difference between a value-property and valuation, nor
the difference between the former and a motive. The value-property, or
the idea the subject has of it, crystallizes only in the course of several
try-outs. The intellectual activity contributing to this crystallization is
accompanied by reflection; as mentioned above, this reflection distin-
guishes between the subject, which includes valuation and motive, and
the object, which includes the value-property.
We accord a value-property the predicates of a value; namely, it is
positive or negative, full or empty, pure or mixed.
To sum up, a value-property is a relational property of an object,
brought into being by the relation between this object and an individ-
ual subject, and identical in its content with the core of valuation. The
difference between a value-property and valuation resides in their
manner of existence: the property belongs to the character of its owner,
it is a component of the world, while valuation is an activity of the
subject.
Everyday speech does not make axiological distinctions and at-
taches the word “value” to a variety of matters. When saying “the
value of” something, the speakers either point to a value-property of
the thing, or to its exchange-value (which we will discuss in part III).
In this manner, one should interpret that “this thing has value” and that
the thing “is valuable.” However, if one speaks about “the values of” a
certain person, it denotes the values that guide this person's valuations.
The manner of speech we also employed about “adherence to val-

ues” ties-in with the usage “the values of” somebody (if a person ad-
heres to a value, the value belongs to him or her).
In contradistinction to a motivative value, a valuative value is truly
neither a possession nor a part, and thus does not belong in any precise
meaning to anyone or anything (a motivative value belongs to a person
in a similar sense that his arm or his emotion belong to him).
Value and the Value-Measuring Instrument
It is sometimes said that a value is a measure, which seems perhaps

to be the same as a measuring-instrument. Words like “standard” or
“norm” are also used in explaining the concept of value without
paying due attention to the difference between a measure, for example
a yard or a meter, and a measuring instrument, e.g. a yardstick upon
which centimeters, meters, inches and yards are marked by notches.
The yardstick could be made of wood and could break and this does
not apply to the yard as a measure. A measure is a general notion,
whereas a measuring instrument is an individual object. What I want to
emphasize is that the valuative value is a measure and not a measuring
instrument. Some single valued object may serve as a measuring
instrument to which other objects are compared with regard to “their
value” or more precisely, from the angle of the value-property in ques-
tion. That is to say, the specific value-property of each among the
other objects possessing the property in question, is compared to the
specific value-property of the sample-object we chose as a measuring
instrument. For instance, a judicial precedent is a measuring instru-
ment similar cases are compared to. The saliently quantitative aspect
of the role played by the measuring instrument may surface here in the
degree of punitive severity. The value represented by this measuring
instrument is the law.
The value-measuring instrument is a tool to test whether the valued
object matches the valuative value. The difficulty in measuring this, or
the imprecision involved, arise from the fact that value-properties are
often not given immediately, but derived from valuation by omitting
some of their subjective features.
Regarding motivative values, we can envision two kinds of meas-
urement. One is value-measurement, carried out by reflection that
seeks to value motives and does so by comparing them; at the root of
this measurement lie special values, designed to value motives. The
other measurement is carried out by reflection that seeks neutral
knowledge of the relative power the various motives have.
The Value-Bearer
We will now examine the notion of value-bearer. A value-bearer is

a property or a structure of the object that accompanies the value-prop-
erty; precision would oblige us to speak of a “value-property bearer.”
It is, however, accepted usage to say that an object “has value” instead
saying that it has a value-property; thus we may choose the shorter and
more convenient phrase in this case, and say “value-bearer” instead of
“value-property bearer” — provided we remember the imprecision in-
volved.
The value-bearer differs from the value-property in that it is value-
neutral; it is neutral in the sense that it does not depend upon the
subject's stand for or against it and we know it through value-neutral
knowledge.
The good taste of a dish is a value-property, borne by the chemical
composition of the dish, which is described by a chemical formula.
The property of water to quench thirst is a full and positive value-
property, given to perception and mixed (like other value-properties of
sensory/feeling substance); the bearer of this property are H2O mole-
cules in liquid condition, mixed with some salts (because distilled
water barely quenches thirst).
Value-properties received by the senses (like tasty or refreshing)
are mixed, namely, they are mixed with elements of information which
may be treated as value-neutral, or they contain these elements. The
intellect as it were, extracts these elements, compares and processes
them, turning them into the point of departure for a procedure that
ends with the physico-chemical description, i.e., it ends with the value-
bearer. The value-bearer is achieved only at a late stage in the
conceptual interpretation of the sensory given.
The question arises whether every value-property has a specific
bearer and in consequence, if we could split the former into two value-
properties, we could also split the value-bearer in a parallel manner.
Max Scheler says: “We know of a stage in the grasping of values
wherein the value of an object is already very clearly and evidentially
given apart from the givenness of the bearer of the value. Thus, for
example, a man can be distressing and repugnant, agreeable, or sympa-
thetic to us without our being able to indicate how this comes about; in
like manner we can for the longest time consider a poem or another
work of art 'beautiful' or 'ugly', 'distinguished' or 'common', without
knowing in the least which properties of the contents of the work
prompt this. … In such cases the extent to which values (in our terms
'value-properties' - M.S.) are, in their being, independent of their

bearer clearly reveals itself.” 17
What is it in the appearance of a person that makes him/her like-
able? I will not always be able to answer this question, but it concerns
a value-bearer. Whoever holds the opinion that every value-property
has a bearer — we name this opinion “correlation-thesis” — will tell
me: Even though you cannot isolate and pin down the factors of the
likeability-bearer now, this bearer exists. The way to find it begins by
discounting the salient element of value within the value-property: we
must ignore the likeability of this likeable face and describe it in ex-
haustive detail, so that finally we will be able to say that this and that
geometrical arrangement of color patches results in a likeable face (for
a certain person or for whoever belongs to a certain kind of human
beings). The same holds for the question what makes an object curi-
ous, mysterious, beautiful, trust-inspiring, etc.18
However, this thesis arouses doubt whether anything will be left in
every case, once the salient value element of the value-property has
been discounted. What argument supports this assumption, apart from
the fact that in many cases one can find the value-bearer?
The correlation-thesis disciple replies thus: The value-property is a
relation and needs the related entities, because there is no relation
which is not borne by its bearers; one of the value-relation bearers is
the subject, so that the second bearer has to reside with the object, and
therefore this is the value-bearer.
Let us examine this argument. Obviously, the very metaphor of a
value-bearer invites such reasoning. This metaphor also fits scientific
commonsense, or the surface that reveals itself to critical reflection,
once the mixture of knowledge and values (most of it) has been re-
moved. At this stage, we arrive at a picture whose value-neutral ele-
ment is fundamental and independent of the subject, while only the
value-element is relational. The value appears as a bridge and the
value-neutral element as a river-bank, i.e., as the one linked to the
subject's opposite bank by the value-bridge. As long as we find value-
bearers, this picture is conveniently workable. One has, however, to
examine its verity.
The correlation-thesis and the philosophy surrounding it would be
correct, if the object of science were the thing in itself, namely, if it did
not carry the contributions of sensory observation and the intellect,
which cannot be removed without annulling the object. As these con-
tributions exist, the object of a value-neutral description is a relational
(and not fundamental) entity as well, possessing no ontological
advantage over the value-property. One should also say that both are
phenomena, and the same thing may possess a value-phenomenon and
a neutral phenomenon, as well as it may appear only in one of these

two modes.
In support of the correlation-thesis one could argue, that viewing
the difference between a value-property and the value-bearer as
entirely subjective, amounts to an excessively subjectivist treatment of
the latter, as the value-bearer is not a pure cognitive idea, but what is
aimed at by means of that idea or what is intended by it. I admit that
the value-bearer is not really an idea (a notion or a picture), but what is
being imagined. However, this consideration also holds with regard to
the value-property, which is not identical with valuation, but is in-
tended by it. If you demand that by “what is aimed at,” or “intended”
we specify a fundamental entity, then we intend the same thing, the
same entity, in valuation as well as in cognition. If, however, you state
that “what is intended” should specify something concrete (as
distinguished from the fundamental, which cannot be characterized),
then the value-bearer contains subjective contributions.
In consequence, the value-bearer has no ontological advantage
over the value-property, and there is no guarantee that every value-
property has a bearer.
A value-bearer will have the same value-property as long as the
subject does not change; the value-bearer will have varying value-
properties for different people, according to their difference in
character.
The fact that apparently value-properties, attributed by different
people to a certain object, differ more from each other than neutral
properties attributed to the same by the different people, is not incom-
patible with the proposition that both are of relational character. It is
possible that (a) one relation is more sensitive to differences between
single individuals than the other. It is also possible (b), as Clarence
Irving Lewis says,19 that value differences matter more to people than
pure cognitive differences, and are therefore more emphasized. If so,
then it is also possible that (c) there is a connection between the two
possibilities (a and b), i.e., that owing to the importance of these dif-
ferences, we do not only emphasize them, but are more sensitive to
them and grasp them more firmly from the outset.
Distinctive Marks
It is not always easy to determine the borderline between value-

properties and value-bearers. The taste of a dish will nearly always
carry a value-charge, and has therefore to be considered a value-prop-

erty. The same goes for smell. With regard to touch as well as hearing
and sight on the other hand, we may be able to point at qualities we are
indifferent to, even though they do not appear in an isolated state.
What is perceived by the senses has therefore usually some valuative
character; the cognitive interest takes it as a point of departure, from
which it develops the notions concerning the value-bearer; having de-
veloped these notions, the cognitive interest views either what is ab-
sorbed by the senses or the value-property as a distinctive mark of the
value-bearer's presence. For instance, someone has an aching tooth;
this value-property may distinctively mark the damage suffered by the
tooth.
However, the value-bearer may also serve as a distinctive
characteristic of the value-property, primarily in the public domain.
Two people whose values differ will require neutral distinctive marks
in order to proceed to mutual understanding in the sphere of values.
When one of them, for instance, talks about a just society, the other
will ask for distinctive marks; he is obviously neither interested in
praise of the just regime nor in its description in terms of values, but in
a description in neutral terms. It is also possible that one of them tells
about a tasty dish and the other, belonging to a different culture, will
ask for distinctive marks in terms of the taste-bearers. The distinctive
mark serves as a means for identification.
A satisfactory list of a value-property's distinctive marks may func-
tion as its definition. As it is in general possible to exchange the de-
finiendum with the definiens (without altering the meaning of what is
said), it seems possible to exchange valuations of objects with their
scientific description wherever constant value-bearers exist, and to
carry out a quasi reduction of the desirable to the existent.
Let us take an example. I wish to learn the distinctive marks of
good writing-paper; I find that it is thick and silky; I even state its
thickness and silkiness quantitatively. I have, therefore, a definition,
and from here onwards the question whether a certain paper is good
writing-paper addresses neutral facts; the sentence “this is good writ-
ing-paper” will from now on be true or false in the same sense that a
scientific text is true or false. On the face of it, a reduction from the
sphere of values to the sphere of science has taken place.
Nevertheless, this consideration ignores a substantial item: The
definition of “good writing-paper” does not convey the full meaning of
this phrase, because it does not re-state the preference, or the value-
character represented by the word “good.” The translation into terms
of value-bearers is therefore not an exhaustive translation.
The issue can also be examined from the following point of view:
The definition provided for good writing-paper is not a nominal defi-
nition, because it is not arbitrary; I do not decide to call a certain writ-
ing-paper “good writing-paper”; I find that I prefer a certain writing-
paper and I describe this paper in neutral terms, but not my preference
for it. Yet, preference is a mode of valuation.
The Value-Proposition
There are two kinds of value-proposition: a) The value-

constituting proposition, which creates and establishes the value (or,
from an objectivist point of view, creates a value-notion and
acknowledges the value). b) The valuative proposition, namely the
proposition that applies the value.
Not every value is constituted, as there are values which are given
to us by means of emotional and feeling valuation. However, we con-
stitute the values that are not given to us by means of propositions
expressed in sentences. Constitution includes the conceptual creation
and the establishment through judgment, and it is not necessary that
the former be accomplished before the latter; on the contrary, it is ap-
parently more frequent for creation and establishment to be inter-
woven. The value being created functions in the process of its creation
as a syntactical subject explained by predicates. The created value is
made up by the predicates that are ascribed to it and (before it is estab-
lished and acquires its emotional charge) it is but the sum of these. We
may begin to create the notion of justice by thinking the proposition
that justice is the proper method to distribute an object possessing a
value-property among people (distribution of roles or goods,
obligations or rights), and go on to make terms by which we arrive at a
certain recommended shape of the distribution method. The better we
succeed in defending the notion of justice we have shaped against a
greater number of doubts, the more strength it will gather, i.e., it will
be established in its place. The predicates attributed to the value-notion
and accumulated within it, are at least partially themselves value-
notions.
The faculty of reason of the individual is the value-creating agency
— be it original in its endeavor or reconstructing in its own way the
creative work of other individuals.
The valuative proposition is either an application of a constituted
value, or the posterior expression of a feeling or emotional valuation.
Such an expression is a conceptual elaboration of a given valuation.
Both kinds of value-proposition frequently contain a pure cogni-

tive component. In a value-constituting proposition this component
may be embedded in the value itself, thus making it a mixed value,
like a goal or a duty. In a valuative proposition, the purely cognitive
element may be the value-bearer, functioning as a distinctive mark of
value-quality.
When my friend asks “do you also believe this is good writing pa-
per,” he may aim at the purely cognitive aspect, namely, “do you also
believe that this is thick and silky paper”; he may, however, aim at the
value-component, namely, “do you also prefer thick and silky paper to
any other?” In an actual situation, I will usually know what he means.
I hear two people arguing whether Reuben Ben-Simon is economi-
cal or stingy, and what I hear does not permit me to determine the
relation between the cognitive and the valuative elements in their ar-
gument. It is possible that they only differ with regard to facts or only
with regard to values — the latter if the value-bearer of stinginess ac-
cording to one opinion is also the value-bearer of economy according
to his correspondent's values. (Theoretically they may not differ at all
— if the value-bearer is not the same, i.e., what the one condemns is
not exactly what the other praises; however, this fact will presumably
surface by itself if their argument is to the point). The difficulty in
separating the components of such valuations is that we have no third,
neutral word to designate the characteristic of a person who tends to
spend only a small part of his or her income, to wit,, we have no name
for the value-bearer.
Content and Form in a proposition
Not every sentence that comprises value-words (like “good” or

“bad,” “tasty” or “not tasty”) expresses a value-proposition. A value-
proposition is a proposition in which the intention aims at the valuative
and not at the cognitive element (which is not always present in a
value-proposition), while a cognitive proposition is that in which the
intention is directed at the cognitive and not at the valuative element
(which will not always be present in a cognitive proposition). When a
proposition incorporates an element at which the intention of the per-
son who maintains this proposition does not aim, this element func-
tions as an accompanying factor, namely, as background or
framework, as an auxiliary means, as a mediating factor between the
subject and the intention's object — namely, it functions as the form of
the intention. In a value-proposition, the valuative element is the
intentional content, while the cognitive element belongs to the form of

the intention; the opposite holds for a cognitive-proposition.
Let us take an example. A child watching a movie asks whether
one of the protagonists belongs to the good guys or the bad guys. From
what the child says throughout the movie and at the end there is no
doubt that it seeks information, knowledge of facts, in order to
understand the sequence of events — for instance, whom this protago-
nist wishes to assist by his deeds. The circumstance that facts and
events of the movie belong to an imagined reality does not alter the
nature of the child's interest, which is cognitive; the question whether
that person belongs to the good guys or the bad guys w as not a request
for assistance in determining a position with regard to the protagonists,
but a request for assistance in the reconstruction of images and plot.
The answer to the question will therefore not be taken as a valuative
but as a cognitive proposition in which values belong exclusively to
form. Here value-qualities function as distinctive marks that show who
belongs to this or that warring party.
When we have no convenient and value-neutral terminology at our
disposal (as we have no third term in relation to “miser” and “frugal
person” or no other names for the good and the bad in a movie), we
will have to draw on valuative words, even if the discussion is not
aimed at valuation.
The Demand that Cognition Precede Valuation
It has been demanded that an object be known before it is valued;

that a perceptual and conceptual idea be created before one assumes a
position with regard to an object. Descartes, for instance, presents this
demand when he infers from his analysis that one should permit the
intellect to accomplish its task before the will passes judgment, as long
as the inquiry seeks the truth (and not a supposition needed for a deed).
And indeed, the intrinsic logic of this demand is clear. Nevertheless, I
do not believe that we, namely human beings, are made in a way that
enables us to meet this demand — in any case, to meet it as it is
presented. The sensory given is not value-neutral; what we absorb
pleases or causes pain, befriends or confounds us. If the sensory given
were neutral we could, indeed, meet the demand that cognition precede
valuation. And not only is the actually given not neutral, but further-
more: The points of departure for cognitive thought and value-thought
are inextricably entwined; on the level of sense-perception it is impos-
sible to separate the value-element completely from the neutral infor-
mative element; the separation is only achieved through abstraction by
means of conceptions (moreover: having made the abstract distinction

we will not always be able to determine the correlation between one
quality and another, between a value-quality and its bearer).
One could also rearrange this demand by division into three in-
stead of two: First one should imagine and understand possible entities
and only afterwards judge the matter of their existence or non-exis-
tence and whether they are good or bad. According to such a demand,
pure thought-content comes first while the two later offshoots, cogni-
tion and valuation, are not interdependent, and their order of appear-
ance is therefore of no account. This demand is also violated by the
nature of the given.
Nevertheless, it is possible — though not in the comprehensive
course of thought — to meet some of these demands in certain sections
of the thinking process.
Value-Knowledge
The question arises whether there are erroneous valuation sen-

tences, which ascribe to a certain object value-properties it lacks. For
instance, the statement that a certain fruit I hold in my hand is tasty,
may be proved wrong. The supposition that certain value-properties
are interdependent in a specific case or in general, may also be proved
wrong. Against existing erroneous valuation sentences, there are cor-
rect valuation sentences, namely, value-knowledge.
In pre-Renaissance thought as well as in everyday thought up to
the present there is no boundary and no division between value-knowl-
edge and pure (i.e., neutral) cognition; science, as far as it detaches
itself from everyday thought, also detaches itself from value-knowl-
edge.
Chapter 4
The Valuative Value: Modes of its

Being
In this chapter, I discuss the subjective reality of the valuative value

and the feelings and emotions in which it is embedded.
From the aspect of its content, the valuative value does not belong
to reality, but faces it as a kind of mirror in which as it were reality can
observe itself. From the aspect of its form — the back of the mirror —
the valuative value includes real ties with the rest of reality and
therefore belongs to it: people adhere to a value, apply it and realize it;
however, a value appertains to reality not only at the final stage —
realization by its disciples — but already in the ways in which real
subjects adhere to it.
The presence of a value involves its location in valuation, and from
this angle we can distinguish five states, or five modes of being: the
first is crystallization, the other four are ways of diffusion by which
the value is implanted in valuations and in what is being valued.
a. Crystallization
The crystallized value does not only exist in its applications, the
valuations made according to this value, but also separately, as a con-
cept. Justice is crystallized in the concept of justice, namely in its
definition (or something like a definition), in the distinctive marks of
the objects which come under this heading (these marks may be value-
properties or their bearers), or in their expositions. True, different peo-
ple have different notions of justice or injustice, but these are but dif-
ferent answers to the same question human beings face, and all enjoy
the same status — each with regard to whoever adheres to it.
A value-concept may crystallize from a value in diffusion. It is
possible, for instance, that the word “just” or the word “unjust” were
used as syntactical predicates in valuation sentences before the word
“justice” began to function as a subject in value-constituting sentences.
The comparison of valuations serves as a point of departure and sup-
plies the matter from which the concept of justice is shaped.
Once the separate value has been constituted, its essential priority
reveals itself in the temporal precedence it takes over its applications:
the mind addresses the value before it addresses valuation.
b. Values Implied by Valuations
This is the state of a value that exists only in the valuations carried
out according to it, but these valuations exist as special, intentional
acts or procedures. Even though the value is scattered, or in a state of
diffusion, it is embedded in the intentional content, namely, it belongs
to what is meant. The valuations made in its light are either
predicative, or emotional, or feeling-valuation.
Predicative valuations discussed here are, for example, the use of
“just” or “unjust” before the concept of justice has been shaped in the
course of its function as a syntactical subject. We have already men-
tioned this usage, describing it as what functions subsequently as the
matter from which the concept of justice is fashioned. Here the mean-
ing of value-words is determined by paradigms, namely, examples that
constitute what is being exemplified. When a deed is said to be just
(before justice has been defined), another, already known deed, analo-
gous to the former, demonstrates what justice is. The analogy with
cases that have already acquired the status of just deeds replaces the
application of a concept (as long as the required concept does not ex-
ist).
The Valuative Value: Modes of its Being 53
It is likely that emotional valuations also serve as a source of con-

tent for the creation of value-concepts, but the manner of content
transmission from emotion to concept is rather obscure. It is probably
mediated by the predicative, diffuse value, i.e., by the influence emo-
tions exert upon the use of value-words.
As for feeling-valuations, even though they may be expressed on
the predicative level, they cannot feed the crystallization of concepts.
Someone, let us call him Reuben, says “this ice-cream is tasty,” thus
voicing a predicative feeling-valuation on a predicative level. It is ob-
vious that neither this valuation nor its expression represent the appli-
cation of a value-concept. And indeed, should we find the value-bearer
of what is tasty for Reuben in the form of a certain chemical formula,
this will be a cognitive concept of what is tasty for Reuben, but not a
value-concept. Even if Reuben himself adopts this concept, it will
neither replace the implied value nor function as a crystallized value.
Try to imagine what would happen if the chemical formula stood for
the crystallization of a value; let us assume that the chemical composi-
tion of some foodstuff appears in print on the package; Reuben would
peruse this and find the food tasty or not tasty in accordance with the
printed message. I admit that this message may influence what is felt
as taste, but basically it is not decisive (imagine that the label Reuben
relies upon was by mistake attached to a different product, and conduct
the inferred experiment in your imagination). The concept of a value-
bearer of what is tasty for Reuben belongs to the meta-valuative and
not the valuative level.
c. Values Implied by the Form of Valuation
Here we also treat of a value enclosed in valuations, but belonging

to their form and not to their content, while their content is an applica-
tion or a quasi-application of other values. For instance, a positive
emotional valuation I harbor with regard to someone may influence the
application of a conceptual value to the same person. As long as the
emotion exists only as a bias in my conceptual value-judgment, it
appertains to the form of valuation. That is to say that the application
of a value-concept may have an emotional form, or better, may have a
form that incorporates emotional factors.
d. Values Implied by the Form of Cognition
To show that the valuative element in a sentence may serve as the

form of the cognitive element, we drew on the example of the child
asking who belongs to the good or the bad in a movie. In this example
the valuative element served only as a kind of framework, but in other
cases the valuative form could shape the cognitive content, in
accordance with the latter's own tendency or opposing it. There is al-
ways a mixture or a compound of cognition and valuation in practical
thought, with one element functioning as content and the other as
form, and they are usually not opposed to each other; in practical
thought as a whole, cognition serves the valuative element, for in-
stance, knowledge about the nature of a certain substance serves the
aim of shaping a hunk of this substance in a certain way; this knowl-
edge is gained in order to serve this aim and its patterns are shaped
accordingly. The full subordination of the cognitive to the valuative
element prevents opposition between them in the practical sphere.
Here the shaping of cognition by valuation does not represent
distortion. Theoretical cognition, on the other hand, asks for
sovereignty; any influence of the valuative form upon the final
content-product will therefore equal distortion.
e. The Individual Value
The particular value-property of a single object is the embodiment

of an individual value. Usually it is the value-quality of one person for
another person, and we may also call it “personal value.” The value of
a father for his son may (at least in many cases) serve as an example of
an individual (or personal) value. It is possible that not only a human
being will serve as the object of an individual value.
The individual value is not separate from the valuation made ac-
cording to it, and the latter is embodied in a value-property of the ob-
ject it addresses. The value-property has no bearer; namely, the object
has no neutral property which can be considered as a bearer. If it had a
bearer, the bearer would also have to be peculiar to this object. You
might say: the peculiar combination of the object's neutral properties is
the bearer of the individual value. However, the whole point of the
value-bearer rests with the comparison from which it arises, i.e., the
correlation between value-property and neutral-property, whereas the
individual value leaves no room for the required comparison. So per-
haps you will argue: person A possesses individual value for person B,
and nobody else possesses this value for B, but person C has the same
value for person D and therefore comparisons can be made and a
bearer for this value can be found. For instance, everyone has only a
one father, but there is room for a comparison between A's attitude to
his father and C's attitude to his father. The answer is this: the proper
individual value bears the stamp of the valuing as well as the valued
person; as two people never have the same fingerprints, so two people
never make an individual valuation in the same manner, and there are
no two people who are valued in the same manner by individual valua-
tions.
Perhaps one could claim that the entire object is the bearer of the
individual value. But the object in the relevant cases is constituted by
its specific value-property; it is made-up by this property and therefore
cannot bear it.
The individual value exists simultaneously on the level of feeling,
emotion and conceptual thought, but on the conceptual level it is not
crystallized. It is enclosed in the sum total of relations between the
valuing person and the person being valued. These relations may be
reciprocal, so that each of two people will represent (or possess) an
individual value for the other — but these will not be one and the same
value.
An individual value par-excellence is not conditioned by the activi-
ties and the states of the value-owner. In this respect, individual values
differ in degree, but there are some that come at least close to, or even
achieve absolute independence of circumstances, i.e., of the object's
activity and state, let alone its other circumstances. That is to say that
when the individual value is positive, valuatively negative activities
will not cancel it.
An individual value has no name. At times, when the need arises, it
is addressed by the name of another, not individual value, to which it
is somewhat close. For instance, one will say that somebody “loves”
his father, yet to refer to the relation in this manner is but an analogy
(if, indeed, this father embodies an individual value). For the person
making the valuation the name of the object functions virtually as the
name of its value.
Having reviewed the ways in which a value exists, we will now
briefly examine the nature of pre-predicative levels, where the value
exists in diffusion.
Feelings of Pleasure and Pain, Pleasantness and

Unpleasantness
Pleasure and pain are the most elementary attitudes a person as-
sumes with regard to his or her environment, to his or her own activi-
ties and states, but these do not circumscribe all feeling attitudes; the
feeling of bad taste is not pain, anxiety is not pain, repulsion or disgust
regarding a certain sight or smell, or the grating of a certain voice or
sound are not pain either; nor would a person say that he enjoys
himself just because he feels comfortable; someone who feels compla-
cent (the opposite of anxious) would not say either that he enjoys the
feeling. In order to embrace the whole range of feeling-positions it is
therefore preferable to speak of pleasantness and unpleasantness, with
pleasure and pain appearing as kinds of pleasantness and unpleasant-
ness. Pain differs from other kinds of unpleasantness in degree and in
that it is located in a part of the body. A feeling of slight unpleasant-
ness in a certain limb or organ will not be addressed as “pain,” and
neither will a feeling of unpleasantness not located in the body. Pleas-
ure should possibly be interpreted in a parallel manner.20
Elementary attitudes could be addressed as “pre-valuation,”
because in the use of language prevailing outside axiology, one would
not, for instance, address pleasure or pain as “valuations.” However,
the requirements of axiological discourse make it preferable to call
such a state “valuation,” because even the abstract thought process,
whose intention is the assumed stance, is accompanied by feelings and
emotions and also bears their imprint. The realm of values is one and
the same. Its unity is noticeable not only in the complementarity of its
parts — “pre-valuation” and valuation — but also in their opposition:
A value of reason would not actually be opposed to a feeling-value, if
they did not reside in the same arena.
Feeling-valuation differs from other valuations in two characteris-
tics: passivity and the absence of objectification.
Passivity
Feeling is passive in this respect that we seem to become aware of

it only post-factum. Apparently, it is not generated within the mind:
the mind has only the finished product at its disposal — thus says the
testimony of immediate self-awareness, leaning on self-perception.
The words “apparently” and “seem” have to convey that on the
philosophical level I cannot adopt this position without reservations.
It seems as if it were not us who make these valuations but our

body, the organism, does it for us, decides what is good or bad, what
tastes good or bad, and passes its verdicts to consciousness in the form
of feelings. If you doubt whether this is, indeed, the testimony of
immediate (or, better, pre-philosophical) self-awareness, ask a person
in pain whether the pain is bodily or mental.
If the human body, or the human organism is a physical entity (i.e.,
can be reduced to its physical elements, can be exhaustively described
in physical terms), then there is no room for pleasantness or
unpleasantness, pleasure and pain included, as physics does not know
such things: textbooks in physics do not tell of pleasures and aches,
nor do the words “pleasure” or “pain,” let alone “pleasantness” or “un-
pleasantness,” translate into physical terminology. If someone fails to
recognize the basic difficulty and says that perhaps tomorrow a
translation into the language of physics will emerge — we should ask
him about a simple thing like a table for example: Is the table a
physical entity? True, each single table is a physical entity, but can we
translate the word “table” into the language of physics, namely, can
the concept “table” be reduced to concepts in physics? In order to do
so, we will have to find a physical property common to all tables and
only to tables — while we deal with tables made from different
materials, of different size, form, color etc. Actually, what is common
to tables and singles them out are valuative characteristics, namely,
that humans make them with the aim to satisfy certain human needs —
to serve them while writing, reading or eating. Aims, however, have
been absent from books about physics for many years. So, what is
valid for the table is certainly valid for pain and pleasure and even
more so for pleasantness and unpleasantness in general.
Even if every ache has a physical correlate, it does not follow that
pain in general has a physical correlate, namely, that there is a physical
attribute common to all correlates of pains and only to them, and the
same holds for pleasures. I think it reasonable to assume that every
single mental “phenomenon,”21 or every mental entity has a single
physical correlate, something like a physical infrastructure. However,
the supposition that for every kind of mental entity there is a matching
kind of physical entity is rather doubtful.
The human body, as far as it is considered to engage in valuative
activities, is not a physical entity. In the sense in which pleasure and
pain are corporal, corporality is not physical. The body of which im-
mediate self-awareness bears witness, is the body as it is experienced,
one's own body as it is perceived, and not the body that is no one's
own, as it is considered and calculated by physics. It is the location of
pleasantness and unpleasantness that constitutes the body as a self-

experienced body.
Feelings of pleasure or pain have in two main respects the same
status as, for instance, the sight of color. 1. In both cases consciousness
accompanying the intentional activity reports that what is perceived —
for example pain or green color — are not a product of the mind but
apprehended by it, i.e., come from outside; it is not the mind that
decides what will cause pain, or what is green; it learns what these are
as an accomplished fact. 2. From the viewpoint of the psycho-physical
dichotomy, the pain and the green spot both are not physical entities. A
certain length of light waves is a physical characterization, and a
certain frequency of electrical impulses in a certain nerve-fiber is also
a physical characterization, but neither the pain nor the green color.
Both qualities, pain and green, belong to bodies in the body-mind
division of experience and belong to the psyche in the psycho-physical
dichotomy. The difference between feeling and sensation is that in the
framework of information seeking observation, sensation belongs to
the realm of value-neutral mental activities, like scientific thinking,
and in this sense there is an affinity between them; there is no such
affinity between feeling in the sense of assuming an attitude and
science.
My aim here is to describe consciousness and not to clarify the
psycho-physical problem. I mentioned the issue merely to prevent an
erroneous ontological interpretation, which does not distinguish be-
tween one's own body as it is experienced and a physical entity, from
being applied to the phenomenological reference to the human body.
To sum up: self-awareness bears witness to the mind's passivity
regarding pleasantness and unpleasantness; it is not the mind that di-
vides what it faces into pleasant and unpleasant and into kinds of
pleasant or unpleasant. The mind finds a fait-accompli — the division
has been made and is presented to it. The divider and presenter is, on
the face of it, the body, but not the body as a physical entity. From
here we have to go on weaving the thread.
The divider and presenter is not exactly the body as it is experi-
enced either, because what is experienced is perceived, and the process
of division, sorting and display-arrangement is not perceived, we are
not aware of it.
If so, it is not the physical stratum within the human being that
carries out elementary valuations — neither the body, as experienced,
nor the mind as far as it is aware of itself — but a pre-conscious
mechanism which presents to consciousness what the senses absorb, 22
seeing to it that the latter already incorporate its being delightful or
distressing to the ear or the palate. This mechanism may be viewed as

belonging to the mind, or as belonging to the organism.
Sensation and feeling differ as acts of reception in that sensation
apprehends value-neutral properties, while feeling apprehends value-
properties. However, sensation as an intentional act, is not separate
from feeling. By the same act of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling or
touching a person usually apprehends value-properties and value-neu-
tral properties of objects, namely, a person senses and feels simultane-
ously.
Not only sense perception but also self-perception (i.e., the percep-
tion of mental states) is pleasant or unpleasant. The pleasantness or
unpleasantness of perception is also the pleasantness or unpleasantness
of the perceived by that perception. Mental events and processes, as
far as they are perceived, i.e. as far as they are conscious, are pleasant
or unpleasant in various degrees and manners (it is, of course, possible
for something to reside at the zero point of a scale from pleasant to
unpleasant). Certain thoughts are pleasant, others are unpleasant to the
same person. The object of a pleasant thought is not necessarily some-
thing perceived through the senses.
Perusing the map of the mind, one might wonder: Are the more
abstract intellectual activities also accompanied by those elementary
feelings, which are originally reactions to sensation? In response we
may say: Mental activities, also the complex ones, have a formal as-
pect that incorporates “vestiges” of lower strata, and among these
“vestiges” are the elementary sensual reactions.
Motives may join the pleasantness or unpleasantness of mental ac-
tivities, namely a striving to achieve the pleasant or to avoid the un-
pleasant. Such motives may be conscious or unconscious. They are
conscious, for example, when a person chooses to read something or to
watch a movie, because he takes pleasure from these activities. They
are unconscious, for example, when a person represses an unpleasant
thought. When a forbidden wish is repressed, it is at once pleasant and
unpleasant. Yet there is a less extreme instance than repression, though
not less interesting to us, which one could call the “expulsion” of
thoughts. The difference is like that between driving an irritating insect
away and killing it. If we ask a person to consider an idea (or a wish)
and tell us whether he had thought about it and then repressed it, there
is no doubt that this person will not only find it difficult to answer, but
even to recognize the suggested idea, if he/she has truly repressed it.
Yet this would not occur with regard to an idea that was temporarily
driven away. The person asked would recognize the idea and not deny
it. A psychologist told me of a person who engages in diversion-
maneuvers in order to divert his attention from a certain thought
whenever it surfaces; whenever the slightest sign of this thought

appears in the area of self-perception, he at once feels a pain in his
chest or a difficulty in swallowing or giddiness, and his attention shifts
to the question of possible damage caused to his body. This person
pays in physical suffering for his success in temporarily removing
from his range of awareness a matter which is unpleasant, because it
involves a great deal of bother. Less drastic means are ineffective in
driving this insect away.23
Wherever feeling is to be found, it bears this feature of passivity.
That is to say, it remains passive even when what it accompanies be-
longs to the realm of activity. When we look at the psycho-physical
subject as a whole, there is no doubt that feeling is an activity, that
what we name “apprehension” is an activity, that pain or the green
color do not exist without a subject. Yet, this is activity at a “low”
level, namely, activity of which considerable components are not con-
scious, or not distinctly perceived. So far as feeling is an activity, it is
not yet comprehensively an distinctly “covered” by self-perception, at
least not to the degree that activities of the intellect are.
The apparently passive or receptive character paves the way for
objectification, but at this stage it does not yet occur.
The Lack of Objectification
As pleasantness and unpleasantness accompany highly different in-

tentional acts, they also accompany acts of valuation, so that valuing
an object for better or for worse on a conceptual level will itself be
good or bad from the feeling angle; being good or bad from this angle
belongs to the form of the conceptual act, while the attitude towards its
object makes up the content of this valuation.
It may therefore occur that valuing something as good may in itself
be bad, and valuing something as bad be good. Here we have a
valuation of valuing. What emerge are layers of valuations in which an
emotional valuation, for instance, settles on top of an intellectual one.
The bottom layer of valuations is the “original,” while the one above is
“being stratified”; it is also possible that both be intellectual, in which
case the stratified valuation belongs to reflection. The original
valuation addresses an object, while the stratified valuation addresses
the act of valuation, but it may at the same time address the state of the
subject engaged in this activity.
A stratified valuation may either belong to the same intentional act
upon which it settles, or it will belong to its form, or it may be the
content of a separate intentional act, i.e., it will belong to reflection

about the original valuation.
Here a question arises: When pleasantness or unpleasantness are
original valuations — for example, of what the senses receive — can
an additional pleasant or unpleasant valuation settle on top of them? It
is, of course, possible to value the original feeling by a reflective act of
the intellect, and for this act of reflection to be accompanied by an
emotion. When reflection mediates in the application of value-con-
cepts, pleasantness may be accompanied (in a round-about way) by
unpleasantness and vice-versa. However, without such mediation,
there is no stratification of feelings upon feelings.
The matter is fairly clear with regard to the most elementary feel-
ings, pleasure and pain. Pleasure is not merely a valuation that what
gives pleasure is good, but is good in itself and thus the state of the
valuing subject is also good. Pain is not merely a valuation that what
causes pain is bad, but is bad in itself and so is the state of the subject.
This is no feeling stratification of good upon good and bad upon bad,
but the issue is this: Valuation of an object at the elementary level
already comprises the state of the subject. The feeling of one's own
state is not something distinct that accompanies the feeling of pleasure
or pain. Pleasure and pain have therefore a double character from the
outset: Here a positive valuation is in itself a valuatively positive state,
and a negative valuation, a valuatively negative state. Any negative
valuation of pleasure or positive valuation of pain will belong to
reflection, namely, it will represent an activity of the intellect or be
mediated by the latter, i.e., it will be external to the original,
elementary valuation and will occur later. One could also say that
feeling has a triple character: valuation of the object, valuation of this
valuing and valuation of the valuing subject.
An organic attitude compounds what exists separately in more de-
veloped positions as three distinct activities, in a unity whose func-
tional components are not perceived separately. Only a comparison
with valuations from more developed levels enables us to speak of the
double or triple character of pleasure or pain. Where the rule of the
primitive layer prevails that to value something as good is itself good,
there is but a single good, blending a pleasurable object and a pleas-
ure-receiving subject within itself. The same is true — the other way
round — for pain. That is to say, the differentiation between subject
and object has not yet occurred. Only the intellect that interprets
pleasures and pains creates this polarity by its interpretation. The sub-
ject-object gap emerges in two steps, by objectification and by the
reflection, which discovers the subject against the background of ob-
jectification and accomplishes its constitution. At the level of pleasure
and pain feelings that accompany sensations the first step — objectifi-
cation — is still absent (there are things and movements at this level,
but not objects). What is being valued is therefore the state of the spe-
cific meeting between subject and object and thus the function, which
stratification was to fulfill in its own way as it does in the rest of
valuations, is fulfilled by feeling. A certain gap between subject and
object is a condition for stratification.
The claim that at the level of sensory reception subject-object po-
larization has not yet occurred, should not be construed as if what is
being received lacked structure and meaning, or internal relationships
and significance. One may definitely acknowledge that what is re-
ceived has already been shaped into things and movements which pre-
serve their own identity, and which are tied into a network of connec-
tions, so that one may acknowledge that reception includes immediate
understanding, without claiming polarization, not to mention a gap,
between subject and object. In this layer, the subject's feeling of itself
is still assimilated into the feeling of the external object.
What is said about pleasure and pain applies to pleasantness and
unpleasantness in general. Let us take hunger as an example of un-
pleasantness. Hunger has two aspects: one is directed at the object, the
absence of food (absence meaning current unavailability). The second
aspect is directed at the subject's state. The negation inherent to the
full, immediately given, negative value-property we address as “hun-
ger” prevails in both aspects at once and cannot be separated. One of
the first papers published in the sphere of value-theory conducts a po-
lemic on these grounds. In his paper “The Need” (1894), Oskar
Kraus24 engages in a controversy with an author named Hermann.
Hermann wrote that “a feeling of want together with the desire to can-
cel this want, is called 'need'.” Kraus argues that the desire included in
need is not to cancel want, but to cancel the feeling of want, so that
according to Kraus we should amend the statement and say: A need “is
a feeling of want together with the desire to cancel this feeling” (fur-
ther on he continues and amends this definition as well). I believe that
in hunger both desires are united — the one Hermann point outs (di-
rected at the object) and the one Kraus presents in opposition to the
former (directed at the state of the subject), and that this unity is ele-
mentary and characterizes need. I have brought the example of hunger
in order to point to the double character of feeling, which belongs to
the realm of valuative values. However, the example involves an addi-
tional factor, desire, which is a motivative value. The motive that joins
feeling bears the same double character we found in the feeling itself.
What is true with regard to the original pleasantness and unpleas-
antness is also true with regard to stratified layers: no additional pleas-
antness or unpleasantness settles upon the pleasantness or unpleasant-

ness of predicative thought, for the same reason that rules the original
feeling: pleasantness does not merely represent the value of what is
pleasant, but also the state of the subject that makes this valuation —
thus preventing the possibility of an additional (not reflective) tier on
top of this pleasantness; the double or triple character so to say, builds
a sloping roof which leaves no room for additional, upward building.
And the same rule holds for unpleasantness.
When the role of valuing the valuation of X (and thus also valuing
the state of the subject, while it values X) is already fulfilled by the
valuation itself and embedded in it, the valuation of the valuation will
always carry the sign of the latter (i.e., the valuation of X): If that one
is positive, so will the other be, if that one is negative, the other will
also be negative. However, when stratification fulfills this role, there
are two possibilities: the valuations may carry the same sign and they
may carry inverted signs.
Without the double or triple character of feeling, it would be alto-
gether impossible to understand cases of thought repression or ban-
ishment. If the negative valuation of a thought were not correlative
with a bad state of the subject, the subject would not avoid it and thus
avoid the thought valued by this feeling.
Both characteristics of the feeling-valuation, passivity and the ab-
sence of objectification, contribute to the strength of its ties with ap-
propriate motives. Both prevent vacillation and delay. When an issue
arises, it has already been determined whether it is good or bad at this
level; when it is good, the subjective totality in which it is embedded is
also good; when it is bad, the totality is bad. That is to say that the
mechanism of assuming organic positions is efficacious in certain cir-
cumstances: its “yes” and its “no” are immediate, comprehensive and
directly bound up with appropriate motives. The manner of its reaction
changes but a little in the course of an individual's life, once early
childhood has passed, and it is doubtful whether it has changed much
throughout the history of the human species.
Emotion
While valuation of the object and of the state of the self are indi-
visibly bound up on the feeling-level, these functions are separate on
the emotional level.25 Here we find two sets of poles:
Love and Hate

Joy and Sorrow.
The first polarity refers to and the focuses on objects, the second
expresses the state of the subject. The lack of congruence between
them is obvious: Love is not always bound up with joy, nor hate with
sorrow. The rule that the state of the subject is positive while valuing
positively, and negative while valuing negatively, does not prevail
here. Thus emerges the polarization between subject and object.
A cluster assembles around each of these four emotions. Next to
love we find fondness, sympathy, liking, adoration; next to hate —
resentment and contempt; next to joy — gayety and high spirits; next
to sorrow — distress and depression.
One might, however, ask: Do not joy and sorrow also refer to ob-
jects, namely, to what causes joy or sorrow; do not love and hate, on
the other hand, also make up states of the subject, for instance, the
state of being in love. Indeed, this is true, but the emphasis of each
polarity is different — in the first it is objective, in the second subjec-
tive.
Some emotions reside somewhere between these sets of poles,
nearer to one of them. For instance, the emotion of belonging to a
family, a peer group, a clan or a people is primarily directed at the
object, but it also constitutes the subject; it is one of the emotions that
cluster around love. Another example: Fear is also mainly directed at
the object, namely, viewing something as frightening. Nevertheless it
also is a conscious state of the subject; the emphasis may be shifted
here and there: primarily focusing on one object or scattered over
occasional objects, when it mainly becomes a state of the subject.
I do not claim that the specific nature of an emotion is exclusively
determined by the positive-negative and subject-object parameters. On
no account do I wish to say that the map of emotions (or of full values
in general), arranged on the axis separating the positive from the nega-
tive half, is symmetrical (if one takes empty values into account, the
result will always be symmetrical, because against love its absence
will appear, the absence of hate against hate, etc.).
Emotion, like feeling, exists in the sphere of observation (i.e.,
sensory perception) as well as in the sphere of the intellect (i.e., con-
ceptual thought). Let us first turn to observation.
The object being friendly, welcoming, nice, charming or beloved is
a value-property it possesses, expressed in what is perceived by ex-
ternal perception, namely the senses, but the property itself does not
reside in the field of this perception. The intentional act of understand-
ing what is sensed discovers the emotional value-property the former
expresses. This property composes the emotional content. What is
sensed and immediately expresses the property, belongs to the form of
this intention. That is to say that emotion belongs to the intentional

content of observation.
Pleasure and pain refer to what is sensed, while love and hate refer
to the meaning of what is sensed; at the level of acts of sensory recep-
tion this meaning is immediately involved with what is sensed, as its
gestalt, and it is immediately understood within the act of reception.
Seeing something graceful incorporates the understanding of what is
seen; gracefulness is the meaning or significance of the sight and both
are apprehended together. Admiration of this gracefulness is the emo-
tion residing in the act of seeing as well as in the sight. Even more so,
seeing a beloved person incorporates the understanding of what is
seen.
Feeling and emotion involved in observation differ in the manner
of their reference to what is sensed: while feeling is involved with the
sensed elements, emotion refers mainly to the structure, namely, to the
order of elements and its meaning. Accordingly, feeling and emotion
also refer in different ways to the body of the self. Feeling is the pres-
ence of this body, facing the soul from the angle of the body's value-
properties and valuative situations; feeling is valuative self-perception,
and prima facie, what is perceived precedes its perception in order of
essence and even in time. Not so with emotion. Emotion precedes its
bodily expression in order of essence and occasionally even in time. A
person cries because he/she is sad, and is not sad because he/she cries.
William James tends to reduce emotion to feeling.26 When the emotion
belongs to intentional content (i.e., what is meant), it requires
sensation and feeling to bear or to embody it.
While emotion functions in the sphere of observation mainly as in-
tentional content, in conceptual thought it serves primarily as form,
namely, here it is a manner of reference to the object; a person thinks
about the object as beloved or as hated, while he usually thinks only
later about his love or his hatred, by reflection about his original
thought. However, in lyrical poetry, for instance (although its form is
verbal and from this angle close to conceptual thought), the intention is
initially trained on emotions. As reflection presumably tends to attach
emotion to observation and not to thinking, we will now name some
intellectual emotions (i.e., which accompany the intellect): the
emotions of confidence and hesitation, of satisfaction or dissatisfaction
with the intellect's work, the emotion of curiosity, enthusiasm for an
intellectual task, concern for the fate of a person the subject thinks
about (there is no need for this thought to be accompanied by percep-
tual images), the emotion of sympathy or hostility regarding an ab-
stract idea.
Emotion does not always need a special value-word in order to

function as the emotional form of a conceptual, cognitive content. The
emotion accompanying a thought determines its course, or participates
in determining its courses; it participates in the choice of patterns and
thematically, in the choice of focal points. When knowledge wishes to
remain value-neutral, it tries to prevent emotion from influencing the
shape of content, allowing it a merely companionate role. It tries to
prevent emotion from leaving its imprint on the product of knowl-
edge's work.
If cognitive thought has an emotional form, so much the more so
reason, which constitutes and applies values. As affinity prevails be-
tween a diffuse value residing in the form of reason and the crystal-
lized value that composes its content, reason cannot dissociate itself
from emotions, nor can it attend to its concerns without their partici-
pation in tracking its courses. The form of reason includes feelings as
well as emotions.
Frequently one and the same emotion an individual has with regard
to a certain object, exists in sense perception, in cognitive thought and
in the constitution of this person's values (like the establishment of
goals) and in their application.
The difference between love-hate and joy-sadness is also apparent
in that joy-sadness are valuative values only and not motives, or in
other words: they have no matching motives. In certain ideas of love
and hate, the motives bound up with them are so salient, that many
theoretical descriptions viewed them as the gist of the emotion. Love
was described and even defined as an aspiration, i.e., a motivative
value. Plato, in the “Symposium” 27 defines it as the aspiration to pro-
create within the beautiful. Aquinas defined love as the aspiration to
good because it is good (and hate as the aspiration to shun evil or the
aspiration to oppose evil).28 Ortega y Gasset argues against this ap-
proach in his paper on love, and I believe his position is right.29 Alto-
gether love cannot be defined but as a valuative emotional value, while
the motives bound up with various cases of love are very different and
it is doubtful whether they suit a single definition (namely, it is
doubtful whether there is a quality common to all these motives and to
them only, apart from their matching this particular kind of valuative
values).
In general joy and sorrow do not make up the content of inten-
tional acts (in observation or thinking), but accompany them or make
up the background to their content; they may be considered as belong-
ing to their form. But observation of what is joyful as being joyful, or
of what is distressing as being distressing may incorporate these emo-
tions within the intentional content, whenever different shades of joy
or sorrow are expressed by the objects of observation (in various

fields: sight, hearing, touch etc.).
People listening to music that expresses emotions provide an in-
teresting theme for axiology. An initial examination of the listeners
already reveals the difference between feeling and emotion. For in-
stance, a person enjoys a sad tune, namely, the feeling is positive while
the emotion is negative, or more precisely: the listener's com-
prehension of the negative emotion is accompanied by a positive feel-
ing. There is no conflict between the emotion's negativity and the feel-
ing's positivity (it is not in spite of its sadness that the listener enjoys
the tune), because their levels are different.
The example of listening to music (or reading a story or watching a
movie) not only clarifies the emotion-feeling difference, but also
emphasizes the fact that an emotion, even if it is strong, is not always
accompanied by a motive.
Someone who listens to music may understand it as conveying a
certain sorrow, such as suffering, or a certain joy, or yearning, and he
may even share these emotions, without their appealing at all to his set
of motives. Needless to say that there are other cases, in which music
joins the appeal to motives and reinforces them.
The very motive to listen to music is immanent to the perceptual
system and one of its characteristics. One must thoroughly distinguish
between the motive to observe and be receptive to emotions conveyed
by observation, and the motive aroused by these emotions: The latter
may not appear at all. What reveals itself here is the separation be-
tween the realm of valuative values and the realm of motivative val-
ues.
There are additional examples for the separation of emotion from
feeling and motive. Reading a sad story or watching a sad movie one
may drop a tear, but at the same time enjoy the experience. Here I do
not deal with the question why a person enjoys this experience (the
reason is that his or her inclination to be moved or aroused has been
satisfied; the issue of arousal, of being moved, will be discussed be-
low).
The plot of the story or the movie may refer to the past or to an
imaginary world, so that the emotions the reader or the spectator expe-
rience with regard to the protagonists and the fate visiting them, will
not involve any motives whatsoever. His comprehension of the pro-
tagonists' motives and the sympathy felt for the latter (or for some of
them) are another matter — but these are not his own motives and do
not activate him.
We will now discuss two attempts made to reduce all emotions and
also some additional values to two polar emotions.
Spinoza discusses elementary values (or valuations) under the

heading “affections.” According to him, there are three basic
affections: Joy, sadness and desire. Joy and sadness comprise a polar
system, while desire stands by itself and is congruent with what we
name “motive” or “motivative value.” The different motives all derive
from a single, original motive, which is the aspiration to perpetuate the
given being. However, what we denote as “emotions,” is to be derived
from a single pair, namely joy and sorrow (furthermore: all kinds of
pleasantness and unpleasantness derive from this pair). Spinoza
wishes, therefore, to base the polarity of references to the object on the
polarity of the subject's situations.30
While discussing love, Spinoza first rejects its definition as the
wish to unite with the beloved (in which Ortega y Gasset follows him),
and also rejects the inclusion of desire in the definition of love (“one
can assume love without this or that desire too”).31 What remains of
these definitions is the peculiarity of the lover that accompanies love,
i.e., the presence of the beloved object pleases him,32 but this
peculiarity is not part of love's definition. That is to say, love is not a
motivative value but, according to Spinoza, a kind of joy, differing
from its other kinds in that love refers to an external object, which
provides the reason for this joy, and this reference is knowledge of the
object. Ortega y Gasset says in this context33 that love is in this case
exchanged for one of its possible results, namely, that love may bring
joy to the lover, but is not in itself joy; there is no doubt that love may
also cause deep sorrow.
I believe Ortega y Gasset is right in rejecting the reduction of love
to joy, and for similar reasons any variation on Spinoza's attempt
should equally be rejected. Love is a certain kind of attitude to an ob-
ject, whose core is neither the joy nor the hope for joy of the subject,
but the object's, namely the beloved's, aspired joy. A mother who loves
her son wishes him well, wishes him joy, while her own joy is
marginal to the matter. One should give thought to the fact, that fo-
cusing on an object does not characterize the cognitive branch of con-
sciousness only, but also the branch that assumes a position. On these
grounds, hate should not be considered as a kind of sorrow either (nor
is it necessary for the person who hates, to be sad).
While Spinoza tips the scales towards the subject and its states,
Franz Brentano tips them the other way, proposing the reduction of joy
and sorrow to love and hate,34 which in his opinion are the foundation
of the sphere of values. The theory of intention originally tried the
radical way of basing all that is subjective on the reference to objects. I
believe, however, that observation of universally known phenomena
shows us that joy is not exhaustively covered by viewing the object as
joyful, or as beloved, nor is it tied to objects; it is therefore to be

explained as that offshoot of the form of intention, which becomes
largely independent of specific contents and constitutes the state of the
intending subject. The same holds for sorrow in the opposite direction.
To sum this chapter up: It is characteristic for the feeling-emotion
layer to serve as a kind of infrastructure for those above it. That is to
say that elementary “phenomena” (or the entities belonging to the ele-
mentary layer) accompany every intellectual act of intention. A sensa-
tion-feeling element also belongs to every act or proceeding of reason
(the sensational character of the verbal aspect of thinking and the feel-
ing, which is pleasant or unpleasant) and also an emotional element
(the emotion we experience towards the object we think about).
Chapter 5
The Dimensions of Value
Victor Kraft on the Components of Value
Victor Kraft, in his “Foundations for Scientific Analysis of

Value”35 says, that the concept of value incorporates affirmation on
one hand, and what is affirmed on the other, or negation on one hand,
and what is negated on the other. Accordingly, value-concepts are con-
structed by two elements: A) The positive or negative character; B)
The descriptive (or material) content, which comprises what is af-
firmed or negated. Thus value-concepts, apart from very general
values like good and evil, which have no descriptive content, are
constructed only by these two elements.
One should note that according to Kraft the descriptive content is
entirely neutral.36 The difference between one positive value and an-
other positive value resides therefore only in the neutral materials they
include, and not in their valuative nature, namely, their character as
values. By the same token negative values differ only in their neutral
ingredients and not with regard to their being values.37 Here Kraft con-
fronts his position with its alternative; in his opinion, the difference
between values does consist of a specific quality which, (in each sepa-
rate value) is a whole that does not lend itself to analysis. Kraft denies
that a value is a particular quality, also denying the existence of value-
properties.
While unfolding his thesis,38 Kraft comes to discuss emotional

situations in which something is alien or familiar; in this case he ad-
mits that we face a particular phenomenon of consciousness which
cannot be taken apart. He subsequently39 admits that the phenomenol-
ogical theory of value is not entirely mistaken. His reservations regard-
ing the validity of his thesis refer to a certain outlook and to certain
cases. 40 We will now leave Victor Kraft and continue to discuss the
principle he presents, concerning the breakdown of a value into its
components.
The Possibility of Reduction to a Pair of Values
The following consideration supports the analysis of a value into

two factors.
An affirmation must affirm something; if what is affirmed is an af-
firmation in itself, it must also affirm something, and if it is a negation,
it must negate something; if we do not arrive at some stage at
something which does not include affirmation and negation, it shows
the affirmation to be empty. Obviously, the same holds for negation; at
the bottom line it negates something that does not include affirmation
and negation. That is to say, that what is affirmed or negated is
neutral.
The same consideration holds for assuming a position in general. A
position is for or against something, and this something has to be
different from the position towards it. However, if in a certain case this
something is itself a position, the chain of positions assumed with
regard to other positions must finally — in its course towards the real
thing — arrive at something which is not in the domain of positions
assumed, something which does not include being for or against,
namely, something neutral.
If a value can be broken down into neutral content on one hand and
its valuative element on the other, and if the valuative element rests on
a single polar relation, which is the positive-negative relation, i.e., the
relation for and against, it follows that there is only one pure value, a
value consisting of a valuative element only, and that it possesses a
single, half-positive, half-negative scale. Or, in other terms, there is a
pair of values which is good and evil.
As impure values are but the application of a pure value to neutral
material, it is doubtful whether they are values at all — whether they
are addressed as “values” by right.
This solicits a question: why stop midway between the most gen-
eral value “good” and the valuation of a specific object as good? Why
The Dimensions of Value 73
stop at a kind of things or activities, or at a group of these, and address

the statement that this kind or this group is good by the name “value”?
Either every good object is a value, or only the word “good”
designates a value, and the same holds for evil. If every good or bad
object is a positive or negative value, the word “valuation” is redun-
dant. And if this is not so, what remains is only the pair of values,
good and evil, which from the angle of their content are but “being
for” or “being against.”
According to this line of thought all values — except two empty
ones — turn out to be but valuations. Just is but what is good in the
eyes of society, beautiful — what looks good, etc. The meaning of the
different value-words is the application of good and bad to hypotheti-
cal (neutral) contents, and their use but a comparison of that hypo-
thetical content to a real situation, or a measuring of the real situation
by the yardstick of the hypothetical content, whose good or bad nature
has already been determined.
Up to this point, the set of a priori considerations yields a clear and
simple pattern. The difficulty arises when we turn to the phenomena.
So and so is for ice-cream, for receiving a salary-rise, for justice, for
his beloved, for himself to stop smoking, and for some football team.
Do all these “fors” have the same meaning? And is all that remains —
apart from the abstract “being for” — neutral content? Would the
addition of a plus sign (+) to the descriptive content create a value?
Could we create so and so's values, whose expressions we have just
mentioned, in this manner?! Is it not more reasonable to assume that
“being for” is just an abstraction, based on a certain proximity be-
tween the cases of being for? In my opinion, the valuative affirmation
is not one and the same affirmation in these different cases; that it
differs not only in degree but also in manner and meaning, namely, by
quality-differences in accordance with the quality of what is affirmed.
And the same rule applies to negation.
Positive valuations differ qualitatively according to the level on
which they are made, i.e., feeling, emotion or predicative thought, but
also within the boundaries of each of these — according to their spe-
cific substance. Do pleasures differ from each other only in degree?
Does a person take pleasure in different things in the same sense? And
if the phenomena suggest a negative reply here, all the more so in the
sphere of emotions, which has more ramifications. On the other hand,
predicative value-thought in general, and conceptual value-thought in
particular — the one that applies values as well as that which consti-
tutes them — does not hover in a void, creating something out of
nothing, or spinning a spider's web out of its possessions by the aid of
logical equipment. It mediates with regard to the rest of the world
through pre-predicative valuations; while it does not limit itself to their

expression in its own way, it is altogether held by them, in its form as
well as in its content. Value-thought begins its work by dealing with
the qualitative multiplicity of the position-assuming it faces, and
adopts that multiplicity, at least in part.
Here we have briefly to return to Victor Kraft who claims in this
context, that there are acts of valuative judgment without feelings of
pleasantness or unpleasantness, devoid of emotional coloring and even
without any aspiration.41 But the question is by no means whether he
feels something or experiences an emotion while passing a valuative
judgment, but whether the value-concept he applies was not created
with consideration for a whole fabric of feelings and emotions, and
whether the value concept does not reflect some qualitative multiplic-
ity of emotions and feelings.
The reduction of all value-thought to two values, positive and
negative, also misses the difference between valuative and motivative
values. Even when a valuative and a motivative value perfectly match
each other, i.e., the motive serves the valuative value and the latter
confirms the former, their content is not identical in most cases, and it
is doubtful whether it can at all be fully identical; it should, therefore,
not be viewed as neutral, descriptive content: it is altogether steeped in
the character of a valuative value here and a motivative value there.
Take, for example, a man's love for a woman or for his son, and com-
pare it with the motives bound up with it. Even if we add the factor
valuation-motivation to the factors affirmation-negation and neutral
substance, we will not be able to build love and the motivations bound
up with it out of these.
To sum up: if we strip, so to say, all positive values of their posi-
tive character as far as it is equal in all of them, what remains at our
disposal will not be neutral substance, but specific contents, possessing
a specific value-character. With the appropriate change in terms, the
same consideration holds for negation. I believe that the observation of
recurrent values sufficiently justifies rejection of the analysis-thesis.
Looking at complex cases, we will find that not only analysis, but
even the attribution of a value to a positive or negative group cannot
be made unequivocally. We will present three such cases here.
The enigmatic and mysterious nature of something, for instance a
somewhat dark forest on whose edge we stand, may be considered
valuatively positive, because by this very characteristic the forest
beckons to us, namely, arouses a motive to walk its paths. It may,
however, be considered alien and unwelcoming. If the forest ties af-
firmation and negation together, then applying the thesis of value-
analysis would mean the following: humans attribute a positive char-
acter to part of the neutral matter and a negative character to another

part; one should, therefore, divide the matter and thus induce positivity
and negativity to separate on their own. But is it not precisely this
physiognomy of estrangement and unease which attracts the person
whose senses are receptive to them? That is to say: perhaps here it is
precisely the negative which is positive.
From the receptive aspect to the motorial, with a content-related
example: adventure-seeking. The risk along the way does not reduce
the adventure's value for whoever seeks it; on the contrary, canceling
the risk would reduce its value. If we have pure affirmation and pure
negation, they will probably cancel each other out; accordingly, if we
reduce the negative element in a certain action, the rate of its net posi-
tive value should increase, but what occurs is the opposite.
A sad song, sung with a sad tune may be considered as positive
because listeners demand it and it is willingly performed — and it may
be considered negative, because it induces sadness, i.e., negates joy.
In all these cases there is no act of mixing a positive value-bearer
with a negative value-bearer and thus also mixing the value-properties.
The proof is in the fact that increase of negation may increase the net
affirmation of the whole. It is reasonable to assume that value-
character possesses an additional dimension besides the dimensions of
affirmation-negation and subject-object — a kind of valuative depth
dimension. The dimension constituted by the subject-object relation is
not specifically valuative as it serves also non-valuative intentions,
whether in itself or as background. An additional, specifically valua-
tive dimension is required, upon which we can draw for the description
of what cannot but be described paradoxically in terms of positive and
negative.
An Additional Dimension of Valuation
It is surprising how much the mental states involved in the realiza-

tion of various positive values differ from or contrast each other. When
a value, full in its positive section, is attained to a considerable extent,
the subject, i.e., whoever adheres to this value, frequently reacts by
calming down, by passing into a state of ease and steady equilibrium
(according to the rule: If the situation is favorable, I am relaxed). On
the other hand, there are full-positive values whose expression and
realization — for instance, in the sublime or in the beautiful — in-
volves emotional movement; when the unrest passes, the subject re-
mains in a state of unstable equilibrium. Here: as the rate of affirma-
tion increases, so does calm. There: on the contrary, with the affirma-
tion emotional movement increases. As affirmation increases, move-

ment, the opposite of calm, also increases.
The presence of a positive value-property may therefore act in op-
posing directions: Calm, and perhaps even steady, in one direction,
moving, touching or even agitating in the opposite direction.
We should note that we do not address motives here, i.e., the ap-
peal of the valued object to motivations. In its appeal to motives the
object — be it a thing or an activity — arouses and incites, or lulls and
paralyses. A highly emotionally moving property, however, may not
appeal to motives at all, and may not cause any (considerable) change
in a person's aspirations and desires. And the soul is moved by an
object not because motives have been aroused, or because some
negative value has been realized; for example, music may calm and
may emotionally move; it is easy to see that music may emotionally
move without any appeal to motives.42
It is now quite obvious that the difference between what is moving
and what calms cannot be described by any of the parameters we have
discussed so far: It is not the difference between positivity and nega-
tivity; not the difference between a value accompanied by a motive
and one not accompanied by any, or by a certain motive; nor is it the
difference between full and empty or between subjective and
objective. We are faced with an additional dimension of the value-
ambit.
One should not view every state of the mind that opposes calm, as
movement. Calm is violated by valuatively negative factors — for
instance, distress; it is also violated by tensions between opposed mo-
tives; it may, perhaps, be violated by a state of emptiness of positive
values (the state Schopenhauer considers as usual, and perhaps as ex-
clusively so in our world), and even more so by sudden awareness of
such a state.
The emotionally moved subject is sensitive to changes in the mov-
ing object, in contradistinction, for instance, to someone wishing to
quell his hunger, who is relatively indifferent to differences between
kinds of food. A change or a difference in the object, which would be
described as tiny or almost unnoticeable from every neutral angle, may
increase emotional movement, or even cancel it altogether. As a neu-
tral description, we may consider one accepted by an observer
adhering to different values, i.e., one who is not being moved. What is
a small change from a neutral point of view may be a considerable
change also in the positive-negative dimension.
The subject's sensitivity is the sensitivity of its values. Therefore,
the moving value is the value that is sensitive (in its full section) to the
valued object, mainly within a certain area of modifications. In other
words: It is sensitive to the slightest differences in what is valued,

around a certain peak. This sensitivity should be understood in this
way: If you change the value-bearers even to the smallest degree, the
value-property will change considerably. However, the said changes
are basically neither slight nor tiny; only their neutral surface
projection is slight or tiny.
The additional dimension is the valuative depth dimension of ob-
jects. From the angle of value-bearers and the angle of the positivity-
negativity relation, we see on the surface projections of images resid-
ing in the depth dimension. In the value-bearer dimension the image is
contracted, at times a line contracted to a dot. The surface image is a
distorted picture of the depth image, namely, of the emotionally mov-
ing value-properties. A person adhering to a moving value does not
decipher the images that appear according to the other dimensions and
parameters, but stands at a vantage-point from which the depth dimen-
sion of objects is seen.
The demand for objective validity of individual aesthetic judg-
ments may seem pretentious. Nevertheless, when the judgment suc-
ceeds in reconstructing observation with concepts, or in other words
— when it conveys what observation has revealed, its validity does not
lag behind that of the value-bearer's description. And the depth
dimension of emotionally moving images also reveals itself to obser-
vation.
What moves us emotionally may look on the surface like a mixture
or a compound of positive and negative value-properties, like good
and bad (or evil), held in each other's grasp.
In a certain sense, valuative depth is identical with value quality.
The differences of degree between positivity and negativity do not
make up value-quality, but presuppose it. The location of an object on
the positive-negative scale of a certain value does not exhaust the ex-
pression of its quality.
What moves emotionally may appear not merely as a positive-
negative compound, but also as something neither positive nor nega-
tive, but nevertheless valuative. A mysterious sight, for instance, is
sometimes beyond positivity or negativity, but it belongs to the do-
main of value-properties and does not leave us indifferent. When
something captures our attention and arouses our curiosity, it possesses
a value-property because we are not emotionally indifferent towards it,
even though our attitude is not clearly positive or negative. However,
one could perhaps claim in this case that this is no proper example for
a value-character; yet, when the fascinating and curious thing, which is
neither positive nor negative, is also emotionally moving, there is no
room for doubt that it has a value-character. This case provides
additional evidence that the positive-negative dimension is not the

sole, specifically valuative dimension. (The relation subject-object also
makes up an intentional, but not specifically valuative dimension).
I took examples from the sphere of aesthetics in order to acquaint
ourselves with the additional dimension, because in this sphere the
factor requiring demonstration was isolated from other factors, or be-
cause here it is easier for reflection to isolate factors — for instance, to
distinguish between an emotion and its accompanying motives: by its
very nature the emotion aroused by sublimity need not be accompa-
nied by any motive. But there is also some emotional movement in-
cluded in enthusiasm, and here it may sometimes be bound up with
strong motives.
Coping with danger, in particular when there is only a hair's
breadth between success and failure, involves sensitivity to slight dif-
ferences in the value-bearer, and this may, indeed, emotionally move.
For similar reasons gambling may move, as well as gladiators' battles
in ancient and bullfighting in our times. We will return to this subject
in Part III.
Chapter 6
Content and Form in Valuative

