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elitary

VIew
In Thill 18suB
+ us Strategy
+ Peacekeeping
+ Military Justice
September 69
UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL
STAFF COLLEGE, ,FORt LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
COMMANDANT
Major General John H. Hay, Jr.
DEPUTY COMMANDANT
Brigadier General Frank B. Clay
The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and General
Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides a
forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, national
security affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.
MilitaryReview
ProfessionalJournaloftheUS Army
ARenaissance forMilitaryJustice . . . LTC JamesA. Mounts,Jr.,USA, 3
and CPT Myron G. Sugarman, USA
Peacekeeping and
The Hamlet Evaluation System . . . . COL Maurice D. Roush, USA 10
Soviet Policy on Nonproliferation Gerhard Wettig 18
The Korean Incident . . . Charles S. Stevenson 27
US Offensive and Defensive Strategy LTC Joseph L. Fant III, USA 31
Peacemaking . . BRIG Michael N. Harbottle, British Army, Ret 43
Keepingthe Lid on IsNotEnough MAlRichard B. Fisher, USA 60
John J. Pershing: AStudy in Paradox . Donald Smythe 66
The Problem ofPower . . . Raymond 1. Barrett 73
Arms and Men: The Balance in Europe . . Alain C. Enthoven 80
Propaganda forthe PLA
Richard H. Giza 89
Reader Forum
96
MilitaryNotes
98
MilitaryBooks
108
Library of Congress Catalog Card No 34-33760 Rev
The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of the
US Army Dr the Command and General staff College.
Editor In Chief
COL Donald J. Delaney
'"
Associate Editor
COL John B. B. Trussell, Jr.
Army War College
Assistant Editor
LTC A. Leroy Covey
Features Editor
LTC Robert G. Main
Production Editor
Helen M. Hall
Actinl Spanlsll-Amerlcan Editor
Luis A. Monserrate
Brazilian Editors
LTC Romero Lepesqueur
LTC Juarez A. Gomes
Publication Ofllcer
MAl Donald E. Tuman
Art and Design
Charles A. Moore
MILITARY REYIEW-Publlshed monthly by the U. S. Army Command and General stall College. fort leav-
enworth. Kansas, In English. Spanish. and Portuguese. Usa of funds for printing of this publication has
been approved by Headquarters, Deoartment of the Army. 25 July 1968.
Second-class JlqStage paid at rort Leavenworth, Kansas. Subscription rates: $4.00 IUS currency) a
year in the United States, United States militarY ~ offices. and those countries whlcb are members of
tbe Pan-American Postal Union ncluding S ~ I n l $5.00 a year In all other c:ountries; single copy price
50 cents. Address subscription mail to tbe Book Department. U. S. Army Command Ind General Stall
College, fort Leavenworth. Kansas 66027.
MASTER'S DEGREE PROGRAM THESES
[

r

Sixteen members of the 1968-69 Regular Course, US Army Command and


neral Staff College. completed the requirements for the Master of Military
and Science degree. Each student condueted research and wrote a thesis
, enting his A complete list of these titles and authors follows.
O8e marked with an asterisk are classified. Additional information can be ob-
, ined from the US Army Command and General Staff College library.
, Analysis of Command and Control
For Civil Disturbance Operations. Ma-
lor James F. McCall.
Analysis of the Management Sys-
iem for the Concept Formulation of
lIajor Army Development Projects.
lIajor Jean D. Reed.
Analysis of the Readability of
rAree Army Magazines. Lieutenant
:::olonel Vernard J. Smith.
Communist Attempt to Con.1Jert Co-
ombian Rural Violence Into Insur-
7ency During 1948-1966: Study of a
'i'ailure. Lieutenant Colonel Robert E.
i)ownen.
Concept of Theater Level Support
'or US Army Forces in Central Eu--
'ope in the 1970-1980 Decade. Major
rhomas J. Kerver.*
Evaluation of the Corps of Engi-
leer Nuclear Construction Ca.pabili-
:ies. Major Edward G. Rapp.
F-100 Dive Bomb Delivery Tactics.
lIajor Smith C. Humphries. Jr. US
Ur Force.
Identification and Disposition of
'lemains in General War. Major John
'-. G. Klose.
Inquiry Into United States Defense
lrrangement Cohesion Through the
Use of Ally Voting Behavior in the
United Na.tions General Assembly.
Major John D. Musselis.
Investigation of the Applicability
of Management by Objectives to the
Command of Army Battalions Not
Engaged in Combat Operations. Ma-
jor William A. Hokanson.
Military Operations on the Surface
of an Extraterrestrial Body. Major
Richard L. Reynard.
Relationship Between the Positional
Accuracy Requirements of Mt7.itary
Topographic Products and ArtiUery
Weapons Systems Effectiveness. Ma-
jor Robert A. Schow. Jr.
Securing Land Lines of Communi-
cation in Insurgent War-A Proposed
Doctrine. Major Dale R. Sweetwood.*
Study of Ethnocentriasm Among
White Professional Military Officers.
Lieutenant Colonel Samuel R. Shalala.
Study of the Army Aviator Reten-
tion Problem. Lieutenant Colonel Wil-
lard C. Goodwin. Jr.
Study to Determine the Best
Method of Updating the Inertial NeL'll-
igation System in Vietnam From the
Aviator's Standpoint. Lieutenant Colo-
nel John P. Brown.
1922

, ,
- ' ...
U
A Renaissance for
MILITARYJUSTICE
Lieutenant Colonel James A. Mounts, Jr.. United States Arm" and
Captsin Myron G. Sugarman, United States Arm,
O
N1AUGUST1969,theMilitary
Justice Act of 1968, the new
Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, anda revisedversionofArmy
Regulation 27-10, Military Justice,
took effect. The Military Justice Act,
togetherwiththe manual and regula-
tions which implement it, make the
most significant changes in the ad-
ministration ofmilitary justice since
theenactmentoftheUniformCodeof
MilitaryJusticein1950. TheMilitary
Justice Act brings added benefits to
the military personnel accused, and,
at the same time, increases military
efficiency.
The act represents a synthesis of
various positiOns advocated by the
armed services and by members of
Congress. The Manual for Courts-
Martial was drafted by a triservice
committee of judge advocates under
the direction of the Judge Advocate
General (JAG) of the Army. The
committee also made certain addi-
tional changes to themanual not ne-
cessitstedbytheMilitaryJusticeAct.
Thesechangesimplementdecisions of
the US Supreme Court and the US
Court of Military Appeals and im-
prove court-martialprocedures.
The act revises military justice in
five areas:
Use and authority of military
judges.
Court-martial procedures.
Septellber 1889 3
MIUrAlY JomeE
Accused's right to legally quali-
fied counsel.
Release of accused from confine-
ment pending appellate review.
Appellate review.
The act changes the name of the
law officer to military judge and re-
quires that military judges be part of
an independent judiciary. The Army
had alresdy made these changes by
administrative r.egulation prior to
passage of the
Militall Judles
The indepeddent judiciary concept
means that judges of general courts-
martial are responsible only to the
JAG, or his designee, for direction
and for efficiency reports. They are
not responsible to commanders conven-
ing courtsmartial. The purpose qf
this concept isto prevent commanders
from exercising any influence over the
procedures and results of cases.
The act authorizes an option of
trial by the military judge alone with-
out court members. This provision
benefits the military accused by giv-
Lieut61l4nt Colonel James A.
Mounts, Jr., is Chief of the Legisla-
tion aM Major Projects Branch, Mil-
ita,ry Imtice Dillision, Office of the
ludge Adll0c0,te General, W(1,8hington,
D. C. He holds a B.A. from W(1,8hing-
ton aM lefferson College, Penmyl-
lIania,; an LL.B. from the Unillersity
of Penmylllania,; aM a M(1,8tws de-
gree in Criminology from Michigan
State Unillersity. He is a member of
the Bar of Pennsylllania, and the US
Supreme Court.
Captain Myron G. Suga,rmGn is (1,8-
signed to the Legislation and Major
Projects Branch, Military Imtihe
Di'llision, Office of the Judge Adllocate
General, W(1,8hington, D. C. He holds
B.S. a,M I.D. degrees from the Uni-
lIersity of Cmifornia" Berkeley, and
is a member of the Cmifornia, Bar.
ing him another option within the sys-
tem and increases efficiency in many
cases. The accused has the right,
knowing the identity of the military
judge, in all general courts-martial,
except capital cases, to request trial
by a military judge alone. This is
similar to the procedures in the Fed-
eral courts where a defendant may
waive his right to trial by jury.
The accused's request for trial by
judge alone will be granted if the
military judge approves. Both sides
are permitted to argue the appro-
priateness of the accused's request.
The option of trial by judge alone will
release many line officers from court-
martial duty and will speed up pro-
ceedings in cases tried a judge.
Power Increased
'
to allow the military judge to assume
a true judicial role. The military
judge will be on a par with judges of
Federal district courts in many re-
spects, and a court-martial will closely
resemble aFederal criminal trial.
The military judge has the author-
ity to hold "Article 39(a)" sessions
without the necessity of assembling
the court-martial members. At the
sessions, the judge may rule on inter-
locutory questions and motions, for
example, on the admissibility of evi-
dence or a confession. He can also
hold the arraignment and take the
plea of the accused. Under the old sys-
tem, the court-martial had to be for-
maIJy assembled with the members
present while these procedures took
place. During many of the procedures,
however, the members were excused
from the courtroom, returning only
when the "out-of-court" hearing was
completed. The new law eliminates the
need for this inefficient practice.
MIOtaIJ Revle.
4
The act also permits the 'military
judge to conduct post-trial sessions
without court members. Appellate
agencies often remand issues to the
court-martial for decision. When these
remands do not require the presence
of the court members, the military
judge now hae jurisdiction to handle
them at sessions without the presence
of court members.
Final Rullnls
The new law makes important
changes in the power of the military
judge to make final rulings. It also
changes the way in whieh many rul-
ings are made at special courts-mar-
tial. The military judge will rule fi-
nally-the court members may not
overrule his decision-on challenges
to court members, on requests for con-
tinuances, on all questions of law, and
on all interlocutory question other
than the factual issue of the accused's
mental responsibility for the offense.
The military judge will also rule fi-
nally on motions for findings of not
guilty and on the accused's mental
capacity to stand trial.
The president of a special court-
martial which does not have a mili-
tary judge now will have the power to
rule finally on all questions of law ex-
cept a motion for a finding of not
guilty. He will not rule finally, how-
ever, on any questions of fact. This
new power will require additional
preparation on the part of the special
court president and additional famil-
iarity with military law. Officers who
may be placed in the role of a presi-
dent of a special court-martial can
read the latest revision of Department
of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 27-15,
Trial Guide for the Special Court-
Martial President, to become better
acquainted with the subtle distinctions
between questions of law and of fact.
Septellber 1869
MILITARY JUSTICE
When the military judge sit.l\ alone
without court members, he decides an
questions of law and fact, and, if the
accused is found guilty, adjudges an
appropriate sentence. The judge will
make a general finding such as guilty
or not guilty unless special findings
are. requested. Special findings might
include the judge's conclusions about
various items of evidence or portions
of testimony, or determinations con-
cerning particular elements of an of-
fense. Special findings may be re-
quested to aid in appellate review of
the case of a trial by a military judge
alone since the appellate court will not
have the benefit of the military
judge's instructions to the court mem-
bers.