Intention
The Distinction between Content and Form of

Intention in General
We have already used the distinction between content and form

above. I now wish to examine it further before we return to use it
again.
The distinction between content and form of intention is more or
less congruent with the distinction between the intentional act and the
course of intention on one hand, and the intent i.e., towards what the
act is intended, on the other. What is meant, what is understood, what
is wished — is the intent. The act belongs to the form while the con-
tent altogether resides in intent.
An intentional act (an act of meaning, an act of understanding) is
located in time and in the subject, but it does not spread over a period
of time; it is a cross section of time within an intentional process, and
within this section the fabric of relations particular to intention reveals
itself. That is to say, that intention needs no extension in time in order
to prevail. Intention already takes place at a point in time. A process of
intention does, of course, extend in time, but each of its cross-sections

already contains intention.
The form, however, reveals itself not only in a section, but also in
the modes of the intentional course, as well as in its background within
the intending subject, because the act's structure and the modes of the
process are tied to this background. The background of one intentional
course consists of other intentional processes.
The question arises: How does intent acquire its independence,
how does it separate from the act directed at it? It exists in separation
from the act in the sense that other intentional acts (in the same proc-
ess, as well as in other process) are also directed at it. The possibility
to refer to it again without duplicating the same act by means of which
we initially referred to it, without referring to this act, without any
reference to the background against which we first recognized this in-
tent — this possibility bears evidence to the intent's independence.
An intent may gradually acquire such independence in the course
of many intentions — for instance, when the intention is a notion and
this acquisition represents crystallization of the notion.
Intention is immanent to consciousness and transcends it. It is
immanent to the extent that it is made up, for instance, by an image or
a concept. It is transcendent to the extent that consciousness estab-
lishes the image or the concept outside itself. The real table outside
consciousness and its comprehensive idea (perceptual and conceptual)
function in intent as one.
Intent may be extraneous to time (like the relation expressed by
Pythagoras' theorem), or it may exist in time (like Napoleon's deporta-
tion to St. Helena). If it is located in time, its location is not congruent
with the act's location in time (except incidentally).
In contradistinction, intentional form is always immanent to mind,
and never extraneous to time. Even when a formal relation does not
occur between elements which are sequential in time, like cause and
effect, and therefore does not need time as the ground to spread on, it
is nevertheless located in time and exists as a procedure within reality
(i.e., the human being's reality).
A concept of the unchanging may, of course, change. In other
words: The thought about what is unchangeable is, of course, change-
able itself. Unchangeability here belongs to content, while change
refers to form. Intentional content may not only refer to the unchange-
able; it may refer to what is changeable, but even then it remains un-
changeable content, because a change of thought and a change in
intention altogether belong to form. If I harbor the wish for a certain
change to occur today between noon and 1p.m., then the wish refers to
the change, but this change does not govern the wish itself (neither in
Content and Form in Valuative Intention 81
its being content, nor in its being form). And if an hour later I have a
different wish (which is incompatible with the former), this change is a
form of intention.
The possibility of change is only one character trait that distin-
guishes between the content aspect of an intention and its factual exis-
tence.
If the correlate of intent is the act, namely, if the category intent is
apprehended as what resides in the field of intention once the act has,
so to say, been removed from it, then intent also includes character
traits imprinted by the intentional act, by the proceedings and patterns
of the intentional process. Should we try to understand intent as pure
intentional content, we would not be able to extract concrete examples
of intent, because every example would also have formal character
traits; we will, therefore, employ the word “intent” in a manner that
enables us to choose examples. When a person considers a table that
would meet his or her requirements, we can say that the table is the
intent. We cannot say without reservations that the table is the inten-
tional content. The term “intentional content” designates the pure cor-
relate of the form of intention; we have already found that in reality it
cannot be isolated and that it is impossible to demarcate a borderline
between content and form in a specific case; one can only extract cer-
tain forms from the intention and present them to reflective observa-
tion, so that other forms remain embedded in the concrete intention
from which these forms have been removed. If we stripped an inten-
tion of its entire form, we would not hold pure content, because the
content, so to say, would evaporate. In order to be present, namely, in
order to be something that can be intended once again, content has to
shoulder the burden of forms.
Intentional content is made of special metaphysical matter, while
intent is this matter, already imprinted by the initial minimal stamp of
form. Within the system the intent acquires its shape, it receives addi-
tional imprints and becomes a substance or a property, a process or a
law, an event or a change; in these completed shapes the intent may
acquire some transcendental status, namely, be established by an indi-
vidual consciousness even outside the totality of any consciousness,
i.e., it may win recognition of its independence from consciousness.
“Before” it becomes transcendent (for instance, as a real table), the
intent is an entity of meaning. The shaping into entities, the border
demarcation between one entity and its neighbor, is determined by the
content as well as by the form that does the shaping. The word “be-
fore” at the head of this paragraph should not necessarily be under-
stood as temporal precedence; the understanding of a content and its
establishment may occur simultaneously. In a certain sense the pedes-
tal on which the content is going to be established may be ready prior

to the establishment, and predesigned for an entity of meaning that
meets certain requirements.
Not every content is subject to objectification in general and tran-
scendence in particular. Part of what a momentary intent contains fails
to become the property of an object. We have already seen that not the
whole volume of a valuation becomes the volume of a value-property
(which, in its turn, participates in constituting the object).
In short, it belongs to the form of an intention that the latter is car-
ried out by somebody, at a certain hour, under certain circumstances
and in a certain manner. The form represents a fact and is part of the
world. The content, however, is not part of the world and may be taken
up (by means of form) as an approach to the world. An intention has,
so to say, a face and a back (or a rear); the face may be turned towards
the world (or rather, towards part of it), but not belong to it as a part;
the back or rear is part of the world. One could shift this metaphor and
have it include a mirror, to wit: the mirror's face is the content, its back
— the form. Intents are what is to be seen in the mirror's face.
I mentioned in the introduction that science may be useful and is
from this angle not value-neutral — but its value-character concerns
only its own existence and not the manner of its reference to objects.
We can now say: Its value-character belongs to its form, while it is
value-neutral (or tries to be so) according to its content. We said there
that art may be beautiful and is not value neutral from this aspect. Now
we can add that the absence of neutrality belongs to the form of art.
The Conscious and the Unconscious
The division of an intention into form and content crosses the di-
vision into conscious and unconscious (in various degrees and man-
ners). We will now examine a few cases of this intersection.
A The content is fully conscious as far as it is unfolded and while
it is unfolded in internal perception. It unfolds in the field of internal
perception through an act of understanding or of meaning. When a
person immediately understands the order of sensory elements that are
present, without the help of interpretation, the internally apprehended
meaning is identical with the externally apprehended order, and this
meaning is the fully manifest and unfolded intentional content. Seeing
that includes understanding, visual understanding, may provide an
example: the sight expresses its meaning (what is externally appre-
hended expresses and the internally apprehended is being expressed).
When a person watches a ball rolling on a surface, bump into another
ball and send it flying, he/she understands the sight even before con-
ceptual thought turns to it. The observed meaning is entirely clear and
needs no interpretation.
B The content is conscious even while it is folded and only some
of it is present, and we feel able to unfold it again. This is the case
when a content exists as a concept and is represented by a word: if
necessary, we will interpret this word in a number of sentences.
C A content which was actually present in the past and by a greater
or lesser effort (in the course of lengthy or shorter searches and
restoration) we can lift it anew into the field of internal perception.
D Let us take the case of something of which a part is present (in
one of the fields of perception), while the part which is absent was not
present in the past either; it is connected to the present part, but not
expressed or revealed by it. Yet, in some cases we are in a certain
sense acquainted with the non-present part, while in another sense we
are not acquainted with it. I am not acquainted with it because it was
not yet present. I am acquainted with it, since in these cases I will
identify it when I come across it as that whose absence was felt, as that
which meets a certain want. Until I came across it, it was not con-
scious, but it existed for me so far as it was missed and so far as I
possessed the ability to identify it. Here we have an expression which
not only unfolds a certain content but also the absence of something
which is needed to complete the content. Until now I did not meet this
thing and I cannot produce it by means of the factors that are present,
but I will be able to identify it when I meet it; this expression is a
certain kind of unsolved hint (more precisely: an unsolved hint ar-
ranged in an order that does not allow for prediction). Imagine a hand-
some painting from which a part is missing (it is hidden by a stain),
and an art-loving observer notices this, but cannot complete the paint-
ing on his own. On the other hand, he will be able to say with certainty
which completion of four, suggested to him, is the right one. He was to
some extent acquainted with the appropriate completion before he saw
it. He had an intention towards the completion implied by means of the
hint and in this sense it belonged to the intent, but it was not conscious.
E A frequent case is that of an immediately conscious form of in-
tention, namely, one that is unfolded (to a certain extent) in the field of
self-perception. For instance, a person is aware of being glad or sad,
i.e., the joy or the gladness are apprehended, they are present in the
field of self-perception. He/she is thus also aware of being angry while
the anger lasts.
F There are forms which are not apprehended, e.g. a certain order
of intentional acts. They may, however, become conscious in some
sense in a roundabout way. We will mention a couple of these:
1. By conceptual analysis of phenomena, reflection arrives at a

concept addressing a certain non-apprehensible order, for example, in
psychoanalysis. The concept will be a reconstruction of the form under
discussion on the conceptual level (reconstruction with the metaphysi-
cal matter of concepts); the concept itself is apprehended (in the field
of internal perception), and by means of the concept this unconscious
order is apprehended (in a certain sense and as far as the concept is
adequate). For instance, emotions functioning as a form of conceptual
thought may not be immediately conscious; they may, however, be-
come subsequently conscious (in general only partially and to some
degree of appropriateness) in a sense mediated by concepts about them
which reflection achieves by analysis (not necessarily psychoanalysis),
as well as by interpolation and extrapolation.
Emotion may, therefore, be immediately conscious, a) as content
(perceptually expressed), b) as form (in the perception-field of states
of the self, in which emotions are also apprehended); c) in other cases
emotion may become conscious only posteriorly, through the media-
tion of a concept about it.
2. When reflection, aided by the will, causes the repeat of a certain
proceeding, turning its form into a content. If this turn-about is suc-
cessful, the unconscious form will become conscious, not as form but
as content, namely, it will appear in the field of internal perception.
That is to say, the mind repeats a previous proceeding, but now takes
notice of how it conducted this proceeding. In this manner, a meaning-
bearer can be turned into meaning; we notice, for example through
repetition, the verbal form which we used in the original act without
noticing. Subject-object relations, which were not noticed in an origi-
nal act of intention when our attention was occupied by the object, can
also be revealed in a repetition designed to this end.
The form which became content by reflective reconstruction does
not retain all the qualities it had before; it primarily loses its self-dy-
namic, its automatic proceeding, and becomes dependent on continual
steering by the will.
Transitive and Reflective Intention
In Alexander Pfänder's terms, the original intention is transitive; it

passes from the intending consciousness to what is outside (in various
degrees of transcendence). The original intention, in its turn, makes up
the intent of reflective intention (in other words: of reflection).43 More
precisely, not the whole transitive intention is the intent of reflective
intention, but only its form. The original intentional content is not
designed to be included in the content of reflection, or to be the object

of this content. Duplication of a content is not reflection about it.
We have here something like a building with multiple floors: the
reflective first floor rises above the transitive ground floor, and the
content of the first floor treats of the form of the ground floor. If a
second floor of reflection on reflection exists, its content will also
address the form, but that of reflection (from the floor beneath). The
act on one floor points to the form on the floor beneath it. However,
the form of an intention is not (fully) identical with the content of
reflection about it, in the same manner that the idea of a table is not a
table. Nevertheless, for an actual intention this identity prevails within
it: the intention towards a certain content is at once an intention to-
wards the object of this content. Looking at it from some distance we
would say: by means of the content, a person intends towards the ob-
ject (which the content addresses). Yet, for the intending person (dur-
ing the act of intention) identity prevails. The specific, real table and
the idea of it represent one and the same intent and are actually identi-
cal for the intending person, whose intention is straightforward and
innocent of reflection. In the same manner the existing form of inten-
tion and its reflective idea compose one and the same intent, and are
identical for the person actually engaged in reflection (without reflec-
tion about this initial reflection).
The form of an intention may function as the object of reflection
by virtue of its being immediately conscious in part, namely, appre-
hended in the field of self-perception.
It is fairly obvious that an intention is not exhaustively represented
by the part which lends itself to description, because only its form is
describable. Neither is it exhaustively represented by the part which
lends itself to valuation, because only the form can be valued.
Reflection does not only treat of this or that single intention, but
also generalizes and searches for types of order, prevailing in intention
in general; it also treats of the subject itself, which is represented as a
sum-total of forms of intention (for instance, a certain single subject,
in a superficial way, as the sum-total of his modes of response); reflec-
tion also knows that in truth this sum-total does not exhaustively rep-
resent the subject. Sometimes reflection wishes to refer to the intend-
ing person, but actually refers post-factum to the modes and circum-
stances of intention, because we have no idea of the intending subject
(of the true “I”), apart from the background and modes on one hand,
and from the intent on the other.
Observation of the Forms of Intention
Our knowledge about mankind is altogether but the knowledge of

forms of intention. In other words: The sciences addressing man and
society as well as knowledge about man and society in everyday
thought belong to the realm of reflection. The sciences seek value-neu-
tral knowledge of the form of intention (the form of valuation in-
cluded), while everyday thought lacks this tendency.
The knowledge of form encounters two obstacles. Besides the dif-
ficulty that not the whole form is immediately conscious while it is
present or takes place, there is the difficulty that the same form, which
truly is immediately conscious (i.e., is perceived) does not, according
to its very function, attract the attention of the subject in the course of
intention (namely, while this form exists). It is perceived but not dis-
tinctly. Attention focuses on the intentional content and only on part of
it, its center (namely, on a certain intersection of content-lines, which
thus becomes the center of the internal perception-field). A person
pays attention to what he/she intends, and not to how it is intended.
Only recurrence makes the attention to the initially conscious, but
hardly noticed form, possible. Only recurrence makes it possible for
the form to become an object and reveal itself distinctly. It is to the
credit of Franz Brentano to have shown that something may be per-
ceived in self-perception without being an object of observation (and
attention); we will further discuss Brentano's theory below.
Knowledge of the form of intention (including meta-valuative
knowledge) consists of observation and of conceptual interpretation of
what this observation reveals. This is not merely empirical knowledge,
in the narrow and conventional sense of the word “empirical.” The
form that appears is not some data which acquires meaning only by
comparison with other data, by generalization or by its conceptual
interpretation; it is initially meaningful, while it is still perceived
without attention being paid. It is immediately understood, prior to any
comparison. Observation means attending to the structure and
functioning of form, i.e., its significance. Conceptual interpretation of
the data revealed by observing the form of intention leans on their
original meaning, but also criticizes it. Immediate understanding of
single cases makes it possible to compare them, because the meaning
of one case revealed to observation usually exceeds its own limits; the
meaning of the individual case goes beyond individual reality, or be-
yond the presence of this individual at this point in time. The exposi-
tion of an emotion, for instance, grants the observer acquaintance with
this emotion, with its essence, which is not merely an acquaintance
with an experience of this emotion, and certainly not merely the indi-
vidual experience, under these specific circumstances. This acquain-
tance includes the ability to recognize the same emotion on a different
background, within a different plurality. The emotion expressed by
another person, one's own emotion as intentional content and one's
own emotion as form (for instance, of conceptual thought) may be
attributed, by virtue of their original meaning, to one kind of emotion,
like love or hate, or to other emotions directed at an object. And this
original meaning, or, so to say, the original quality of these emotions,
enables us to identify them even in a case in which the form is dis-
closed only through interpretative consideration.
The acquaintance of the mind with itself has in its basis a charac-
teristic of pure intuition in the Kantian sense (similar to the pure intui-
tion of space as the basis of geometry), rather than the characteristic of
empirical, data-collecting observation. Empirical observation of intel-
lectual phenomena comes relatively late and is based on immediately
understood observation. Here one may, however, draw not only on
Kant, but on any philosopher who treats of the immediate perception
of the universal within the individual, or of the individual's display of
its essence or its meaning. Intuition as described by Spinoza or by
Bergson, observation of essence according to Husserl or intuition ac-
cording to Hartmann, as well as the function of expression as dis-
cussed by Cassirer and myself — all these are pertinent to the discus-
sion of our acquaintance with emotions.
One of the characteristics of Kantian pure intuition, which we also
find in the observation of intention forms in general, is constructive-
ness. For instance, the recall of events incorporates a building activity.
This activity may lead to the uncovering of emotions, which are in-
volved in those events. Art in general and in particular the art of narra-
tive, of the play and the movie, incorporates the construction of images
and of emotions. A work of art enables the person absorbing it to
experience emotions he or she did not feel previously, and also to un-
derstand emotions (e.g. of a protagonist in a novel) he or she does not
experience even while reading, watching or listening to this work of
art. This comprehension is based on the building activity.
The activities of recollection, imagination and absorption of works
of art are a source of knowledge about forms of intention. They paral-
lel actual building in space, as well as that of geometry.
We will now turn to Franz Brentano's teaching — the philosopher
who renewed the category of intention, thus turning the corner leading
to the 20th century.
Brentano distinguishes between external and internal perception.
In external perception colors, sounds, tastes, smells and sensations of
touch are present. Internal perception grasps intentional activity and

intentional contents (the meanings or purports). According To Bren-
tano, all intentions and all intents are perceived. This means that eve-
rything which is mental is conscious, since Brentano characterizes
mental as intentional.
On the other hand Brentano believes that introspection is impossi-
ble, because this observation imposes a change on its object; thus the
enquirer does not observe what he sought, but an artificial by-product
of his own activity.44 An infuriated individual, wishing to observe this
fury, is bound to fail.
However, according to Brentano, this is no deficiency. Internal
perception presents whatever is necessary in order to determine the
principles of knowledge in general and the knowledge of emotions in
particular (the latter underpinning the ethic which tells us what rates
love and what rates hate). And as all that belongs to the mind is pre-
sented to the intellect, it is presented clearly and distinctly. Thus the
perceiver and the perceived are identical and there is no mediation,
liable to distort or garble the perceptional message; accordingly, the
capacity of internal perception belongs to the realm of accomplished
truth. For example, causality is grasped when the endorsement the will
accords an activity (of body or intellect) is grasped. Thus, something
that is required for the principle of causality is grasped. For instance,
love is perceived when a person grasps his love for his offspring; thus,
something is perceived which is necessary for the principle that tells us
what deserves love.
Brentano believes that the sciences and ethics have no need of pre-
suppositions or a priori synthetic sentences. According to Brentano,
Kant's theory about the synthetic a priori propositions legitimizes
prejudices (which are synthetic because they are not based on logic,
and are a priori, because they are not based on experience).
These are a few guide-lines from Brentano's teachings which be-
came to some extent characteristics of phenomenological thought.
Without engaging in a detailed discussion, I wish to express some
reservations with regard to essential issues.
1. We should distinguish between self-perception, which grasps
the “I,” or rather the forms of its intentions, and internal perception,
which grasps intentional contents, or meanings. The ties of internal
perception with self-perception are not closer than the former's ties
with external perception.
2. As not everything which is mental is truly conscious or per-
ceived, the self-perceived is segmented and bears the ensuing distor-
tions. Our understanding of what is self-perceived is not better-
grounded than our understanding of what is externally perceived. The
immediate comprehension accompanying both fields of perception is

far from being complete and is in a number of cases even illusory.
To sum up these two points: In self-perception the perceiver and
what is perceived are not fully identical.
3. Conceptual interpretation (formulated in words and sentences)
of what is self-perceived is not complete at any stage, and conceptual
interpretation of pure external intuition (observation in space) is not
finite either.
Let us now briefly turn to Kant's school of thought. The concept of
pure intuition of space as the basis for geometry is correct in the sense
that the observation geometry is based upon is not empirical, and does
not collect statistical data. This conception is incorrect from the angle
that Euclidean geometry was not complete without being incorporated
in a more comprehensive system, i.e., without mentioning that it treats
of a specific, relatively simple case, in which the degree of space-
curvature equals zero, and that there are other geometries for the other
degrees of space-curvature. As geometry is an a priori concept, it does
not treat of the given physical space, whose curvature-degree is not to
be determined a priori, but treats hypothetically of all the different
curvature degrees.
The same rule holds for pure observation in the sphere of self-per-
ception. There is no guarantee, at any stage, that further qualification
of propositions will not be needed; that further clarification of alterna-
tives is not necessary; that no need will arise for the integration of the
propositions we have asserted, as special cases within a wider frame-
work.
Since it is not certain that the formulation of a proposition is
completed and that it does not require qualifications, one should not
say either that it is evident.
With regard to terminology: pure intuition, or the observation
which does not gather data for induction but enables us to learn some-
thing from a single case, and the propositions supported by pure intui-
tion, rate the name “a priori,” if a posteriori equals inductive. Yet,
actually one should also understand pure intuition as a certain kind of
experience and the propositions leaning on them as being empirical, in
a somewhat broad sense of the word.
4. As mentioned above, Brentano believed that internal (or self)
perception provides a basis for evident truth, but he also believed that
there is no self-observation (or introspection). Yet, even though the
obstacle Brentano mentions exists, it does not prevent self-observation,
yet somewhat distorts what appears to it. The study that discovers the
distortion consists of meticulous interpretations of observations, which
aim at its isolation.
The reconstruction of intention-proceedings enables us to observe

them. It occurs in such reconstruction that the form turns into content,
which from the cognitive angle presents an advantage and a disadvan-
tage; the advantage is that what was folded is spread out, so that its
components are distinct; the disadvantage is that this turn-about
changes what we seek to observe.
For Brentano, this obstacle equalled prevention, because he sought
completed truth and full certitude with regard to this truth.
5. Conceptual interpretation of empirical observation as well as of
pure intuition requires prior suppositions, namely, suppositions which
are not proven by observation or intuition.
Emotion as an Intentional Content
While dealing with matters discussed in previous chapters, I more

than once came up against a claim which could have been aimed at
multiple issues in this part of the book. The claim was: an emotion is a
fact that confronts the mind like a feeling and like an unwanted state of
the own body; therefore it has the character of an “is” and not an
“ought”; consequently it is neither a value nor a valuation. The answer
should be: A typical emotion is not exhaustively represented by its
passive and factual aspect; furthermore: this is not its main aspect. We
should distinguish between the emotion itself and the fact of experi-
encing it, as we should distinguish between a value and the fact that
Reuben or Simon adhere to it, namely, believe in it, apply it and may
even be guided in their behavior by this value.
The difference between a typical emotion and its being
experienced by someone under certain circumstances is not the
difference between the general and the individual, namely, between
the emotion in general and individual case, or between a certain kind
of typical emotion (like love or hate) and an actual, individual case
belonging to this kind, but the difference between intentional content
and intentional form. Experiencing an emotion is an intentional act (it
belongs to the form), while the emotion proper is what one intends by
this act, or: it is one element of what is intended, it belongs to intent
(i.e. to the content). For example — in love the beloved will belong to
the realm of intent; his being beloved by someone is not only one of
his properties but constitutes the idea this person has of him, namely,
constitutes intent.
The value — valuative or motivative, emotional or conceptual —
is primarily a certain kind of intentional content. This means that to
say, a value is the sum total of content and form, would be misleading:
a value is a value only by virtue of its being content. When I observe

values adhered to by others, which are not my own values, my view is
reflective and absorbs the form of the value, the facts, the meta-
valuative fact that some values are present, namely, that they are being
adhered to. Yet, for whoever holds to the values I observe, while they
adhere to them, the same values belong to the realm of content, and
they will usually pay no attention to their form. When we speak of a
change in values, the word “value” refers only to the formal aspect —
the aspect revealed to the view from outside. With regard to its
content, a value is unchangeable, even though it may refer to a valua-
tion of change. Accordingly, we are inclined to make intent, or some-
thing in it, absolute. For cognitive reflection about concepts of justice
in various societies, justice is changeable, or in any case, one concept
of justice may be exchanged for another. However, for the person in-
tending justice on the transitive level, it is unchangeable; he or she
cannot possibly believe that such and such rules equal justice now, but
on the morrow something else will represent justice. Being indignant
at an injustice, one does not say: this is unjust according to the stan-
dards I hold now.
It is true that at times emotion is no content whatsoever, even for
the person who experiences it; it functions in such cases, for instance,
as the form of some non-emotional content which may not be valua-
tive either. Yet the origin of this emotion, so far as it is a typical emo-
tion, is in its status as content. Before love and hate serve as a form for
thoughts, they are contents of sensual perception; usually they deal
with an object being viewed as beloved or as hated, namely, with
comprehension of a sight as expressing the state of being-beloved or as
expressing the state of arousing love, being worthy of love. We also
comprehend the sight as expressing the object's being graceful, attrac-
tive, or as expressing its being hated, threatening and malicious.
Comprehension of the sight belongs to the intentional act of seeing, it
is part of this act, and the meaning of the sight is the intentional con-
tent of seeing. The same holds for the tactile, the audible and other
sensory aspects of contemplation. In one of its origins, emotion be-
longs to the meaning of sensory impressions we receive from the ob-
ject.
Intentional content is the non-factual aspect of intention. Here it
makes no difference whether the sensory aspect has the character of a
picture or of a symbol, whether the content is an emotion or a concept,
whether the intention is valuative, cognitive, or the contemplation of
possibilities. Factuality is only one aspect in any case — the aspect
that serves once again as an object for intention on a higher plane —
the object of descriptive and explanatory as well as of valuing reflec-

tion.
Whoever fails to notice the content of emotion because of its fac-
tual aspect (and therefore claims that it is not a value), will not commit
the same error in the intellectual sphere. When dealing with an
intellectual, cognitive act whose content is a concept, it is easy to see
that there is more to it than form, because its content crystallizes at the
opposing pole to its form. As content it is universal, as form it is
individual, an activity taking place in real life. The objectivity of in-
tention qua content resides in the direction towards the objective, and
from this angle it is precisely the form which is subjective — is a
certain component of the subject; the subjectivity of intention qua
content resides in its existence in the sphere opposite the facts, but
from this angle the form is objective, is part of the world, part of the
field of facts and not a reference to the latter. Intellectual cognitive
intention is well-polarized and the philosopher cannot ignore this po-
larity; he is compelled to admit that here the factuality of intention is
but one pole of an entirety. In emotion, however, the non-factual ele-
ment is a certain facet, but it does not crystallize at a particular pole;
one may, therefore, be apprehensive of a one-sided view, namely, of
understanding form, as if it were not the form of a content, a meta-
valuative fact, but an ordinary fact. Even though what is perceived by
reflection is always only form, and a comprehensive view understands
it as the form of a content, the one-sided view does not see the signals
of its function, its bearing evidence of an intentional content which
exists beyond the form. The one-sided view we should beware of here
may be called “naturalistic” — viewing emotion as a mere reaction to
sensory impressions. The fear of such a naturalism somewhat recedes
in the discussion of conceptual thought, because it is fairly obvious
that this is not a reaction, or only a reaction, primarily on account of its
inherent demand for validity. This naturalism with regard to emotion is
compatible with an entirely non-naturalistic approach to conceptual
thinking.
This naturalism not only denies the intentional character of emo-
tion, but views it as always following sensation, which as a picture or a
symbol of an object conveys information. In this view, the emotion has
an external relation to the object and to the sensation, namely, the
relation of effect to cause. It is not the meaning of the specific sensa-
tion immediately involved in this sensation.
Whoever distinguishes between content and its form in the intel-
lectual sphere, understands that here factuality belongs to form and
that the adherence to a conceptual value is but one aspect of value-
thought, needs only this additional step: to make this distinction and
this understanding pertinent for the entire sphere of intention.
This discussion raises the question which emotions may be con-
sidered emotions proper, or typical emotions, i.e., originate in their
function as intentional content. Are joy and sadness also typical emo-
tions (in the meaning mentioned here)? What is the relation between
understanding an emotion of another person, and experiencing an emo-
tion? We will not attempt to answer these questions here. For this
discussion it is sufficient that there are emotions directed at objects,
emotions expressed in images of these objects, which may be embod-
ied in value-properties of the objects, i.e., there are emotions to which
their function as content is essential and enables them to come into
being, even if they do not function exclusively in this manner.
The claim we presented at the beginning of the current paragraph,
was the following: an emotion represents a fact and not the content of
an “ought to” and is accordingly not a value. We must now treat of the
category “ought to” that appears in this claim. This category does not
refer to the whole sphere of values — it characterizes only values of
reason, namely, conceptually crystallized values (and even among
these, usually only norms and obligations).
As the category “ought to” serves only part of the sphere of values,
one should not say about something: this issue does not constitute an
“ought,” therefore it is not a value.
Preference
Preference can be characterized as choice or quasi-choice. It is an

adjudication between good and good or between bad and bad. When a
person is faced by a choice, adjudication will hold on to the greater
and abandon the lesser good, or hold on to the lesser and avoid the
greater evil. When a person is not actually faced by a choice, his pref-
erence is somewhat like a game that simulates choosing.
Preference is therefore a certain kind of valuation. While valuing is
basically drawing a line between good and bad, preference demarcates
the difference between good and good or bad and bad; namely, it dif-
ferentiates between relative good and relative bad. A bad possibility
compared to another bad possibility can be relatively good.
The act of preferring takes place on ground prepared by another
valuation which is not preference, since the comparison of good with
good assumes that the distinction between good and bad has already
been accomplished.
Preference, in its turn, divides into two kinds:
A) Quantitative preference — choosing one out of multiple objects

possessing the same value-property, based on measurements according
to the scale of a single value.
B) Qualitative preference — choosing one out of multiple values
(one from among different value-properties).45 Qualitative preference
combines a volition and an act of reflection.
Only qualitative preference (when carried out in the presence of an
actual choice) is an adjudication in its proper meaning, namely, an act
of the will.
Prima facie, qualitative preference is a valuation of values. We
should, however, keep in mind that a value is not wont to be valued
but from the angle of its form. A motive can be valued, adherence to a
value can be valued, persistence in such adherence, and other factors
belonging to the form can be valued — an implementation of a value
and its embodiment by a value-property; we can, of course, value a
volition or a deed from the aspect of the volition it embodies. But, the
content of a valuative value is not, in its turn, subject to additional
valuation. There is no need to justify the basis of justification once
again. One does not ask whether justice is just or beauty is beautiful.
Qualitative preference represents valuing reflection, whose task is
to value consciousness and its motives; the object are the forms of this
consciousness, because reflection covers but the form of intention.
Society and Its Mode of Reality
Relations “between” human beings which make up society do not

reside between but within them, within their consciousness. Even their
institutional crystallization, state and law included, has no independent
existence whatsoever; it exists but in consciousness, namely, only in
the consciousness of individuals. The same rule holds for money and
for property in general.
These relations, however, and primarily their crystallizations —
state, law, property, money — usually appear to the members of soci-
ety as very real, as an objective reality independent of their conscious-
ness. And truly, these relations exist objectively, but this is the objec-
tive or factual existence of consciousness itself. Nothing in this exis-
tence, in this mode of being, is independent of consciousness. Society
is a certain segment of intentional form (or the form of a certain seg-
ment of intention).
For several reasons, the form of intention may indeed be mistak-
enly considered as something outside and independent of conscious-
ness.
A) The form is not always conscious it is not in all instances

grasped immediately by self-perception. For example, the thinker need
not be aware of his manner of thought. The form is independent of
awareness in general and awareness of itself in particular. This inde-
pendence of awareness can in some circumstances appear as independ-
ence from the mind.
B) From a number of angles, the form of intention is not subject to
the will, even when it is conscious. This is true of emotional as well as
of intellectual forms.
C) Forms of intention which have crystallized as inter-personal re-
lations, acquire independence with regard to the individual.
The intention whose forms make up society, is intention towards
values; thought about society and its institutions is but reflective
knowledge and valuation of forms of value-thought. Facts in the
sphere of relations between one individual and another, for instance,
reciprocal contractual obligations they undertake, are meta-valuative
facts.
When someone tells a friend that X, with whom both are ac-
quainted, embezzled his employer's money, was caught and sacked, he
may but wish to inform his friend, to report facts, without valuing X
and his deeds; the friend may view the story in the same manner and
ask for factual details — what the employer knew at various stages
about the use of his money, whether he trusted X and so on, questions
about X's and his employer's intentions and emotions. The conversa-
tion is therefore conducted on a meta-valuative neutral level, but the
language is valuative now and then, because, as opposed to axiology,
common reflection about value-thought needs no special technical jar-
gon (different from the language employed by value-thought). The
same word designates a value on the level of its application as well as
on the level of reflection about it and its application. Because of this
the meta-valuative conversation may sometimes, so to say, slide un-
wittingly back to its original level. For instance, the parties to this
conversation, on the face of it, draw a valuative conclusion from the
facts — that X should be made to repay what he stole, or that in any
case he should not be given money to handle. Actually, they have
passed from the meta-valuative, neutral meaning of the words describ-
ing a certain social reality, to the valuative meaning of these words,
and have drawn a practical conclusion through the mediation of this
meaning.
It is quite possible for a person to describe a bank robbery with
some sympathy (let us say, if nobody was hurt), employing words
which are negative on the original level of their meaning (also for
whoever tells the story) like “robbery,” “fraud,” “misrepresentation”
— even though in the meta-valuative context of the story they bear no

negative coloring; here they are somehow amusing and are usually
viewed in this vein by the listeners as well. When the gap between
levels is so great there is no danger of unwittingly sliding from one to
the other, but it seems that such a gap is not frequent.
Dealing with ordinary facts, for instance those concerning inani-
mate nature, a contemporary of ours would not confuse a value and its
application with things and facts. However, when the facts are meta-
valuative it is harder to pinpoint the passage from fact to value and
vice-versa, because here the fact is but the form of a value, namely, the
latter's residing in our consciousness. The value form is caught be-
tween two levels of content — the level whose reality is made up by
the form, and that which discusses it as an object; it turns into a pro-
gressively thinning factual barrier between levels of content, at times
becoming transparent and disappearing from the sight of the philoso-
pher. If Reuben believes wholeheartedly that he owes Simon 1000 $,
and he persists in his belief, he will, on the face of it, truly owe him
this sum — in particular if he expresses this belief in writing and signs
it. The question whether a debt by Reuben to Simon exists turns on a
meta-valuative fact. If a person believes that he is sinning by not
adhering to the articles of faith his religion prescribes, could he be
wrong? His belief concerns a meta-valuative fact, valued as a sin; yet,
the meta-valuative fact here is, as it were, a layer of thin ice, walked
by individual reflection.
However, whoever cautiously walks this layer of thin ice, will find
that it covers the entire field of value-thought and also the whole field
of intention, and the border between the moving waters and the ice
exists. The valuative content of intention and its factual existence
complement each other in unity, but are by no means identical.
Truly there is no passage from the form of any intention to its con-
tent, because these are two facets of the same procedure, and one facet
does not turn into the other one.46 Reflection deals always exclusively
with form. However, reflection itself proceeds from the description of
the form of value-thought to its valuation, namely, from the descrip-
tion in valuative language of meta-valuative facts to their valuation
and to practical conclusions.
The passage that occurs in reflection does not affect its object. It is
reflection itself which passes from one kind of reference to intentional
form to another kind of reference to the same. The form which serves
as an object for reflection does not turn into the content it serves as
form, nor does this content turn into its own form. A fact and valuative
content do not metamorphose into each other. This rule is valid for the
fact which is the object of valuative content, as well as for the fact that
X thinks this content (and how he thinks it).
A meta-valuative fact is not less substantial than another fact; it
lends itself to neutral description, i.e., which may be accepted as cor-
rect by adherents to opposing values. And as a meta-valuative fact is
subject to the same rule as all facts, one cannot derive a valuation or a
practical conclusion from such a fact without the mediation of a valua-
tive assumption.
An imperative (non hypothetical) and statements of worthiness and
of what ought to be, are not derived (directly) from the neutral descrip-
tion of social facts, or from any description so far as it is neutral.
Conjoint Intention towards the Same Meanings
The bond between content and content also belongs to the realm of
content. That is to say: the content of intention is not cast into separate
units, each one indifferent to all the rest, and connected to each other
by links of form; as if contents were shut into metal boxes, joined by
metal links. And from intention in general to thoughts: the connection
between the intentional content of one thought to the content of
another one is not only formal; on the contrary, on the whole it is
primarily the bond of content.
The first content bond between several intentions is their being di-
rected towards the same intent. Identity of intent is the content bond
between different acts. But this bond is also accompanied by a formal
element, and it is the latter which enables reflection to discuss the
bond; even though reflection fails to reproduce the identicalness con-
ceptually, it can refer to it so far as it was immediately understood on
the pre-reflective level; this shortcoming of intellectual reflection
arises because identicalness is a bond of content and not a pattern of
form.
Understanding an intent as identical with the intent of a previous
act (along the continuity of the same proceeding or within another
proceeding) involves understanding the distinction between the identi-
cal and the different. The identification is not made by means of dis-
tinctive marks, because in this case one would have to ask how these
marks are to be identified — whether once again by distinctive marks;
the identification occurs immediately (a person getting up in the morn-
ing does not ponder who he is and needs no distinctive marks to de-
termine his own identity).
Identification by the intellect is preceded by that of sense percep-
tion. A person grasps that two sense-percepts are identical already at
the lowest level of complexity in sensory reception. The casting of

intentional content into units, namely into intents, occurs by virtue of
identification.
The identity bond between intentions provides the basis for a bond
of continuity, thus enabling us to weave a thread of comprehension
which passes through many intentions. From here we will turn to the
connection between intentional proceedings of different people.
The primary connection between human beings is their conjoint in-
tention towards the same intent. This connection is the foundation for
all other human ties. The identity bond between intentional proceed-
ings of different people, enables them to intertwine their intentional
contents. The contents join a totality by virtue of their consisting of the
same metaphysical matter, and by their thematic proximity. The
common thought embodied in conversation belongs to the primary
connection, but conjoint or common intention also occurs in the sphere
of perception.
The quasi-natural factual relation between members of a society is
merely a covering for the primary connection, even when it is institu-
tionalized and has acquired quasi-independence of the individuals in-
volved (they replace each other, the relation remains valid); it is but a
form of intention, or more precisely: a form of the content bonds be-
tween the minds of individuals.
Here as well as in individual consciousness the essentially first
bond is identicalness and the distinction between the identical and the
different. Different individuals intend the same intent. To the question
whether this is truly one and the same intent, one should reply that it is
so in the same manner in which an individual intends the same intent
on different occasions — notwithstanding some difference between the
intent on one occasion and that on the other one.
Individuals can understand each other by virtue of intent identity,
and they can also continue each other's thoughts. In this partnership,
one person is not the object of another's activity or thought, but both
intend a third thing. One person becomes the object of his or her coun-
terpart only on a higher level, which rests on this layer of intentional
cooperation.
It has become clear what makes the joint and the mutual under-
standing possible. As communication it is carried out at its basis by
means of immediately understood expressions, i.e., by means of sen-
sations which embody their meaning and need no interpretation —
emotional meanings as well as value neutral meanings (such as causa-
tion).47
The immediate character of the expression does not exclude errors
and misunderstandings, because the point of immediacy is that it needs
no mediation, no explanation in order to understand a certain

sensation. In other words: this sensation (the expression) is not mean-
ingless and waiting for me to supply the meaning (by interpretation);
however, it has not yet been said thereby, what the cognitive value of
this meaning is.
Mutual expressive understanding in the sphere of perception en-
ables humans to develop a system of common symbols and signs, to
draw on symbolic expressions and to converse with each other.
I can think about another's thought only when I have understood it,
namely, when I have thought it myself (following the other person's
utterance). Accordingly, I can think about the other person as having
this thought only after understanding him to some degree on the level
of participation in its content. In the course of a conversation the
listener is subject to the rivalry between an understanding and a
reflective approach; adopting one approach prevents adopting the other
at the same time, or at least impedes it. This rivalry indicates that the
approach to another person as an object is not liable to mix with the
approach to the other one as a partner on the basic level of reference to
the same intent.
What was said here about consciousness is mutatis mutandis valid
in practice. In practice, inter-personal partnership is also a necessary
condition for one individual to become the object of another individ-
ual's activity.
As mentioned above, the casting of intentional content into intents
occurs by virtue of identification, i.e., actually by virtue of the content
casting itself.
The casting of consciousness in general into individual subjects
occurs by virtue of the will's individuality, namely, it occurs because
two people do not possess one and the same will. Only the boundaries
of the will determine the borderline between my consciousness and
other humans, between my soul and all other human souls. The do-
main of voluntary action is wide enough to establish the individuality
of the mind.
As the difference between will-faculties of individuals explain why
a number of humans do not make up one intending subject, so the
existence of the will explains why a person has no more than one soul
or intellect, namely, why he or she is a single personality. A human
being is an individual, i.e., indivisible, because his will is indivisible
(and as far as his will is indivisible). Even when a person seeks to
annul his own in favor of somebody else's will, and the same person
wishes to be absorbed by the personality of the other, he cannot do so.
The will can annul itself in this or that case, with regard to certain
issues, but it cannot abolish itself altogether (without injuring the very
life of its owner). The very existence of the will therefore impedes
mystic aspirations which seek to abolish the boundaries of the indi-
vidual (and thus the individual itself) by its absorption into a perfect
being; in fact, mystic authors point to this impediment.48
David Hume asked what our impression of the “I,” the self was.
And indeed, it seems that there is no unmixed impression of the self.
Yet, in self-perception we receive impressions from volitions, and
these include a feeling of the self, of the “I” that wills. Accordingly
commonsense rejects doubts concerning the existence of the “I.”
PART II
The Division of Values and

their Typology
Chapter 1
The Principle of Division
In this part I will try to divide values into sections according to the
manner of their application, and describe some types of values in each
section — values around which, all other values in this section cluster.
The question we have to answer is according to what values should
be divided. We have to take account of a distinction made by various
scholars,49 even though it appears in a number of variants and in
slightly differing terminology. This is the distinction between what, in
its own right, possesses a value-property in the full sense of the word,
and that which does not have full ownership of a value-property,
because the latter adheres to it by virtue of something else and not in
its own right and immediately. This distinction was linked to the claim
that an experience (which includes any action or activity) or a state of
consciousness may have intrinsic value, namely, it may possess a
value-property which is not mediated by anything else. Experiences of
pleasure, joy or their opposites, as well as experiences of wonder and
being emotionally moved, are links in the chain of a person's life,
whose essence is their specific value-character. An external object on
the other hand, namely, a thing or a set of events in a person's
environment, has value because experiencing it carries value, i.e., the
meeting between this person and this object possesses value. The
object's value is extrinsic, it is indirectly related to the object.
According to the inner logic of this claim, nothing can be said to

be good, unless it is good for someone. That is to say that goodness is
being good for somebody, and reality of goodness in a good thing
resides in someone's experience of this thing. The thing is good in a
mediated sense, while experiencing it is good in its own right. It is not
the apple which is good in the full meaning of good, but eating it, not
the painting, but looking at it, not possessions but their consumption.
This logic is rooted in the relational character of values and value-
properties. Their character makes the existence of an external object's
value-property conditional on the latter being bestowed on the object
by the meeting with a subject. The actual existence of a value-property
resides exclusively in the experience and in life.
The point of departure for this logic is the critical axiological view,
which examines the mode of existence attached to value-phenomena
(in order to assemble a kind of axiological ontology) and tips the
scales in favor of the subject — not in favor of the subject beyond its
relation to an object, but in favor of the live subject, in favor of the
experience. The importance of this logic lies in that it undermines
popular value-philosophy, which has a penchant for extreme objectiv-
ism, a cult-like approach to the material embodiments of values. How-
ever, the popular value objectivism, which mistakes value-properties
for fundamental properties of an external object, is not just an errone-
ous philosophy, to be replaced by the study of critical axiology; it is an
expression, albeit a naive one, of the outward-directed character of
valuative intention. Objectivism expresses the general tendency of the
intentional system to objectify. However, the unbalanced picture of
value-character critical axiology draws, shortchanges the report on this
tendency by presenting the experience, or the state of mind, as valua-
tive per se, in opposition to the external object, whose value is merely
secondary or extrinsic. Does a person undergoing a valuative experi-
ence — that on which axiological attention now focuses — truly feel
that the experience itself is the core, and the external object this person
experiences is merely secondary? Is experiencing the hub and not what
is being experienced? Is it possible for the form of intention to be the
major issue while its content is subordinate, namely, will this be the
original transitive experience itself, in which the external object is the
intent? I suspect that precisely those who claim that the experience is
the core draw a picture which is not faithful to it, namely, to the
original experience that turns outward from the individual to the world
— the experience which reveals its nature when it is lived through in
concentration, while “one forgets oneself,” without reflection which
might spoil its spontaneity. I do not suggest that the scales turn to-
The Principle of Division 105
wards the object beyond the meeting, but towards the object within the
meeting.50
There is an additional argument against the division into experi-
ence, or a state of consciousness or of mind on the one hand, and the
external object on the other hand: From the viewpoint of consistent
critical reflection — is the object truly external? Is the object not that
which is being experienced, which exists within the experience, that
whose properties are all relational to the subject? It is precisely the
viewpoint adopted by the distinction we discuss here, which requires
the object to be considered external only to one of the experienced
contents, or to one of the intents, but not to consciousness as a whole,
or the mind as a whole. For instance, the object will be external to the
body of the valuing individual, but not to its mind, since this exter-
nality — as it is intended — is altogether made of materials belonging
to the mind, of sensations and notions (the mind here has a wider
scope than the body).
The object of the experience is the content which has undergone
objectification. The critical axiological reflection short-changes this
object because of a perspectival distortion.
According to its nature, reflection only treats of the form of an in-
tention, while it discards the content as belonging to the object of the
particular intention. If reflection addresses a transitive intention, it
discards the content of this intention as belonging to an external object,
namely, external in the sense of axiological ontology. This is not the
same externality that a person ascribes to an object he or she expe-
riences on the transitive level — an object which is external in the
sense that it is not a limb or a part of the human body. In the context of
axiological ontology externality means independence from the mind or
from consciousness. It transforms the object described as external into
something alien to the mind and irrelevant to the values that mind
maintains.
Axiological ontology asks: Can anything that has no relation to a
human being (or a subject) possess a value-property? Can a value-
property not be of value for someone? The answer is negative. Inten-
tional content and the real object of experience become blind spots for
this ontology, their contents being transferred either to the intentional
act and to the form in general, or to the utterly external object. This
division of intentional content and of the object that is immanent to
experience, transfers value-properties to the act. Not beauty, but the
pleasure derived from it “possesses value of its own,” or “intrinsic
value,” not justice, but the good of society as a whole, not freedom,
but what one does with freedom.
All this yields a perspectival distortion which biases truth to vari-

ous degrees. Verily, between the intentional act, including its modes
and background, and “the object in itself,” there is something else —
the intentional content, or the intent, with its two facets: the objectified
facet, which has become a value-property, and what remains as a
subjective remnant that has not undergone objectification, namely,
which remains only the (subjective) content of an intention (devoid of
objective status).
We learn that although every value-property relates to a subject,
things, activities and people may possess a positive or negative value-
property in a full or intrinsic sense, and not only for the sake of pleas-
ure or sorrow, content or discontent. That is to say — even though the
beautiful thing is beautiful in someone's eyes, it is so in this person's
eyes by virtue of its essence and without reservations. Beauty is not
identical with the satisfaction derived from viewing it in a beautiful
thing. Nor does the question whether what is beautiful in the eyes of
one person, is also beautiful in the eyes of others, increase or decrease
the validity of this claim. We have, however, to clarify the nature of
the “what” mentioned here. When two people see the same thing and it
is beautiful in the eyes of one and not beautiful in the eyes of the other,
they do not see the same sight. Although this proposition is valid only
with regard to a certain, basic kind of beauty, it is sufficient for our
purpose. Beauty may belong to the factors constituting the sight, and
not only to those which make up the response to a sight.
A value may be relational in two aspects; we may ask about a good
thing for whom and in whose eyes it is good. And these are two
different questions. We may also ask in whose eyes these or those
contents (say, a certain kind of equality) represent justice — but it is
presumably impossible to ask “justice for whom” in the same way we
asked “good for whom?” Although we say that justice was done to a
certain individual (when people remedy an injustice done to him), this
belongs to the realization of justice, mediated by the application of the
value “justice” to facts, and not to the content which makes up this
value.
Good is relational in its form (in whose eyes, who adheres to it) as
well as in its content (for whom), while justice is relational only in its
form.
It would be wrong to understand justice as what is good for the
public. The absence of identity between justice and what is good for
the public may surface properly in a situation in which justice impedes
the public in its treatment of a certain individual (or some individuals)
belonging to it, and this impediment obstructs the public good.
The Principle of Division 107
The realization of justice therefore possesses a full value-character

of its own, which does not reside in the satisfaction we derive from it.
The identification of something which possesses self or inner value
with the experience or with trying it out, is therefore bound up with a
perspective of reflection that denies the existence of intentional con-
tent.
A typology of values cannot be built upon the shifting sands be-
tween object and subject, driven by the winds of reflection. Values
have to be divided into sections, so that each section holds experiences
as well as objects being experienced, be these external or internal. An-
other requirement is that the difference between sections should not
arise from the division of the valued objects into genera and species,
but from a difference which is essential to the form of valuation.
The requirements arising from our discussion can be met by a
principle of division based on the structure of activity.
Every valuative value is bound up with human activity. Aesthetic
values also possess this bond, because intuition belongs to the realm of
activity. And this bond may serve as a differentiating property in the
general division of values into sections, i.e., we will attribute a certain
value to one of the sections according to the nature of its bond with
activity.
The complex in which activity is embedded can be divided into
three members: The result of an action, the action proper and the
factors of an action. The third member circumscribes here the motives
and their background, all the factors that participate in bringing the
action about, and in some respect the individual subject as a whole.
I divide valuative values into three sections according to their di-
rect bond with this or that member of the activity-complex. A value is
directly bound up with one member, bearing upon the other members
through its mediation. The same can also be put in this way: We value
the totality and the remaining members according to one member, for
instance: We value the action-proper and the person carrying it out
according to the action's result.
The term “according to” can be used in two ways: a) A person val-
ues an object according to a certain value (namely, based on this value,
or in the course of its application). b) He or she values a certain object
according to another object (or one member according to another
member, always of course, based on some value), for instance, the
action proper according to its result.
To the extent that valuative values are accompanied by motives,
the division of the former may also serve as a division of the latter;
that is to say, the motivative value will belong to the same section and
to the same type within the section to which its congruent valuative
value belongs; it follows that this division may also serve as a division
of actions, so far as each of these actions is determined by an
exclusive, or a principal motive that belongs to a certain section and
type. When a type of deed or action matches a type of valuative value
by means of the motive, we will delineate the typical characteristics
according to the deed in which this particular motive, namely, that
according to which the deed was classified, is exclusive.
The sections are therefore:
First section: Values designated to value according to the action's
result.
Second section: Values designated to value according to the
action-proper.
Third section: Values designated to value according to the factors
of activity.
Forthwith I will also name them section A, section B and section C.
At the conclusion of the discourse about the division of values into
sections and types (at the end of Chapter 9 in this part) I will try to
present the result of this division in a table.
Chapter 2
The First Section: Valuation According

to Results. The End
The term “end,” in an extension of its usage, also serves at times in the
sense of “raison d'être.” We will use it here in its narrow meaning, as a
synonym for the word “goal.” That is to say, the end is an idea
(perceptual or conceptual) of an action's desired result; this action
itself is a means, namely, it is directed at the end. Although end is an
idea, the achieved end is not an idea, but the real, desired result (in our
terminology).
The end accommodates the valuation of the actually achieved re-
sult, the valuation and guidance of the action aimed at the result, as
well as the valuation of the person executing this action.
A typical achieved end is the outcome of an objective process, in-
tertwined with a goal-oriented action, or the final link in a chain of
cause and result, the action being one of the links. Sowing wheat is a
typical goal-oriented action — because one “sows in tears” as well as
because it emphasizes the integration of an action as a link in a natural
causal chain.
The person seeking the end has to be knowledgeable with regard to
the process his object undergoes, in order to enter the process and in-
cline it towards his end; furthermore: he needs previous knowledge of
the results (i.e., a well-founded supposition of the results; a supposi-

tion whose probability is proportional to the required amount of re-
sources).
The idea of the desired result appeals to the heart and to the intel-
lect. It appeals to the heart as a pleasant idea. The sower in tears is
encouraged by the idea of reaping. To the intellect, the idea of the re-
sult appeals as a planning instruction. Planning characterizes goal-ori-
ented activities. Good planning turns the following stage into execu-
tion, namely, into a non-spontaneous activity, which in principle can
be carried out by machines.
The end that appeals to the heart is the motive. A deed properly
belongs to those which are goal-oriented when the end is its sole mo-
tive, namely, when it has no positive value-property except the result it
is expected to achieve; its membership in this category becomes
especially obvious, when it possesses negative value-properties in
other aspects, for instance, if the deed is exhausting and unpleasant or
opposes the ideals of its executor.
Efficiency
Valuation of the objects of a goal-oriented deed is mediated by the

concept of usefulness, while the concept of efficiency mediates valua-
tion of the deed itself. Efficiency represents the combination of effec-
tiveness and economy (factors which may exist separately), namely,
the proportion between a given amount of accomplished end, i.e.,
product, and the amount of resources invested in it. The smaller the
amount of resources, the greater efficiency is. Here we view the
activity as an act of exchange: We provide resources, we receive a
realized end. Being efficient means to give but little.
An important component, present in any system of goal-oriented
resources, is time. The less time we devote to a goal-oriented activity
(while the quantity and quality of the result remains constant), the
greater its efficiency. The activity is valued negatively as a loss or a
sacrifice of resources and should therefore be contracted and reduced
as far as possible. The executor of a goal-oriented activity is
compensated for its negative value by the positive value of its result.
From here follows the most salient difference between an efficient
and a pleasant deed. The first is carried out as fast as possible, while
the second suffers from speed (in any case, beyond a certain limit).
What is efficient possesses in itself a negative value, while a pleasant
activity possesses a positive value. Accordingly, the typical pleasant
The End 111
deed is not goal-oriented and does not belong to section A but to sec-
tion B, in which the motive aims at the deed itself.
When a person eats tasty food, he or she does not try to do it effi-
ciently, so that their eating is not to be considered as goal-oriented.
However, a sick person who has no appetite and eats in order to get
well, may eat in an efficient manner.
A deed of mixed character, which according to its motives belongs
to both sections A and B, incorporates an opposition between these
heterogeneous elements; under certain circumstances the opposition
will become topical and require a decision and preference.
Whoever paints his home, fixes something within it, decorates it or
works in his garden (and perhaps also the person polishing his car),
usually does not do it efficiently, because he does not try to save time.
Why does he not grudge spending his time? Perhaps a), because on the
face of it, he already consumes the product of his work while he works
on it, and consumption, of course, is not meant to be efficient; in this
case, two activities take place simultaneously or alternately, like a
person who now and then tastes a dish he or she is cooking; or perhaps
b), because he likes this work and is free to do it in his own home
anyway he wishes.
The medieval artisan, whose guild protected him from competi-
tion, could afford to elaborate his work at the expense of efficiency —
for instance, to decorate his carpentry with artistic carvings.
Viewing the action as devoid of intrinsic positive value in the
realm of goal-orientation is not only a matter of methodology. From
the methodological aspect, we consider an action in section A as de-
void of positive value, because we look for typical cases. The typical
case of section A is that which has value exclusively by virtue of its
end, and not in its own right.
However, apart from the methodological aspect, a relevant consid-
eration arises not from the nature of the meta-valuative discussion, but
from the nature of the issue. Goal-orientation itself demands effi-
ciency, and efficiency demands curtailing the action's time-span,
namely, viewing the action as a sacrifice offered up to the end, as a
surrender of resources for which compensation is due, i.e., the view of
activity as negative and therefore as requiring contraction or curtailing,
belongs to the structure of goal-orientation.
The predisposition of a person for a goal-oriented action is differ-
ent from that for an action pleasant in its course, or in general for one
desirable for its own sake. The predisposition for a goal-oriented ac-
tion is tyranny of the will.
The Proportion of a Sacrifice in the Present to a

Reward in the Future
As said before, the goal-oriented deed is a matter of exchange. The

decision to execute it is a decision to sacrifice power, time and materi-
als now, in order to gain a reward in the future.
How great a sacrifice is a certain reward worth? Here we face a
complex question. Axiology should not recommend a norm, but try to
find out in general what norms can determine this matter. It has to
clarify whether different kinds of sacrifice and different kinds of
reward have some common denominator. If there is no common
denominator, no common measurability, the existence of a quantitative
relation, which fulfills the role of a threshold of profitability is
possible.
Let us take a case possessing common measurability. Is it worth-
while to expend 100 units now, in order to receive 100 units in future
(in a year)? To clarify the question: We do not speak of 100 physical
units (because then the question would address the relation between
these and my present need, whether they represent more than I need),
but of 100 units of a certain pleasure (we will assume for a moment
that such a thing exists). It seems we will receive more negative than
positive replies to our question. For this discussion, it is sufficient that
we will also receive negative replies. We go on to ask whether 100 in
exchange for 101 would be alright. We can also ask in financial terms:
What is the correct or accepted rate of interest for these pleasures?
Let us now assume that there are negative units of pleasure,
namely, units of pain which set off the units of pleasure, in any case
when they appear simultaneously. Will we agree to suffer 100 negative
units in order to gain 100 positive ones a year later? If not, will we
agree in exchange for 101 a year later? The question concerns the rate
of interest (or the discount) of pleasure and suffering. This question
incorporates another one — how much wear and tear a person is pre-
pared to undergo today, in order to achieve a given amount of pleas-
ure, in the future.
It appears that the rate of interest for pleasure and distress differs
with different people, and even differs for the same people in different
periods of their life or perhaps even on different days. The diligent
person has a low rate of interest, the lazy one has a high rate of inter-
est. It seems that a zero rate of interest will mark the upper limit of
industry and an infinite rate of interest the limit of laziness. It is pos-
sible, however, that people who are not lazy, who tend to be active in a
spontaneous and non goal-oriented manner, people inclined to engage
in activities whose attraction resides in themselves and not in their
The End 113
results, will join the lazy ones in choosing a higher rate of interest than
diligent people. The rate of interest for pleasure and distress is
therefore not a function of personal readiness for activity and effort in
general, but represents the degree of goal-orientation an individual ad-
heres to on a certain day (or permanently).
The will determines the rate of interest for pleasure and suffering
and by means of this decision expresses its structure in general, as well
as its position with regard to goal-orientation in particular.
A lower rate of interest prevails in modern industrial society
(within the active nucleus that propels it) than in traditional societies,
and behavior according to this lower rate is considered more rational.
By the way — in a certain sense a negative rate of interest is possible;
a person may seek to postpone pleasures (to leave the best dish for the
end of the meal) and to hasten pain, because anticipating pleasure is
pleasurable in itself (an addition to the expected pleasure), 51 while an-
ticipating pain is distressing in itself (an addition to expected distress).
There is some room for casuistry here: whether the rate of interest is
truly negative in such cases. But we will not discuss this possibility.
The Individual as a Means to His Own Ends
In every goal-oriented activity, its executor is also aimed at an end,

i.e., he himself is one of the means to the end. As the activity's execu-
tor is also the “owner” of the end (it is his end), the subject here has a
double status: he constitutes the end and he is subjected to it. He con-
stitutes the end by his will, and he is subject to it through his intellect,
his sensory observation and his body. As a will, he subjects himself as
intellect, as sensory faculty and as moving body.
The will is not only required to constitute, namely, to choose and
establish the end, but also to supervise the body, the sensory observa-
tion and the intellect — lest they indulge their own inclination to act
spontaneously or to rest — in order to have them carry out, at the fast-
est possible pace, the plan paving the way to the goal. The will has to
overcome opposition all along the way; this opposition increases the
more the end, addressing the intellect which processes it into a set of
instructions, is alien to the end addressing the heart, namely, to the
attractive idea of the achieved end, meant to arouse the motives that
propel the implementation of the intellect's instructions. When the
instructions point to a deed which is not at all similar to the achieved
goal as it is imagined, the end addressing the heart confronts an obsta-
cle on its way to mobilize the requested forces. The will stops the gap.
This gap exists already between the instruction to sow and the wish
to reap, but it is greater when the instruction demands a repeated
movement of the hand on an assembly-line, or the filling in of blanks
in forms. The will bridges the expanding abyss by diverting forces,
aroused by the pleasurable idea of the achieved result, into the channel
leading there, and by underpinning these forces.
Once the intellect, the faculty of observation and the body become
accustomed to the implementation-routine, the will needs less vigi-
lance to supervise them. Recreation, on the other hand, diverts the
intellect, the observation faculty and the body from the tasks of im-
plementation, even beginning to arouse their inclination to act in their
own way; thus the will has to be more vigorous and to use force, in
order to put them back on the track they are destined to follow.
Here it is meet to address briefly some front-lines on which goal-
orientation clashes with opposing inclinations.
Goal-orientation trains the faculty of perception and observation to
search certain objects, to look for certain characteristics in the object,
to choose the useful, and, of course, to do so quickly.
Observation, however, tends by its nature not to hurry. If some-
thing within the object arouses it in particular, it is the pleasant and not
the useful element. It may be pleasant to behold or pleasant in some
other respect. Observation does not hunt for anything, but it may ask
for something, for the continuing display of something, for the
continuation of a displayed sequence, or even for its completion. From
the view point of the faculty of observation, the thing itself, as it were,
asks in this case for completion, while observation just follows in its
wake.
When observation is not harnessed to an end, it incorporates im-
mediate understanding of expressions in general and emotional expres-
sions in particular. The free observer lets his or her eye linger on a
detail until its image surfaces, or until it joins other details and ex-
presses something. According to the nature of activities, a rivalry ex-
ists between a predisposition for observation aimed at understanding
expressions and that for observation which supplies the intellect with
data in the search for what is useful. If such a pattern becomes fixated
within an individual, it may damage his or her ability to change to the
alternative tack. Observation, concentrating on the search for what is
useful, is weaned away from its own inclinations and may, in the
course of time, lose part of its ability to see understandingly.
Goal-orientation trains the intellect to apply principles and to cre-
ate on the conceptual level, by means of these principles and based on
the data supplied by observation, a practical substitute for the objects
of goal-oriented activity. This substitute enables the intellect to arrange
The End 115
the deed in thought prior to arranging it in reality, and as it were, even

to absorb possible failures in a thinking-game and not in practice
(Bergson believed that the intellect is incapable of reaching far beyond
its goal-oriented role). In other words: The conceptual picture the
intellect is required to create, must enable it hypothetically to predict
results of our intervention while it is going on. That whose reaction to
our intervention cannot be predicted, is not an object of goal-oriented
activity. The intellect, trained to obey the goal-oriented will is
required, like observation, to save time, to avoid dealing with endless
details and to keep to the straight and narrow. When the will in its
capacity as power of judgment, decides to stop the intellect's work on a
certain task, it assembles the results of the latter's labor into a coherent
picture and answers the questions that are still open. The will allocates
probabilities: When the data accumulated by the intellect yield a
partial picture, justifying the allocation of 70% probability to a
positive, and 30% probability to the negative answer, the will some-
times stops the intellect's work, allocating, for example, 90% to the
positive and 10% to the negative answer (according to the individual
will's inclination), and begins to issue commands according to the
positive answer. If such a procedure, which the goal-oriented will
tends to employ, extracts a high price through practical failures, the
will has to revert to greater patience within this specific range of cases,
and to permit the intellect to use more time for its tasks, raising the
threshold from 70 to 75.
It would be correct in general to say that the will determines the
end while the intellect chooses the means, because the choice of means
to a given end is but cognitive work. However, even in pure goal-ori-
entation, when the executor of the deed considers it merely as a means
and therefore planning the deed is a matter of cognition, the will qua
judging power also intervenes with regard to probability calculations,
i.e., the shaping of verifications.
If the intellect, owing to its inclination to inquire into whatever
crosses its sight, begins to research the will itself, it flaws the latter's
spontaneity in the same manner in which it is liable to flaw the spon-
taneous course of other activities the individual engages in, by observ-
ing them. For example, a person becomes angry, his fury rises and he
decides to observe his rising fury; it will not be the same fury if he
succeeds at all in observing his own emotional states, because self-
observation alters what is observed; he may, however, fail in the im-
plementation of the decision to observe his rising fury because the
latter carries him away, namely, it refuses, so to say, to become an
object for observation. The same pattern holds for the opposition pre-
vailing between the mechanism of goal-oriented activity and its core,

the will, and self-knowledge.
The Individual as a Means to Another's Ends
When the intellect, the observation faculty and the motor system of
an individual adjust to the execution of tasks in general and to a certain
routine of execution in particular, the individual's will can in certain
matters be replaced by another will, authorized by the former, which
relinquishes its place and transfers its authority to the alien will. A
person can become a means for someone else only after he or she have
adjusted to their status as a means. In contradistinction, no one could
derive profit from a hippie in the sixties or the seventies of our century
or from a cynic in ancient times (although a person could derive
pleasure from their company).
When a goal-oriented individual's will deposits part of its authority
with an alien will, it does not do so in order to establish an additional
end, but as a means to its own, already established ends, namely, in
exchange for a reward or the cancellation of a threat, be it a threat
from the same alien will, or from some third party.
The alien will tends less to accept self-oriented inclinations in the
systems which from its point of view should merely carry out instruc-
tions. Replacement of the master will usually make subjection to the
end more severe.
The goal-oriented individual is his own master, that is to say, he is
his own slave. As a slave, he can be turned into a means or a tool for
someone else. On the other hand, as a master who treats himself as a
means, he considers others even more strongly as means. If he con-
siders himself also or to a great extent as a means, he will tend to con-
sider others exclusively as means.
A person captured into slavery as a result of war or a slave hunt
does not function as a slave against his will, but against his wishes;
that is to say, the will decides to prefer slavery to death, but the person
wishes not to be faced with this alternative. Regarding such a person, it
is not only his master who views him as a means (a living and
speaking tool) but also the other way round: he treats his master in a
goal-oriented manner (for instance, the goal of annulling the threat). In
slavery, the interpersonal relationship is mutually goal-oriented, on the
part of the master as well as on the part of the living and speaking tool.
Therefore, as Aristotle states, friendship between the master and the
slave, qua slave, is not possible.52
The End 117
Goal-Oriented Speech
When a person turns from a subject, which has intrinsic value, into
a means for himself and for someone else, the interpersonal bond also
turns into a means. Speech, initially being voiced thought, namely,
letting the other one participate in the speaker's thought, or thinking
jointly about some object, now becomes itself an external object, that
is to be used as a tool. It is not anymore spontaneous cooperation with
the other one, but a tool used to manipulate him. It is not thinking
aloud, but the product of silent thought.
The factual aspect of intention also exists without goal-orientation,
be it in talk of the individual's soul with itself, or in talk with another
soul. But in goal-oriented speaking the factual aspect of the intention
becomes external to it; it is not anymore the intention's own form.
Goal-oriented speech has two facets: a facet of speaking about and
a facet of speaking to. From the angle of its content the speech is about
an object, and in this respect it may be truthful or not truthful; from the
angle of its form speech is to a person and shaped in order to attain
certain results in this person; accordingly it is measured as more or less
efficient.
In its simple manifestation, goal-oriented speech is a request or an
order, a threat or a promise, whether this form is revealed by the struc-
ture of a sentence or by its intonation. In its complex manifestation it
sounds as if the goal-oriented person talks innocently, provides infor-
mation or deliberates aloud; the speaker himself may, of course, be-
lieve in the truth of his information and the validity of his deliberations
and speak in order to make the other one draw the practical conclusion
that serves the speaker's end, or in order to win the listener's trust.
For the observing philosopher, goal-oriented speech in general and
its complex brand in particular, demonstrate the paradoxical phenome-
non of intention towards form. That is to say, this speech is thought
conducted on two floors at once: as “speech about” it belongs to one
floor, say, the transitive floor, but as “speech to” it is guided by the
reflective, i.e., a higher floor. Reflection's active intervention, aided by
the will on the transitive floor causes this transformation of form into
content — of what is usually and ordinarily a form of intention, into
the speaker's intent; at the same time, what is usually content becomes
here — again, for the speaker — something that accompanies thought,
aids it, i.e., a form of thought. The manipulative element of goal-ori-
ented speech creates the polarization of publicity-secrecy, which
characterizes the entire field of social occurrence.
Interest and End
Originally, the word “interest” and its derivations addressed in-

volvement, namely, a valuative attitude. For recent generations, they
have increasingly become synonymous with what possesses from a
goal-oriented point of view, a positive value-property. This property is
sometimes meant to be an end, or a means to achieve it, and some-
times also to be something like a potential end. The word “potential”
points to a special kind of objectification, characterized by the possi-
bility for someone to have an interest unknown to himself or herself (or
still unknown to him or her). Having such an interest is compatible
with acting against it. It is difficult to claim that a person has a goal
unknown to himself, but the transformation of the goal into an interest
makes this possible. That is to say, we who observe Reuben Ben-
Simon, believe he “should” establish a certain goal for himself (which
in reality he does not establish), and name it “the interest of Reuben
Ben-Simon”; we also believe that whatever aids achieving this goal
(which in reality does not exist) is in his interest. Reuben's interest is
seen as his potential goal, and we expect him to adopt it.
What ends (or, what is the same: goals) a person has, depends on
his or her will; circumstances influence the substance of ends only in a
roundabout way, through the will. In contradistinction, circumstances
and not the will determine what a person's interests are. Interest is
given. It seems to be an end dictated to a person by the surrounding
objects. Actually, neither objects nor our cognition about them may
dictate an end, but only the means required to achieve it.
The conceptual pattern bound up with the usage of the word “inter-
est” is a category in the valuative reflection of one goal-oriented indi-
vidual, discussing another goal-oriented individual. However, this
reflection does usually not consider itself as valuative, but as knowing
the facts of life in a neutral manner.
This category makes it possible also to ascribe a sort of end to
something besides a real, individual, human being. If we say that some
institution, be it a political party, a library, a state or a university, “has”
this or that end, this statement will presumably be interpreted thus: this
institution is a means to this or that end; the institution does not
establish the end. But we can speak of an institution's interests so that
it appears as a subject, possessing interests, and not as a means to their
realization. According to this manner of speech, we may refer to an
institution as if it had a will and adheres to values, without spelling this
out. If I say “party A has interest B” I will not be understood that party
A is useful for someone in achieving B, but that party A is interested
in achieving B (or that we expect it to be interested in doing so).
The End 119
Objectification of the end while it is transformed into an interest

ties therefore in with the set of ideas in which institutions exist as
subjects. These ideas may be acknowledged as convenient metaphors.
There are, however, multiple degrees in the transfer of characteristics
from the metaphor or the allegory to the exemplar. The user of the
metaphor is not always aware of the borderline between what is and
what is not transferred to the exemplar. If we ask him for an account,
he will draw the borderline in a manner that transfers the necessary
minimum to the exemplar. Nevertheless, while he uses the metaphor
and focuses on it, he may act according to a different borderline.
A group of people stands midway between the individual and a so-
cial institution. The group resembles a real subject in that it may ad-
here to common values (i.e., in a certain area members of the group
adhere to the same values), and it may in a certain sense establish an
end for itself (i.e., the members of the group establish the same end for
themselves), and act towards it (i.e., the members of the group will
coordinate their activities towards this end); but a group of people does
not have a will and is therefore not a subject. The subject-resembling
group is usually small, while one can only metaphorically speak about
large groups in the language one uses in speaking about an individual.
To sum up, the category “interest” is the objectification of an end,
and has the following features. A. Once the end has become an inter-
est, the will is no longer responsible for it. The human being under-
stands it, but did not establish it. The cancellation of the freedom to
choose, of the freedom to exchange this end for an alternative, stabi-
lizes the position of the end. B. The category “interest” enables norma-
tive speech about others to acquire a cognitive image. I do not say: he
acts in opposition to my advice (or to the advice I would have given,
had he asked me); but: in opposition to his interests. C. The category
facilitates the obedience of one individual to other individuals through
the mediation of an institution. The order does not come from another
person but from the institution, which acts in accordance with its in-
terests.
The concept of interest is convenient: It does not require any hy-
pothesis about the intentions of the person who is supposed to have the
interest. It is convenient precisely because of its fictitious character.
The insight into the constructive and fictitious nature of this concept is
not incompatible with its scientific application. But it puts some limits
upon this application.
Chapter 3
The First Section: Valuation According

to Results. Caution
We value a deed and its executor as cautious or incautious. This is

a type of values and valuations that belongs to the first section. A deed
is valued as cautious if it is arranged to prevent certain possible results.
In a goal-oriented deed, caution refers to a possible additional result
(apart from the end) which possesses a negative value. In a deed which
has value in itself, namely, one whose motive does not belong to the
first section, caution comprises a modification, activated by
consideration for the result.
In all cases, the motive for caution accompanies the principal mo-
tive. The reason to execute the deed which is valued as cautious, is not
caution. Accordingly, caution — as opposed to goal-orientation —
does not make up a type of deed.
Health, for instance, is a type of value belonging to the type of
caution-values. The person working towards an end, as well as the
person who eats and drinks out of need, may both be valued as being
cautious with regard to their health. For instance, a person who keeps
to a diet (namely, foregoes dishes he likes because of his diet), exe-
cutes by eating — like other people — a deed which is not performed
for the sake of its result, which is not measured by its efficacy, but
with him (or her) the deed undergoes a modification, in consideration
for the results of eating, or out of caution.
Chapter 4
The Second Section: Valuation

According to the Activity Itself. The
Need
Feeling Valuation
The first issue to address in order to understand the nature of a

need as a value is that valuation based on need is not made by valua-
tion-sentences, but occurs within sensation and feeling. Valuing ac-
cording to a need is not an act of judgment. I value the beverage in
front of me by my sense of taste. Here valuation is but a feeling I ex-
perience while drinking it. The sentence “the drink is tasty and refresh-
ing” does not make the valuation; it posteriorly expresses it in con-
cepts and words.53
What is the object that possesses the value-property of being tasty
and refreshing? To be precise, the object is the act of drinking, while
the beverage has value only in a secondary, mediating sense. And so it
is in general: The act that satisfies a need has value, and by virtue of
this act its object also possesses value; in a slight extension of the
accepted usage of these terms we may name the act “consumption”
and the objects “goods.” As valuation according to need is a feeling
that accompanies the act or its absence, it is neither a valuation of the
act's motives, nor of its results, but refers exclusively to the act itself
and belongs, therefore, to value-section B.
The first characteristic of a valuation according to need its
therefore its involvement with feeling.
Fullness
The second characteristic of a need is its being a full value all

along its positive-negative range; it is full as a positive as well as
negative value. Satisfaction of the need is accompanied by pleasure
that fills its positive branch; the absence of satisfaction is accompanied
by discontent filling its negative branch. If the positive branch were
empty, satisfaction of the need would merely cancel the feeling of dis-
tress and discontent. If the negative branch were empty, the absence of
satisfaction would merely equal an absence of pleasure and not any-
thing substantial, really felt. If someone enjoys playing chess but does
not miss it when no suitable occasion arises, the value of this activity
is not a need for him. Regarding this example: here we did not reduce
the usual scope of the need concept, but there is an example from the
opposing pole, in which the above description — which we treat as a
component of a definition — involves such a reduction. If, for in-
stance, breathing is not accompanied by pleasure, but the lack of air
would be felt as distress, there is no doubt that breathing represents a
value, but it is not a need in the sense described above. I believe, in-
deed, that in the framework of typology it is better to label as “need”
only the typical need which is full at both poles; thus, because of the
importance of this bi-polar fullness, which accords the need the special
weight it has in the life of human beings.
The Motive
A need is not only felt a), as a distressing absence, i.e., a negative

valuative value or b), as satisfaction or pleasure i.e., a positive valua-
tive value, but also c), as a desire for a certain activity or a wish to
engage in this activity, namely, it is felt as a motivative value. The
motive is embodied in an arousing and attractive, perceptual or con-
ceptual idea of the goods and their consumption.
A simple and typical example of a need is the necessity to eat. It is
fully bi-polar, because the absence of eating is a negative value in its
own right, actually felt. In other words: the negative value-property is
The Need 125
full and felt as hunger, namely, a kind of distress; the act of eating is a
positive value in its own right and not only felt as the cancellation of
hunger, the cancellation of distress, but also as something valuatively
substantial because it involves pleasure, which is a full, positive feel-
ing valuation of the activity. The motivative value, which as appetite
or as a wish to eat propels the activity, is also obvious. A person may
feel appetite without feeling hunger: Here the motivative value appears
separately from the valuative value (i.e., in this case, from the negative
feeling valuation), in order to assist the philosopher in drawing his
distinctions.
The example of eating arouses the question how far the need is
general. The question is: to eat what? The need may be very specific
and refer only to a certain dish, or it may be fairly general, so that
various dishes could equally satisfy it. Another question also comes to
mind: Is this one need of eating in general or a number of specific
needs. Perhaps the need is but an abstract description. However, we
will not discuss these questions here.
A Given Value
A need is a given, another characteristic distinguishing it from

many other values. It is not the product of a decision. We do neither
create it (consciously and deliberately), nor establish it. A person es-
tablishes ends for him- or herself, but he finds his needs, prima facie,
within himself, as if he became aware of them only posteriorly. Here
the words “as if” require an explanation: What I am conscious of pos-
teriorly, should exist anterior to my awareness of it, and exist as
something else, not as conscious content. Theoretical consideration,
however, teaches us to doubt the full identity between conscious con-
tent and something which is not conscious content. A red stain, for
instance, is given to me by sensation, but we know that color exists
only in our consciousness; in terms of physics only electrical pulses
within nerve-fibres exist, light waves of a certain length, but no red
color. Nevertheless, be the theoretical interpretation whatever it is, the
actual reality of a need, its reality as the experience of a given, is prop-
erly distinct from an end.
The interpretation of the need as a given has to be qualified on
three counts:
A. As mentioned above, theoretically or ontologically the need be-
ing a given should not be interpreted in a manner that accords it exis-
tence before it is felt.
B. Being a given is not to be interpreted as being inborn. Not every

need is inborn; not every need is wholly inborn.
C. Regarding the strength of a need as a motive: The need being a
given should not lead us to interpret the activity it arouses as dictated
to us (for instance, dictated by our nature). The motive is felt as a
dictum, but not the act. Like any motivative value, a need does not
activate a person automatically, but joins a totality of motives within
which it may be counterbalanced by opposed motives of the same type
or of other types. A person may forego the pleasant for the useful or to
fulfill a duty, e.g. when he gets up to work at the expense of his need
to rest, or he comes to the aid of someone else.
The response to a need is a matter for consideration and a decision.
A person can decide to go on hunger-strike, can carry the decision out
and persist in it. The given nature of the need will surface in his hun-
ger; namely, in that he cannot implement a decision not to feel hunger,
in the same manner that he implements his decision not to eat.
The Degree of a Need
A need is measured or accorded degrees in four aspects: A. The

positive feeling-valuation of a commodity may be a matter of estimate
from the angle of feeling intensity; that is to say, a comparative esti-
mate of two pleasures is made with regard to degree. B. The same
holds for the negative valuation of an unsatisfied need; two states of
discontent are compared. C. The positive motive to satisfy a need may
be measured by its power in relation to another positive motive;
namely, two states of attraction a person experiences towards satisfac-
tion of a need, are compared. D. The same holds for the negative mo-
tive to avoid non-satisfaction of the need; namely, two urges to escape
states of distress are compared.
Regarding A and B: Here we treat of comparisons conducted
within a relatively small group of similar needs. The taste of one kind
of chocolate is compared to another kind of chocolate, and not to the
pleasure derived from satisfying the need in company. There are no
general standards here — only incidental comparisons of one pleasure
with a similar pleasure, or one kind of distress with a similar distress.
Regarding C and D, the power of attraction and urge is measured
by the contest between motives, based on the slightly simplistic as-
sumption that the stronger motive tips the scales and makes the person
act.
The Need 127
Distinctness of the Need
A need is properly distinct when its owner precisely identifies the

activity which satisfies this need, as well as the objects necessary for
this activity. A somewhat objective interpretation would say that he
identifies the value-bearers. A need may be indistinct, even though it
is conscious and powerful. In such a case a person is aware that he
suffers, but does not know what makes him suffer, what is wanting; or
vice-versa, he feels content but does not know what causes his well-
being. With young children, typical cases of indistinct needs are fre-
quent. A three-year old has already mastered speech sufficiently to
report quite well what he feels. However, what he does feel seems to
be rather indistinct. To judge by a comparison between behavior and
speech, such a child does not identify the need for food, drink or sleep.
In the course of its development, the child learns to distinguish its
needs. While the young child does not yet distinguish its elementary
needs, the adult fails at times to distinguish non-elementary needs. It
may well be that phenomena of boredom, aggression or excessive
goal-oriented industry incorporate the element of an undistinguished
need.
Another matter. If Freud was right in that humans repress forbid-
den wishes, then inhibitions to distinguish the object of a need pre-
cisely also exist in cases where it carries a taboo, or a distinction once
made, may be forgotten.
On the face of it, there is proximity, or even congruence, between
indistinctness and generality of a need, as well as between distinctness
and specificity. The need to eat fruit is a general need (relatively),
while the need to eat grapes is a specific need The question arises:
May not a somewhat indistinct need for grapes be identical with a
distinct need for fruit? And if so, are these two distinctions, distinct-
indistinct and specific-general, not congruent or identical?
It seems that the difference between the two distinctions is this:
Whoever has an indistinct need for grapes will eat peaches (for exam-
ple), but he will not be satisfied; the person having a need for fruit will
be satisfied by peaches as well as grapes. That is to say, indistinctness
addresses disaccord between wish and satisfaction, or in other words,
between the motivative and the positive valuative value. In generality,
on the other hand, there is no disaccord and no conflict whatsoever is
involved.
Let us now turn to the phenomenon of a substitute for a commod-
ity. A person may have a need for something which possesses proper-
ties a, b and c, but he will also extract some satisfaction from a thing
which has only a and b. The thing possessing a and b is a substitute for
the one possessing a, b and c. Here we address the system of borders

that circumscribe the sphere of objects. For a certain need, A for
instance, there will be two circles, one enclosed within the other: In the
inner circle — the suitable object, in between the two circles — the
substitute, and beyond the outer circle — a wholly unsuitable object.
Need B will have three circles. There may even be a complex need
with countless circles, with the most suitable object in the center of the
field of objects, while the others will be near it according to their
degree of suitability to what is required. A need whose objects have no
substitute will only have one circle, with the good objects inside and
the bad ones outside, without differences in degree.
The possibility of substitutes is not explained by a difference be-
tween distinctness and indistinctness, but by a special structure of the
need that reveals itself in its application qua valuative value to the
objects of consumption. This structure consists of a multiplicity of
good-bad degrees.
Contracting the Meaning of the Word “Need”
The word “need” is usually employed in two different senses.