Court-Martial Procedures
The new law, the manual, and its
implementing regulations streamline
court-martial procedures in many
ways. All counsel who are members of
the Judge Advocate General's Corps
(JAGC) and all military judges will
take one-time oaths to serve faithfully
in all cases to which they are detailed
and will not be sworn again for indi-
vidual cases. Reporters and interpret-
ers, at the discretion of the convening
authority, may take an oath for all
cases to which they are detailed. These
oaths expire when the individual is
reassigned.
Additionally, convening authorities
may authorize the administration of
an oath to court members and to coun-
sel who are not members of the JAGC
for all cases referred to the court to
which they are detailed. Except in
capital cases, the military judge or
president of a court-martial without a
military judge may enter findings of
guilty without vote of the court mem-
bers when the accused pleads guilty
and such plea is determined to be
5
proviifent. These provisions .will speed
the procedural phases of trials by
court-martial.
Perhaps the most significant changes
in militai:y justice involve the special
with a qualified, detailed lawYer with-
out a request.
Within the United States, excluding
Alaska and Hawaii, there are no ex-
ceptions to this requirement for coun-
An accused at a special ael. If the accused requests a certified
US A .....
Under the'Military Justice Act of 1968, a general court-martial win closely resemble
a Federal criminal trial and the military judge, left front with bad< to camera, win
J:Ie on a par with judges of Federal district courts
court-martial must now be afforded
the opportunity to be defended by
legally qualified counsel, certified by
the JAG. This, in.general, means that
an accused may be defended by a mem-
ber of the JAGC. PrOvision, however,
is made for the use of lawYers in other
branches of the service who are not
members of the JAGC and for judge
advocates of other services, should the
need arise. This procedure differs
from the procedure in a general court-
martial where the accused is provided
lawYer counsel and none is provided,
the court-martial may not proceed.
In other areas, a special court-mar-
tial convening authority who does not
have lawYer counsel will request such
counsel from the general court-martial
convening authority which exercises
supervisory jurisdiction over his com-
mand. If the supervising convening
authority cannot supply counsel, that
convening authority will obtain coun-
selfrom certain designsted commands.
If counsel cannot be obtained in this
MIlItI., .nI..
8
manner because of physical conditions
or military exigencies, outside the
continental United States, the super-
vising convening authority with the
concurrence of the designated com-
mand may cause a certificate of non-
obtainability to be filed with the
court-martial and the trial may prO.
ceed.
It is contemplated that there will be
few situations where certificates of
nonobtainability will be issued. Mere
inconvenience does not constitute a
physical condition or military exi-
gency and does not excuse a failure to
extend to an accused the right to
qualified counsel. In addition, these
conditions should exist only under
rare circumstances and, even then,
compelling reasons must be given why
trial must be held without lawyer
counsel at that time and at that place.
Bad Conduct Dlscharel
Under the new law and regulations,
a special court-martial convened by a
general court-martial convening au-
thority may adjudge a bad conduct
discharge if a verbatim record of the
proceedings is kept, if a military judge
is detailed to the court, and if the ac-
cused is detailed a qualified counsel.
Although the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice has always permitted a
bad conduct discharge as a possible
sentence for certain offenses at a spe-
cial court-martial, the Army has pre-
viously required approval of the JAG.
acting for the Secretary of the Army,
before assigning a reporter to take a
verbatim record at a special court-
martial. Prior to the act, the one ju-
risdictional requirement before a spe-
cial court-martial could adjudge such
a discharge was a verbatim record.
Authorization for a bad conduct
discharge special court-martial, when
convened by a general court-martial
MILITARY JUS1ICE
convening authority, should provide
another useful alternative for the
vening authority. It will also present
a forum for the trial of those individ-
uals who are not felt to deserve the
possible greater punishment of a gen-
eral court-martial.
The Military Justice Act permits a
convening authority to detail a mili-
tary judge to a special court-martial.
Army regulations tequire a convening
authority to detail a military judge
whenever a judge is available. It is
clear that, initially, military judges
will not be detailed to all special
courts-martial because of a lack of
available personnel. Regulations,
therefore, specify that judges will be
detailed first to those cases involving
complicated issues of law or fact.
Types of Judl'S
There will be two types of military
judges for detail to courts-martial-
those of general courts-martial who
can act as military judges at both gen-
eral and special courts-martial, and
those of special courts-martial who
can act only as judges at special
courts-martial. Some military judges
of special courts-martial will be as-
signed to the US Army judiciary just
as military judges of general court-
martial are. They will be supervised
and rated as directed by the JAG.
Other military judges of special
courts-martial will be certified for
duty as judges by the JAG, but will be
assigned to commands in other judge
advocate roles. They will serve as mili-
tary judges as an additional duty. In
order to make absolutely sure that
they are unaffected by command pres-
sures, their performance of duty as
military judges will be rated by a
member of the US Army judiciary as
directed by the JAG. If a military
judge is detailed to II special court-
7
MIUTARY JUSDCE
martial, the accused will have the
same option as exists at a general
court-martial to request trial by a
military judge alone.
The Military Justice Act also
makes significant changes affecting
the summary court-martial. An ftC-
cused'may object to trial by summary
court-martial even if he has previously
refused punishment under Article 15.
This permits an lICjlused to be repre-
sented by a lawyer defense counsel if
he wishes to Jitig.te his case fully
every time he is faced with the pas-
of punishm,ent.
He may refuse punishment under
Article 15 and trial by summary court-
martial. In this event, the convening
authority may refer the case to a spe-
cial court-martial where the accused
will be afforded the opportunity to re-
quest qualified counselor to a general
court-martial where the accused will
be detailed a qualified counsel. It
should be noted that the accused runs
the risk of a greater punishment by
refusing Article 15 and trial by sum-
mary court-martial.
Release Pending Appeal
The new law provides a method for
releasing an accused from confinement
while his court-martial conviction is
being appealed. A convening authority
or other authority having jurisdiction
over an accused has the discretion to
release an accused from confinement
pending appellate review if the ac-
cused so requests. No bond or mone-
tary deposit is required. When appel-
late review is completed, and if the
sentence to confinement is aftIrmed, the
accused will then be required to serve
his sentence. No credit against the
confinement portion of
will be given for the time during
which the accused was released.
The Military Justice Act makes im-
llortant changes in appellate. proce-
dures in the services. It constitutes
one Court of Military Review in the
Army in place of the present boards
of review. Members of the court will
be known as appellate military judges.
The act amends the Uniform Code to
broaden the scope of the JAG's power
to grant new trials and to review
cases not otherwise reviewed by the
Court of Military Review. These pro-
visions of the act became effective on
24 October ,.968.
Extended Revle.
The review was previously limited
to general court-martial cases not in-
volving punitive discharges or sen-
tences of more than a year's confine-
ment. It is now extended to all court-
martial cases. The time for filing
petitions for new trial is increased
from one to two years.
The JAG is given the power to re-
view and to vacate or modify in whole
or in part the findings or sentence, or
both, in any court-martial which has
been reviewed finally, but has not been
reviewed by the Court of Military Re-
view. Applications for review under
the new provisions must be based on
grounds of newly discovered evidence.
fraud on the court, lack of jurisdiction
over the accused or the offense, or er-
ror prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused.
The new law and regulations also
provide for summarized records of
trial in certain cases and set forth
new provisions for authentication of
court-martial records. If an accused
receives punishment of a minor nature
at a general court-martial, the record
may be summarized, as may the record
of trial of an acquittal. Certain
changes in court-martial orders are
also made.
The Standing Committee's additions
Mllitlry R." 8
I
to the Manual for Courts-Martial are
also significant. The most important
is the change to paragraph 76 of the
manual. Paragraph 76d will permit
'the members of a court-martial, when
a military judge is detailed thereto, to
receive additional information rele-
vant to the sentence to be imposed.
This additional information is limited
to that contained in DA Form 20 for
enlisted accused, DA Form 66 for of-
"flcer accused, and records of punish-
ment under Article 16 required by
regulations to be retained in the ac-
cused's military personnel records
jacket (DA Form 201). This regula-
tion will thus limit consideration of
Article 16 punishments to those re-
ceived within a reasonable period of
time.
Additional changes made by the
Standing Committee include changes
to the rules of evidence required by
recent court decisions, a change to in-
structions to court members on pun-
ishment, and one change to the table
of maximum punishments. The con-
tinued existence of the Standing Com-
mittee will aid in keeping the Manual
for Courts-Martial accurate and up to
date.
The changes in the administration
MILITARY JUSTICE
of military justice brought about by
the act, the manual, and the regula-
tions require study by all members of
the Army. Courses of instruction on
the new law will be given by JAG of-
ficers and will be" planned so as to
meet the needs of the member. A one-
hour course will be given to all en-
listed men, company grade officers,
and warrant officers. An additional
hour for company grade officers and a
two-hour course for field grade and
senior officers will be given.
The Military Justice Act of 1968
places the judicial system of the
Armed Forces ahead of most civilian
jurisdiction in terms of judicial proce-
dures and concepts of due process. In
addition, the manual and the Army's
implementation of the act and the
manual provide a judicial framework
which equals or surpasses most of the
minimum standards for criminal jus-
tice proposed by the American Bar As-
sociation. The Army's procedural sys-
tem alone can never create a properly
functioning system of justice unless
members of the Army, enlisted and
officer alike, administer the system ,
with vitality, a spirit of justice, im-
partiality, and good faith. When this
is accomplished, the Army will have a
renaissance in military justice.
Slptellllir 1969
9
The
Hamlet
Evaluation
System
Colonel Maurice D. Roush, United States Armg
T
HEwarinVietnam differs from pastwars inseveral signifi-
cantaspects. Themilitaryobjective inthepastgenerally has
been to defest or neutralize enemy forces and, perhaps, to control
'" certain terrain. InVietnam, defeat ofenemy forces andcontrol of
terrain are incidental to the prime objective-to win for theGov-
ernmllntof the Republic of Vietnam (GRVN) the allegiance and
support of the people.
Battlefieldbookkeeping inthepasthas been simplified bytheuse
oftheforwardedgeofthebattleares (FEBA),thelineonthemap
tracingourforwardpositions. Thisline,alongwithourintelligence
system, told us What territory we controlled, where the enemy
Mnlll" RnI.. 10
strength could be found, and what ad-
vantages we or the enemy possessed
through control of key terrain such as
obstacles and high ground. In Viet-
nam, the FEBA is not necessarily a
continuous line; perhaps not even a
line at all, but rather an aura of.
changing hues encompassing the en-
tire country.
Revolutlonarr Development
In Vietnam, the FEBA must meas-
ure the allegiances or will of the peo-
ple, and the enemy strength we must
destroy is the control he exercises
over these people. Similarly, our high
ground rests among the pcople and
the moving dynamics of their willing-
ness to be measured and counted on
the side of their government through
act and resolve.
Emphasizing the difference in this
war, our military commander has been
given total responsibility for revolu-
tionary development, the leading edge
of our pacification program. Revolu-
tionary development, often considered
a civilian endeavor, recognizes the in-
tegral nature of the military and
development forces-social, political,
economic, and psychological-that are
Colonel Maurice D. Roush is the
Huntington District Engineer, Hunt-
ington, West Virginia. He holds a
B.S. in Engineering from the US Mil-
itary Academy, West Point, and an
M.S. in Civil Engineering from the
University of Illinois. He 'graduated
from the US Army Command and
General Staff College in 1968, from
the Armed Forces Staff College in
1966, and from the US Army War Col-
lege in 1968. He has 8erved with the
7th Infantry Division in Korea, with
the H onoluliu Engineer District in Ha,-
waii, as an Engineer Advisor to the
Turki8h ad Army in Erzurum, and
with Military AS8istance Command
Headquarters in Vietnam.