These senses are closely connected, but they should nevertheless be
considered as separate. We have been using the word only in one of its
senses, and it is appropriate to present both of them now.
A) A need is something that exists in mind. It is a feeling, a feeling
of distress, aspiration or satisfaction, or the sum total of a several
feelings, or a generalization made from the angle of the laws that gov-
ern it, or a hypostasis of this generalization, namely, the establishment
of something like a permanent suppositional entity, residing in the
background of these feelings, which unites them and reveals itself
within them. This entity belongs to the realm of values.
B) A need is a state of the organism, namely, its state when some-
thing is required for its survival and its activity. In this sense, a human
being needs food as a car needs fuel, or a fire needs to consume wood.
In these sentences we have applied the name “need” to something
which is not a value, and in axiological discourse it is better not to
attach the same name to something which is a value and to something
which is not. It is therefore preferable to say that a person lacking
appetite (say, because of an illness) requires food, not that he has a
need for food, and that a car requires fuel in order to travel, that the
fire requires wood, etc. In this context we will speak of “requirements
“ and not of needs.
The Need 129
There is a considerable degree of congruence between needs (in

sense A) and requirements, so far that it begs the attempt to describe
them as the subjective and the objective facet of the same entity. This
congruence arises from a connection between them. A species of ani-
mals has a clear evolutionary advantage, if its members have
congruent needs and requirements, namely, they feel that they need
what objectively promotes their existence and activity, they enjoy what
aids their organism and suffer from what hurts it.
But actually need (in sense A) and requirement are not fully con-
gruent. Furthermore: they may be opposed, namely, a person may feel
a need for something which hurts his health, or repulsion for some-
thing that aids it.54
The requirement is some aspect of a causal connection, like the
role certain foodstuffs play in human metabolism; this connection in
itself does not yet bestow value upon food, as the connection to fire
(without a subject) does not bestow value on wood either. Something
has value only with regard to a subject and in relation to it.
Sense B of “need” acquires valuative significance as a requisite for
health only by the mediation of reason. This mediated character does
not prevent requisites for health from acquiring preference over feel-
ings, when their positive or negative mark is the opposite of what a
person feels. The value health, as established by reason, is altogether
not a need, but belongs to the first section (i.e., to valuative values
according to the result of an activity) and to the type of caution with
regard to results, or of consideration for these; nor is it identical with
requirement, but merely relies on knowing it.
It is obvious therefore, that the theory of value must distinguish
between the two senses and use “need” only in sense A, the subjective
sense, because it treats of the need as a value.
If a person interprets a toothache as a sign of decay in his tooth, or
a good feeling as a sign of health, he does not refer to the ache or the
good feeling as values or as valuations, but as signals to be deciphered.
One may also view an aspiration as a sign that the body needs what is
aspired to in order to persist in its regular activities. These
interpretations may be true or false — they belong to the realm of
cognitive work, the work of knowing facts, not of valuing them. This
work is integrated with practical thought and serves the values of cau-
tion. But pleasure and pain are not only signs of health or disease.
Pleasure itself not only bears witness to the value beyond it, but be-
stows value on the activity it accompanies. In the same way, distress
not only bears witness to objective damage, but bestows negative
value on the activity it accompanies.55
When the word “need” is used in sense B, the feeling is seen as a

sign or a symbol of the objective “need,” namely, something external
to the valuing subject. The intellect has to decipher the feeling.
Can Anyone Know Better than I What Is Good for

Me?
If we limit the question to the sphere of needs, we are in principle

obliged to reply negatively, as no one knows better than I what I feel,
nor could I possibly be mistaken with regard to what I feel. This reply
certainly depends on our decision how to define a need, namely, it
follows our usage of the word need in sense A) and not in sense B, as
explained above.
Perhaps here an opponent of mine will argue: You have admitted
that a need may not be well-distinguished, and a need which is not
well-distinguished is but a need which is not well-known, i.e., not
known to the person who has this need; if so, this person does not
know what is good for him or her.
There is some truth in this argument, but first I have to point out its
error. If we have an “unknown need,” then this need would exist in its
entirety while it is unknown. The same holds for “the need that is not
well-known,” which also looks as if it existed “well” (or “properly”),
namely, in its entirety. However, this is wrong.
While the unknown is not faulty, or shortchanged, or lacking
something because it is unknown, the need which is not well-distin-
guished lacks something, wants specificity, lacks being directed to-
wards specific objects. It is the need itself that is wanting, not just the
awareness of it is lacking specificity. In the not well-distinguished
need, the valuative value does not match the motive. The indistinctness
represents an internal opposition, a kind of flaw in the need's
mechanism, which prevents it from becoming a value that properly
guides the person who has the need. In consequence, knowledge alone
is no remedy in this case, but only a change of needs. All this was
unknown to the owner of the need, in any case, initially unknown, and
may be known to another person. Here is the element of truth in what
my objectivist opponent claims.
This element of truth in the objectivist argument does not contra-
dict the position that a need is subjective, i.e., resides in consciousness.
The manner in which consciousness proceeds is not always conscious,
or wholly conscious. That is to say, that within consciousness itself
there is something which is not entirely conscious (mainly with regard
The Need 131
to the “how” and not the “what”). The need as a negative valuative
value, the need as a positive valuative value and the need as a motive
are conscious, but a) their interrelation is not conscious and b), the
distinctness of the objects (objects of consumption activities) is a
matter of degree.
In order to assess the weight carried by the objectivist argument
regarding non-distinguished needs within the total axiological contro-
versy between objectivists and subjectivists, we have to examine the
status of knowledge encapsulated in the distinctions a person makes in
the sphere of his needs. Here we should distinguish between two kinds
of knowledge: knowledge we name “cognition,” applying to objects
which are in some respect independent of this knowledge, and knowl-
edge that does not belong to the sphere of cognition. Say: A person
knows how to play chess, i.e., there is knowledge here. But the game
of chess does not exist independently from the fact that people know
how to play it, so that we cannot speak of cognition here. Even though
the game undergoes a certain objectification, the players do not
establish it as transcending knowledge. We will now apply this dis-
tinction to the matter of needs. The organism's requirements are ob-
jects of cognition. The adult may cognize that the child requires sleep,
while the child is unaware of its want. However, I believe that in this
case the adult does not cognize the child's need, but a requirement of
its organism.
The young child, learning to distinguish the objects of its need,
perfects and develops the need itself jointly with the knowledge “about
it.” This is valuative knowledge, knowledge on the valuative level
itself, but it is not cognizance. Cognizance of values resides only on
the meta-valuative level.
The Division of Needs According to the Object
A human being has proto-needs, a proto-need of its metabolism

with nature and a proto-need for human community. Each proto-need
branches out into multiple needs. The branches emerge, change, die
and replace each other. Accordingly, humans do not differ with regard
to their proto-need, but they differ in their specific needs; here the dif-
ference may be such that a certain object may possess positive value
for one individual, and negative value for another. There are people
accustomed to consume live insects regularly, while others recoil at
the very idea of eating a live insect.
The proto-need of cooperation with other humans branches out
into the need for sex, the need for love, the need to be esteemed or
encouraged by others, the need to dominate or the need to be

dominated, the need for revenge and similar needs a person has, which
depend on other people. The power, the distinctiveness, the degree of
generality of these needs change; ultimately some of them are replaced
by other needs which also grow from and feed on the same trunk.
The proposition that a person needs other people is opposed to the
meta-valuative view of the other one merely as a means, namely, that
actually one person serves other persons exclusively as a means, and
that society (as well as any cooperation between humans) is but an
instrument. According to this view — presented, for example, by
Hobbes — a human being's needs are exclusively directed at nature,
while he needs other human beings as the means to gain the products
of nature's materials.
The Shape of a Value and Its Matter
The need may dictate ends. For instance, the need to eat bread dic-
tates bread as an end and this end dictates the means, namely, baking,
milling, harvesting, sowing and plowing.
Bread is an object of need and an end. What is common to the need
and the end will be named “the matter of the value,” while the
difference between them is “the shape” (or “figure”) of the value.
Whoever bakes or eats bread, steals it or gives it as a present to the
hungry, whoever avoids eating bread because of a diet, all these refer
to bread as a value. What is common to them is the matter of the
value, while its shape greatly differs.
Being a quasi-natural value, needs are a mine from which a human
being extracts the matter to create other types of values.
The dictation of ends by the need obviously presupposes the dif-
ference between them, between the dictated ends and the dictating
need. We should remember that the dish itself, not the act of eating it,
is the end. Eating does not follow as a result of means. An end is cor-
relational to means, so that anything not arising from the use of means,
should not be addressed as “end.” Besides things, activities of other
people may function as ends. A deliberate act of my own would not
function as an end for me, though the preconditions required for this
act to occur may, of course, be ends of mine.
Here one could ask: Is the category “the value matter” not in some
sense congruent with the category “object of valuation” (or “the object
possessing the value-property”), is “the value matter” not an abstract
The Need 133
object of valuation? And if so, is this category not superfluous and

thus also the distinction between the shape of a value and its matter?
In reply, it will be enough to give an example here. The means is
valued according to the end, but does not belong to the value matter of
this end.
Chapter 5
The Second Section: Valuations

According to the Activity Itself.
Inclinations and Constraints
Inclination and constraint are relatives of the need. They differ from
the need in that they are full only in one half of their range or in other
words, in that they have empty partners. Inclination is full in its posi-
tive and empty in its negative half. For instance, a person is inclined to
play chess: if the occasion arises, he plays chess and enjoys it, but he
does not suffer if there is no occasion to play. The inclination may, of
course, turn into a need for someone, namely, he will occasionally
suffer if he cannot play chess.
Constraint is full only in its negative half. When a smoker says I
do not enjoy the cigarette I smoke, but I would suffer if I did not
smoke now, he smokes under constraint. Let us assume that a person
does not enjoy breathing but would, of course, suffer if he did not
breathe; we may say that he is constrained to breathe. Another exam-
ple: a person is constrained to avoid the pain of a burn.
The word “constraint” is perhaps not the best term for the type that
looks like a negative need, because it arouses the erroneous impression
that a person cannot resist a constraint and avoid acting according to it.
Yet, I cannot find a more suitable term for this type of value. One
could say that a constraint is “a negative inclination,” namely: X is

negatively inclined towards not smoking, or anyone is negatively in-
clined towards not breathing and towards pain.
The motive accompanying an inclination is attraction, and the mo-
tive accompanying a constraint is an impulse or an urge. Desire is a
combination of attraction and urge.
Regarding the objects of inclinations and constraints: We find
them in all spheres where needs are found; they are directed at things
in nature and at other people.
A need and an inclination may be intertwined. For instance, some-
body has a need for fresh fruit and the inclination to prefer grapes to
other kinds of fruit.
Constraints and inclinations differ from needs only in their being
half-empty. Valuation according to them is already carried out by sen-
sation or by feeling and they are given to the individual. Here the value
is also encapsulated in valuations.
The particularity of inclinations and constraints is that in certain
circumstances they may arise from the organism's requirements and
abilities, or from the personality's requirements and abilities and not
from another value, while all other values arise exclusively from val-
ues.
A person living where the air is clean may not specially value air
in general and clean air in particular, even not from the angle of
feeling attention; yet, should he lack air in general, or air of good
quality, he will clearly and distinctly feel constrained to breath clean
air. A person may not specially value the fact that his body has weight,
but should he find himself in conditions of weightlessness, he will feel
the urge to regain his weight. A human being requires countless
factors, but these requirements are not revealed to his or her feeling,
emotion or thought; when one of these factors is absent, a new value,
the constraint, comes into being.
The ability to perform a certain kind of action may not reveal itself
to its owner until the occasion for such an action arises; a new inclina-
tion may develop in the course of this activity, namely, an attraction to
and pleasure in the activity may emerge while it is going on. The
inclination to activate an ability for the sake of activity resides poten-
tially in many abilities, as the constraint exists potentially in the or-
ganism's requirements.
Chapter 6
The Second Section: Valuation

According to the Activity Itself. The
Ideal
The ideal is a design of an action and the recommendation to act ac-

cording to this design. The designed action is recommended as pos-
sessing its own value, not conferred upon it by the circumstances or
the results of its realization. We use the phrase “design of an action” in
a broad sense, so that it also refers to rules of behavior and models of
activity. The design describes the manner of an action as well as its
object; with certain ideals the emphasis is on the manner or the struc-
ture of an action only, while others emphasize the embodiment of ac-
tivities within an external object. The design may serve as a blueprint
and may determine the action's course in detail, from beginning to end,
as in the case of a ceremony in which one error voids the whole
sequence; however, with ideals referring to creative activities, the de-
sign has to leave room for innovation, so that in the course of the ac-
tion realizing the ideal something is created which the ideal did not
possess initially. When an ideal does not determine the action's course
in detail, it is preferable to describe it as a rule and its realization as
behavior according to the rule.
When the ideal recommends some spontaneous activity, creative
activities included, the rule may be mainly negative, namely, it states
that there is no compulsion or constraint, or any external dictate, re-
garding the recommended activity. Sometimes the ideal is a negative
design, a recommendation, or at times a demand or an order to avoid a

certain deed, well-defined with regard to its manner and its object.
That is to say that a taboo may be an ideal. A moral command of
“don't” is also an ideal.
Utopias are ideals too. In the same manner that Thomas More's
Utopia presents a positive ideal, George Orwell's 1984 and Aldous
Huxley's Brave New World present negative ideals.
The ideal is a valuative value which guides deeds and actions in
general. It is usually joined by an aspiration to realize the ideal, i.e., a
motivative value. This aspiration may be the main motive of a certain
action, so that realization of the ideal represents a type of action and
this aspiration may serve as an attendant motive accompanying the
main motive, and leave its particular stamp on the action, whose main
concern belongs to another type of value.
The accepted usage of the word “ideal” evokes the idea of some-
thing sublime. Here we use the word in a somewhat broader sense, to
depict a type also including actions which are in no way sublime. For
instance, courtesy is an ideal, but courteous behavior is usually a
mundane matter, devoid of exaltation. Apropos, one could also say
that courtesy represents a group of ideals, because different societies
practice different sets of manners, i.e., this is a group of ideals which
fulfill a similar function, they meet the same question — how to be-
have in order to shape a deed aesthetically, or what the accepted style
of behavior is. The motive to act according to a code of manners is
usually an accompanying motive; for instance, a person eats in a well-
bred manner, while the main motive is his appetite. A person may, of
course, eat out of courtesy, for example, being a guest whom good
manners oblige to eat of what his host offers.
When the ideal is sublime and the person adhering to it considers
himself called upon to play a special role in its realization, the emo-
tional appeal of the sublime and the feeling of a mission combine to
arouse a strong aspiration. The emotional appeal in the sphere of
valuation, and a powerful aspiration in the sphere of motivation join to
make up enthusiasm.
The Ideal Compared with the End
The ideal differs from the end primarily in that it has no means.
The ideal is realized immediately, in a deed or in an action which is no
deed (e.g. in thought guided by the ideal). The realized end is obtained
as a result; while the realization of an ideal cannot be obtained as the
result of an objective external process — it has to be carried out.
The Ideal 139
In the second place a typical ideal differs from an end in that once
it has been established and stands firm, it does not require the media-
tion or the aid of the will in order to be realized. An end requires the
aid of the will, because there is no motive aimed directly at a deed
which is only a means, so that the will has to stop the gap. In this
respect, the ideal resembles the other values belonging to the second
section. For instance, for a person behaving politely because his or her
will demands it, courtesy is not an ideal but a means to an end, or
wariness with regard to the damage impolite behavior could cause.
The compulsion the will imposes on the system of motives
characterizes actions whose value resides in their results, or in
preceding factors (intention and ability), but not in the action itself.
This compulsion is therefore characteristic for sections A and C.
In two aspects an end involves more cognitive work than an ideal.
First, an end which cannot be realized causes damage to its owner,
who loses both ways: He employs means, namely, sacrifices resources
(time, strength, assets), foregoes pleasures (he could have enjoyed at
the time), but does not receive compensation for his resources. The
same holds for a common end which a number of people establish for
themselves. An unachievable end has no virtue whatsoever. Not so
with regard to an ideal: If it cannot be fully realized, even a tiny bit of
realization is a good thing. The time devoted to the realization of an
ideal is not a means, realization is not obtained as a result of the deed,
but as the deed itself; realization of an ideal is therefore not subject to
efficiency, neither with regard to effectiveness, nor with regard to
economy. A person realizing an ideal, namely doing what the ideal
recommends, does not try to accomplish the deed as fast as possible
(or as slowly as possible), but does it according to the nature of the
deed and the doer; in the same way as he does not hurry with a deed he
accomplishes by inclination. While the time devoted to an end is a
sacrifice, the time devoted to an ideal is no such thing; on the contrary,
it possesses a positive value-property and is permeated by valuative
affirmation. The establishment of an end must be followed by a check
that answers the question whether this end is achievable. Not so with
regard to an ideal.
Second, an end demands cognitive work in order to find the means
and choose the most efficient one, while the ideal does not require
means. The end requires prediction, namely, hypothetical prediction: If
I employ this means, this and that result will follow. The same does
not hold for an ideal.
The suggestion to consider the ideal as an end for itself may arise
here, but what serves as an end for itself serves also as a means for
itself, while with an ideal there is no division into means and end; the
ideal is beyond the relation between means and end. Because of the
absence of means it does not make sense to say that a person realizing
an ideal is in a state that comprises an end for him or her, as one can-
not say that something is a result, if it has no cause.
The Ideal Compared with the Need
The ideal differs from the need, the inclination and the constraint
in that all these are given to a person, he does not choose them, does
not create and establish them, but finds them within himself; he feels
them as positive valuations (pleasure), as negative valuations (distress)
and as a motive (desire and its derivatives); he also has the impression
as if all these already existed before he felt them. The ideal, on the
other hand, is not a given. Reason (aided by imagination) creates and
the will establishes the ideal, namely, a person assumes a position
concerning the idea of the pattern of an action his reason and his
imagination unfold for him. A person assumes a position, i.e., he does
not find himself within it. It is true that the individual does not always
create his own ideals; on the face of it, he sometimes adopts ideals
others have created. Yet the adopted value is not a given either: a
person does not adopt his or her needs. The individual has to re-create
the adopted ideal within himself and then to choose it, to establish it
and to anchor it within his personal system of values. In the course of
this proceeding, he may modify the ideal.
The aspiration to realize an ideal differs from desire (which is the
motive of a need) and its derivations, the attraction of an inclination
and the urge of a constraint, in that this aspiration arises from the ad-
herence to an ideal as a valuative value. In the sphere of ideals, the
valuative value begets the motive. The motive grows within a person-
ality as a complement to the valuative value. This proposition is, of
course, utterly opposed to Christian von Ehrenfels' (and many others,
who followed in his steps) value-theory, but it is affirmed, for instance,
by the manner in which many religious and political movements
emerged, and by the attempts made by various groups of people to
realize utopias in their own way of life.
Desire and its derivatives originate in requirements a person has
from outside, from nature or society, and they possess some independ-
ence with regard to the system of valuative values. Their origin is not
in valuative values — on the contrary, valuative values may emerge
from these requirements.
The action realizing an ideal may be accompanied by satisfaction
with its realization. Even though this satisfaction resembles the pleas-
The Ideal 141
ure that accompanies actions motivated by need or inclination, it dif-

fers from this pleasure in that it is not primary, like the latter, but arises
from the ideal, and thus from the action guided by the ideal. If we wish
to describe this satisfaction as pleasure, we have to say that in this case
not pleasure determines what is good, but the good (an idea of
goodness) determines what will be pleasurable.56
One can compare the striving for an ideal with given values from
another angle, namely, the difference between an urge (in constraint)
and attraction (in inclination). From this angle aspiration resembles
attraction and differs greatly from an urge, because aspiration as well
as inclination are positive motives, while the urge is a negative motive.
As mentioned above, desire also incorporates an element of urge,
which represents an additional difference between desire (directed at
the satisfaction of a need) and aspiration (to realize an ideal).
For the time being we will characterize the creation of ideals in
general outlines, leaving the characterization in a semi-raw state, in
order to return and refine it further on (see below, Part III, Chapter 4,
under the heading “Value-Constitution”).
Reason does not create ideals out of thin air. Reason creates them
from given values, as if separating the core of value from its given
shape, the content from the form, and shaping them in its own way.
Reason takes its matter from inclinations, constraints and needs, proc-
esses them, refines them and turns them into syntheses which possess
entirely new qualities.
Some of the given values which serve reason as creative matter
complement each other potentially, and prima facie reason only carries
out what nature has prepared for its work. Some values are opposed to
each other, wrangling in the arena between individuals or that within
the individual, while reason is called upon to suggest settlements for
these conflicts; the will completes reason's work by establishing its
suggestion if there is only one, or by choosing and establishing one, if
there are several. We will now turn to study some examples of ideals.
Justice as an Ideal
An example par excellence is justice. A distribution of goods and

benefits exists in fact, and thus the question what the proper distribu-
tion is, what kind of distribution I will recommend to a group I do not
belong to but whom I wish well (and who may ask for my advice). I
therefore consider the various possible proportions between allotments
(e.g. that the allotment be in direct proportion to the recipient's
weight), what methods of implementation are possible and how these
match certain proportions or serve their promise. For instance, if I

recommend equal allotments for two people, I will also recommend a
method for implementation: One of them divides the whole into two
portions, and the other one chooses his portion. The principle or the
blueprint of the recommended distribution and their recommendation
make up the value of justice. And like the question of how to distribute
what possesses a positive value-property, there is the question how to
distribute what possesses a negative value-property (sharing the
burden of taxes etc.); here a blueprint or at least a principle is also
required.
I will value the distribution as a just or an unjust deed, according to
whether it matches the recommended blueprint. To name a deed “just”
not because its results aid the realization of justice, but because the
deed itself matches the required blueprint, is characteristic of justice. It
is also characteristic that I am not interested in the motive, i.e., I do not
inquire into the purity of intention behind the just deed.
Furthermore, when I consider the just deed I do not feel pleasure,
but think about it and value it positively in my thoughts; if I draw
satisfaction from the deed being just, the prevailing order is this: I
experience satisfaction because the deed is just (or just in my view)
and not vice-versa, it is not just because it gives me satisfaction.
A motive may attach itself to the idea of justice, namely, the aspi-
ration to do justice. This may be the sole, or the decisive motive for a
deed that belongs to a special kind, alongside goal-oriented deeds, or
deeds arising from need, inclination or constraint, namely, a deed
which realizes an ideal; yet, the motive to do justice may also attach
itself to other motives and thus bring about the modification of a deed,
whether goal-oriented or propelled by a need.
Can justice dictate means, namely deeds which per se do not em-
body justice, but serve it by their results? On the face of it, the answer
to this question is in a certain sense positive; however, one should
remember that justice does not dictate means directly, and in my opin-
ion, the same holds for other ideals. Justice does not emerge (as if
automatically) from a process we cause to occur. One cannot manufac-
ture justice. It is realized by a deed which is at least carried out in
agreement with justice, i.e., with an eye on the ideal too. One should
therefore be precise: Justice cannot be an end, because it does not arise
from means, but is done. At the utmost, means may beget precondi-
tions, necessary to the realization of justice, or remove impediments
that hinder it. For example, removing a dictatorial government, which
causes injustice, is a means to create preconditions, or to pave the way,
for the realization of justice. Only the preconditions necessary for
justice to prevail may be ends, not justice itself.
The Ideal 143
As justice is neither an end nor a means, the actions it guides are

not measured by their efficiency or in any case, efficiency is not rele-
vant for an action so far as it is guided by justice.
What about punishment for the violation of a just law? Can the
penalty itself be just, i.e., a realization of justice, or is it a means to
remove an impediment to justice? Some reply one way, others reply
differently, and each of the two ways can serve to advocate a certain
penalty. The person considering punishment a realization of justice has
a different ideal of justice from the person who believes that to cause
damage to any living creature is not a realization of his or her ideals.
Yet this person may also advocate some punishment, or demand its
imposition, as a means to teach the offender a lesson, or to deter
others, or as a means of self-defense, by isolating the offender, to wit:
as a means to achieve preconditions required for justice to be im-
plemented.
However, the person considering punishment merely as a means
may also say, that some punishment is just or unjust, with regard to the
distribution of punishments: he may, e.g., consider it unjust to impose
different punishments on different delinquents guilty of the same
offense.
And from punishment to laws — are laws ideals? Are laws of the
state and religious laws (commandments) altogether values and if so,
are they ideals?
Laws which do not belong to the realm of means are ideals. There
are laws which are not considered values but means (and perhaps all
laws in the eyes of some people). But a law which is not a means is a
blueprint for an action (or the avoidance of an action), which is not
only recommended but also a commanded, namely, a certain kind of
ideal. Behavior according to such a law, or arising from it, realizes an
ideal. The law as an ideal is a ramification of justice, or a kind of em-
bodiment, placed on a special pedestal.
Legislation may be an end. For example, passing a motion in par-
liament will be an end and will dictate means, like a give and take
agreement of the faction seeking this end with another faction, which
will bind the latter's members to vote for the motion. If the set of
means is efficient, the said legislation will pass as a result. But re-
member, the end is not the law, but its legislation. What the law dic-
tates is behavior according to it, which is not measured by efficiency
or effectiveness, but by its accord with the design it contains. It makes
sense to say: “So and so is careful to obey the law”; it does not make
sense to say: “So and so is efficient in obeying the law.” The law does
not dictate means, but legislation does.
The implementation of laws, like their legislation, may be an end

that dictates means, for instance patrols or other police activities.
These may again be the matter of a law, which refers to them specifi-
cally and determines what is permitted and what is forbidden in police
activities, but they do not refer to this law as a means either.
A propaganda campaign, demonstrating that the alternatives to a
certain law would harm the public and that it should therefore be
strictly obeyed, may be aimed at an end, i.e., be a means, and the
campaign may be assessed as more or less efficient; but the end is to
obey the law and not the law itself, namely, the end is to persuade
people to adopt this law as a value, and to award this value a perma-
nent place in their consciousness.
It is obvious that a law is neither a need, or an inclination, or a
constraint, nor does it belong to section C (dealing with the valuation
of an action's causes).
To sum up — A law is an ideal to the extent that it is a value and
not a decree serving as a means. And now to the motive: The motive to
obey a law may be identical in content with the law itself, namely, it
may be an aspiration to uphold an ideal (i.e., as a motive it will belong
to the type “ideal”). It is, however, presumable that laws are more
frequently upheld and obeyed with an eye to expediency: to avoid
penalties, to be thought reliable, etc. Obviously, the law does not
function as an end in these considerations either.
There is, however, a third possibility to consider. A person may
obey a law neither because he approves of it, nor out of goal-oriented
considerations, but because he believes the state he lives in is a consti-
tutional state, and in such a state a citizen should uphold all laws, even
if he disagrees with a specific one. Here some conception of law in
general and not the specific law belongs to the realm of ideals, namely,
the ideal decrees that there should be laws. This, of course, does not
prevent specific laws from becoming ideals. But there is a fourth
possibility, slightly different from the third: A person may decide to
follow the rule that makes up the third possibility up to a point, beyond
which he would not obey laws that oppose his values.
Truth and Beauty as Ideals
Another example of an ideal is the value of speaking the truth.

What stands out in speaking the truth is that it is neither a means nor
an end. Speech which is a means to some end will not always convey
truth; even if it does so, its efficiency and usefulness are not in its
truthfulness, but at best in that the listeners believe it to be true.
The Ideal 145
Speaking the truth and utility converge only incidentally. Accordingly,

whoever recommends speaking the truth not in a certain case but in
general, does not recommend it as a means. On the other hand,
speaking the truth is not an end, it does not arise (as the result of a
process directed by means), but is done.
Knowledge may also be an ideal. That is to say, when the act of
observation and the act of thinking are not the means to some end, they
are an action guided by inclination or the realization of an ideal.
Not only the value of knowledge rests on the borderline between
inclination and ideal. Quite a number of values are not easily classified
as inclinations or as ideals. Being or not being innate may sometimes
serve as a demarcation line. An inclination may be inborn, but not an
ideal.
Is beauty an ideal or rooted in inclination, namely, the inclination
to distinguish the beautiful and to admire it? Presumably inclination
and ideal combine with regard to beauty, to wit: On one hand we have
an inborn inclination to distinguish a certain kind of beauty and admire
it; on the other hand we develop and extend this inclination or build on
top of it a layer of fashioned taste, of artistic style, which is to be
viewed as an ideal.
It seems that humans are inclined to give sensory expression to
what they feel, namely, to shape what they sense into an expression
and the emotion into what is expressed. This inclination and the action
it propels undergo a stylizing process, from which ideals of expression
arise. A synthesis of the beauty ideal with the ideal of expression
creates art, or rather the artistic ideal to fashion a beautiful expression.
The artistic deed is the realization of an ideal and is also a spontaneous
act by virtue of the inclinations embedded in the ideal.57
The Game
The Game will be our final example in this series. Embedded in its
basis is the inclination to cope with a difficulty, while the basis of this
inclination is the organic requirement to activate various kinds of
power. A game is stylized coping with a difficulty (or coping with a
stylized difficulty). As the basis of game includes the organism's re-
quirement to activate power, reflection about power joins in and par-
ticipates, whether more or less, not only in this or that individual case
of wrestling with a difficulty, but also in the very shaping of rules for a
game, namely, the specific ideal regarding a certain game. Here we
deal with reflection that assesses and values the forces the self can
muster. The individual's attempt to measure its forces reveals itself in
the competitive element embedded in most games, namely, in that the

player has to cope with a rival and not just with a difficulty per se.
This element of reflection, present in many games, does not belong to
section B, i.e., to valuation of an action according to itself, but to
section C, valuing the action as evidence of strength or skill, as bearing
witness to the rate of this strength or skill. Tackling a rival by way of a
game has therefore — apart from processing and stylizing a direct
spontaneous inclination towards the action itself (which belongs to
value-section B) — a mediating element as well, the attempt of a
person to value him- or herself, and to use the rival as a valuative
yardstick (a matter belonging to section C).
It is common to art and games that both arise from an inclination to
activate power or skill for their own sake. They differ in that in art, as
opposed to games, a creative power is activated (i.e., the creation of
sensational expressions). They also differ in that game, when it fash-
ions a difficulty into a competitive field, leaves room for reflection
which assesses and values the rate of forces the individual can call up.
Presumably, an element of self-valuation also appears in art, not within
the artistic ideal itself, but as an accompanying element in the course
of its realization through the practice of art.
In the same way in which characteristics belonging to value-
section C (the reflective section) intertwine with ideals of certain
groups, characteristics belonging to value-section A may intertwine
with ideals. Even though a game of chess is neither a means nor an
end, within it, namely in the course of the game, a means and an end
may emerge: a certain move may be the means to achieve a desired
situation, which in its turn will be a stage or the means to win the
game. For this goal-oriented characteristic not to mislead us regarding
the character of chess as an ideal, we should remember the typical case
of someone enjoying the game he loses against an able rival, much
more than the one he wins against a poor rival. Accordingly, he will
prefer the good rival not in order to learn from him, but as the partner
in a preferable realization of the action's design.
To conclude the discussion of ideals as a type of value we have to
register the following parameter, according to which ideals differ from
each other. On one hand, or at one pole, there are ideals whose role
determines their content to a considerable degree, or rejects from the
outset countless possible alternatives to the chosen ideal design, leav-
ing only a few choices to the will. The role is, for instance, to settle a
given conflict, a role derived from the conflict's negative value, which
is a value of the reflection about the conflict. (Apropos: it is also pos-
sible for reason within one of its historical or biographical figures to
accord a conflict per se, in a certain sphere — ethics, for example — a
The Ideal 147
positive value). In this case, the freedom of the will which draws on
the assistance of reason, is limited. Even though the relevant difference
between the alternatives may be great, there are only two or three pos-
sible answers to the question we face, and if we decide to answer it we
have to choose from these few (sometimes it is also possible to choose
a certain mixture of these answers). Justice and moral values may
serve as examples.
On the other hand, or at the opposite pole, we find ideals which
were chosen from an endless number of alternatives. Games, for exam-
ple, belong to this group. That chess is played on a board of 8x8
squares and with these and not other chessmen, is but the establish-
ment of one out of countless possibilities for a game of intellectual
contest between two rivals. The ideal of an artistic creation in one of
the arts and in a certain style, could also be taken as an example.
However, here the freedom shows more in the creative spontaneity,
recommended by the ideal, than in the choice and the establishment of
the ideal itself. In other words: While the rules of a game compare in
general with a well-tailored garment that follows the body contours of
its wearer, and playing the game according to the rules compares with
the latter, the design recommended by an artistic ideal does not fit the
artistic action so snugly. Accordingly freedom stands out in the sphere
of art, mainly in the scope of continuous space the ideal grants the
action, while in the sphere of games freedom also shows in the number
of possible games, namely, in the space inhabited by the possible
ideals themselves.
In any case, both games and art differ essentially from ideals
whose role is to settle conflicts between values.
Chapter 7
The Third Section: Valuation

According to the Activity's Factors.
Valuation of Motives
Two Kinds of Motive Valuation
A person is induced to value motives when they oppose each other.

He values other people's motives when these oppose each other as well
as when they oppose his own motives; he also values his own motives
because some opposition between them has broken out. A person's
reason is called upon to voice an opinion with regard to rival motives,
his will is called upon to make a decision. And as the motive is valued,
so is an action valued according to the motive that made someone
carry it out, and so is the person activated by this motive valued.
We can distinguish two kinds of valuative values, designated to
value motives.
A valuative value of the first kind determines preferences. That is
to say, it is not meant to distinguish between good and bad, which was
already accomplished by valuative values of sections A and B. The
motives are attached to these values (of sections A and B) and are
already aimed only at what is good, i.e., either directly (as a positive
motive), at the realization of some positive value segment, or indi-
rectly (as a negative motive), at avoiding the realization of some nega-

tive value segment. The valuative value of the first kind dealing with
motives determines what is better and what is worse, which motive is
superior and which is inferior; it determines the scale according to
which the quarrel between motives is to be settled so far as these be-
long to one and the same person, and helps to form an opinion with
regard to the clash of interpersonal motives.
According to the first kind of motive-valuing values, a person is
not condemned for harboring a certain motive, because no existing
motive is bad from his or her point of view (according to this kind of
motive valuation); he or she are condemned only because they acted
according to the inferior, and not according to the superior motive.
They are condemned for the order of priority regarding the power of
their motives, which the ensuing action revealed to be the wrong order.
For instance, a person is not condemned because he was afraid in the
face of danger, namely, was motivated to flee or hide, but because he
did not conquer his fear and did not prefer a motive prescribing a
certain worthy action. The motive to avoid danger is not bad, but it
may be inferior to another motive with which it finds itself in rivalry
under given circumstances, be the rival motive negative or positive, be
it a demand to avoid greater danger or aimed at an appropriate action.
The adjective “worthy” belongs to the lexicon of preference in mo-
tives: worthy behavior is behavior prescribed by the preferred motive.
While the valuative value of the first kind does not treat the timid
severely and even shows understanding for the human heart, the mo-
tive-valuing value of the second kind goes beyond that, and judges a
motive as a good one or as a bad one. More precisely, this valuative
value makes up the measure according to which motives are acquitted
or condemned. It is not satisfied with the proposition that one should
not act according to the motive which lost its case in court, but it states
that this motive should be uprooted.
The motive-valuing value of the first kind resembles a judge in a
civil action, dividing property between warring litigants. The second
kind is the judge in a criminal action, facing an alleged offender. This
example diverges from what it exemplifies only in that a judge applies
laws and consults precedents. For precision's sake the example may be
amended in this manner: The motive-valuing value of the first kind is
the law according to which the property is divided, while that of the
second kind is the law according to which the suspect is judged.
To sum up: The division into kinds occurs between rules of prefer-
ence, i.e., arbitration, according to which the motive's place is allotted
but the motive is never condemned, and criminal law for motives,
according to which a motive may be found guilty in court.
Valuation of Motives 151
Without valuative values designed to value preferring and arbitrat-

ing motives a person could neither act nor exist, because he or she
would lack guidelines for cases of motive rivalry, while they could
very well exist and act without a criminal law for motives. One may
infer from this consideration that the second kind is perhaps an ex-
trapolation of the first: a motive which was inferior turns negative, the
one whose part of the disputed property equalled zero is now to pay a
fine. Perhaps abstention comes into being in this manner, by according
the status of a bad motive to a motive considered inferior in the
abstaining person's environment.
Values of Preference
Preferences are material, typological or formal. Material

preference of one motive over another arises from the special character
of these motives. The formulation of such a preference requires that
the motives be named, or that at least one of them be named. Instead of
separate names for each of the other motives the name of a group of
motives will appear, i.e., the motive called by its name is preferable
over or inferior to this group.
Let us present an example. Bravery as a value stands for the inferi-
ority of fear to positive motives which call for risk-involving action. A
hero is the person who conquers his fear in favor of the risk-carrying
deed. The conquest of fear occurs by virtue of the will; that is to say,
the will provides the motive opposed to fear with sufficient additional
power to overcome fear in its role as a motive. Fear is not only a mo-
tive, but also a valuative value, primarily on the feeling level. As a
motive it is, for instance, the wish to get away from what frightens or
to hide from it; as a valuative value it is a feeling of discomfort, or
better yet, a feeling of some suffering in the presence of what fright-
ens.
Heroism as a valuative value is therefore designed to value
motives and to value will power or more precisely, it is the material
preference of motives for risk-involving action (or of a certain
contingent of such motives) over fear.
We will now turn to typological preference. This is preference for
a certain type of values over another type, to serve as motives; the
division into types may be as suggested here or any other kind of divi-
sion. As an example we may use the preference of an ideal as an illus-
trious motive, over a need, an inclination or a constraint, and prefer-
ence for an end accommodating this ideal (preparing preconditions for
its realization), over an end serving a need, an inclination or a con-
straint. If X did something towards the realization of an ideal in which

he and whoever comes to value him believe, for instance, the ideal of
justice realized in a just deed, while Y did the same deed for his own
benefit or — which is actually the same — because of external com-
pulsion, X will be valued more than Y: X's motives are superior to Y's
motives. The word “superior” (or “illustrious,” “lofty,” “high-
minded”) expresses a certain kind of preference for typological or for-
mal motives.
Another example of type preference is to prefer ends over needs in
general, and the need for rest in particular. This preference value is
called “diligence” or “industry.” We will say that a person who works
hard, foregoing rest, entertainment and other activities propelled by
need or inclination, is “industrious” even if his end is utterly alien to
us; that is to say, be the end whatever it is — an issue for material
consideration — what matters is that the dominant motivative value
belongs to the ends type.
A preference neither chosen according to the value itself nor to its
type but according to some formal criterion, is a preference for
motives that match valuative values more than others, to wit, the
demand is that the motives determining a person's actions be identical
in content to the valuative values he upholds. The test-question is
whether this person's actions are induced by motives he values
positively in other people, and not by those he values negatively in
others.
A special kind of preference, which may not fit the triple division
mentioned so far, arises from the valuation of a system of motives, and
includes the valuation of single motives in accordance with a value-
property of the system they belong to. As an example, we can take
preference according to the presence or the absence of opposition
between motives, i.e., the valuation of motives and their owner ac-
cording to a structural property of the motivative value system. Some
people prefer an individual motive system that incorporates conflicts
(provided these do not prevent decisions) to a system without con-
flicts. Let us assume that we agree with regard to all values within the
three sections required in order to value individuals X and Y, their
motives and their actions. Both X and Y do what is right, and in iden-
tical circumstances both behave in the same manner. Furthermore:
Both do what is better. One of them however (Y), chose his prefer-
ences only after some inner conflict, during which he had to overcome
inferior and less positive motives. The other one (X) acted according
to the preferred motives without inner conflict, because he did not
have the inferior or less positive motive, or because it had so little
power that no conflict was felt. Whoever prefers a motive system that
incorporates conflicts, will prefer Y over X (Let us now imagine two

people, A and B, who both do what is bad, but A does so only after an
inner conflict and B without. If in the case of X and Y the owner of
conflicts was to be preferred, the more so in the case of A and B).
Nicolai Hartmann, for instance, believed that the conflict in itself has
positive value.
On the other hand, there are those who prefer a value system that is
free of conflicts and operates automatically. They believe humans
should arrange their values in a way that leaves no room for conflicts.
Whoever meets this demand will be labeled “steady” and “rational.”
The word “rational” serves positive valuation in a number of different
senses, which cannot easily be gathered into a suitable definition.
Both parties will perhaps agree generally on the valuation of a state
in which a conflict prevents a decision: it is preferable to a bad deci-
sion and inferior to a good one.
Whoever prefers conflict will probably prefer people who are not
self-satisfied to those who are. In contradistinction, whoever prefers
the absence of conflicts will consider self-satisfaction as a good thing
per se (i.e., a special value) and also as a sign for a positive state of
mind (a system without conflicts).
Morality
Systems of morality are a certain kind of motive-valuing systems.

That is to say that morality does not add motives to those it finds, and
that there is no special moral good which was not already good from
another aspect (apart from the moral aspect), namely, there is no moral
good which does not rely on what was already good prior to reflection
about motives. Something is good if it realizes a positive value; a good
motive in the moral sense aims at the realization of a preferred positive
value.
The distinction between moral values and those motive-valuing
values which do not belong to morality, is not congruent with the
division into kinds discussed at the beginning of this chapter, but
crosses it: Besides systems of morality that deal with arbitration, there
are also those that condemn or acquit. However, the latter can be de-
scribed as arising from the former through more rigorous moral judg-
ment; accordingly we limit our discussion and only treat of morality as
a system of preference.
A system of morality is recognizable by three character traits.
First, it prefers motives designed to realize ideals, or more specifically,
certain behavior patterns in interpersonal relations. This is a
characteristic of typological preference. The end, caution, the need,

inclination and constraint are inferior to ideal behavior patterns which
bear the seal of morality; for instance, they are inferior to behavior
patterns embraced by the ideal of justice. Here we may distinguish
between ethics and morality, according the name “ethics” to the set of
behavior-valuing values, namely, ideals all or part of which serve mo-
rality when it comes to value motives (because they are directed at the
realization of these ideals). The name “ethics” would place the empha-
sis on the deed and the way it is directed (although it may value not
only deeds but also other actions and emotions), while the name “mo-
rality” would stress intention and preference, i.e., preference of one
direction over others, and therefore preference of the motive that suits
it over the rest of motives. Accordingly, ethics belong to the second
section of values and morality to the third section (even if apart from
this aspect they are identical in content).
The second characteristic of morality systems refers to the power
of preferred motives. The motives preferred by a system of morality
are often less powerful than their rivals. We should remember that the
power of a certain motive, held by a certain individual, is expressed in
various modes of readiness for sacrifice, or in marginal power at
different times. There are therefore many quite frequent states, in
which the actual marginal power of a preferred motive falls below the
power of a rival motive, inferior in comparison to the first. We learn
from this that among other traits, morality is characterized by an
occasional strong temptation to act in opposition to its demands, and in
consequence requires assistance from the will.
The third characteristic of morality systems addresses the com-
mand form they acquire. They command behavior in the preferred
manner in the same way that a person's will is thought to command its
owner himself (a person's will is thought to appeal to its owner as
“you”). The individual's will receives a ready-made formulation from
the moral codex, and has only to adopt it and to instruct the will's
owner how to behave. Here we should note that the motive leading to
the deed morality commands, is directly tied to the valuative value
designed to value deeds and not to a value designed to assess motives.
The motive for the deed morality commands as well as the valuative
value bound up with it belong to the second section of values. Valua-
tive values (of section C) designed to value motives do not require a
special motive to be attached to them, i.e., a motive of the third sec-
tion, in order to influence behavior; they directly influence the will
which, as mentioned before, reinforces the positively valued motive.
An action performed out of duty is an action carried out by virtue

of the will, which is guided by reflection that values motives, and it is
performed in opposition to strong motives.
Motives are attached to ideals included in ethics, while the will is
attached to morality.
Why do we say that morality commands actions and do not say
that ethics command? Because the act of issuing a command, or giving
an order, is the act of willing, namely, the will orders and commands.
Adherence to an ideal, on the other hand, is bound up with the
aspiration to behave accordingly, so that an aspiration and not a com-
mand accompany the adherence to ethics. Ethics may, for example,
accord a focal place to the emotion of love, while a moral framework,
based on this ethics, will not demand love — not because motives for
the emotion are absent, but because the will does not govern emotion,
and love cannot be ordered. 58 Thus, happiness may also occupy a focal
place in ethics, but not in morality.
Open and Closed Morality
Closed morality can be recognized in that it imposes different be-

havior patterns on different people, or even different behavior patterns
on the same person in relation to or the presence of different people.
The subjects of morality, i.e., those required to behave in a preferable
manner, are arranged in circles, so that contingents of human beings
remain outside the sum total of subjects. The objects of morality are
also arranged so that some of them receive a great deal of considera-
tion, and there are groups which do not differ from each other in the
degree, but in the manner of consideration; and there are systems of
closed morality in which contingents of human beings remain outside
the circles, namely, they are not awarded any consideration. 59 A sys-
tem of closed morality draws its content from a certain concept of jus-
tice, prevalent in the society which created this system. A circle of
subjects as well as a circle of objects may be defined according to eth-
nicity, a person's gender, his or her belonging to a certain class, pro-
fession, etc.
Law often reflects morals. The legal codex of the Ripuarian and
Salian Franks at the beginning of the Middle Ages provide a character-
istic example of closed morality systems. Ripuarian law states:
7. A free person who kills a free Ripuarian will be sentenced to pay

200 solidi...
8. A person who kills a slave will be sentenced to pay 36 solidi...
10. A person who kills a church official will be sentenced to pay 100
solidi...
12. A person who kills a Ripuarian woman after she has begun to bear
60
children and until the age of 40 will be sentenced to pay 600 solidi...
Morality as a codex for sexual behavior is also a proper example of
a closed morality system. The same holds for any professional ethics.
In its most salient form, closed morality is a system of material
preferences which are not based on a particular principle, nor does the
typological element the system incorporates exceed the limits of mo-
rality in general. Closure as well as materiality make a multiplicity of
morality systems possible and indeed, history provides us with a host
of different morality systems; Eduard Westermark's books are illumi-
nating in this respect. 61 Confronting closed, material morality, there is
formal 62 and open, i.e., universal morality, and in between there are a
number of system figures, which have exceeded materiality and even
closure on certain issues and to a limited degree. Kant presented and
analyzed open morality (if we overlook the remnants of materiality
that stuck to him).
What characterizes open morality is that its subjects do not divide
into kinds, or in other words: This morality has a single kind of sub-
ject, including everyone able to understand it, namely, every reason-
able being; nor do the objects of open morality divide into kinds, or in
other words: There is only a single kind of object of moral consid-
eration, defined so that any subject of morality (and nothing else) is
also its object. To a certain extent, these traits also characterize the
preferred behavior pattern. The same behavior pattern, or the same
practical rule, the reasonable being would recommend to a society or a
group of reasonable individuals, to which he himself does not belong
and whose members he does not know, but whom he wishes well, is
the preferable behavior pattern that obliges himself (i.e., the person
who recommends it). The motive he prefers for an ideally-reasonable
society he constructs in his thoughts without considering himself a
member, he is to prefer for himself (within the reality of his life);
however, as a motive is a individual entity, we must clarify this for-
mulation and state that we deal here with kinds of motives, namely, in
each case a kind of motives is preferred — the kind to which all those
directed at behavior according to some recommended pattern A
belong. The behavior pattern, or the practical rule, is formulated in a
sentence, somewhat like this: “If you are in this or that subjective state,
and if you find yourself in these or those circumstances, you have to
do the following deed...”; for example, if you can swim and see
someone drowning, try to save him. Sometimes one can omit the
preamble (beginning with “if”) and state only the ending explicitly, or
omit part of the preamble (and say: “Try to save a drowning person” or
“Save a drowning person”), on the assumption that the preamble arises

from the context; as a check it is sometimes a good idea to explicate
the conditions.
You ponder whether to perform or not to perform a certain deed,
try it out in thought and ask yourself whether you would recommend
to a society of reasonable strangers (i.e., recommend to each of them)
to behave according to the pattern this deed is built upon, or whether
you would recommend to avoid such behavior. Three results are pos-
sible: You would recommend the pattern, you would recommend to
avoid behaving according to this pattern, or you would not recommend
anything on this matter (in any case, no “yes or no” recommendation).
This consideration is the formal test through which you put the
practical notion. If you recommend avoidance, the idea to perform the
deed has failed the test. In the two other cases it has passed.
To sum up: Universal morality commands the individual to adapt
his or her set of motives, by the aid of a formal test, to the ideal-uni-
versal motive-valuing values, his or her reason finds within itself.
The matter of recommended legislation for a strange society63 (i.e.,
to which the recommending person does not belong) is necessary for
universal morality not to be interpreted as Schopenhauer64 interpreted
Kant's theory, as inverted egoism. 65 In my opinion, Schopenhauer did
not interpret Kant appropriately, but we will not go into the matter of
interpretation here. The inversion of egoism embodied in the rule “do
not do to your neighbor what you hate for yourself,” does not yet pro-
vide full formalization. For example, I may be aware of hating some-
thing, but I do not ask a member of the ideal society to be made up in a
manner that will make him hate what I hate today. What I actually hate
involves needs and constraints that are given to me, but not the ideals
which I constitute, and certainly not universal ideals. If X is disgusted
by expressions of pity, this does not prevent him from upholding the
ideal of a society in which pity and its expression play a role.
Every ideal of justice includes the concept of impartiality or non-
involvement and of an external vantage point, thus already incorporat-
ing the idea which achieves full development in formal morality. The
goddess of justice holds the scales of judgment while her eyes are
covered. It seems that every closed material morality already hints at
the principle of recommended legislation for an alien society.
The formality of formal morality resides in that it assumes only a
minimum of pre-suppositions; (in some sense, it does not presuppose
anything).
It assumes reasonableness, because it addresses everyone who un-
derstands its appeal, namely, whoever possesses reason. Reasonable-
ness is not a content that is added to the action of appeal itself.
It assumes the existence of the will, because the multiplicity of

reasonable individuals reveals itself already in the question how they
treat each other — a multiplicity created by the will and not by reason.
The will is the individuation principle of understanding subjects.
Apart from these two assumptions, the question how one should
behave assumes nothing. The answer has to be developed from the
question itself, without the aid of additional assumptions. That is to
say, there is no room here for assumptions concerning the nature of
subjects or the nature of objects.
We save presuppositions when we refrain from clarifying the
nature of various objects of moral consideration, but assume that the
subject is also the object, and that the state of being a subject of
morality is constituted by the capability to understand morality's
appeal.
In formal morality, duty and right are defined together. What ought
to be done is a duty as well as a right.66 Any duty a subject has is also
his right — the right of the same subject when it is the object of
another's consideration. Any right is also a duty. The list of an in-
dividual's duties is the list of his rights. We have to distinguish be-
tween a duty according to formal morality and commitment. A person
may, for example, commit himself to a deed which is opposed to his
formal moral duty. In any case, a commitment to one person may, of
course, discriminate him or her in relation to others. Loyalty, for in-
stance, is a value of closed morality which may be a matter of com-
mitment (someone commits himself to be faithful to his king or his
wife). Another big difference between formal and material morality is
that failing in a duty of material morality is not necessarily to the det-
riment of someone else. There may be no other subject who is a victim
of the failure to uphold a duty. For instance, sexual mores determine
behavior patterns as a duty, even when these do not defend any body's
right — like the duty of unmarried women in general and girls in
particular to avoid sexual intercourse. Such duties, imposed by a
material morality, may not be confirmed by formal morality.
The congruence of duty and right in formal morality expresses the
equality already embedded in the absence of presuppositions, namely,
in that we know nothing about the subject of morality (who is also its
object) but that he possesses reason and a will. As there are only two
relevant properties, and all members of society possess these, each
member has the same rights and duties as all his peers.
Reciprocity in formal morality shows itself in that the latter pre-
sents its demands reciprocally, namely, it demands from person A and
person B to fulfill the same duty to each other, thus also determining
their reciprocal right. However, this reciprocity is not conditional: Ac-
cording to formal morality, A's duty towards B is not conditional on B

upholding A's right, i.e., on B fulfilling his duty to A. Formal morality
does not acknowledge conditioning, because this would exclude
someone from the circle of its objects. B cannot extract himself from
the circle of objects by not fulfilling his duty to A. Accordingly, A is
obliged to fulfill his duty to B, even though B does not fulfill his duty
to him. From this aspect a duty is presented to everyone separately.
This is not so in closed, material morality: Here reciprocity may make
a duty conditional upon the privilege.
The status of certain aesthetic values can be examined in the light
of this distinction between formal and material morality. The relation
between aesthetics and morals varies in different systems of morality.
Each of these systems treats of motives, so that we have first to find
out which motives involve aesthetics, namely, ideals concerning what
is beautiful, becoming or appropriate.
Everyday usage employs expressions like “an ugly deed,” “unbe-
coming behavior” etc. Impolite behavior may be considered unbecom-
ing, and the same holds for attire that jars on accepted custom in gen-
eral, or attire thought to be wrong for its wearer, as well as for the
violation of accepted rules in sexual behavior. We deal therefore with
behavior that violates aesthetic values. When a person has a strong
motive to behave in an unbecoming manner (unbecoming in terms of
the society he lives in), and frequently this motive is stronger than its
opposite (the motive to behave becomingly), the intervention of mo-
rality and the will is needed in order to conquer temptation. The mo-
rality which accords aesthetic values a moral seal is, of course, a
closed, material morality. When the terms “inappropriate,” “unbecom-
ing” describe immoral behavior, they may point out that the origins of
moral prohibitions this behavior violates, are in aesthetics; this is in
particular valid for transgressions without a victim (i.e., according to
formal morality they do not encroach upon the right of any member in
this society, nor do they cause damage to any of them).
The characterization of a value as ethical (i.e., meant to value be-
havior) and its characterization as aesthetic (i.e., meant to value ap-
pearance, looks, etc.) are not incompatible; on the contrary, many val-
ues are being characterized in both ways. On the other hand, the rela-
tions of suitability and opposition between formal morality and aes-
thetics are always indirect and contingent.
In order to acquire the seal of morality, the aesthetic values that
won it had previously to absorb multiple forces from the comprehen-
sive value system actually prevailing in society (the society which
adheres to this morality). They may have been congruent with public
interests, or with ends cherished by multiple members of this society
(for example, men whose wives were their chattels, may have been
able reinforce their privileges through suitable aesthetic principles).
Why Formal Morality Requires the Complement of

Material Morality
Formal morality cannot carry the burden of motive valuation

alone, because (1) it is ambiguous with regard to a large group of cases
and (2) it has no meaning with regard to another group, perhaps
smaller but not less important; it requires the aid of a material morality
in order to choose one of its meanings (or understandings) when the
first group is concerned, and in order to meet a want with regard to the
second group. We will now list four “shortcomings” of formal
morality; the first two address multiplicity of meaning and the last two
its absence. (We put the word “shortcomings” in quotation marks,
because these would be actual shortcomings only if we charged formal
morality with the role of morality as a whole).
A. A given deed is subject to many practical rules (or many deed
patterns, in Kant's terminology: maxims), some of them good and
some bad rules, namely, some pass the formal test and accordingly,
prima facie, the deed is permitted but some fail the test and accord-
ingly, prima facie, the same deed is forbidden. Doing some deed is a
duty, because according to a certain pattern of it, or a certain maxim,
avoidance of this deed does not pass the formal test; and, on the other
hand, duty demands not to do it, because according to another pattern
of it, or another maxim, the deed does not pass the test. The question
is, therefore, how to generalize a single or individual deed, and this
cannot be answered with the aid of a formal criterion.
Let us examine a few examples.
First example. One, Reuben, asks himself whether to carry a
weapon. On one hand his wish is for no human being to carry arms, so
that in his opinion the maxim “carry arms (if you know how to use
them and possess some)” fails the formal morality test (according to
the first version of the categorical imperative in Kant's Fundamental
Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals). Accordingly, if the carrying
of arms is subject to this rule or maxim, it is disqualified and duty
demands to avoid it. On the other hand, Reuben would feel safer if he
had a weapon handy. It comes to his mind that the relevant rule states:
“Carry arms to defend yourself when you expect danger.” The reserva-
tion added to the rule reduces the opposition presented by his wish that
no arms be carried by anyone, and he cannot say anymore that turning

this rule into a general law opposes his wishes (their sum total). The
question arises to which practical rule, or behavior patter, the carrying
of arms belongs.
Second example. Let us imagine someone who tends to condemn
people, has a somewhat quick temper and is not inclined to shun vio-
lence; this person beats his son because a trick he played has caused
grave damage to some property (we will assume that the deed does not
involve the violation of a prevailing law). What is the appropriate rule
from which this deed arose: “Beat your son when he plays a trick that
causes damage,” or “beat any person if you believe he or she deserves
punishment the authorities are not taking care of, and you are not
committing a legal offense by doing so,” or “beat other people if you
can”?
Third example. A person in particularly difficult circumstances
wants to commit suicide but does not wish for all humanity, or all
reasonable beings, to do the same. Does the deed he wishes to perform
come under the rule “commit suicide if you can,” or under the rule
“commit suicide if you have lost all hope and are fed up with life,” or
perhaps “commit suicide if your suffering is unbearable and lengthy
consideration has shown you that all hope is lost.” This person may
wish that some of these rules, at least the last one, be generally valid,
but the other rules do not pass the test.
Fourth example. X likes people to pity him and express their pity.
He asks himself: Would I like all people to proffer each other all the
time pity and consolations? The answer is positive. Along his way X
meets Y who belongs to a type common in competitive society, he
likes people to envy him. X tells Y that he pities him (he has found
something which is truly wrong with Y) and thus makes him miser-
able. We will, perhaps, tell X: What you did does not apply to the rule
you intended, but to the rule “do not treat your neighbor in the way he
asks to be treated”; your error was in formulating a too specific, rule.
There are grades rising from the specific to the universal in all four
examples. In all of them the special practical rule which specifically
matches the deed from the doer's viewpoint passes the test of formal
morality (according to the belief of the person who performs the deed),
while the most universal practical rule fails the test. The special rules
were these: “Carry arms when you expect danger, in order to defend
yourself,” “beat your son when he plays a trick that causes damage,”
“commit suicide, if your suffering is unbearable, and lengthy consid-
eration has shown you that all hope is lost,” and also “tell another
person that you pity him or her for what is wrong with them.”
If we formulate the practical rule in a sufficiently specific manner,

we will be able to justify many deeds.
The question I suggest the reader ask himself is not what rule to
choose as being relevant from a moral point of view, but whether the
choice can be arranged according to a formal criterion, which can be a
part of the principle of formal morality.
We will now present an example in which the difference between
the practical rules in question is of another kind.
Fifth example. Crook X not only profits from swindling people,
but it also amuses him. He usually succeeds in conning people, but
failure does not depress him. Having perused the appropriate chapter
in Kant's theory, the crook asks himself if the next swindle he hatches
in his imagination comes under the maxim (or practical rule) “cheat
people” or “try to cheat people.” The learned crook finds it difficult to
imagine a state of affairs in which everybody cheats everybody else,
but he can imagine a state in which everybody tries to cheat all other
people, and accordingly, everyone frequently speaks the truth in order
to be trusted, and thus be able to entrap the trusting person when the
right moment arrives. As this crook loves a challenge, he definitely
likes the arena of conning attempts; he will be happy to be an amused
observer, he is definitely prepared to be the object of a conning at-
tempt he will try to derail, and needless to say, he is prepared to con-
tinue doing what has become a habit. He also thinks that if society has
to pay dearly for undermining universal trust, the price will not be
exorbitant and is to be preferred to the tedium created by the absence
of challenge. The learned crook has therefore decided which rule
matches the categorical imperative and which does not, but he does not
know which applies to the deed he hatches in his imagination.
B. The same examples in which we found the same deed to be
subject to different practical rules, may serve us to examine the multi-
faceted relation between a practical rule and the categorical
imperative. This relation is not direct, but mediated by “ability of the
will,” which is individual. Even though we may, in the name of
morality, command the will to follow reason alone, we cannot ignore
the dilemma, that should the will ignore the special properties of
human nature (those of the will's owner) it would be incapable of
taking a stand on many questions; thus, because jointly with human
nature it would ignore material preferences altogether; on the other
hand, if the will does not ignore the nature and preferences of its
owner, a certain practical rule will be commendable as a general law in
the eyes of one individual, and inadmissible in the eyes of another.
Different individuals will suggest different laws to a society whom
they wish well. One likes order and discipline and will suggest laws in
this vein, including methods of severe punishment; another one,

inclined towards individualism and loathing submissiveness, will
suggest laws that enhance individual freedom and reduce the severity
of punishment. While the former will advocate strict and severe educa-
tion, being prepared to imagine himself an object of such education,
the latter will reject the view of a young person as a means to the end
of molding his or her personality. The same holds for patterns recom-
mended in relation to the life of a family.
Concrete reason is not a single one. There are multiple instances,
or multiple figures of reason. The different instances, or the different
figures of reason do not extract the same result from the application of
the same categorical imperative to a given practical rule, because “the
ability to will,” or the sum total of reasonable wishes (which mediate
between principle and practical rule) are different for each.
Kant believed that pure practical reason offers an unequivocal in-
struction to a person facing the following alternative: Either to give in
to inclinations he can realize “in comfortable circumstances” in the
present and “(like the South Sea islanders) should let” his “talents
rest,” or “to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural
capacities”; .”…as a rational being he necessarily wills that his facul-
ties be developed, since they serve him, and have been given him, for
all sorts of possible purposes.”67 Kant's preference is a material or ty-
pological preference, and can constitute a specific figure of reason, but
it is not a formal preference, arising from rationality or reasonableness
in general. What is worthwhile to sacrifice for possible goals to be
determined in future, is not a matter for pure reason; it belongs to what
constitutes a specific, historical figure of reason.
This shortcoming of formal morality can also be viewed in the fol-
lowing manner: The accord of a person's motives with his motive-
valuing values and hence with his ideals, is not sufficient for morality
to be realized by a certain society, because such realization also re-
quires far-reaching congruence of inter-personal ideals regarding
issues like organization, law and order, or development, or the
question what is just; it follows that in certain spheres the members of
this society have to adhere to common ideals. To wit, a sharing of
values precedes preferences in general, and this is the basis of material
morality which complements formal morality.
C. So far we have discussed formal morality's multiplicity of
meaning; we will now turn to the limits of its application.
Let us imagine a person in time of war, facing a situation in which
he has either to kill an enemy or be killed himself. If he kills his en-
emy, he treats him and his life only as a means, thus violating the
categorical imperative. The enemy ceases to be an object of moral con-
sideration for him, in opposition to the universal character of formal

morality. But if he permits his enemy to kill him, he would violate
formal morality in exactly the same manner. Accordingly, formal mo-
rality does not instruct him how to behave in these circumstances, and
does not show him how to avoid violating it.
You may say: Formal morality forbids human beings to enter upon
a situation in which they cannot behave in accordance with it. But
frequently an individual has no way to evade such a situation; for
example, a youngster just out of childhood, finding himself on a bat-
tlefield of a war that has been going on for generations. In such cases,
formal morality is inapplicable. It still has meaning, because the
closed, material morality prevailing among warriors may be nearer to
or farther away from formal morality, and these differences may be
quite substantial. There is room here to complement morality (and
ethics) by the end of reducing the number and range of cases in which
formal morality is inapplicable, and do so, if possible, by preventing
their emergence from the outset.
Closed morality corresponds with what may be named “group ego-
ism” or “egoism of a group,” which may very well correspond with
far-reaching altruism of the individual within the group. Whoever
holds to the dichotomy egoism-altruism will find it difficult to explain
behavior informed by a closed morality, in which the individual
proffers sacrifice not for his own sake but for another member of his
group (be the group a family, a people etc.). It seems that real-life
cases of proper moral action, namely, making a great sacrifice (at the
expense of a strong motive) are informed by a closed morality.
D. Open morality does not include reasonless human beings
among the objects for consideration (foetuses, infants, senile or insane
people or those in a state of protracted coma). On the other hand, many
systems of closed morality issue instructions how to treat such people.
A similar question arises with regard to animals in general, and
those resembling humans in particular. Should genetic engineering
succeed in creating a species of apes who can perform certain tasks,
and are able to fulfill the role the Delta People fulfill in Huxley's
“Brave New World,” formal morality would probably not forbid it.
According to the spirit of universal morality, it requires complements
from closed, material morality with regard to reasonless groups of
living creatures.
Summarizing the Issue of Motive Valuation
The principle of formal morality is one and the same and its mul-
tiple formulations serve to interpret each other; in a manner convenient
for axiological description, one can express it as an order to examine
one's own motives (according to the formal test), and to adapt them (if
necessary) to valuative values. The most salient expressions of this
principle are Kant's different formulations of the categorical impera-
tive. It is also expressed by the statement that a person's duty to an-
other person is identical in its content with the former's right to con-
sideration (including assistance) by the latter, and that a person's duty
is but to hold up the other one's right; that is to say, there is no sin
without a victim, and the victim — in order to be taken into account —
has to be a real human being (or another reasonable creature, should
we come to know one), and not some institution, or a hallowed sym-
bol, or an idea, or the truth (in other words: the victim of a sin is
somebody and not something). By its very nature formal morality does
not forbid material morality to impose additional duties, it does not
forbid a person to shoulder duties and commitments apart from those
embraced by formal morality. Incest, for example, is not a sin in the
realm of formal morality, but formal morality leaves room for material
morality to outlaw incest.
The formal character of formal morality shows itself in that it is
not sufficient for the valuation of motivative values. At best, it may
function as a necessary condition within a material and typological
web for the valuation of motives,68 and in such a case a motive may be
preferred only if it does not fail the formal test. And indeed, the
actually prevailing morality in any society is a synthesis of formal and
material morality. 69 And the difference between societies does not
only rest upon the ethical web itself, but also upon the role it accords
to the formal principle. Here an empirical axiological question arises,
regarding the structure of present and past moral systems (professional
ethics included): To what degree and in what manner do they fill the
framework of formal morality systems, and to what extent do they
incorporate, apart from the typological preference characteristic for
any morality, material preferences that are contingent to reason, like
duty without right (i.e., a duty of one person, which does not involve
granting a right to any other person).
A theoretical axiological question which requires clarification, is
how far material and typological preference is bound up with the
closed character of morality, and how far the complements of formal
morality (which it needs) change it necessarily from being open to
being closed.
Chapter 8
The Third Section: Valuation

According to the Activity's Factors.
Valuative Values Directed at Abilities
People usually value various abilities and powers not only as a means
for action, or as its precondition, but in many cases also as being
valuable in their own right. That is to say, ability and power are values.
The relatively large volume of an ability is a positive value-property of
the person possessing that ability.
From the angle of ability valuation, neither a deed nor its result
possess value themselves; they are valued positively or negatively
according to the ability they demonstrate. Here the presumably origi-
nal and perhaps even most frequent valuative view is reversed.
According to the reversal, the point and justification of the ability to
act is neither the action nor its result, but the other way round: the
value of both resides in that they bear witness to the ability, measure it,
or even embody its objectification.
Consider the audience watching a sporting match and the manner
in which it usually values such an event. For example, they watch a
running contest and are glad to see that so far X is faster (so far as they
know) than other runners. X has not been sent by them or by anyone
else, nor will they derive any benefit from his skill. They do not be-
long to the circle of his friends either, nor will they share in the respect
he commands. They value X's running as an implementation of his
skill, they value X as the owner of this skill, and they value the skill as
a skill.
The running contest is certainly accompanied by valuations of all
other types. There is the aesthetic element concerning the style of run-
ning, which is an ideal according to its figure, and belongs to the kind
of beauty ideals. There is the sportive and amusing element, also an
ideal according to its figure. This element was more pronounced
before the advent of precision watches, before achievements in speed
on different occasions could be compared, for instance, at subsequent
Olympic Games. A t that time there was no room for competitive
running of a single runner on the track. Runners needed each other for
comparison. Since the introduction of the stop-watch, other candidates
in the same contest are superfluous, and perhaps the same holds for all
other contestants, because an athlete can contest his own achievement
of the previous day. The sportive and amusing element prevailed
primarily among the contestants themselves.
Contestants and competition organizers share, of course, a number
of additional elements concerned with ends (income), but it seems that
these would not exist, if the audience of a contest did not value it ac-
cording to skill. To flesh the picture out one can mention additional
elements, like the inclination to the act of running itself which shows,
for instance, in the pleasure the runner derives from it. It appears,
however, that precisely the identification and pinning-down of all
other values applied in competitive sports, emphasize the fact that the
audience values according to skill, i.e., makes the potential primary
and the action secondary, a measuring of the potential. Measuring a
potential may, of course, be end-oriented, it may serve to plan the use
of this potential; but here, with the audience watching a running con-
test, it is not end-oriented.
Another example. Two people look at a drawing; one says: this is a
gifted droughts man; the other says: this is a handsome drawing.
Perhaps the first sits on the committee that awards grants, perhaps he
wishes to hint obliquely that the drawing is not handsome. If we as-
sume that neither of these possibilities applies here, then the first one
adopts the viewpoint of a person watching a sports competition. The
second one is exclusively guided by aesthetic ideals.
Two individuals sat for an exam and were graded “very good.”
One of them says that he did not prepare at all for the exam, because
he had no time. The other one admits that he worked for the exam.
What does the first one boast about? Obviously not his achievement
but his talent. The achievement alone, without the circumstances in
Valuative Values Directed at Abilities 169
which it was gained, does not demonstrate his talent sufficiently, so he

adds the circumstances: no preparatory work (in this vein one could, of
course, add impediments and difficulties which were overcome).
Chapter 9
Valuation of Humans. Emergence of

Reflective Motives
There are special values, designed to value human beings. The

types of values we have so far discussed, are the matter from which
reason and imagination shape values that enable us to assess human
beings. For example, reflection about the value type “end” yields the
following values: achiever, efficient, organized, disciplined, economi-
cal and diligent. The fact that someone tries to show others that he
enjoys life, indicates that to enjoy is a value-property, the owner of this
property is the owner of pleasures, or one who takes pleasure in life.
Here we have a value that values human beings, made out of the type
“need.” The value of being fastidious as well as the values of
possessing a sense of humor or being sociable in general etc., are
based on the type “inclination.” The value “idealist” is based on the
ideal. The values of being a moral or immoral person, being responsi-
ble, dignified, a hero, naive, cunning, possessing a strong will etc., are
based on reflection about motives and their shaping by the will.
Valuation of ability yields the value successful, i.e., successful in a
contest, and also talented, strong, possessing manual skills, intelligent,
original, etc.
Values fit to value humans are, therefore, the product of reflection
by human beings about themselves in general, and about the values
they adhere to, in particular.
While values fit to value humans according to their content are

based on all other types of values, they resemble the ideal according to
their figure: a kind of comprehensive pattern equipped with touch-
stones and yardsticks, first to examine the relation between various
activities of a person, and then to examine the structure of personality
through this relation. The will, motives, ability, are examined through
the mediation of acts of willing, motivations and various activities.
A value fit to value humans also resembles the ideal in that it is not
given to people — they create it themselves.
Finally, this kind of value has an additional common characteristic
with the ideal, in that the adherence to such a valuative value gener-
ates a new motive. The individual itself values not only others by this
kind of value, but also itself; he or she compares their self-image, who
he or she actually is, with the recommended pattern, with who they
wish to be; he determines what within himself matches the pattern, and
while doing so he feels self-satisfaction; but he also determines what
he finds wanting within himself and feels dissatisfied; this dis-
satisfaction generates an aspiration to adjust to the recommended
model, namely, a new motive, the power of self-consciousness. All
motives discussed so far were transitive, while a person's motive to
adapt himself to an image is reflective.
Individual reflection sets its seal on a person's deeds and other ac-
tions through its motives; it may encourage further action — for in-
stance, the motive that joins the value “achiever” will encourage goal-
oriented activity. The motive joining the value “owner of abilities”
will generate training and competitions. However, individual reflection
causes not only a quantitative addition of power, but frequently also a
change in quality: The emphasis shifts from the issue to the subject,
from the specific result to the subject achieving the result, the
achiever; from the specific deed involving pleasure to the subject
being an owner of pleasures, from amusement and joking to his
possessing humor, from the ideal to his being an idealist, from duty to
his being responsible, reliable and moral, from the pleasant feeling of
strength in an action to nurturing his strength for its own sake and to
measuring it (not in the course of a game, not as a game, but to build
up support for his self-confidence).
A person assists someone else — an action which presents a num-
ber of typological possibilities. He may do it to serve some end. He
may be fond of the other person, or he may in general tend to come
spontaneously to the rescue of someone in distress. He may do so
because he believes this to be proper behavior, namely, he realizes an
ideal. The last case may involve reflection: He seeks to become a duti-
ful person and he feels satisfaction not out of compassion, and not
Emergence of Reflective Motives 173
because a specific ideal has been realized, but because looking at him-
self now, he feels gratified. This self-observation may occur in private,
without to broadcast the good deed, but an individual may also require
the reaction of another person in order to assess himself.
In typical competition, the decisive motive is reflective; namely, it
arises from reflection about oneself. We have to distinguish between
typical competition (which belongs to section C) and the activation of
power, be it free or stylized activation (which belongs to section B) on
one hand, and between typical competition and struggle (belonging to
section A) on the other hand. The word “competition” serves, for in-
stance, to describe the relation between two people, selling identical
merchandise at the same market, which is a kind of struggle, namely,
end-oriented action. Our discussion, however, treats of competition in
a very restricted sense; we discuss what we call typical competition. It
is not an end-oriented action, but a measure the competitor applies to
his strength and his talents. To what extent a game remains a stylized
activation of power or skill or turns into typical competition, depends
on the players' attitude.70
Other people serve a person as a mirror, to ask “is there anyone
handsomer than I, a greater achiever, a more respected individual” etc.
Paradoxically a person sometimes loses his or her autarky or sover-
eignty, precisely through their self-knowledge. The mirror tells them:
“To become what you wish to be, you still lack this and that.” For
example, the mirror reflects the absence of status symbols, thus caus-
ing the observer to wear himself out in order to gain these. A young-
ster wishing to be a proper man looks at someone else as a mirror and
discovers that he lacks a motorcycle resembling a space ship, plus the
matching suit and crash-helmet. Another example: In the past a do-
mestic radio transmitter resembled a piece of furniture (and was even
considered elegant if a small sliding-screen covered the buttons and
switches, the glass panel and the metal parts); in time the mirror told
the owner of this transmitter: to rule an electronic control center, to be
technologically powerful, your radio transmitter must show switches
and dials, buttons and measuring instruments. It turns out that goods
do not anymore satisfy only or even mainly a need, but the wishes of
self-consciousness when it looks into the mirror; the instruments are
not anymore examined according to their usefulness, nor vehicles as a
means of transport, but according to their power to convince individual
reflection that it may, indeed, feel pleased with itself. From here
onwards, prima facie, goods equal a self-image. By accepting the mir-
rors dictate, the individual cancels its sovereignty.
When the reflective motive joins a motive belonging to another
type, it changes the deed's quality, besides strengthening the heart and
adding power to this motive; this qualitative change is sometimes

obvious and can be observed as the style of an activity and its objects.
From this aspect style is a reflective residue, layering itself on top of a
person's world.
At the beginning of this part we discussed an axiological theory
which claims that the valuative focus is not the issue at hand but the
experience enveloping or entertaining it; that is to say that only the
experience possesses value of its own and not what is being experi-
enced. This theory is wrong with regard to the broad course of valua-
tive experience to which original valuations belong, be they of feeling
or conceptual, and to which actions whose motives are transitive be-
long, i.e., actions directed from the subject to the object, and not back
to the subject through the mediation of the object. Yet, once reflective
motives enter the arena and overpower transitive motives, the real
world becomes a mediator between a person and himself. Even the
sphere of ideas (in philosophy, science, art) may change: from being a
matter on which a person focuses per se, the reference to this matter
has now become its focus and possesses value in its own right. And
since the logic has been turned upside down, cases patterned on sub-
jectivist axiological theory begin to occur: From now onwards the
focal point actually shifts to the place where according to this theory,
it should have been from the outset. There is, perhaps, no need to say
that these cases do not constitute a confirmation of the theory.71
Self-valuation changes a person not only through special motives
that arise from it, but also immediately, namely, its very presence
causes other factors within the individual to change.
Reflection bound up with self-valuation, which may lead to the
cancellation of individual sovereignty, may do the same to spontaneity
in action. Full spontaneity occurs in actions carried out for their own
sake, i.e., their motive belongs to section B and is directed at the action
itself (it occurs only to a much lesser degree in goal-oriented action).
The spontaneity of an action for its own sake involves attention to the
matter in hand and becomes flawed when attention is directed by
reflection, whose aim is to convince itself that it has ground for self-
satisfaction. Yet, valuative reflection may also reinforce sovereignty
and autarky, as well as remove obstacles from the path of spontaneous
activity.
A field of reflective emotions stretches over the area between the
ideal of the self, its application in self-valuation and the reflective mo-
tive. The basic pair of reflective emotions (positive and negative) has
several grades. The first grade consists of confidence in one's own
strength against the lack of such confidence. In the second grade we
find more saturated emotions (if one may put it this way): self-satis-
Emergence of Reflective Motives 175
faction (or conceit) against dissatisfaction with oneself. In the third

grade, self-consciousness achieves full emotional saturation: In pride
or against it, in shame (which is perhaps, a kind of fear). The emotions
overflow the banks of self-consciousness and flood its dams in the
third grade, namely, in arrogance (here the emotion gains its own
objectifications) or against it, in depression (which paralyzes a person,
as fear does to an animal which “feigns death,” in order to mislead the
threatening predator).
The higher the saturation grade of an emotion, the more changes it
generates in the entire emotional system of the person who has this
emotion. First a change in grade; joy may increase when a person is
glad that he is glad (he feels satisfaction because he is glad), or is sad
because he is sad, or afraid of being afraid, or proud of his pride. But
the grade may also change in the opposite direction, when a person is
irritated with himself because he is irritated (angry with being angry)
or because he is afraid. Qualitative changes may also occur in the envi-
ronment of reflective emotions.
At a certain stage transitive emotions become fraught with a reflec-
tive charge and lose something of their transitive character; through
the emotions the same applies to thoughts whose form is emotional,
until the core of a person's reference to his environment, namely his
transitive stance, comes in a way to embody his reflection about
himself.
In this manner a reflective value-deployment, or orientation,
emerges. Value section C shifts to the center, while sections A and B
are marginalized. Within section C, values designed for self-valuation
become the pivot on which everything turns. And indeed, it seems that
a contingent of humans are made up according to this pattern.
Alternative orientations are transitive, i.e., objective: here the ob-
ject is neither a mirror nor a instrument for measuring the self. There
are two such orientations: (1) to section A, namely, the results of deeds
(things and sets of issues), and (2) to the actions themselves. The
orientation to actions themselves seems also to be an orientation to the
subject (like reflective orientation), but in the course of an action the
person performing it is interested in the issue on hand and not in
himself, and the issue includes the action's object (be it an object of
concept or an object of observation) In this respect orientation to
section B resembles orientation to section A, yet here the action is not
a means, i.e. a part of the cause of what is desired, but has value in its
own right.
Whoever eats, thinking about health and vigor he wishes to gain by
consuming certain victuals, performs an action which apparently
belongs to section B, but his orientation aims at the end. Whoever eats
expensive delicacies and indulges in showy consumption, may enjoy

the self-satisfaction of feeling a king. His orientation is reflective.
Reflective orientation may be compatible with actions of section A,
because they lack spontaneity anyway (so far as they truly are of
section A, and possess no elements of section B). On the other hand,
reflective orientation does not go well together with actions of section
B. That is to say, if reflective orientation were to be tried on section B
proper, it would diminish the section's original character.
An Outline of the Division
A remark in the margin of typological discourse: I do not believe

that the division into sections and types enables us to capture and
characterize all emotional values.72
I will now try to outline the division of values in a table (figure 1).
Sections and Types of Values
Values
Section A Section B Section C