Sept.mb.r 1989
HAMLET YALUAnO" SYSTEM
being employed to accomplish our ob-
jectives among the people.
Obviously, today's commander has
many more aspects to consider and a
greatly complicated battlefield upon
which to operate. Equally clear, he
must have a broader knowledge of
how his varied forces are scoring in
order to be able to gauge his progress
and locate the points for decision on
his battlefield. He heeds the type of
information that will allow him to
reach valid judgments on the mix of
forces which will produce success
without sacrificing economy. In one
area, he may have to rely predomi-
nantly on military forces; in another,
social, economic, or political forces
may be more decisive.
Current Information
The US Militsry Assistance Com-
mand, Vietnam (USMACV) J2 oper-
ates an automated system which pro-
vides the commander an amazing
array of current information on the
enemy structure, from tax collectors
and political commissars to Viet Cong
(VC) and North Vietnamese Army
(NY A) main force units.
Data on the enemy is collected by a
large, combined United States and
GRVN organization that works both
with military and governmental agen-
cies at all levels. The data, in turn, is
analyzed and processed into timely
intelligence by combined intelligence
centers using automatic data process-
ing techniques. The results are then
sent to the field by message or printed
report. It is pertinent to note that the
system provides countrywide, inte-
grated intelligence information.
This system, however, focuses on
the VC and NY A military structure
and, therefore, does not provide
rounded and complete intelligence cov-
erage of the entire battle. While
11
HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM
enemy force structure information
can serve ss an indicator in determin-
ing some pacification progress. it is
but one piece of the complex puzzle.
To round out the picture. USMACV
hss the Hamlet Evaluation System
(HES)-an automated system de-
signed to provide information on
hamlet and population control. Bssic
data for HES has been provided by
222 US distJ;ict senior advisors by
monthly evaluations of the non-Viet
Cong-controlled' hamlets in their dis-
tricts. These evaluations are made in
terms of 18 significant
nine dealing with security and nine
with development .
Security Field
In the security field, advisors rate
hamlets bssed upon VC activities and
capabilities, and counterbalancing
friendly force considerations. Devel-
opment ratings are established by
evaluating GRVN activities and capa-
bilities in the social, political, eco-
nomic, and psychological fields. Dis-
trict advisors do not have substantial
staffs so they must depend upon their
own observations and information
they can obtain from their Vietnam-
ese counterparts.
Because data from other districts
is not available for comparison and
correlation, the evaluations by senior
advisors represent compartmentalized
intelligence information arrived at in
isolation. These evaluations are sent
to Saigon and tabulated on computers,
with equal weight given to each of the
18 indicators. Several system deficien-
cies become apparent immediately:
HES primarily measures VC and
GRVN inputs ye.t the information the
commander needs pertains to results.
This is the only way he can evaluate
the efficiency of his forces and deter-
mine which of his many assets should
12
be applied 'to' a particular situation.
The system tends toward histor-
ical statistics rather than providing
current intelligence. Much of the in-
formation portrayed on the HES re-
port is over a month old before it gets
disseminated.
Weighing all indicators equally
could obscure critical trouble spots
and successes. For example, a hamlet
that hss been secure for a long time
has a high security rating, but this
could hide a lagging development pro-
gram.
The monthly reporting cycle does
not fit all indicators. Some, such as
VC force activities, should be kept cur-
rent on a daily or hourly basis. Agri-
cultural production figures may be bet-
ter suited to a cycle related to the
growing and harvesting periods.
While human judgment undoubt-
edly is best able to evaluate ,the at-
titudes, trends, and tendencies among
the population, the rapid turnover of
advisors and the complex nature of the
value judgments required for valid
evaluations raise some doubt concern-
ing the authenticity of the results
reported.
The US district senior advisor
gets nothing out of the system except
a tabulation of his own input.
Reliance upon GRVN counter-
parts for a significant amount of the
required data, with limited verifica-
tion capability by the sector advisor,
could cause misleading results.
No attempt is made by HES to
assess conditions among the people in
VC-controlled hamlets.
The system does not provide for
cross-checking of HES data with
that available from other areas and
through other sources such ss the US-
MACV J2.
While HES may provide a yardstick
Military Rnl..
HAMLET VALUAnON SYS1EM
Advisors must depend upon their own observations and information
Vietnamese counterparts and village elders
to assess progress in pacification, its
deficiencies create doubts concerning
total usefulness and reliability. The
failure to provide timely intelligence
on both GRVN and VC population
control and the questionable ability to
provide accurate measurement results
are serious deficiencies.
How can we do better?
RES goals for improvement should
include:
Acceleration of the system to
provide the commander and advisor
with current pacification intelIigence
rather than historical statistics.
Achieve a greater capability for
assessing the loyalties and aspirations
of the people, both in GRVN and VC-
controlled areas.
Broaden the data base to include
all required information and enhance
data verification.
TIle system logic and evaluation
September 1989
methods shOUld recognize and apply
emphasis to the more pertinent indi-
cators and overcome problems inher-
ent in the current subjective advisor
evaluations.
Evaluating the VC and GRVN con-
trol strength and the loyalties of the
people in a hamlet is a long and labo-
rious process. Initially, indicators
must be selected and data gathered
both within and outside the hamlet be-
ing evaluated. Then, questionable in-
dicators must be identified and cor-
rected or discarded and, if sufficient
indicators are not available to produce
a valid result, further inquiry must be
made.
Once sufficient valid indicators are
available, they must be weighed and
combined to produce hamlet evalua-
tion. This evaluation then can be en-
riched and verified by considering
external indicators such as the loyal-
13
HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM
ties of surrounding hamlets, the pres-
ence of forces capable
of reinforcing the' hamlet, and the
potence of VC umts operating in the
vicinity. Each of these operations, in
itself, may not be complicated, but,
taken together and applied to the
12,650 hamlets in Vietnam, they rep-
resent a formidable task for our dis-
trict advisors.
The computer, with its speed and
ability to call up and consider vast
amounts of data, is ideally suited to
perform the complete pacilication eval-
uation task. A full-time' HES com-
puter in Saigon could bave access to
the intelligence produced by the US-
MACV J2 computer complex and could
make use of data available from other
agencies such as civilian elements of
the US mission and the GRVN Min-
istries, as well as that furnished by
field advisors. Furthermore, full-time
operation would allow production of
current intelligence rather than
monthly reports. For esse of refer-
ence, the system could be called the
Automated Pacification Evaluation
System (APACE).
Computer Programing
The program for ,APACE would
have to provide for indicator valida-
tion and weighing and for determina-
tion of adequacy of indicators, as well
as for production of evaluations. Also,
the program must be compatible with
other existing computerized systems
in Vietnam to allow cross-referencing
and sharing of data.
Indicator validation could be accom-
plished by comparison with previously
submitted data of the same category
for the hamlet in question and by
comparison with similar data from
neighboring hamlets. Validity pre-
requisites could be developed for most
indicators. In the case of indicators
judged to be questionable, the com-
puter could be programed to query
the source and assign a deflated value
to the indicator in question pending
resolution.
Standard weights cannot be as-
signed to indicators because they take
on varying significance under differ-
ing circumstances. For a hamlet being
secured, security indicators must pre-
dominate over development indicators,
and, in a VC-controlled hamlet, a to-
tally different set of indicators must
receive emphasis. Development indi-
cators, such as proportion of arable
land under cultivation, warrant more
. weight in a well-secured hamlet. The
computer itself would have to be
programed to assign appropriate
weights to indicators.
Models
Thresholds for adequacy or suffi-
ciency of indicators would be estab-
lished and included in the computer
program. A number of models could
be designed, and the computer could
be programed to select the model most
nearly approximating the hamlet be-
ing evaluated.
For each model, a number of speci-
fied indicators and a fixed percentsge
of the remaining indicators would be
considered mandatory in order to
produce a valid evaluation. The com-
puter could be programed to query
appropriate sources for missing in-
formation. Meanwhile, the computer
output would indicate that it lacked
sufficient information for valid assess-
ment, hence focusing the attention of
the commanders and advisors on areas
of deficiency in the reporting system.
Our experience in rating the effi-
ciency of our own and the enemy's
forces provides a firm base and prece-
dent for selection of the best indi-
cators for these two variables. Similar
Military Review
14
HAMLET EYALUAnON SYSlEM
techniques could be adopted for eval-
uating GRVN and VC governmental
efficiency. However, selection of indi-
cators for evaluating the loyalties and
attitudes of the people poses quite
another problem.
Years of buffeting have taught the
Vietnamese peasant to answer official
questions with,the answers he believes
alty of the people are more plentiful
than might be expected. Tax collec-
tions, savings in GRVN institutions,
proportion of arable land under cul-
tivation, number of able-bodied males
continuously in hamlet residence,
quantity of informant reports from
the people, number of defections from
the Viet Cong of people native to a
A hamlet that has been secure for a long time may have a high security rating, but
could be lagging in its development program
will please the questioner. One hardly
could expect a peasant to tell a GRVN
official that he does not enthusiasti-
cally support the GRVN. Clearly, we
must try another approach. Along
this line, it is said that the thousands
of VC who defect to the GRVN and
the refugees who, of their own voli-
tion, move from VC to GRVN-con-
trolled areas are voting with their
feet. This type of vote--overt action
that risks VC reprisal and demon-
strates faith in the GRVN-sure1y is
the soundest indicator of popular at-
titude and loyalty for which we could
hope.
Quantifiable indicators of the loy-
Septe.ber 1969
hamlet, numbers of residents compet-
ing for local elective offices, consump-
tion of luxury items, and amount of
harvests marketed through official
channels are but a few of the host of
quantifiable indicators available. The
problem here is to determine those
which are most significant.
In the development field, it may be
necessary to select different indicators
for measurement as hamlets progress
in order to focus on specific problems.
Also, a varied pattern of indicators
probably would yield more comprehen-
sive evaluations of the aspirstions of
the people and the GRVN accomplish-
ments in meeting these aspirations.
15
HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM
Varying indicators would help guard
further against spoofing the system.
A comparison of our newly selected
indicators with existing information
assets undoubtedly would show addi-
tional reports to be required and some
of the reports currently required to
be unnecessary or redundant. Bssi-
cally, the system would require three
types 'of reports: cyclic, spot, and
query.
The cyclic reports would be re-
quired on that type of data which
requires updating at regularly recur-
ring periods such as agricultural out-
put. Establishment of realistic report-
ing periods actually could decrease
report volume as compared to that ex-
perienced in the current across-the-
board monthly reports.
Spot Reports
Spot reports would be submitted
for the more perishable information
such as VC and friendly armed force
actions. The query or one-time report
would be levied by the computer when
it hss insufficient data or when it has
questions relatiye to the cyclic and
spot reports; Overall, reporting re-
quirements probably would increase,
but not as significantly ss initially
might be expected. Certainly, APA-
CE would spread out the reporting
requirement, thus eliminating the
monthly humps. Added to this, the
type of data required would be basic
in nature, requiring little or no eval-
uation by the reporter.
Essential to the reporting require-
ment would be the installation of au-
tomatic data processing read-in and
read-out substations throughout Viet-
nam to provide reporting speed.
Equally essential, these substations
would have to be connected to the
central computer in Saigon by com-
munications circuits to insure ready
access. Where possible, these substa-
tions would be located to provide a
maximum of a one-day time gap be-
tween the central computer and the
using and reporting commanders and
advisors.
'APACE' Services
The primary service to be per-
formed by APACE would be the pro-
vision of current and thorough intel-
ligence on pacification progress. The
system would utilize the reporting
substations and communications sys-
tem.. to prbvide on a routine bssis, at
Utl-Cl' level, CIIl'l'Cnt graphig and tahu-
lar dillplays of pacification intelligence
designed to assist the commander and'
advisor. The system also would re-
spond to user requests for additional
in-depth information and trend analy-
ses.
While the basic intelligence dis-
played would pertsin to the sspira-
tions, loyalties, and attitudes of the
people, information on friendly and
enemy forces also could be displayed
in order to provide a complete picture.
Intelligence in graphic or tabular
format could be displayed either by
individual element or in combination.
APACE, like most systems, would
have its problems. Need for constant
input, possibility of error, and cost
are among the foremost difficulties.
Advisors will have to supply a large
portion of the input to the system,
and reporting requirements probably
would increase. This system, however,
would differ from HES in that the
advisor would receive useful current
intelligence in return for his input.
His reports would be combined with
information from other sources and
processed to provide him with the
intelligence information needed to
improve his own operations. This fac-
tor should prove to be an effective
MIlItarJ alII.. 18
HAMLET EVAlUlnON SYSTEM
incentive for prompt and accurate
reporting:
The possibility of system error,
particularly in logic, represents the
gravest Computer programs,
once designed, are inclined to take on
an aura of perfection that is neither
earned nor necessarily valid. Further-
more, if a few of our advisors apply
faulty logic under HES, only a por-
tion 'of the country is afflicted. How-
ever, with APACE, a logic fault could
extend countrywide. This problem
could be made manageable, though, by
using several continuous checking
means.
Periodic changes of indicators and
constant reevaluation of indicators
would guard against faulty input. The
greatest danger would be compla-
cency, and, as in any other operation,
command supervision alone could sup-
ply the essential impetus and sense of
urgency needed to assure system ef-
ficiency.
Cost, perhaps, is the least of the
problems. As it stands today, we have
no system to locate the 'FEBA and the
high ground on a current basis in our
pacification war. At the same time,
we are pouring millions of dolIars
into that war. The expenditure en-
tailed in establishing APACE would
be minuscule in comparison with total
expenditures, but it could result in
substantial savings by enhancing the
effectiveness of our efforts.
Any system such as HES-which
attempts to measure the attitudes, as-
pirations, and loyalties of the people
-will be subject to error because it
deals in what is now an inexact
science. Complete application of au-
tomatic data processing techniques
could provide us with a system re-
sponsive to the needs of the com-
mander and advisor for timely pacifi-
cation intelligence.
The type of system visualized in
APACE would allow consideration of
the myriad indicators available, thus
increasing the reliability of resultant
evaluations. APACE could help focus
on the real essence of the war-the
winning of the people-and could as-
sist us in insuring that our assets
were applied to that end.
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correspondence.
Septellllir 1969
17

From OrbiB
SovietPolicy
onN
Gerhard Wettig
P
RESENT Soviet policy toward
the West operates on two dis-
tinct levels: the European level and
the United States-USSR level. In the
first case, the central concept is "Eu-
ropean security"; in the second case,
nonproliferation plays the decisive
role.
It is striking that the Soviets hail
"European security" as an applica-
tion of the ideological doctrine of
"peaceful coexistence between states
of different social orders," but they
do not associate nonproliferation with
that doctrine. Another conspicuous
fact is Soviet reluctance to voice the
only argument that can provide moral
justification for a nonproliferation
treaty-namely, that the spread of
nuclear weapons threatens the world
with the prospect of uncontrollable
nuclear conflict.
Until April 1968, only slightly more
than one percent of all Soviet state-
ments had mentioned the nonprolifer-
ation argument. In these cases, either
the international public or, more of-
ten, an exclusively Anglo-Saxon audi-
ence was addressed. The nonprolifer-
ation argument seemed to be alien to
the thinking habits of the Soviet elite.
Moreover, the top leaders carefully
avoided giving publicity to the sub-
ject at home and in the Communist
world. No message directed to a do-
mestic or Communist audience alluded
to it.
One concludes that Soviet leaders
did not want their followers to regard
nonproliferation as an important ob-
jective--an inference confirmed by
Soviet unwillingness to link nonpro-
liferation to peaceful coexistence.
Communists are to view nonprolifer-
ation as a matter of temporal expedi-
ency, not as a matter of high principle
MIlItIry .IY/.w
18
as they would were an ideological con-
cept associated with it.
Since May 1968, the Soviet propa-
ganda line has undergone some
changes. The arguments in favor of
nonproliferation were repestedly pub-
licized in statements not only for for-
eign, but also for domestic, consump-
tion. This seems to contradict the
conclusion of the previous paragraph.
However, a closer scrutiny of the
statements for the domestic public
reveals that the nonproliferation ar-
gument is never employed in general
terms, only as a specific foreign policy
objective of the Soviet Union.
PolHlcal Weapon
A nonproliferation agreement is
usually deemed necessary in order to
neutralize the dangers emanating from
the "most aggressive" members of the
"imperialistic camp"-that is, mainly
West Germsny. Thus, nonprolifera-
tion is regarded not as a universal
principle, but as a political wespon
which serves in the struggle against
specific opponents.
Soviet citizens were warned to re-
gard the nonproliferation treaty not
This article was ctmdensed
from the original, a'PPearing in
ORDIS, No. " Winter 1969, pub-
lished by the Foreign Policy Re-
search Institute of the Univer8ity
of Pennsylvania, under the title,
"Soviet Policy on the Nonprolif-
eration of Nuclea.r Weapons,
1966-1968." Copyright 1969
by the Trustee8 of the Univer8ity
of Pennsylva.nia.
Mr. Wettig is a. apecialist in
the foreign policy of the Soviet
bloc a.t the Federal Institute for
Eastern and Interna.tiona.l Stud-
ies, Cologne, Germa,ny, a.nd the
author of Entmilitarisierung und
Wiederbewatfnung in Deutsch-
land, 1948-1955.
NONPROLIFERATION
as an "end in itself," but as a means
which will improve the conditions of
the struggle against the imperialists
and, "consequently, also the perspec-
tives of a success in this struggle." 1
The notion of nonproliferation as
a political means instead of a political
objective, surprising as it may seem
to the Western mind, is a logical out-
come of Soviet doctrine. Since the
days of V. I. Lenin and Joseph Stalin,
peace has been accorded no moral and
political preference in comparison to
war. Peace and war are good and just
in quite the same manner, provided
they promote "social progress" and
"liberation of mankind." That Soviet
leaders actually have preferred peace
to war in most cases (although not
always) is due to their perception
that war involves serious risks.
"Peaceful Coulstence"
It is in this context that the doc-
trine of "peaceful coexistence," pro-
claimed in 1956, can best be under-
stood. The risks of modem warfare
have become so great that an inter-
state war, possibly involving the nu-
clear-weapon powers, must be avoided
in principle. Other forms of warfare,
such as "liberation wars" outside the
zones of nuclear armament or civil
wars with no possible interstate con-
frontation, may still be supported as
''progressive.''
A similar pattern of ressoning ap-
plies to the choice between nuclear
proliferation and nonproliferation. It
is not by chance that Soviet state-
ments never indicate any interest in
universal nonproliferation-that is, in
a nuclear armsment ban to those
countries which are not viewed as
actual or potential opponents. The
function of the treaty is to "bind the
hands" of specific enemies.
1 CommeDt&17 of Baril Pavlov, RadIo Moscow
(R....lan). 10 Inno 1968.
19
NONPROLIFERADON
The objectives the Soviet leaders
seek to attain by means of the non-
proliferation treaty can be discerned
from their interpretations of it and
demands regarding ita provisions.
Until 1967, United States-Soviet ne-
gotiations were largely focused on the
issue of whether nuclear-weapon pow-
ers had the right to transfer nuclear
weapons or know-how to alliance or-
ganizations.
US authorities lield the view that
this did not amount to proliferation
because substituting a "nuclear alli-
ance" for a nuclear power did not en-
large the number of entities control-
ling nuclear weapons. The Soviet Un-
ion maintained, in diplomatic notes
and PU9lic statements, that the US
standpoint would open loopholes to
proliferation by indirect means.
Contrary to the United States, the
USSR has been completely unwilling
to share its nuclear capabilities with
its allies. Moscow does not even allow
them to develop major civilian nuclear
facilities.
Moscow Victory
In 1967, Washington bowed to So-
viet objections and eliminated the
alliance option from its draft. In sub-
sequent Soviet public statements, this
US backdown was depicted as a great
triumph. Indeed, it was a great vic-
tory for Moscow. The Kremlin ac-
quired a voice in determining how
the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion can be armed, and it received an
assurance against the possibility that
a West European nuclear defense
community might be created as an
intermediate step toward an evolving
united Western Europe.
Several ambiguities inherent in the
nonproliferation treaty affect political
and military problems of the Western
alliance. The treaty is not clear re-
garding the meaning of indirect con-
trol over nuclear weapons which a
nonnuclear-weapon state may not ex-
ercise. On this basis, Soviet commen-
tators frequently denounce even the
limited consultation in matters of
nuclear strategy realized through the
two planning bodies of NATO, calling
it a wicked device designed to circum-
vent the treaty and proliferate nu-
clear weapons to the Federal Republic.
Weapons Storage
Another target of Soviet propagan-
dists is the presence of nuclear-war-
head stockpiles in West Germany.
They stress that nonproliferation does
not permit storage of nuclear weapons
on the territories of nonnuclear-
weapon states. That the West Ger-
mans fulfill their alliance obligations
by allowing Western troops, especially
US nuclear-armed troops, to be sta-
tioned on their soil is interpreted as
a violation of nonproliferation policy.
Western assurances that the nuclear
arsenals are under strict US control
are dismissed as insincere or as un-
realistic.
It is obvious that the soviet aim is
to induce the West Germans to op-
pose the Western military presence
on their soil and to create as much
trouble as possible for the stationing
of US troops in central Europe--
which, after all, is still the hard core
of US security guarantees to the
European members of NATO. A de-
nuclearized NATO defense posture in
Western Europe would have no chance
of success in case of a military con-
flict, for the Soviet armies in East
Germany, Poland, and the USSR
would be qualitatively superior by
virtue of their nuclear armament.
One of the principal deficiencies of
the nonproliferation treaty is that it
does not distinguish between military
Military Review 20
nuclear technology (which shall not
be allowed to the nonnuclear-weapon
states) and civil nuclear technology
(which must not be hampered in anr
way). Soviet representatives give as-
surances that no one, including the
West Germans, shall "suffer under
the pretendedly different interpreta-
tions of the wordings" of the treaty,
provided, however, that the West Ger-
mans do not attempt:
to seek loopholes in the inter-
pretation of the articles to the treaty
which would allow them to acquire
n"clear weapons in one way or
another." ,
This sounds fine, but it leaves open
the crucial question as to which kinds
of nuclear activity should be regarded
as opening loophoies for nuclear ar-
mament.
Public Statements
The record of Soviet public state-
ments makes it abundantly clear that
Soviet leaders are willing to denounce
a wide variety of West German nu-
clear activities as steps toward nu-
clear weaponry. The Federal Republic
is regularly accusea of preparing or
even initiating production of nuclear
weapons inside and outside its bor-
ders. All kinds of national or interna-
tional civil nuclear programs are
quoted as evidence for this. Alleged
nuclear cooperation between the Fed-
eral Republic and .other countries--
notably South Africa, Israel, and
Communist China-is condemned as
especially dangerous.