Valuation according to Valuation according to Valuation according to
the action's result the action itself the action's factors
Given values Constituted values
end caution need inclination constraint ideal motive ability values

valuing valuing to value
values values humans
Figure 1
Chapter 10
The Typological Approach and

Reductionism
The approach I presented in this part is opposed to axiological reduc-

tionism, which attempts to encapsulate all values in a single figure.
Reductionism tries to present any variance or change as subordinate
(or marginal) through which the common essence can be seen.
Reductionism also claims a common measurability for all values, thus
making all valuative problems soluble by measurement and
calculation. In addition to the general uniformity and measurability of
values, this approach considers them as being dictated to us, by our
nature in one version, and by ideas existing per se in the other version.
Reductionism does not view ideas as the creation of man.
The Utilitarians and Hobbes, Spinoza and Plato tried to implement
the reduction (its three characteristics, uniformity, measurability and
dictate included), from various angles. I believe that these attempts,
made by great thinkers, have failed, and that it is worthwhile to try the
alternative, phenomenological typological way. The following part
will contribute to the presentation of an alternative for the two last
characteristics of reductionism.
From among the various directions of reductionism, contemporary
society should in particular ponder the attempt to attach all values of
all types exclusively to the end. The reduction of duties to an end is
known in ethics as utilitarianism, and has been widely discussed. Ac-

cordingly, we should here deal with the reduction of section B values
to the end. Advocates of this reduction argue that enjoyable deeds,
namely, deeds performed from need or inclination, are also merely
means directed at an end, and their end is pleasure. There is no more
important task for typology, than to disentangle the threads of this
claim, and to do so one should once again pay attention to the follow-
ing points:
1. A realized end is a result of employed means, and follows them
in time, while the pleasure from a pleasurable action is simultaneous
with it. (Another matter is that pleasure may stretch beyond the ac-
tion's time span, if the valuations of the person performing the action
stretch beyond it; thus he enjoys himself prior to the action in its nar-
row sense, as well as afterwards).
2. The realized end is alien to the action aimed at it and tied to it
causally according to the order prevailing in the world — a connection
whose existence is known but not always comprehensible to us, be-
cause it is not unfolded before our sight. In contradistinction, the con-
nection between pleasure and the pleasurable action is subjective, of
course, felt by the subject, essential to him and not similar to the con-
nection between the input and output of a black box.
3. Pleasure is specific to the pleasurable action. The word “pleas-
ure” and its meaning belong to reflection and are the product of a gen-
eralization which incorporates certain abstractions, while on the transi-
tive level (the level reflection aims at) there is no single kind of pleas-
ure. The end, on the other hand, does not require a specific deed as its
means. Different reasons may lead to the same result, and accordingly
an end may be achieved by different means. From the angle of the end,
it does not matter which of these we choose, not the nature of the deed
matters, but only its result. (We will choose the most convenient
means from among those we know, and we will exchange it for an-
other, once we know more about the issue). However, the person seek-
ing pleasure (on the original, transitive level) seeks a specific pleasure,
and this can be gained only from a specific deed (of one kind). He is
not prepared to exchange it for another pleasure he himself feels at
times, and certainly not for a great pleasure people with utterly differ-
ent inclinations seek or experience. We will return to this matter be-
low, in Part IV, when we discuss the attempt to derive non-given val-
ues from given values.
4. The doer does not seek pleasure at all while he himself and his
deed remain on the original, transitive level, because his attention is on
the issue. With this formulation I am trying to hone in a slightly
paradoxical manner something that needs clarification: the doer of the
The Typological Approach and Reductionism 179
deed does not seek pleasure, even not the specific pleasure, but seeks
the deed (or the action), and precisely because this is so, he can feel
pleasure (original, transitive pleasure). An intense, profound and fruit-
ful conversation about a theoretical topic may be pleasurable, it arises
from an inclination to seek theoretical comprehension, yet the people
conducting it do not seek pleasure, but the theoretical discourse and the
understanding that attract them. One could also say: If they conducted
the conversation with an eye on pleasure (which sounds rather absurd
here), they would not enjoy it. A person reading a poem may enjoy it,
but his motive is the poem's attraction, if he has read it before, or that
of the particular poet. People of reflective orientation (on the valuative
level itself) may try to imitate the original transitive action in order to
extract pleasure from it, but it is reasonable to assume that if they
enjoy it, it is not the pleasure they initially sought. To seek pleasure is
a quest of reflection, and this pleasure has lost its specificity.
Some of Antisthenes' statements lend themselves to the following
interpretation: He used to drink wine only when he thirsted for wine,
and water when he thirsted for water. He tries to remove the residue
reflection and civilization have deposited on his inclinations and
needs, and on the inclination and needs of his peers. Antisthenes be-
lieved that many needs of the latter were not properly diagnosed, that
they exceeded their original limits and caused an unnecessary depend-
ence on great quantities of goods, and on unnecessarily expensive
goods. By internal listening to his needs, he succeeds in becoming
aware of his needs' original range and their specific quality.73
Among the actions belonging to section B, the deed motivated by
constraint comes close to end-orientation by its vagueness, or the ab-
sence of specificity from the deed itself (above, in chapter 5 of this
part, I clarified my use of “constraint”), and it is more convenient for
the axiological school that aims at reduction to the end, than deeds
motivated by inclination or need. One may describe the relief felt by a
person performing the constraint-impelled deed, as if it were the deed's
end. This description does not fit the action, but it distorts the truth less
than reduction to an end of those values in section B, whose positive
branch is full and whose motive is attraction (and not an urge to escape
from something). Accordingly, the reductionist axiologist describing
an action motivated by need, whose character is two-fold (as both
branches are full), stresses the aspect that resembles constraint, the
wish to escape distress: a very hungry person is not particular with
regard to the specificity of his food.
PART III
The Relative Weight of

Values and Conflicts
between them
Chapter 1
Measuring Values
The Platonic Theory of Measurement
In the Protagoras dialogue Socrates claims, that there is a common

measure for all that is good or bad; thus one cannot only state that this
action is better than that action, but also that A is good to a higher
degree than B is bad, and that it is therefore worthwhile to suffer B in
order to gain A; to wit, we can compare the absolute numeric values of
good and bad.
Socrates disputes the popular opinion that there are people who
know what is good, but do what is bad because they give in to their
pleasures. For instance, a person who drinks to excess even though he
knows it to be wrong, or one who shuns painful medical treatment,
even though he knows that he needs it. The pleasures are good as such
and are said to be bad only because the deed they involve, like exces-
sive drinking, is bound to cause suffering in the future. Pain is bad as
such and is said to be good only because the deed it involves, like
medical treatment, is bound to produce pleasure or pleasantness in the
future.
However, Socrates argues that the person who seems to do wrong
because he yields to pleasures, in truth does not exactly know what is
good, namely what is better and what is worse, what is the greater and
what the lesser evil, nor does he compare good and bad correctly. Nev-
ertheless, whoever does wrong, does not claim that it is good, or that
good is bad; he errs with regard to their absolute numeric values, and
not with regard to the previous mark, concerning plus and minus. The
heavy drinker errs because he does not know how to measure good and
bad, he has not mastered the theory of measurement. Measuring errors
arise because what is remote in time looks smaller to us, in the same
manner in which what is remote in space looks smaller than it actually
is; the drunk assesses his future suffering as less than it will be.
What is true for the individual also holds for society. From other
dialogues we learn that the person doing a wrong to another is like the
drunk who injures himself, he lacks knowledge of the degrees and pro-
portions of value-properties. For example, we should not say of an
iniquitous tyrant that he acts for his own good and dispenses iniquity
to others, because he does himself greater wrong than good.
Plato believes that correct measuring provides the key to the solu-
tion of all human problems. The same outlook is presented in a num-
ber of variations by scholars of later periods.
Here some critical considerations are required.
1. Plato did not show (nor did other disciples of the theory of
measurement) how to compare pleasures that differ in quality (for in-
stance, how do we determine that the pleasure in reading a beautiful
poem equals four units, while the pleasure in consuming good ice-
cream equals three units, or vice versa). He did not explain either how
to compare different kinds of suffering.
2. It is doubtful whether pleasure and pain set each other off in
general. Is there no valuative difference between the life of a person
who suffered a great deal and enjoyed many pleasures and that of a
person who suffered little and enjoyed few pleasures? According to
Plato — as application of the measurement theory ordains — there is
no difference between them. One person sought adventure, wandered a
great deal, bore hardships and fears but found great interest in what he
discovered. Another one lived in comfort, suffered very little, but
found little stimulation in his surroundings. Once the good and bad
experiences of these two have been set off against each other, we find
that according to the measurement theory their state is equal. Yet, is
this really true? How did the multiple shades of sorrow and joy the
adventure seeker experienced, disappear?74 Is there no dimension of
qualitative depth — a blind spot for the theory of measurement —
which foils this setting-off of joy against sorrow? Let us take another
example. One person is often sad, because he or she feels compassion
with the sorrow of others. However, they also gain much joy when
taking part in the joy of other people. Someone else is indifferent to
others — is their state truly equal? When asked whose fate, among
Measuring Values 185
these two, we would prefer, we have to take a valuative decision, and

it turns out that the difference between the two is valuative. If values
were spread out only in the positive-negative dimension, a common
denominator (i.e., common measurements) should exist as well as the
possibility of a counterbalance. But most values are not one-dimen-
sional. The dimension of valuative depth, the dimension of what
moves emotionally and what calms incorporate additional differences,
some of them qualitative, and cannot be set off against each other.
Indeed, in a number of cases, mainly in the sphere of goal-orientation,
people behave as if there were such a counterbalancing. Yet, it is not
reasonable to assume that every negative value may in some
clearinghouse set off every positive value.
3. The theory of measurement presupposes that a valuative
interest-rate of zero is the correct rate. Is this fixation not arbitrary? I
fail to see a single weighty argument favoring a zero interest rate, or
favoring any other interest rate. For numerous people the interest rate
fluctuates. It is doubtful whether anyone actually holds to a zero
interest rate.75
4. The theory of measurement should be examined according to the
distinction between the valuative and the meta-valuative level. Appar-
ently Plato may be understood in two ways (a and b). According to a
he claims that the measurement theory (including the counter-balanc-
ing and the zero interest rate) is accepted by humans, but they fail in
its application and interpret this failure wrongly. Instead of interpreting
it as a lack of sufficient knowledge with regard to measuring, they
interpret it as the surrender to pleasures. Understood in this way,
Plato's claim refers to facts (in the sphere of adherence to values), and
is meta-valuative (meta-ethical). According to b he recommends the
theory of measurement, but does not claim that everyone agrees with
him.
With regard to the claim arising from A, it is obvious that people
do not, in general, adhere to a zero interest rate. Regarding the recom-
mendation in B, it can be viewed as a legitimate suggestion of value
from among a variety of suggestions; as one approach among a series
of possible alternative approaches from which we can choose, once a
measuring-instrument is presented to us.
Measuring Valuative Values

More than anything we need measurements of valuative values. If
we could measure them, we would gain an excellent guide for our life:
we could find out what is better or less bad, chose them and try to
arrange motivative values accordingly.
However, it is doubtful whether there is anything else so far out of

our reach. From Plato to the present day scholars voiced the need for a
theory of measurement, but none pointed to a way to carry out such
measuring.
Even though in practice comparison, measuring and grading take
place in the sphere of valuative values, these are never general; they
are not valid with regard to all values or all value-properties.
Differences in quality between valuative values are so great that no
common denominator for all quantitative propositions exists; we have
no way to compare the value of things with the value of actions and
even within each of these secondary spheres, there is no denominator
suitable for all values they encompass. For example, how do we
compare the beauty of one thing with the benefit derived from another
thing?
Here one could ask whether there are no situations in which a per-
son has to choose between a beautiful and a useful thing, and whether
in such a case he or she would not compare the two.
Measuring by Means of Decisions
Motivative values may be measured by competition between them.

The result of a competition tells us that a certain motive is stronger
than its rival. The motive measured in this manner has already been
shaped quantitatively and qualitatively by the will. The competition
leads to a deed and to be precise, this deed is not always in accordance
with a volition, i.e., the will's resolution: a person may, for instance,
keep smoking or drinking excessively against his will. However, in
order to discuss the measuring of motives (and subsequently the issue
of an exchange rate and of money), we will simplify the picture and
look at the outcome of the strife of motives as if it were identical with
volition. In this discussion, we therefore refer to the volition as if it
were final on one hand, and as if it measured the relative weight of
motives (without influencing this weight!). In Chapter 9 of this part we
will drop this assumption (presented in order to simplify the dis-
cussion) and discuss struggles between the will and motives. Here we
assume that if a person decides to execute deed A and not the alterna-
tive deed B and acts accordingly, this is a sign that the motive to do A
(or to attain its result) is stronger than the motive to do B (or attain its
result), for this person at this time (namely, within the complex set of
circumstances prevailing at the time the deed is carried out). The same
holds for the choice someone made of the beautiful and not the useful
thing; this choice bears evidence of the relative weight of his motives
Measuring Values 187
at that time, and not of the relation between valuative values this
person adheres to, or between the value-properties of this beauty or
that usefulness, as they reveal themselves to the same person.
In the sphere of motives, we have therefore a yardstick we lack in
the sphere of valuative values. And let us understand this yardstick in
its broad sense, so that it also pertains to cases in which we are un-
aware of a struggle between motives. Thus, a decision to carry out an
unpleasant deed will also count as a yardstick for motives, even if it
was not preceded by an open struggle between the motives involved,
because such a decision is a sign that a positive motive has overcome a
negative motive.
As mentioned above, a positive motive is the quest for a certain
object, namely an action or a thing; a negative motive is a quest for the
absence of a certain object, for avoiding it, for the arrest of an ongoing
action, without including the affirmation of some alternative. In other
words: The negative valuative value that matches the negative motive,
is full. Let us take an action as example. X hates to correct exam
papers. The valuative value “checking exam papers” is full in its
negative segment, because this segment refers to the action, the object,
and not to the absence of something; the positive segment of this
valuative value is empty, because the absence of the hated action is
approved (its avoidance or arrest). The aspiration to avoid checking
exam papers or to cut it short belongs to the realm of motives and we
label this motive as “negative', because it does not include any af-
firmation, namely the seeking of a specific alternative, even though it
joins various positive motives, directed at some alternatives to the
hated action.
When a positive motive (A1) to achieve a goal (B 1) meets the op-
position of a negative motive (C) to the goal-oriented action (laziness
may serve as an example of a negative motive), and the positive mo-
tive overcomes the opposition, this testifies to its strength. And if
another positive motive (A2) to achieve a different goal (B 2) meets the
same opposition (C) and fails to overcome it, we conclude that motive
A1 is in the given circumstances stronger than motive A2.
Negative motives of opposition to unpleasant tasks belong to the
same kind; qualitatively they have some common elements and there-
fore common measurability; measuring them is relatively easy and the
resolution is therefore made without much agonizing.
We measure positive motives directed at goal-oriented activities by
means of negative motives. However, can we go beyond this point? In
the field of motives one may sometimes exceed boundaries and com-
pare a goal-oriented motive with a motive of another kind, but the
sphere of valuative values is out of reach. Valuative values cannot be
compared by analogy with motives. One should not say: Valuative

value A is superior to valuative value B, because the motive aimed at A
is stronger than that aimed at B. This would be wrong in the first place
and mainly because valuative and motivative values are, so to say,
made up by different metaphysical matter (to employ Leibniz's
language), but also because the measuring of motives gives their
strength at a certain point in time only. And as the weight of a valua-
tive value cannot be derived from the strength of a motive, thus the
motive's strength cannot inform us with regard to the “biological bene-
fit” the organism gains from various objects. For this purpose, the pre-
determined harmony revealed in our world is not sufficient. Not every
unhealthy dish has a bad taste and thus engenders a negative motive.
We should note that measuring through a resolution of the will (or
a decision) which is realized, measures facts and not what ought to
occur; it tells what someone actually prefers, or what a certain group
of people prefer in their deeds and in fact; it does not tell what ought to
be preferred, it is meta-valuative and not valuative. A human being
could be a more rational creature, if he or she could first measure rele-
vant value-properties and decide afterwards.
Chapter 2
Money
Money is said to have no smell. In itself neither enjoyable nor un-

pleasant, it can be good or bad only indirectly through its results, or
the results of its use. But the scope of its use is wider than that of
anything else. Thus, money is only a means, but a possible means to
every end. It can serve a certain objective as well as its opposite, while
other means serve specific ends. The value of money is limited only in
quantity; one inquires after its quantity, not its quality (the exception to
this rule being the question concerning currency-stability). Money is
the means par excellence.
Among kinds of money, paper currency and bank money (demand
deposits) are typical. Other assets that served as money, like gold,
silver, cattle, sheep or shells are also commodities. Being not only
means but also ends, they have a double nature. Commodities are ends,
while typical money is a means only. Money which one can also eat or
use as an adornment is primitive. Typical forms of money appeared
late in history, only after the shortcomings of its primitive forms had
become obvious. The theory that money is a commodity was
represented by Karl Marx, but the development of money pointed in
another direction. Here also development moved towards specializa-
tion, towards separation of money from commodities. Typical money
is also not a representative of a certain commodity like gold, though it
assumed also this figure.
In its more developed figures money is a kind of ownership certifi-

cate for part of society's property, but not for a specific, physical part.
The very existence of a universal means is an embodiment of goal-
orientation, an embodiment of what is typical for values which can be
realized by employing means. It assumes its typical and unadulterated
form in goal-oriented society.
Money as a Cognitive Medium
As a yardstick, money is meant to measure means. Whatever the

measuring-instrument, it only measures items of its own kind. Any-
thing measuring length has to possess length, anything measuring
weight has to possess weight, and so on. Money, which in its typical
form is only a means, measures only means.
What is the common quality of all means which is the substance
measured by money? For comparison: Should we ask about the com-
mon quality of whatever is measured in meters, the answer would be
length. The common quality we find in means is their valuative nega-
tivity, namely, whatever only aims at an end and is not identical with
it, involves a sacrifice in order to achieve the end. The sacrifice is a
non-pleasurable effort, or suffering, or forgoing pleasurable things or
actions. Instead of making one of these sacrifices, one can pay money;
money is the universal, cumulative representative of sacrifices made
for the sake of ends, and it is the instrument that measures them.
Money measures an end only through the mediation of its means.
When an end is measured by money, the resources invested are being
measured, or rather, the resources that should be invested now in order
to achieve this end. Measuring the end does not represent additional
use of money, but is in a certain sense a reduction of the end itself to
the status of a means.
The relation between prices, namely, between the financial sacri-
fices necessary to acquire goods on the market, is basically the relation
between the sacrifices made before the goods came to the market, i.e.,
the relation between non-financial sacrifices. These sacrifices are what
nature demands from us: to pay by means of labor.
Labor also serves as money. It is the original form of money. “La-
bor was the initial price, the original purchase-money, paid for all
things,” says Adam Smith.76 By work, a human being buys his or her
products from nature. Nature is the ultimate salesperson; it determines
price tariffs according to the prevailing level of technology. It imposes
its own minimum demand as the maximum tariff on all other sellers —
Money 191
compulsion by means of competition, because whoever can buy

cheaply from nature, will not buy dearly from another seller.
Supply and demand influence the price paid in labor, as they influ-
ence market prices.
The supply mentioned here is basically the table of tariffs nature
— following Adam Smith's parable — imposed for a certain product
on a certain technological level; to wit: if you demand X quantity of
this product, its price in labor will be so many hours; should you need
a greater quantity, you will probably have to pay for each of the addi-
tional units with more labor than for the previous units. For instance, a
greater annual amount of wheat is needed so that farmers will have to
cultivate poorer soil, which requires greater effort.
The demand discussed here is the readiness to invest efforts and
take trouble for an additional unit of the desired product. An additional
unit brings the point of repletion or saturation nearer. As we come
closer to this point, the readiness to sacrifice diminishes.
As nature demands progressively more, when the desired quantity
of a product increases, and the human being is less and less ready to
invest effort, so even if humans were initially prepared to sacrifice
more than actually required, we will usually arrive at a point where
the minimum sacrifice demanded by nature, equals the maximum hu-
mans are prepared to give; this point will designate the actual amount
produced and the actual price.
The significance of this topic is not just technical, it embraces a
principle. So far as the sacrifice people actually make for a unit of a
certain product is also the maximum they are prepared to give for it
(under current circumstances and taking into account the actually pro-
duced quantity of the item in question), the relation between the sacri-
fices made for two products, A and B, also represents the proportion of
readiness to make a sacrifice for A, to the readiness to do so for B.
The relationship between the instances of readiness to make sacrifices
for two products expresses the relationship between the powers of
motivative values, but only on the basis of a very complex set of cir-
cumstances. The relation between these instances of readiness does not
make up the relation between the powers of motives. A person's readi-
ness to sacrifice for a unit of product A will change once he has gained
an additional unit of A, while the motive's power is not altered by this
change in readiness. The same power of a motive determines different
degrees of readiness to sacrifice under different circumstances; the dif-
ference in circumstances also includes differences in quantity of the
product in question (namely, in the amount already gained, to which
we add a unit). The readiness to sacrifice is a point in the curve of the
motive's power.
The following arises from this reservation: Although the power of

the motive determines the price of a commodity (when nature's tariff-
table is given), money is not a yardstick which enables us to say
without reservation: the motive aimed at end A is stronger than the
motive aimed at end B (or: the motive aimed at a unit of A is stronger
than the motive aimed at a unit of B).
To sum up: 1. Money measures motivative and not valuative val-
ues; 2. Money measures motives directed at an end and not those in-
volved in a positive value of an action itself (i.e., without taking its
results into account); 3. Money measures the marginal power of a mo-
tive, namely, the readiness to make sacrifices.
Regarding points 1 and 2: There is nothing in the entire realm of
values so convenient to measure like the motive for an unpleasant ac-
tion. Near the area of these motives there is the field of motives for
pleasant actions on one hand, and on the other hand the field of valua-
tive values. Neither of these is measurable to the same degree, and in
any case, they do not show a broad common measurability even within
each of these fields.
The motive is more measurable than the valuative value because it
is measured by the will's arbitration between different motives, i.e.,
through the act of choosing the motive to be preferred. The resolution
or the choice are the scales that weigh values, but they cannot help us
in weighing valuative values. One could argue the comparison of
valuative values by analogy to the motives attached to them. If motives
A2 and B 2 are attached to valuative values A1 and B 1, a decision
favoring A 2 shows, on the face of it, a resolution on valuative values
favoring A 1. However, the specific valuative values which lend them-
selves more or less to quantitative comparison with each other, fail to
confirm the analogy. In the case of those needs that are satisfied by
products of labor i.e., of goal-oriented activity, it may happen that the
consumption of a product which requires great sacrifice involves less
pleasure than consumption of something attained without such sacri-
fice. Pleasure is a valuation and it cannot be measured by the sacri-
fices made to attain the pleasurable object, while the motive can be
measured in this manner.
In its ordinary use, the word “useful” designates a valuation. Ac-
cordingly, “usefulness” or “utility” designate a valuative value. How-
ever, economists since Alfred Marshal apply the word “utility” to des-
ignate that which they measure by the willingness to pay. “Utility is
taken to be correlative to Desire or Want.” 77 Practically it is the same
as the power of a motivative value.
The motive for an unpleasant action is more measurable than the
motive for a pleasant one because a decision is needed to carry out the
Money 193
unpleasant action, it is necessary to overcome opposing motives,

which is not the case with regard to pleasant deeds. The will's arbitra-
tion at the beginning of the deed and the overcoming of opposition in
its course, serve as a measuring tool. But, a deed which requires no
overcoming of obstacles does not involve a measuring of values.
Is measurability of values extended beyond the sphere of ends and
means? Values which are not ends themselves but dictate ends as a
precondition for their realization, may prima facie be compared by aid
of the ends they dictate. However, we have already discussed the satis-
faction of needs by goods achieved through the use of means. Rejec-
tion of the quantitative analogy between valuative and motivative val-
ues leads to rejection of the analogy between the weight of an end-dic-
tating value and the relative weight of the end it dictates. An ideal
dictating ends which are hard to achieve, does not play a greater role in
the life of a person who adheres to it than an ideal which does not
dictate ends at all.
If money does not measure valuative values, it certainly does not
measure value-properties of objects. As with the power of a motive, a
valuation may also be marginal, for instance, an additional unit may be
valued less than previous units of the same kind, and this does not
apply to value-properties. Needless to say that money does not meas-
ure non-valuative properties of an object. Accordingly, properties of
things and actions are not measured by money. The motive for an ac-
tion to acquire a house (to build it or raise money to buy it) cannot be
viewed as a property of the house. The price of a house does therefore
not express any property of this house. One may, of course, view the
price itself as a property of the house in the same sense that any rela-
tionship an object occupies at some point in time, can be called “a
property of this object at that point in time,” but this is only a manner
of speech. In any case, the semblance as if the price expressed the na-
ture of the thing so priced is misleading.
From the general to the particular: In the same way that the price
does not express any property of what is sold, we must emphasize that
it neither expresses the latter's property to give pleasure. There is no
doubt a link between the pleasure derived from a thing and the fact
that one is prepared to pay for it; there may even be a link between the
intensity of pleasure involved in consuming some product, and the
power of the motive represented by its price. This intensity may be
among the factors influencing the power of the motive, which through
its mediation influence the price. But there may be an altogether non-
pleasurable thing which has a price because it is, useful as a tool, and
something else may be pleasurable but have no price, because it can be
gained without sacrifice.
I have now to point out some of the reservations applying to this

discussion, and will first mention two reservations concerning the
quantitative propositions in this chapter.
First: we spoke, according to Adam Smith's metaphor, of purchas-
ing from nature. Yet, until a product reaches the consumer, the price
collected by nature is inflated by additional payments, demanded by
the social system. These additions may not stand in the same relation
to each other as that which prevails between the prices nature collects.
The most typical among this kind of additions arise from violence or
politics, for example, the toll collected by a feudal lord from people
who cross a bridge held by his villeins, or the addition to the price of a
natural substance like petroleum, collected by an association that
dominates its sources. These additions include custom duties and
indirect taxes.
However, beyond these arbitrary additions there are others, for the
effort involved, directly or indirectly, in organizing the division of
labor. On account of arbitrary and organizational cum economic addi-
tions, the relation between market prices is not congruent with the
relation between the amounts of labor demanded by nature for the pro-
duction of goods.
Second: what was said so far in this chapter referred directly to du-
plicable products, namely, those of which multiple copies can be
made. However, the proposition that prices express the power of mo-
tives, holds also for non-duplicable goods.
I do not deal with the details of quantitative qualifications because
our aim is to clarify the relationship between the notion of value in
economic life and the entire realm of values. Regarding this relation-
ship one other point should be clarified: the additional role money has
acquired over recent generations. Before we present this role, we will
describe its background.
Money as a Valuative Medium
Modern industrial society tends to excessive goal-orientation. This

orientation shows in that everything is regularly measured by money
and exchanged for money; accordingly, values which are not ends lose
their specifity in contradistinction to the end and even appear to as-
similate in the sphere of ends; finally, this goal-orientation shows in
that, prima facie, the difference between ends and means tends to dis-
appear. The hoarding of means, which in the form of money can be
conveniently hoarded, becomes an independent end. Accordingly, ends
themselves appear as if they were accumulated means.
Money 195
From this point onwards a person also assesses in terms of money

goods, in particular durable goods, kept for his own consumption, and
not only goods he offers for sale.
The difference between the pleasant and the useful is now hidden;
not because the useful looks as if it were pleasant, but because people
treat what is pleasant in a frame of reference appropriate to what is
useful as a means to an end.
All colors in the realm of values fade and do not differ much from
end-oriented grayness. Differences in quality become blurred.
Under these circumstances money assumes a new role. For the in-
dividual it changes progressively from a yardstick that measures
values post factum, to a builder's-measure for values, participating in
their construction, from a picture of other people's motivative values to
the plotting of the alignment of his own, from a regulator of relations
between humans (in which it has already acquired an almost exclusive
position), to a regulator of relations between the individual and him or
herself, namely, between his or her different wishes. Money began its
itinerary as information for the individual about the rest of humans,
neutral information to be taken into account while regulating one's
relations with them; it ends its journey as a dictate or a norm, shaping
the individual self.
In its normative role, money determines the relative weight of the
individual's motives (or participates in its determination). Whether, or
how far, money has actually gone through this paradoxical transforma-
tion, to what degree it now produces what it was meant to depict, I do
not know.
Money fulfills its first normative role when it measures efficiency.
Efficiency is a matter of means. We will say a means is efficient if it is
effective (yields results of satisfactory quality), and economical
(namely, it does not involve wasting time and other resources). A
means is more efficient than another one, for instance, when their re-
sult is the same, but one is more economical. However, when the
products of goal-oriented deeds differ in quality, the efficiency of
these deeds can only be compared by way of money and by means of
profitability; the comparison is accurate as far as the market in which it
takes place is a free market (i.e., operating without monopolies and
without violent intervention, be it legal or illegal). And as the efficient
deed is preferable to the non-efficient, it is feasible that precisely in its
role as a measure of efficiency money began to strengthen its norma-
tive role, i.e., forming motives while measuring them, and thus led to
its paradoxical metamorphosis.
Money — paradoxically transformed — served as evidence for the
opinion that means tend in general to become ends, or in a different
version: What was only a means for a long time acquires, by virtue of
habit, the status of something desired in its own right.78 In its simple
form this opinion is unacceptable, because no one is likely to become
fond of every thing or every action. Drawn out repetition may even
have the opposite result: something with no value-quality or even
pleasant may become loathsome. In my opinion, something may be-
come desirable in its own right, when it was not only a means, but had
additional characteristics already from the outset. A wealthy person,
for example, does not only possess purchasing power; he is respected
and he enjoys the respect people feel for him; from this angle money
awards pleasure even if one does not buy anything with it.
The paradoxical transformation of money has the following princi-
pal aspect. The acceptance of a message formulated in terms of money
as a valuative value establishes an order of priorities of motives as an
order of preference of valuative values. It is an adjustment of the
valuative to the motivative value, a preference of motives over
valuative values
Chapter 3
The Rate of Value Realization and

Valuative Grading
The Profile of a Valuative Value
Although different values are not commensurable, it seems that

each one of them has a quantitative aspect, namely, beyond its division
into good and bad it also divides into better and less good, into worse
and less bad. A value contains an ideal possibility to be realized on a
scale, i.e., that one of its realizations will be suitable for quantitative
comparison with other realizations of the same value; it also contains a
demand to be completed by a scale, by a real measuring-rod
possessing a zero point and notches which mark degrees of good along
one side, and degrees of bad along the other side of zero. This demand
may be met only in part: there may be a scale without a zero point, but
with a positive and a negative direction and a comparison between
better which is also less bad, and worse, which is also less good. The
scale or measuring-rod may consist of several objects which serve as
notches. When I say that Mr. X is as diligent as Mr. A, determining
X's rate of diligence by this comparison, then A serves as a notch on
the yardstick of value “diligence.”
When Nicolai Hartmann discusses the intermediate-virtue and
Aristotle's concept of mesotes, he describes (following an author
named M. v. Kohoutek) the realization of a value by means of a curve

within a space defined by a set of axes; the horizontal axis is consid-
ered ontological, designating units of value-matter, or the value-bearer,
or the valuable object, while the vertical axis is considered axiological,
designating the rate of the value.
The graphic description serving axiologists resembles the one used
by economists. We will now look at some examples of values pos-
sessing different structures, by means of their graphic description.
rate of value
value A
value-bearer
Figure 2
The description of some value A (see fig. 2) as a straight line

climbing up to the right (as shown above) claims a constant relation
between the bearer of value A and the rate of this value. The point
where the value curve crosses the horizontal axis (point X 1), shows the
required minimum for the value-bearer; if we replace A by wisdom we
receive the version that whoever expands his wisdom increases his
own value, and that there is a minimum of wisdom a human being
needs.
We will now turn to another example, value B. The value a person
attaches to whatever can be bought for money, i.e., his or her attitude
to money and assets, can be described by a curve. We will compare the
position of two people (figure 3).
A attaches a constant value to money: should he gain assets in ad-
dition to those he has, he would not take less pleasure in the new assets
than he took in the previous ones. B, on the other hand, attaches a
The Rate of Value Realization and Value Grading 199
decreasing value to additional money, so that the rate of the positive

value regarding the entire matter of money or assets remains for him
below a certain limit (upper barrier).
rate of value position of
person A
position of
person B
debts (neto) assets (neto)
Figure 3
Value C. Values A and B (figures 2 and 3) had a fixed direction
(climbing from left to right). However, there are values without a fixed
direction: their curve ascends in one section and descends in another.
Let us examine a convex curve, looked at from above, like the fol-
lowing (figure 4):
rate of
value
value-
bearer
Figure 4
This curve represents a value constructed as a golden mean be-
tween two extreme, bad ways. It may, for instance, present an educa-
tional conception, the horizontal axis describing to what degree the

educator intervenes in the life of his ward. To the right of the axes
intersection we find increasing intervention. To the left of the axes
intersection we have events of increasing importance in the ward's life,
with no intervention by the educator. The opinion expressed by this
upwards arching curve says that intervention is good, that there is a
correct degree of intervention (point X2), and that one should beware
of too much or too little intervention. (X1 and X 3 show the minimum
and maximum of appropriate educational intervention). The reader
will find discussion of values belonging to this group in Aristotle's and
Nicolai Hartmann's work.
Figure 5
Value D. A concave curve (looked at from above). This curve

(figure 5) expresses an opinion saying that one should get away from a
certain critical point . For example, a Machiavellian position on means
of oppression a ruler may use against an unsympathetic population
would argue that the ruler should be wary of employing X 2 oppressive
means because this amount is insufficient as a deterrent for
disobedience, but quite sufficient to irritate the population and make it
restive. The ruler has to choose between two good options (less than
X1 or more than X3), and avoid the middle way.
Curves help us to show the profile of a value, i.e., its structure
from a quantitative angle, and we can compare the profiles of two val-
ues. In this manner one can first of all compare two values with the
same name which answer the same question, like two different ap-
proaches to education or two conceptions of the value of assets as pre-
sented above, in the example of value B. In this case the conceptions
(i.e., the values) are compared by means of curves drawn on the same
set of axes.
Values which do not answer the same question can usually not be
drawn on the same set of axes; nevertheless graphic description en-
ables us to compare them, for instance, as straight, convex or concave
etc.
Comparison of Values According to Height and

Strength
The height of a value represents the character of its positive sec-

tion. A value is higher the more we value and praise its realization.
Someone who risks his life to save another from drowning wins
greater acclaim than a person who helps another without risk to him-
self and without really sacrificing anything. Accordingly, the value
realized by the person who saved the drowning one, is said to be high.
The strength of a value represents the character of its negative sec-
tion. A value is stronger the more we blame the person who fails to
realize it, or violates it. Not to murder is a stronger value than not to
steal.
Nicolai Hartmann, who first made this distinction, claims that in
the sphere of ethics a value's height stands in inverse proportion to its
strength, and he presents many reasons for this claim.79 As an example
of a high value we brought the rescue of another, involving risk to
oneself; we now ask whether this value is strong, namely, whether we
would strongly condemn someone who hesitates to rush into a fire or
jump into stormy, ice-cold waters; it seems that the answer will be
negative, namely, that this high value is weak. Avoidance of murder
was our example for a strong value; we now ask whether it is high,
whether it accords great honor to a person if one says that he is not a
murderer; from the obviously negative answer we learn that this strong
value is low. Another example: heroism is a high value, but whoever
does not show himself a hero is not much censured. The value is weak.
Nicolai Hartmann views values as arranged in tiers: strong values in
the lower tier carry the weak, higher values. This stratification tallies
with Hartmann's ontological theory about the stratification of reality.
Graphically height means that the curve describing the value
climbs steeply beyond the point where it crosses the horizontal axis
(from below). It may, for instance, almost overlap with a parallel to the
vertical axis in a certain section of it. Strength is graphically shown in
that the curve drops steeply beyond the point where it crosses the
horizontal axis (from above). It may, for instance, almost overlap with
a parallel to the vertical axis in a certain section. Hartmann's claim will
be graphically expressed in that a value-curve which is steep on the
upper half of the plane will continue flat on the lower half, and a curve
that is steep on the lower half, will continue flat on the upper half.
Comparison of value-profiles with regard to height or strength is
difficult in most cases, because the steepness depends on the manner in
which the horizontal axis, representing value-matter, is arranged. To
compare two values they must a) both have the same value-matter and
b) the scale has to be the same. As the first condition is usually met
only when the two values are two different answers to the same ques-
tion and have the same name, the exact comparison according to
height and strength refers to a comparison of different opinions on the
same matter; in other cases, however, gradation according to height
and strength is a matter of feeling and perspicacity.
Determining the proportion in which the curve in the upper half of
the space stands to that in the lower half could perhaps replace a com-
mon value-matter as a basis for comparison, because prima facie we
could compare this proportion in different values. But here a difficulty
surfaces, because when a section of a value is empty it has no value-
matter: Whoever avoids a deed altogether, does not avoid it more or
less. If however, for the sake of description, we add a measuring-in-
strument for avoidance (for instance, the length of time spent, or the
size of the sacrifice made by avoiding this deed), the instrument will
not be common, i.e., it will not be relevant for the full section.
Hartmann takes his examples from values possessing only one full
section, which is the section described by a steep curve: The high val-
ues are full in their positive and the strong ones in their negative sec-
tion. Here, an argument against Hartmann could come to mind: Should
we join two values possessing one full section so that they
complement each other and become a value which is full in both sec-
tions (when proximity or similarity of the value-matter permit it), we
can achieve a high and strong value. For example, we join the avoid-
ance of murder and saving a life, thus achieving the value “human
life” — which will be strong and high at once.
I believe Hartmann would have replied as following: The value
“human life” as a single value precedes ethics, it is in itself a basic
value; ethics takes it as matter from which it constructs the two values
in question. Hartmann would justify the separation of the two empiri-
cally, basing it on prevailing custom of valuation.
Hartmann's rule about inverse proportion of height and strength is

relevant to ideals and duties. Beyond this sphere it has no clear mean-
ing. If we try to examine this rule in its application to non-ethical
ideals, a comparison between the aesthetic and the ethical comes to the
fore. There are axiological reasons to consider the aesthetic as higher
than the ethical value (for instance, the acclaim of a paragon artist ex-
ceeds the acclaim of someone who fulfills all his duties), and there is
no doubt that it is weaker than the ethical.
When we value motives aimed at fulfilling a duty according to
height and strength, the risk consciously run by whoever fulfills his
duty becomes relevant, as does the general readiness to make sacri-
fices. We have already met this readiness as an exchange regulator,
while searching for factors that determine valuation in economic life;
now we find it in the sphere of ethics among the factors determining
height and strength. Is it the same readiness to sacrifice, that functions
in these different spheres?
The relevant factor in determining the value of a commodity are
the absolute quantities of resources necessary for its production, while
in the moral and not goal-oriented spheres in general, we deal with the
relative quantity a person sacrifices from among his or her overall re-
sources. From the angle of height and strength there is a difference
between the person who gave his last dollar to aid someone else, while
his next expected income was small and not imminent (this is realiza-
tion of a high and weak value), and one who gave a dollar out of a
million at his disposal (realization of a strong and low value); yet,
from the economic angle, the first dollar equals the second one.
Dependence of a Value on another Value
A value may depend on another value, or be conditioned by it in

two senses: a conditioning of content or a conditioning of realization.
A value-content is conditioned by another value if the first cannot
be understood without understanding the second. For example, one
cannot understand the value that forbids stealing without understand-
ing the value “property.”
The realization of a value is conditioned by another if it cannot oc-
cur without first realizing the second value. Conditioning from the
aspect of realization does not, of course, belong to pure valuative
structure, but to the structure of the valued world.
When we discover that the presence of thing A, which has no
value-property, is a necessary precondition to the realization of posi-
tive value B, does A itself then acquire positive value (namely, a posi-
tive value-property)? The reply is yes, unless the presence of A is also

a necessary precondition for the realization of negative value not-B —
because it is possible for something to serve as a necessary precondi-
tion for good and bad at once.
Chapter 4
Reason and Conflicts
The Distinction between Rivalry and Opposition
Two kinds of conflict can be distinguished in the sphere of values:

rivalry and opposition
1. Rivalry prevails between values whose realization requires use
of the same resources. This is a conflict between valuative values
which sometimes peaks in a struggle between motivative values in the
arena of decisions. The conflict is “local” (namely, about specific re-
sources) and passing. One and the same rivalry between two values
may surface in a number of “local” conflicts. Rivalry characterizes the
relation between ends but it may also appear between other values,
regardless to which type they belong. If you look at rivaling values in
themselves, namely, regardless of the resources they may require, you
may not find any opposition between them; they do not convey in-
compatible messages.
2. Opposition between values is distinct from rivalry in that it is
objectively embodied. It is embodied in the fact that one and the same
object has two value-properties, one positive, the other negative; the
object may be a thing, a process, an action or a state of affairs.
When there is opposition between values, we say that an object is
good and bad — good according to one value and bad according to the
other. The opposition may involve an internal struggle, when opposed
valuations arise from conflicting instructions how to act, namely,

whether to approve or reject a certain action. Internal struggle exists,
for example, when the object valued positively and negatively at once
is an action, and when the same person values it in this manner.
But not every opposition between values involves internal strug-
gles. Opposing values held by different people may also represent
opposition between values and may be felt as such, when these people
operate in the same society.
Opposition between ends prevails when a certain act aids the
achievement of end A and impedes the achievement of end B. Such
opposition may prevail between different ends of the same person, or
between the ends of different people.
The origin of valuative conflicts is twofold: in the first place, in the
complexity of the human being, which generates a variety of ties
between the individual and the world, and second, in that the world is
not altogether made up for the convenience of humans. That is to say,
a multiplicity of inconvenient ties between a person and his or her
environment engenders a multiplicity of incompatible demands.
It is possible — even though it is not easy — to imagine a world
made up without real conflicts, i.e., in which all valuative conflicts
remain merely hypothetical; but even then conflicts are not canceled
on the ideal level, because a valuative problem is not resolved by
preventing the case that serves it as a value-bearer.80
Value-Stages
There are three stages of value:

1. The stage preceding the order of preference, which is a stage of
conflicts. 2. The stage of coalescence within a system; partial resolu-
tion of conflicts. 3. Values beyond conflicts and preference; creations
of pure spontaneity.
1. To the first stage belong values of the first and second sections,
i.e., mainly ends, needs and ideals. An unfulfilled need makes rea-
son establish the commodity which satisfies this need, as an end. The
emergence of new circumstances makes reason refine an inclination
until it becomes an ideal. Reason then harnesses itself once to one
tendency and once to another, thus helping to develop partial sets of
given elementary values, namely, values of feeling and emotion, which
serve as a point of departure for the development of the first stage; yet,
by the same token, it also exacerbates conflicts, and in particular,
creates many new conflicts. For instance, the rivalries between ends
did not initially prevail between the needs which served as a point of
Reason and Conflicts 207
departure for the constitution of these ends. The same holds for
opposition between ends. At this stage reason (by creating values) and
understanding (by applying them) generate and exacerbate opposition.
2. At this stage, reason is not guided by feeling and emotion; on
the contrary, it tries to overcome conflicts it created while guided by
these. It creates value-grades and orders of preference and these are
themselves values which a priori assume the comprehension of first-
stage values. Reason alters first-stage values and adapts them, or at
least tries to adapt them to the requirements arising from second-stage
values, with the aim to consolidate values within a comprehensive
system.
The concepts justice, right, and duty, money and prices, height of a
value and strength of a value, are values of the second stage. The
values height and strength did not acquire their names on the valuative
level, but in discussions of meta-valuative character; however, the
gradings that make up the meaning of these names emerged on the
valuative level.
When reason creates values according to which we prefer one
value to another, a practical solution of conflicts emerges, namely, an
instruction how to behave. The practical solution is the only one re-
quired by rivalry and therefore cancels it. In contradistinction, the
opposition between values is not canceled by practical solutions. Al-
locating a value an inferior position in the order of preference does
neither cancel not change it; as it were, it goes on saying what it said
previously, before the order of preference was introduced, now also
with regard to cases in which its message opposes reason's judgment.
Reason tries to change it in order to suit the value to its place in the
system. At this juncture two variants of the same value may be pre-
sent: the original value, belonging to the first stage and the second one,
being built up according to the system's requirements and meant to
replace the first. They may exist alongside each other. For instance,
one may be considered the voice of emotion and the other the voice of
reason.
It is also possible for the opposition between values of the first
stage to reappear as opposition between values of the second stage.
Attempts to resolve one kind of opposition may create new kinds of
opposition.
3. At the third value-stage, reason resides beyond conflicts and be-
yond the role of settling these. Here it creates — for instance, aesthetic
ideals, drawn from aesthetic inclinations, at times realizing them in the
imagination and at times attaining them in reality. The spirit, namely
reason at this stage, is not urged by needs and constraints to perform
its work, nor is it attracted to work by the task of settling conflicts, but
on the contrary: being free of urges and tasks it is at liberty to observe

its environment including previous value-stages, to take something
from it and complete its figure. Reason is free to receive inspiration
from what it can observe, in order to shape itself out of its own
materials; it is free to create something new which cannot be predicted.
In addition to a contingent of aesthetic values, the third stage in-
corporates values guiding cognitive theoretical thought in general, and
philosophy in particular. For example, the value of methodical valua-
tive neutrality belongs to the third stage.
Third-stage values are beyond conflicts from the angle of their
constitution, from the angle of the subject who constitutes them, but
not from the angle of their results with regard to the system into which
they integrate. In a roundabout way, they may contribute to the exac-
erbation or the alleviation of conflicts.
At each of these stages, we find feelings and emotions as well as
concepts. An elementary, pre-conceptual, pure feeling and emotional
level of values does not actually exist, because this pure pre-
conceptual level should not be influenced by concepts, while emotion
and feeling residing in a person are influenced by his or her concepts.
Even in the abstract, it is difficult to find the contours a value which is
not at all influenced by concepts. The distinction between an
elementary and a conceptual level comes therefore to indicate the
direction of an abstraction and not its finished product.
The division into an elementary and a conceptual level crosses the
division into stages. It is required in order to examine reason's contri-
bution to values.
The Constitution of Values
A value which is not given is not only the product of creative

work, but also of its establishment. The establishment of a new value
demands that the individual arrange himself accordingly, so that appli-
cations of the new value, arising from its content and the nature of the
objects, indeed represent this individual subject's positions with regard
to the object. To establish also means to believe that this content is
indeed a value. Constitution consists of creation and establishment.
The individual may adopt value contents held by others, and thus
save himself the effort of creation, but only he himself can establish
his values (so far as they are not already given to him on the elemen-
tary level).
Values are created by reason but established by the will. Constitu-

tion is therefore a joint endeavor of reason and will. The initiative for
constitution may come from reason or may come from the will.
The initiative comes from the will (a) in distress situations in
which a qualitative change in a person's set-up is necessary, because
the prevailing value-system cannot instruct his intellect how to escape
this distress; in a certain sense this is a situation devoid of guidance a
person happens upon, because the system of given values is not suffi-
ciently rich to guide his valuations and lead the way; (b) when a per-
son is disconcerted by a surplus of instructions, namely, when two
values issue conflicting instructions with regard to an object possess-
ing positive and negative value-properties; here an additional view-
point is required in order to discover an additional dimension of the
object and to find, say, in its depth the value-property according to
which the person will treat the object.
The initiative comes from reason in states of composure, in the ab-
sence of distress and disconcertion, fueled by its own motive, which
initially is the motivation to understand. Intellectual understanding is
an understanding of alternatives. Since understanding a negative sen-
tence involves understanding of what is being negated, to understand a
positive sentence means to do so against the backdrop of its alterna-
tive, i.e., its negation. Reason therefore deals with the unfolding of a
set of alternatives in general, and alternatives for the relevant disposi-
tion of the personality in particular. And this already comprises con-
struction work. Creative reason also builds in the sphere of sensory
intuition. We may describe reason's own motive as the motive to take a
conceptual or perceptual figure and edit its variants. Such variations
may not only be set up in imagination but also in reality, namely, in a
person's environment. In states of composure reason trails the will, to
have it establish ideals reason has created. When the will establishes a
value, it chooses one content out of the alternatives reason unfolds as
candidates for the status of a value, i.e., an end or an ideal. The will
chooses a candidate according to which the subject will be able to ar-
range itself. The will operates as a legislator who consults other agen-
cies of the personality. It consults reason, or orders it to present the
development of alternatives and the unfolding of alternatives. It needs
information when the goal is not established but the ability to achieve
it presumably exists; this ability is a combination of objective and
subjective factors.
However, a person creating a value may believe he is discovering
it, and a person who establishes a value may believe that he acknowl-
edges it. This is even more likely when a person adopts the value-con-
tent from other persons. That is to say, constitution may be accompa-
nied by self-consciousness which does not view it as constitution, but

as the acknowledgment of a set-up external to the individual and inde-
pendent of it. We will try to clarify where this illusion originates.
It is appropriate to label thinking in the sphere of values as “rea-
son” when it creates values (ends and ideals), and as “understanding”
when it finds the means needed for these ends (constituted by reason).
Reason participates in the constitution of valuative values. The will
provides these with the weight of motives, at times by diverting
already existing motives into the required direction; for example, it
diverts motives aimed at the satisfaction of a need to goal-oriented
action, namely, to the use of means required in order to gain the
commodity which satisfies this need. Reason influences the system of
motives indirectly, by means of the will. The evidence that reason,
indeed, influences motives, resides in all those goal-oriented actions
which are definitely unpleasant and therefore involve self-compulsion.
Such compulsion reveals itself daily in the life of human beings. The
will implements this compulsion on the advice of reason, or perhaps
we should say: on the advice of the reason of ends. Let us briefly stop
to examine these differences in formulation.
I am trying to emphasize two different characterizations
concerning reason.
At one end the emphasis is this: The role of thought is not only to
search efficient means to given goals but also — and in the first place
— to create goals, to shape contents the will establishes as goals, and
beyond goals — to create ideals; that is to say, reason which creates
values plays an essential role in determining human behavior.
However, at the other end we must emphasize this: it is not reason
writ large, i.e., reason in general, but always a certain figure of reason,
or creative reason assuming a certain figure, or one instance of reason;
it is an instance of reason that serves a certain individual will (even if
it is similar in many individuals, though not in all); the will not only
determines the task of a certain person's reason, it also participates in
determining its pre-assumptions and through these, in determining its
manner of operation. Reason of a certain kind, having a special set of
relationships with the will takes part in the compulsion (mentioned
above) that occurs in typical goal-oriented activities, while another
kind of reason has a different set of relationships with the will. When
we speak of reason below, we refer to one of these instances of reason.
Let us consider the issue of creation, and ask: How does reason
create values? Does it create them out of nothing? One rather wishes to
reply: Creation is the shaping of matter; reason takes the initial matter
for its work from the elementary level, namely, it imposes change on
values it takes from feelings and emotions. This reply is correct to
some degree, but not sufficiently for axiology to accept it at face-

value. It is correct when we refer to axiological inquiry because
indeed, reason does not create something out of nothing, without any
data. We may also speak of shaping when we refer to perceptual
values, or to the observational aspect of values.
However, the image of shaping matter is inadequate, because rea-
son cannot directly mold concepts and sets of concepts from feelings
and emotions. It cannot requisition a lump of matter from the elemen-
tary level, so to say, and transfer it to its own territory, the sphere of
concepts. Concepts consist of different metaphysical matter from that
of feelings and emotions, while conceptual values as a point of depar-
ture are not given to reason. For example, when reason creates a con-
cept of justice it cannot shape it out of feeling or emotion, nor can it be
derived from a given concept (an inborn idea) or from formal morality.
In practice, reason observes feelings and emotions and initially
constructs concepts in keeping with their example; it creates some-
thing similar to a conceptual copy of feeling and emotion, or of the
objects which stimulate feeling and emotion, or of the behavior ex-
pressing feeling and emotion. Reason can impose changes only on
concepts arranged according to this given lay-out; it can continue to
develop them and build them up into a whole lay-out; then reason can
unfold the different variants of the conceptual lay-out as alternatives,
one of which is subsequently established by the will.
Ends, for instance, are products of reason. A contingent of ends are
identical in their value-matter with needs. For example, a person needs
certain food, say, bread, and his reason creates the end to gain bread,
e.g. by producing it. Here bread makes up the value-matter of the end
as well as of the need. Yet reason does not create the end from the
elementary matter of the need, but from the need translated into its
own language, or copied in the sphere of concepts (the same holds for
honing an inclination into an ideal). A special act of the will is needed
in order to make the effort and sacrifice resources for the goal drawn
by reason; the will is necessary before the effort begins: to establish
the goal, to decide, “to sow in tears,” as well as it is necessary further
on, to encourage the owner of the will.
Two characteristics, specific to the conceptual sphere, are relevant
to the issue of values: (A) Going beyond the individual and (B), going
beyond the present, namely, (A), generality and an outlook upon what
is individual and (B), breaking out of the course of time and an outlook
upon it. From the vantage point of eternity, a pure, reasonable outlook
does not distinguish between past, present and future. This distinction
arises from a synthesis between reason and observation: the point in
time at which reason breaks out of it serves as a kind of barrier that

divides time for the sake of orientation.
It is true that beginnings of these two instances of transcendence
can already be found at the pre-reasonable level (in the same way that
other beginnings of form, specific to the conceptual level, exist on this
level, like affirmation and negation, reality and absence etc.), but they
are never complete.
The degree of relevance of these two differences between the
spheres to each and every value is so high, that the conceptual copy of
an elementary value cannot be “true” to the original in every aspect,
nor should it be entirely true, because if it were it would have no ad-
vantage, and would not help to settle conflicts. The difference between
a value of feeling or emotion and a conceptual value is therefore not
only a difference in the sphere in which the values reside, but also a
difference in content.
We will now briefly examine the first difference. An elementary
value does not exist separately but is embedded in acts of valuation,
i.e., the valuation of individual things, and it is different in different
valuations. The value created by reason exists separately, as an object
of intentionality, and it may include the instruction how to apply it.
The difference in value-content between the personal and the universal
shows in particular with regard to ethical values (i.e., ideals concern-
ing the behavior of humans to each other), because universality is es-
sential to them, namely, their reasonable character. Divers ethics fre-
quently differ in their degree of universality, but it characterizes all of
them. As mentioned above, morality equals ethics applied to the
valuation of motives. Closed morality treats different groups of people
differently, while universal morality treats all humans equally; how-
ever, even closed morality does not mention given names (of indi-
viduals).
The difference in the degree of universality between various ethics
concerns content, of course, and not just formulation. The proposition
that the valuative value, which is separate from valuation, is a product
of reason, and that on the elementary level values exist within and only
by means of valuations, should not be interpreted as saying that the
valuative value is an abstraction of valuations (Victor Kraft says that
empiricism claims values “are simply abstractions of valuations.”81
Even where on the thinking level itself a valuative value embedded in
predicative valuations precedes the separate valuative value,
crystallized as a concept, reason does not merely extract this value
from valuations by means of analysis and crystallizes it into a concept,
but introduces the changes necessary in order to integrate it into the
value system.
We will now turn to the second difference between the elementary

level and the level of reason, namely, that reason exceeds the present.
This difference shows in that an end referring to the future resides on
the level of reason; even when this end is identical in content with a
need, it differs from the latter in its reference to the course of time.
The division of values into two levels only is neither acute nor
adequate. It is not acute because there are emotions whose existence
does not reside in observation but on the thinking level, emotions
belonging to the form of thinking, which guide the course of thought;
accordingly these emotions belong in some sense to the level of rea-
son, i.e., to the specific figure of reason. One of these is, for instance,
an emotion arising from the thought that a severe wrong has been
done. The division into two is inadequate from this angle and also
because there are great differences between feeling and emotion (al-
though even here intermittent phenomena exist).
Types of Opposition Between Values
Reason's task is to settle conflicts. However, as reason's horizon is

wider in the second stage than in the first, new difficulties appear, part
of them a reconstruction of former difficulties in the new stage, and
part of them entirely new ones. We will list seven types, or seven
groups of opposition between values:
1. Opposition in the valuative, positive-negative dimension and the
problem of radical evil.
2. Tension in the valuative dimension of emotionally moving-
calming.
3. Friction between goal-orientation and spontaneity.
4. The opposition between justice and other values.
5. The struggle between the will and motivative values.
6. Opposition between a value aimed at the valuation of humans
and a given value.
7. Clashes between different duties.
With regard to group seven I will point to the writings of Simmel,
Hartmann and Landmann,82 which succinctly explain that this is not
merely rivalry over resources, but true opposition. Regarding the first
six groups, we will now tackle them one at a time.
Chapter 5
The Question of Radical Evil
Kant and Schopenhauer believed that the human being by nature in-
corporates radical evil ; in other words, that the malice residing within
humans cannot be uprooted (this alongside of other factors, which
operate in the opposite direction). According To Kant, the human race
tends to deviate consciously from virtue or in other words, to act
knowingly in opposition to moral law,83 or to rebel against it.
Schopenhauer stresses the material aspect: every human being tends
(though in different degrees) to harm others independently of the pos-
sible benefit to himself arising from the damage he causes, and per-
haps even at the expense of some damage to himself.84
As we face a host of evidence testifying to acts of cruelty over dif-
ferent periods and countries, which in each case are hard to explain
exhaustively by the benefit presumed to be gained by their perpetrators
(in their own opinion), we may accept the assumption (at least, for the
sake of discussion). Thus we may assume that many people, in various
societies, harm others not in pursuit of some end, but as harm for
harm's sake (apart from the harm they cause as a means to gain their
ends), but we should also ask whether there is an alternative to the
explanation Kant and Schopenhauer offer (I ignore the differences be-
tween them here).
Before we turn to the alternative, we will elucidate the thesis of
radical evil in its axiological context. Radical evil is a value-system
that includes not only motives, but also valuative values of feeling and
emotion, which incorporate pleasure derived from harm done to
another and from schadenfreude at his expense, as well as sorrow for
the custom of keeping proper standards. It seems that conceptual
valuative values, demanding revenge against members of a group over
generations — for example, an ethnic group — belong to this system.
In contradistinction to the system of evil, a person incorporates a
comprehensive value-system that matches proper standards (and
alongside these two systems a third one, made up of values which in
themselves are neither moral nor immoral). It is clear that according to
this thesis morality is not a method of motive-preference (thus
paralleling civil law), but a method that condemns or vindicates (thus
paralleling criminal law).
According to this thesis, one and the same person simultaneously
upholds two diametrically or categorically opposed values; one value
says A and the other one says not-A, so that they indeed contradict
each other in the entire area of their possible application.
The thesis of radical evil accords malice the status of belonging to
human nature, i.e., it does not emerge over time nor can it be uprooted.
Yet, the status malice acquires fails to make it more understandable. It
is difficult to see the explanatory strength of this thesis.
Against this background of the unfolded thesis of radical evil, one
can sketch the outline of an antithesis. The antithesis says that values
one and the same person adheres to simultaneously are not directly, or
diametrically, or categorically opposed; that perusal of the values
themselves does not necessarily reveal the opposition to whoever ex-
amines them, but the matter unfolds in this way: In the field of value-
application we also happen upon cases in which the same object pos-
sesses a positive value-property according to value A, and a negative
one according to value B. In the issue we deal with the object is a deed
a person does in relation to another person, or the behavior of one
individual to another, while values A and B are the ideal of behavior
approved by morality on one hand, and a value which has no such
approval on the other. According to the antithesis morality need not
parallel criminal law, but may be arranged as a morality of preference
(see Part II above), namely, as preferring the said ideal to other values.
From the angle of the antithesis the moot state of affairs looks like
this: a certain deed has a positive and a negative value-property
according to different values, and the question whether to carry it out
is a question of preference, answered by morality. The bad deed does
not arise from a bad motive (according to the antithesis there is no
such thing), but from an inferior motive and in opposition to the
preferable one.
The Question of Radical Evil 217
We will now examine a few kinds of cases in order to see whether

it is possible to defend the human race, and we will track the origins of
values demanding to harm others or to harm the doer himself; to some
degree we will also track the manner in which the opposition between
an ethical and an anti-ethical value is settled in the consciousness of a
person adhering to both. I recognize five sources for the affirmation of
doing harm to another. One will be characterized in the next chapter
(on tension in the emotionally moving-calming dimension), while the
other four are these: A. Utility, i.e., the harm done is the means to an
end of the harm doer; this issue is sufficiently clear and will not be
discussed. B. Self-defense, namely, extending the need for self-defense
beyond the limit of usefulness, and according harm the status a value.
C. Redressing the past, the mythological belief in a magic potential to
change the past. D. Competition. We will now discuss B, C and D.
Extensions of the Need for Self-Defense
The original need for self-defense is narrow, activating a person

when he or she is being assaulted; after a number of assaults by the
same perpetrator, the latter's presence is sufficient to awaken the need.
Reason turns self-defense into an end and understanding finds the
means that oblige the defender, for instance, to strike at the attacker
prior to his assault and sometimes even prior to this attacker's initial
assault, if the latter is to be expected on some grounds. Accordingly,
Hobbes believed that non-reasonable creatures could exist together and
could even cooperate without violence, while precisely those who pos-
sess reason are incapable of such behavior.85
This extension of self-defense by understanding is, of course, con-
cerned with anticipated utility. Yet, there is another extension of the
need for self-defense not concerned with anticipated utility, namely, it
occurs in the dimension of needs themselves; this is the inclination, or
even the need to retaliate after an assault. When the need for retaliation
exists, its owner suffers sorrow and distress so long as he has not
caused real damage to his attacker, he feels pleasure while he inflicts
damage, his pleasure increases the more the damage is felt by the re-
cipient, and he feels satisfaction afterwards. Such retaliation, when it
appears as a need, is revenge. The characteristics of distress, pleasure
and satisfaction, accompanying progressive stages of revenge-matura-
tion, are, of course, absent from the extension of self-defense by un-
derstanding when it seeks utility. Furthermore, in many cases, the wish
for revenge is clearly opposed to the wish for utility, and the revenger
is fully aware of this. In extreme cases a person may be ready to pay

for his revenge with his life, as Kleist's Michael Kohlhaas does.
If only humans (and no animals) feel a need for revenge, this does
not mean that the need arises from goal-oriented extensions of self-
defense engendered by understanding; perhaps it arises from a human
ability to remember which animals lack; the memory of injury and
insult lives within the injured person even in the attacker's absence,
and encourages a kind of need for self-defense in circumstances in
which the original need does not arise at all.
Like other needs, revenge may be “translated” by reason into ends,
or it may “dictate” to reason the establishment of ends, i.e., revenge
may require means to prepare the ground for its realization. The state-
ment that reason translates revenge into its own language and accepts
its dictate, may well grate on the mind. Whoever is unfamiliar with
revenge feelings, or rejects revenge altogether, may argue that reason
does not behave unreasonably. However, this person's reason is differ-
ent from the revenger's reason; we have different kinds of reason, or at
least different figures of reason. Each kind of reason has its own value-
presuppositions, using these as major premises in its syllogisms.
Different kinds of reason will therefore arrive at different conclusions,
even if they adopt the same description of facts as a minor premise.
Different presuppositions involve different procedures of analysis and
different kinds of reasoning. One may, therefore, speak of different
kinds of reason or at least, of different figures of reason.
Revenge, having been adopted by a certain kind of reason, be-
comes a value according to which a person values others as well as
himself. The revenger is valued positively. Thus Lamech could boast
to his wives: “...for I have slain a man to my wounding, and a young
man to my hurt. If Cain shall be avenged sevenfold, truly Lamech
seventy and sevenfold” (Genesis, IV/23-24).
In a society in which revenge is a deeply embedded valuative value
it may become a means for the individual, for instance, in order to
meet expectations, or because the fame of the revenger deters potential
attackers. Yet revenge which has become a means is not revenge any-
more.
However, revenge per se which is an extension of the need for self-
defense, may itself keep expanding, and this so that the further exten-
sion is felt as a need. The additional step of extension will be revenge
wreaked by the injured person — not upon the attacker, his partner or
a so-called associate (a member of his family, tribe or people), nor
upon a descendant of his partner — but upon some person, or even
some creature, animals included. In certain cases, the injured person
feels a need for revenge without a specific target. This appears to me
the most plausible explanation for many cases of cruelty, inflicted

upon victims the perpetrator never met before. For instance, when the
injured person cannot directly revenge himself upon his attacker, or he
dare not do so, he finds relief in unspecific revenge and strikes at
whatever is within reach, a kind of substitute for the proper object.
There is no doubt that the non-specific avenger is an evil doer, but in
general a furious evil-doer and in any case not an amused evil-doer; he
is an evil-doer who keeps smarting from an injury he suffered in the
past.
The aspiration to retaliate or avenge, be it even unspecific and ran-
dom revenge, lacks the characteristics Kant and Schopenhauer
attribute to radical evil (this aspiration comes into being over time and
against a background of circumstances, etc.), but it may serve as a
causal explanation of deeds Kant and Schopenhauer consider
manifestations of radical evil.
Magic Redress of the Past
There are deeds which tear other deeds out of the past and cancel
them. This is a value-property they possess, which apparently exists in
certain traditional value-systems. The uprooted deed is canceled from
the outset, so that it never was. Should you ask critically,” if the deed
never occurred, was there no uprooting either?” — the reply will not
deny the uprooting, but interpret it as uprooting a semblance.
We deal here with an outlook on the nature of time in relation to us
which does not consider the past to be behind us and not existing
anymore; on the contrary, the past is in front of us and exists as past,
while the future is behind us. The words for “before” and “after” in
English, Hebrew and some other languages originate in this outlook
(also the old Hebrew word for “a long time ago”).86 We face the past
because we know it. The present acquires its meaning from the past it
joins. In the framework of such an outlook on time it is not so prepos-
terous to extend your hand into the past and pluck out something alien
that encroaches on it.
A salient example of such a deed are killings carried out “to guard
the honor of the family.” A girl or a woman engaging in forbidden
sexual intercourse stains the honor of the family. Killing the sinner not
only obliterates the stain but also her name, and when her name is
obliterated she herself never was. At the utmost, she represented a
semblance.
While the revenger hates his victim, this killer does not hate the
girl who has sinned. As reported, he feels profound shame and wishes
to be delivered from it; his deliverance arises from eradicating sin and
sinner.87 Anger may accompany hatred as well as shame, but they are
different kinds of anger. Obviously the society endorsing this kind of
killing does not consider it murder. In such a society preserving family
honor may, like revenge, become a means for the individual, for
instance, in order to meet expectations, or because the killing may
deter other female members of the family from sinning. Once guarding
the honor of the family has become a means for an individual, the
deed, of course, loses its specific characteristics.
There are combinations of revenge and magic redress. A nobleman
who was insulted and offended, in particular if this happened in public
or if the honor of a lady under his protection was denigrated, revenges
himself ceremoniously, according to the rules of dueling if the of-
fender is also a nobleman, or without ceremony if he is not. Yet, sub-
jectively such revenge presumably involves shame rather than hatred,
so that “objectively” it means utter obliteration of the offense.
An unspecific revenger, namely, someone who revenges himself
on a random creature, perhaps also eradicates an offense he suffered in
this manner; he may thus disburden himself of fear concerning a past
deed which still distresses him, a kind of fear of the past. Shame may
in some sense also be fear of something already past.
With regard to redress of the past, we should not depreciate its
significance by interpreting it as redressing the image of the past,
namely a sort of “fabricated” evidence for a false report, or something
like printing corrected versions of old newspapers in George Orwell's
1984. On the contrary — what is plucked out of the past becomes, if
remembered at all, a kind of bad dream we have already shed, or a
decoy-dream that begins benevolently, pulling the dreamer into its web
of events, a dream which subsequently reveals itself as painful. Killing
the sinner without hatred resembles the effort to wake up from a bad
dream. Keeping to the dream analogy and developing it, one can view
redress of the past as an extension of the need for self-defense, i.e., a
kind of self-defense against a bad dream.
So far, we have discussed shame caused by deeds committed by
another person. However, deeds a person did himself may fulfill a
similar function. Here he also wishes to uproot the deed entirely, and
in order to achieve this even to cancel his individual identity involved
in the shame or causing dissatisfaction, by assimilating within a wider,
collective subject. When the wider subject is a couple, the person
develops symbiosis with his or her partner, which turns them into a
single subject. When the wider subject is a large group, like a nation or
an ideological movement, the individual needs moments of solemn
uplift during which he loses his personal identity and utterly identifies
with the nation or movement. Such a person needs to identify with

something wider, or to find another identity for himself, and this need
is distinct from the need to belong, or to be part of a group. The wider
subject with which a person seeks to identify must be proud of itself,
so that shame or self-dissatisfaction are exchanged for collective pride.
Perhaps this explains the high degree of sensitivity people demonstrate
in matters concerning some collective pride (ethnic community, na-
tionality, perhaps even the fans of a football team, etc.).
I do not know whether it is superfluous to say that collective sub-
jects exist only in mythological imagination. Indeed, when people
truly believe that something exists and even more so when their belief
arises from a strong need, they behave as if the thing were really there;
thus it acquires a kind of existence, namely, a socially functional exis-
tence (which perhaps may also be named “conventional existence”);
when all individuals in a certain group believe this and behave accord-
ingly, a person joining the group or being born into it finds himself
compelled to acknowledge the existence of that thing. Such is the ex-
istence collective subjects may gain.
Erich Fromm discusses the need to shed individual identity in his
book “Escape from Freedom” and views it as sado-masochism.88
The term “sado-masochism” incorporates the possibility that the
need to shed one's identity will lead a person to hurt himself and oth-
ers, while striving to realize his need. He will hurt himself because
such hurt represents self-cancellation; he will hurt those he wishes to
assimilate to, because in this manner he appears to uproot the barriers
surrounding the other's personality, thus delaying his assimilation.
Competition and Envy
Till now we dealt with positive valuation of damage done to an-

other so far as this valuation originated in value section B, i.e., the
section of values which refer to a totality valued according to the ac-
tion itself, as opposed to its results or causes (we did not stop to deal
with the approval of damage originating in section A, i.e., damage to
one person that equals benefit to another, because this matter is clear
and easy to explain).
There is affirmation of damage that belongs to section C, namely,
valuation according to an action's causes, or more precisely, valuation
according to ability, which we will now examine. Valuation according
to ability was already discussed above, as part of the typological issue;
here we will focus on its crystallization as competition.
The competitor values himself in reference to the achievements of

others. Damage to another — whether caused by the competitor
himself or by another agency — may diminish the other one as a
yardstick for competitive values; the distance between notches, so to
say, decreases and the subject, i.e., the valuing competitor, grows
relatively to the measuring-instrument. Initially his quest is not to
damage the other one, but to enhance his own value; alongside
satisfaction he may therefore feel pity for the injured person. In a
certain sense, this satisfaction represents schadenfreude. In a
competitive society the possibility of mixing schadenfreude with pity
may cause an individual to feel offended when someone pities him; he
wishes to be envied (envy and pity do not go together, of course).
A combination of non-specific revenge with the wish to reduce the
other competitor is also possible, for instance, a synthesis of envy
belonging to competitive values and a certain degree of the need for
target-less revenge; the amused malevolent person embodies some-
thing resembling this synthesis. Amusement accompanies various
competitive acts (in particular, if the competitors keep a not-too-high
degree of eagerness); accordingly it is reasonable to classify the
amusement of the malevolent person as belonging to the realization of
a competitive value. However, the amused malevolent (at least in mov-
ies) is a frightening figure, so that he may have goal-oriented imitators
among those wishing to exploit the advantages of what is frightening.
To sum up: These and similar considerations lie at the root of my
opinion that causing damage for its own sake is an offshoot of the need
for self-defense or of competitive inclinations, and that its origin is not
a paradoxical aspiration to perform valuatively negative deeds for
their own sake. All three value sections incorporate values which
develop an offshoot of affirmation for damage to others.
How the Conflict between Approval of Damage to