In their messages to foreign audi-
ences, however, the Soviets argue that
the treaty will open the way to greater
assistance by the nuclear powers
to the less-developed countries, thus
starting a new era in the peaceful
1I0llPROUFERAnOil
use of the atom. Moscow's strategy is
to appeal to the states of the third
world to support the treaty and in
this way to pressure reluctant West-
em Nations into signing it. In prac-
tice, however, the Soviet record of
peaceful nuclear assistance to other
nations, even to the East European
A"",. N... F8GhH"U
A US Army Ser(letmt miselle prepared
for lauuch duritlg a NATO exercise.
Both the Sergetmt and the logger range
PerMing miselles have been furnished to
West Germany, but nuden warheads
remain under US control.
allies, has been poor, especially com-
pared with the efforts of the United
States and Canada.
Another issue raised by the non-
proliferation treaty has to do with
the controls to insure treaty compli-
ance. In accordance "with the long-
standing Soviet policy of favoring
public declaratory agreements with-
out effective control,"" Soviet leaders
"The Nudsr NODProlifen.tion Treaty:'
Ori>io. No. 4 Winter 1968. p 966.
21
NONPROUFEUnON
originally rejected nonproliferation
safeguards. In order to overcome So-
vietopposition,BritainandtheUnited
States then conceded that controls
should be applied only to the nonnu-
clear-weapon states as thesewere the
partieswhichweretoassumethereal
obligations under the treaty.
The idea of controls only for other
nations was acceptable to Moscow.
Controls applied to other countries
seemedtobe arealbargainsincethey
mightopen doors toSoviet inspection
and inftuence abroad without requir-
ingany Sovietcompromise in return.
Concession Doubtful
Soviet leaders had to consent to
controls intheCommunistEastEuro-
peancountries, itis true, butwhether
thisamountedtoaconcessionisdoubt-
ful. The civil nuclear equipment of
theareaisratherscarceastheSoviet
Union has reserved full-scale develop-
ment for itself. Moreover, with'the
Kremlin's apprehension of emancipa-
torytendencies inthepeople's democ-
racies, international checking proce-
dures with Soviet participation may
well become a means ofstrengthening
Soviet supervision over the whole
area.'
Thecontrolsenvisagedbythetreaty
areviewed bySovietleadersashighly
favorable to their interests. They de-
mand that those states harboring ex-
cessive nuclear ambitions, most nota-
blyWestGermany,submittothemost
rigorous of controls.
AftertheAmericansacceded tothe
Sovietdemand thatnuclearpowersbe
exempted from the inspection safe-
guards, Moscow raised a new issue
on thecontrolproceduretobeapplied
tothenonnuclear-weaponstates.There
arethreegenerallyrecognize4models:
The RomamaDJ. so deep)y committed to in..
dependence from Moscow. have vigorously oppoaed
the nonproliferation treaty.
Thecontrolsadministeredbythe
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in Vienna which include
checking all relevant documents and
blueprints, site inspections, and ap-
proval of installations and technical
processes.
The safeguards practiced by the
European Community of Atomic En-
ergy (Euratom) that do not require
nations to divulge technological se-
crets, butarebased largely on input-
output checks of fissionable material.
Such controls are much less prone to
/ industrial espionage and to foreign
interferencewith a nation's decisions
in civil nuclear technology.
A still less interventionist form
of control advocated by some scien-
tists who believe thatthere is hardly
any need for specific control devices
since a modern and effective nuclear-
weapon system must consist of so
many components thattheirexistence
would be detected early.
Soviet PosHiOll
The IAEAcontrols intheirpresent
form are highly unpopular with the
industrially advanced nations, espe-
ciallythemembersofEuratom,dueto
the opportunities for espionage and
intervention they open to the con-
trollers and their increasing costs
which, according to some experts,
mayamountto10 percentofthecivil
nuclear product. The Soviet position
isquiteclear: ThepresentIAEAcon-
trols are to provide the standard.
They are the only ones stringent
enoughto bartheWest Germans and
others from access to nuclear arma-
ments. In their opinion, one of the
crucial features of the IAEA safe-
guard system is the inspectors:
. right not only to examine aU
documenmtion ,-elating to cont,-oUed
nuclea,- installations and materials,
MIIIWJ Review 22
NONPROUFERAnON
but also to carry out on-the-spot in-
spections.'
Western, especially West German,
advocacy of input-output checks as a
reliable control procedure that would
not be prone to misuse provoked a
sharp retort from Moscow. Bonn was
accused of wanting to keep open loop-
holes "for the uncontrolled accumula-
denounced as a worthless "self-
control" arrangement designed to
prevent detection of military nuclear
preparations by the West Germans
who are alleged to be in full command
of Euratom. The Soviet line of argu-
ment is that there must be one and the
same control arrangement for all na-
tions concerned. The IAEA is pre-
Soviet soldiers prepare a for not provide
strategic or tactical missiles with a nuclear capability to any Warsaw Pact nations.
tion of nuclear explosives" and to pro-
tect its "nuclear centers from the
eyes of all those not taken into confi-
dence.
tt

One of the, questions of the control
procedUre is 'whether the IAEA is to
be the sole and direct agent enforcing
nonprOliferation safeguards. The five
nonnuclear-weapon members of Eura-
tom have made their accession depend-
ent on a verification agreement which
would leave the controls to Euratom
and entrust only subsequent verifica-
tion to the IAEA.
This has provoked great hostility in
Moscow. The Euratom controls are
Septell\ber 1889
sented as. the only body which can
enforce the. safeguard system envis-
aged in the nonproliferation treaty
and be responsible for checking treaty
compliance.
In addition to the problems created
by the ambiguities of the treaty, there
are some issues related to nonprolif-
eration that are largely ignored by
the treaty. The nuclear-weapon pow-
ers claim for themselves a permanent
monopoly of the crucial means of
destruction, putting all other states
into a position of lasting relative
weakness. They do so in the name of
international security-that is, reduc-
ing the chances of a world war be-
tween nuclear-armed powers.
The nonnuclear-weapon states have
23
NONPROUFERATION
a more comprehensive notion of their
security. They do not want to be ex-
posed to nuclear threat and blackmail
any more than to nuclear warfare.
Fears of being blackmailed into de-
pendency or surrender have been the
principal incentives for "going nu-
clear." .
Some nuclear "have nots," especially
several of the more advanced coun-
tries in the nonaligned world, regard
both the good will and the deterrence
assurances of thJ nuclear-weapon
powers as utterly unreliable sources
of .security. United States-8oviet
mutual deterrence was of no use
to Czechoslovakia in 1968. Various
states, currently under an effective
nuclear-weapon power guarantee, are
concerned that changing super,power
interests and commitments or chang-
ing nuclear-power ratios in the future
might undermine their security.
Redefine Problem
In the early phases of negotiation
on a nonproliferation treaty, the
Soviets were reluctant to mention the
security issue at all. When it became
impossible to ignore the matter, they
made various attempts to redefine the
problem to meet Soviet needs. The
West Germans were told that the de-
creased danger of nuclear war to be
achieved by a nonproliferation treaty
was, in itself, a sufficient security
guarantee. Notions of insecurity are
dismissed as absurd allegations fab-
ricated by the West Germans.
Meanwhile, Moscow is careful to
avoid any commitment. When a West
German memorandum called for an
unequivocal assurance from the nu-
clear weapon-states never to resort to
nuclear blackmail, Moscow replied that
this was but an "attempt to spread
distrust to the objectives and inten-
tions of those signatory powers which
possess nuclear weapons.'"
A serious deficiency of the nonpro-
liferation treaty is the lack of clear
criteria for treaty compliance. Mainly,
but not exclusively, with regard to the
Federal Republic of Germany, Soviet
Natl"
The RefJenge, Britain's fourth PfJlsris
submarine at ita launch in 1968. There is
no NATO organization covering strategic
nuclear forces, but both Britaiu and the
United States have committed Polsris
submarines to the planning control of the
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
spokesmen have advanced criteria
which allow almost anything pertain-
ing to nuclear matters to be declared
military in nature and, as such, con-
trary to the treaty.
One can foresee that, if the treaty
enters into force, Moscow will raise
charges of military nuclear activity
against certain countries and demand '
l' Broadeut of Radio Moscow (German).
18 ]lay 1967. The Issue '" .till vital to Bonn
becaue, on the baata of Articles 68 Bnd 107 of
the United Natlolll Charter, Moscow formally
dafmI the right of interference in the intemal
matters of the Federal RepubUc.
MilltaJy .evlew
24
i
r .
NONPROUfERAnoN
'that the supply of fissionable mate-
o rials to those countries be halted at
. once. Such demands with regard to
US uranium supplies for Euratom
, would giveSovietleaders another op-
I"portunity to intervene in United
. States-West EUropean relations.
r
AslongastheUnitedStates-Soviet
~ negotiations on the nonproliferation
fagreement were underway, Moscow
, soughttoexploitallkindsofWestern
t differences which arose over the issue.
!: Anglo-Saxon audiences were warned
t of alleged aggressive intentions on
thepartoftheWestGermans-inten-
tions partly deduced from the fact
that Bonn was understandsbly reluc-
tant to support nonproliferation in
some of the forms under considera-
tion.
AnDther Version
TheWestGermansreceivedanother
version oftheSovietline. TheUnited
States, according to Moscow, dictated
itswilltoits Europeanallies and did
not heed its allies' interests. The
Americans were depicted as indiffer-
enttotheissueofreunification,reluc-
tantto supportWest Germanpolicies
ingeneral, tiredoftheir NATO com-
mitment, andalresdyembarkedonan
anti-Bonn, nonproliferation course.
This kind ofargumentwas meantto
convincetheWest Germansthatthey
were losing their crucial backing in
Washington and, therefore, would be
well advised to initiate a new policy
outside NATO, especially one that
was more friendly toward the USSR.
Whenagreementonthenonprolifer-
ationtreatywasinsight,Sovietstrat-
egy gradually changed. Moscow had
secured what it wanted. Therefore,
principal Sovietconcern had tobedi-
rected toward making sure that the
~ o m i s contained in the agreement
woUld be fulfilled through treaty
implementation. The first indication
of the shift in Soviet policy was the
stress placed in late 1967 on the ab-
solutely binding character of the
treaty. Any provisions which might
give the nonnuclear-weapon states a
chancetowithdrawincaseofnational
emergency were attacked as "evasion
clauses" thatwould nullify the entire
treaty.
Grelt Impact
SovietoccupationofCzechoslovakia
had a great impact on their nonpro-
liferation treaty strategy. Western
reactions to themilitary intervention
convincedSovietleadersthattheirac-
tion had seriously dimmed the pros-
pects for treaty adoption.
There must have been considerable
embarrassmentover thisfact inMos-
cow. Until mid-September, Soviet
communicators, obviously lacking in-
structions on how to deal with the
new situation, remained,silent on the
nonproliferationissue.Whenthetopic
was finally taken up again, the So-
vietstriedinvariouswaystocounter-
actthe trend.
They warned Americans that a
change ofattitudemightrender "the
relations between the greatest world
powers as bad as they were during
the first days of the cold war." For
thefirst time, themutuality of inter-
est .in United States-Soviet coopera-
tion (theexistenceofwhichhadbeen
previously denied) was stressed.
WesternapprehensionsarousedbySo-
viet action against Czechoslovakia
were denounced as mere pretexts for
scuttling the treaty.
The United States was informed
thatBonn was exploiting the Czecho-
slovakian events "in order to justify
itsunwillingnesstosignthenonprolif-
eration treaty," and that Bonn no
longer considered itself "a vassal of
2S
NONPROLIFERATION
Washina1;on." Discontented with the
"European course of the American
reactionaries," West German leaders
allegedly desired to forge their "own
political and military hegemony in
Western Europe," a course that re-
quired possession of "atomic and hy-
drogen bombs.'"
From the beginning, West Ger-
many has been the focus of' Soviet
nonproliferation polemics as it is for
many other issues. Moscow has re-
peatedly stated in'unambiguous terms
that the principal importance of the
nonproliferation treaty lies in the:
Bituatioo of Central Eur!Ype
where the nuclear ambitiom of the
West Germam, militl1lT'1l gang dictate
most 'Vigorously mea.sures which are
apt to pre'Vent equipment of the
Bunde8Wehr with nuclear weapons in
any form, directly or indirectly.
What are the reasons for Soviet
preoccupation with West Germany?
The Soviet leaders must be fully aware
that Bonn has no chance in the fore-
seeable future to acquire nuclear
weapons, for the United States, France,
and Britain are opposed to the Federal
Republic's acquisition of them.
Analysis of Soviet public state-
ments yields other motives for select-
ing the Federal Republic as the main
target of attack. Alleged West Ger-
man opposition to a nonproliferation
treaty is frequently linked to Bonn's
NATO orientation. The West Germans
have been told repeatedly that their
compliance with the treaty can be ac-
cepted as a sincere contribution to
peace only if NATO ties are cut and
Atlantic nuclear strategy rejected.
Moscow regards West Germany as
the backbone of NATO and of the US
a_cut by BeIobtoV. RadIo Iloecow (Eug-
Dab). 10 Ootober 1968
v. lIIatve7ev. "Shu vpered," 1.t1ut.JIG. 27
A......t 1987.
presence in the European Continent.
Deprived of West Germany, NATO
would be "reduced to an empty
notion." 10 Thus, the Soviet Union is
trying to loosen the Federal Republic's
NATO ties in the expectation that, if
West Germany proves to be a vulner-
able target, the Atlantic alliance and
the European position of the United
States can be mortally wounded.
Soviet nonproliferation policy is
paralleled by Soviet "European se-
curity" policy. The actions under the
heading of European security are
geared to mobilize West Europeans
against the United States and the
Federal Republic (depicted as an
anti-European US instrument). Such
a course, however, increases the dan-
ger that the dreaded ''Washington-
Bonn axis" will grow firmer.
To prevent this, by separating the
Americans from the West Germans,
is the function of Soviet nonprolifer-
ation policy. Lesser Soviet objectives
are to undermine the Federal Repub-
lic's position as an integral part of
Western Europe and as an indispen-
sable component of any future West
European integration, to disrupt the
West European communities by weak-
ening Euratom, and to thwart West
Germany's new East European policy
of conciliation and bridge-building
which may affect the obedience and
militancy of Moscow's allies.
In 8um, Soviet nonproliferation
policy does not aim at internstional
detente, but at generating tensions
that win help the Soviets in their
struggle to remove US power from
Europe, to spread Soviet influence
over a disunited Western Europe, and
to restore Soviet rule over Eastern
Europe.
10 sDUtak BeaIov, "What Is Behind the s_
eJaJ BelatlODlhlp/" Itl""""ticmd Ail".'" (Mos-
eow). 1968. Number 8, p 9 ~
Mnltlrr InI,.
28
The Korean Incident
Charles S. Stevenson
T
HE capture of the Pueblo is not
the first time the US Navy has
had trouble in Korea. In fact, Korean
ships attacked both US merchant
ships and naval vessels in Far East
waters over a century ago.
The General Skerman-an Amer-
ican merchsnt ship-was fired upon
and burned in Korean waters in 1864.
Presumably on an unofficial trading
mission for spices, herbs, and selected
artifacts from such nations as the
Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, and an
almost unknown Corea, as it was
spelled then, the ship grounded in the
TatunII' River just south of Seoul. On
current maps, this is identified as the
Toedong River.
As members of the General Sher-
man's crew, mostly of Malayan and
Chinese extraction, attempted to come
ashore, a strong confrontation took
plaee between them and Korean na-
tives. The crew of the US vessel was
massacred and the ship set afire. No
Americans were captured and little
navigational equipment was salvaged
by the Koreans. It was reported sev-
eral years later by French seamen
that the Koreans thought the US
venture was ODe to rob the graves of
the nation's ancient kings.
KOREAN INCIDENT
It has been recorded that the Ko-
reans got their courage to attaCk the
General Sh6f'11Ul,n from the fact that
they had earlier defeated a French
naval attempt against Seoul following
the persecution and death of some
French Catholic missionaries.
The General ~ n attack was
resented quietly by official US naval
authorities, but before an investiga-
tion was held and facts made avail-
able, all they couid do was to fret over
the possibility of' retaliation.
Political MR
. However, the then Secretary of
State, William H. Seward, made a
political move to get a discussion with
the Korean Government, not only
about the General Sh6f'11UI,n inCident,
but also ab()ut the possibility of a
treaty concerning the treatment of
seaman shipwreCked in that area.
There also was some hope of starting
trade relations with the distant Ko-
reans.
The move was in the form of a re-
quest to France in 1866 to join in an
expedition to Korea. In what must be
described as extraordinary perception,
it was Seward's feeling that the tiny
nation would eventually be divided in
some way.
The invitation, as it was so worded,
was sent to France because it was
thought that the French were on rea-
sonably good relations with the Chi-
nese who were, in turn, supposed to
Clw.rZes S. Stevenson' served with
the 81-'th Engineers of the 89th Divi-
sion during World War 1. He is a re-
tired Vice President of HaJlmark
CllrtlB, Incorporated, KanBt1.8 City,
Missouri, lind the Ci1lili4n Aide to the
Seoreta.ry of the Army from western
Missouri. Following trips to 71. fill.-
tions, he Iw.B written IIrticZes for 'llllri-
0U8 publiCtl.tions.
have some kind of influence with Ko-
rea. The reasoning was that a good
word to the Koreans by the Chinese
would ease the way for an American
discussion with the Koreans. Nothing
came from this-probably because
Napoleon III was still rankled by the
opposition of the United States to his
Maximilian adventure in Mexico.
Immediate Rejectloo
With this failing, the United States
turned to the Chinese in its effort to
meet with the Koreans. Anson Burlin-
game, the US Minister to China at the
time, brought the story of the deaths
and destruction of the General Sher-
man fracas to the attention of the
Chinese foreign office, hoping for its
help in beginning negotiations with
the Koreans. He received an imme-
diate rejection with the word that
China had no control over the internal
affair!! of Korea. The Chinese plainly
stated that their relationship with the
Korean Government was one of cere-
mony only, and not one of rule.
Burlingame at once informed Rear
Admiral H. H. Bell of the American
Asiatic Squadron of the Chinese re-
fusal to help. Shortly after this, the
admiral moved the Wa;chusett and the
ShlJfUl.ndoa.h of his fleet-with 10 guns
and nine guns respectively-into the
rivers near Seoul where they took
soundings. This time, the US ships
were not challenged. Admiral Bell's
vessels were reasonably well armed
while the General ShBf'11lMl, had only
enough arms to ward off pirates. This
ended the episodes of the late 1860's.
A few years later, in 1870, the
United States again sought Chinese
cooperation in attempting to secure a
treaty for the protection of Bailors
shipwreCked on the Korean coasts,
with a slight hint for opening of trade.
The negotiations were entrusted by
lllitaly Rnlew I
28
Hamilton Fish, the then Secretary of
State, to a diplomatic officer, Fred-
erich Lmv, US Minister to China
rather than to a naval officer. This
was done because it was deemed de-
sirable to establish a diplomatic rather
than a military relationship with the
Koreans. Then, too, it was hoped to
advance the general American cause
with the Chinese.
Peate Talks
After some correspondence between
Low and the KiUg of Korea through
the Chinese, Low announced that
there was indication that the Koreans
at last might talk with the Americans.
As a result, Rear Admiral John Rod-
gers, Commander of the Asiatic
Squadron, was directed to go to Ko-
rea. Along with his tlagship, his tleet
included the CoUwado, two corvettes,
the AlaBka, the Benicia, and gunboats
Monocacy and Palo8. The BotiUa ar-
rived near the mouth of the Han
River with a total of 85 guns and
somewhat over a thousand sailors and
marines. This was in May 1871.
After minimum amenities had been
observed, the Americans asked for an
interview with the King, continuing,
meanwhile, to move slowly up the Han
River toward Seoul. After recogni-
tions by the King that the Americans
were at least in the area, two emis-
saries boarded Admiral Rodgers' tlag- ."
ship and carried on a desultory and
fragmentary conversation. The Amer-
icans were soon convinced that the Ko-
reans had limited authority and that
little would come from the talk. The
visit ended with Admiral Rodgers
advising the two Koreans that it was
his plan to continue up the river to
take some soundings and to 1ind a bet-
ter place to anchor the balance of his
tleet.
Two days later, on 2 June 1871, Ad-
KOREAN IIICIDEJIT
miral Rodgers started the Monot:GC!I
and the Palos-with howitzers promi-
nently dispiayed-imd _ ama1Ier
vessels inward. Wh11e one cannot read
the minds of Koreans, this may have
provoked them. In any event, as the
Americans passed the 1irBt of the de-
fenses, the Koreans opened 1ire with
what has been described as several
hundred cannons of. small caliber. The
Americans responded with their 8-
inch guns, causing the Koreans to run
from the fort which had been fired
upon. They did not even pick up their
dead or wounded. The American casu-
alties were two injured and no damage
to any of the ships.
While it would have been a good op-
portunity to press an offensive and
continue up the river, Admiral Rod-
gers chose to return to the main body
of his Beet. However, he sent some
men ashore with instructions to leave
a note tied to a stake on the island. It
read that, if he did not get an apology
within 10 days, he would exercise
force. No apology came, and on 10
June, the Monocacy, the Palos, and
four smaller vessels began to move up
the Han.
Korean Defenses
The Korean defense along the river
consisted of a series of forts located
for the most psrt on the island of
Konghug. They were made of wood
and concealed in the marshes and
swamps of the Han. As the small US
Beet approached the forts, the Amer-
icans began shelling. Following only a
little resistance, they began to land in
the swamps and marshes to take pos-
session of the forts. Suddenly, the Ko-
reans went into action, and a severe,
tough, hand-to-hand ground struggle
began. At a fort called the Citadel-
because of its location at the top of a
150-foot hilI-the 1ighting was espe-
28
1
KOREAN INCIDENT
I
eWJy hllr\iforthll.Amllricans lIS thIIy topressanoft'ensive,AdmiralRodgers :J
]
aM:empted:w:"forcetheir way upthll chose:nottodoso. Heturnedhi,fieet
. :'
,amund.and.sailed back to the mouth. J
Koreans ofptbe.Han:River':lIl1re, beanchored, 4
gave up notonly their poBitions, but hoping for some word from the Ko-
also about 500 estimated dead andan reaDS. When Done had come by 3 July, 1
unknown number of wounded. The the entire fieet left the area, leading
Americans had three dead and 10 the Koreans to believe that another
wounded. Westernnationhadbeenforcedto re-
Again,whileitwouldhavebeenad- treat under the of Korean
vantageous from a militaryviewpoint force.