Others and Ethical Values Is Resolved
Affirmation of damage to others for its own sake, or affirmation of

killing another for its own sake (i.e., beyond any usefulness to the
perpetrator, or to whoever approves of the deed, or to someone these
two wish to benefit) is unequivocally opposed only to universal mo-
rality. However, traditional moral systems are closed systems, judging
different people by different criteria. Punishment, for instance, will be
determined according to the status of the offender as well as that of the
victim. A person's right to become an object of moral considerations is
therefore a matter of degree. A contingent of humans — foreigners or

individuals belonging to certain peoples, or people whose skin has a
certain color, or slaves — are not objects for consideration at all and
their treatment is not modified by closed morality. Nor has closed
morality any difficulty in excluding a person temporarily, or within a
certain context, from being an object for consideration, be it because
of a deed this person has done, or on account of circumstances beyond
his control.
Values which demand (in certain cases) to hurt human beings
(without any expected benefit) may therefore be compatible with
closed morality; when they refer to someone belonging to the objects
of consideration, they exclude him from this group to the degree which
is necessary in order to prevent a contradiction between valuative
values. Furthermore: Such values may even integrate into a closed
morality ( for instance, the duty to retaliate or avenge may be incorpo-
rated in such a morality system).
As mentioned before, traditional moral systems are closed. The
morality of groups in the criminal world is also definitely closed.
However, moral views prevalent in developed countries among en-
lightened contemporary populations, also embrace elements of closure
in this or that manner and to varying degree. For example, what we
perceive as professional ethics is not only (or primarily) an application
of general ethics to a specific sphere, or its greater stringency with
regard to the specific sphere, but also the license accorded in the spe-
cific sphere to what is forbidden by general ethics. In many cases this
is borne out by the custom to establish internal disciplinary tribunals
for population groups organized according to profession, trade or place
of work, in particular when such tribunals operate as surrogates for
ordinary courts of law. The difference between the internal and the
general court or tribunal expresses the difference between general and
professional ethics, or between closed and universal morality.
The concepts of justice prevailing these days still include a notion
of retaliation or revenge. It is not only that damage to another for its
own sake is utterly compatible with closed-morality values but fur-
thermore, the moral rigorousness — i.e., the fanatical severity and
strictness of closed moralities — may paradoxically materialize in acts
of cruelty. Following Nicolai Hartmann one should say that these acts
of cruelty represent the sacrifice of elementary, low and strong values
for the sake of high and weak values. Such cruel moral stringency ap-
pears in particular in ideologically informed totalitarian regimes (be
their ideology religious or non religious).
Chapter 6
Tensions in the Moving-Calming

Dimension
As we found in Part I above, the division into emotionally moving and

calming crosses the division into positive and negative values. We
must now examine a surprising phenomenon in the realm of values.
Within a value-synthesis a negative emotionally moving value may
paradoxically enhance a positive value. That is to say, when positive
value A, which is not very moving, combines with negative and mov-
ing value B, we arrive at a synthesis A-B, whose positivity is greater
than that of A. To depict it graphically: The curve describing A-B
passes above the curve describing A (in the space above the horizontal
axis).
A salient example is taking risks. When an audience watches
circus acrobats performing without a safety net, it takes part in
something emotionally moving without sharing the negative aspect,
the risk. Observing this audience (and similar examples), one may
receive the impression that the emotionally moving element is positive
in itself, as if it were separate from the risk (which remains with the
acrobat). But this is not true. The audience probably participates in the
risk, but only in its imagination and this is sufficient for it to enjoy
some degree of the emotional movement it lacks; the fact that
audiences sometimes prefer acrobatics without a net does not make

sense otherwise. Yet, the full emotional movement is experienced only
by the person who also feels its full negativity.
In a dangerous adventure (like a trip from Israel to Petra in Jordan,
before 1995) the moving element is not separate from the negative
one, the danger to the person's life. For many people the motive for the
adventure is strengthened by greater danger (presumably to a certain
limit of increase); but not only the motive: Whoever returns safely
from this adventure gains higher esteem from many people the greater
the danger was, namely they view it as a positive value.
An excursion to the red rocks of Petra devoid of danger is positive
and moving, but only to a low degree. A trip in an Alpine funicular is
positive and moving, but the risk a mountaineer takes is more emo-
tionally moving and the degree of its positivity is higher.
In a synthesis the moving negative value functions as spice. The
person risking his or her life does not seek death in the same sense that
one does not consume spices separately. Yet, this person seeks the
risk, though in order to overcome it. The supposition that whoever
freely chooses to take a great risk (in degree of danger as well as the
probability to be hurt) without any constraint unconsciously seeks
death, is not necessary in explaining the phenomenon. The aspiration
to take risks may exist without an underlying, unconscious death-wish
— though not any risk but one embodied in an adventure which has a
positive attraction as well (aesthetic, sporting, social etc.). On the other
hand, the risk should by no means be seen as the price an adventurer
pays for the positive value he gains, but on the contrary, as something
that enhances the positive value.
The inclination to take risks may increase by a synthesis with
competitive values. However, this should not lead to the conclusion
that the inclination itself arises specifically from competition, and in
general from value-section C. On the contrary, basically this inclina-
tion appears to lean towards the action itself (i.e., belongs to value-
section B).
How can something valuatively negative enhance the positivity of
a synthesis? The fact that it is emotionally moving only determines its
location according to a different dimension, and does not refer to the
degree of positivity. And indeed, the very fact that valuative space has
multiple dimensions does not provide an answer to this question.
However, it seems plausible that within a synthesis an additional
value achieves realization. That is to say, the addition of something
moving, which is negative according to one value, engenders (or en-
hances) the realization of another value, which was not previously
taken into account. The other, additional value involves the very struc-
Tensions in the Moving-Calming Dimension 227
ture of the subjective aspect in the moving-calming dimension. Hu-

mans need emotional movement, and when this need is satisfied by
something negative and moving, it incorporates, of course, some posi-
tivity.
We remember that what moves the emotions involves, among
other elements, a sensitivity of the value to the valued object. In Part I
above, at the end of the discussion concerning emotional movement,
we said: Dealing with danger, in particular when only a short step
separates success from failure, incorporates sensitivity to small differ-
ences in the value-bearer.
The ability of something negative but moving to serve as spice, or
— without the metaphor — to contribute positively to a value-synthe-
sis, arises therefore from a special need of man (which may change
over different periods of an individual's life) for experiences of emo-
tional movement; this need is a sort of ramification of the need for
spontaneous activity. In contrast to the need for moving experiences,
there is a need for calming experiences, and there is a kind of comple-
mentary bond between these needs. A human being presumably re-
quires a certain dispersal of experiences along the moving-calming
dimension, and a certain balance between the moving and the calming.
Such a balance is needed when a stratification of values has taken
place. A certain order of values on a basic plane (defined by the di-
mensions moving-calming and positive-negative) becomes itself a new
value, residing on a higher plane.
We may now pinpoint an additional source for what appears as
radical evil, for instance the pleasure derived from combat between
gladiators in ancient Rome. Presumably, this meets a certain need for
emotional movement (or a need for some kind of emotional move-
ment). The spectator enjoys the risk involved in violent combat, but at
his ease, without any risk to himself. As a spectator the Roman soldier,
himself a survivor of violent combat in battle, had the opportunity to
experience the enjoyable aspect of this danger in isolation, a kind of
risk without risk. It may well be that spectators of this kind are
responsible for the most cruel customs of entertainment. In our times
bullfights are probably also enjoyed by spectators who do not enjoy
damage caused to a human being in the arena, and perhaps even not
the damage caused to the bull, but the convenient opportunity to
experience a dangerous situation, in which very much depends on very
little (on a small difference in the value-bearer). In any case, I see no
plausible alternative explanation.
In the same manner that humans incline towards emotional move-
ment even if it involves a negative value-quality, we find in other
cases an inclination towards calmness even if it involves negative

value-properties.
The tendencies Freud describes as Eros and Thanatos (death) are
basically identical with the inclination to emotional movement (Eros),
and the inclination to the calming (Thanatos). The name “Thanatos,”
(death) Freud chose as a label, is rather extreme. The tendency labeled
“Thanatos” surfaces often, for instance, in that a reprimanded child
cries and falls asleep (certainly not every child does so), namely, es-
capes into sleep; or in that a person finds solace in being drunk. Ac-
cording To Freud, this is a tendency to pass onto a lower plane of
existence, to animality, then to vegetativeness and only in the end to
the utterly inanimate, real death.89
Suicide is the radical display of the quest for calm, and therefore
the reason Freud chose the name Thanatos — but the radical display of
calm touches certain radical displays of emotional movement. When
Heinrich von Kleist committed suicide, he did not seek calm beyond
the boundaries of life (he believed he and his partner were setting out
towards a wondrous adventure). In order to study the relation moving-
calming (Eros-Thanatos) one has to examine cases of suicide which
were not flight from an awful fate awaiting this person as the only
alternative to death (i.e., which seemed to be the only alternative in the
eyes of the suicide), but cases in which an inherent, internal inclination
was the decisive factor, and not a course of external events in the
environment of the suicide (though such a course always plays some
role, too). If the suicide asks for calm, proximity of the poles surfaces
in that the person seeking movement seeks a death-risk, to come close
to death, yet not death itself. For Kleist the poles merged. It appears
that the quest for the most moving and the most calming experiences is
relevant both to the explanation of damage a person causes himself
and the damage he inflicts upon others.
In any case, a great deal of valuative opposition or tension between
emotionally moving and calming values adhered to by the same sub-
ject, arises from the fact that humans have a penchant for both.
There is no opposition between a positive and a negative value,
because both belong to the same valuative scale; they complement
each other and make up the segments of one and the same value. How-
ever, a variety of values that oppose each other are scattered over the
moving-calming dimension, because movement cancels calm.
Freudian terminology does not suit axiology, because it infringes
upon valuative neutrality. The moving element was handsomely
named, while the calming element received the daunting name “death”
(“thanatos” in Greek,) which is misleading. The quite common quest
for an easy and effortless, peaceful and harmonious life is by no means
a negation of life or a death-wish, but represents the choice of a differ-

ent life-style from the one named “Eros.” One could turn this upside
down: name the preference for emotional movement “a quest for agita-
tion, tension, worry and risk,” name it “adventurousness,” and name
the preference for calm “the quest for harmony.” As there are positive
as well as negative values at both poles, the characterization of one by
its radically negative component, or of the other by a positive value
would be misleading.
We have now to clarify the relation between the opposition “mov-
ing-calming” and the opposition prevailing, in Nicolai Hartmann's
view, between the high and the strong value, which according to him
comprises the fundamental antinomy of ethics. We have already dis-
cussed this distinction Hartmann makes: As mentioned above, these
two gradings are not only different, but they usually appear in inverse
relation. We should also remember that the strength of a value does
not refer to the power of motives, but to the form of the curve describ-
ing the valuative value: the steeper the curve describing the negative
segment of a valuative value, the stronger it is, and the steeper the
curve describing the positive segment, the higher the value is.
According to Hartmann, the fundamental ethical antinomy is actu-
ally a meta-opposition between values, namely, the opposition be-
tween two approaches to conflicts in the sphere of ethics, or between
different methods to resolve these, or between different orders of pref-
erence. That is to say, values and instances of opposition between
them reveal themselves to a certain level of reflection; reflection asks
how to deal with them and faces two opposing proposals.
The order of preference according to strength says: In the first
place one should avoid objects with negative value-properties
altogether, and in any case, begin by avoiding whatever is rejected by
strong values. The price paid for avoiding evil is waiving the
realization of all high positive values (or of a part of them) as a luxury.
A society which realizes such an order of preference — i.e., succeeds
in behaving accordingly — will be devoid of bodily and mental harm
(murder, physical injury and accidents), and devoid of hunger or
shortages of vital products.
The order of preference according to height says: High values, or
at least the highest, should be realized even at the expense of
abandoning elementary values.
Realization of the strength preference will accord us peace,
security and tranquillity. Should we extend this beyond the public
sphere, to the individual in relation to itself, it would mean the absence
of sorrow and pain in exchange for waiving pleasures and joys, at least
very rare or intensive pleasures and joys. Realization of the reverse
order of preference would gain us the rare, the sublime and the
emotionally moving good.
According to Hartmann, the very existence of opposition between
values bears a positive value in the sphere of ethics 90on two counts:
for one, because deliberation between different duties embodies moral
sensitivity, i.e., the realized opposition to ethical indifference, and
second, because opposition, involving the aspiration to transcend the
given state of a subject, encourages development. The affirmation of
opposition per se is doubtless a high and weak value (in some sense it
is embodied in tragedies, in Leibniz's Monadology and in Goethe's
Faust).
Preference for height does not therefore, attempt to uproot valua-
tive conflicts, but to propose solutions limited to the practical sphere,
while preference for strength wishes to approach a state without con-
flicts, namely, a state in which the subject does not aspire to transcend
its given entity. Preference for height is itself a high and weak value,
preference for strength — a strong and low value.
Thus, preference for height will not ask us to qualify single values
so that their demands which involve conflicts be checked; but prefer-
ence for strength will demand that the single value be shaped in a way
which a priori reduces the possibility of clashes with other values in
the areas of application.
In developing the implications of the claim that height and strength
oppose each other, it seems that there is a considerable degree of
imbrication between this opposition, the emotionally moving-calming
opposition, and the opposition Freud found between Thanatos and
Eros. However, be this degree of imbrication whatever it is, we must
now study the nature of solutions Hartmann's fundamental antinomy
suggests.
I believe two points are obvious: this opposition reveals itself only
on the level of reason, and reason, qua reason does not settle the con-
flict. It reveals itself only on the level of reason because it is a meta-
opposition, opposition between gradings, between preferences, be-
tween methods of solution. Its fate is not decided according to pure
reason which reviews it, because pure reason has no suitable yardstick.
The specific reason of real humans adopts this or that solution, or usu-
ally some set of compromises, subject to some principle of compro-
mise. We may, for instance, decide to let a few, very strong values
head the order of preference, but following some minimal realization
of these arrange the other values according to their height, and do the
same with what remains to be realized of these very strong values,
without considering their strength at all. Or we may do the opposite: A
few, very high values will head the list and the remainder be preferred
according to their strength. This specific, concrete reason, which is not

consistently attached to some formal principle, certainly still belongs
to the realm of reason, but it operates according to rather complex
principles, chosen by the will from among a larger group of principles
reason creates.
Concrete reason is one among a number of alternative figures of
reason which create other principles, or arise from a different choice
out of the same principles.
The fact that different societies differ in their grading according to
strength, and in particular differ in their grading according to height,
does neither reduce the weight nor the permanence of the opposition
between these gradings. Indeed, it seems that these gradings exist in all
value-systems, and that they not only fail to imbricate, but even stand
in inverse proportion to each other.
The aristocracy probably prefers grading according to height, or
advocates such preference (this refers, of course to values within the
range of its sight, values which are high in its eyes). Popular morality
tends to prefer grading according to strength. Immanuel Kant incorpo-
rates certain aristocratic values which fail to match ethics as he under-
stood it, in aesthetics, but according to the value of the sublime, not
the value of beauty. War is in his eyes neither good nor beautiful, but it
possesses sublimity. Nietzsche probably accepted preference only
according to height.
Chapter 7
Goal-Orientation and Spontaneity
We now continue the discussion of goal-orientation, begun within the

context of value-typology (Part II, Chapter 2). We have to examine the
conflict between the end and values of section B, which are realized in
spontaneous action. This concerns needs, inclinations and ideals (i.e.,
all section B values except constraints). A person guided by these val-
ues acts on motives inherent to the various segments of his personality,
while the values do not really deprive each other (with a constraint this
equilibrium may be disturbed) and the main point is that they are not
repressed by the will.
The end demands efficiency, namely, economy in time and re-
sources. The need and the ideal on the other hand, do not demand that
the actions they instruct be economical, and in particular they do not
demand economy in time; on the contrary, hurry, or reducing the time
the action takes, may oppose these values. The end considers the ac-
tion negatively and therefore wishes to shorten it, while the need and
the ideal view the action positively and wish to shape it, each in its
own manner. The realization of an end demands that a person set him-
self up accordingly: he is required to serve as an efficient tool in the
implementation of a plan which makes up part of the valuative value
(in this case a mixed, and not a pure value); this tool is activated by the
will, which replaces (prima facie) the inherent motives. The human
being will therefore be organized, disciplined, his own master, not
subject to caprice, and he will also be economical in the way he thinks

and speaks. On the other hand, the subject of actions whose raison
d'être is in the action itself, need not drive himself forward and will
accordingly immerse himself in his activity — he acts spontaneously.
These subjects are therefore differently organized. One lives for the
future, his present is a means — the other lives the present in the pre-
sent. The spontaneous subject does not subjugate his receptivity to his
motorial skills, he does not arrange the input according to the desired
output. Accordingly he may pay attention to his environment as well
as to himself, he may keep an open mind. He is interested in what he
sees, hears and in what other senses in themselves have to offer, and
not only in what intellect extracts from them; he is spontaneous in his
receptivity as well, and thus it is precisely this subject who is creative
— not in the sense of finding efficient means, but in the sense of cre-
ating something new, which cannot be predicted.
Because the active subject of an end differs from the active subject
of a need or an ideal, a mixed action will bring the opposition to the
surface: if the subject is set to achieve an end, the values of the action
itself will be shortchanged; if he is set to realize values of the action
itself, goal-orientation will suffer.
A person tending his or her garden engages in a mixed action.
Shortchanging goal-orientation means they will not be efficient,
namely, they will not hurry, neither be thrifty with time nor with ma-
terials, their product will be slight in relation to the quantity of in-
vested resources (mainly time). The same holds for an artisan who
loves his craft and is not exposed to competition (for example, if he is
protected by an association of artisans); he can afford to ponder the
artistic shaping of his products.
Socially, islands of spontaneity may cause difficulties in a goal-
oriented, or ends-oriented setup, by impeding regularity and disci-
pline, and thus impeding efficiency. A spontaneous person, or a person
so far as he is spontaneous, is not subjected to himself, and it is there-
fore harder to subject him to his superiors. Subjection to oneself is a
precondition to subjection by others.91
From its initial use onwards the word “spontaneous” unites two
mutually complementary characteristics: A. Spontaneity is devoid of
compulsion and does not come from outside. B. Spontaneous action
does not implement a plan; it may realize an already existing idea,
provided that the idea does not incorporate a plan which instructs exe-
cution. The plan for the achievement of an end outlines precisely (from
the relevant angles) the cause of action and its time-table. In this
sense, suddenness is usually thought also to testify to spontaneity
(although spontaneity is not always sudden). It is obvious that in a
Goal-Orientation and Spontaneity 235
goal-oriented social system (with regard to labor or war) there is no

room for action which does not execute a plan, and such action may
definitely cause disturbance or damage.
The theories of morality, and mainly Kantian philosophy of morals
emphasized that man is not merely a means and that we should not
treat him as if he were. But for the goal-oriented system it would be
highly convenient, if the individual treated himself as if he were merely
a means, so that even the need would assimilate to the intended end:
he would eat in order to be fit, he would be fit in order to work and to
vanquish his enemies, he would work and win in battle in order to be
able to eat (or, like Brecht's Mr. Keuner, who tells of his neighbor that
he listens to music in order to exercise rhythmically, exercises in order
to be strong, etc. Brecht names the anecdote: “Servant of Ends”).
So far the overall historical course has favored goal-orientation in
contradistinction to the orientation on values of the action itself (i.e.,
spontaneity). Industry is the crowning achievement of this course. In
industrial society, the work process was exclusively subjected to the
governance of ends, while all other values were exiled to leisure time.
Whoever devotes his principal physical or mental strength to his work
which is intensive and whose rhythm is externally imposed and there-
fore exhausting, arranges his personality according to the type of val-
ues that inform his work; he is incapable of turning about and chang-
ing his personality structure in his spare time, and thus incapable of
realizing some section B values which require a suitable attitude and
personality setup. The subject is compensated for the progressively
severe separation between work and leisure by a quantitative increase
in spare time, but qualitatively leisure time remains a complement of
work: what work produces, is consumed in spare time; leisure time is
for shopping and consumption. All other section B values are short-
changed. Work may shortchange the ability to enjoy leisure.92
The achievement of goal-orientedness is not the number of work-
ing hours it governs, but the strict separation between work and lei-
sure.
The control goal-orientation has achieved over all economic life
shows in that the entire economy has been made to turn on money.
From there, in no time at all, goal-orientation becomes the axis of a
whole new world of values. In previous generations an individual
strove to appear to his peers as noble, or loyal, a hero or an avenger,
respected and dignified, or even as a moral person. These wishes for a
self-image have faded and become marginalized. He now wishes to be
rational, talented and an achiever, and he wishes to be viewed in this
light. The value expressed by the praise-word “talented” is not an end
and does not belong to the same section, but in modern society it
comprises a basic element in the synthesis with goal-orientation, which

we will discuss further on.
It pays to remember in this context that all combat and struggle are
basically goal-oriented, and goal-orientation in its turn may therefore
acquire a more aggressive character, or in any case a more contentious
one. The orientation on inclinations and ideals, on the other hand, has
a creative and non-contentious character, namely, its concern is crea-
tion for its own sake, with no goal in sight.
Goal-oriented people do not labor for goal-orientation per se of
course, but for specific ends and for increased efficiency of the means
to these ends. However, by doing so they aid some specific goal-ori-
ented system in which human relations are also arranged as means
towards ends, and thus they assist the reinforcement of goal-orienta-
tion. They succeed in providing such aid because, among other factors,
the non-contentious character of spontaneity-geared orientation, and
also because of the latter's unorganized character, which is part of its
substance.
However, we also find some development in the opposite direc-
tion, against the reinforcement of goal-orientation, for example devel-
opment in which a certain, much repeated, goal-oriented deed (like
hunting, or even battle)93 progressively sheds its goal-orientedness,
namely, becomes a game, an art or a kind of ceremony, or engenders a
refined offshoot of this type.
Finally, one should point to an internal affinity prevailing between
the opposition goal-orientation-spontaneity, and the opposition calm-
ing-emotionally-moving. goal-orientation, in wishing to economize
effort and to justify every effort, inclines towards the calming element.
What on the other hand, moves emotionally will not offer guidance in
a goal-oriented framework, but only for a spontaneous action.
Translating this thesis into Freudian language, we find that spontaneity
belongs to the sphere of Eros and goal-orientation to the sphere of
Thanatos. In Hartmann's terminology: goal-orientation belongs to
strong and spontaneity to high values.
The fact that in a rough outline history has so far traveled towards
progressive reinforcement of goal-orientation, does not necessarily tell
us that the same will go on indefinitely. With regard to the future,
there are two main broad possibilities or prospects:
Prospect A is the continuous reinforcement of goal-orientation or
“rationalization” of the individual and society. This means that the
factory, the office and other bodies of the same type, as well as the
institutions that serve them, will continue to develop in the direction
prevailing now.
Prospect B means that the expansion of goal-orientation will reach

a point of exhaustion, for the individual on account of the values
which are not ends, and for society because of a multiplicity of rival-
ing ends individuals possess (the answer to whether a certain govern-
ment office is efficiently organized depends on the end you choose:
the end valid for the official working there, the end desired by the
public the office serves, the end envisaged by the incumbent minister,
etc.). Prospect B also embraces the case in which goal-orientedness
has not yet reached its limit of growth, but has come sufficiently close
for us to see it. At that juncture, humans may turn about to move
towards abolishing the divide between work and leisure, towards the
shaping of post-industrial technology. That is to say, they may shape
technology and its direct uses with the tendency to redress interest in
the act of producing goods from natural materials, namely, interest in
the action itself and not merely in its results. Should this happen,
humans would not wish anymore to reduce their working hours as far
as possible, as they do not wish to reduce the time spent on
spontaneous activities.
Prospect B means therefore that instead of shaping technology and
its uses towards greater efficiency, i.e., additional products from given
resources, or additional leisure time, we wish to shape it so as to offer
additional satisfaction, interest, emotional movement while we use it,
and so that working together would create bonds between people
instead of friction. Prospect B therefore deals with paving the way for
acts of production and creation in general to become spontaneous
activities.
It may well be that the opposition between the prospect of contin-
ued industrial development and the prospect of passing to post-indus-
trial activity is not of the kind to prevent their simultaneous existence
in one and the same society; in that case individuals would be able to
choose the most congenial direction for themselves.
However, we will not further discuss the question which prospects
are realizable in the future. Suffice it to have drawn an alternative to
the prevailing state of affairs, and thus to have created the contrast and
the background against which the figure of industrial society's value-
system stands out. Against the background of an alternative, the pre-
vailing value-system presents its profile.
Regarding the causes for the development prevailing so far, one
tends to ask whether want, which is the cause for goal-oriented activity
(because man establishes as an end only what he lacks), is not also the
cause for the relative weight of the end within the value-system. Want
is a good reason for the will to declare a state of emergency, during
which all personality sections labor under pressure and are obliged to
obey the time-table dictated to them. It seems therefore as if the effec-

tive cause of goal-orientation in general were also rooted in want, and
once the goal-oriented effort yields the desired result, i.e., the abolition
of want, the state of emergency would be canceled for the individual
as well as for society. The development of methods in goal-oriented
activity, i.e., technological advance and the ensuing rise in
productivity, reduce want; thus, on the face of it, they reduce the in-
centive for goal-oriented activity and furthermore, the efficient cause
for an overall ends-directed orientation. According to this line of rea-
soning, the historical development of goal-orientation itself should
have led to its reduction in favor of spontaneity. Yet it appears that the
course of history has moved in the opposite direction — to an exclu-
sive orientation on ends and their measure, efficiency. How are we to
explain this fact?
We find some contribution to the solution of this problem in the
synthesis that broadens original goal-orientedness by joining it to an
additional value. We will now discuss this issue.
The Synthesis of Goal-Orientation and

Competitiveness
A synthesis between goal-orientation and competitiveness prevails

in contemporary society, even though the two are alien to each other
from a comparative point of view. goal-orientation values a proceeding
according to its results and its degree of economy, and values intention
and ability according to the proceeds they yield; it also values man
himself according to the results of his deeds, while the opposite order
holds in the competitive manner of valuation. Here ability is valued in
itself even if it serves no end, like the ability to run a certain distance
in a fraction of a second less than a rival, or less than one's own
previous score. The deed, on the other hand, is valued only as a
testimony of ability, whatever the result may be. From a goal-oriented
point of view contests are irrational but may still be justified as games
or leisure activities, while valuation in the competitive manner is anti-
rational (see Part II, Chapters 8 & 9 above).
Initially alien values join in a synthesis whose success is recogniz-
able in its persistence, its tightness and its strength as a bearer. The
synthesis of ends and competition persists in contemporary society and
appears to prevail increasingly among large population groups. The
tightness of this combination shows in that people adhering to it view
it as one piece, whose components they fail to distinguish. It bears the
principal part of the achievement-oriented value-system and instructs

the active nucleus of modern society.
Historically the merger of goal-orientation and competition came
late. In ancient Greece, especially in its polis, competition was for
free-born citizens, while goal-orientedness was proper for slaves. The
free-born, mainly youngsters, competed with each other in sportive as
well as other contests, and considered this an entertaining and benefi-
cial occupation, while they considered goal-oriented activity as suit-
able for slaves. As the slave was a means, his activity was also merely
a means, while his master needed only the goal, i.e., the results. The
master himself does things whose value lies in themselves, because the
slave bears the goal-oriented activity; the master is therefore free to
dispose of his time as he wishes. The actual distribution was not so
sharply divided, but it appeared in this figure to contemporaries, if we
consider Aristotle as their spokesman.94
It turns out that goal-orientation and competitiveness were alien to
each other not only in substance but also historically (until modern
times).
Goal-orientation is the most suitable value-figure in times of pres-
sures and distress, when a gap prevails between wishes, needs and
inclinations on one hand, and reality on the other. In such times it is
preferable to any other value-figure with regard to the solution of
problems facing the subject, i.e., bridging the gap. Other values, under
conditions which do not suit their realization, engender ends to come
to their aid. Under stress, even some animals can behave in a goal-
oriented manner.
Once pressure is removed and distress disappears goal-orientation
(the pure value, prior to the synthesis with competition ) becomes non-
saturated from the angle of feelings, emotions and motives. Its motives
are not sufficiently strong to sustain a civilization that depends on it.
Even when want on one hand and temptation on the other are great, the
motive for goal-oriented activity is not strong enough to compare with
spontaneous activity in regard to the doer's enthusiasm for what he
does and his devotion to doing it. However, when want is neither
sufficiently painful nor the temptation of goods and social status too
attractive, the motive is not strong enough to persist in the goal-
oriented action and accomplish it. Internalization of values of
diligence, of the fear of poverty, of the value of new products civiliza-
tion offers, even if it reaches far enough to suppress desires which di-
vert the mind from the end, even if it is reinforced by a matching ide-
ology, is not strong enough to sustain a goal-oriented society.
Goal-orientation therefore needs the synthesis with a value satu-
rated in its emotional aspect and possessing a strong motive. Yet, all
values concerning love of or interest in creative activity incorporate

rivalry with goal-orientation, and especially with efficiency. Whoever
loves his work does not seek to save time and may even fail to bow to
discipline. goal-orientation has to combat hatred of labor without mo-
bilizing the love of work to aid it, or perhaps more succinctly, the love
of that creative activity which, being only a means (or mainly a
means), belongs to the realm of work. The synthesis of ends with in-
clinations towards the action itself prevails occasionally, but it limits
technological advance towards additional efficiency. The medieval
artisan, well-protected from competition by his guild, presumably
loved his craft (at least in many cases) and incorporated artistic ele-
ments in his product; however, this synthesis of goal-orientation and
love for a craft would not have allowed for the industrial revolution to
occur.
Section B values are therefore not very suitable as partners for sec-
tion A values. Goal-orientation now turns to section C, where a syn-
thesis with the notion of duty is possible. But duty implies a degree of
compulsion and goal-orientation is already overloaded with com-
pulsion; historically this synthesis also existed (for instance, in Cal-
vinism), but it suffers from the same anemia that afflicts pure goal-
orientation.
This leaves competition, namely, the valuation of ability, which is
not a rival of goal-orientation. Not only does it not prolong an action,
it even pushes and accelerates on its own. In addition, it possesses the
complement necessary to ensure persistence: one receives the reward
for the end only when the task is accomplished, while pleasure in the
act of competing is already gained on the way. The opposition between
the logic of goal-orientation and that of competitiveness seems not to
present an impediment. Competitive actions demands that ability be
stretched to the utmost, as well as utter devotion to the action, and
within a synthesis this demand assists the tyrannical disposition of
goal-orientation to turn the individual into a means.95
The synthesis with competition saturates goal-orientation not only
from the angle of its motives. As a valuative value, goal-orientation
has no emotionally moving component, the notion of thrift does not
generate enthusiasm. Competition, on the other hand, is an moving and
enthusiasm-arousing value, and it contributes these elements to its
synthesis with goal-orientation. Pure competition belongs to the realm
of amusement; within the synthesis it becomes serious, not just a
temporary game, while the laborer's serious goal-orientation acquires
an entertaining feature.
Chapter 8
The Oppositions between Justice,

Freedom and Other Values
In the frame of typology (Part II, Chapter 6) we briefly discussed jus-

tice and its character as an ideal. We will now turn to a more detailed
study of justice, the instances of opposition between justice and other
values, and its placement within the value system.
Justice is a value that answers the question how to distribute,
namely, how much to allocate to whom. The issue is the distribution
(also, if requested, the re-distribution) of objects possessing a positive
or a negative value, including rights and duties. The word “how” (in
the phrase “how to distribute”) refers both to the procedure of distribu-
tion and to the pattern according to which the action's result is ar-
ranged. The value justice already incorporates the answers to when
and what to distribute: when the dispersal (or the division) of
possession (or ownership) already matches the pattern with regard to a
certain object, there is, of course, no need to divide.
The value justice does not belong to the elementary level, i.e., the
level of given values (feeling and emotion). It belongs to those reason
has created with the tendency to regulate behavior liable to being
pushed in opposing directions. Even though there is an emotion con-
cerning justice, and in particular an emotion concerning injustice,
these cannot exist without reason; they accompany what reason and
the will constitute.
The vantage point from which justice, or reason that participates in
its constitution, observes its objects, about to be distributed among
individuals, is an inter-individual and general vantage point, while the
values already adhered to by individuals in a certain society are
accepted as givens; that is to say, justice does not come to determine
what is a good or a bad object, what is better and what worse, but
accepts these as an already known given. The first value-stage func-
tions as a given for the second stage.
Justice is an ideal, namely, it has to be done, to be directly real-
ized; its realization does not arise from means a person employs or by
any kind of mediation. One may employ means in order to create the
preconditions necessary for the realization of justice, but the realiza-
tion does not arise by itself as a result of these means.
So far for a brief characterization of justice in general. Yet, justice
is not one and the same; from the axiological point of view, we should
say that there are many “justices.” Language has no plural form for
justice because it is structured for the valuative and not for the meta-
valuative use of words; whoever holds up justice, holds up one of
these “justices” as the only, unique justice.
What we have said so far about justice in general belongs therefore
to the outline of a value every society needs. The single concepts of
justice (we will avoid the jarring term “single justices”), namely, the
notions of justice accepted by various societies, are but concrete con-
tents that fill the outline, i.e., the different, alternative answers to the
question how to distribute.
All concepts of justice divide into two kinds: the salient concepts,
which determine the desirable proportion of allocations, and those
which are not salient, i.e., they do not recommend a certain proportion.
Salient notions of justice determine that the object for distribution
be divided into portions according to an already existing division (or
an already existing dissemination) among those who receive portions
of something else, that makes up a given basis for distribution. The
distribution basis, so to say, is already established and now guides the
division of what has to be distributed, named “the object” or “the ob-
ject of distribution.” The basis may be individual human existence
alone: assuming that no member of a society is either less or more an
individual than all other members, the portions (i.e., the allocated
quantities) will be equal; this kind of justice is salient as well as non-
discriminating. However, there is salient justice that discriminates,
namely, reference to birth may be the accepted basis, i.e., a reference
to race, nation, the rank in aristocracy, etc.; achievements (or a certain
Oppositions between Justice and Other Values 243
kind of achievement) or needs may be chosen as a basis for distribu-

tion. The equality required by all salient concepts of justice is not the
equality of portions (which characterizes only the non-discriminating
concept), but equality of proportion in relation to the basis of distribu-
tion; that is to say, the quantity of the object allocated to person A,
divided by the quantity of person A's share in the basis of distribution,
will equal the quotient of the quantity of object allocated to person B,
divided by person B's share in the basis of distribution.
Non-salient concepts of justice may recommend a distribution
procedure, like drawing lots (for instance, the lots drawn for official
positions in ancient Athens). Whoever advocates lot drawing does not,
of course, support a certain proportion, but only the procedure of lot
drawing in general, or a specific procedure whose details are predeter-
mined, with regard to the manner of lot drawing. Non-salient concepts
of justice also embrace the recommendation to reduce the volume of
distributed objects deliberately, namely, not to distribute certain ob-
jects on society's behalf, but to leave matters in this sphere of objects
to develop on their own, through the actions of individuals belonging
to this society; thus, on condition that these actions be restrained by
permanent general-rules, and that they yield some distribution of the
objects among the members of the same society. These general rules
may also be considered as a procedure in a broad sense of the term.
Finally one may join one principle of justice in a certain sphere of
objects to another principle in a different sphere; for example — equal
portions regarding the allocation of voting and election rights (while
contingents of society are excluded because they are too young, or
foreigners, or woman, etc.), and no organized distribution in the eco-
nomic sphere (with restraints imposed on economic activity by general
rules, supervised by the courts and the police). By joining the two
principles, we arrive at a heterogeneously composed concept of
justice.
The different and rival notions of justice are constituted by differ-
ent figures of reason; each notion constituted by reason in one of its
special historical shapes. However, in some sense they are those that
constitute the different figures of reason (or the different kinds of rea-
son). In short: By means of the justice concept the will chooses, the
specific reason constitutes itself, i.e., the way it arranges its valuative
considerations.
Some features are common to all concepts of justice. We will now
elaborate two of these, namely, the point of view justice takes and the
approval of society's intervention in the life of individuals. Here we
have to return to what was said above, to wit: Justice observes its ob-
jects from a universal, inter-individual point of view, while the view-
point of individuals has to determine which object is good and which

is bad. The issue of this special, non-personal, universal viewpoint
requires clarification. In order to go beyond the personal and arrive at
the universal viewpoint, I have to execute a kind of thought experi-
ment. However, the experiment is not to say: let me assume that from
now onwards everyone in my society will behave like me, will treat
me as I treat others — may I now say that my behavior is good? Such
a thinking experiment certainly makes up one stage in the development
of valuative deliberation, but it is by no means sufficient, because we
arrive at an inverse egoism which says, treat others as you wish them
to treat you. To achieve the universal point of view you must ask
yourself: what kind of distribution rules would you recommend to an
alien society, to which you do not and will not belong, but whom you
wish well; that is to say, you are neither involved as a subject nor as an
object of behavior, and you do not favor one of this society's members
more than the others. Furthermore, you do not know what members of
this society consider a good or a bad object; you legislate for them
how to distribute good objects (goods, services, rights) and bad objects
(burdens and duties), while you leave it to them to determine which
objects are good or better and which are bad or worse.
Whoever falls victim to a violation of rules says that he has suf-
fered a wrong; he does not say: damage was inflicted on me. He dis-
tinguishes between damage and wrongs as two different negative val-
ues. The utterance “wrong” already includes the statement that the is-
sue is damage, but it also includes a violation of justice. The benefit to
whoever does the deed and the damage to the deed's object are a
matter for their personal points of view, while the proposition that the
deed is a wrong already incorporates a third viewpoint, i.e., incorpo-
rates the existence of a universal, non-personal viewpoint. The latter
does neither belong to someone nor to society, because society may
also exercise injustice. Philosophical discourse comes to extract this
assumption from the specific issues with regard to which it is applied,
and which thus keep it out of sight.
Yet, even in concepts of justice that are utterly alien to universal
morality and which receive no philosophical exposition by whoever
adheres to them, this assumption is embedded — the assumption that
justice equals a non-personal viewpoint, residing beyond and above all
viewpoints of whoever is involved in events, viewpoints which are to
be judged according to justice. A viewpoint of non-involvement,
which we verify to ourselves by the model of proposing legislation for
an alien society.
A person or a society may stand at a vantage-point of justice and
look out from there, they may abandon it, come closer or back away
further; all this occurs against the background of the valuative view-
points attached to the observing subject — be it a real, individual sub-
ject or a social quasi-subject (as when one speaks of a family's welfare,
the honor of a tribe, or of benefit to an entire society or nation). About
“good” one may ask “good for whom?,” about “useful,” “useful to
whom?” — but it is improper to ask “justice to whom?” or “just to
whom?.” Justice is not “of someone,” not “for,” not “to...”
All this is not extraordinary according to the logic of universal
morality, but it is also embedded in the justice concept of closed mo-
rality. That is to say, even specific and discriminating justice which
imposes different laws on people belonging to different categories,
allocates punishment according to the rank of the offender and the
rank of the victim — even such justice is not structured according to a
subjective viewpoint, and those who accept it understand this.
In traditional societies, earlier laws are sometimes considered pref-
erable to later ones,96 and even when leaders pass new laws which are
clearly opposed to the old ones, they do so to restore validity to some-
thing even older than the repealed law. That is to say, members of such
societies do not perceive laws as an expression of the legislator's will,
because then the legislator's later will would cancel what came before.
The law is perceived as an exposition of justice and not as an
expression of will. In contradistinction to justice, the will is someone's
will and belongs to a certain period of time. It seems that precisely
societies adhering to closed morality and salient, discriminating justice
consider not only justice as independent of the people in the arena seen
from justice's vantage-point, but by proxy also the law, which is but an
expression of the former.
We now turn to an additional characteristic of justice concepts. A
tendency to approve intervention in the course of events between indi-
viduals lies at the root of all justice concepts, the tendency to regulate
or even direct them, namely, not to let events just take care of them-
selves. However, in the most salient justice concepts this tendency is
stronger than in less salient concepts, though it is present there as well.
The said intervention is to be carried out by organized society,
including bodies invested with compulsory powers.
Values of freedom also vary in different value-systems, but they
have a common tendency, opposed to the tendency of justice concepts;
they are poised against intervention in the individual's life, against
external regulation or direction. The more salient values of freedom
and values of justice (be this salient justice discriminating or not) are,
the more a collision between them becomes inevitable.
If your concern is justice alone, nothing will induce you to limit or
to qualify it. If your concern is individual freedom alone, you will not
find anything in its nature that obliges you to reduce it. Safeguarding
the freedom of an entire public certainly requires that the freedom of
individuals be curtailed, so that the realization of one person's freedom
does not injure others; however, this consideration may already be
guided by justice: how to distribute the right to freedom.
The relative weight of justice as opposed to freedom increases the
greater want is and the more it is want of necessities, namely, the
greater the suffering is of whoever bears the injustice (the issue here is
the weight of a certain justice-concept for those who adhere to it). In
Nicolai Hartmann's terms, one should say that justice is a lower and
stronger value than freedom.
The value justice tends to clash not only with freedom but also
with utility, i.e., with goal-orientation. In the first place, there is utility
for the individual, namely, the individual who loses out by just
intervention. This aspect is obvious. However, there is also compre-
hensive utility, or the sum total of utility society achieves. goal-orien-
tation already requires that the goal-oriented individual tyrannize him-
self, and there is no goal-orientational reason for organized society not
to harness self-tyrannization to its wagon; on the contrary, it seems
that a goal-oriented viewpoint will encourage the tendency for self-
tyrannization, whether by threats (of want or other mishaps), or by
temptation (with goods or other benefits); as justice plays a restraining
role in general, it will impose far-reaching restraint on these means as
well.
If, to aid this discussion, we include pleasure in the concept of
utility — as economists do — and if we assume for a moment that
utility, perceived in this manner, can be measured, there is no reason
not to assume that certain forms of slavery, or other kinds of bondage,
may yield a greater overall quantity of utility than a just society (ac-
cording to a number of justice-concepts). That is to say, the suffering
of the oppressed is set off by the surplus of pleasures for those who are
free (not by the somewhat negligible pleasures of the former).97 This is
especially valid for the less cruel and outrageous forms of slavery. Any
principle of justice which is not initially structured according to the
heterogeneous viewpoint of compromise with the demands of utility,
may find itself on a collision course with the latter. Bondage may be
non-efficient and not useful if it does not fit the kind of work given to
the bondsman. For instance, the rough form of latifundia slavery, suit-
able for rather simple technology which does not require initiative on
the laborer's part, will not be efficient when more complex tasks are
demanded from the bondsman. However, bondage is not flawed from
the angle of efficiency and utility because it is unjust.
Justice does not only clash with freedom and utility, but also with
the care for humans and the inclination to treat people with benevo-
lence. Such a clash may occur, for example, when punishment is de-
termined by justice but is too severe for a common emotion of com-
passion, or the inclination to benevolence. Such clashes will increase
in number under discriminative justice which, for instance, allocates
slaves few rights and heavy punishment.
According to Nicolai Hartmann the kinds of opposition justice
concepts encounter, embody ethical antinomies which can be formu-
lated as paradigmatic contradictions — when one value obliges us to
say “deed A should be carried out,” while another value rejects the
statement.
In some sense, there is no solution for a value-antinomy; in reality,
a person chooses this or that way, thus perforce violating some other
value he adheres to and not resolving the antinomy. In another sense
antinomies “resolve themselves” for you when you abandon the
antinomian values (or one of them), namely, abandon them as valua-
tive values and replace them by others; the antinomy is not resolved in
this manner, but loses relevance. Other instances of opposition become
relevant. When one exchanges one justice-concept for another, one
exchanges one opposition for another.
A value-system that contains opposition will instruct the doer
which course to choose; in the most frequent real cases in which oppo-
sition appears, the system will, for instance, say: in case A act accord-
ing to justice, in case B act according to values that oppose justice
(care for human beings, utility or freedom). In this manner the system
does not resolve the antinomy, but nevertheless fulfills its role as the
provider of guidance.
For the peace of mind of those who adhere to a value-system, it
may not call things by their proper name, i.e., refrain from saying that
the recommended behavior in case A sins against the duty to care for
human beings etc., because the recommendations of a value-system
should not include sin. In order not to become entangled in contradic-
tions, the declared formulation of clashing values is sometimes altered.
A heterogeneous course of reasoning is integrated in (at least) one of
them, and it qualifies the value's own logic. On the face of it these
qualifications do not reduce the value's field of validity, but are later
paragraphs of the value's content, which qualify earlier paragraphs of
this content. Instead of saying we reduce the value's area of validity,
and we recommend unjust behavior in case B (a sharp formulation,
liable to arouse doubts), one says: In case B justice requires what the
opposing value prescribes (care for humans, utility, freedom).
Arguments conducted on a normative (not meta-valuative) level

provide a good data source for axiology. The controversy on justice
between John Rawls and Robert Nozick may serve us as an example.
Rawls proposed a detailed normative theory of justice which recom-
mends a salient justice (with built-in qualifications, expressing other
values). Nozick developed a non-salient concept of justice which left
considerable room for utility and mainly for freedom. Both underpin
their recommendation with arguments which address the proper inte-
gration of the recommended justice concepts within a comprehensive
value-system. The proximity between Rawls's and Nozick's value-sys-
tems shows in many common features; in the first place both adhere to
universal morality as well as to a moralistic and not to a utilitarian
manner of consideration. This proximity seems to bear evidence to one
and the same comprehensive value-system upheld by both but modi-
fied by each alternatively, in order to try and resolve the opposition
between justice and freedom and utility. As Rawls and Nozick have a
common basis to a degree, their debate may be viewed as the expres-
sion of an antinomy within a common comprehensive system. It is
characteristic for the debate that it remains open: the arguments sup-
porting the two alternatives do not cancel each other, but exist one
alongside the other.
The detailed debate is interesting because it unfolds the nature of
valuative argumentation, or the founding of values. To sum up: Ar-
gumentation deals with placing a value within a value-system, so that
valuative deliberation becomes possible in cases which are not specifi-
cally mentioned by the value codex.
Value's Place in a System and its Essence
Axiologically it is worthwhile to examine a value not only from its

controversial-normative aspect. Whoever defends a value (as Rawls
and Nozick defend their concepts of justice), presents it with all the
surrounding auxiliary structures which come to defend the building
itself. Some of the auxiliary structures are closely attached to the
building and hide part of it, thus distorting its contours, its figure. And
it is appropriate to present a value in this manner. Whoever attacks
what he considers an unworthy candidate for a value, also deals with
auxiliary structures he wants to demolish. Therefore, what is
prominent in a debate is the consideration for additional values in the
same system. In a debate placement within a system is prominent.
However, axiologically not only the place of a value in the system
is of interest, but also its own inner logic. That is to say, axiology also
wishes to see the building without the structures surrounding it, to

trace its contours, to gain an impression of its own figure, to under-
stand a value's own pure tenor. Let us take an example. The pure tenor
of salient justice does not include any consideration for absolute quan-
tities of utility, of pleasure, of freedom, but only for the proportion
between the allotments people receive.
The tenor of the value >not to murder< is >not to kill humans<.
Martin Luther and later the authors of the King James Version trans-
lated the Biblical commandment that expresses this value (Exodus,
20/13) according to its pure tenor: “thou shalt not kill,” even though
the original text uses the Hebrew word for murder. The differences
between killing and murder are that murder refers only to humans (as
objects of the deed), only to deliberate deeds, and only to unlawful
deeds (not any deliberate killing of humans is considered as murder).
The value >not to murder< is made up by the skeleton >do not
kill< and all the soft tissues that envelop it, consisting of rules which
permit killing, sometimes even demand it, and state that it is not
murder. The skeleton remains unchanged over generations, while the
soft tissues surrounding it change or are replaced. Some manslaughter
which is not considered as murder by a person adhering to one value-
system, will be viewed as murder by someone adhering to a different
value-system. Take two newspapers, representing opposing positions
and study their description of one of the frequent cases of manslaugh-
ter which occurred in insurrections or civil wars, and you will learn the
difference between the killing of human beings and murder.
Every value, so to speak, considers itself the only one within the
system. It does not find arguments within itself for the reduction of its
validity or its demands. Whoever holds a value will not find restric-
tions for its validity but in other values. In order to discover these
restrictions one has to think about ones surrounding reality, about
feasible ways within this reality to realize the various values he ad-
heres to; to think about relations of dependence on one hand and rela-
tions of opposition on the other, prevailing between the realization of
one value and the realization of another (or rival) value. That is to say,
discovery of a value's possible qualifications and the establishment of
some of them requires a replacement of the valuative point of view.
But the fixation of a person on a single point of view occurs. He will
not see any qualifications for value V, he will adhere to V's skeleton
without its enveloping tissues.
The skeleton of a value exists therefore not merely as an abstrac-
tion; it is exposed, so to say, not only to the axiological X ray appara-
tus (which is value-neutral), but also to a special kind of valuative, or
normative look; the look of whoever is fixated on a certain value.
The fixation of a viewpoint and the subsequent focusing of a sys-

tem on a single value appear in the sphere of individuals as an obses-
sion with a single issue, and in the sphere of society as fanaticism or
fundamentalism. The single value may be a goal or may be an ideal.
For a person who fanatically adheres to Value W, W will be higher as
well as stronger than other values. The positive value-property W is
better than other positive properties compared to it, and the negative
value-property W is worse than other negative value-properties.
When the unqualified value is a goal, all means serving it become
sanctified.
However, the unqualified value may be an ideal, for instance, non-
violence or peace, justice or order, efficiency or freedom, speaking the
truth or aiding sufferers. As a person cannot live only according to one
value (by employing only one value), the idea-fanatic usually makes
allowances without admitting it, namely, by using pretexts aided by
linguistic maneuvering.
Fanaticism (and also other kinds of fixated focusing) leans on
emotion and does not try to defend the value which is its object by
arguments. Argumentation in favor of one value employs the aid of
other values, and shows integration of the defended value within the
system, its adaptation to other limbs of the system. Accordingly ar-
gumentation in favor of a value qualifies it, limits the sphere of its
validity in the case of conflict with others. Fanaticism is not ready to
pay the costs of defending its cause by reasons.
In contradistinction, a value-system built on some degree of bal-
ance between opposing values requires a shift of the valuative view-
point from one value to another, releasing the bargaining to some de-
gree, and thus reason itself, from emotional bonds.
A valuative value's own course of reasoning belongs to the realm
of essence. Accordingly, whoever adheres to a value acknowledges
that the value's validity is not externally awarded, by the system or the
subject; it is not awarded by virtue of arguments, it is founded on
itself. The typical single valuative value is its own master and treated
accordingly by the person adhering to it.
A value-system, on the other hand, including the placement of this
or that value within it and the compromises which cement one value to
another, does not possess its own essence: It is not a principle and is
not a table of values, which some philosophers searched for (they
searched for the table of values, writ large); it is the deliberation which
reason employs to examine applications and their realization, to exam-
ine the power of motives, to check which hypothetical opposition be-
tween valuative values has become real by virtue of the circumstances.
A value-system is a process of reason's crystallization into one of its

historical figures, which instructs one society among others.
However, in the same manner in which the focus on a single value
may become fixated and acquire an extreme (and emotional) figure,
the position opposed to this fixation, advocating a balanced system,
may also acquire an extreme (though not emotional) figure; it may
deny the existence of opposition between values in every sphere of
values founded in reason (i.e., between values of ethics themselves and
between these and utility). According to this viewpoint opposition be-
tween values in the sphere of reason is but a semblance; stringent scru-
tiny of the opposing values will reveal in at least one of them an addi-
tional content concerning the manner of its application, and this con-
tent annuls the value opposition. Opposing demands were based on the
failure to distinguish more delicate features of these values, namely,
were not rooted in the values themselves. This belief in harmony that
explains away conflicts of values, requires to regard the qualifications
added to a value by the system as this value's own tenor; the soft
tissues replace the skeleton and the boundaries between values within
the system become blurred.
Axiology takes interest in one point of view while it draws the
picture of a single value, and in the other point of view while it exam-
ines the system and the basis of the valuative deliberation.
A certain fear has been voiced, that by perceiving values as
belonging to a subject, and by the admission that there are differences
of opinion about them, values are relativized. Actually, a value does
not become qualified by its “attribution” to a subject in general, and to
a real, individual subject in particular. We will return to this issue fur-
ther on. Only another, opposing value can relativize a value. The
qualification of a value within a value-system may express such rela-
tivity. When a definition of justice does not only refer to the propor-
tion between the rations individuals receive but to their size as well,
this expresses a relativity of justice and an attempt to resolve opposi-
tion between it and other values.
From a certain point of view a value may not change, but be re-
placed by another; it does not belong to the sort of beings that can
change. From this angle the value as an intent is detached from inten-
tionality and becomes absolute. This is the viewpoint of the intention
towards the value's own, pure tenor. Axiology takes an interest in this
point of view and in what it reveals, but cannot adopt it.98 It is con-
venient for axiology to describe the replacement of soft tissues — in
the metaphor above — as continuous change. It will consider as a
replacement only a case in which continuity is manifestly broken.
Conflicts and the Relation between What Should Be

and What Is
Opposition between two values adhered to at the same time by the

same individual occurs only in the sphere of application (obviously
rivalry also occurs only in this sphere). That is to say, a person does
not approve and disapprove of the same value, but he or she applies
different values that at first sight do not seem to oppose each other. In
the course of applying them the person comes up against an object (be
it a thing or a deed) which turns out to be good from the angle of one
value and bad from the angle of another value. If this object is a deed,
then as far as it is good, it is to be done, and as far as it is bad, it is not
to be done. A contradiction appears and requires to change one of the
opposing values. If the valued object is a thing (and not a deed), it may
indirectly imply a contradiction.
This opposition may refer to an object which is only imagined and
not real, and in this case the opposition is only hypothetical; but it may
refer to an existing object and then the opposition is real. Within every
system, many instances of opposition are merely hypothetical, and do
not trail changes in opposing values or restrict their validity. Real
opposition however, trails qualification of values and restriction of
their validity, because without this the system would not be able to
guide a person's actions.
As objects of intentionality, existent things cannot directly influ-
ence the value according to which they are valued. However, the an-
swer to the question what things exist determines the answer to the
question which hypothetical instances of opposition between values
are purely hypothetical, and which among them are real. This answer
incorporates a demand to restrict the validity of certain values. change
in evaluated reality turns a purely hypothetical instance of opposition
into a real one. For example, an improvement in medical technology
makes it possible to do things which according to the existing system
possess opposing value-properties; thus, in order to settle the conflict,
a demand for the creation of a new value emerges. Here the question
arises, whether the causal connection between change in reality and a
change of values does not undermine the distinction between what
should be and what is, between value and reality.
It seems that through the mechanism of settling conflicts valued
reality trails a change in the values applied to it, and thus cancels the
border between what is and what should be. But if we are meticulous
we will find that as an object of valuation, reality influences the ad-
herence to values (i.e., determines if the adherence is qualified), while
this adherence belongs to reality. This adherence is part of the form of
values, i.e., of value-thinking. The difference between value and its

form is revealed in the following state of affairs: An exposition of a
value cannot be made in a neutral language, while its form may be
described, and this can be done in a neutral language. The form is the
factual aspect of value thinking. What changes as a part of real proc-
esses is the form of values and not the values as intentional content.
Value's mode of application, its place in the system and its soft tissues
— all these belong to its form. If we distinguish meticulously between
content and form of intentionality, considerations concerning value
conflicts will not undermine the logic of the distinction between what
is and what should be.
Now to a related issue: The collision between motivative values is
always influenced by the environment as well. Even if the power of
motives is given to us, we still do not know which motives will col-
lide, with how much power this will occur, and which is the stronger
one. Here the marginal power of motives is relevant, as this is their
real power (the general power of a motive is purely hypothetical). The
marginal power, however (which is identical with the readiness for a
sacrifice in given circumstances), is determined by the reality sur-
rounding a human being, namely, by the supply it offers. The order of
priorities of motives, determined by the will, refers to their marginal
powers.
Reason, trying to settle conflicts between valuative as well as mo-
tivative values, needs therefore information about value-bearers, or
about objects of valuation, and not only crystallized and defined val-
ues.
A Model for Opposition and Mutual Conditioning in

the Realization of Values
The environment may contribute to the shaping of a value-opposi-

tion on two counts. It may dictate a certain ceiling above which oppo-
sition between the realization of two values, V and W, prevails. Above
this ceiling realization of value V impedes the realization of value W,
but up to this ceiling — not; value W will also have such a ceiling.
Both ceilings together make up the upper limit for a possible joint
realization without the need to choose.
The environment also contributes to the shaping of value-opposi-
tion when it makes realization of value V a precondition for the reali-
zation of the opposing value W. This means that the same values
which oppose each other above a certain ceiling, L2, will stand in a
dependence relation beneath another ceiling, L1, when L1 is not higher

than L2. That is to say, realization of V up to L1 is necessary if W is to
be realized. Such conditioning may be reciprocal (similar limits may
also occur in rivalries).
The integration of both contributions into a reciprocal system
yields a model, in which each of the scales of the opposing values will
have four special notches: minimum, two optimum notches (from the
angle of the system's harmony and from the angle of its output,
namely, from the angle of maximal realization of the system's values),
and maximum. We will thus gain five areas, which we will mark by
the letters a, b, c, d, e. In area a (up to the minimum) the realization of
value A and value B aid and are necessary for each other. In area b (up
to the harmony optimum) they neither aid nor impede each other. In
area c (between the two optimum notches) the realization of A pre-
vents further realization of B (above its first optimum), but does not
cancel what has already been realized of B; the same holds for the in-
fluence of B's realization on A. In area d (above the second optimum)
the value becomes tyrannical within the system, and cancels an al-
ready prevailing realization of its opposition (beneath the first opti-
mum notch). Area e (above the possible maximum) is a paradoxical
area: should I try to realize A in this area, I will cause the cancellation
of what was already realized of A itself, because here the realization of
A cancels the realization of B beneath the minimum notch — and as
the minimum of B is necessary for A, A is in reality canceled together
with B.
The drawing of the scale is therefore like this:
L1 L2 L3 L4
a b c d e
Condi- possibil- Impossi- cancels re- cancels reali-
tioning ity of bility of alization of zation of the
joint re- further the oppos- opposing
alization joint re- ing value in value in area
aliza- area b a, and thus
tion cancels itself
When V arrives at L 2, W can also arrive there. When V stands at

L3, W remains at L2. When V stands at L4, W has returned to L1.
There is good reason to believe that in modern society important
values are arranged according to this model. For instance, mutual con-
ditioning will prevail, when both values are vital, namely, when a
person cannot function within the social system without their realiza-
tion. Limitation of the opposition by a bottom line will prevail, for
example, when the more-vital realization of value V resides in a differ-

ent sphere of objects than that of the more-vital realization of value W.
The opposition between salient justice and other values has a focal
place in modern reality, and I believe that in its general outline it is
arranged according to the model described above. A minimum of sali-
ent justice, for instance, conditions the realization of other values from
the aspect that non-salient justice allows for individuals to die of want
(of food, clothing, medical care); for whoever is liable to die of want
under the rule of non-salient justice, achieving a minimum of salient
justice is a necessary condition for the realization of any other value.
In circumstances in which want looms over a considerable part of soci-
ety, the stability of the social-political system also requires a minimum
of salient justice.
When salient justice nears its maximum mark it turns into tyranny;
when it passes this mark it cancels itself, namely, what is to be its
realization is perforce something else, i.e., is not at all a realization of
justice.
The same holds for freedom. Without a minimum of freedom, all
other values lose their relevance, while a maximum of freedom trails
anarchy, which cancels freedom itself.
The model described above is also relevant for the analysis of spe-
cific instances of opposition which at their root are offshoots of the
focal kinds of opposition, as well as for criticism of the aspiration to
maximize the realization of a single value. For instance, the opposition
between an individual's conscience and the law of the land is an
offshoot of the opposition between freedom and justice. A law which
leaves no room for conscience to express itself could deprive a state of
its character as a state ruled by law. Obeying conscience while break-
ing laws (in a state ruled by law) leads to a breakdown of society,
which is the object conscience refers to.
Chapter 9
Struggles Between the Will and

Motivative Values
The will, whether consulting reason more or whether less, decides in

conflicts between motives. The motive the will has rejected often not
only continues to exist, but even challenges the will and engages it in
struggles.
We find the will fighting for the sake of values of all types. The
end, obviously, need not be mentioned here again. The will is mobi-
lized for the sake of prudence. When rivalry occurs within the family
of needs, inclinations and constraints, the will supports one of the
rivals. The same holds for rivalry between ideals and for rivalry or
opposition between duties. These struggles frequently create complex
situations demanding sophisticated maneuvering from the struggling
parties, as if it were a struggle between two different persons. In order
to analyze these complex situations we have to distinguish between the
different factors involved in the struggles, i.e., reason, will, and
motives, and treat them as different agencies or components of the
personality.
When Ulysses' ship approached the place where the sirens sang, he
asked his mates to tie him to the mast. He stopped their ears with wax,
having ordered them beforehand to go on and tighten his bonds, if he
gave signs that he wanted to be released. Ulysses wanted to sail on and
reach home, but he knew that the sirens' song would arouse his desire
to leave the ship and join them; he therefore outwits his future desire
by means of the orders he gave to his mates. He does not wish to forgo
hearing the sirens sing, and he believes that paying this price is not
necessary.
The power of the opposed motives undergoes changes from one
hour to the next. Ulysses' will and wisdom anticipate the reinforcement
of some motives and create an objective situation in which these
motives' superior power cannot lead to action. John Elster in his book
Ulysses and the Sirens acutely and in a scholarly manner analyses a
series of struggles going on within the personality; however, he does
so without acknowledging the existence of different agencies within a
personality, i.e., without a suitable theoretical model.
A subject made up of a single agency, a uniform and rational sub-
ject, will not limit the number of options he may have at his disposal in
future. A monolithic Ulysses would tell himself: when the time comes
I will see whether it is worthwhile to leave the ship for the sirens, even
at the cost of forgoing the return home. In the future he will have not
less but more information then now and therefore a better basis for
making decisions.
Numerous people who decide to stop smoking, or to wean them-
selves of overeating or the use of alcohol, create circumstances that
limit their freedom to give in to their desire when, as expected, it
overcomes the will. A person will avoid passing the tobacco shop, will
throw the key to his bar behind his back when he goes to bed (so that
he will not be able to find it and drink when he gets up during the
night), etc. Here the will does not tie itself but ties the motives. In
strict sense, we have in these cases no self tying as we have in other
cases no self deception. The ideas of such reflexive actions are conven-
ient in describing some phenomena, but not appropriate for analyzing
and explaining them.
One may argue as follows: Any voluntary action is guided by the
will. As smoking, eating and drinking are voluntary actions, they can
not be done against the will. When motives opposed to a decision that
has already been made gain additional power, they do not circumvent
the will to generate action, but cause the will itself to surrender and
order the action. We have then to develop the idea of will in accor-
dance with the use of the phrase “voluntary action.” It is an
appropriate starting point, since there are no differences of opinion
about what for instance voluntary muscles are. According to this
course of reasoning, we have to say that in some cases mentioned
above the will indeed ties its own hands in order not to obey the
motives.
Struggles Between the Will and Motitative Values 259
While the wider meaning of the word “will” is connected with the
phrases “voluntary action” and “voluntary muscles,” the narrow mean-
ing is tied to decision and judgment. What is done “against the own
will” is according to the narrow meaning a deed opposed to a decision
and to valuative judgment. According to the wider meaning of “will,”
it is impossible that a person will do something against his or her own
will.
The simpler model can do with the will in its limited sense. And I
will use here the word “will” only in its narrow meaning. I have then
to say that whoever smokes in opposition to his own decision, smokes
in opposition to his will, although smoking is a voluntary activity.
According to this model, the phrase “voluntary action” is to be taken
as one word.
Elster presents the case of a state tying its own hands by a consti-
tution.99 The legislator does not tie his own hands by an ordinary law,
because he is free to change it, while constitutional change requires a
special majority. If we look at it more carefully, we will see that here
also one factor ties another factor: The adherents of position A are
today a majority in the law making body and they tie by constitution
the opponents of position A who will perhaps be tomorrow a majority,
but not a sufficient majority to change the constitution. A possible
justification in some cases is: The decision we passed with a great
majority should not be annulled by a smaller majority.
The will vanquishes motives by virtue of its strength or by virtue
of its cunning (the cunning of reason it calls to its aid). When the will
loses this is caused by weakness or by the absence of sophistication.
The twentieth century tendency not to admit the existence of a
will, but only the existence of intellect and motives (or reason and
desires), gives rise to the question whether perhaps the opposition pre-
vails not between the will and motives, but between one motive and
another one. However, opposition between motives themselves fails to
explain the situation in which a person acts in explicit opposition to
what he believes to be good for himself. A description of the opposi-
tion as prevailing between different motives ignores the qualitative
difference between the warring forces.
Discussion of willpower and in particular of the will's weakness
has sometimes been introduced into discussions of moral theory. It
belongs to the very issue of morality that the motive it commands to
prefer is in relevant situations also the relatively weak motive, namely
morality, by its nature, finds itself prima facie struggling with motives
(or the individual's aspiration to behave according to morality finds
itself struggling); by its nature morality needs the aid of the will in its
struggle, and the will, therefore, appears in these discussions as

morally good.
However, it is possible that in some case a person's will, while
battling with motives that block its way, will serve what is morally
wrong. One may reckon that this individual acknowledges morality (as
accepted by his society) but scorns its validity under circumstances
prevailing at the time ( when he thinks that others do not behave ac-
cordingly), and decides to act in opposition to morality in a manner
that serves one of his ends; thus, although the motives opposing his
will, for instance motives of compassion, are morally preferable. 100
However, we return to the case in which the will commands what
morality requires and fails in its struggle with a motive blocking its
way (a case often discussed under the heading “akrasia”; the term de-
notes a property of unbridled behavior, while the will is weak and
cannot hold on to the reins). The question arises whether the owner of
the will could in this case behave according to his will and morality's
commandment. We now shift our attention from willing to ability. The
question arises because duty a priori assumes ability.
Here we have to distinguish between ability in a limited sense, in-
cluding the skill to act and an objective opportunity to do the deed, and
ability in a very broad sense, including willpower as well, namely,
sufficient strength to overcome rival motives. Ability in its very broad
sense lies at the root of a tenet: If X fails to do a certain deed, he does
not want (has not the will) to do it or cannot do it (he may, of course,
neither want nor be able to do the deed). From this sort of tenet it
arises that if a person wants to do a deed and does not do it, he cannot
do it; and one could continue paradoxically: and if he cannot, he is not
obliged to do it either.
The inner logic of the distinction between will and ability as fac-
tors preceding action, requires us not to consider the strength of the
will as belonging to the factors of ability, but as a factor attached to the
will; thus we will say that a person can do a deed if he has the
necessary skill (and if the necessary objective circumstances are
there); we will say so independently of the system of motives this
person possesses, and independently of his decisions or his willpower.
According to this course of reasoning ability is understood as a factor
which is not dependent on the will (this does not prevent us from ac-
knowledging the existence of a volition to gain ability). Accordingly,
we will reject the conclusion structured in the following manner: If X
wants to do A and fails to do A, it shows that he cannot do A.
I believe the categories whose application is fruitful in the analysis
of struggles between the will and motives, are the categories of the
will in its limited sense (namely, not everything that stands behind
Struggles Between the Will and Motitative Values 261
every action called “voluntary”), and ability in a limited sense (which

does not include willpower). These categories do not create a dichot-
omy: the motives which deflect a person from his decisions do neither
belong to the will nor to ability. These categories do not lead the
analysis of personal cases into a paradoxical maze.101
Chapter 10
Repression
In our discussion of typology (Part II, Chapter 9) we already men-

tioned the existence of special values (belonging to section C) aimed at
the valuation of humans, by which a person measures himself, namely,
he compares his self-image with these values. The sum total of values
aimed at the valuation of humans a person adheres to and applies to
him or herself, comes together in an ideal this individual seeks to
realize. However, a certain stratification may emerge in this manner,
i.e., this person's ideal will include the values he adheres to and also
state which values he does not adhere to (in other words: what contents
he will not uphold as values). For example, X wishes not to belong to
those who adhere to a certain value A, or who maintain a certain
opinion B.
Yet there are values humans do not constitute, namely, values a
person adheres to which were not established by his will but were
given to him; he finds them within himself and only subsequently
becomes aware of them. These are needs, inclinations and constraints
given to him as desires arising within him. And among such given
values, there may be one the adherence to which is opposed to this
person's ideal. He or she wishes not to be a person who has this desire.
A state of self-dissatisfaction therefore emerges during the valua-
tive reflection of a person about himself: The value according to which
he values himself defines the fact that he upholds a certain given value
as a negative value-property. The given value this person finds within

himself will be faulty in his eyes both as a valuative and a motivative
value. If the will decides in favor of the ideal and against the given
value, it faces a special task because the issue is not avoidance of ac-
tion according to the given value, but uprooting it completely.
This task resides on the border of the will's ability and perhaps be-
yond it. Anyway, in numerous personal cases it is certainly beyond the
capacity for self-shaping. Now, to replace the task it cannot manage,
the will may settle the conflict by adjudging that in fact its owner does
not uphold the given value in question. That is to say, a person
deceives himself and thus removes a negative self-valuation from his
consciousness. When this kind of self-deception succeeds, it represents
repression. The repressing will seeks to tear the forbidden wish out of
memory. It alters the picture of its past.
The repressed value exists as an inclination to integrate elements
of the forbidden content with other, legitimate values, i.e., to insinuate
something of the repressed wish into various syntheses. This circum-
vention of censure may be far-reaching enough to license a forbidden
drug, while on the other hand repression may be radical.
Freud discovered repression in cases in which sexual wishes were
repressed. However, the mechanism he describes may also serve the
repression of other wishes, like the desire to hurt another person cru-
elly, be it a specific individual or a random target; the basis of such a
wish is the desire to avenge an injury suffered by the repressor, or a
propensity for magic alteration of his past, because the latter interferes
with his self-image. In the same manner, feelings of hatred may be
suppressed in a society that condemns hatred. These repressed values
may insinuate themselves into syntheses and confer aggressiveness
upon non-repressed values, some of which are utterly
different from the repressed ones and even from each other. Love,
for example, or moral rigor may acquire an aggressive coloring. This
consideration may aid the explanation of random cruelty, exercised by
humans throughout very different periods, in far-flung localities and in
different social strata, i.e., it may help to explain why the values op-
posing cruelty fail to gain the upper hand.
A repressed value is non-saturate — it saturates itself by a synthe-
sis with conscious values. The person repressing a value is aware of
the syntheses that include the forbidden content, but he does not iden-
tify it as such.
Chapter 11
Ideology
The core of ideology is that it helps human beings to live with the
opposition prevailing between his values.
A value's own course of reasoning continues to protest against
qualifications attached to it in order to adapt it to the system. Opposing
values are dissatisfied, so to say, with the compromise imposed upon
them by the necessity to adopt a position, the necessity to cope with
situations in our environment. All these make consciousness uneasy.
Opposition may also prevail between a system of valuative values
and a system of motives. The order of preference of valuative values is
not congruent with the order of priorities of motives according to their
power; furthermore, the order of priorities is arranged according to the
marginal power of motives in a given moment and therefore changes
frequently, while the order of preference does neither change much nor
quickly. The opposition between valuative and motivative values
which appears as knowing what is good and doing what is bad also
irritates self-consciousness. It saddles the subject with a self-portrait he
or she does not like at all.
Simple Ideology — Justifying Actual Prevailing Value-

Systems
A simple Ideology draws a picture of the world and the subject

that makes it easier to explain away the main modes of value-opposi-
tion, creating an impression that the cases of opposition are less
weighty, and putting the remaining blame on factors which do not
depend on the subject.
A certain kind of ideology — we will call it transcendent — argues
for the existence of an additional reality, beyond empirical reality. This
reality incorporates things good in every sense and things bad in every
sense; the object has no opposing value-properties. In this reality what
is present is present as a whole and in every sense, what is absent is
not there in any sense. This additional reality is therefore devoid of
cases in which our values oppose each other, and there are no
contradictions in the subject's thinking when applied to this reality. In
the light of the reality beyond reality, all instances of opposition
between values turn out to be merely hypothetical and therefore
negligible.
The reality beyond functions as what truly exists, while the status
of empirical reality is reduced — sometimes slightly reduced to a level
of contingency, but sometimes much reduced to that of a mere phe-
nomenon or even to what is only a semblance. Transcendent ideology
makes the phenomenon transparent and points to what truly exists
beyond it; this ideology provides a running interpretation of events,
explaining them against its transcendent background. This interpreta-
tion reduces real value-opposition till it becomes merely hypothetical
and till it finally cleans the value-system entirely of real opposition.
Addressing human reality, people's empirical practice which de-
parts from what their trans-empirical essence dictates, is explained as
an error, not on the part of the explaining subject, but an error of the
person whose practice has to be explained. For example, if human
beings in general or a certain person is good on the trans-empirical
level, then his being empirically bad arises from ignorance (not mine
but his). And when a bad person behaves well it is also a mistake,
namely, empirical contingency. The same holds when explaining the
practice of an entire human group, a people or a class; when members
of the group behave in opposition to their essence, they err or do not
know what is required.
Many religions also include, apart from value-concepts, a clearly
transcendent ideology; but not only these religions create an additional
reality, some secular political ideologies do the same.
Ideology 267
The man who called himself Junius Brutus (so let us call him so),
author of “A Defense of Liberty against Tyrants” which was published
in the sixteenth century, claiming that a rebellion could be legitimate,
wrote: “The whole body of the people is above the king.”102 Did Bru-
tus believe that the people of England or the people of the Ottoman
empire in his time were above the king (or the queen)? No, of course
he did not believe this, but in trans-empirical England, the proper one,
the people were already above the queen and in the Ottoman empire
the people were above the sultan.
You may ask why Brutus does not say “In my opinion it is always
better for the people as a whole to be superior, and for the king to be
subject to it.” The reply lies in the music of these sentences. “The
whole body of the people is above the king” may be rendered with
pathos in a speech, while striking the table with your fist. The sentence
suggested to Brutus instead, however — try saying it with the same
degree of pathos!
There is of course, no legitimate rebellion against the king in trans-
empirical reality, because he will always bow to the authority of the
people as a whole. The rebellion exists only on the empirical surface.
What is, on the face of it, illegitimate in the rebellion is set-off by the
illegitimacy of the tyrant — one error is set off by the preceding one.
And not only the relation between king and people differs here and
there, but the people itself and the king himself are different. This does
not mean that the people should be different from what it is, but that in
its transcendent essence it already is different today.
Transcendent ideology need not become entangled in lies when it
describes the empirical environment in which the subject lives. What it
needs is provided by the transcendent interpretation of this description.
The soothing picture of his or her value-system a person gains in
this manner incorporates an element of illusion — but the illusion
required for the self-portrait is smaller the lesser the internal contradic-
tions within the system are in number and in weight.
Ideology in general has two principal characteristics:
1. It appears as a mixture of valuing thought and cognitive thought
(thought that demands the status of cognition for itself), similar to
practical thought. However, if we examine it meticulously, we will
find that it incorporates no values and no cognition in their rigorous
sense, but a free creation, like a work of art.
2. Ideology satisfies a human need, or more precisely, the need of
the reflection a person engages in about himself or herself: if it suc-
ceeds it enables him to approve of himself; in any case, it frequently
saves his or her superego from dissatisfaction, and the minimum it is
required to provide is to calm the superego or self-consciousness as a

whole.
In his consciousness, a person draws a picture of what he wishes to
be as well as a picture of himself as he actually is, and he estimates the
discrepancy. This self-portrait includes a picture of his value-system.
The latter in its turn is in a certain sense made up — among other
factors — by the world it is applied to. This is so because a value-
system whose internal conflicts are merely hypothetical, is different
from one in which the conflicts are real. Accordingly, a different world
picture requires a different system of values (even if each value
remains valid), and thus, of course, a different picture of the subject
himself emerges — a picture in which the discrepancy between what
he is and what he wishes to be is different from what it was before-
hand. Ideology molds the world picture in a manner that reduces this
discrepancy: A person devoid of ideology — if such a person exists —
will be dissatisfied with himself and his value-system will be prone to
deeper and conscious changes.
Apart from transcendent there are also immanent ideologies. Im-
manent ideology can also work without clashing with phenomena,
because the field of possible explanations for phenomena is wide even
without colliding directly with the scientific explanation of these phe-
nomena.
It is quite common for immanent ideologies to ascribe certain val-
ues and intentions to people. A person who harms others deliberately
and dislikes to appear malicious in his own eyes, attributes malice to
others and thus justifies his actions by the claim, that under prevailing
circumstances his survival depends on these. Other instances of value
opposition can also be justified by ascribing values and intentions to
people. Here the ideologue persists even when these not only contra-
dict what people say, but also what they do; he gives a special status to
the ascribed values and intentions — for instance, the status of an
interest (which is a kind of end dictated by the object) awarded to the
ends attributed to a person or a group; it then turns out that the owner
of this interest has not yet acquired knowledge concerning his objec-
tive interest and has therefore acted against it (the ascribed intention
becomes potential and is realized when the self-interest has been ac-
knowledged). Some even establish true needs in the idea they have of
other people, needs which are invisible because they are hidden by
false needs or reside in their shadow. The principle is the same as in
transcendent ideologies. The individual or the group who know their
interests and their true needs differ from the empirical individual or
group. They are trans-empirical. If so, what is the difference between
the immanent and the transcendent ideology? The main difference is
Ideology 269
but one of degree: In one kind a whole sphere is separate from the en-
tire empirical sphere, and transcendency is declared; the other does not
have a whole sphere designated for establishments, and mainly there is
no declaration that these exceed the domain of experience.
It is not easy to distinguish between immanent ideology and prac-
tical thought. While transcendent ideology is declaredly separate from
everyday practical thought by virtue of the topics it treats of, it is dif-
ferent with immanent ideology. The latter and practical thought deal
with the same matters, and both do so, prima facie, as a mixture (or a
compound) of cognition and valuation. The difference we are looking
for resides mainly in that practical thought precedes and dictates ac-
tion, while ideology justifies it after its completion, ex post facto.103
Let us take a simple example from hypnosis. The hypnotist orders the
hypnotized person to respond to a certain signal, after he awakes, by
opening the window. He awakes, the signal is sounded and he re-
sponds as ordered. When afterwards he is asked why he had opened
the window, he answers that the room was stuffy or that he wanted to
see something outside etc.; he invents a reason, according his behavior
a rational character after the event, and he believes in what he says —
he succeeds in deceiving himself.104
In another society, in which not rationality but honor is the domi-
nant aspiration, ideology will wrap behavior post-factum in a cloak of
respectability.
The boundary between the aspect of before and the aspect of after
the event is not always clearly marked. Ideology can engender doings,
namely a special residue of an ideological-ceremonial deed layered
upon the original deed that needs justification, or something like a
special style of the original deed which adds an element of charm. As
common practical thought is not a mixture whose components of cog-
nition and valuation are distinct, and because the deliberations of prac-
tical thought are arranged in terms into some of which ideology has
cast its contents, it is not easy for axiology to separate these two.
The characterization of ideology as justification ex post facto has
two meanings. The first meaning is that the deed being justified oc-
curred in the recent or the remote past. And indeed, the picture of one's
own past, be it of an individual or of a nation, often presents an ideo-
logical character. The second meaning is that the value instructing a
certain kind of deeds (including deeds present and future) gains justifi-
cation by being integrated into the system, namely, by blurring the
opposition between this value and the other limbs of the system.
What is common to ideology and repression is that both aid value-
systems in fortifying themselves and persisting in their existence; both
save the person adhering to a value-system hesitation and confusion. It

is doubtful whether human beings could do without them.
Compensating Ideology
There are ideologies (among the transcendent as well as among the

immanent) which, on the face of it, neither explain away value-opposi-
tion nor provide grounds for recommending the dominant values in the
system that informs active life. On the contrary, they provide grounds
for recommending values that are practically inferior within the
system, even for vigorous pleading on their behalf, and accordingly
they exacerbate the picture of opposition between values. For example,
a spontaneous individual who does not plan his actions, who is not
structured towards ends and is no egoist, may advocate an ideology of
individual goal-orientation and even preach it. It is possible for a
society in which much violence between individuals prevails and is
even considered legitimate, a society that values its members ac-
cording to their success in violent encounters (for example, medieval
knights), to espouse avoidance of violence and even of violent self-
defense.
For an adherent of a value-system such an ideology, which is built
as an infrastructure for practically inferior values, may function as a
kind of compensation for the fact that some of his or her values are
neglected by the system, or are deprived of their practical impact.
Compensation may exceed the degree of deprival, i.e., the ideology
may aid a radical version of the practically inferior value: The short-
changed individual goal-orientation of the first example may be
strongly recommended as enlightened egoism; the rejection of
violence in the second example will be recommended in its extreme
figure, namely, turning the other cheek. Ideological compensation is
generously awarded because it remains on a purely ideological level,
while the deprival is real.
Here a question comes to mind: Why is the superego prepared to
make do with ideological compensation? The manner in which com-
pensation is received can be understood with the aid of Hartmann's
notions of height and strength. As mentioned above, a value is weak
when not realizing or violating it is relatively not a severe offense and
may be forgiven. The less severely the offense against it is valued, the
weaker the value is. However, according to Hartmann the relation of
height to strength is inverse. Accordingly, when we add to the height
of a deprived value, we will not expect it to remain as strong as it was,
i.e., offenses against this value will be less severe. One may continue to
Ideology 271
extol a sublime value even though one commits small offenses against
it in everyday life.
The picture that compensating ideology creates in self-conscious-
ness shows, that the deprived value was awarded great height. Yet the
deprival arises from the relatively little weight the deprived motives
carry, while the strength of valuative values is subsequently reduced
by ideology, thus adapting it to the order of motives; compensation by
adding height to these values comes last in this procedure.
Compensating ideology does neither blur nor camouflage the de-
prival of a value's practical impact, but it provides a reason to view it
leniently. Sometimes it even provides a reason to justify the deprival
— when the choice is between foregoing the realization of a strong
value and sinning against a value that ideology has made higher and
elevated it in rank. The realization of strong, vital values is perceived
as a precondition for the realization of high values. Realization of the
high value is postponed until another time and for other cases.
A person adhering to an ideology is not aware of its function, he is
not aware that ideology stands for justification after the event. He is
aware of its contents and of the fact that he feels at home with it.
An idea serving one person as ideology may be a real value for an-
other, for instance, it may guide his actions and be accompanied by a
matching motive. Preaching a certain idea that serves an entire public
as compensating heightening, may move an individual emotionally,
may motivate and guide him to realize the idea. In a certain sense, the
choice of a high value at the expense of a strong value resembles the
risk involved in an interesting adventure. However, in the same way
that a certain idea (we will call it A) functioning as ideology may be
taken with utter gravity by one of its disciples, it is also possible for an
individual to take A less seriously than generally accepted by the
public upholding this ideology; this will occur when a number of
ideologies suit the somewhat vague needs of this person and he
chooses to adopt idea A because he wishes to belong to the public
adhering to A; that is to say, this person treats A like a garment he
wishes to be seen wearing, in order to belong to those who dress in this
manner.
Originally, ideology is not a tool for statesmen, but man's daily
bread. It is an object of mental consumption that satisfies a vital need.
Its vitality shows in that people are angered when they hear something
liable to undermine their belief. However, statesmen have always
known that their endeavor cannot be maintained by force alone, and
that they also need the proper use of ideologies. Originally ideology
needs no deceit, it maneuvers beyond the territory of truth (the already
known truth), while honoring the latter's sovereignty. However, in
many cases the statesman cannot make do with this space, so he tries
to steep the ideological bread in his own potion.
What has been said about statesmen would be misleading if we
failed to add that with regard to this issue there are extreme differences
in degree between different statesmen, different states and different
political streams. There is political usage of ideology that distorts the
truth but a little, and there is usage utterly opposed to truth.
There is a rationalistic, anti-ideological ideology, on the face of it
pragmatic, that recommends science as the exclusive guide of action,
i.e., as a replacement for values, and experts as a replacement for
statesmen in government. However, as science deals only with what
exists, it can dictate but means for hypothetical goals, and experts can
only apply knowledge regarding means, but cannot say anything about
goals (as experts), and even less determine what goals are to be; this
anti-ideology is but an ideology whose inner logic is not properly
structured.
Finally we have to remark on the following issue: Ideology does
not always exist separately, as an organized set of ideas; more fre-
quently it appears as a certain coloring of other thoughts, or a kind of
spice added to consciousness, or to value-thought, or to practical
thought. In such a case, it will show in terminology, in hidden prem-
ises or in a method of selecting facts under discussion.
PART IV
Objectivism and
Subjectivism
In this part we will first treat two rival modes of thought prevailing in
people's everyday consciousness — objectivism and subjectivism.
These precede the philosophical theories known by the same name.
These modes of thought prevail in the sphere of cognition as well as in
the sphere of valuation. The reflection we are going to discuss in the
next two chapters is non-philosophical reflection.
Chapter 1
The Objectivist
Popular objectivism (i.e., the mode of objectivistic thought common in

everyday consciousness) emerges when the mechanism of objectifi-
cation, natural to consciousness, is expanded. This mechanism crystal-
lizes the instances of what is intended, organizes them as objects and
establishes them beyond the subject.
When a person views the contents of his sensation or better, his
sensory observation as well as the contents of his thought as entities
independent of his sensations or his thought, when he believes in that
independence and expresses this belief in his treatment of what he
senses and thinks, we say that he objectifies these contents.
Objectification is usually applied to intentional content. In any
case, intentional content is always a candidate for objectification
Here I direct the reader to Chapter 6, Part I above, because we go
on and twine threads begun there, and we use terms coined and ex-
plained in that chapter.
We can distinguish two stages of objectification: Arranging the ob-
ject and establishing it as an object. The arrangement or the construc-
tion is the work of observing and understanding, while establishment
is the work of judgment, i.e., of the will.
Objectification occurs in grades: from the grade of the object's
utter indifference to the subject to a stage of some sensitivity towards
it. These are different levels of reality. Fictional reality we read about
or watch in a movie has also undergone some process of externaliza-

tion. Children refer in their games to figures from a fictional reality
which is also external in relation to consciousness (for them, while
they play the game), but it is properly separate from the reality each of
them shares with all other people.
A remark in the margin of this discourse: In describing an object as
emerging from objectification I do not assume a position of episte-
mological subjectivism (of idealism versus realism), because I do not
refer to the question of what relation this object (the concrete object)
has to the thing in itself (whether they are identical, or similar; whether
one may speak meaningfully of similarity between a phenomenon and
the thing itself, etc.). For the present phenomenological discussion, I
need not assume a position regarding the character of this relation. In
other words: we can use the idea of “objectification” without deciding,
what its ontological interpretation is: whether objectification is the
production or the reproduction of an object.
Naive Objectivism
Objectivism is a mode of thought that establishes, in addition to

and together with intentional content, forms of intention apart from the
subject, i.e., apart from the intention. Naive objectivism does so
immediately, namely, the form is not separate from the content prior to
its establishment, but is established jointly with the intentional content
which it serves as form.
What is being established of the form is its conscious part, namely,
in the first place what is immediately conscious (is perceived). The
elements established beyond the subject include the formal aspect of
what is intended, the patterns in which it is cast, but also
characteristics of the intentional act. The established concepts carry the
mark of the intellect's casting patterns: patterns like properties and
substance, species and genera, laws and events. In extreme cases of
naive objectivism, the name of a thing is also externalized.
Objectivism is the inclination to raise the degree of objectification,
namely, to confer upon the object utter independence of the subject.
An attitude of naive objectivism is natural to human beings: It is
natural to align oneself towards the outside, towards the environment,
and not towards oneself, i.e., to pay attention to what is external, and
therefore to view as external what one pays attention to. The struggle
for survival encourages human beings to turn outward. When he per-
ceives certain sections of himself in the context of an outward inten-
tion, he keeps turning outward and externalizes them as well.
The Objectivist 277
Reflective Objectivism
Reflective objectivism does not represent an immediate

externalization of the form of intention but of reflection's intentional
content, which is more or less congruent with the form of transitive
intention. This kind of reflection does not consider itself as reflection,
but as cognition of external reality.
Reflective objectivism is already present in popular thought and ar-
rives at its salient expression in objectivistic philosophy, which estab-
lishes the forms of intention as the structure of all that exists. A salient
representation of philosophic objectivism appears in the ontology of
ideas ( Plato, Frege and Nicolai Hartmann). However, our theme in
this chapter is popular objectivism, naive as well as reflective, and not
objectivistic philosophy.
Popular Objectivism in the Sphere of Values
The objectivist considers an object's value-property as fundamental

to the object, and not as something made up by the relation to man.
The cherry is tasty and beautiful not only for the subject. This objec-
tivism with regard to values is analogous to popular objectivism in the
sphere of cognition: For objectivistic reflection, the cherry's redness is
also a fundamental and not a relational property of the cherry. The
same holds for conceptual values and value-properties (like a deed
being just or unjust); these are also characteristics of reality and not
something we constitute. The same approach appears on the level of
reflection about reflection, of course without being aware of this strati-
fication.
For the objectivist as an individual values are a matter of learning,
similar to arithmetic, and not a matter of decision or will. The applica-
tion of values as well as their establishment are not a matter for his
decision and willing, but are dictated to him/her. The radically naive
objectivist has no will, i.e., he does not consider his will as will; in
some aspects his will cancels itself and he adopts (though this is also
an act of the will) the values of the society that surrounds him. He
needs an authority which he can obey. In his view, this authority does
not pave his way but shows it to him. He may use the word “will,” but
he strips it of some of its roles and on the other hand, attaches various
motives to the same will.
He considers some features of his self-image as images of his envi-

ronment; to achieve this his reflection must alter them, so that they can
be considered images of the environment.
So far as the objectivist cannot externalize something of his or her
self and view it as part of the environment, he or she considers it as
possessions. The hand he uses is his, it is his closely attached property;
it is not a part of the self. The same holds for his body in general, his
strength, and the talent he finds in himself.
Having turned part of himself into a set of properties and
characteristics of the environment and part of himself into possessions,
what is left of himself is but an empty sphere. Accordingly the
consistent objectivist does not occupy himself with self-valuation; as
nothing of himself is left, nothing has to be valued. His characteristics
and his patterns of observation which have become part of the
environment are valued jointly with the latter, and what has become
possessions is valued as possessions. Nor is he liable to be swept away
by a whirlpool of reflective emotions, because such emotions will not
develop at all.
The objectivist is well-suited to goal-oriented activity. In goal-ori-
ented activity that meets the requirements it establishes, the person
carrying it out is merely a means. Here lies the difficulty we discussed
in the chapter dealing with opposition between goal-orientation and
spontaneity. For the objectivist this difficulty shrinks, because accord-
ing to his view only his possessions are left of his self, and possessions
are bound to function as means. The hand and the arm, the leg, the rest
of the body, strength and talent belong to him and he uses them and
not himself.
Focusing on the end as a dominant type of value matches the ob-
jectivistic outlook from another important angle. A value-property has
to be the property of an object, which according to this outlook can
only be an external object, because only what resides outside the mind
or consciousness possesses original content (in contradistinction to
consciousness, whose contents come from outside). And thus valua-
tions of section C (i.e., valuations according to what precedes action)
have no real value-bearer, because they value the subject; valuations of
section B, valuing human actions, are not real either, apart from the
traces they leave in the external world. Section A, on the other hand,
suits this outlook because here valuations are rooted in the value-prop-
erties of reality. Here, in the external results of an action, the active
objectivistic subject finds himself on solid ground.
Objectivism confers a certain stability on a person, because his
values and his character appear to him as characteristics of the world
and thus he cannot alter them. Changes in his values, changes in his
The Objectivist 279
character, or a change in himself are completely beyond his horizon;

he changes without being aware of it, he neither shapes his values nor
himself. However, unconscious change is usually slow and continuous,
without sharp turning points.
The degree of stability objectivism confers upon a social system is
even higher, because it makes its members view the existence of soci-
ety's values and their expression in laws as independent of any will.
The wise legislator discovers laws, he does not invent them. Nymphs
may aid him (as they aided Numa Pompilius, king of Rome), but they
do not constitute values, or their manifestation in laws. Even God,
according to popular prevailing monotheism, does not constitute the
principle of the good, he can not choose that the bad will be the good,
that the content of badness will be the content of goodness. God
chooses the good, because it is good, and it is not the other way round:
what he chooses will be good post factum, by virtue of his willing it.
In contradistinction to popular objectivistic monotheism, certain
philosophers (as for example, Descartes) present a subjective
monotheism; according to them, God constitutes good from the outset:
if God had wished something else, this something else would be the
good. However, in prevailing objectivism the good bears no arbitrary
character.
Popular objectivism is not only the manner in which a subject
views itself; it also participates to a degree in constituting this subject.
The objectivist does not merely consider himself an object — in a
certain sense he actually turns himself into an object, at least as a po-
tential. We say that he considers himself an object because in his cog-
nitive judgment he establishes the forms of valuative thinking, dis-
covered in the course of reflection, outside himself; in this manner,
however, he establishes something of his subjective entity, his charac-
ter, outside himself — he externalizes his character. His selfhood loses
substance. Accordingly he is a convenient object for goal-oriented us-
age, be it himself or others who make use of him.
However, popular objectivism does not turn itself into truth in this
manner. The subject does not cease to be a subject when it becomes an
object; nor does it actually become pure understanding without will, or
as understanding, a tabula rasa on which external dictates are in-
scribed.
About Internalization and Externalization
When axiology wishes to explain the formation of a value it is not

allowed to employ a theory of internalization of values because the
latter assumes that the value already exists, that a certain public al-
ready adheres to it and implants it in the individual with the help of
coercion; “…external coercion gradually becomes internalized; for a
special mental agency, man's super-ego, takes it over and includes it
among its commandments.”105 Yet, the fact that internalization fails to
explain the formation of a value in a certain public is not the only flaw
the internalization concept presents. This concept treats the individual
as if it were a tabula rasa; a piece of soil waiting to be planted. But this
is wrong. Even to say that for the seedling to take root, the individual
must be inclined towards the thing to be planted is not satisfactory.
People can modify a process already taking place within another
person, they can intervene in a process of value-change, or value-
formation actually proceeding within another one. We could rightly
speak of internalization, if it were possible for the same individual to
internalize alternative values, namely, value V would have been inter-
nalized by an individual, if instead of V he could be made to internal-
ize value W which is incompatible with V. If he cannot be made to
adopt W, then V is already present within him (to some degree of
maturation).
Internalization not only fails to explain how a value is created
within a society, it also assumes something about the nature of hu-
mans, and it is doubtful whether this assumption matches any expla-
nation of value-formation; that is to say a person made up so that val-
ues could be implanted in him, or insinuated into him in some other
way by threat or temptation would not be able to create values, or con-
sciously to alter values he adheres to. However, if the entire public is
composed of individuals in whom values are implanted, or individuals
resembling the latter, one cannot understand where the implanted val-
ues come from. To make the category of internalization viable one has
therefore to assume that the public also includes real people, apart
from those who function as plant nurseries, and that with regard to
these real people the internalization theory does not apply. Presumably
it does not apply to anyone, even to the adherent of naive objectivism.
When internalization of values of a certain culture is under discus-
sion and these values are accepted by the parties discussing the issue
of internalization, the concept's weakness is not apparent, because usu-
ally people do not ask what the origin of a value they accept is; they
only ask for the origin of an alien value, a value held up by others. A
certain degree of wonder is needed for someone to ask what the origin
is.
In contradistinction to internalization, the externalization of values
helps to adapt processes of value-change in individuals. A person ex-
ternalizes a value which resides within him on the level of reason, at-
The Objectivist 281
tributing to this value an existence independent of human conscious-

ness, not necessarily as a Platonic idea, but as a fundamental (i.e., not
relational) value-property of things. thus, when he truly believes in this
existence. In a society whose members externalize values, they are
prepared to learn value contents from others as they learn facts from
other people — in both cases the issue is knowledge. The readiness to
learn contents improves communication in the valuative sphere. One
should, however, remember that even though one can teach a person
the content of values, one cannot establish them for him or her as val-
ues; only they themselves can do so.
A theory of change in public values can therefore rely more on ex-
ternalization then on internalization. But internalization may occur in a
certain marginal sphere. There are values which do not guide man in
his actions and thought, which are not accompanied by a motive and
can be changed or replaced by another value without any change in the
value system. Such values may in a certain sense be implanted or in-
ternalized. For instance “opinions.” A person may adopt these and
voice them in order to make a certain impression on his audience. If he
wishes to satisfy their expectation, he will say what is expected; if he
wishes to appear original, he will express a surprising opinion. Here
opinion is a kind of garment for the mind, and the garment is donned
with consideration for custom and expectations (whether by accepting
custom or by opposing it). The snob will voice an opinion favored by
the aristocracy and whoever wishes to appear bourgeois, an opinion
considered as bourgeois (he will morally resent industrial action others
engage in, even if he himself sometimes goes on strike). And they will
not only voice these opinions, but uphold them among themselves.
That is to say, one does not only don the garment, but considers it
handsome and appropriate and feels comfortable wearing it. And as
there is fashion in clothing, it also exists in the narrow or wide margins
of a value system.
Yet, even in such cases of internalization (or implanting) some
kind of valuative clue already exists within the person, this is a value
aimed at self-valuation, namely, an ideal of reflection (for example,
the ideal to become an aristocrat etc.). Actually, this is more than a
valuative clue: it is reflection's inclination to adopt certain values from
certain people.
Society
In Part I above we already said that relations between people are

not between them, and one may add that society is not above them, not
does it include them (only in a subordinate sense, or a certain aspect of

them). Society exists within the consciousness of individuals and it
exists there in the first place as a form of intention, or rather as a
system of intentional forms.
From this point of departure we go on to twine the thread of dis-
cussion. Society is not the original system of these forms, but an
externalization of the system.
It is not the individual which is formed by the internalization of
society's values; it is rather society which is created by the externaliza-
tion of individual ways of valuation, namely, feeling, emotional and
conceptual ways of valuation. The very community between people is
of course not created by externalization, as it comes into being to-
gether with humanity itself and it involves conjoint and mutual under-
standing. Externalization but takes part in creating the organized figure
of community as a society, as a family or a clan or as some economic
body, or as a partnership and so on. This organized figure is
consciously, actively and with purpose shaped and institutionalized by
individuals (and groups), who know society but need not know that it
is a result of externalization.
A concrete society may be described as arranged in three layers.
The basic layer is the community of understanding among people and
the need for this community. The second social layer is externalization
of the forms in which people are aware of each other. The top layer is
given to society by virtue of shaping and institutionalizing activity.
Evil as a Value-Property
The objectivist has to meet a challenge presented by the distur-

bance of his orderly and stable world by some of its inhabitants, who
are openly and sometimes demonstratively belittling the valuative
order of the world and society.
Plato's philosophical objectivism explains these disruptions by lack
of knowledge. However, the popular version of objectivism, whose
objectivations are value-properties and not Platonic ideas, considers
knowledge as information (and not as the comprehension of ideas),
while malicious people do not always, or in particular lack
information.
A person who is not an objectivist may try to explain the disrup-
tion by a system of different values. That is to say, people who belittle
my values, adhere to other values. But such an idea does not fit into
the objectivist's horizon.
The Objectivist 283
The objectivist accepts the disruption (so far as its origin is not
lack of information or skill) as something finite and final, which can-
not be explained. An explanation reveals the structure of what is ex-
plained, presents the structure in a model. The disruption of valuative
order on the other hand, exceeds any structure. It cannot be presented
in a model. The image fitting valuative disruption is the crooked and
convoluted, in opposition to the straight.
The words “to understand” and “to justify” and their derivations
are in many cases used as synonyms. There are the things that disrupt
valuative order which cannot be explained (for instance, by lack of
information); there is therefore something which can neither be justi-
fied nor understood from any valuative angle. This is evil as a value-
property, or malice. Mythological imagination substantializes it in
Satan. Philosophical imagination reveals it as radical evil.
According to the above the objectivist inclines towards condemn-
ing morality and not morality of preference, namely (following our
clarification above, in Part II), his morality parallels criminal and not
civil law.
In folk tales and popular movies the protagonists divide into good
and bad ones; children accept this easily and without questions (even
at the question-asking age); this means that for them evil is also a
value-property, and a property that cannot be reduced.
Evil is therefore a reservoir into which everything basically not
understandable can be drained off, to avoid breaching the dams of an
objectivistic outlook.
Apart from this cognitive role, evil serves as an objectification of
hatred. Evil is what one hates, but for the objectivist it is the other way
round: he hates somebody because that one is evil.
In this manner, a link between the incomprehensible and the hated
is established.
Chapter 2
The Subjectivist
While objectivism is a mode of thought that treats the form of inten-

tion as if it were content, subjectivism represents an inclination to treat
intentional content as if it were form. Accordingly one may view
subjectivism as reflection's orientation on form and name it “formal-
ism,” and view objectivism, so far as it engages in reflection, as an
orientation on content, and name it “anti-formalism.”106
So far as the objectivist is consistent, he denies reflection legiti-
macy, because if there is no form of intention, reflection has no object.
Accordingly his reflection about himself is a) either not considered as
reflection ( but as cognition of an external object), or b), it concerns
him so far as he is bad, so far as something within him is faulty and
does not function as tabula rasa, or c), reflection and its object (the
form) are transient and incidental, thus needing neither legitimacy nor
attention to their status.
The subjectivist, on the other hand, can legitimately reflect about
himself (he receives confirmation from reflection on a higher floor).
The subjectivist finds selfhood not mainly in his intellect but in his
will, not in his observation but in his emotions and feelings. He also
views his cognition as his own reaction, expressing him himself, and
not as a dictate he receives, or the depiction of what exists. While the
objectivist views valuation as cognition, the subjectivist views
cognition as valuation; the reduction occurs in opposite directions, but

neither keeps the two spheres separate.
The subjectivism we discuss here is not epistemological subjectiv-
ism; the latter denies that the things surrounding us are independent of
cognition, namely, they are phenomena appearing to us.
As opposed to the objectivist, who considers himself a tabula rasa,
the subjectivist considers himself as an entity abundant in original
content, not less than any other entity in his environment; accordingly
he is a being among all other beings in nature.
In contradistinction to the objectivist, he does not view society as
residing outside the particular individuals part of whom are familiar to
him, or between them; he does not view society as something finite
and given to individuals, nor does he view social factors as anonymous
forces. He views society as an expression of the will of individuals, and
makes an effort to express his own will.
In the same manner that the subjectivist does not view himself as a
tabula rasa but as a source of content, he views other people as con-
crete subjects too, as beings abundant in original content, but therefore
also as his rivals, and as objects of his actions. As subjects they are a
special kind of objects. The more this attitude is transposed from
thought to the arena of reality, i.e., the more he exercises his authority
over others, or succeeds in maneuvering and manipulating them onto
the desired track, he cognizes the concrete subject in the manner a pot-
ter cognizes his clay. He concretely cognizes himself only later, by
analogy with the subjects which are his objects. While he occupies
himself consciously and with purpose (goal-orientation included) with
the shaping of social relations, he uses ready-made raw-materials, but
these are supplied by the objectification of forms of consciousness.
The subjectivist, who has turned others into his objects, cognizes
them — so far as they are objectivists — not in the manner they cog-
nize themselves; thus, because they cognize themselves only in their
externalizations and in the abstract, their selfhood scattered over things
in their environment. The subjectivist, on the other hand, cognizes
them as living creatures who respond and react in a particular manner.
Their cognition converges to a degree only in one sense: so far as the
objectivist externalizes himself into a crystallized natural entity which
is his property (his body, his strength, his talents). The subjectivist also
considers the objectivist as property, but he stakes claims of ownership
to him.
The analogy he draws between the objects of his social activity and
himself refers both to the same kind, i.e., living, thinking creatures,
who react in particular ways; however, this does not cancel the differ-
ence between him and them, a difference he recognizes and seeks to
The Subjectivist 287
fortify, both for goal-oriented reasons and in order to fortify his trust in
himself. The question of trust in himself is of no concern for the
objectivist, while the subjectivist, who is aware of his reflection as
reflection, also possesses values of reflection, namely, to have this or
that character; he vacillates between the pleasure of self-approval
when these values are realized and despondency when they evade
realization.
For the subjectivist these values are not only full in their positive
segments (as in ideals and inclinations), but also in their negative
segment. That is to say, from the angle of their structure they have
become needs. The axis of a subjectivist's life are his inward directed
needs.
The subjectivist competes all the time with people who resemble
him; they are the yardstick he uses to measure himself in order to de-
termine how far his inward-directed needs have been satisfied.
The satisfaction of an ordinary need (belonging to section B) is
given, as its non-satisfaction is given. Whoever ate to capacity, feels
replete. This is different with regard to needs (perhaps only quasi-
needs) belonging to the individual's reflection about himself. He has to
compare himself to his rivals in order to know whether he may ap-
prove of himself, whether he is permitted to feel replete.
At the end of Part II above (Chapter 9), we found three orientations
according to sections, namely, the value system may focus on one of
the three sections. The objectivist characteristically focuses on section
A, principally on ends, while the focus on section C values, aimed at
the valuation of humans, characterizes the subjectivist.
Besides reflection, the subjectivist also emphasizes immediate self-
awareness, namely, his entire self-consciousness. He lays emphasis on
his passing through an experience, and not on what is experienced;
accordingly the shades of what is experienced are less distinct; differ-
ences in what is intended disappear because of the attention paid to the
act itself.
Objectivism and subjectivism are propensities of self-conscious-
ness which influence the value-system, and stamp the character of peo-
ple inclined by these propensities as well as the position they assume
within the social system. Paradoxically, the development of self-con-
sciousness in both manners shortchanges personal autarky. The objec-
tivist comes close to whom Hegel describes as a slave in “Phenome-
nology of Spirit,” and the subjectivist comes close to whom Hegel
describes as a master.
A person is not necessarily an objectivist or a subjectivist in the
sense described here. On the other hand, he or she may combine the
two inclinations, so that in certain matters they will behave according

to one propensity, and in other matters according to the other.
Chapter 3
The Validity of Values and the

Question of their Foundation
Disagreement and Relativity
A certain qualification, regarding the distinction between what is

and what ought to be, arose in one of our previous discussions. It did
not upset the line of reasoning involved in this distinction. Neverthe-
less, before we apply this distinction to the problem of consensus con-
cerning values, we have to say again what the qualification is.
In our discussion of value opposition (Part III, Chapter 8), we saw
that cognition of what is can influence a statement of what ought to be
only through the opposition prevailing between values of one and the
same person, and that this possibility is also qualified as following: On
the part of cognition, this is only a meta-value-cognition, on the part of
what ought to be it does not deal with the skeleton of values but with
their soft tissues (according to the metaphor we used); that is to say,
we deal with the alignment of the border dividing a certain field of
application in which there is conflict between two values, between
these two. In other words: rather than dealing with the shaping of pure
values, we deal here with the shaping of mixed values (which
incorporate a cognitive element). Now to the theme of the current
chapter.
For whoever adheres to a value, its validity belongs to the inten-

tional content. It belongs to the essence of the distinction between the
intentional content of a valuative value and a fact — that a fact can by
no means strengthen or weaken a value's validity. For the valuative
value, the fact remains a field of application and nothing else. The fact
may be valued positively or negatively, or it may reside at the
valuative scale's zero point — it can in no case influence the value
applied to it.
Adherence to a value is in itself a fact and from the angle discussed
here, it should be treated like all facts.
To be sure, it is also a fact that others adhere to some of my values;
yet, as a fact can neither strengthen nor weaken the validity of a value,
this specific fact cannot strengthen the validity of my values either.
On the other hand, the fact that other people uphold values which
differ from mine, or even values which are incompatible with them,
cannot restrict the validity of my values at all, nor can it lead to a rela-
tivization of the values I adhere to.
One says at times that a society or an individual possess values, or
that a certain value belongs to a society (to which this society and no
one else adheres). However, this metaphor refers only to the form of
the value and not to its content, while validity belongs to the content.
Such utterances describe the form of valuative intention. They do not
give an exposition of the content. With people who accept these
statements at face value, they may leave the impression that the con-
sensus question is relevant to the validity of values; thus, if we admit a
lack of consensus, we “relativize” the value. However, the adherence
to a value cannot become more relative then it already is, because it is
a pure matter of factual being, not a matter of validity, and the state-
ments about the possession and belonging of values do not refer to the
value itself.
A state maintains a certain system of currency. The currency be-
longs to the state. This kind of ownership has to be taken at face value:
paper money not used by any state known today, has no validity today
for me either. Here we have a link between belonging and some kind
of validity, which can be reduced to the validity of cognitive
statements. But in the sphere of values, the absence of consensus is not
directly relevant to the question of their validity or possible relativity.
However, a person may have a special motive to uphold valuative
values prevailing in his community, i.e., he has a motive for valuative
adjustment. This motive joins a value aimed at self-valuation. If this
person's will aids the said motive, part of his values may undergo some
adjustment to what prevails in his community. Should he discover that
one of his values opposes the prevailing values, doubts will surface
The Validity of Values 291
and that value may be relativized. Yet, even in such a case it is still
true that only the opposition between values upheld by the same
person (at the same time) may lead to a restriction of their validity.
Yet, while on one hand a conflict between values residing on the same
level (for example, values belonging to sections A and B) need not
dislodge one of them, but requires to forego the realization of one of
the two in each case of application, namely, to forego one value, not
necessarily always the same. On the other hand, a conflict between a
value aimed at self-valuation which requires adjustment to what is
accepted (and is accompanied by a motive) and a value opposed to the
latter, is bound to undermine one of these — a process that sometimes
appears as “relativization” of the value.
Furthermore: The fact that a value is common to many people does
not confer a more objective character upon it than it had before.
The value of uniformity, or of everyone accepting the same norm,
is a meta-value directed at the system and demanding that everyone
adhere to the same value-system. It does not demand of all people
equally to realize the universal system, but it demands that they ac-
knowledge it; at best, acknowledgment in theory and practice, but at
least it demands not to adhere to an alternative system. This value
prevails in modern times, accompanied by a motive to adapt personal
value-systems to the prevailing one. Here the value shapes the facts
and not vice versa.
The Theoretical Problem of Value Foundation
In everyday thought, when a person feels called upon to justify

some valuation, he declares the value according to which he has
valued as well as the yardstick he uses. Presentation of the value and
the yardstick is the required reason. On the other hand, a request for
reasons that justify the value itself is usually beyond the horizon of this
thought ( the response to such a request may also merely yield a pres-
entation of the value). The subject feels no need to ground a value in
his everyday practice of life, even if it contradicts another value in one
of its actual applications; feeling obliged to resolve the contradiction
he perceives this as a demand to forego the realization of one of these
values.
Cognition and values were not perceived as separate in theoretical
thought until the Renaissance; accordingly, foundation of a value was
not separate from the foundation of cognition. However, since value-
neutral science came into being, the question of grounding guiding
values became a particular problem for theoretical thought: Values
cannot be founded on cognition if the latter is value-neutral. Subse-

quently theoretical reflection about values divided in two broad direc-
tions: the attempt to achieve value-neutral knowledge of the values
themselves within the framework of sciences about man, and the at-
tempt to found values, which, of course, is not valuatively neutral. To
found values is to discover the source of a value's validity and thereby
enable us to set priorities and solve conflicts between values.
Chapter 4
Attempts to Solve the Problem of

Value-Foundation
We will now briefly review and examine five different approaches to

the issue of value foundation, as following:
1. Metaphysical deduction of values (the metaphysical approach).
2. Their derivation from the essence of reason (the transcendental ap-
proach). 3. Reduction to given values (naturalism). 4. Reliance upon a
particular faculty of knowledge (intuitionism). 5. Hypostasis of values
(axiological objectivism).
Metaphysical Deduction of a Value from Cognition
The first attempt to ground values deals with re-unification of the

spheres whose division generated the problem of value foundation.
Unification is achieved by changing the character of the division and
the character of the spheres, until the derivation of values from cogni-
tion seems to become possible and thus the neutrality of science is
canceled. This course does not begin by canceling neutrality. In its
elements cognition will remain valuatively neutral in the sense that it
will not set out with a valuative presupposition; but it will not remain
valuatively neutral in its conclusions: The values are not invested in

the research, but revealed by it. In the course of cognition what ought
to be will be derived from what is. This kind of cognition is therefore
not identical with modern science; in contradistinction to the latter it
treats not only what actually exists, but also what potentially exists,
and it understands this potential as something which already includes a
valuative dictate, telling us whether the potential ought to be realized.
In contradistinction to inductive science, which applies mathematics in
general and probability calculations in particular to experience, we
deal here with cognition that interprets inductive science
metaphysically.
The sphere of values also changes: It loses the independence it
achieved, prima facie to its own detriment, in the course of its separa-
tion from science.
For this philosophy, the typical value is the mixed value, the end
and duty, and not the pure value, namely, the ideal, the need or the net
valuative element of the end or duty. Here pure values are not really
values but a kind of abstraction of values, or a one-sided and distorted
description of values.
According to the above, value sentences are true or false. Factual
sentences on the other hand, incorporate the explicit or implicit as-
sumption of a stand. The borderline is canceled. If the study of reality
takes a stand, certainly the more so does the study of values. That is to
say, that there is no room left for axiology as a neutral study of values.
Spinoza is an exponent of this philosophy. Although he argues
with the view that the world is ordered, suited to the end, beautiful
etc., namely, with the traits the thought of earlier periods attributed to
the world, he nevertheless tries to derive values from this world. The
transition from the cognition of facts to values was to be presented in
the course of passing from Part III of his Ethics” to Part IV; only such
a presentation would show whether cognition incorporates the seed
from which a value grows, but actually this presentation is missing.107
A quite similar attempt was made in the 20th century by Erich
Fromm,108 who establishes psychoanalysis within this system instead
of Spinoza's psychological theory (in Part III of the “Ethics”). How-
ever, he does not clarify either what Spinoza failed to illuminate.
Hegel's absolute idea is also an instance of metaphysical
prevalence over the gap between cognition and values. Yet, in the
chapter discussing the absolute idea Hegel limits himself to a
description of its characteristics in comparison to previous stages in
spiritual development; actually, these are postulates regarding the roles
the absolute idea is to fulfill and not an exposition of the idea itself.
The content is missing. As if we were told that the idea answers such
Attempts to Solve the Problem of Value-Foundation 295
and such questions, but we are not told what the answers are. Hegel's
disciples accepted his metaphysical orientation but failed to accom-
plish his work.
In my opinion, we deal here with an abstract logical utopia which
cannot serve as a methodological guide.
While in positive arguments for metaphysical derivation the con-
tent is missing, its followers are on the face of it well-equipped with
negative evidence, namely, arguments against the separation of value-
thought from neutral cognitive thought. These arguments point to
cognitive elements in mixed values and to the violation of valuative
neutrality by the sciences. And indeed, there is no doubt that these
pointers are valid and show us where borders are crossed. However,
the very fact that these border-crossings can be identified, shows us
that the border is visible, and this is all that adherents of separation
need. If we can point to a cognitive element in values and to a
valuative element in science, it shows that these elements can be
identified. No reasonable adherent to the separation between cognition
and values will forbid to mix them; he will demand that mixing,
whenever necessary, will be carried out so that the elements remain
identifiable. Those who present negative arguments do not claim that
thought (a text or a lecture) should not be arranged in a manner that
separates valuation from cognition, but that this is impossible, their
argument being that actually such an arrangement does not exist; here
they point to the border-encroachments and thus manifestly prove the
opposite of what they set out to show.
The Derivation of Values from the Nature of Reason
We now have to examine whether Kant's theory of the Categorical

Imperative can serve as a foundation for ethical values. This question
is not dependent on Kant's own intention: whether it was ethical (to
provide ethical values with a foundation and a touchstone for practical
use), or whether it was meta-ethical (to present an axiological analysis
of moral thought). The position based on Kant proffers the following
argument. Values that require foundation are values created by reason.
And indeed, it arises from the nature of reason that it gives the same
advice to everyone, imposes the same imperative on everyone; thus,
according to reason you are not permitted to recommend a practical
tenet unless you recommend it to everyone, and you are not permitted
to let yourself behave according to a rule, if you harbor the wish that
not everyone behave in the same manner. By that token we gain a
touchstone for the examination of tenets which guide action.
We already discussed the Categorical Imperative in Part III, Chap-

ter 7. In the course of this discussion, we found that duties cannot be
derived from the Categorical Imperative, that the latter requires some
complements, and that various incompatible complements are possi-
ble. Accordingly, the Categorical Imperative cannot serve as a founda-
tion for moral values.
The Reduction of All Values to Given Values
Naturalist philosophy tries to derive non-given values from those

that are given. It denies therefore that reason and the will it guides
constitute values and claims that reason only transfers values into its
own sphere and turns them into abstractions, or in other words: it pro-
vides them with linguistic expression.
Given values can be recognized in that the positions they instruct
are feelings and emotions immediately apprehended in the field of
self-perception in which the individual is aware of him or herself.
Needs, inclinations, constraints — fear and anger, joy and sadness —
are examples of given values a person is aware of, prima facie, only
after the event, i.e., as if the values existed before he or she became
aware of them. They do not choose these values.
I have indeed no doubt that a given value precedes a value of rea-
son precisely from the angle of perception: To be altogether able to
understand values of reason, one has to be familiar with given values.
Whoever felt neither pleasure nor pain, nor joy or sadness etc., will not
apprehend what justice is — as a person born blind fails to understand
talk about colors. However, can we derive justice from pleasure or
pain, from love or hate?
Consistent reductionism seeks not only to derive non-given from
given values, but also to derive the expression of these values in the
same manner; for example, a declaration of justice and utterances
about what is and what is not just, namely, the expression of a value is
also instructed by a value, i.e., it also possesses value.
Naturalists divide into two parties: Those who believe in the foun-
dation of morality in altruism and those who believe it is founded on
egoism. We will begin by discussing altruism.
Arthur Schopenhauer, who believed in foundation in altruism,
considered morality as an expression of man's propensity to commis-
erate with others. Sometimes a person suffers because he witnesses the
suffering of someone else; of course, his suffering does not arise from
deliberations, nor is it derived from a decision or from choice; it is an
immediate response that embodies a propensity of human nature.
When a person aids another or forbears hurting him or her, and does
not benefit from the aid he provides or even suffers damage from his
forbearance, he does not do so by virtue of reasonable consideration
according to Schopenhauer, but by virtue of compassion. Reason's
considerations give expression to an already existing emotion in the
figure of moral values.
The more common behavior of humans is devoid of moral value or
even opposed to morality. This kind of behavior is also explained by
Schopenhauer as an expression of human inclinations. Apart from pity
or commiseration, man has two additional basic motives: egoism or
the love of life and malice, which seeks to damage others. Egoism is
indifferent both to other people's sorrow and joy; it views them only as
means to a personal, self-serving end, while pity and malice are not
indifferent to others.
Whoever does not possess a little of all three basic motives is not a
human being.109 Egoism is the animal element, malice is the satanic
element. While these fail to arouse amazement in Schopenhauer, pity
does arouse amazement — it is the mystery of ethics. This mystery
acquires its full significance in the framework of Schopenhauer's meta-
physics.
However, these three motives, incorporated by each individual in a
particular and permanent proportion, make up his or her unchanging
character (character is the individual essence and essence does not
change). The differences between individuals with regard to these pro-
portions are, of course, radical (with one person this motive is very
strong, while with another person another motive is strong, and it may
happen that one element leaves only a trace).
Here the following critical remarks are indicated:
1. Even if Schopenhauer is right in explaining human behavior as
arising from three permanent motives, this cannot provide a foundation
for morality (or any other value). Indicating that a certain motive is the
cause of a deed is not a reason for the valuation of this deed, or more
precisely, it is not a reason to uphold a certain valuative value that
serves to value the deed.
How can commiseration, being a basic motive, become an argu-
ment for behaving according to this motive? Is to point out the other
two basic motives also a reason to fulfill their requests, to behave
accordingly, i.e., to value deeds that embody these two motives posi-
tively? Cruelty is also explained by analogy to a morally valuable
deed, namely, as an expression of essential malice, though in contra-
distinction to Nietzsche,110 Schopenhauer does not admire it, nor does
he believe that his explanation justifies cruelty.
Schopenhauer's theory suggests no reason why I should help a per-

son whom I do not pity (and I would not benefit by coming to his aid).
Yet, if I pity him, I need no argument in order to help him, nor does
pity's status as a basic motive strengthen the actually existing
motivation.
One may perhaps accord some merit to Schopenhauer's thesis and
say that his intention was in fact meta-ethical and not ethical, but that
its expression became distorted by the conditions attached to the con-
test for the prize of the Royal Danish Society of Sciences. However, as
we wish here to clarify positions regarding the foundation of values in
general and of morality in particular, I refrain from engaging in inter-
pretive considerations. 111
2. On the meta-ethical plane, it is hard to understand what argu-
ments made Schopenhauer acknowledge only the propensity for com-
miseration as an altruistic motif, and not acknowledge the existence of
an inclination to participate in another's joy. This stand is part of
Schopenhauer's comprehensive position, which accords positive exis-
tence only to pain and suffering, while pleasure and joy are but the
cancellation of pain and suffering and the relief involved in it. 112 He
believes therefore that values (at least elementary values) are empty in
their positive section and full only in their negative section. Schopen-
hauer tries to cancel or explain away cases that clearly demonstrate
participation in another's joy. This outlook contradicts multiple phe-
nomena and does not help to explain others.
3. Is there a mystery in individual's propensity to commiserate with
others (or to share their joy). An animal's inclination to help its
descendants and others of its own kind, its readiness to fight for its
family or its herd aids the survival of its species, and therefore pro-
motes evolution. To what extent does mutual aid arise from a herd
element and what is its figure; is it aimed specifically at certain actions
or is it directed towards the creation of a general propensity to help
members of the same species? Whatever the answer to this question,
there is no mystery involved. It is reasonable to assume that a
considerable contingent of animals possess such a hereditary element.
Up to this point, we have discussed the attempt to found morality on
an altruistic motive.
The orientation on egoism as the foundation of morality also errs
by taking the cause of the motive as a reason for the valuative value;
however, this orientation also incorporates shortcomings absent from
altruistic naturalism, which explains altruistic behavior by a special
motive. Egoistic naturalism is compelled to explain the aid man offers
his descendants, his family, his people or the rest of humanity as self-
aid — it must explain how altruism is actually egoism in disguise.
Apart from the controversy between followers of the egoistic and

the altruistic orientation, and apart from their common error of consid-
ering cognition that explains motives as a justification of valuative
values, the basic error both branches of naturalism commit arises from
a third issue, on the meta-valuative level. This issue is the character of
given values. Given values are not sufficient to evolve a system, and to
instruct a person's actions. When someone asks these values for
guidance, he receives too many or too few answers: Either the given
values proffer contradictory instructions (when a person harbors
wishes that contradict each other in reality) without suggesting a
yardstick for a decision, or they offer no answer at all when the
question is somewhat complex like, for instance, “how to distribute.”
Values reason constitutes provide what given values lack, and
accordingly the values of reason cannot be derived from given values.
Finally one should consider that in a certain sense given values also
require foundation (and not only constituted values), because a person
can refrain from acting according to them — as a hunger-striker
refrains from the action demanded by the need to eat and drink.
I will now remark briefly on additional meta-valuative issues that
involve naturalism.
A certain variation of naturalism deals with the calculation of
pleasure quantities. Even if we agree that any contentment aroused by
the realization of values is a kind of pleasure, and if we say that pleas-
ure accompanies any realization of values, we have to consider once
again that this pleasure is specific. We will not always agree to ex-
change it for another specific pleasure, and we will by no means agree
to exchange it for pleasure in the realization of values we do not up-
hold, be the quantity it yields even the double of ours (let us assume
for a moment that one can indeed calculate quantities of pleasure, and
that in our imagination we can exchange pleasures with others). Adam
Smith remarks that we pity a merry lunatic who laughs and sings.113
Since pity and envy are incompatible, we do not envy the merry luna-
tic for his joy, because he frolics in his lunacy. When I see a mountain-
climber who enjoys hanging on a fragile outcrop above an abyss, I do
not envy him. Should I see someone enjoying food I detest, I cannot
envy him for his pleasure. That is to say, a person seeks to realize his
own values and thus also seeks the pleasure and satisfaction involved,
but he does not seek unqualified pleasure; accordingly he does not ask
great quantities of pleasure for himself, be the pleasure whatever it is;
thus A does not envy B, who derives great pleasure from the
realization of his values, so far as these are not his own values as well.
However, a special case is possible (at least on the face of it): that
a special value of reflection which demands to multiply pleasures joins
a person's set of values and then, probably only then, he may envy
someone who enjoys a value he does not share. This value of reflec-
tion may even possess sufficient weight for the specific shades of
pleasures to fade, so that the difference between them shrinks and the
person adapts himself to his self-portrait.
The egoistic, utility-oriented variation of naturalism tends to mix
pleasure and utility, need and end; thus, in order to anchor ends in
man's nature and treat them as if they were given to him and not estab-
lished by himself. Mixing the two absolves it from the need to refer to
the constitution of ends.
Foundation in a Special Faculty of Knowledge
A fourth position regarding value-foundation claims the existence

of a special cognitive faculty in which values are revealed to us.
Knowledge of values which prima facie require foundation, namely,
moral values, arises in particular from this faculty within us; whatever
comes from this source is free of error and accompanied by the aware-
ness that it is free of error, i.e., it is evident. Some call this source
intuition while Franz Brentano identifies it with inner perception,
which is but the mind's perception of itself and the meanings at which
it directs its intentions.114
Inner perception is the source of what is evident, because within it
the conceiver and what is conceived are fully identical, without media-
tion; it leaves no room for perspectival distortion and accordingly, no
room for error. Other instances of evident knowledge which lie at the
basis of knowledge in other spheres also arise from this source like, for
instance, the principle of causality.
Brentano does not claim that nobody can deny evident truths, but
that whoever denies them — if such a person exists — judges blindly,
i.e., he lacks the necessary cognitive faculty. This resembles a contro-
versy about colors with a color-blind person.
The position described here is of cognitive orientation and similar
to the position of metaphysical deduction. Self-awareness with regard
to the source of evident truths is therefore the foundation of values.
The fault-line of this outlook is that it assumes a consensus with
regard to values at least among those who understand the issue at hand
(those who do not judge blindly). However, not only all societies
throughout all generations lack such a consensus with regard to values,
but it does not even exist in civilized societies (we discussed this mat-
ter above, in Part III, Chapter 8, the paragraph on “Value's place in a
System and Its Essence”). Aristotle was in favor of going to war in
order to capture slaves, provided those were destined by their nature to

be slaves. To kill someone in such a just war is therefore not consid-
ered as murder. Needless to say that in the eyes of many killing as a
means to enslavement belongs to the worst kinds of murder. Many
erudite people supported Aristotle's outlook until the middle of the last
century. Should we say that the source of evident truths sprang up only
then?
Hypostasis of Values
The hypostasis of a value is turning it into a self-reliant unit, in-

dependent of any other entity, namely, man, God or nature. This unit
exists beyond space and time and beyond people. The value therefore
acquires the status of a Platonic idea.
The above already says that values cannot acquire foundations, but
that they do not need them either. If a value has a foundation it relies
on it and is not wholly self-reliant. Yet, the value acquired its status
precisely by virtue of its wholeness and self-reliance, i.e., its inde-
pendence. If one wishes nevertheless to employ the term “foundation,”
one should say that any value, being a value, is already founded within
itself, and therefore needs no further foundation.
The independence of a value resides in its wholeness, its indivisi-
bility, in the impossibility to separate parts of the value-content from
each other. One cannot, for instance, know a part of the value without
knowledge of the whole. Distorted knowledge of this value is impos-
sible.
The specific content of a value and its valuative character are of
one piece; it is therefore impossible for a person to understand the
specific content of a value without knowing that he deals with a value.
A person cannot, for example, understand a distribution method which
embodies justice without knowing that it is a value. He is not liable to
err and consider the valuative content as value-neutral, as if it did not
involve taking a position.
Accordingly, there is no room for error in the area of value knowl-
edge. An individual or even a society may not be aware of a certain
value at all — and indeed, throughout history attention shifts from
certain values to others. Our spirit alternately illuminates these or
those values, which explains while there is no consensus with regard to
them.
Errors may occur regarding the comprehension of messages con-
veyed by feelings and emotions, namely, with regard to what reason
tries to extract from them in specific cases, or with regard to the appli-
cation of values. The field of possible errors therefore surrounds val-

ues, all threads connecting values with subjective and objective reality
pass this field, but the reference of intellect to valuative values cannot
err, the conceptual picture of a valuative value is inevitably true to its
referent.
The hypostasis of values leaves no room for volition in the consti-
tution of values.
Nicolai Hartmann developed this theory.115 It corresponds partly
with the theories about a special source of knowledge (inner
perception or intuition) with regard to evidence; it differs from these in
that it builds the solution to the foundation problem on the nature of
the object of knowledge, and not on the nature of its subject.
One may argue against the ontological status of value-independ-
ence, that a value always refers to a subject; it states what is good for a
subject, how it should act, what it would regard as beautiful or as sub-
lime, so that the value cannot be understood without understanding the
essence of the subject — which indicates that the value depends on the
subject. Hartmann replies that as the validity of a natural law which
applies to a specific event does not depend on the occurrence of this
event, so the validity of a value should not be interpreted as any kind
of dependence on man.
It is of interest that the first, wide-ranging development of the the-
ory of ethical antinomies occurred in the framework of this outlook;
these were also ontologized and are not understood as a matter of his-
tory.
The outlook described in this chapter represents a more radical ob-
jectivism than that described as metaphysical deduction; the latter
treats knowledge whose object is man as a transition stage from
knowledge of what is to knowledge of what ought to be, while here we
deal with something which does not depend on man being what he is.
The value which achieved hypostasis refers to various hypothetical
subjects and among them also to this or that existing man, in these or
those circumstances.
Extreme ontological objectivism is largely on a par with prevailing
popular objectivism (even though they are not congruent), and may
find a kind of phenomenological affirmation in the latter. (Popular
objectivism does not separate the sphere of values from other spheres,
and of course, does not employ Platonic ideas. It is not difficult for
axiological objectivism to explain these differences away).
The fault-line of extreme axiological objectivism lies in the imagi-
nary assumption that perfect answers are available for all practical and
emotional problems we will meet, and that these answers exist as Pla-
tonic ideas. The ontologizing of antinomies is even more fantastic,
because the perfect answers to our problems contradict each other. If a

mortal being is caught up in a contradiction, alright, but for eternal
ideas to be thus entrapped seems not to tally with their perfection;
accordingly Plato believed that these ideas reside beyond contradic-
tion.116
To the merit of radical objectivism one should say that Hartmann
did a great deal of axiological work on value-description within this
framework. This was possible because this objectivism is not subordi-
nate to systematic constraints requiring it to ignore certain facts, while
intuitionism, for example, has to ignore the lack of consensus, and
egoistic naturalism has to ignore altruistic deeds which do not lend
themselves to reduction. Precisely because of its fantastic character,
radical objectivism can interpret every fact, and therefore it never finds
itself in contradiction to value-neutral axiology.
Chapter 5
Waiving the Attempt to Achieve

Ultimate Foundation
As a motto for his treatise “on the basis of morality,” Schopenhauer

chose this sentence (taken from The Will in Nature): “To preach mo-
rality is easy, to found morality is difficult.” About a hundred years
later, during a discussion with the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein re-
sponded by saying: “To preach morality is difficult, to found morality
is impossible.” 117
The first four approaches (out of the five described above)
represent attempts to find a foundation for values; radical objectivism
emerged when these had failed in their endeavor and already
represents the waiving of value foundation. Yet, radical objectivism
does not consider itself a waiver, but claims that values need no
foundation at all.
However, returning values from an imaginary objective sphere to
the solid ground of subjective reality, the life-fabric of reasonable
creatures who become entangled in contradictions between their own
values and change these, we discover that values are not sufficiently
perfect entities in order to pre-empt the request to justify them. Yet,
they cannot be justified without the mediation of other values, also
needing foundation, so that we cannot provide foundation for the
value-system as a whole. Reflection may perceive this inability as a
shortcoming. True, not popular but only philosophical reflection will

sense this disadvantage, when it accounts for value-opposition and has
to face the separation of value-neutral science from the sphere of
values. Philosophical reflection's wish to found values should not be
rejected as being based on an error; but it is possible that it expresses a
value of universal uniformity.
We may call the direction emerging from these considerations “ax-
iological pragmatism”; actually, those who engaged in value-neutral
axiology tended to take this direction.118
Pragmatism points out that the state of affairs we discovered is not
a particular feature of the sphere of values; cognition also relies on
presuppositions which on one hand are not self-evident, are not devoid
of alternatives, and accordingly we may demand their foundation; on
the other hand they have no proper foundation. The lack of a proper or
ultimate foundation and accordingly the absence of absolute certainty
therefore characterizes all human thought and may be experienced by
philosophical reflection as a disadvantage, wherever human thought
lays claim to validity.
We will review this state of affairs in the sphere of cognition as it
appears in Clarence Irving Lewis' pragmatism,119 in order to try and
derive an analogy for the sphere of values.
Experience presupposes a system of concepts and rules, namely, it
cannot confirm or refute them. Empirical cognitive thinking is impos-
sible without an a priori tools. C. I. Lewis characterizes the a priori as
analytical, but for him this does not mean that it has no alternative. On
the contrary, we choose from alternative a priori systems the one best
suited for its role, and it helps us to interpret the data we sense. The
cognition achieved by this interpretation is sometimes powerless in the
face of something which is prima facie a given; to deal with this the
system is equipped with drainage channels which help it to remove the
prima facie given that does not fit in: a channel of illusion, of a dream,
of a semblance, in short: the channel of unreality; thus we are told that
this sensation, which cannot be interpreted, is not a given at all, but an
inappropriate addition, or in any case not an ordinary given. When
cognition over-uses excusatory drainage-channels, it shows a
shortcoming of the a priori system. A system will be successful if its
application does not require frequent use of such drainage-channels.
This is one example of a pragmatic advantage of one a priori system
over another. The pragmatic criterion for the choice of presuppositions
is whether they are applicable to the given, convenient to apply, and
whether their application enables us to predict aspects that interest us.
Instead of the metaphor we used, a drainage-channel, C. I. Lewis
employs the image of a scrap-basket, and acknowledges that this cate-
Waiving the Attempt to Achieve Ultimate Foundation 307
gory plays a special role in the system of categories: a scrap-basket

category. 120 From here onwards no given (or prima facie given) re-
mains outside the a priori sorting containers. A system that removes a
large contingent of experience to this basket will be replaced by an-
other one. However, the difference between systems resides not only
in the absolute or relative quantity of unprocessed scraps among the
raw-materials of experience, but also in the identity of these remnants.
What kind of data are removed? In one system (or one method) certain
data will go to the scrap-heap (unprocessed or only partly processed),
while in an alternative system other data will be removed. Therefore a
different world picture, different experience and testing will emerge,
i.e., people's lives in the world will also differ from what they were.
When you admit the existence of a scrap-basket category, you admit
that the a priori definitely imposes a dictate on experience, a dictate
that concerns the content of experience.
Lewis' characterization of the a priori as analytical is liable to mis-
lead on two counts. A. This characterization could be interpreted as if
the a priori were imposed on human thought; that we cannot avoid
thinking accordingly, for instance, that we cannot think but according
to logic. Lewis believes otherwise: Our logic also has an alternative.
Man chooses the a priori. B. The characterization of the a priori as
analytical could be interpreted as if it neither dictated anything to ex-
perience, nor shaped a world picture, but existed as a framework.
However, the notion that a certain a priori system has a particular
scrap-basket is incompatible with such an interpretation.121
There are two types of pragmatism in Epistemology. One claims
that the a posteriori element in cognition is pragmatically examined,
and it exchanges truth for utility, namely, it argues that what we call
“true” is but a useful proposition; it actually cancels truth. The other
type of pragmatism claims that the a priori element in cognitive
thinking is the one chosen by pragmatic considerations; it turns out
that we should not say that this element is true or false (at least not in
the same sense as the a posteriori element is true or false) but that it is
more or less prolific, more or less convenient, etc. The a priori serves
truth, which always incorporates an a posteriori element, but it is nei-
ther true nor false in itself. The second type of pragmatism does there-
fore not deny the possibility to think the truth.122
The first type of pragmatism may be called “radical pragmatism”
and the second “moderate pragmatism,” as it claims that only a certain
element in cognition is pragmatic. The discussion of the attempts to
provide a foundation for values leads to pragmatism, but to its moder-
ate form.
As mentioned above, the characterization of the a priori as analyti-

cal is weakened by Lewis himself. However, in my opinion, moderate
pragmatism altogether needs no such limitation of the a priori. The
pragmatic choice can be referred to the synthetic a priori principles
Kant pointed out (of course not in the context of interpreting Kant),
and to the a priori postulates which lie at the root of science according
to Bertrand Russell's analysis in his book Human Knowledge — its
Scope and Limits. When moderate pragmatism admits the existence of
a synthesis a priori in cognitive thinking, it moves one step nearer to
radical pragmatism, but it does not close the gap; it admits in this
manner a certain relativity of truth, but without uprooting the concept
of truth.
I believe that moderate epistemological pragmatism is a good
model for the construction of an axiological solution to the problem of
value-foundation. Given values parallel the sensory given in the sphere
of cognition; values constituted by reason and will are the a priori
element of value thought; the pragmatic test lies in the application of
values and their realization, and mainly in the degree to which in-
stances of opposition, emerging in the course of value-application, are
overcome. Value-systems that pass the pragmatic test are accepted
throughout the history of societies, and they vacate their position when
they fail the same test.
Moderate axiological pragmatism is the view that values possess
foundation in the sense that they are arranged in a comprehensive sys-
tem and that instances of opposition between them, emerging in the
course of their application to reality, can be practically settled (even if
not on an ideal level); and that this practical settlement matches the
system's inner logic. According to this outlook, there is no final foun-
dation, no theoretically sufficient foundation, namely, the foundation
that many philosophers searched for in modern times. Yet, the sense in
which value foundation according to pragmatism exists is important,
because it incorporates the possibility to elucidate alternatives on the
level of reason, the possibility for a value difference between humans
to mature into an explicit disagreement, which by definition involves
the understanding of alternatives.
In an argument about values I will call my adversary's attention to
the fact that in prevailing circumstances, or in circumstances that may
reasonably prevail, two of his values contradict each other; that a cer-
tain mixed value (a goal or a duty) among his values cannot be real-
ized, and that his value-system has no answers at all for some actual
problems. All these arguments refer indeed more to the systems power
to rule a certain society than to its value-character. Even if they fail to
convince my adversary, they may arouse doubts and reservations in
him, which may enable him to think of alternatives and understand

them.
There is an important difference between the emotive doctrine of
value — also called “emotivism” — and moderate pragmatism. Ac-
cording to emotivism, value-terms are used as expression of emotions
and this is all their meaning; in this way values are reduced to emo-
tions. According to emotivism, there is no point in arguing about
values and valuations, while pragmatism opens a broad area for dis-
cussion and argument in the sphere of values. In contradistinction to
emotivism, Pragmatism considers values and valuations as a matter of
judgment.
When a person admits that his values have no foundation, he does
not deprive them of their validity. An object is valuable in virtue of a
value, but does this value have its value-character in virtue of another
value? When we attribute a value-property to an object we may need a
justification based on the distinctive marks of having this property, but
when we treat a value as a value, we have no distinctive marks of
being a value, which we could rely on. In other words: The object has
value, but a value has no value; on the other hand it does not lack
value either, it does not resemble a valueless object.
The logical demand for direct justification stops in the face of val-
ues. Yet, as instances of opposition between them occur, reflection
feels the need to justify them, which is a different kind of justification
— indirect justification that deals with adjustment to the system in
general, and to the system as it is actually applied to circumstances
prevailing at the time, in particular.
It is important to realize that indirect justification is circular, as it
is, of course, carried out according to a value, namely, the value of the
absence of valuative conflicts. This is an ideal which cannot be fully
realized, but in its realization to some degree of proximity it is a strong
and not a high value. Whoever prefers a certain value within the
system according to its height, may consider conflicts a fair price for
avoiding the deprivation of the high value; he will reject pragmatic
considerations of indirect foundation, but he will not be able to offer
the system any ultimate foundation.
The overall contribution of indirect justification goes to man's
awareness of his value-system and to the sovereignty of reason. Yet,
the sovereignty of reason is not a universally accepted value either;
even an intelligent and learned person may reject it.
Finally, we have to approach the question whether moderate prag-
matism is a kind of conventionalism. Conventionalism views values as
conventions, namely, as the result of an agreement. Convention is a
display of will, i.e., the will of the individuals belonging to a society.
Many individuals may not offer their agreement on their own initia-
tive, but accept what others decide and the agreement may not be spelt
out, yet in any case conventions depend on the will. Accordingly, the
limits of the will are also the limits of any possible convention. These
limits are the following:
A. The feeling and emotional given, which includes needs, inclina-
tions and constraints, does not depend on the will. B. Values estab-
lished by the will are not something the will creates in a void; some
values (for instance, ideals) are fully compatible, while some oppose
each other in their possible applications, some hypothetical instances
of opposition between values are in the realm of real opposition; what
price will a value, on the face of it, have to pay in order to integrate
within the system with opposing values, or what price will the oppos-
ing values have to pay; what is the depth of required concessions or
what is the tariff of these concessions — all these and similar issues
are not determined by the will.
The will is limited by the empirical sphere of data in the environ-
ment as well as by the needs, constraints and inclinations of man him-
self; on the other hand the will is limited by the essence of values,
namely by the content's own logic, found by reason when it looks for
the solution of conflicts between values — whether these are contents
to be established by the will as new values, or already established val-
ues that require qualification because real new instances of opposition
between them and other values have emerged.
On one hand it would be excessive reduction to say that the will
only chooses, because this description shortchanges the spontaneity of
the will's initiative; on the other hand it would be excessive expansion
to view the will as an authority that creates something out of nothing,
even in the sphere of constituted values.
In any case, moderate pragmatism acknowledges the role of con-
vention. It seems, however, that conventionalism tends to deny the
existence of the given, or to belittle its weight, in order to expand the
sphere of conventions, while moderate pragmatism has no such ten-
dency.
An additional difference between moderate pragmatism and con-
ventionalism also involves the will, but from the angle of its nature,
and not from the angle of the sphere and the degree of its dominance.
The difference lies in conventionalism's propensity to stress a certain
characteristic of the will at the expense of other characteristics; this
characteristic is expressed by the term “arbitrary” attributed to the
sphere of the will; it is expressed by drawing an analogy between val-
ues and the rules of a game,123 while the game is confronted with seri-
ousness.
The will has two facets: a facet guided by reason and a facet not so
guided. The first represents the will's appeal to reason and the aid it
draws from it: the will activates reason, orders an examination of is-
sues, asks it to look for additional possibilities and in a certain sense
asks it to invent them, to look for new observation points and finally,
to unfold alternatives. And it is the will guided by reason which turns
a reason into a cause.
The facet not guided by reason concerns a situation in which, on
the face of it, reason throws the ball back to the will and stops work-
ing; it arrests the process of argumentation, the process of justification,
and a cause is established instead of a reason. With the will the cause
becomes a reason. Reason faces the question why is A preferable to B
(in material and typological preferences, which make up the cohesion
of values into a web), and passes this question to the will, which
replies, “just so,” thus I am determined to act.
The facet of the will guided by reason founds reality in essence: by
means of the deed, essence becomes reality. In contradistinction, the
facet not guided by reason founds essence in reality by replying “just
so” to the question “why.”
It seems that the facet guided by reason reveals itself in that the
will decides in favor of the value-system, namely, in turning the arena
of conflicts between values into a field of give and take, and in favor
of qualifying both parties to these conflicts. The facet not guided by
reason reveals itself in an acute decision that favors a single value in
all instances of opposition the latter meets, a decision that saves reason
the process of give and take, or compels it to provide ideological
pretexts for canceling in practice the validity of values within the sys-
tem.
It seems that the facet guided by reason reveals itself in that the
will takes all other segments of the personality and their own inclina-
tions into account, while the facet not guided by reason reveals itself in
capricious tyranny of the will.
In Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's philosophies and in convention-
alism the will shows us only, or mainly, the facet which is not guided
by reason. Moderate pragmatism is not hindered from acknowledging
both facets of the will nor does it incorporate any systemic constraint
to stress the facet not guided by reason.
Chapter 6
The Ontological Status of Values,