Korea is,one oftheworld's Dlsjor testing groundsfor the principles
uponwhiehtheUnitedNationswasfounded: coUedive_urity,peaceful set-
tleDlent, and self-deterDlination. What happens to this country is of grave
""neemtoaU nationsinterestedin keepingthoseprinciplesalive; and there-
fore it- is inlperative for the United Nations to make clear to aU that its
presence in Korea will be Dlaintained, also that the responsibilities of the
internationalcoDlDlunity towardthisareaDlUst andwillcontinue.
What, the world has been witnessing ever since North Korea eDl-
barked on a policy ofstepped-upviolence-isnota mer"succession of minor ,
incidents, rather a systeDlatic campaign toexport revolution into the South
through violence and terrorism.
US Senator Stuart Symington
MIIItIry Rlflt.
30
us Offensive and Defensive Strategy
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Fant DI, United State. Arm"
ThiB article WIt8 taken from a
theBiB prepared while the author
WIt8 a 8tudent at the US Army War
College. The view8 ezpre88ed and
conclusions drawn by Colonel Fant
while in an academic environment
are not to be construed as ezpre8-
8ions of official US GO'IIernment or
Department of Defense policy.-
Editor.
O
NE goal is fundamental to US
fulfillment of its national pur-
pose-the preservation of this coun-
try as a viable national entity. The
possibility of nuclear war poses a real
threat to the achievement of this goal.
To safeguard our national security,
we must be capable of deterring a de-
liberate nuclear attack. But even if we
should absorb a surprise attack, we
must be able to intlict in retaliation
an unacceptable degree of damage
upon the attacker. In addition, we
must be capable of limiting damage to
our population and industry.
Strategic oft'ensive forces provide
an assured destruction capability and
hence the necessary deterrent to such
an attack by either of our likely ad-
versaries-Communist China or the
USSR. Strategic defensive forces con-
September 1969 31
US STRATEGY
tribute directly to limiting dal!l&ge,
but they can also serve as a deter-
rent by successfully intercepting and
destroying the enemy's offensive weap-
ons before they reach our strate-
gic offensive forces. Less directly,
these defensive forces may contribute
further to the deterrent should they
become so effective as to undermine
the enemy's confidence in his offensive
capability. ,
A mixture of both strategic offen-
sive and defensive forces is essential
if we are to be prepared for the threat
of nuclear war. Within each force, we
should strive for variety. The greater
our options, the more the enemy task
is compounded, for he must prepare
responses to resulting broader capa-
bilities. On the other hand, simplifica-
tion of our options may tempt him to
undertake a surprise attack.
Sb'ate&ic Deterrent
To fulfill ita purpose, a strategic
offensive force must be in being and
should be frightening, inexorable, per-
suasive, inexpensive, foolproof, and
controllable. To meet such character-
istics, US strategic offensive forces
consist .of a mix of missiles and
manned bombers. Eaeh can do things
the other cannot. Together, they are
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Fant
III is with the Ofjice of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, Wash-
ington, D. C. Other assignments in-
clude duty with the Capitol Military
Region in Vietnam, with the 11th
Airborne Division and the 50-6th I'TV-
fantry in Germany, and with the -6oth
Infantry Division in Korea. He holds
a B.S. in Engineering from the US
Military Academy, West Point, an
M.A. in English from the University
of Pen1l81llvania, and is a graduate of
the US Marine Corps Command and
Staff College (I/lia the US Army War
College.
prepared for instantaneous retaliation
against an aggressor at any level of
conflict. Under a second-strike con-
eept, they also must be able to sustain
an initial enemy attack and still be
capable of launching crippling blows
against preselected enemy targets.
In addition to missiles and manned
bombers, the force includes long-range
reconnaissance aircraft, associated
support forces, and command and con-
trol systems. The capability of such
weapons, supported by a national re-
solve for their use, provides the de-
terrent to an aggressor's military ac-
tion. But if the deterrent posture ~
not avert general war, strategic offen-
sive forces must be able to conclude
the conflict on terms favorable to the
United States.
Assurln, Survival
The purpose of strategic defensive
forces is to assure the survival of
the United States as a viable nation
in the event of attack by limiting
damage to a nominal, acceptable level.
Such forces may also enhance the
credibility of our nuclear deterrence.
Their mission is to detect and destroy
enemy missiles and aircraft enroute
to targets in the United States.
While the United States has had
an effective defense against manned
bombers since the early 1950's, it has
not yet deployed an antiballistic mis-
sile (ABM) system.
The USSR's present policy is osten-
sibly a policy of peaceful coexistence.
There appears to be no immediate
danger of it launehing a preventive
war. But in the event of nuelear
war, it will strive to win by em-
ploying multiple systems and damage
limitation. Although the USSR does
not possess the capability to destroy
all US retaliatory forces in a first
strike, it does have the capability to
MII\tarJ Review
32
us STRAlESY
retaliate and assure destruction of US
targets beyond acceptable limits. It
continues to strengthen its air de-
fense system, extend civil defense
programs, and strive for competence
in its military forces which have had
no recent combat experience.
It is clear that the USSR has de-
veloped the scientific-technological
base capable of producing sophisti-
resented a substantial increase-15
percent-in projected defense expend-
itures. It seems reasonable that this
jump refiected a shift in -priorities
within the defense establisbment and
a quest for strategic superiority. '
The Soviet arsenal of nuclear de-
livery vehiclea is formidable, consist-
ing of a creditable manned-bomber
force, an increasing ,number of sophia-
US A , , ~
The Bear, a Soviet turboprop aircraft can reach any target on the North American
Continent on a two-way mission without refueling
cated weapon systems and challenging
the United States in any field of mil-
itary research, development, testing,
and engineering. This base, combined
with its ability to concentrate quickly
on priority programs, poses grave
questions for US planners in a period
of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
disarray, heavy US commitment in
Vietnam, and pressures for defense
economy at llome.
According to the Soviet published
budget, defense expenditures in 1966
rose about five percent. The eight-
percent increase announced for 1967
did not represent an increase in the
proportion of national income devoted
to defense. But the 1968 budget rep-
September 1969
ticated intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles (ICBM's) with great range and
payload capabilities, and more and
more submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBM's).
The inventory of Soviet intercon-
tinental bombers has not increased
during the past year. Yet the approx-
imately 155 aircraft represent a mix
of relatively high-performance sub-
sonic bombers. The Bear is a four-
engine, turboprop aircraft capable of
reaching any target on the North
American Continent on a two-way
mission without refueling infiight.
The Badger is a twin-engine plane of
relatively short range. To be effec-
tively used in an attack against this
33
UnJIATECY
continent, it must be refueled inflight,
but the Soviets do have an operational
in-flight refueling capability. Last is
the Buon, a four-engine jet similar in
size and capability to our B-5'. Like
the Ba.dger, it can be refueled inflight
to cover most North American targets.
The Soviets have been doing re-
search and development in the field of
supersonic bombers, and one is in
their inventory-the Blinder. It is a
swept-wing, medium bomber with
twin-jet engines'mounted externally
near the tail. They also are develop-
ing a new Mach 3 interceptor that
will greatly increase the threat to the
US manned-bomber force.
Balllstic-Missn. Fore.
Over the past year, the Soviets have
continued their buildup of hardened
and dispersed land-based missiles. At
present production rates, the USSR
will surpass the United States in
number of ICBM's this year, and, by
1974-75, could have as many as 2,500
compared with 1,054 currently plan-
ned for the United States.
Another factor directly affecting
deterrent superiority is US confirma-
tion of Soviet claims of a mobile
ICBM. Such a self-propelled missile
has been viewed in Moscow parades.
Mobility makes an ICBM difficult to
destroy because it cannot be targeted.
The other type ballistic missile of
specific interest is the SLBM. As of
July 1967, the Soviets had about 330
conventionally powered and 50 nu-
clear-powered submarines. About 30
of the former and 10 of the latter can
carry and fire an average of three
ballistic missiles each, so 130 is a
reasonable estimate of their SLBM
strength as of that date. The fact that
some of the other submarines in being
can be converted to carry ballistic mis-
siles, coupled with the estimated pro-
duction rate of six to eight new nu-
clear submarines each year, make the
future threat from SLBM's the more
ominous.
Of even greater concern, however,
is the evidence that the Soviet Union
is developing a new class of nuclear
submarines with 16 missile tubes
each. This is the same as the US
Polaris submarine.
ABM System
Soviet ABM defense is presently
based on the Galosh. This multistage,
solid-fuel antiballistic missile is de-
ployed in limited numbers around
Moscow. It is believed to have a range
of several hundred miles and to carry
a nuclear warhead in the one to two-
megaton range. It is, therefore, suit-
able for interception at high altitude
and for area defense. At present, this
ABM defense would not materially
affect US "assured destruction" ca-
pability. Future increases in the sys-
tem may well require adjustment,
however, in our offensive forces.
The Soviet Fractional Orbital Bom-
bardment System (FOBS), developed
in 1967, is more of a deterrent weapon
system than a pinpoint system capable
of successfully attacking such hard-
ened targeta as a missile silo. It does,
however, present a threat to soft tar-
gets such as bomber bases and large
US cities.
Although the system can carry less
payload than an ICBM powered by
the same size booster, and it is not
sufficiently accurate to eliminate or
appreciably reduce US retaliatory ca-
pability, it will add flexibility and
versatility to the Soviet nuclear strike
force. Because FOBS is not on a bal-
listic path, it is difficult to track and
then predict its target area. As a re-
Bult, warning time is cut from about
15 minutes to five or less.
MIIIta/J Rnlew 34
us STRATEGY
Tech.ftOloDl' Wed;
In addition to this 120-foot "Brezhnev BlockbDBter." the Soviets have a mobUe
intercontinentsl ba1liatic missUe in their arsenal
While FOBS undoubtedly may cir-
cumvent existing US systems, compli-
cate our problems. and increase the
versatility of the Soviet nuclear strike
force. much more can be done in the
midrange period to increase their of-
fensive flexibility. A Multiple Orbital
Bombardment System that circles the
earth at least once before being
brought down on a target would be
more accurate than FOBS and pos-
sibly more so than an ICBM. Track-
ing the vehicle for many hours al10ws
ita orbit to be determined precisely,
and, when it is finaJly "launched" into
a ballistic trajectory, it is only a few
hundred miles from its target.
Another feasible, although expen-
sive, warhead is a boost-glide vehicle
September 1969
that can puJl out of a ballistic reentry
trajectory and glide for thousands of
miles while taking evasive action. Off-
setting the fact that such a vehicle
cannot carry as heavy a payload, is
not as accurate, and is not as cheap
as an ICBM is the the fact such a
weapon can be brought down several
hundred miles away from a target in
an apparent miss, then attack at low
levels and high speeds.
The United States is putting into
operation a Multiple Independently
Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)
for its Minuteman ICBM and its
SLBM's-a system that does not offer
flexibility in target approach tech-
niques. It does, however, permit
launching several warheads along bal-
3S
US STRATEGY
listie paths from a single rocket
booster to increase the number of
targets that can be attacked, thereby
complicating an enemy's defense prob-
lem. Since Soviet boosters are capable
of carrying larger payloads than US
,in time, a Soviet MIRV
Air Force
The Minuteman III is the newest version
of the solidfuel intereontinentsl ballistic
missile '
balance of nuclear forces between the
two powers.