Relationism
The analogy we drew between epistemology and axiology helped us to

crystallize a pragmatic position concerning value foundation; we can
now expand this analogy in order to clarify the ontological status of
values.
Regarding this status, there is widespread support for the opinion
that science is more objective than valuation; that is to say, science
employs concepts to draw a portrait of objects in space and over time,
while valuation expresses a subjective response to the meeting with
these objects. According to this opinion, value-neutral thought is more
objective than valuing thought. I do not accept this opinion.
A value-property may be as objective as any other property,
namely, it is the property of an object residing in space and time. The
property of a cherry in being tasty and its property of being red are
both made up by the relation between the specific cherry and the spe-
cific person; in both cases we deal with the response of a human being
to the cherry. The cherry's valuative property lies in that it arouses a
valuative human response, its value-neutral property lies in that it
arouses a value-neutral response (let us suppose that the person in
question does not respond to differences in color). The question
whether people resemble each other with regard to the response under
discussion, or to what degree they are similar in this regard is an issue

in itself. A common response of all humans to the same stimulant is
not more objective than the response specific to a certain individual: in
both cases the response is determined by the nature of the respondent
as well as the nature of the thing that elicits the response, i.e., both by
the nature of whoever looks at the cherry or eats it, and the nature of
the cherry. The question whether people resemble each other in their
response to a cherry is not more relevant to the status of the response
as a property than the question whether all cherries arouse the same
response in a certain individual.124
In this respect, what is true for feeling is also true for thought.
Cognitively neutral thought and valuative thought about an object are
both thinking responses that bear the stamp of thinking procedures and
patterns as well as the stamp of the object. From an ontological angle
one should therefore not say that value-neutral knowledge is closer to
the object or even to the thing in itself than valuation, be it emotional,
feeling or conceptual.
Cognition as well as valuation embody relations between subject
and object. One cannot distinguish between the relative weight of the
subject's and the object's contributions to the relation between them.
One cannot assert, for example, that the contribution of the subject to
the character of this relation is greater than that of the object; because
it is impossible to separate these contributions. In order to do so one
would have to remove the subject or the object, and thus cancel the
relation between them which is the subject-matter of the inquiry.125
This means that we must reject subjectivism and objectivism with
regard to cognition as well as with regard to valuation.
It is not only impossible to isolate one of the factors, it is even
difficult to fixate one while examining a variation in the other along an
adequate scale. Accordingly, I maintain that against both objectivism
and subjectivism we should recommend relationism in epistemology
as well as in axiology.
Perhaps you will say the following: Even if this holds with regard
to valuation, what about the value? Valuation is a subject-object rela-
tion, but is the value not purely subjective and not a relation? Here we
have to focus attention on two matters.
A. We have seen that a value is influenced by the value-system to
which it belongs, and the system is influenced by valuations, i.e.,
mainly by the valuation of existing external objects; that is to say that
hypothetical value opposition does not trail a re-shaping of the oppos-
ing values, while actual opposition between values trails re-shaping.
With valuation as the mediator, the object's specific nature influences
The Ontological Status of Values. elationism 315
the shape of the value. This is influence in reverse, because through

the will and the deed the value directly influences the external object.
B. This situation in the sphere of values has some kind of analogy
in pure cognition. The presuppositions of cognition (of course these do
not include hypotheses requiring examination) are certain formulations
that express the set of molds into which cognition casts its concepts
and the procedure of using these molds. This set of molds in its turn
has to be applicable to objects, i.e., it has somehow to fit them.
Accordingly, in the same sense in which a value is antecedent to
valuation, reside more intricately within the subject but be indirectly
influenced by objects, there are presuppositions to cognition and its
basic concepts which possess the same characteristic: they are in the
same sense antecedent to cognition, they reside more intricately within
the subject, but they are indirectly influenced by objects.
It is to the credit of Clarence I. Lewis that he clarified this ax-
iological issue and demonstrated how accurate the analogy between
the two spheres is. 126 We can go on and trace it in detail. Cognition as
well as valuation has sensory data; these are involved with each other
and cannot really be separated. In both spheres, data are interpreted.
are “facts” present in both spheres, or perhaps only a neutral fact is to
be considered a fact — this is a matter of nominal definition. In any
case, we are permitted to speak of prediction or a forecast in both
spheres; valuative prediction will say the fruit will be tasty when it
ripens, or the results of a deed will or will not justify the deed, to wit:
Valuative prediction is a conjecture as to valuative properties of future
results, yielded by a process or a deed (a sort of prediction already
surfaces in the sphere of perception, i.e., the expectation of something;
perceptual expectation is attached to both valuative and value-neutral
properties). The valid analogy between cognition and value-thought
permits us to speak of knowledge in both spheres. There is a process of
learning in the valuative sphere, so there is valuative knowledge
(which is not cognition).
So far, we dealt with the opinion that science is more objective
than valuation. By rejecting this opinion I do not wish to say that in a
phenomenological context one should not distinguish between the
objective and the subjective. We can characterize the difference
between content and form of intention with the aid of this distinction,
because the concrete object is constituted out of intentional content,
while the concrete subject is made up by a totality of intentional forms.
In other words: The perceptual and conceptual idea we establish as an
object consists mainly of intentional content, and in this sense the
content is objective; on the other hand, our idea of the cognizing and
valuing subject is the sum total of ideas we harbor with regard to
intentional forms, and in this sense the form is subjective. However, let
us return to the difference between the two spheres.
Considerations against the opinion that cognition is more objective
than valuation do not lead to the conclusion that there is no difference
between the spheres, but that the difference does not reside in the
dimension in which the search took place. These considerations do not
cancel the possibility to draw a border between cognitive and valuative
thought, nor can they blur the border. Even though there is no
ontological difference between the spheres, from a phenomenological
angle the difference is obvious. The approach of the cognizant subject
expresses the wish to observe without being involved with the object
of observation, while the approach of the valuing subject looks for
involvement or participation in the object. Cognition is objective to the
extent that it wishes to picture the object, while valuation is objective
as long as it is involved and partakes in the object, and through
mediation of the deed participates in shaping it within reality. That is
to say, each sphere has a different kind of objectivity according to
which the subject arranges itself differently while dealing with each
sphere; accordingly each sphere has a different kind of subjectivity.
Because the cognizant subject wishes to observe without involve-
ment with observation's object, he or she seeks to create a sensory and
conceptual idea of the object which is devoid of any individual contri-
bution by him- or herself (apart from the metaphysical matter he uses
to reproduce the object; this matter is said to be indifferent to whatever
image it is given). This is the cognizant subject's original wish, which
is expressed in its strict sense as long as the subject is naive. When he
discovers any contribution of his in the object's image, he seeks to
remove it if possible, and if not he tries at least to mark its borders
clearly, to stress: this is only the picture's frame, not part of it; beyond
the framed picture there is another one without a frame, and this is the
true picture. Accordingly he finds it difficult to accept what the theory
of cognition teaches, namely, that he possesses no idea devoid of sub-
jective contribution; he feels that truth, as he originally sought it, re-
sides beyond his reach.
In brief, cognition feels uncomfortable with its relational ontologi-
cal status.
However, value-thinking also seeks objectivity but a different kind
of objectivity, which is compatible with subjectivity and even with
individuality, i.e., a particular personal feature. Value-thought is not
surprised when it discovers its ontological status, namely, that it is
relational. On the contrary, a value's objective absolute status as an
idea appears to be strange; accordingly even Nicolai Hartmann himself
tries here and there to soften the core of his theory (and this core does
not lend itself to softening), as he shies away from its strangeness.
In epistemology objectivism expresses a natural wish of cognition,
the original level upon which epistemology is layered; while in axiol-
ogy Hartmann's version of objectivism does not express a wish of the
original level, but a way out from the problem of value foundation.
In short, value-thinking does not try to overcome the subjective
element in its ideas, nor does it establish an idea without a subjective
frame behind them. What it sometimes does try is to overcome actual
opposition between two groups of values: one of them in favor of a
common inter-individual framework, and the other in favor of personal
autonomy. But neither of the opposing sides represents value-thought
in general.
Cognition's subjectivity consists of perceptual and conceptual
forms, which can be devoid of emotion, while valuation's subjectivity
always incorporate emotion. Even when reason applies a conceptual
value it has created itself, like justice, it is accompanied by emotion.
When an intentional, purely cognitive act is observational, the ar-
rangement of what is perceived in a figure and a background will serve
as its form; when the act is conceptual the casting patterns of concept
will function as form. In a pure valuative intentional act the form will
be emotional, i.e., a form in which one of the important components is
emotion.
When a pure cognitive act of intention incorporates an emotional
element, the latter refers to cognition's action and not to its object, to
what is cognized; it refers to how a person feels at the time of his cog-
nitive action. In contradistinction, even if the emotional element in an
intentional valuative act is formal, it may refer directly to the object
and appear to us as the form of the object: if I am angry with the ob-
ject, the object is irritating. This irritation determines my manner of
thought about this object.
However, the principal difference regarding the function of
emotion in these two spheres, lies in that in the sphere of cognition
emotion can function only as form, while in the sphere of valuation
emotion functions also and primarily as intentional content, and
undergoes objectification, and becomes part of the object. (Even
though in the course of objectification something like a partial
shedding of the emotional content occurs, namely, shedding of its
transitory and exchangeable shades, which do not become part of the
external object).
While from a cognitive point of view the object is mute and we
talk about it, from a valuative point of view the object appeals to us,
talks to us; it smiles or frowns at us, attracts or repels us, encourages

action or warns against it.
All these are considerations and observations that prima facie sup-
port the emotive doctrine of value, but its flaw is that it ignores rea-
son's role in the sphere of values, namely, that reason creates values. It
errs in its pretension to base reason on emotion. Eduard Westermarck,
a disciple of this doctrine, contributed a great deal to the comparative
research of value-systems. The framework of the emotive theory of
value made this contribution possible, because of the weight the emo-
tional element actually has.
Because of its emotional character, the sphere of values differs
from the cognitive sphere in another aspect. Under usual
circumstances it is impossible to adhere to a value tentatively, in order
to learn its nature. It is difficult to apply a value hypothetically without
believing in it. A person can consciously change his values when he
feels that they oppose each other; however, so long as he assumes the
usual or natural position in the sphere of values on its transitive level,
he cannot exchange his values temporarily for those of another person
in order to apply and try them out. In the cognitive sphere on the other
hand, there is not impediment to the thinking of a conditional sentence,
or even to thinking an unrealizable condition.
The above begs a question: does not the actor in a certain kind of
theater try to feel the emotion belonging to the role he plays; is this not
a case of him experiencing this emotion hypothetically? This concerns
an actor whom the director requires to identify with the protagonist he
represents and not just to imitate him.127
It is quite probable that the actor can adopt the information about
the state of the figure he embodies while he plays his role, as if it were
absolute truth. If the director tells him look at this ball until you see a
mouse, he is capable of seeing a mouse, yet his emotional response to
the mouse will be his own. An actor can make himself believe for a
while that another actor on the stage is his enemy and wishes to kill
him, but the manner of his emotional response is not something he can
change temporarily for the sake of the play. He can love an actress on
the stage “hypothetically” only if he manages to believe certain facts
for a while, namely, that she possesses the looks and the style of
behavior he likes. He cannot decide for the sake of the play what kind
of looks and style of behavior he will like. That is to say, the manner
of emotional response is not subject to the will. The action of the in-
tellect, on the other hand, is subject to the will.
Various reports on hypnosis bear evidence that it is easier to im-
plant or to uproot information in a person during hypnosis, than to
implant or uproot values. A person may not only change his opinion
quite quickly with regard to neutral, factual matters, but even exchange
it for an utterly different one, if he receives reliable evidence to found
the new opinion; yet this is not so in the sphere of values. The valua-
tion of an object will certainly change if the object changes, or in any
case, if the picture of the object changes in the eyes of the valuing per-
son, but neither the value nor the method of its application have
thereby been changed. A change of values is a relatively slow process,
as distinguished from change in cognitive thinking.
One can therefore, apart from categorical agreements, also achieve
hypothetical agreements in the sphere of cognition, to wit: If we as-
sume assumption A, we will by its application receive such and such a
picture of the circumstances, and if we assume B, we will receive a
different picture. When there is no categorical agreement with regard
to a certain issue, a hypothetical agreement enables us to outline the
border of the controversial area. In contradistinction, in the sphere of
values the emotional load bears down on the thinking subject, reducing
flexibility and mobility. Accordingly the person involved in a valua-
tive argument has usually no picture of the valuative difference at the
root of the argument, and in this case one cannot rightly speak of a
controversy about values; thus, because in order to oppose what some-
one says I have to understand it; I must pinpoint what I oppose and
reconstruct it in my mind; but the reconstruction of another's values
involves the reconstruction of the emotions that belong to these values,
i.e., feeling, or quasi-feeling these alien emotions, at least on the face
of it. And the more alien the values a person tries to reconstruct, the
stronger the resistance to the feeling involved in the reconstruction will
be, and the less the other's values will fit into his own value system
(and precisely in such cases the understanding of the emotional aspect
is even more necessary).
However, we deal here not only with the inter-individual sphere
but with the character of the choice made when one assumes a posi-
tion. Taking a stand in the cognitive sphere requires understanding the
alternative, because If I pronounce a negative sentence, I must under-
stand its positive opposite, otherwise I will not know what I negate;
the same is true if I pronounce a positive sentence, because what is
positive is the negation of the negative. Whoever does not understand
the alternative to what he states, does not understand what he is talking
about. This rule is valid with regard to intellectual cognitive action.
But the expression of an emotion does not necessarily involve the
understanding of an alternative emotion.
To sum up — the difficulty a person meets in trying to understand
a position opposed to his own in the cognitive sphere is not great, and
in any case does not arise from the nature of this sphere, while in the
sphere of values this difficulty is based on a principle, because emo-

tion is not subject to the will.
Chapter 7
Phenomenology of Values
The difficulty in understanding a rival position, inherent to the sphere

of values, presents a challenge to its phenomenology.
We will outline a few characteristics of this phenomenology before
we return to discuss the obstacles that stand in its way.
The phenomenology of values is based on observing them while
their valuative validity is bracketed, thus paralleling the bracketing of
existence in general phenomenology. When we enclose valuative
validity in brackets, we do not bracket the entire valuative matter, not
the very function of content as a value, nor the specific ways in which
contents function as values. Should we bracket the whole valuative
matter we would not, for example, discuss the dimensions of valuative
space and type differences, which are essential for the description of
value-thought phenomena. We certainly should not say, let us bracket
good and evil, because these are the issues to discuss; we will bracket
only the validity of the statements that these are the good and the evil.
The phenomenology of values is therefore value-neutral reflection.
Of course, when we ignore validity, we also ignore invalidity, for
example, that value X, prevailing in another society or generation, is
invalid to us. We also ignore the question of factual adherence to
values and this is part of our disregard at this stage and in this discus-
sion for the question of what factually exists (both from the aspect of
the valued object and the value applied to it). In this sense, the ab-
straction of valuative validity (the valuative status) is close to the ab-

straction of reality (the cognitive status), and accordingly they can be
joined. However, here we have to remember that even at this stage we
do not ignore what kind of value-system a certain value belongs to,
because the link with the system belongs to the value's figure. We do
neither ignore its adjustment to the other limbs of the system, nor the
instances of opposition between this value and other limbs. Our con-
cern is the distinction between a value's own logic (its skeleton) and
the set of qualifications attached to it and even incorporated within it,
which aids its adjustment to the value-system.
As long as I have not bracketed validity, the values of another per-
son which are incompatible with my own, are not values at all in my
eyes, I cannot describe their valuative character, their figure. Once I
have bracketed value-validity, a series of alternatives presents itself to
my mind. Understanding values that are incompatible with each other
is the first step towards the description of value figures.
Not only the values of another person elude my cognition as long
as I have not bracketed value validity, but I do not cognize my own
values, because I cannot describe their form as long as I have not com-
pared them with alternatives. I have no meta-valuative cognition of a
value-system that rejects revenge altogether, if I do not understand a
system that approves of it. To understand one of the opposing systems
one has to understand the other one as well.
Here we find the difference (discussed at the end of the previous
chapter) between cognizant thought that thinks in contra factual condi-
tional sentences (i.e., “if it were..., then...”), and value-thought that
finds it difficult to think in contra factual conditional sentences, be-
cause of the emotions attached to it. It is easy to imagine that what is
there is not there, and that what is not there is, but it is hard for a per-
son to imagine that good is bad and bad is good. That is to say, we see
a special obstacle blocking the road of value phenomenology already
at its beginning, an obstacle which does not stand in the way of general
phenomenology.
This obstacle is paradoxical: For one and the same reason a person
cannot describe the values he adheres to and those he does not adhere
to. He cannot describe the value he upholds because the precisely de-
scribed object is the form of the value which he has to isolate in order
to describe it; it cannot be isolated without comparing it to alternatives,
and this comparison, in its turn, requires understanding of the
alternative. Therefore, one cannot describe a value without understand-
ing its alternatives (one can, of course, preach a value without under-
standing its alternatives, but this is a different story). On the other
hand, one cannot describe the alien value if one does not understand it,
Phenomenology of Values 323
namely, one cannot describe its form without understanding its con-
tent. But the path to comprehension of an alien value, opposed to a
person's own values, is closed to ordinary thought. That is to say, in
order to deal with axiology in general and with the phenomenology of
values in particular, a person has to understand the alternatives to his
own values and he has to remove the obstacle blocking the path of
ordinary thought or to bypass it. (Ordinary thought — i.e., thought not
guided by phenomenology does not view the obstacle as an obstacle,
but tends to imagine that it has no alternative at all. This is in
particular true with regard to popular objectivism).
A certain difference that exists here and there in everyday con-
sciousness on the transitive level may serve the phenomenologist as
something to hold on to in order to remove the obstacle: the difference
between experiencing and understanding an emotion. When a person
sees a face expressing joy he can understand the joy without sharing it,
he can understand sadness without being sad, for example, when he
listens to sad music. It is doubtful whether schadenfreude could exist
without this difference, because whoever enjoys another's sorrow, un-
derstands the sorrow without sharing it. A person cannot only under-
stand that another suffers without suffering himself, he or she can also
understand the specific quality of the other person's suffering. The
whole specifity of an emotion may be understood without sharing the
same emotion.
We deal here with the understanding of an emotion which does not
belong to reflection but occurs on the original level of intention. Ini-
tially this understanding was perhaps integrated with experience of the
emotion, but the development of consciousness involves ramifications.
The phenomenologist can use this understanding of another's emo-
tion in order to understand values opposed to his own; in the course of
this process he will behave as if he had exchanged the experiencing of
his own emotions (as far as they present an obstacle to him) for under-
standing them (a temporary exchange).
One may argue: You can understand an emotion without
experiencing it if you have already experienced it in the past. The
answer is that on the basis of emotions a person has experienced he
can also understand different emotions, perhaps up to a certain degree
of difference.
Ordinary consciousness includes the understanding of emotions
without sharing them, but probably only emotions the experience of
which is not incompatible with a person's own system (the system this
individual consciousness adheres to). Without methodical guidance, a
person understands emotions which he himself could have experienced
under certain circumstances, but this is not sufficient for
phenomenology. It has to expand understanding, namely, it has to

enable the phenomenologist to understand emotions which are incom-
patible with his own value-system.
Understanding an emotion is not intellectual or conceptual com-
prehension, but it may make the latter possible. The former itself oc-
curs in the emotional sphere. The intellect may face emotions from
two positions: in its reference to some object it may be guided by the
emotion felt towards this object, or it may cognize the emotion, i.e., its
form (cognition based on emotional understanding). The intellect is
capable of immediate conceptual understanding only with regard to
conceptual entities made out of its own metaphysical matter, but not
with regard to emotion. Immediate understanding of emotion means to
look at it while it remains in its own sphere. This observation of emo-
tion may be constructive and instructed by the intellect, but it does not
transfer the emotion into the intellectual sphere; accordingly, con-
ceptual knowledge that relies on the observation of emotions is neither
evident nor finite.
Let me now, in the following lines, use the words “objective” and
“formal” in the sense they have in Descartes' and Spinoza's writings.
In so far as an emotion is experienced it exists formally, and in so far
as it is the content of emotional understanding it exists only
objectively, not formally. Emotional understanding reconstructs the
emotion on an objective plane. When a person formally reconstructs
another's joy he is happy himself, when he formally reconstructs love
for a certain object, he loves it himself. However, understanding an
emotion without experiencing it is objective reconstruction. But even
objective reconstruction can be full reconstruction. In the reconstruc-
tion of an emotion directed at an object, the intention directed at the
object also takes place, i.e., transitive intention, and this occurs even in
understanding without experiencing. This understanding is immedi-
ately accompanied by awareness of the reconstruction's imaginary
character, or as exclusively objective reproduction.
Between understanding an emotion while and while not experienc-
ing it, there may be intermediate cases of undergoing the experience in
a weaker form. But it would be a mistake to assume that the degree of
understanding is the same as the degree of experiencing the emo-
tion.128
The understanding of an alien value is possible not because people
do not differ much, but because valuative differences occur between
branches that grow out of the same trunk, namely, because a value
grows out of a value. Whoever occupies one branch has therefore to
reach the other branch and finally to occupy a suitable observation
point on the trunk. The ability to understand alien values enables the
Phenomenology of Values 325
phenomenology of values to construct its first stage, the stage of ob-

serving alternative values as they reveal themselves in acts of valua-
tion.
The first, or the preparatory stage of value phenomenology resides
midway between the given valuation phenomena and the methodical
reflection by which it is guided. In principle, it resides on the inten-
tional level of the phenomena of consciousness which are to be de-
scribed and analyzed in the following stages. That is to say, when we
treat of the valuation of an external object, the preparatory stage also
resides on the level of intention towards the object. When we treat of
valuing reflection (for instance, of the objectivistic-naive kind) in eve-
ryday thought, the preparatory stage also resides on the same level.
The preparation we discuss is not reflection about the phenomenon, as
if it were spread out fully accomplished in front of the phenomenolo-
gist; it is a work of reconstruction and adjustment of valuations based
on alien values.
After the first stage come two stages of phenomenological reflec-
tion. At the second stage we bracket every status, be it valuative or
cognitive, in order to arrive at pure contents of thought and imagina-
tion. Thus, we also bracket whatever specifies objectivism and subjec-
tivism as well as the controversy between them. For example, we roam
the sphere of the justice concept, examine ways of salient justice and
of non-salient justice and what is beyond justice and wrong (when
there is no shortage and no problem of distribution); having walked the
length of all these pathways, we look at the place justice occupies in
this or that system. One can describe these procedures as metaphysical
unfolding and metaphysical analysis of justice. At this stage thought
freely exchanges hypothetical courses, hypothetically applies one
value and subsequently replaces it with its alternative. It unfolds the
instances of opposition between values that meet various questions
(like justice and liberty) and arranges possible “solutions.” It is free of
the manacles of reflection which prevails over values. It is free of
emotions, free of the ontological slant towards objectivism or
subjectivism, and free of the need to found values.
At the third stage, phenomenology takes cognitive statuses out of
brackets, leaving only the valuative ones bracketed. At this stage, we
can refer to the reality researched by psychology, history, ethnography
etc. We can approach the explanation of existing value-systems. This
is not a predictive explanation as usual in natural science, but a post-
factum explanation. It does not predict because what is truly new can-
not be derived from what is old because it is not included in the latter;
in the sphere of values as in the rest of spiritual spheres, new things are
created. Yet, what is novel, be it even utterly novel in part, is con-
nected to what is old, and sometimes one may say that it fits one of the
old factors. For instance, a new answer to an already existing question
is possible, an answer which is not derived from the question and not
derived from another existent factor, but one may say that it fits the
question. Awareness of the question causes the creation of the answer.
We deal therefore also with causal ties, but part of them are unique in
their concrete figure and do not enable us to predict.
Epilogue
The pragmatic position regarding the question of value foundation, the

relational position regarding the question of their ontological status
and the phenomenological approach to the work of axiology may well
combine into a single outlook.
At a future and more advanced stage of axiology it may achieve
methodological lessons for the valuative level.
Glossary
The following technical terms are used in this book in the sense
roughly explained here. In some cases an example replaces direct ex-
planation.
ACTION (synonym: act). Something recognizable by a certain dis-
tinct feeling. A person feels whether he or she is passive or active.
Action is being active. There is no need for a further characteristic
to regard something as an action. For example, there is no need to
check whether the entrant for the status of an action may occur in
response to an order. Willing is an action.
AXIOLOGY is the general theory of value; it studies the ways in
which we value possible objects, and the ways in which the manner
of valuation influences motivations and is being influenced by
them.
END (synonym: goal) and MEANS. These are correlative concepts,
like left and right. Not everything which is desired is labeled “end”
here, but only what is gained by the use of means. The means is the
cause for the realized end.
EMOTION and FEELING. Feeling is the valuative facet or part of
sensation. It may be located in the body. Pleasure and pain are feel-
ings, while love and hate as well as joy and sadness are emotions.
Wonder at what is beautiful or exalted belongs to the realm of emo-
tion.
EMOTIONAL MOVEMENT is a kind of emotional valuation. It is
neither positive nor negative, although it may accompany a positive
as well as a negative valuation. The sublime is emotionally moving
and so is the mysterious. An esthetical experience may belong to
the realm of emotional movement. We have to distinguish between
emotional movement and agitation. Anger, for instance represents

agitation, but not emotional movement. Antonym: Calmness.
GOAL-ORIENTED action. An action taken as a means and measured
by efficiency. It is not desirable in itself, but required on account of
its results.
IDEAL. The ideal differs from the end in that it is not achieved by the
use of means. It is not achieved as the result of a process man
initiates. The ideal is directly realized by the action it informs, even
if this action does not realize it fully. The ideal differs from the
need in that man creates it, chooses and establishes it; that is to say,
it is the product of constitution, while the need is given to man: A
person does not choose what his or her needs will be. Justice is an
ideal.
INTENTION. The word “intention” signifies an elemental act of the
mind that assumes different specific forms: the form of (a person)
meaning something, of understanding something, or perceiving it,
or being aware of it. The mind, as it were, stretches itself in all
these forms towards something (towards an object or an idea). In
this use of the word we follow Franz Brentano (in the manner he
used the German word “Intention”). We also use the derivatives “to
intend” and “intentional.”
FORM AND CONTENT of intention. This is the distinction be-
tween the “how” and the “what” of the intentional act. Attention is
focused on the content, namely, on what is intended and not on the
ways and manners of the intention. However, the form of one act
may be referred to by another intentional act, namely, a reflective
act.
TRANSITIVE intention and REFLECTIVE intention. Inten-
tional acts are characterized as transitive when they refer to some-
thing outside consciousness; they are characterized as reflective
when they refer to other intentional acts.
INTENT. That which is intended. The intent is what we intend, but
not from the aspect of its existence outside intending mind, but as
far as it belongs to the latter's contents. We can repeat the proce-
dure and intend the same intent again. Intent is a crystal of inten-
tional content.
KNOWLEDGE and COGNITION “Knowledge” appears in its
broad, generally accepted sense, while “cognition” designates
value-neutral knowledge. Its object is whatever exists. It treats its
object as something not dependent on it. Cognition includes a
description and an explanation of its object.
TYPICAL. The typical of a group of phenomena is not the more fre-
quent combination of properties to be found in this group. Not the
Glossary 331
statistical characterization is here decisive. Typical is that which is

free from disturbances. As a melody could be disturbed by back-
ground noises, so a combination of affinitive properties may be dis-
turbed by some addition to it or subtraction from it emerging from
the background. As auditive understanding discerns between the
melody and attending noises, so does the observation distinguish
between typical and contingent phenomena.
VALUE. A value is the stance we assume in relation to things and
ideas, considering them good or bad, just or unjust, loved or hated,
exalted or contemptible, beautiful or ugly, pleasurable or painful.
These are conceptual, emotional or feeling stances. They include
stands taken in practice and such which do not involve action.
Note: I provide this explanation here for the sake of convenience,
even though it overemphasizes the individual-subjective aspect.
VALUE-BEARER. A value-neutral property always accompanied
by a certain value-property.
FORM OF VALUE. The Form of a value is a section of the inten-
tional form of value thinking. It is the aspect of the value that is
seen by the reflection on it, i.e. the factual aspect of value thinking.
The form includes the transitive intentional act, the adhering to the
value, and the role of the value in the system of values.
FULL and EMPTY valuative values. A full value requires the
existence of a certain thing, or a certain deed, or the presence of a
certain sensation, feeling or emotion. An empty value requires the
non-existence, or the non-presence, of a certain something. Not to
steal is an empty (positive) value.
GIVEN and CONSTITUTED valuative values. A given value is
a value we neither create nor choose, but become aware of post-
factum, namely, we find it within ourselves by means of a feeling
or an emotion. The constituted value is created by reason (in a
series of alternative possibilities), and the will chooses and
establishes it.
POSITIVE and NEGATIVE MOTIVATIVE VALUES (also:
positive and negative motives). A positive motivative value is the
desire for or the aspiration to something, the attraction it exercises;
a negative motivative value is the opposition to something, the urge
to escape a certain situation, to get away from something.
POSITIVE and NEGATIVE VALUATIVE VALUES. The
positive valuative value praises something. It serves as a norm (or a
quasi-norm) for according praise. It is the content of a specific
good. The negative valuative value condemns. It is the content of a
specific evil.
PURE and MIXED valuative values. The pure value does not in-
clude cognition (i.e., value-neutral knowledge of facts). A wish is a
pure value, while a goal or a duty include cognition of the ability to
realize them.
HIGH and LOW, STRONG and WEAK valuative values. We
deal here with two scales of preference according to Nicolai Hart-
mann. The scale of high-low treats of the positive part of the valua-
tive scale: High is whatever receives greater praise. The scale
strong-weak treats of the degree of condemnation involved in the
negative part of the valuative scale.
VALUATION. Valuation can be described as assuming a position.
It is the application, or quasi-application of a value. The statement
that a certain deed is just is its conceptual valuation. Love is an
emotional valuation. The taste of a dish a person enjoys is his feel-
ing valuation of the dish. Some valuations are neither positive nor
negative, for instance, considering something as mysterious (see
explanation of “emotionally moving”).
VALUATIVE values and MOTIVATIVE values. A valuative
value is whatever serves as a basis for valuation, or the element ac-
cording to which a person values. A valuing person may only pos-
sess his valuations, while he does not formulate the rule, the valua-
tive value, according to which they are carried out (similar to gram-
matical rules). A motivative value is a force that accompanies
(though not in every case) the valuative value; it is felt as a desire,
an aspiration, an attraction or repulsion.
Value NEUTRALITY. The text of a chemistry book is value-neu-
tral.
Value PROPERTY. The objective correlate of the act of valua-
tion. Beauty is a value-property of a beautiful woman, justice is the
value-property of a just deed.
VOLITION, WILL . Willing is an intentional act that requires a cer-
tain (future) action from the person who wills, and expresses readi-
ness to bear certain sacrifices (which, according to this person's
knowledge, the action involves), so that this intentional act
becomes the cause of the action's occurrence (if the action can be
carried out, namely. if the ability and certain circumstances are
there). A decision is a kind of volition (it is a verbal volition). A
wish not accompanied by readiness for the necessary sacrifice is
not a volition. The term “will” denotes the human faculty to
mediate between the sphere of valuative values and the sphere of
motivative values and to turn a reason into a cause.
Notes
The emphasis by italicization in quotations is mine; the spelling is according to

the original. Bibliographical details appear in the bibliography.
Introduction (pgs. 1-10)

1. See: Ari s t o t l e, Po l i t i cs , Bo o k I, C h ap t er 2 , 1 2 5 2 b .
2 . Ari s t o t l e, Ph ys i cs , Bo o k II, Ch ap t er 8 , es p eci al l y 1 9 9 b at t h e b eg i n -
ning.
3. Wi t h reg ar d to th e d i fferen ce b et ween th e v al u at i v e an d th e met a-
v al u at i v e l ev el , co mp are Hu s s erl , Hu s s er l i a n a XXVIII, p p . 5 6 -5 7 .
4 . J . Lai rd , Th e Id ea o f Va l u e, p . XVI. I n th e i n t ro d u ct i o n t o t h i s b o o k ,
t h e read er wi l l fi n d a rev i ew o f t h e t erms d es i g n a t i n g v al u e in a n u mb er o f
l an g u ag es .
5. Th e h i s t o r y o f th e g en eral th e o ry o f v al u e (o r o f wri t i n g s in th i s
s p h ere) b e g i n wi t h a p ap er b y Ch ri s t i an v o n Eh ren f el s in Ri ch ard Av e-
n ari u s ' Ph i l o s o p h i ca l Qu a r t er l y in 1 8 9 3 a n d 1 8 9 4 . Th e ti t l e o f t h e p ap er
i s “Wert h t h eo ri e u n d Et h i k .” I t ap p eared as a seri es o f art i cl es in fi v e
i n s t al l men t s . Th e wri t i n g o f t h i s p ap er was p reced ed b y d i s cu s s i o n s at
Al ex i u s Me i n o n g ' s semi n ars . Eh ren fel s tri es in t h i s p ap er to in co rp o ra t e
s t u d i es fr o m t h e eco n o mi c fi el d (mo re p reci s el y , d i s cu s s i o n s in r es p o n s e
t o t h e Au s t ri an sch o o l o f Karl v o n Men g er an d Fri ed ri ch v o n Wi es er), an d
fro m th e s p h ere o f et h i cs . Th e term “ax i o l o g y ” was d i s s emi n at ed b y
Wi l b u r Urb an , o n e o f th e sch o l ars wh o in t ro d u ced t h e th eo ry o f v al u e
i n t o th e E n g l i s h sp eak i n g wo rl d . A d et ai l ed acco u n t o f t h e h i s t o ry o f
v al u e-t h eo ry ap p ears in O. Kra u s , Di e Wer t t h eo r i en — Ges ch i ch t e u n d
Kr i t i k. Th e su b t i t l e in fo rms u s th at h e n o t o n l y d eal s w i t h h i s t o ry . Th e
read er wh o seek s a co n v en i en t p res en t at i o n o f th e v ari o u s th eo ri es an d
t h ei r in t e rco n n ect i o n , wi l l me et an o b s t acl e: Krau s freq u en t l y b eg i n s to
arg u e wi t h a s ch o l ar b efo re h e fi n i s h es t h e p res en t at i o n o f h i s t h eo ry (at
t i mes , mu c h earl i er), so th at th e p res en t at i o n is in co rp o rat ed in t o th e
co n t ro v ers y . Ch ri s t i an v o n Eh r en fel s ' s p eci al p l ac e i n h i s t o ry i s sev e rel y

s h o rt ch an g ed i n Krau s ' d es cri p t i o n .
6. See en d n o t e n u mb er 8 2 .
7. Th o mas Ho b b es , Levi a t h a n , Ch ap . X, p . 6 7 .
Part I, Ch apter 1 (pgs. 13-25)

8. See: Imman u el Kan t , Fu n d a men t a l Pr i n ci p l es o f th e Met a p h ys i c o f
Mo r a l s, p .3 8 . Th e ju s t i fi cat i o n o f d ev i at i o n s fro m Kan t ' s v ers i o n is n o t
n eces s ary fo r th e p res en t d i s c u s s i o n . Wi t h reg ard to th i s mat t er see: Leo
Hen ri Wi l d e, Hyp o t h et i s ch e u n d ka t eg o r i s ch e Imp er a t i ve, p .8 0 .
9. Eh ren fel s b eg i n s h i s p ap er “We rt h t h eo ri e u n d Et h i k ” wi t h a
d i s cu s s i o n o f th e ex ch an g e v al u e; fo l l o wi n g t h e Au s t ri an eco n o mi s t s h e
s t at es (1 7 , p . 8 1 ) th at th e ex ch an g e v al u e o f th i n g s st an d s i n p ro p o rt i o n
t o th ei r m arg i n al u t i l i t y . He b as es u t i l i t y o n sat i s fact i o n o f th e n ee d (1 7 ,
p . 8 4 ). Th e n eed h as two as p ec t s : A. Des i re o r as p i rat i o n , n amel y , th e
mo t i v at i v e v al u e. B. Th e feel i n g o f d i s t res s , n ame l y , a feel i n g v al u at i o n .
Here Eh ren fel s p o s es th e q u es t i o n o n wh i ch o f th es e two as p ect s a v al u e
s h o u l d b e b as ed . Su mmari zi n g t h e co n s i d erat i o n s o f p ro s an d co n s h e
s ay s : “Wer t h is d i e v o n d er Sp rach e irrt h ü ml i ch o b j ect i v i rt e Bezi eh u n g
ei n es Di n g es zu ei n em au f d as s el b e g eri ch t et en men s ch l i ch en Beg eh ren ”
(“Val u e i s th e b y lan g u ag e mi s t ak en l y o b j ect i fi ed rel at i o n o f a th i n g to a
h u man d es i re ai med at i t ,” 1 7 , p . 9 8 ). Th at i s t o say , h e t i p s t h e s ca l es fro m
t h e feel i n g as p ect (i .e., fro m th e as s u mi n g o f a f eel i n g p o s i t i o n , o r fro m
t h e v al u at i v e v al u e) to ward s t h e d es i re (i .e. th e mo t i v e). An d h e rev e al s
h i s o p p o s i t i o n to th e o b j ect i v i s m o f p o p u l ar th o u g h t , wh i ch refers to
v al u e as a p ro p ert y th i n g s p o s s es s . Eh ren fel s ex t en d s th e co n cep t o f
d es i re to in cl u d e wi s h es , as p i rat i o n s an d v o l i t i o n ; th e co n cep t o f th e
d es i red th i n g i s ex t en d ed t o b eco me a cat eg o ry wh i ch i n cl u d es p ro ces s e s ,
s i t u at i o n s , rel at i o n s an d p o s s i b i l i t i es (S ys t em d er Wer t h t h eo r i e, I, p . 5 3 ).
No t lo n g a ft er th e p u b l i cat i o n o f Eh ren fel s ' fi rs t art i cl e o n v al u e th eo ry ,
Al ex i u s v o n Mei n o n g react ed to it . A rev i ew o f th e co u rs e o f th e
co n t ro v ers y b et ween t h e two ar i s t o crat s (Mei n o n g av o i d ed th e u s e o f h i s
t i t l e “v o n ”) ap p ears i n R. Fro n d i zi , Wh a t i s Va l u e, p p . 4 3 -4 7 .
Mei n o n g ' s lo g i c say s th at o n e d o es n o t d es i re so me t h i n g u n l es s it is
p l eas an t ( o r it s ab s en ce is u n p l eas an t ) an d n o t v i ce v ers a — it is n o t
p l eas an t , o r g o o d b ecau s e o n e d es i res it . Th e as s u mi n g o f a feel i n g p o -
s i t i o n is th erefo re th e d eci s i v e fact o r. He arg u es ag ai n s t Eh ren fel s t h at a
p ers o n d o e s n o t as p i re to s o me t h i n g h e h as at h i s d i s p o s al , an d th erefo re
i t sh o u l d h av e n o v al u e fo r it s o wn er. Mei n o n g ' s o p i n i o n s are p res en t ed
i n h i s b o o k Ps ych o l o g i s ch -Et h i s ch e Un t er s u ch u n g en zu r Wer t t h eo r y
(1 8 9 4 ), an d i n a b o o k p u b l i s h e d p o s t h u mo u s l y wh i ch rep res en t s h i s lat er
o u t l o o k (m ean t to co me in s t ead o f a seco n d ed i t i o n o f th e b o o k
men t i o n ed ab o v e): Zu r Gr u n d l eg u n g d er a l l g emei n e n Wer t t h eo r i e
(1 9 2 3 ).
Notes 335
In th e co u rs e o f th e d i s p u t e a b o u t v al u at i v e an d m o t i v at i v e v al u es
b o t h p art i es amen d ed th ei r p o s i t i o n s in o rd er to m ak e th em d efen s i b l e,
u n t i l th e g ap b et ween t h em b ec ame i n d i s cern i b l e h e re an d th ere. On e wa s
co mp el l ed to ad mi t th e in d ep en d en ce o f v al u at i v e v al u es , th e o t h er was
co mp el l ed to ad mi t au t o n o my o f th e mo t i v e. Mei n o n g ' s react i o n was
ch aract eri s t i c — h e was so mewh at s u rp ri s ed to d i s c o v er t h at th e g ap h a d
b eco me i n d i s cern i b l e. See: A. Mei n o n g , On As s u mp t i o n s, p p . 2 3 1 - 2 3 4 .
Th e mai n b en efi t ax i o l o g y can d eri v e fro m th i s co n t ro v ers y d o es n o t
ari s e fro m d i s cu s s i o n o f th e s h o rt co mi n g s o n each si d e, an d ev en les s
fro m t h e a t t emp t s t o amen d p o s i t i o n s , b u t p ri n ci p a l l y fro m t h e res u l t o f a
d raw, wh i c h tel l s u s th at th e red u ct i o n s h av e fai l ed an d th at th e b arr i er
b et ween v a l u at i v e an d mo t i v at i v e v al u es d o es n o t p rev ai l o n l y o n th e
s u rface. M an y p h i l o s o p h i cal ar g u men t s en d in a d ra w an d are left th ere ,
b u t t h e re s u l t o f a d raw may a l s o b ear fru i t .
A q u i t e co mp reh en s i v e at t emp t ai mi n g t o b as e th e v al u at i v e v al u e o n t h e
mo t i v e (wi t h o u t referen ce to E h ren fel s ) was mad e b y W. D. Lamo n t . See
h i s Th e Va l u e Ju d g emen t, p p . 2 1 0 - 2 4 6 . He wi s h es to sh o w t h at v al u at i o n
i s n ei t h er b as ed o n co g n i t i o n n o r o n feel i n g an d e mo t i o n , b u t o n
as p i rat i o n (o r co n at i v e at t i t u d e).
Amo n g co n t emp o rary wri t i n g s d e al i n g wi t h th e rel at i o n b et ween
v al u at i v e an d mo t i v at i v e v al u e s , E. J. Bo n d ' s Rea s o n a n d Va l u e, p p . 1 -8 3 ,
i s so mewh a t cl o s e to o u r p res e n t d i s cu s s i o n . On e s h o u l d n o t e th at h i s
d i v i s i o n i n t o “mo t i v at i v e reas o n ” an d “g ro u n d i n g r eas o n ” (s ee t h ere p p .
3 0 -3 1 ) i s n o t co n g ru en t wi t h t h ed i v i s i o n mo t i v at i v e-v al u at i v e v al u e .

10. Th i s is De s cart es ' p o s i t i o n an d I fo l l o w th e p at h h e o u t l i n es . See
Des cart es , Th e Pri n ci p l es o f Ph i l o s o p h y , Part I, Pri n ci p l es 3 2 -3 5 .
11. Ps y ch o l o g y was in t eres t ed in t h e rel at i o n b et ween th e d eg ree o f
s u b j ect i v e cert a i n t y p eo p l e at t ri b u t ed to th e an s wer s th ey g av e to q u es -
t i o n s p o s e d t o th em, an d t h e p ro b ab i l i t y t h at t h es e an s wers were t ru e. Em-
p i ri cal fi n d i n g s sh o wed th at a b o v e a cert ai n th res h o l d p eo p l e d emo n -
s t rat e in man y cas es o v erco n fi d en ce in th e t ru t h o f t h ei r an s wers , i .e ., th e
s u b j ect i v e cert ai n t y t h at t h ei r an s wers are tru e e x ceed s p ro b ab i l i t y , wh i l e
b el o w t h i s t h res h o l d th ey s h o w u n d erco n fi d en ce, i . e., s u b j ect i v e cert a i n t y
fal l s b el o w p ro b ab i l i t y . I b el i ev e th i s fact may b e u n d ers t o o d in th e
fo l l o wi n g man n er: Wh en cert ai n t y , b as ed o n th e in t el l ect ' s an d
o b s erv at i o n ' s wo rk p as s es t h e p o i n t we wi l l n ame “ co n fi d en ce t h res h o l d ”
(s ay , 7 0 % in a cert ai n cas e), th e p o wer o f ju d g men t al l o cat es (i n th es e
cas es ) a c o n s i d erab l e amo u n t o f ad d i t i o n al co n fi d e n ce; th i s ad d i t i o n
en ab l es a p ers o n to in i t i at e t h e act i o n n eces s ary to imp l emen t th e
d eci s i o n w h i ch aro s e fro m a si t u at i o n as s es s men t ( wh o s e p ro b ab i l i t y
ex ceed ed 7 0 %), wi t h o u t fu rt h er d o u b t s . On th e o t h e r h an d , wh en wel l -
g ro u n d ed c ert ai n t y st ay s b el o w th e co n fi d en ce-t h re s h o l d , th e p o wer o f
j u d g men t d ed u ct s a p o rt i o n o f co n fi d en ce, n amel y , it cas t s d o u b t u p o n
t h e i n t el l ect ' s wo rk , i n o rd er to co n t i n u et h e ex a mi n at i o n fro m an an g l e o f

emp h as i zed u n cert ai n t y . In su c h cas es , th e p o wer o f ju d g men t creat es a
b reak in t h e co n t i n u i t y o f th e cert ai n t y d eg ree th e su b j ect at t ri b u t es to
h i s o r h er j u d g men t s . We s ai d th at t h e ad d i t i o n i s al l o cat ed “i n o rd er t o ...”
an d t h e d e d u ct i o n i s mad e “i n o rd er t o ...” b u t t h i s co n s i d erat i o n i s n ei t h er
co n s ci o u s , n o r d o es it act u al l y ex i s t as a co n s i d erat i o n ; th i s is th e
fo rmu l at i o n p h i l o s o p h i cal refl ect i o n e mp l o y s to d es cri b e an
u n co n s ci o u s tel eo l o g i cal st ru c t u re o f a d eci s i o n -m ak i n g p ro ces s . Th i s
s t ru ct u re p rev ai l s at an earl y st ag e o f t h e p ro ces s , at wh i ch t h e d eg r ee o f
co n fi d en ce o r b el i ef is cry s t a l l i zed . It rev eal s i t s el f in th at we ro u n d o ff
t h e d eg ree o f co n fi d en ce, o n ce u p ward s an d o n ce d o wn ward s . It h el p s a
p er s o n to a ct d eci s i vel y a n d e n er g et i ca l l y d es p i t e u n ce rt ai n t y (p u rel y
co g n i t i v e) , an d faci l i t at es th e meet i n g o f ch al l en g es . Th e wi l l n eed s o n l y
a y es o r n o an s wer fro m th e in t el l ect : ab o v e o r b e l o w t h e th res h o l d . T h e
i n t el l ect rep l i es i n it s o wn w ay wi t h co n s i d erat i o n s o f p ro s an d co n s . We
may al s o f o rmu l at e th e in t erp r et at i o n o f th e emp i ri cal fi n d i n g s th u s :
t h ere is a cert ai n mi d way p o i n t b et ween wh at is cl o s e to cert ai n t y an d
wh at is cl o s e to d o u b t , an d th e p o wer o f ju d g men t a p p a r en t l y ten d s to
a vo i d th i s mi d d l e, t en d i n g to ti p th e s cal es in th i s o r t h at d i rect i o n . Th e
p o wer o f j u d g men t i s b u t t h ew i l l i n o n e o f i t s ro l es .
Th e ex p eri men t al fi n d i n g is u s u al l y d es cri b ed g rap h i cal l y b y a set o f
ax es , i n w h i ch th e h o ri zo n t al ax i s d es cri b es co n fi d en ce, i.e., t h e cert ai n t y
s u b j ect s a t t ri b u t et o t h ei r an s wers , ex p res s ed b y n u mb ers fro m 5 0 t o 1 0 0 ,
wh i ch th ey al l o cat e to an s wers (5 0 = to t al u n cert a i n t y , 1 0 0 = ab s o l u t e
cert ai n t y ) ; th e v ert i cal ax i s d es cri b es th e p ro b ab i l i t y th at t h e an s we rs are
t ru e, an d th i s p ro b ab i l i t y is cal cu l at ed as t h e p e rcen t ag e o f tru e an s wers
amo n g al l an s wers . Th e rel at i o n b et ween co n fi d en ce (s u b j ect i v e ce rt ai n t y )
an d p ro b ab i l i t y (o b j ect i v e cer t ai n t y ) is ex p res s ed in a cu rv e. In a q u i t e
co mmo n fo r m, th i s cu rv e cro s s e s th e 4 5 d eg ree li n e fro m ab o v e,
as cen d i n g to t h e ri g h t . Th e fo l l o wi n g p i ct u re o ft e n emerg es (See fi g . 6 ).
If th e cu r v e were co n g ru en t wi t h th e 4 5 d eg ree li n e (p as s i n g d i ag o n al l y
b et ween th e ax es ), “s u b j ect i v e ” cert ai n t y (co n fi d e n ce) wo u l d b e co n -
g ru en t wi t h “o b j ect i v e” cert ai n t y (p ro b ab i l i t y o r th e p ercen t ag e o f tr u e
an s wers ). Th e fact t h at th e cu rv es as cen d fro m l ef t to ri g h t tel l s u s th at i n
a g en eral man n er su b j ect i v e an d o b j ect i v e cert ai n t y acco rd . Th e in -
cl i n at i o n to d i v i d e an s wers b y two , in t o cert ai n a n d u n cert ai n o n es , i n -
fl u en ces t h e fo rm o f t h e cu rv e an d i s ex p res s ed i n it s fl at n es s , n amel y , i n
t h at it as cen d s o n l y sl o wl y fr o m left to ri g h t . A fl at cu rv e b ears d i rect
ev i d en ce t o t h e fact t h at co n f i d en ce g ro ws fas t er th an p ro b ab i l i t y .
Ho wev er, s h o u l d a st eep cu rv e (as o p p o s ed to a fl a t o n e) ap p ear in th e
s p ace d es c ri b ed b y th e s et o f ax es (i n t h e ab o v e d rawi n g ), th e i n creas e o f
t h e su b j ec t ' s co n fi d en ce in h i s an s wers wi l l in v o l v e an in creas e in h i s
u n d erco n fi d en ce if i t ex i s t s , o r a sh ri n k i n g o f h i s o v erco n fi d en ce, i f th i s
p rev ai l s . Su ch a cu rv e as cen d i n g to th e ri g h t may cro s s th e li n e o f g o o d
cal i b rat i o n (t h e 4 5 d eg ree li n e) fro m b el o w. Th e f o l l o wi n g fact o rs , fo r
ex amp l e, a ct i n t h e d i rect i o n o f a s t eep cu rv e:
Notes 337
A. Th e fac t o r d i ct at ed b y th e tech n i q u e o f th e d es cri p t i o n (u n d erco n fi -

d en ce is i mp o s s i b l e i f h al f th e an s wers are wro n g , an d o v erco n fi d en ce is
i mp o s s i b l e i f al l an s wers are co rrect ).
B. Wh en t h e su b j ect s are n o t a ware h o w eas y th e ea s y q u es t i o n s an d h o w
d i ffi cu l t th e d i ffi cu l t q u es t i o n s are, t h i s u n awar en es s cau s es th e cu r v e to
b eco me s t e ep er.
Fi g u re 6
On th e mat t er o f o v erco n fi d en c e s ee Sarah Li ch t en s t ei n , B. Fi s ch h o ff & L.

D. Ph i l l i p s , “Cal i b rat i o n o f P ro b ab i l i t i es : Th e St at e o f th e Art to 1 9 8 0 .”
See al s o G i d eo n Keren , “On th e Ab i l i t y o f Mo n i t o ri n g No n -Veri d i cal
Percep t i o n s an d Un cert ai n Kn o w l ed g e: So me Cal i b rat i o n St u d i es ”; an d
b y th e sam e “Cal i b rat i o n an d P ro b ab i l i t y Ju d g men t s : Co n cep t u al an d
Met h o d o l o g i cal Is s u es .”
12. Sp i n o za to Bl y en b erg h , 2 8 Jan . 1 6 6 5 ; Th e Ch i ef Wo r ks o f Ben ed i ct
d eS p i n o z a ,v o l . 2 , p . 3 4 3 .
13. Pl at o , Rep u b l i c, II, 3 6 8 - 3 6 9 .
14. Th e p i ct u r e man y au t h o rs d raw o f th e h u man mi n d , a s if it were

mad e u p ex cl u s i v el y b y t h e i n t el l ect , n amel y , o f o n e s ect i o n o n l y , l ea v es
n o ro o m fo r sel f-d ecep t i o n . Th i s i n t el l ect u al i s t p i ct u re g en erat es t h e fo l -
l o wi n g co n s i d erat i o n : Th e ch ea t er k n o ws th e tru t h , th erefo re h e is n o t
l i ab l e to b e ch eat ed ei t h er b y an o t h er o r b y h i ms e l f. J o h n El s t er wro t e in
1 9 8 3 ab o u t a seri es o f th eo ret i cal tri al s carri ed o u t b efo re: “….t h ey al l
t en d t o re p ro d u ce t h e b as i c p a rad o x in ev er-s u b t l e r fo rms ” (S o u r Gr a p es ,
p .1 4 9 ). Hi s ap t cri t i ci s m i s a l s o v al i d fo r man y t h i n g s wri t t en lat er o n . On
t h e o t h er h an d , t h ere are at t e mp t s at red u ct i o n wh o s e ten d en cy i s t o d en y
t h e ex i s t e n ce o f p arad o x i cal c as es . Th i s d en i al wa s co n g en i al to Jo h n
El s t er' s o u t l o o k , b u t h e ad mi t s (i n Ul ys s es a n d t h e S i r en s, p .1 7 7 ) t h at h e
fai l ed in th i s at t emp t . Jo h n s t o n t o u ch es th e ro o t o f t h e p ro b l em wh en h e
wri t es : “. ..t h e s u rface p arad o x an d th e d eep er p ar ad o x es o f sel f-d ecep t i o n
(...) ari s e b ecau s e as t h eo ri s t s o f s el f-d ecep t i o n we ten d t o o v er rat i o n al i ze
men t al p ro ces s es t h at are p u rp o s i v eb u t n o t in t en t i o n al ” (“ Sel f-Decep t i o n
an d th e Na t u re o f Mi n d ,” p .6 5 ) . A s y s t emat i c su rv e y o f v ari o u s wo rk s i n
t h i s s p h er e ap p ears i n : Al fred Mel e, “Recen t Wo rk o n Sel f-Decep t i o n .”
15. Th e read er wi l l fi n d two ex amp l es o f th i s k i n d o f sel f-d ecep t i o n in
Ev an Hu n t e r, S t r a n g er s Wh en We Meet , New Yo rk , 1 9 5 8 . Do n (Marg aret ' s
h u s b an d ) a n d Ev e (Larry ' s wi fe ) d ecei v e th ems el v es wi t h reg ard to th e
fi d el i t y o f t h ei r s p o u s es .
16. See: B. Wi l l i ams , “Deci d i n g t o b el i ev e,” p p . 1 4 7 -1 5 1 .

17. Max Sch el e r, Fo r ma l i s m in Et h i cs a n d No n -Fo r ma l Et h i cs o f
Va l u es , p p . 1 7 -1 8 . Sch el er cl ears a p at h fo r ax i o l o g y b y mean s o f th e
d i s t i n ct i o n b et we en a v al u e-p ro p ert y (o r a v al u e-q u al i t y ) an d th e v al u e-
b earer, b u t h e i s n o t met i cu l o u s i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b et ween a v al u e an d a
v al u e-p ro p ert y ev en wh ere su ch met i cu l o u s n es s is n eces s ary . So fo r
ex amp l e, w h en h e s p eak s o f th e ex i s t en ce an d n o n -e x i s t en ce o f a p o s i t i v e
v al u e, wh e n h e mean s th e ex i s t en ce an d n o n -ex i s t en ce o f a p o s i t i v e
v al u e-p ro p ert y . See, fo r i n s t a n ce, i b i d ., p .2 6 .
18. A p ers o n c ert ai n l y k n o ws wh at is fu n n y an d wh at is n o t , b u t h e
can n o t say wh at th e v al u e-b ear er o f th i s fu n n i n es s is . Th at is t o say , th e
fact t h at so met h i n g i s fu n n y i s a v al u e-p ro p ert y o f t h e lat t er, wh i ch act u -
al l y h as n o v al u e-b earer (o r i n an y cas e, we d o n o t k n o w s u ch a p ro p ert y ).
19. C .I. Lewi s , An An a l ys i s o f Kn o wl ed g ea n d V a l u a t i o n , p p . 4 1 9 -4 2 3 .

20. Sp i n o za ex p l ai n s p l eas u re an d p ai n as a p aral l el . As p ai n is a
s ad n es s l o cat ed i n so me p art o f man , s o i s p l eas u r e a jo y l o cat ed i n o n e o f
h i s p art s . See: Et h i cs , Part III, Pro p . 1 1 , Sch o l i u m.
21. In a cert a i n s en s e, th ere are n o n o n -men t al p h en o m en a, b ecau s e th e
p h en o men o n is mad e u p b y mat er i al s o f th e mi n d to wh i ch p h en o men a
Notes 339
ap p ear, i t is mad e u p b y s en s a t i o n s wh i ch d o n o t e x i s t b u t i n th e s en s i n g
s u b j ect . O n th e o t h er h an d , wh at is p h y s i cal d o es n o t ap p ear, it is n o t
g ras p ed b y a sen s e, b u t is th o u g h t b y th e sci en t i s t an d b y mean s o f
s y mb o l s an d si g n s . Th e p h y s i ci s t Art h u r Ed d i n g t o n ex p l ai n s th i s v ery
wel l in th e in t ro d u ct i o n to h i s b o o k Th e Na t u r e o f th e Ph ys i ca l Wo r l d ,
wh en h e co mp ares t h e real t ab l e h e wri t es o n t o i t s p h y s i cal co rrel at e : Th e
t ab l e h e w ri t es o n is so l i d , i mmo b i l e an d is a th i n g (o f su b s t an t i al
ch aract er) , wh i l e it s p h y s i cal co rrel at e (t ab l e N. 2 ) co n s i s t s mai n l y o f
emp t y sp ac e (i t is mad e u p o f at o ms an d th e v o l u me o f each at o m is
mo s t l y emp t y ), wh i l e t h e mas s it i s mad e o f co n s i s t s o f mo v i n g p art i cl es .
On e may ad d h ere th at th e p h y s i cal sp ace is n o t th e sp ace in wh i ch th e
s en s ed tab l e res i d es . Th at is to say , t h e p h y s i cal co rrel at e o f t h e sp eci fi c
t ab l e i s n o t s i mi l ar to i t . So far as n o n -men t al e n t i t i es d o n o t ap p ea r, o r s o
far as al l p h en o men a are men t a l , it wo u l d b e mi s l e ad i n g to sp eak ab o u t
men t al p h e n o men a so as to leav e th e imp res s i o n th a t th ey are a k i n d o f
p h en o men a.
22. Th e p h ras e s “wh at th e sen s es a b s o rb ” o r “act s o f r ecep t i o n ” are
met ap h o rs ex p r es s i n g t h emi n d ' s p a s s i v i t y , s o far as i t i s aware o f i t s el f i n
t h e s p h ere o f s en s at i o n . Fro m cert ai n as p ect s , t h e ex amp l e d o es n o t ma t ch
t h e ex emp l ar. So met h i n g o n e ab s o rb s ex i s t s p ri o r t o b ei n g ab s o rb ed an d
t h e same h o l d s fo r th e imag e i n v o l v ed in th e term “g i v en ”: So met h i n g
o n e g i v es ex i s t s b efo re it is g i v en . Red co l o r an d a h i g h -p i t ch ed to n e ,
l i k e p ai n an d p l eas u re, d o n o t ex i s t b efo re th ey a re g i v en to o r ab s o r b ed
b y th e mi n d . Th e imag es co n cer n i n g wh at is ab s o rb e d an d wh at is g i v en
are th eref o re to o o b j ect i v i s t i c i f u n d ers t o o d at f ace v al u e. Wh at is g i v en
t o ex t ern a l p ercep t i o n , o r ab s o rb ed b y it , h el p s u s to u n d ers t an d o u r
en v i ro n men t an d th i s co mp reh en s i o n is p art l y immed i at e; it al s o h el p s
u s b y i t s v al u at i v e q u al i t y t o fi n d o u r b eari n g s i n t h i s en v i ro n men t .
23. Th e man co n cern ed fi n d s it d i f fi cu l t to fi t in t o a wo rk p l ace an d n e-
g l ect s h i s d u t y to earn a li v i n g fo r h i s fami l y . A cco rd i n g l y th ere is a
fact u al co n n ect i o n in th i s cas e b et ween th e mat t er fro m wh i ch h i s at -
t en t i o n is sh i ft ed (t h e n eg l ec t ed d u t y ) an d th e ma t t er to wh i ch it sh i ft s
(h i s b ei n g si ck an d th erefo re in cap ab l e o f fu l fi l l i n g th e d u t y ); th i s
co n n ect i o n acco rd s effi ci en cy o f ex p u l s i o n . Ps y ch o l o g y is in t eres t ed i n
t h e d i s p l a cemen t wh i ch p rev ai l s h ere. Fo r o u r d i s c u s s i o n we n eed o n l y
o n e facet o f th e d es cri b ed d i s p l acemen t wh i ch b ear s ev i d en ce to a
rel at i v el y si mp l e st at e o f aff ai rs , n amel y , th at t h o u g h t s are p l eas an t to
t h i n k o r u n p l eas an t , an d acco r d i n g l y at t ract o r re p el , i.e., th ey aro u s e a
p o s i t i v e o r n eg at i v e mo t i v e, t o t h i n k o r t o i g n o re t h em. Th e p s y ch o l o g i s t
wh o to l d m e o f t h i s cas e i s Ez ek i el Av s h al o m. An o t h er cas e I k n o w o f i s a
p ers o n wh o wo rk ed d u ri n g h i s v acat i o n ev en th o u g h fi n an ci al l y h e d i d
n o t n eed i t at al l , an d in s p i t e o f t h e fact t h at th e wo rk d i d n o t at t ract h i m.
He ex p l ai n ed it b y say i n g th at d u ri n g v acat i o n s h e is b o t h ered b y b a d
t h o u g h t s a b o u t p as t d i s ap p o i n t men t s an d wro n g s d o n e to h i m man y
y ears b efo re, wh i l e th es e d o n o t b o t h er h i m wh i l e h e wo rk s . Th i s cas e is
t h e o p p o s i t e o f th e p rev i o u s o n e: Here a p ers o n fl ees to wo rk , th ere h e
fl ees fro m wo rk .
24. See Os k ar Krau s , Da s Bed ü r f n i s — Ei n Bei t r a g z u r b es ch r ei b en d en

Ps ych o l o g i e, p p . 8 -1 0 .
25. Hu s s erl d i s cu s s es th e d i s t i n ct i o n b et ween feel i n g an d emo t i o n as
t h e d i ffer en ce b et ween “p a s s i ve si n n l i ch e Gef ü h l e “an d “Gef ü h l s a kt e a l s
wer t en d e A kt e.” See: Al o i s Ro t h , Ed mu n d Hu s s er l s et h i s ch e Un t er -
s u ch u n g en — Da r g es t el l t a n h a n d s ei n er Vo r l es u n g s ma n u s kr i p t e, p p . 4 9 -
50.
26. In h i s p ap er “Wh at is an Emo t i o n ?” James wri t es : “ ...We feel so rry
b ecau s e we c ry , an g ry b ecau s e we st ri k e, afrai d b eca u s e we tremb l e, an d
n o t t h at w e cry , s t ri k e o r t re mb l e b ecau s e we are so rry , an g ry o r fearfu l ...”
(Wi l l i am J ames “Wh at i s an Emo t i o n ?” p .1 7 0 ). “I n o w p ro ceed to u rg e t h e
v i t al p o i n t o f my wh o l e th eo ry , wh i ch is th i s . If we fan cy so me st ro n g
emo t i o n , a n d th en try to ab s t r act fro m o u r co n s ci o u s n es s o f it al l th e
feel i n g s o f it s ch aract eri s t i c b o d i l y sy mp t o ms , we fi n d we h av e n o t h i n g
l eft b eh i n d , n o ' mi n d -s t u ff' o u t o f wh i ch th e emo t i o n can b e co n s t i t u t ed ,
an d th at a co l d an d n eu t ral st at e o f in t el l ect u al p ercep t i o n is al l th at
remai n s ” ( i b i d . p .1 7 3 ). H en ri Berg s o n , in Ti me a n d F r ee Wi l l , Ch ap t er I
(es p eci al l y p p . 2 8 -3 1 ) may su r p ri s e th e read er b y as s u mi n g a p o s i t i o n
t h at is cl o s e to James . In o rd er to sh o w th at th e mi n d p o s s es s es n o
q u an t i t at i v e el emen t o r as p ect at al l , h e h as to a n s wer t h e q u es t i o n w h at
t h e in t en s i t y o f feel i n g s an d emo t i o n is , th at d i f fers in d eg ree. An d h e
ex p l ai n s : Th e d i fferen ces in d eg ree d o n o t b el o n g to th e mi n d th at
p ercei v es o r ex p eri en ces feel i n g s an d emo t i o n s b u t to th e p ers o n ' s o wn
b o d y , wh i c h is p ercei v ed b y th e mi n d ; mo re p reci s e l y : th es e d i fferen ce s
i n d eg ree ari s e fro m th e si ze o f th e areas o f th e o wn b o d y , o r fro m th ei r
n u mb er; th es e ex t en s i v e d i ffer en ces in si ze are fe l t as in t en s i v e
d i fferen ce s in d eg ree. In th i s man n er h e tri es , so to say , to ex i l e
q u an t i t at i v e el emen t fro m th e real m o f th e mi n d . I n co n t rad i s t i n ct i o n to
J ames ' an d Berg s o n ' s o u t l o o k , y o u fi n d in Ben -Ze' e v a d es cri p t i o n o f
emo t i o n as b el o n g i n g to in t en t i o n an d as a v al u at i v e ap p ro ach . See: A.
Ben -Ze' ev , “Th e Nat u re o f Emo t i o n .”
27. Pl at o , 2 0 6 e.
28. Acco rd i n g to J . Ort eg a y Gas s e t , On Lo ve, p .1 0 .
29. i b i d . p p . 1 0 -1 2 .
30. Th at is to say th at acco rd i n g to Sp i n o za th e v al u a t i v e as p ect o f
i d eas b el o n g s to th ei r fo rmal en t i t y , wh i l e th ei r co g n i t i v e as p ect is th e
“o b j ect i v e en t i t y ” o f th e id eat u m . Th e co g n i t i v e as p e ct al o n e mak es u p
t h e co n t en t o f i d eas . See: Sp i n o za, On t h e Imp ro v e men t o f Un d ers t an d i n g
(Bru d er, § 3 3 -3 4 ) i n : Ch i ef Wo r k s o f S p i n o z a, v o l . II, p p . 1 2 -1 3 .
31. Sp i n o za, Et h i cs , Part III, d efi n i t i o n s o f emo t i o n s (affect s ), d efi n i -
t i o n s 6 , 7 , s ee al s o : Part III , s ch o l i u m t o p ro p o s i t i o n 1 3 .
32. i b i d ., i b i d .
33. Ort eg a Y G as s et , On Lo ve, p .1 2 .
34. Acco rd i n g to Bren t an o j o y i s a n act i v i t y o f l o v e a ri s i n g fro m b el i ef
t h at wh at o n e lo v es is real i ze d . He say s : “Di e g ü n s t i g s t e Lag e is d i e d er
Freu d e. Si e h at d as Ei g en t ü ml i ch e, d as si e d i e Bet ät i g u n g d er Li eb e i s t i m
Notes 341
Gl au b en , d as , was man li eb t , s ei v erwi rk l i ch t .” Gr u n d l eg u n g u n d Au f b a u

d er Et h i k, p .1 8 5 . “ Th e mo s t ad v an t ag eo u s si t u at i o n is th at in wh i ch we
feel jo y . It is u n i q u e in b ei n g th e fo rm in wh i ch o u r lo v e is man i fes t ed
wh en we b e l i ev e th at it s o b j ec t is real i zed ”). Th e Fo u n d a t i o n a n d
Co n s t r u ct i o n o f Et h i cs , p .1 7 0 . A d et ai l ed d i s cu s s i o n can b e fo u n d i n h i s
b o o k Ps ych o l o g y f r o m a n Emp i r i ca l S t a n d p o i n t.

35. Vi ct o r Kra ft , Fo u n d a t i o n s fo r S ci en t i f i c An a l ys i s o f Va l u e, p p . 1 2 -
1 3 (In th e o ri g i n al : Gr u n d l a g en ei n er Wi s s en s ch a f l i ch en Wer t l eh r e;
Wi en 1 9 3 7 ) .
36. “It is , th en , th e mat eri al co n t en t th at ch aract eri zes each v al u e an d
d i s t i n g u i s h es o n e fro m an o t h er. B u t t h i s co n t en t i s c o mp l et el y n eu t ral , a s
i s ev ery t h i n g t h at i s p u rel y m at eri al .” i b i d . p .1 3 .
37. “...[T]h e v ari et i es o f v al u e, th e v al u es , are n o t real l y
d i fferen t i at i o n s o f v al u e...” ib i d . p .1 6
38. i b i d . p p . 4 0 -4 5 .
39. i b i d . p . 4 4 .
40. Becau s e th e p h en o men o n o f fami l i ari t y can n o t b e b r o k en d o wn
i n t o n eu t r al mat t er an d a p o s i t i v e o r n eg at i v e p o s i t i o n (i b i d . p . 4 3 ), a n d
b ecau s e th er e i s n o g u aran t ee t h at si m i l ar cas es d o n o t o c cu r in t h e emo -
t i o n al s p h ere, Kraft p refers t o mak e a sh arp d i s t i n ct i o n b et ween as s u mi n g
p o s i t i o n s in th e sp h ere o f th i n k i n g ex p res s ed in l an g u ag e, an d th o s e i n
t h e sp h ere o f feel i n g an d emo t i o n ; th u s al l th e ca s es th at rep u d i at e h i s
t h es i s wi l l res i d e in th e lat t er sp h ere, wh i ch wi l l b e fen ced in as fa r as
p o s s i b l e, wh i l e i n t h e s p h ere o f t h o u g h t , t h es p h e re o f v al u e-s en t en ce s , h e
wi l l b e p e rmi t t ed u t t erl y t o r ej ect th e ap p ro ach t h at cl ai ms th e ex i s t en ce
o f v al u e q u al i t i es . He mak es t ermi n o l o g i cal d i s t i n ct i o n s ai med at
s t ren g t h en i n g th e b o rd er b et we en sp h eres (t h e wo rd s “v al u e” an d
“v al u at i o n ” refer o n l y to p red i cat i v e th o u g h t wh i l e “as s u mi n g a
p o s i t i o n ” is al s o u s ed i n refe ren ce t o t h e feel i n g an d emo t i o n al s p h ere).
41. See i b i d . p . 3 0 .
42. “A b i rd lo v er o u t b i rd wat ch i n g sees a g o l d en eag l e in fu l l fl i g h t .
Sh e th i n k s i t marv el l o u s , rare an d b eau t i fu l , an d th i s st ro n g l y affect s h er
p h y s i o l o g i cal l y . Bu t th i s d o es n o t lead h er to wan t to d o an y t h i n g . Sh e
d o es n o t s ay an y t h i n g an d n o t h i n g u n u s u al sh o ws i n h er ex p res s i o n an d
s h e mak es n o g es t u res . To an o b s erv er sh e wo u l d ap p ear merel y as a
wo man g azi n g at a b i rd in fl i g h t . It may ev en b e t h at sh e i s so tak en u p
wi t h th e s i g h t th at sh e d o es n o t ad v ert to h er o wn emo t i o n ” Wi l l i am
Ly o n s , Emo t i o n , p . 5 8 .
Part I, Ch apter 6 (pgs. 79-100 )

43. Th e at t ri b u t e “t ran s i t i v e” was g i v en to th e p re-re fl ect i v e lev el b y
Al ex an d er Pfän d er; see h i s Di e S eel e d es Men s ch en , Ver s u c h ei n er ver s t e-
h en d en Ps y ch o l o g i e, p . 2 8 . Wi t h reg ard to th e n at u re o f refl ect i o n see :

Nat h an Ro t en s t rei ch , Refl ect i o n an d Act i o n , Ch ap t e r o n e: At t i t u d e an d
Ho ri zo n . A n d Mi ch ael St rau s s , Emp f i n d u n g , In t en t i o n u n d Zei c h en ; VI:
Di e Refl ex i o n .
44. See F. Bre n t an o , Ps ych o l o g y fr o m a n Emp i r i ca l S t a n d p o i n t, v o l . I,
p p . 2 9 -3 4 .
45. In Bren t an o ' s s ch o o l o f t h o u g h t an d in p art i cu l ar in Os k ar Krau s we
fi n d a d i s t i n ct i o n in p ri n ci p l e b et ween q u al i t at i v e p referen ce an d o t h er
v al u at i o n s . See: O. Krau s , Zu r Th eo r i e d es Wer t es , p p . 8 2 -8 5 . Krau s b as es
t h e t h eo ry o f ex ch an g e v al u e o n t h i s d i s t i n ct i o n .
46. Th e sen t en ce “t h i s is a wo rt h w h i l e d eed ” ex p res s es u s u al l y a
s t at emen t o n th e v al u at i v e lev el , wh i l e t h e st at em en t “X ju d g es t h at t h i s
d eed is wo rt h wh i l e” st at es a m et a-v al u at i v e fact . Th e fi rs t st at emen t may
b e v al u at i v el y co rrect , th e se co n d may b e tru e. Th e fi rs t may ex p res s
v al u at i v e k n o wl ed g e, th e s eco n d p u re co g n i t i o n (v a l u e-n eu t ral ). A p ers o n
may , h o wev er, ex p res s in t en t i o n o n th e v al u at i v e l ev el in say i n g “I
b el i ev e th at t h i s d eed is wo rt h wh i l e,” b u t b ecau s e h e mi x es it wi t h me t a-
v al u at i v e in fo rmat i o n (at face v al u e t h e st at emen t mat ch es t h e p as s i n g o f
met a-v al u a t i v e in fo rmat i o n ), t h e in t en t i o n is ex p r es s ed in a weak en ed
man n er. Th at i s t o s ay , t h e as s u med p o s i t i o n i s q u al i fi ed .
Ral p h Bart o n Perry wri t es ab o u t su b j ect i v i s t i c rel at i v i s m, tak i n g h i s
cu e fro m M o o re: “A seco n d st at emen t o f th i s v i ci o u s rel at i v i s m is th e
as s ert i o n `t h at wh en we ju d g e an act i o n to b e ri g h t o r wro n g wh at we a re
as s ert i n g is merel y t h at s o meb o d y o r o t h er t h i n k s it t o b e ri g h t o r wr o n g .`
Gen eral i ze d an d s i mp l i fi ed , th i s as s ert i o n is t o t h e effect th at co n s i s t s in
b ei n g th o u g h t t o b e v al u ab l e — `t h ere is n o t h i n g e i t h er g o o d o r b ad , b u t
t h i n k i n g m ak es i t s o .` No w t h e fu n d amen t al d i ffi cu l t y wi t h t h i s v i ew l i es
i n th e fac t th at o n e wo u l d t h e n h av e n o t h i n g to t h i n k ab o u t . If a t h i n g is
v al u ab l e b y v i rt u e o f b ei n g b e l i ev ed to b e v al u ab l e, th en wh en o n e
b el i ev es a th i n g to b e v al u ab l e, o n e b el i ev es th at it is b el i ev ed to b e
v al u ab l e, o r o n e b el i ev es t h at it i s b el i ev ed to b e b el i ev ed t o b e v al u ab l e,
an d s o o n ad i n fi n i t u m. In s h o rt , t h ere can b e n o ju d g men t ab o u t v al u e , o r
o b j ect o t h er th an th e act o f j u d g men t it s el f — a j u d g ed as wel l as a
j u d g i n g .” R. B. Perry , Gen er a l Th eo r y o f Va l u e, p p . 1 2 9 - 1 3 0
Perry ' s co n s i d erat i o n s are wel l arran g ed . He b el i e v es t h at th e refu t at i o n
h e p res en t s u n s et t l es Ed ward W es t ermarck ' s th eo ry , b u t n o t h i s o wn . In
o rd er n o t to b e affect ed b y th i s refu t at i o n , an ax i o l o g i cal th eo ry h as to
ch o o s e o n e o f th e fo l l o wi n g tw o co u rs es : Ei t h er (A ), th e co u rs e o f a
co n s i s t en t ax i o l o g i cal o b j ect i v i s m as fo rmu l at ed b y Ni co l ai Hart man n .
Or (B), th e co u rs e o f a p h en o m en o l o g i cal d i s t i n ct i o n b et ween a v al u at i v e
an d a met a -v al u at i v e l ev el , b a s ed o n t h e d i s t i n ct i o n b et ween co n t en t an d
fo rm in t h e in t en t i o n as a wh o l e. A t h eo ry wh i ch d o es n o t s et o u t o n o n e
o f th es e c o u rs es wi l l in ev i t ab l y d ri ft to ward s cap ri ci o u s in d i v i d u al i s t i c
s u b j ect i v i s m. Perry h i ms el f d o es n o t wan t to d ri ft in th i s d i rect i o n , h e
co n s i d ers it d an g ero u s , b u t n e i t h er d o es h e ch o o s e o n e o f th e co u rs es
Notes 343
men t i o n ed . Acco rd i n g l y , h e ru n s ti me an d ag ai n in t o d i ffi cu l t i es in

d efen d i n g h i s p o s i t i o n ag ai n s t co mp l ai n t s h eh i ms e l f p res en t s s o w el l .
47. See: M. St rau s s , Emp f i n d u n g , In t en t i o n u n d Zei c h en , § 9 -1 2 .
48. See, fo r i n s t an ce, H. Berg s o n , Th e two S o u r ces o f Mo r a l i t y a n d
Rel i g i o n, p .2 1 9 .
Part II, Ch ap ter 1 (pgs. 103-1 08)

49. Cl aren ce Irv i n g Lewi s wri t es : “In th i s sen s e o f 'i n t ri n s i c v al u e' as
t h e v al u e o f th at wh i ch is v al u ed fo r it s o wn sak e , n o o b j ect i ve exi s t en t
h a s s t r i ct l y in t r i n s i c va l u e; al l v al u e s in o b j ect s are ex t ri n s i c o n l y . Th i s
i s so b eca u s e th e en d , b y rel a t i o n to wh i ch al o n e an y t h i n g is u l t i mat e l y
t o b e ju d g ed g en u i n el y v al u ab l e, is so me p o s s i b l e real i zat i o n o f
g o o d n es s i n d i rect ex p eri en ce” (An An a l ys i s o f Kn o wl ed g e a n d V a l u a -
t i o n, p .3 8 7 ). St u d y i n g Lewi s n o t e th at h e d i s t i n g u i s h e s b et ween i n t ri n s i c
an d in h ere n t v al u e, th e lat t er b ei n g a k i n d o f ex t ri n s i c v al u e wh i ch
i n cl u d es o b j ect s th at acco rd u s d i rect p l eas u re, a n d d o es n o t in cl u d e
u s efu l mea n s wh i ch acco rd p l ea s u re o n l y t h ro u g h t h ei r res u l t s .
Mo o re wri t es : “By far th e mo s t v a l u a b l e th i n g s , w h i ch we k n o w o r can
i mag i n e, a re cert ai n st a t es o f co n s ci o u s n es s , wh i ch may b e ro u g h l y d e-
s cri b ed as th e p l eas u res o f h u man in t erco u rs e an d th e en j o y men t o f
b eau t i fu l o b j ect s ... —I h av e m y s el f u rg ed ... th at th e mere ex i s t en ce o f
wh at i s b e au t i fu l d o es ap p ear to h av e s o me in t ri n s i c v al u e; b u t I reg a rd i t
as in d u b i t ab l e t h at Pro f. Si d g wi ck was s o far ri g h t in t h e v i ew... th a t s u ch
mere ex i s t en ce o f wh at i s b eau t i fu l h as v al u e s o s mal l as to b e n eg l i g i b l e,
i n co mp ari s o n wi t h th at wh i ch at t ach es t o th e co n s ci o u s n es s o f b e au t y ”
(Pr i n ci p i a Et h i ca , p p . 1 8 8 - 1 8 9 ; § 1 1 3 ). See al s o : G. E. Mo o re, Et h i cs , p p .
1 5 3 -1 5 4 .
Key n es wri t es i n h i s memo i rs a b o u t t h eo u t l o o k t h a t p rev ai l ed i n Mo o re ' s
ci rcl e: “N o t h i n g mat t ered ex ce p t st at es o f mi n d ” ( My Earl y Bel i efs , in
Two Memo i r s, Lo n d o n 1 9 4 9 , p .8 3 ). Mary Mi d g l ey cri t i ci zes th i s o u t l o o k .
See: Mary Mi d g l ey , Hea r t a n d Mi n d , p p . 6 5 -6 7 .
50. Ed mu n d Hu s s erl al s o t ak es th i s st an d . In h i s su mma ry o f Hu s s erl ' s
man u s cri p t s Al o i s Ro t h , p .1 1 0 , wri t es : “Der Wert — d as is t d er g ro ß e
Irrt u m jed er h ed o n i s t i s ch en Th eo ri e — is t n i e d as Ich erl eb en , d er p er-
s o n al e Ak t d es Wert en s , d as Ge fü h l , so n d ern d as am Ob j ek t d es Wert en s
Erfü h l t e” (“Th e v al u e — th i s i s th e g reat erro r o f al l h ed o n i s t i c th eo ri es
— i s n ev er th e s el f' s ex p eri en ce, t h e p ers o n al act o f v al u at i o n , t h e f eel i n g ,
b u t th e o b j ect o f wh at is fel t b y v al u at i o n .” Fu rt h er o n , o n t h e same p ag e
h e q u o t es Hu s s erl ' s man u s cri p t : “Ni ch t d as Si ch fre u en is t d as
Wi l l en s zi e l , so n d ern d as Erfre u l i ch e” (“Th e g o al o f th e wi l l i s n o t b e i n g
g l ad , b u t wh at g l ad d en s ”). On e sh o u l d n o t e h ere th at th e sh i ft o f
emp h as i s f ro m th e o b j ect t o th e su b j ect , fro m wh at is ex p eri en ced t o t h e
ex p eri en ce , is n o t o n l y u p h el d b y h ed o n i s m; o n th i s see th e p rev i o u s
n o t e.

51. Co mp are: D erek Parfi t , Rea s o n s a n d Per s o n s, p p . 1 5 8 - 1 6 3 .
52. Ari s t o t l e, Ni co ma ch ea n Et h i cs , 1 1 6 1 b . S o me d i ffi cu l t y o f
i n t erp ret at i o n ari s e s fro m co mp ari s o n wi t h Po l i t i cs , 1 2 5 5 b .
Part II, Ch ap ter 4 ((pgs. 123- 133)

53. Hare wri t e s : “Th e p ro b l em may al s o b e p u t i n th i s way : if we k n ew
al l th e d e s cri p t i v e p ro p ert i es wh i ch a p art i cu l ar st rawb erry h ad (k n ew , o f
ev ery d es c ri p t i v e sen t en ce rel at i n g t o th e st rawb e rry , wh et h er i t was tru e
o r fal s e), an d if we k n ew al s o t h e mean i n g o f th e wo rd “g o o d ,” t h en wh at
el s e sh o u l d we req u i re to k n o w , in o rd er to b e ab l e to tel l wh et h er a
s t rawb erry was a g o o d o n e? On c e th e q u es t i o n is p u t th i s way , th e an s wer
s h o u l d b e ap p aren t . We sh o u l d req u i re to k n o w, wh a t are th e cri t eri a in
v i rt u e o f wh i ch a st rawb erry i s to b e cal l ed a g o o d o n e, o r wh at are t h e
ch aract eri s t i cs th at mak e a s t rawb erry a g o o d o n e, o r wh at i s th e s t an d ard
o f g o o d n es s in st rawb erri es . W e sh o u l d req u i re to b e g i v en th e maj o r
p remi s e.” (R. M. Hare, Th e La n g u a g e o f Mo r a l s, p . 1 1 1 ).
Th e q u es t i o n wh et h er th e s t raw b erri es are g o o d is d et ermi n ed wh en th ey
are eat en , i.e., n o t o n th e v e rb al (o r p red i cat i v e ) lev el . Th e u t t eran ce th at
cert ai n st rawb erri es are g o o d ei t h er ex p res s es p o s t -fact u m t h e ex p eri e n ce
o f eat i n g th em, o r a g u es s th a t wi l l b e v eri fi ed o r refu t ed b y fu t u re eat i n g .
Th e q u es t i o n is th erefo re n o t d et ermi n ed b y th e a p p l i ca t i o n o f cr i t er i a,
u n l es s y o u say th at th e act o f eat i n g is al s o a cr i t eri o n . Bu t if y o u say
t h i s , y o u b l u r th e b o rd er b et w een v al u at i o n th at t ak es p l ace o n th e
p red i cat i v e lev el , wh i ch req u i res ju d g men t , an d v a l u at i o n th at is o n l y
ex p res s ed p o s t eri o rl y o n t h e s ame l ev el .
54. Th e st u d y o f b i o l o g y so far as it i s rel ev an t t o t h e th eo ry o f v al u e,
s h o u l d b eg i n wi t h th e fact o f n at u ral d eat h an d th e d et eri o rat i o n lead i n g
t o it . Th e sci en t i s t , Carl Fri ed ri ch v o n Wei zs äck e r wri t es th at h e see s n o
b i o -ch emi c al reas o n wh y in d i v i d u al s wh o li v e o n wi t h o u t a ti me li mi t
(u n l es s k i l l ed b y v i o l en ce) s h o u l d n o t b ep o s s i b l e . Bu t a l i mi t ed (o r ev en
s h o rt ) li f e ex p ect an cy i s in h i s o p i n i o n fo r th e g o o d o f th e s p eci es o r t h e
race, an d rap i d n at u ral rep l ac emen t o f g en erat i o n s mak es rap i d
d ev el o p men t p o s s i b l e: “Th e mo r e g en erat i o n s a s p ec i es p ro d u ces wi t h i n
a g i v en p e ri o d o f ti me, th e mo re mu t at i o n s , o r co m b i n at i o n s o f
mu t at i o n s , wi l l h av e a ch an ce o f b ei n g tri ed o u t .” Wei zs äck er, Th e
Rel eva n ce o f S ci en ce, p .1 3 4 . Wh en a d ras t i c ch an g e in cl i mat e an d fl o ra
o ccu rs , th e race wh o s e g en erat i o n s are rap i d l y rep l aced , i. e., wh o s e
memb ers h a v e a sh o rt er li fe ex p ect an cy , wi l l ad j u s t mo re eas i l y . An d
i n d eed , an i mal s u s u al l y tak e c are o f th ei r y o u n g b u t n o t o f t h ei r p are n t s ,
an d wi t h t h i s b eh av i o r rep res e n t th e sp eci es ' “i n t eres t .” T h erefo re th e
t en d en cy , in h eren t to an i mal s wh i ch mu l t i p l y s ex u a l l y , to d et eri o rat e an d
d i e wh en t h ey h av e es t ab l i s h ed a n ew g en erat i o n , a i d s d ev el o p men t .
Notes 345
It may wel l b e th at p art o f n a t u re' s p ro p en s i t y to fav o r y o u n g creat u r es

ari s es fro m th e co n g ru en ce (t h o u g h n o t co mp l et e, i t is co n s i d erab l e) o f
t h ree fact o rs : o f (A) wh at t h e y as p i re to an d d es i re, o f (B) wh at g i v e s t h em
p l eas u re a n d o f (C) wh at is u s efu l fo r th e ex i s t en ce o f th e (i n d i v i d u al )
o rg an i s m ( an d t h u s , o f co u rs e, t h e o p p o s i t e — fro m wh at t h ey reco i l , w h at
mak es t h em so rry an d wh at h arm s ). On t h e o t h er h an d , p art o f t h e d i s fa v o r
n at u re sh o ws th e o l d ari s es fr o m th e fact th at th i s th reefo l d co n g ru en ce
n o lo n g er p rev ai l s . Fo r ex amp l e, th e o l d p ers o n en j o y s th e s ame fo o d h e
en j o y ed in h i s y o u t h , b u t n o w th i s fo o d h arms h i m an d t h u s — acco rd i n g
t o Wei zs äc k er — b en efi t s t h e r ace. Th e ab s en ce o f t h i s co n g ru en ce (wh i c h
p rev ai l s f o r t h e y o u n g ) g en era t es a s t at e o f d et er i o rat i o n an d mak es i t g o
o n t i l l d e at h o ccu rs .
55. In h i s b o o k Et h i k d es rei n en Wi l l en s Herman n C o h en co n d u ct s a
b at t l e ag a i n s t th e p ri n ci p l e o f p l eas u re(-d es i re) an d so rro w. See p p . 1 5 0 -
1 6 0 . (In t h e German o ri g i n al p l eas u re an d d es i re a re d es i g n at ed b y th e
s ame wo rd “Lu s t ”).
Co h en d o es n o t d i s t i n g u i s h b et ween t h e v al u at i v e a n d th e met a-v al u at i v e
l ev el , an d th erefo re emp h as i ze s th e v al u at i v e l ev e l it s el f. He t ri es t o d en y
t h e ro l e f eel i n g p l ay s in th e set o f et h i cal ru l es in th e same man n er in
wh i ch h e d en i ed th e sen s o ry g i v en in h i s th eo ry o f co g n i t i o n . In t h e
co u rs e o f th i s b at t l e h e sees th e ro l e acco rd ed to p l eas u re, d es i re an d
s o rro w as a v al u e-mark (Wert ze i ch en ) an d a v al u e-m eas u re (Wert mes s er).
See p p . 1 6 2 -1 6 5 . Th e v al u e-mar k b ears ev i d en ce t o h eal t h an d d i s eas e a n d
i n g en eral to th e v al u e o f a s eg men t in th e real c o u rs e o f li fe. Yet , to
at t ri b u t e su ch a ro l e t o feel i n g i s acco rd i n g to C o h en al s o o p p o s ed to t h e
s o v erei g n t y o f p u re wi l l . Th u s , as o n e sh o u l d d en y th e d i rect v al u e o f
feel i n g , o n e sh o u l d al s o d en y it s in d i rect v al u e . Co h en d o es n o t p re ach
ab s t i n en ce fro m li fe' s p l eas u r es , b u t rej ect s th em a p l ace in th e
co n s i d erat i o n s o f p ract i cal re as o n . Co h en ' s in t el l ect u al i s m su rfaces i n
t h at h e d o es n o t sp en d arg u men t at i v e effo rt to ref u t e th e d i rect v al u e o f
feel i n g (t h e g o o d in feel i n g g o o d ), wh i ch h e v i ews b u t as t h e emb o d i me n t
o f a h ed o n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y , b u t sp en d s su ch effo rt ag ai n s t th e ri v al
i n t el l ect u al i s m, wh i ch v i ews t h e feel i n g s o f d es i r e, p l eas u re an d p ai n as
s i g n s o f t h e v a l u e o f t h e l i fe-co u r s e, t h at req u i re i n t erp ret at i o n .
Part II, Chapter 6 (pgs. 137-147)

56. “In my o p i n i o n , th ere are two th i n g s wh i ch h av e la i d as t ray th o s e
p h i l o s o p h ers th at h av e i n s i s t ed s o mu ch o n t h e s el fi s h n es s o f man . In t h e
fi rs t p l ac e, th ey fo u n d th at e v ery act o f v i rt u e o r fri en d s h i p was a t t en d ed
wi t h a sec r et p l ea s u r e ; wh en ce th ey co n cl u d ed , th at fri en d s h i p an d
v i rt u e co u l d n o t b e d i s i n t eres t ed . Bu t th e fal l acy o f t h i s is o b v i o u s . Th e
v i rt u o u s s en t i men t o r p as s i o n p ro d u ces th e p l eas u r e, an d d o es n o t ari s e
fro m it ... ” Dav i d Hu me, “Of t h e Di g n i t y o r Mean n es s o f Hu man Nat u re,” p .
87.
57. Aes t h et i c v al u es are b as ed o n v ari o u s v i t al v al u es , amo n g th em t h e

s ex u al u rg e, an d in th ei r tu rn th ey sh ap e th es e v i t al v al u es . Hart man n
d i s cu s s es th e is s u e fro m th e v i ewp o i n t o f v al u e-t h eo ry . N. Hart man n ,
Äs t h et i k, p p . 3 5 1 -3 5 6 .

58. Gad amer i s v ery cri t i cal o f u n i v ers al i t y an d ap ri o ri s m in et h i cs , an d
i n p art i cu l ar o f th e a-p ri o ri u n i v ers al in n o n -fo r mal et h i cs , n amel y , th at
arran g ed a s a mat eri al et h i cs o f v al u es . Fro m th e p ract i cal an g l e th i s
u n i v ers al i t y si n s i n h i s o p i n i o n mo re ag ai n s t th e co n cret e si t u at i o n t h an
t h e Cat eg o ri cal Imp erat i v e d o e s , an d fro m t h e t h eo ret i cal an g l e i t cre at es a
t an g l e o f p ro b l ems wi t h reg ard t o t h e rel at i v i t y a n d ab s o l u t en es s o f v a l u e
an d th e sc al e o f v al u es . Gad am er sees th e fact th a t a d u t y to lo v e is
i mp o s s i b l e as a weak n es s in h er en t to th e mo ral i t y o f d u t y . It is a
weak n es s , b ecau s e l o v e is s u p e ri o r t o a d eed b en ef i t i n g an o t h er, wh i ch i s
d o n e o u t o f d u t y ; lo v e is s u p e ri o r to th i s d eed fr o m th e mo ral as p ect as
wel l . See: H. G. Gad amer, “Üb e r d i e Mö g l i ch k ei t ei n er p h i l o s o p h i s ch en
Et h i k ,” p . 1 8 5 . Wi t h reg ard t o t h e st at u s o f lo v e in v al u e-t h eo ry , see wh at
Gad amer sa y s ab o u t th e th eo ry o f th e 1 9 t h cen t u ry p h i l o s o p h er Ru d o l f
Herman n Lo t ze: H. G. Gad amer, “Das o n t o l o g i s ch e Pr o b l em d es Wert es ,”
p p . 2 0 8 -2 1 3 . Gad amer p o i n t s t o Lo t ze' s in fl u en ce o n Fran z Bren t an o wh o
b as ed et h i cs o n l o v e fo r wh at is wo rt h wh i l e t o lo v e (an d h at e fo r wh at is
wo rt h wh i l e to h at e). Th ere is n o d o u b t th at Bren t a n o ' s th eo ry i s th e s o i l
i n wh i ch t h e g en eral th eo ry o f v al u e g rew. “Th e ca p aci t y fo r emo t i o n al
j u d g men t ” acco rd i n g to Lo t ze a n d fri en d s h i p , as d i s cu s s ed b y Ari s t o t l e
(wh i ch is n o t su b j ect t o th e w i l l ei t h er, an d can n o t b e o rd ered t o eme rg e)
i n Gad amer ' s o p i n i o n mak e u p t h e n u cl eu s o f a co n c ret e et h o s an d p o i n t s
o f su p p o rt fo r p h i l o s o p h i cal d i s co u rs e ab o u t it . B u t th e co n cret e et h o s
n eed s n o p h i l o s o p h y , n ei t h er in o r d er to emerg e, n o r i n o rd er to g ai n
au t h o ri t y . See: H. G. Gad amer, “Wert et h i k u n d 'p rak t i s ch e Ph i l o s o p h i e' ,”
p p . 1 1 6 -1 1 9 . So me p h i l o s o p h y ma y err b y ap p eal i n g a g ai n s t et h i cs , an d
cu l t u re th erefo re n eed s an o t h e r p h i l o s o p h y wh i ch c an cel s su ch an erro r
o u t ; th i s ro l e is fu l fi l l ed b y Kan t i an fo rmal i s m. On th e ju s t i fi cat i o n o f
p h i l o s o p h y Gad amer s ay s : “...d i e ei g en t l i ch e Rech t fert i g u n g ... Si e b es t eh t
d ari n , d as ... d er Geb rau ch d er Vern u n ft i mmer d er Kri t i k b ed arf. Si e d i en t
i m Th eo ret i s ch en d azu , d em tra n s zen d en t al en Sch ei n n i ch t zu v erfal l en ,
d er in d i e Irru n g en d er Met ap h y s i k v erfü h rt , u n d i m Mo ral i s ch en d azu ,
d as Vern ü n ft el n g eg en d i e k at e g o ri s ch e Verb i n d l i ch k ei t d es Si t t en g e-
s et zes zu u n t erb i n d en (...) De r Fo rmal i s mu s d er Ka n t i s ch en Et h i k sch i e n
mi r d i es er n eg at i v en in d i rek t e n Fu n k t i o n d er p h i l o s o p h i s ch en Refl ex i o n
g erad e an g emes s en ” (“...t h e ac t u al j u s t i fi cat i o n .. . man i fes t s i t s el f i n t h at ...
t h e u s e o f reas o n al way s n eed s cri t i ci s m. Th eo ret i cal l y i t serv es t o e v ad e
t h e trap o f tran s cen d en t al ap p earan ces wh i ch en t i c e u s in t o th e erro rs o f
met ap h y s i c s , an d mo ral l y it se rv es to p rev en t in t e l l ect u al ma n i p u l at i o n
ai med ag ai n s t th e cat eg o ri cal v al i d i t y o f et h i cs . (...) Th e fo rmal i s m o f
Notes 347
Kan t i an et h i cs ap p ears to me a s ap p ro p ri at e to fu l fi l l th i s n eg at i v e,
i n d i rect f u n ct i o n ” (i b i d ., p . 1 1 7 ). Wh i l e Gad amer, acco rd i n g to h i s o wn
l i g h t s , fi n d s a l eg i t i mat e p l a ce fo r Kan t ' s d i s co u rs e, h e fai l s t o fi n d s u ch a
p l ace fo r Sch el er an d Hart man n . In my o p i n i o n th i n k i n g in g en eral an d
reas o n i n p art i cu l ar fu l fi l l a mu ch b ro ad er, i n d ep en d en t ro l e i n th e s p h ere
o f p o s i t i o n s act u al l y as s u med b y h u man s wi t h reg ar d t o each o t h er, th a n
t h at wh i ch emerg es in Gad amer' s th ree wo rk s men t i o n ed h ere. Reg ard i n g
t h e su p eri o ri t y o f l o v e o v er a d eed d o n e o u t o f d u t y , th e q u es t i o n ari s es
wh et h er th ey can b e ran k ed o n th e same scal e. We c an co mp are act i o n s
s u b j ect to th e wi l l an d ran k t h em o n o n e scal e fro m in feri o r t o su p eri o r;
i n a d i ffe ren t sen s e we may p e rh ap s ran k emo t i o n s fro m an et h i cal as p e ct
(fo r in s t an ce, wh en o n e as k s wh at i s wo rt h wh i l e t o fo s t er i n a p u p i l ), b u t I
d o n o t s ee h o w o n e can co mp are an act i o n o u t o f d u t y wi t h an act i o n t h at
ex p res s es emo t i o n acco rd i n g to th ei r h ei g h t , an d e v en les s h o w to
co mp are it wi t h th e emo t i o n it s el f. Et h i cs treat s o f id eal s wh i ch are a
p ro d u ct o f reas o n an d acco rd i n g l y mark ed b y th e st amp o f u n i v ers al i t y .
An d th ey b ear th i s st amp al s o wh ere it is n o t li k e l y fo r et h i cs to b e
t ran s l at ed in t o th e lan g u ag e o f co mman d s . Wh en an et h i cal v al u e is
creat ed b y reas o n o b s erv i n g em o t i o n s l i k e fri en d s h i p an d lo v e, i t remai n s
a v al u e cr eat ed b y reas o n an d es t ab l i s h ed b y t h e w i l l . A v al u e o f l o v e , l i k e
t h at fo s t e red b y Ch ri s t i an i t y , n amel y , lo v e fo r th e al i en h u man b ei n g , is
an id eal c reat ed b y reas o n i n o n e o f i t s h i s t o ri ca l fi g u res ; it i s mar k ed b y
t h e s t amp o f g en eral i t y an d i s n o t i d en t i cal wi t h it s p ers o n al real i za t i o n s ;
acco rd i n g l y , i t is n o t i t s el f an emo t i o n , n o r i s i t “a cap aci t y fo r em o t i o n al
j u d g men t ” wh i ch lean s o n emo t i o n s as th ey are act u al l y ex p eri en ced . An
et h i cal v a l u at i o n i s b y i t s v e ry n at u re n o t a p re- p red i cat i v e v al u at i o n t h at
fi n d s it s ex p res s i o n p o s t -fact u m o n th e p red i cat i v e lev el ; th u s , b ecau s e
et h i cal v a l u es are s et o u t in a web g ro u n d ed i n re fl ect i o n (wh i ch d o es n o t
p res i d e o n th e p re-p red i cat i v e lev el ). Th i s p ro p o s i t i o n is co rrect ev e n
wh en t h e o b j ect o f v al u at i o n i s an emo t i o n , an d al s o wh en t h e v al u e i t s el f
i s creat ed wh i l e emo t i o n s are b ei n g o b s erv ed . Let u s p as s fro m th i s me t a-
et h i cal p h i l o s o p h i cal co n t ro v e rs y b et ween emo t i o n an d reas o n to th e
p o l ari zat i o n o f th e in d i v i d u al a n d so ci et y it in v o l v es — th e in d i v i d u al
as th e o n e wh o ex p eri en ces th e emo t i o n an d so ci et y as a co mmu n i t y o f
reas o n . Th e cap aci t y fo r emo t i o n al ju d g men t wh i ch lean s o n emo t i o n s
an d th ei r rel at i v e wei g h t , is req u i red as a co mp l emen t o n p art o f th e
i n d i v i d u al to t h e et h i cs co mmo n t o h i m an d to o t h e ri n d i v i d u al s wh o ar e
memb ers o f s o me so ci et y . Un d er real -l i fe ci rcu ms t a n ces th e emerg en ce o f
a co n t rad i ct i o n b e t ween t h es e co mp l eme n t ary p o l es i s al s o p o s s i b l e. Yet I
s ee n o way in wh i ch emo t i o n an d th e cap aci t y fo r e mo t i o n al ju d g men t
can rep l ac e mat eri al a-p ri o ri u n i v ers al i t y i n et h i cs . To mak e u s ad mi t th e
ex i s t en ce o f t h i s p h i l o s o p h i ca l p ro b l em, we wo u l d h av e t o b e sh o wn t h a t
at th ei r b as i s th e rel at i o n b e t ween th em is ri v al r y an d n o t co mp l emen t .
Fi n al l y I b el i ev e th at p h i l o s o p h i cal v al u e-t h eo ry h as to b e a v al u e-
n eu t ral d i s ci p l i n e (wh i ch th er efo re d o es n o t as p i r e to an y “au t h o ri t y to
d i ct at e,” wh i ch Gad amer d en i es p h i l o s o p h y ), b u t I see n o imp ed i men t
p rev en t i n g t h e p h i l o s o p h er fro m p art i ci p at i n g i n h i s p art i cu l ar ma n n er as
p h i l o s o p h e r in a d i s cu s s i o n , f o r ex amp l e, o f wh at ju s t i ce is , ev en if th i s
d i s cu s s i o n i s s al i en t l y n o rmat i v e, n amel y , s et s o u t t o cry s t al l i ze n o r ms .
59. In d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b et ween cl o s ed mo ral i t y (an d cl o s ed et h i cs ) an d
o p en mo ral i t y (an d o p en et h i cs ) I s et o u t in th e w ak e o f Hen ri Berg s o n ' s
Th e Two S o u r ces o f Mo r a l i t y a n d Rel i g i o n . Ho wev er, in co n t rad i s t i n ct i o n
t o cl o s ed mo ral i t y (o f a tri b e o r a g ro u p ) Berg s o n d o es n o t es t ab l i s h
fo rmal mo r al i t y , as p res en t ed b y Kan t , in th e ro l e o f o p en an d u n i v ers al
mo ral i t y , b u t an et h i cs b as ed o n emo t i o n s an d o n p ers o n al creat i o n o f
v al u es d er i v ed fro m th em. In t h i s mat t er I d i d n o t fo l l o w in h i s st ep s .
Al t h o u g h I l earn t fro m Berg s o n wi t h reg ard t o th e creat i o n o f v al u es a n d
t h e p ro ces s i n g o f v al u e-b o d i es b y reas o n ro o t ed in emo t i o n , I b e l i ev e
ax i o l o g y s h o u l d n o t ig n o re fo r mal mo ral i t y an d it s sp eci al lo cat i o n in
t h e v al u e- s y s t em. Berg s o n b el i ev es th at in b o t h k i n d s o f mo ral i t y th e
i n t el l ect , in i t s o wn way , p ro ces s es v al u es wh o s e so u rce i s ex t ern al t o t h e
i n t el l ect . Th i s s o u rce is n at u ral an d i n feri o r to th e i n t el l ect wh en we d eal
wi t h th e m o ral i t y o f a tri b e, wh i ch is an in t el l ect u al ex p re s s i o n o f th e
i n s t i n ct t h at k eep s th e an t at it s tas k o n th e an t h eap , an d to a d eg r ee a
s u rro g at e o f th i s i n s t i n ct . Bu t th e s o u rce o f v al u es is h u m an an d s u p eri o r
t o th e i n t el l ect wh en we d eal wi t h o p en mo ral i t y , wh i ch is t h e i n t el l ect u al
p ro ces s i n g p i o n eeri n g i n d i v i d u al s acco rd to em o t i o n s t h at o p p o s e d eed s
o f in j u s t i ce. Mo ral emo t i o n is ri ch in co n t en t , a b o t t o ml es s so u rce o f
i d eas , an d “mo re t h an an i d ea” (p .7 6 ).
60. Karl A. Ec k h ard t (ed .): Ger ma n en r e ch t e — Text e u n d
ü b er s et z u n g en , Vo l . 2 , p p . 1 4 1 -1 4 3 .
61. Ed ward Wes t ermarck co l l ect ed a n d an al y zed a larg e amo u n t o f
emp i ri cal mat eri al ax i o l o g y n eed s . O f p art i cu l ar imp o rt a n ce are h i s Th e
Or i g i n a n d De vel o p men t o f Mo r a l Id ea s , an d Ch r i s t i a n i t y a n d Mo r a l s.
Hi s o wn , e mo t i v i s t i c co n cl u s i o n s d o n o t n eces s ari l y ari s e fro m th es e
wri t i n g s .
62. I l earn t t o d i s t i n g u i s h b et wee n t h e mat eri al an d t h e fo rmal in et h i cs
fro m Max S ch el er, an d mai n l y f ro m h i s b o o k Fo r ma l i s m in Et h i cs , a n d
No n -Fo r ma l Et h i cs o f Va l u es .
63. In Th e S o ci a l Co n t r a ct , Bo o k II, Ch ap t er VII, p . 3 3 , Ro u s s eau d eal s
wi t h th e f o rmu l at i o n an d su g g e s t i o n o f laws b y s t r an g ers . Wh o ev er su g -
g es t s l aws as a st ran g er s erv e s th e l eg i s l at o r b ec au s e i n o rd er t o leg i s l at e
ap p ro p ri at el y h e mu s t ex p res s th e g en eral wi l l , b u t “t h e g en eral wi l l to b e
real l y s u c h , mu s t b e g en eral i n i t s o b j ect (p .2 5 ). Th at i s t o say , i t mu s t n o t
b e ai med a t a p ers o n al o b j ect (p p . 2 9 -3 0 ); b ecau s e t h e s t ran g er i s i g n o ran t
o f p ers o n a l mat t ers , th es e wi l l n o t d i v ert h i s in t en t i o n fro m th e g en eral
o b j ect .
64. In th e Pri ze Es s ay On th e Ba s i s o f Mo r a l i t y § 7 (p p . 8 8 -9 1 )
Sch o p en h au er tri e s to sh o w th at eg o i s m is n eces s ary fo r u s in o rd er to
i n t erp ret o u r “b ei n g ab l e to w i l l ,” in co rp o rat ed i n th e Cat eg o ri cal
Imp erat i v e . He fi n d s sev eral p o i n t s o f su p p o rt fo r th i s i n Kan t ' s wri t i n g s .
Su ch lean i n g o n eg o i s m may su cceed in t h e fo u n d at i o n o f th e p ri n ci p l e
Notes 349
o f p o l i t i cal as s o ci at i o n b u t n o t , a cco rd i n g to Sch o p en h au er, in th e

fo u n d at i o n o f t h e mo ral i t y p ri n ci p l e , an d h e i s ri g h t .
65. Here we d e al wi t h an o p i n i o n I cal l “eg o i s m in rev ers e.” Th i s i s n o t
a g o al -o ri en t ed ex t en s i o n o f e g o i s m, li k e “d o n o t wro n g y o u r n ei g h b o r,
s o th at h e wi l l n o t rep ay y o u in k i n d ,” b u t an o p i n i o n wh i ch tru l y u p -
h o l d s a n o n -eg o i s t i c p o s i t i o n , b u t can n o t co n s t ru c t t h i s p o s i t i o n wi t h o u t
as s u mi n g f ro m th e o u t s et th at we u n d ers t an d wh at e g o i s m is , an d
fu rt h ermo r e, th i s eg o i s m h as t o rep res en t so met h i n g p erman en t . Fo r
ex amp l e, a n o p i n i o n as s u mi n g t h at th e ad o p t i o n o f an eg o i s t i c st an d
req u i res — fo r ev ery p ers o n ad o p t i n g it — t o wi s h (u n d er ci rcu ms t an ces
o f d i s t res s ) t o b e ai d ed b y o t h ers . On a s u ch s o l i d mean i n g o f eg o i s m th i s
o p i n i o n b u i l d s mo ral i t y as t h e fo rmer' s n eg at i o n , n amel y , as res t rai n t o f
t h e s el f' s eg o i s m an d co n s i d er at i o n fo r th e eg o i s m o f th e o t h er o n e. Here
o n e co u l d arg u e th at eg o i s m is n o t so s o l i d , i.e., u n eq u i v o cal , p erman en t
an d b eari n g th e same mean i n g f o r ev ery in d i v i d u al th at ad o p t s it . Fo r
ex amp l e, t h ere may b e an in d i v i d u al , s ay , n amed Re u b en , wh o in cas e h e
ad o p t ed an eg o i s t i cs t an ce, wo u l d p refer t o su ffer d i s t res s to h u rt i n g h i s
p ri d e b y a ccep t i n g th e ai d o f an o t h er p ers o n . Fo r Reu b en co n s i d erat i o n
fo r th e eg o i s m o f an o t h er p ers o n fo u n d i n d i s t res s , wo u l d mean to i g n o re
t h e lat t er an d n o t to h el p h i m . We wi l l as k Reu b en : Can y o u wi l l t h at al l
memb ers o f y o u r so ci et y av o i d h el p i n g each o t h er? Hi s an s wer wi l l b e
fu l l y p o s i t i v e. Yet , sh o u l d h e b e as k ed to p rep are leg i s l at i o n fo r an al i en
s o ci et y an d q u es t i o n ed ab o u t th e ch aract er o f it s memb ers , h e wo u l d n o t
rep l y wi t h cert ai n t y th a t th es e al s o are, li k e h i m, v ery p ro u d a n d
v u l n erab l e in th ei r p ri d e. Wi t h reg ard to t h i s is s u e see th e d i s cu s s i o n o f
v ari o u s cr i t i q u es ai med at Kan t in Leo Wi l d e' s b o o k Hyp o t h et i s ch e u n d
Ka t eg o r i s c h e Imp er a t i ve, p p . 1 9 4 -2 1 8
66. “...[A]n d in d eed , th e co n cep t s o f d u t y an d ri g h t a re n o t o n l y
co n cep t s t h at co mp l emen t each o t h er... th e co n cep t o f d u t y is in tru t h a
co n cep t o f ri g h t , b ecau s e t h e d u t y is al s o b as ed o n th e j u s t i fi ed d ema n d
t o res p o n d , an d th e d i fferen ce b et w een ri g h t an d d u t y i s a d i fferen ce i n
t h e d i rect i o n o f t h e d eman d ... ” Nat h an Ro t en s t rei c h , Po wer a n d it s Mo u l d
(Heb rew), p . 2 6 4 . On d u t y an d ri g h t see al s o : W. D . Lamo n t , Th e Pr i n ci -
p l es o f Mo r a l Ju d g emen t , p p . 7 8 -9 5 .
67. I. Kan t , f u n d a men t a l p r i n ci p l es o f t h e met a p h ys i c o f mo r a l s , p . 4 0 .
68. Su mmari zi n g Hu s s erl (acco rd i n g to h i s man u s cri p t ), Al o i s Ro t h
wri t es : “D as b ed eu t et ... d aß d i e ech t e Id ee ei n er fo rmal en Et h i k ei n e
mat eri al e n i ch t au s s ch l i es s t , so n d ern g erad ezu fo r d ert ” (“Th i s mean s .. .
t h at th e g en u i n e id ea o f a fo r mal et h i cs d o es n o t ex cl u d e a mat eri al o n e,
b u t act u al l y d em an d s i t ”), p . 4 3 .
69. Aaro n Ben - Ze' ev , in “On th e Su b j ect an d Ob j ect o f Mo ral i t y ”s h o ws
t h at in th e act u al l y p rev ai l i n g mo ral i t y in k n o wn so ci et i es (i .e., th e i r
memb ers v a l u e acco rd i n g l y ) th e re i s n o eq u al d eg re e o f b el o n g i n g t o th e
cat eg o ry m o ral s u b j ect , n amel y , o n e p ers o n b el o n g s mo re t o t h i s cat eg o ry
an d an o t h e r o n e les s ; an d th e same h o l d s fo r th e c at eg o ry mo ral o b j ect .
Th e cat eg o ri cal st ru ct u re o f a ct u al l y p rev ai l i n g m o ral i t y is n o t arran g ed
acco rd i n g to th e mo d el o f Ari s t o t l e' s cat eg o ry o f su b s t an ce. It tu rn s o u t

t h at i n sy n t h es es o f mat eri al an d fo rmal mo ral i t y th e cat eg o ri cal s t ru ct u re
i s d et ermi n ed b y th e mat eri al mo ral i t y sp eci fi c to a g i v en so ci et y . Th i s
s p eci fi c m at eri al mo ral i t y al s o d et ermi n es th e st r u ct u re o f et h i cal ru l es ,
wh i l e fo rm al mo ral i t y g u i d es t h e cap aci t y fo r et h i cal ju d g men t b y
ap p l y i n g a n d i n t erp ret i n g th es e et h i cal ru l es ; i t d o es t h i s acco rd i n g to i t s
rel at i v e w ei g h t wi t h i n t h e co n cret e sy n t h es i s . Wh en p as s i n g fro m Kan t t o
Max Sch el e r' s p h i l o s o p h y , it l o o k s as if mat eri al mo ral i t y is th e
i n t erp ret a t i o n o f fo rmal mo ral i t y , o r mo re p reci s e l y : t h e acco mp l i s h me n t
o f th e in t erp ret at i o n o f th e f o rmal . Ho wev er, th e an al y s i s o f p rev ai l i n g
mo ral o r e t h i cal ju d g men t p ro b ab l y rev ers es th e al l o cat i o n o f ro l es an d
acco rd s fo rmal mo ral i t y t h e ta s k o f in t erp ret i n g m at eri al mo ral i t y ' s r u l es ,
o r o f acco mp l i s h i n g th ei r in t e rp ret at i o n . In o t h er wo rd s : th e ro l e o f th e
s p i ri t p re v ai l i n g in th e sp eci fi c et h i cal ru l es (i n a si mi l ar sen s e to “t h e
s p i ri t o f th e law,” as d i s t i n c t fro m th e lan g u ag e o f th e l aw). An d in d eed ,
t h e cl as s i cal Kan t i an fo rmu l at i o n — “So act as to t reat h u man i t y , w h et h er
i n t h i n e o wn p ers o n o r i n t h at o f an y o t h er, i n ev ery cas e as an en d w i t h al ,
an d n ev er as mean s o n l y ” (Kan t , Fu n d a men t a l Pr i n ci p l es o f th e
Met a p h ys i c s o f Mo r a l s, p . 4 6 ) — Is b et t er su i t ed t o ex p res s “t h e sp i ri t o f
a mat t er” b et t er th an t o “d i ct at e b eh av i o r. ” Th i s fo rmu l at i o n i s n o t
s u i t ab l e a s a to u ch s t o n e, b eca u s e th e “wi t h al ” an d th e “n ev er... o n l y ” it
i n cl u d es l eav e t o o mu ch o p en u n d et ermi n ed sp ace, b u t it i s su i t ab l e as a
k i n d o f re mi n d er to ti p th e sc al es to ward s wh at is h ere cal l ed “en d ”
(n amel y , w h at h as v al u e n o t as a mean s an d n o t as a p reco n d i t i o n fo r t h e
real i zat i o n o f a v al u e). Th at i s to s ay , wh en th e mat eri al ru l es l eav e ro o m
fo r s ev era l p o s s i b l es o l u t i o n s i n an i n d i v i d u al ca s e h el d u p fo r v al u a t i o n ,
t h e fo rmal p ri n ci p l e reco mmen d s t o ch o o s e t h e s o l u t i o n t h at is cl o s es t t o
t h e v i ew o f p eo p l e as “en d s .”

70. Reg ard i n g g ames an d co mp et i t i o n see Jo h an Hu i zi n g a , Ho mo
Lu d en s , Ch ap t er I II. I b el i ev e th e t y p o l o g y o f v al u es req u i res a mo re acu t e
d i s t i n ct i o n t h an fo u n d in Hu i zi n g a (wh i ch h i s res earc h d i d n o t n eed ) b e-
t ween g ame s (b el o n g i n g to Sect i o n B) an d co mp et i t i o n (b el o n g i n g to
Sect i o n C) . Al t h o u g h th ere is a b ro ad area in wh i c h g ames an d co mp et i -
t i o n are c o n g ru en t , th ere are n o n -co mp et i t i v e g ame s , an d th ere is co m-
p et i t i o n w h i ch i s n o g ame at a l l b ecau s e i t i s car ri ed o u t i n d ead earn es t .
71. Max Sch el e r ch aract eri zes th e d i v ers i o n o f fo cu s f ro m wh at is
ex p eri en ced to t h e ex p eri en ce as p at h o l o g i cal . He d i s cu s s es th e is s u e in
t h e las t c h ap t er o f h i s p ap er “Di e Id o l e d er Sel b s t erk en n t n i s .” (s ee e s p e-
ci al l y p p . 2 6 2 -2 6 4 ). Ho wev er, if a p at h o l o g i cal p h en o men o n in an in -
d i v i d u al i s b y d efi n i t i o n o n e o f wh i ch t h i s i n d i v i d u al s u ffers , o n e s h o u l d
n o t say th at th e refl ect i v e co n fi g u rat i o n is p at h o l o g i cal , ev en if th i s o r
t h at p at h o l o g i cal p h en o men o n m ay ari s e fro m i t .
Notes 351
72. As a seq u e l to th e ty p o l o g i cal d i s cu s s i o n I wi l l r efer h ere to th e

req u es t fo r es t eem. We fi n d it i n al l th ree s ect i o n s . In t h e fi rs t s ec t i o n we
fi n d th e r eq u es t fo r es t eem b o t h as an en d to b e a ch i ev ed b y th e u s e o f
mean s , an d as a mean s ai med at ach i ev i n g o t h er en d s (wh en a p ers o n
h o p es so me h o w to p ro fi t fro m t h e es t eem o t h ers acc o rd h i m o r h er, an d
d o es n o t s eek res p ect fo r i t s o wn sak e). An d we fi n d i t , o f co u rs e, i n th i s
s ect i o n as a mat t er to b e trea t ed wi t h cau t i o n , i. e., as a res t rai n i n g fact o r
(i n so me c u l t u res at t en t i o n to o n e' s sel f-es t eem r es t rai n s in a si mi l a r
man n er to th e res t rai n t ex erci s ed b y an at t i t u d e o f res p o n s i b i l i t y in
an o t h er cu l t u re). In t h e s eco n d sect i o n we fi n d t h e req u es t fo r es t eem fi rs t
o f al l as an o ffs h o o t o f th e n eed to b el o n g to a s o ci et y . Here a p ers o n
d i rect l y e n j o y s th e man i fes t at i o n s o f res p ect h e r ecei v es ; h e, so to s ay ,
co n s u mes t h em. Th i s i s t h e s al i en t req u es t fo r es t eem, ch aract eri zed b y i t s
reci p ro ci t y : fro m t h i s as p ect a p ers o n d o es n o t as k to b e es t eemed b u t b y
t h o s e h e e s t eems , an d i n wh o s e s o ci et y h e wi s h es t o b e wel l -p l aced . In t h e
t h i rd sect i o n th e req u es t fo r es t eem may ex i s t in sev eral man n ers . Fro m
amo n g th es e we wi l l h ere refer to t h e p o s s i b i l i t y fo r t h i s req u es t t o ex i s t
as a k i n d o f co n s t rai n t o n ref l ect i o n . In t h i s cas e th e co mp an y o f o t h ers
wh o co n fer res p ect is n o t so u g h t fo r it s o wn sak e, b u t in o rd er to
o v erco me f eel i n g s o f i n feri o ri t y an d t o rel i ev e t h e su fferi n g t h ey cau s e . If
a p ers o n i s h o n o red b y mi s t ak e , wi l l t h e s at i s fact i o n t h i s h o n o r b ri n g s , b e
fl awed ? We as s u me th at th e p ers o n h i ms el f k n o ws th at it was a mi s t ak e;
p erh ap s h e ev en d el i b erat el y m i s l ed th o s e wh o h o n o red h i m. If th i s
i n d i v i d u al seek s res p ect in th e framewo rk o f sect i o n s A o r B
(ex cl u s i v e l y ), t h e v al u e o f th e man i fes t at i o n s o fe s t eem wi l l n o t b e fl awed
i n h i s ey e s . Bu t if t h e q u es t fo r es t eem b el o n g s t o sect i o n C, n am el y wh en
a p ers o n n eed s to rei n fo rce s e l f-es t eem, it may we l l b e th at k n o wl ed g e o f
t h e mi s t ak e wi l l s p o i l h i s s at i s fact i o n . Bu t fi n al l y we may al s o imag i n e a
cas e o f a sect i o n C req u es t fo r es t eem, in wh i ch th e p ers o n h o n o red b y
mi s t ak e su cceed s in d ecei v i n g h i ms el f an d b el i ev es th at h e in d eed
d es erv es w h at h e recei v ed .
Part II, Ch ap ter 10 (pgs. 177- 179)

73. Read An t i s t h en es i n Xen o p h o n ' s “Th e Di n n er Part y ” (p p . 2 4 5 -2 4 7 ).
An t i s t h en e s ' wo rd s d o n o t imp l y th at h e sh u n s li fe ' s p l eas u res ; o n th e
co n t rary , h e g ai n s p l eas u res w h i ch are n o t in feri o r, wh i l e h e fo reg o es p art
o f th e g o o d s d es i red b y o t h er memb ers o f h i s s o ci e t y . Th e cy n i c an d th e
s t o i c trad i t i o n in t erp ret ed t h e ab o v e as an as p i ra t i o n to ret u rn t o n a t u ral
n eed s an d to res t o re t h em.
Part III, Chap ter 1 (pgs. 183- 188)

74. So me cri t i ci s m o f th e id ea o f co u n t er-b al an ce can b e fo u n d in : M.
St o ck er, Pl u r a l a n d Co n f l i ct i n g Va l u es , p p . 8 0 , 8 2 , 3 0 3 .
75. Ab o u t t i me an d v al u e real i zat i o n see ab o v e p arag ra p h e ab o u t “Th e

Pro p o rt i o n o f a Sa cri fi ce in t h e Pres e n t t o a Reward in t h e Fu t u re” an d o n
t h e g en era l b ack g ro u n d t o th i s p ro b l em s ee: M. Sl o t e, Go o d s a n d Vi r t u es ,
Ch ap t ers 1 an d 2 .

76. “Wh at is b o u g h t wi t h mo n ey o r wi t h g o o d s is p u rch a s ed b y
l ab o u r... as mu ch as wh at we a cq u i re b y th e to i l o f o u r o wn b o d y . Th at
mo n ey o r t h o s e g o o d s in d eed sa v e u s th i s to i l ... L ab o u r was th e fi rs t
p ri ce, t h e o ri g i n al p u rch as e-m o n ey t h at was p ai d f o r al l t h i n g s .”A. S mi t h ,
Th e Wea l t h o f Na t i o n s, p . 3 0 , C h ap t er V). Th e ex ch a n g e v al u e an d mo n ey
are d i s cu s s ed fro m a p h i l o s o p h i cal v i ewp o i n t in t h e fo l l o wi n g wo rk s : W .
D. Lamo n t , Th e Va l u e Ju d g emen t, Ch ap t ers I-V. Geo rg Si mmel , Th e
Ph i l o s o p h y o f Mo n ey.
77. Al fred Mar s h al , Pr i n ci p l es o f Eco n o mi cs , v o l . I, p . 9 2 .
I d o n o t r eco mmen d th i s u s ag e o f th e wo rd “u t i l i t y ” in p h i l o s o p h i cal
d i s co u rs e, b ecau s e th e p o wer o f th e mo t i v e ex p res s ed in d eman d , u t i l i t y
an d p l eas u re is al l ti p p ed to g et h er in t o an in d i s t i n ct wh o l e lab el ed
“u t i l i t y .” Acco rd i n g to th i s c o n cep t o n e wo u l d h av e t o say , fo r in s t an ce,
t h at a p er s o n in creas i n g l y ad d i ct ed t o h ero i n wh o acco rd i n g l y i s p rep a red
t o p ay mo r e an d mo re fo r th e d ru g , g ai n s g reat er a n d g reat er b en efi t
(“u t i l i t y ” ) fro m it s co n s u mp t i o n — ev en if a co mp r eh en s i v e b al an ce
s h o ws th at co n s u mp t i o n o f th e d ru g cau s es th e ad d i ct mo re mi s ery th an
p l eas u re. See Lamo n t o n u t i l i t y : W. D. Lamo n t , Th e Va l u e Ju d g emen t, p p .
8 8 -9 0 , (i n p art i cu l ar t h e s eco n d n o t e o n p . 8 9 ).
Mars h al h i ms el f h ad h i s res erv at i o n s as to th e d i f feren ce b et ween th e
p o wer o f a mo t i v e an d th e g rad e o f b en efi t fro m it s real i zat i o n see
Pr i n ci p l es o f Eco n o mi cs , v o l . I, fo o t n o t eo n p ag es 9 2 -9 3 .
78. Ch arl es St ev en s o n d i s cu s s es th i s is s u e. See: C. L. St ev en s o n ,
Et h i cs a n d La n g u a g e, p p . 1 9 2 - 1 9 8 . He al s o p ro v i d e s referen ces to o t h e r
au t h o rs wh o d i s cu s s ed t h e mat t er.

79. See: Ni c o l ai Hart man n , Et h i cs , II, Ch ap t er XXXVIII (LXIII), p p . 4 4 4 -
463.

80. Wh en we su cceed to co n s t ru ct ( co n s i s t en t l y ) in o u r imag i n at i o n a
s i t u at i o n in wh i ch an at p res e n t p rev ai l i n g co n fl i ct v an i s h es , th ere i s
s o met h i n g in ci d en t al in th e co n fl i ct . On th i s mat t er see: Bern ard Wi l -
l i ams , “Et h i cal Co n s i s t en cy ,” p p . 1 6 7 -1 7 0 .
81. V. Kraft , Fo u n d a t i o n s f o r S ci en t i f i cAn a l ys i s o f Va l u e, p . 5 .
Notes 353
82. Bas i cal l y Si mmel , Hart man n an d Lan d man n as s u me th e same

p o s i t i o n . In o rd er t o b ro ad en th e p i ct u re, I wi l l al s o li s t h ere so me o t h er
wo rk s th at d eal wi t h cl as h es b et ween d u t i es an d b e t ween th em an d o t h er
v al u es :
Geo rg Si mm el , Ei n l ei t u n g i n d i eMo r a l wi s s en s ch a f t, Ch ap t er 7 .
Ni co l ai Ha rt man n , Et h i cs , Vo l . II, Ch ap t ers VI-VIII (3 1 -3 4 ), XXXVI (6 1 ).
Mi ch ael La n d man n , “Ph än o men o l o g i s ch e Et h i k .”
Mi ch ael Sl o t e, Go o d s a n d Vi r t u es , Ch ap t ers 4 an d 5 .
St u art Ham p s h i re, Mo r a l i t ya n d Co n f l i ct .
Ch ri s t o p h e r W. Go wan s (ed .), Mo r a l Di l e mma s.
Bern ard Wi l l i ams , “Co n fl i ct o f Val u es .”
Part III, Chapter 5 (pgs. 215-223)

83. See: Das B ö s e, i n : Ru d o l f Ei s l er, Ka n t -l exi k o n — Na ch s ch l a g s wer k
z u Ka n t 's sä mt l i ch en S ch r i f t en / Br i ef en u n d h a n d s ch r i f t i ch en Na ch l a ß,
Hi l d es h ei m 1 9 6 4 (1 9 2 9 ), p p .7 1 - 7 5 . See al s o : Imman u el Kan t , Rel i g i o n
Wi t h i n t h e Li mi t s o f Rea s o n Al o n e, p p . 2 3 -3 0 , 4 6 .
84. See: Sch o p en h au er, On th e Ba s i s o f Mo r a l i t y, p p . 1 3 5 - 1 3 6 , 1 4 5 ,
192.
85. Ho b b es d i s cu s s es th e q u es t i o n wh y b ees an d an t s can li v e in a
s o ci et y d e v o i d o f v i o l en ce o r co mp u l s i o n an d h u man s can n o t d o so ; in
an i n t eres t i n g p arag rap h h e s h o ws h o w reas o n ex acerb at e s o p p o s i t i o n b e-
t ween h u ma n s . See: Levi a t h a n, Ch ap t er 1 7 , p p . 1 3 0 -1 3 1 .
86. M. Lan d m an n , Ref o r m o f th e Heb r ew Al p h a b et , p p . 2 9 8 - 2 9 9 .
87. In cert a i n cu l t u res , g reat l o v e o f p aren t s to th ei r d au g h t er is
co mp at i b l e wi t h k i l l i n g h er in o rd er to mak e u n d o n e so met h i n g sh e h as
d o n e. In h i s n o v el S h a me Sal man Ru s h d i e tel l s ab o u t a Pak i s t an i in
Lo n d o n wh o k i l l ed h i s b el o v ed d au g h t er, h i s o n l y c h i l d , in o rd er to s a v e
t h e h o n o u r o f h i s fami l y .
88. Eri ch Fr o mm, Es ca p e f r o m Fr eed o m, p p . 1 4 1 - 1 7 9 . See, fo r i n s t an ce,
o n p . 1 7 6 th e d i s cu s s i o n o f a st at e i n wh i ch a “t e n d en cy t o g et ri d o f o n e' s
i n d i v i d u al s el f” awak en s i n a p ers o n .
89. Freu d d i s c u s s es d eat h in s t i n ct s in : Beyo n d t h e Pl ea s u r e Pr i n ci p l e,

p p . 3 0 -5 0 .
90. Hart man n , Et h i cs , v o l . II, p p . 9 3 -9 5 .

91. Mi ch ael Lan d man n , Al i en a t o r y Rea s o n, p . 2 9 .
92. Max Sch el e r d i s cu s s es th e rel a t i o n b et ween u t i l i t y an d p l eas u re in
h i s Res s en t i men t (s ee es p eci al l y p p . 1 4 9 -1 5 2 ); h e p o i n t s t o th e p o s s i b i l -
i t y th at w o rk may co mp ro mi s e t h e wo rk er' s cap aci t y fo r p l eas u re. Ac-

co rd i n g to Sch el er, th i s is th e en s l av emen t o f th e en d to th e mean s .
Mo d ern as c et i ci s m wi t h wh i ch S ch el er arg u es , tri es to ju s t i fy th i s
b o n d ag e.
93. Hu i zi n g a d i s cu s s es th e q u es t i o n wh et h er in an ci e n t Greece th ere
was a real tran s i t i o n fro m b at t l e to p l ay , o r o n l y “a d ev el o p men t o f
cu l t u re in p l ay ,” in Ho mo Lu d en s, p . 7 5 . O n p . 4 7 Hu i zi n g a tel l s t h at “At
t h e Ol y mp i c g ames th ere were d u el s fo u g h t to th e d eat h .” See al s o p . 7 4
o n g l ad i at o rs . Th e fi ft h ch ap t er, en t i t l ed “Pl ay a n d War” is mai n l y
d ev o t ed to th i s mat t er. Wi t h r eg ard to a g ame as p art o f a b at t l e, o n e
rememb ers Ab n er say i n g to Jo ab “Let th e y o u n g men n o w ari s e an d p l ay
b efo re u s ” S a mu el II, 2 / 1 4 .
94. See: Od e d Bal ab an , “Prax i s a n d Po es i s in Ari s t o t l e' s Pract i cal
Ph i l o s o p h y .”
95. Fo r th e sak e o f b rev i t y I b r i n g th e fo l l o wi n g q u o t e fro m Ad am
Smi t h wi t h mu l t i p l eo mi s s i o n s : “Th e p o o r man ' s s o n , wh o m h eav en i n i t s
an g er h as v i s i t ed wi t h amb i t i o n ...ad mi res t h e co n d i t i o n o f t h e ri ch . … He
d ev o t es h i ms el f fo r ev er t o th e p u rs u i t o f weal t h an d g reat n es s . To o b t ai n
t h e co n v en i en ces wh i ch th es e a ffo rd , h e su b mi t s in th e fi rs t y ear, n ay in
t h e fi rs t mo n t h o f h i s ap p l i ca t i o n , to mo re fat i g u e o f b o d y an d mo re
u n eas i n es s o f mi n d th an h e co u l d h av e s u ffered t h r o u g h th e wh o l e o f h i s
l i fe fro m th e wan t o f th em. He st u d i es ... Wi t h th e mo s t u n rel en t i n g
i n d u s t ry , h e lab o u rs n i g h t an d d ay to ac q u i re tal en t s su p eri o r to al l h i s
co mp et i t o r s — h e serv es th o s e wh o m h e h at es , an d i s o b s eq u i o u s t o
t h o s e h e d es p i s es . Th ro u g h th e wh o l e o f h i s l i fe h e p u rs u es th e i d ea o f a
cert ai n ar t i fi ci al an d el eg an t rep o s e... wh i ch , i f i n th e ex t remi t y o f o l d ag e
h e s h o u l d at l as t at t ai n t o it , h e wi l l fi n d t o b e i n n o res p ect p refe rab l e t o
t h at h u mb l e s ecu ri t y ... wh i ch h e h ad ab an d o n ed ... i n t h e las t d reg s o f li fe,
h i s b o d y w as t ed wi t h t o i l ... h i s mi n d g al l ed an d r u ffl ed b y t h e memo ry o f
a th o u s an d in j u ri es ... fro m th e in j u s t i ce o f h i s en emi es , o r fro m th e
p erfi d i t y an d in g rat i t u d e o f h i s fri en d s ...” Th e Th eo r y o f Mo r a l
S en t i men t s , p .1 8 1 ). S mi t h v i v i d l y d es cri b es an ex t reme cas e, b u t t h i s cas e
i n fo rms u s ab o u t th e ru l e, an d th e ru l e is th at co mp et i t i v e g o al -
o ri en t at i o n d o es n o t p ay . Th e il l u s i o n th e g o al -o r i en t ed in d i v i d u al
b el i ev es i n is rei n fo rced b y t h e co mp et i t i v e sp i ri t . Fu rt h er o n in th e
co u rs e o f th e d i s cu s s i o n (p .1 8 3 ) Smi t h say s : “An d it i s wel l th a t n a t u r e
i mp o s es u p o n u s in th i s ma n n er . It is th i s d ecep t i o n wh i c h ro u s es a n d
keep s i n c o n t i n u a l mo t i o n th e in d u s t r y o f ma n ki n d . ” Th e in d i v i d u al wh o
s eek s weal t h an d es t eem an d is ev en p rep ared to ch eat o t h ers , d ecei v es
h i ms el f; a s i f an i n v i s i b l e h an d p u s h ed h i m o n t o a co u rs e o f s el f-s acri fi c e
fo r th e sa k e o f a p ers o n al en d : An at t ract i v e an d awe in s p i ri n g v i s i o n o f
weal t h an d es t eem; th e in v i s i b l e h an d th u s d i rect s h i m to ward s th e
real i zat i o n o f a h i s t o ri cal i d eal , a k i n d o f aes t h et i c v i s i o n o f ci v i l i zat i o n ' s
p ro g res s . Fo r aes t h et i c reas o n s Smi t h p refers p ro g res s al o n g th e
h i s t o ri cal co u rs e p av ed b y il l u s i o n s an d s u fferi n g to ward s a p erfect
mat eri al c i v i l i zat i o n , to as t u t ei d l en es s .
Notes 355

96. In an ci e n t At h en s th e p ro p o s al o f a law th at co n t rad i ct ed an
ex i s t i n g l aw was an o ffen s e. I n i t i al l y th e Areo p ag u s h ad th e tas k to
p rev en t th e tab l i n g o f su ch mo t i o n s at t h e g en eral meet i n g . Th e tran s f er
o f au t h o ri t y fro m t h en Areo p ag u s to th e p o p u l ar as s emb l y en ab l ed ev ery
ci t i zen to s u e an o t h er ci t i zen i f h e p ro p o s ed s u ch a l aw. Th e term “g r ap h e
p aran o mo n ” d es i g n at es su ch a l aws u i t . Ev en wh en th e g en eral meet i n g
h ad accep t ed an d co n fi rmed a l aw, th e p ers o n wh o h ad p ro p o s ed i t co u l d
s t i l l b e s u ed . Th e p u n i s h men t fo r su ch a p ro p o s al was sev ere: ex i l e o r
d eat h . Th e s e d et ai l s were tak e n fro m Mo s h e Ami t , Hi s t o r y o f Cl a s s i ca l
Gr eece, (Heb rew). Jeru s al em: Mag n es , Heb rew Un i v ers i t y Pr es s , 1 9 8 4 . p .
3 2 4 . Th e m at t er was b ro u g h t t o my at t en t i o n b y Dr. Av n er Co h en .
97. Eq u al d i s t ri b u t i o n o f a g i v en (p h y s i cal ) q u an t i t y o f a p ro d u ct in -
creas es i t s u s efu l n es s (t h e p r o d u ct wi l l b e mo re u s efu l t o t h e p o o r t h an t o
t h e ri ch ). On t h e o t h er h an d t h ere is t h e co n s i d er at i o n t h at th e ab s en ce o f
a p l ed g e t o d i s t ri b u t e eq u al p o rt i o n s may i n creas e t h e effo rt s mad e b y t h e
memb ers o f a so ci et y , an d th u s in creas e th e q u an t i t i es o f p ro d u ced . On
t h e mat t er o f set t i n g o ff th e sl av e' s su fferi n g b y t h e mas t er' s p l ea s u re in
o v eral l , u t i l i t ari an so ci al ac co u n t i n g see: Jo h n R awl s , “J u s t i ce as
Fai rn es s ,” § 7 .
98. In h i s d i s cu s s i o n o f et h i cs an d aes t h et i cs Ni co l ai Hart man n ad o p t s
t h e v an t ag e p o i n t o f th e in t en t ' s o wn p u re lo g i c, in co n t rad i s t i n ct i o n to
t h o s e o f t h e i n t en d er an d t h e in t en t i o n . Fro m t h i s v an t ag e p o i n t o n e s ees
s i g h t s d ev o i d o f imp ed i men t s , o f in t erferen ce b y a l i en fact o rs ; lo o k i n g
o u t fro m t h ere o n e recei v es a cl ear d es cri p t i o n o f co mp l ex mat t ers i n th e
s p h ere o f et h i cs an d aes t h et i c s . No tech n i q u e o f a b s t ract i o n co u l d mak e
t h i s co mb i n at i o n o f p ro fo u n d n e s s an d cl ari t y p o s s i b l e. Th e p ri ce
Hart man n p ay s fo r t h i s ad v an t a g e i s t wo fo l d :
A. It leav es n o ro o m fo r th e d i s t i n ct i o n b et ween th e v al u at i v e an d th e
met a-v al u a t i v e lev el an d th u s th e d i s t i n ct i o n b et w een n o rmat i v e an d
p h en o men o l o g i cal d i s cu s s i o n o f v al u es . Gad amer' s c ri t i ci s m o f Hart man n
ari s es fro m th i s p o i n t . See: G ad amer, “Wert et h i k u n d 'p rak t i s ch e
Ph i l o s o p h i e' ,” p p . 1 1 5 -1 1 8 .
B. It leav es n o ro o m fo r a th eo re t i cal ex p l an at i o n o f real (n o t merel y
h y p o t h et i c al ) v al u e o p p o s i t i o n , li k e o p p o s i t i o n wi t h i n a co h eren t an d
h i s t o ri cal sy s t em. Det ach men t o f a v al u e fro m th e in t en t i o n to ward s it
t rai l s it s d et ach men t fro m th e v al u e-s y s t em. Hy p o s t as i s trai l s ab s o l u -
t i zat i o n o f th e v al u e an d it s o p p o s i t i o n to o t h er v al u es , an d th i s ab s o -
l u t i zat i o n leav es ro o m n ei t h er fo r sy n t h es es th at b ri d g e t h e g ap b et ween
o p p o s i n g v al u es , n o r fo r Ari s t o t l e' s mes o t es , i .e. , th e mean , wh i ch i s o n e
o f th e sy n t h es es an d fu l fi l l s an imp o rt an t ro l e in Hart man n ' s et h i cs .
Kars ru h en , in h i s res earch o n v al u e o p p o s i t i o n an d o b j ect i v i s m in
Hart man n ' s wo rk , s h o ws th at t h e lat t er u p h o l d s th r ee p ro p o s i t i o n s o u t o f
wh i ch ev er y two are co mp at i b l e wi t h each o t h er, b u t b y n o mean s are al l
t h ree co mp at i b l e. Th es e are: A. Val u es ex i s t in d ep en d en t l y o f

co n s ci o u s n es s . B. Th ere is o p p o s i t i o n b et ween v al u es (i n cl u d i n g
an t i n o mi es ). C. Th ere are sy n t h es es b et ween t h e o p p o n en t s . See:
Karl s ru h en , Wer t wi d er s t r ei t u n d Wer t o b j ekt i vi s mu s, p p . 1 7 4 - 2 0 4 , an d in
p art i cu l ar , p p . 1 8 8 -1 8 9 .

99. J . El s t er, Ul ys s es a n d t h e S i r en s, p p . 3 7 , 9 4 -9 6 , 1 0 3 .
100. See A. M el e, Ir r a t i o n a l i t y, p . 5 .
101. Th e read er can g ai n a p i ct u r e o f th e maze o f d i s cu s s i o n ab o u t
ak ras i a wi t h o u t b ei n g cau g h t u p in th e sch o l as t i c co n s i d erat i o n s
t h ems el v es , i n : Wi l l i am Ch arl t o n , Wea kn es s o f Wi l l.
Part III, Chap ter 11 (pgs. 265 -272)

102. See i b i d , p . 1 2 4 , h e ad i n g : “Th e wh o l e b o d y o f t h e p eo p l e is ab o v e
t h e k i n g .” It is g en eral l y t h o u g h t th at t h e au t h o r o f t h e b o o k was Hu b ert
Lan g u et . T h e p s eu d o n y m d eri v es fro m th e n ame o f t h e man wh o ex p el l ed
t h e l as t k i n g fro m Ro me: Lu ci u s J u n i u s , cal l ed Bru t u s .
103. Wi t h reg ard to id eo l o g y , Leo n Fes t i n g er' s th eo ry o n co g n i t i v e
d i s s o n an ce is r el ev an t . Here o n e sh o u l d n o t e th at Fes t i n g er emp l o y s th e
wo rd s “co g n i t i o n ” an d “k n o wl ed g e” i n a v ery b ro ad mean i n g ; v al u es an d
v al u at i o n s are al s o “co g n i t i o n s ,” o r “k n o wl ed g es .” See A Th eo r y o f
Co g n i t i ve Di s s o n a n ce, p . 1 0 .
104. A st o ry rel ev an t to o u r trea t men t o f h y p n o s i s ap p ears in : Eri ch
Fro mm, Es ca p e f r o m Fr eed o m, p p . 1 8 7 - 1 8 9 .
105. Si g mu n d Freu d , “Th e Fu t u re o f an Il l u s i o n ,”p . 1 1 .
Part IV, Ch ap ter 2 (pgs. 285-2 88)

106. Reg ard i n g fo rmal i s m an d an t i -fo rmal i s m, see: M. St rau s s , Emp -
f i n d u n g , I n t en t i o n u n d Zei ch en , p p . 1 9 7 - 2 2 0 .

107. Sp i n o za h el d two o p p o s i n g p o s i t i o n s o n g o o d an d ev i l : On e is
d o mi n an t i n p a rt III o f Et h i cs , th e o t h er i n p art IV. He d i d n o t s u cceed in
b ri d g i n g t h e g ap b et ween t h em.
108. See h i s b o o k , Ma n f o r h i ms el f .
109. Sch o p en h au er say s (On th e Ba s i s o f Mo r a l i t y, p .1 3 6 ) th at n o
h u man b ei n g i s en t i rel y wi t h o u t s o met h i n g o f al l t h ree mo t i v es .
110. See: Fri ed ri ch Ni et zs ch e, On t h e Gen ea l o g yo f Mo r a l s, p p . 3 9 -4 2 .
111. No t e Sch o p en h au er' s fo l l o wi n g sen t en ce: “No t ev e ry o n e is
cap ab l e o f cl earl y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b et ween th e p u re l y th eo ret i cal searc h
Notes 357
fo r o b j ect i v e tru t h , a search d i s s o ci at ed fro m al l in t eres t , ev en fro m th at

o f mo ral i t y as p ract i ced , an d a s ac ri l eg i o u s at t ack o n th e h eart ' s h al l o wed
co n v i ct i o n ” (On t h e Ba s i s o f Mo r a l i t y, p . 4 0 ).
112. On t h e Ba s i s o f Mo r a l i t y, p . 1 4 6 .
113. Ad am Smi t h wri t es : “Sy mp at h y d o es n o t ari s e so m u ch fro m th e
v i ew o f th e p as s i o n as fro m th at o f th e si t u at i o n wh i ch ex ci t es it . We
s o met i mes feel fo r an o t h er a p as s i o n o f wh i ch h e h i ms e l f seems to b e
al t o g et h er in c ap ab l e; b ecau s e, wh e n we p u t o u rs el v e s in h i s cas e, th at
p as s i o n ari s e s in o u r b reas t … Of al l th e cal ami t i es to wh i ch th e co n -
d i t i o n o f mo rt al i t y ex p o s es ma n k i n d , th e l o s s o f r eas o n ap p ears t o th o s e
wh o h av e t h e l eas t sp ark o f h u man i t y , b y far th e m o s t d read fu l , an d th ey
b eh o l d t h a t las t st ag e o f h u ma n wret ch ed n es s wi t h d eep er co mmi s erat i o n
t h an an y o t h er. Bu t th e p o o r w ret ch , wh o is in i t , lau g h s an d s i n g s ... Th e
co mp as s i o n o f t h e sp ect at o r mu s t ari s e al t o g et h er fro m th e co n s i d erat i o n
o f wh at h e h i ms el f wo u l d feel if h e was red u ced to th e same u n h ap p y
s i t u at i o n , an d , wh at p erh ap s i s imp o s s i b l e, was at th e same ti me ab l e to
reg ard it wi t h h i s p res en t rea s o n an d ju d g emen t .” Th e Th eo r y o f Mo r a l
S en t i men t s , p .1 2 .
114. See Fran z Bren t an o , Th e Or i g i n o f o u r Kn o wl ed g e o f Ri g h t a n d
Wr o n g , p . 2 0 (en d o f § 2 6 ); F. Bren t an o , Th e Fo u n d a t i o n a n d Co n s t r u c-
t i o n o f Et h i cs , p p . 1 2 6 - 1 3 2 , 1 3 6 -1 3 7 , an d al s o b y th e same au t h o r
Gr u n d z ü g e d er Äs t h et i k, p p . 7 2 -7 4 . As to cri t i ci s m o f Bren t an o ' s v al u e
p h i l o s o p h y see: E. To p i t s ch , “ Kri t i k d er p h än o men o l o g i s ch en
Wert l eh re, ” Wer t u r t ei l s s t r ei t, S. 1 6 -1 9 .
115. See: N. Hart man n , Et h i cs , I, p p . 2 2 2 -2 3 1 .
116. In Cad wa l l ad er' s S ea r ch l i g h t o n Va l u es o n e fi n d s an
i n t erp ret a t i o n an d a g o o d d efe n s e o f Hart man n ' s v a l u ep h i l o s o p h y .

117. Wi t t g en s t ei n at a meet i n g wi t h th e Vi en n a Ci rcl e . See
Wi t t g en s t e i n a n d th e Vi en n a Ci r cl e — Co n ver s a t i o n s reco r d ed b y
Fr i ed r i ch Wa i s ma n n, p . 1 1 8 . On th e imp o s i b i l i t y o f a fo u n d at i o n o f
et h i cs see al s o A. Öl zel t -Newi n : Di e Un l ö s b a r kei t d er et h i s ch en
Pr o b l eme.
118. We may c o n s i d er Geo rg Si mmel as th e fi rs t ex p o n e n t o f a v al u e-
n eu t ral ap p ro ach in ax i o l o g y an d a p rag mat i c ap p ro ach t o v al u e fo u n d a-
t i o n . See h i s Ei n l ei t u n g i n d i eMo r a l wi s s en s ch a f t .
119. See h i s b o o k : Mi n d a n d t h eWo r l d Or d er .
120. Ib i d . p . 3 5 0 .
121. On th i s mat t er Lewi s sai d d i fferen t th i n g s wh i ch can n o t al way s
s i mp l y b e al i g n ed wi t h each o t h er . Fo r in s t an ce, in h i s art i cl e “A
Prag mat i c Co n cep t i o n o f th e A Pri o ri ” h e wri t es (p . 2 3 1 ) t h at th e a p r i o ri
d o es n o t d i ct at e an y t h i n g t o e x p eri en ce.
122. Th e seco n d ty p e o f p rag mat i s m is co mp at i b l e wi t h tr u t h in th e
cl as s i cal s en s e, t h o u g h n o t i n t h e s en s e i n wh i ch co g n i t i o n an d it s o b j ect
are id en t i cal , b u t in th e sen s e Lei b n i z ex p l ai n s a s a k i n d o f p ro j ect i v e

s i mi l ari t y wh en h e d i s cu s s es s en s at i o n. See: G. W. Lei b n i z, New Es s a ys
o n Hu ma n U n d er s t a n d i n g, p . 1 3 1 .
123. An ex cel l en t cri t i q u e o f th e co mp ari s o n b et ween et h i cal v al u es
an d a g ame ap p ears in : M. Mi d g l ey , Hea r t a n d Mi n d, Ch ap t er 8 : “Th e
Game,” p p . 1 3 3 -1 5 0 .

124. Theodor Geiger assumes a position typical for the Vienna Circle (or a
branch of it). He advocates a distinction between an objective property,
attributed to a thing in a theoretical sentence (cognitively legitimate) and a
value-sentence, which is an illegitimate objectification of a personal,
subjective response. See: Geiger, “Das Werturteil — eine ideologische
Aussage”
125. Th e q u es t i o n , wh at th e rel a t i ve wei g h t o f a n eces s a r y co n d i t i o n
fo r so met h i n g i s , wh en th ere a re mo re th an o n e su c h co n d i t i o n , is irre l e-
v an t . On e can p o s e an o t h er q u e s t i o n — an d rememb er th at i t d i ffers fro m
t h e fi rs t — wh i ch i s : Wh at h ap p en s wh en we fi x at e o n e fact o r t h at mak e s
u p o n e n ec es s ary co n d i t i o n , an d imp l emen t a v ari at i o n in th e seco n d
(wh en th er e are two ). Wh en th e re are two free v ari ab l es (arg u men t s ) in a
fu n ct i o n a n d o n e d ep en d en t v ar i ab l e (t h e v al u e o f th e fu n ct i o n ), o n e
s h o u l d n o t as k wh i ch free v ari ab l e is mo re i mp o rt a n t . Th e s ame h o l d s f o r
a fat h er, a mo t h er an d o n e o f th ei r d es cen d an t s , a n d fo r th e co n t ri b u t i o n s
o f h ered i t y an d ci rcu ms t an ces to an i n d i v i d u al , et c.
126. See: C. I. Lewi s , An An a l ys i s o f Kn o wl ed g e a n d V a l u a t i o n , Bo o k
III. Ev en th o u g h Lewi s cl ai ms th ere i s an an al o g y an d arran g es h i s arg u -
men t s p ro p erl y acco rd i n g to it , h e is in co n s i s t en t in th e ap p l i cat i o n o f
t h e imp l i e d co n cl u s i o n s to th e sp h ere o f v al u es . W h i l e Lewi s b el i ev es
t h at in th e (p u re) co g n i t i v e s p h ere th ere is cl ear l y ro o m fo r th e re-
p l acemen t o f a-p ri o ri sy s t ems , wi t h th e ch o i ce b et ween th em mad e ac-
co rd i n g to p rag mat i c co n s i d era t i o n s , th i s ch aract e ri s t i c o f a-p ri o ri s y s -
t ems is n o t emp h as i zed in th e sp h ere o f v al u es . Le wi s n o t o n l y fai l s t o
s p eak o f a scrap -b as k et cat eg o ry in t h e sp h ere o f v al u es , h e d o es n o t p ay
an y at t en t i o n to th e o p p o s i t i o n th at p rev ai l s b et w een v al u es . Th at is to
s ay , wh i l e in th e sp h ere o f co g n i t i o n Lewi s d ecl ar es th at th e a-p ri o ri is
an al y t i cal , b ei n g aware at th e same ti me o f th e p r o b l ems at th e ro o t o f
co g n i t i o n seek i n g t h o u g h t , h e is n o t aware o f th e p ro b l ems at t h e ro o t o f
v al u e t h o u g h t .
127. On th e m at t er o f th e act o r s ee: Nat h an Ro t en s t re i ch , Ref l ect i o n
a n d Act i o n, p p . 8 8 -8 9 .
Part IV, Chapter 7 (pgs. 321-326)

128. In h i s b o o k Th e Na t u r e o f S ymp a t h y (p p . 9 -1 0 ), Max Sch el er
ch aract eri zes em o t i o n al u n d ers t an d i n g , wh i ch (i n th e Ger man o ri g i n al ) h e
Notes 359
cal l s “Nac h fü h l en .” By th i s n a me h e ex p res s es th e reco n s t ru ct i v e ch ar-

act er o f t h i s k i n d o f u n d ers t a n d i n g . He st res s es t h e d i fferen ce b et wee n
t h i s an d i n t el l ect u al -co n cep t u al u n d ers t an d i n g o n o n e h an d , an d th e
d i fferen ce b et ween emo t i o n al u n d ers t an d i n g an d act u al l y ex p eri en ci n g
an emo t i o n o n th e o t h er. As a so u rce o f k n o wl ed g e reg ard i n g o t h er
p eo p l e' s e mo t i o n s , Sch el er p o i n t s to th ei r immed i a t e su rren d er th ro u g h
s en s o ry ex p res s i o n (faci al ex p res s i o n , g es t u res , e t c.)

Michael Strauss: Volition and Valuation

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Michael Strauss: Volition and Valuation

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Volition and Valuation

University Press of America, Inc.

Part I - Elementary Value Theory

Chapter 1 Valuative and Motivative Values 13

Chapter 2 The Will 27

Chapter 3 Value Properties and their Bearers 37

Chapter 4 The Valuative Value: Modes of its Being 51

Chapter 5 The Dimensions of Value 71

Chapter 6 Content and Form in Valuative Intention 79

Part II - The Division of Values and their Typology

Chapter 1 The Principle of Division 103

Chapter 2 The First Section: Valuation According to

Chapter 3 The First Section: Valuation According to

Chapter 4 The Second Section: Valuation According to the

Chapter 5 The Second Section: Valuations According to the

Chapter 6 The Second Section: Valuation According to the

Chapter 7 The Third Section: Valuation According to the

Why Formal Morality Requires the Complement of

Chapter 8 The Third Section: Valuation According to the

Chapter 9 Valuation of Humans. Emergence of Reflective

Chapter 10 The Typological Approach and Reductionism 177

Part III - The Relative Weight of Values and Conflicts

Chapter 1 Measuring Values 183

Chapter 2 Money 189

Chapter 3 The Rate of Value Realization and Valuative

Chapter 4 Reason and Conflicts 205

Chapter 5 The Question of Radical Evil 215

Chapter 6 Tensions in the Moving-Calming Dimension 225

Chapter 8 The Oppositions between Justice, Freedom and

Chapter 9 Struggles Between the Will and Motivative

Chapter 10 Repression 263

Chapter 11 Ideology 265

Part IV - Objectivism and Subjectivism

Chapter 1 The Objectivist 275

Chapter 2 The Subjectivist 285

Chapter 3 The Validity of Values and the Question of their

Chapter 4 Attempts to Solve the Problem of

Chapter 5 Waiving the Attempt to Achieve Ultimate

Chapter 6 The Ontological Status of Values, Relationism 313

Chapter 7 Phenomenology of Values 321

Index of Names 367

Index of Subjects 369

M. S., Jerusalem, 1999

The phenomenology of values and valuation belongs to axiology, i.e.,

Besides the domain of value there is, then, a cognitive domain, to

Here we should distinguish between two levels of thought: first,

A. That in this meta-valuative context it is more convenient to use

charge of false pretenses against knowledge in general and science in

Let me present some examples to clarify the difference between

benefit (and in his opinion, all humankind belongs to this category).

(c) It acknowledges that the observation of phenomena of con-

ties, or be the owner of properties, namely, that properties can attach

Elementary Value Theory

Valuative and Motivative Values

The distinction between them

The question what a value is can be answered by showing the dif-

Valuation that stems from judgment and is conveyed verbally may

What motivates to action could simply be called “motive” instead

Valuative value Valuation (= valuing or adopting an

Motivative value Motivation (= motivating or activating)

Valuing and motivating are real occurrences or states within the

Motivative values lack the immediate reality valuation and motiva-

Valuative value Maintaining it Valuing accordingly

Motivative value Motivating