The strategic threat to the United
States posed by Red China is small.
At present, it does not have a strate
gic nuclear force capable of attacking
the United States, but, by the mid-
1970's it could have a modest force
of ICBM's. This possibility was suffi
cient to lead to the US decision in
September 1967 to initiate deploy-
ment of an austere Chinese-oriented
ABM defense.
Today, Red China has no long.
range bomber force, and there is no
indication it will undertake the devel
opment, production, and deployment
of such a force. Instead, it appears as
if it intends to base its nuclear de-
livery system on missiles. Its progress
in the nuclear field has been both sur
prising and impressive.
Red China does not appear to pose
a significant direct threat to the
United Statea in the midrange period
even if it should perfect an ICBM
capability, as seems certain. Such a
capability does not appear to be part
of an offensive strategy, but, from
its point of view, it does provide some
deterrent against a US attack and
affords desired prestige and stature
among its neighbors. Yet Red China's
pathological focus on the United
States justifies being suspect of its
defensive appearance. How might it
indirectly use its fledgling nuclear
capability to affect the United States?
"Nuclear Blackmail"
It is completely plausible that Red
China could use its new power as a
form of intimidation or "nuclear
blackmail" in Asia to force nations to
revoke US base rights and to insist
on withdrawal of US forces. It also
could insist they abandon or avoid
regional self-defense alignments. It
could, in effect, hold cities such as
Tokyo and New Delhi as "hostages"
to preclude a US attack against China.
The success of such efforts would de
pend, however, upon the faith of the
threatened nation in US resolve. A
final, if remote, capability is the
clandestine introduction of nuclear
devices'into either the United States
or nations friendly to it.
How, then, is the United States
equipped to meet the Soviet and
Chinese threats?
, One of the stated US basic defense
policies is that our strategic retalia
MilitarJ Rnlew 38
tory forces must be strong enough to
deter nuclear attack on the United
States or its allies.
To deter our likely adversaries suc-
cessfully, we must not only have stra-
tegic otfensive forces in being, but
they must be capable of surviving an
enemy attack and capable of control
under the worst possible conditions.
Bed China might be able to utilize
nuclear blaekmail to hold Tokyo as a
hostage to preclude a US attack upon
China
The necessary size of such a force has
been and remains a subject of contro-
versy. Some advocate a force capable
of destroying virtually all of the
enemy's nuclesr capability in a first
attack, contrary though it is to US
policy' and principles. Even so, the
proposal is more ideal than real, for,
undoubtedly, the Soviets have devel-
oped a degree of survivability suffi-
cient to foil such an attack.
Others advocate only a force large
enough to survive a first attack, then
counter by destroying the enemy's
cities and industry. Present US policy
lies somewhere between these two
extremes. There is agreement, how-
ever, that a mixed force of bombers
SeplHlber 1868
us STRATEGY
and missiles is desirable to make it
necessary for an enemy .to prepare
defenses against more than one weap-
on system.
The mainstay of our interconti-
nental bomber force is various models
of the B-SS. However, announced
policy provides for retirement of old-
er model B-5S's and all B-5S aircraft
by. the end of Fiscal Year 1971. The
force to be maintained through Fiscal
Year 1973 is 266 B-5S's (G through
H) and 210 FB-11l'B.
Manned Aircraft
Although advanced development will
continue on engine and avionics sys-
tema integration for possible applica-
tion in an advanced manned strategic
aircraft, no followoOn bomber has
gained final approval. Instesd, some
of the B-SS'8 will be modified to per-
mit carrying, as will the FB-11l'8, a
new short-range attack missile which
makes terminal defense against low-
level bombers difficult and expensive.
Study will continue on more advanced
bomber penetration aids and on a wide
range of electromagnetic warfare de-
vices.
When deployed for nuclear attack,
most of the B-SS'8 are equipped with
two Hound Dog air-to-surface mis-
siles which are basically pilotless air-
craft. Target information is preset in
the missile prior to launching, and,
since it is inertially guided, it can-
not be decoyed or jammed from the
ground. It may be released at high
altitude to proceed supersonically to
a target, or it may approach it at an
extremely low level. The Hound Dog
can extend the range of the B-5S,
which is approximately 10,000 miles
without in-flight refueling, by about
600 miles. This permits the missile to
assist the bomber in penetrating heav-
ily defended areas.
37
US STRATEGY
While the B-51l StratofM'tress is a
subsonic jet bomber, the newer B-58
H'UBtler is supersonic. In-flight refuel-
ing is possible with both aircraft, but,
without it, the Hustler's range is be-
tween 4,600 and 6,900 miles, depend-
ing on the speeds flown. It has a mul-
tiple-target capability by carrying
weapons under each wing, and in a
pod suspended beneath the fuselage.
Land-Based Forces
The principle land-based ICBM in
US strategic offensive forces is the
solid-fuel Minuteman which has a re-
action time of approximately SO see-
onds. The missile system is consid-
ered to have a high degree of sur-
vivability because of its hardened,
widely dispersed silos. This 1,000-
missile force represents a mix of
Minuteman I's, II's, and Ill's.
Minuteman III, in addition to a
greater range, has a new improved
third stage'that wiII enable it to carry
a greater payload and improved pene-
tration aids to counter an ABM de-
fense. Development of model Ill,
however, is taking longer than
planned. As a result, "phase out" of
model 1 will be slowed to compensate
for the slip in the schedule for initial
deployment of model III.
Supplementing Minuteman are 54
reliable Titan II's. The liquid fuel
used in this two-stage missile is of a
type that can be stored aboard. Con-
sequently, reaction time from opening
the silo door to firing the missile is
one minute. It can carry a much heav-
ier payload than a Minuteman, and
this makes it especially useful against
large, soft targets that are not de-
fended by ABM's. Plans to allow it
to decline after Fiscal Year 1970
have been changed, and the present
force wiII be maintained through Fis-
cal Years 1969-7S.
D 6 ~ e lnd'ust", Bulkti,.
The submarine-launched Poseidon mis-
sile is eapable of a payload double that
of the Polaria
As was true of Minuteman, there
are three models of the Polaria SLBM
-At, AB, and AS. Each has a suc-
cessively greater range-l,S80, 1,700,
and 2,850 miles. From a deterrent
standpoint, the high degree of sur-
vivability of the Polaria system makes
this component of the strategic offen-
sive forces most valuable.
The United States has 41 submar-
ines capable of carrying SLBM's,
and 31 of these are to be refitted with
the Poseidon missile-an advanced
version of the Polaria. Poseidon will
be' capable of double the payload and
greater accuracy.
MIIitaJy Review
38
While the principal mission of such
strategic offensive forces is to deter
attack upon the United States, they
also contribute to dsmage limitation.
This is accomplished whe'n ;memy mis-
sile-launching sites and bomber and
submarine bases are attacked in tiine
to destroy the weapons' carriers be-
fore they are launched. Those US
weapons in excess of the number
deemed necessary to accomplish the
amount of destruction of enemy tar-
gets considered essential must be
justified on the basis of their contri-
bution to the "damage limiting" ob-
jective. Yet such an objective is pri-
marily the responsibility of strategic
defensive forces.
Defense Policy
How can we defend against an
enemy nuclear attack? Such defense
is accomplished by attacking enemy
delivery vehicles at their bases before
they are launched, destroying enemy
vehicles en route before they reach
their targets, destroying or neutraliz-
ing warheads in terminal areas, and
using passive measures such as shel-
ters. In determining the size and com-
position of forces necessary to provide
this defense, several principles have
been observed by the Department of
Defense:
.. It will be virtually impossible to
provide anything near to a perfect
defense against the forces which the
Soviets are expected to have during
the next decade.
The Soviets have three types of
strategic offensive weapons: land-
based missiles, submarine-launched
missiles, and msnned bombers--each
of which could, by itself, inflict severe
damage on the United States or its
allies.
For any given level of enemy
offensive capability, successive addi-
us STRATESY
tions to each of our various systems
have diminishing marginal value. Be-
yond a certain point, each added incre-
ment to existing forces results in less
and less additional effectiveness.
These principles point to the need
for balanced defensive forces capable
of successfully engaging aircraft, bal-
listic missiles, and satellites.
Antiaircraft defepses consist of
F-IDI V",,",_ are nsed on lighter, inter.
ceptor, and reeonnaissance missions
manned interceptors, surface-to-air
missiles (SAM's), and the command
and control and early warning sys-
tems necessary to make these weapons
effective. Three supersonic fighters
have provided most of our interceptor
forces-the F-l0l Voodoo, the F-IO!
Delta Dagger, and the F l 0 ~ Star-
fighter.
These are phasing out to be re-
placed by a force of F-l08X Delta
Darts. This Mach 2.5 aircraft has a
highly sophisticated guidance and
fire control system capable of taking
control of the craft shortly after take-
off, flying it through a climb or a
cruise to an attack position, firing
the armament at optimum range, and
US STRATEGY
breaking the aircraft away to seek
other targets. All of this is accom-
plished by a ground-based computer
through a system known as Data
Link. The armament that can be car-
ried on all these interceptors includes
the following air-to-air missiles:
Sidewinder-Uses passive, infra-
red principle of guidance and has a
conventional high-explosive warhead.
Falcon--Five different missiles
that use one of two types of guidance:
passive infrared l or active radar
seeker. One of the Falcons has a nu-
clear warhead.
Genie-Unguided air-to-air rock-
et with nuclear warhead.
"Inner Ring" (
Nike Hercules and HAWK surface-
to-air missiles, are strategically de-
ployed to provide an "inner ring" of
defense for designated critical areas
throughout the country. The Nike
Hercules, which may be armed with
either a conventional or a nuclear
warhead, can start operating on an
enemy bomber as it approaches to
within approximately 85 miles of its
target. It has successfully intercepted
such bombers above 100,000 feet.
The HAWK is armed with a high-
explosive warhead. It is more mobile
than the Nike Hercules and can
intercept enemy bombers flying as
low as treetop level out to about 20
miles. Most of the Hercules and all
of the HAWK's are expccted to be
retained in the air defense inventory.
The interceptors and missiles com-
prising US antiaircraft defense forces
will serve no purpose, however, unless
approaching vehicles are detected, in
time, to lauach defensive forces to de-
stroy them. US surveillance, warning,
and control systems appear adequate
to the present threat. A computerized
Semiautomatic Ground Environment
(SAGE) system uses information
from defense radars to assist in nec-
essary tactical decisions by collecting,
correlating, and displaying all air de-
fense information at the North Amer-
ican Air Defense Command Head-
quarters.
A semiautomatic Back-up Intercep-
tor Control (BUIC Ill) system has
been integrated into the SAGE system
which it may replace when Airborne
Warning and Control System air-
craft and new over-the-horizon (OTH)
backscatter radars become available.
Detection Systems
The proposed deployment of an
ABM defense system will have con-
siderable impact on strategic defense
programs. In respect to detection, the
Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR)
planned for an ABM defense system
can handle some of the long-range
acquisition and tracking functions of
the present Ballistic-Missile Early
Warning System (BMEWS).
Conversely, the OTH backscatter
radars intended for antibomber de-
fense can provide limited detection
and tracking of ballistic missiles
launched from submarines. Forward-
scatter OTH radar transmitters and
receivers already deployed-eoupled
with a satellite-borne, missile warn-
ing system under active development
-appear to be capable of providing
earlier warning of ICBM's, and even
FOBS's, than BMEWS's.
The proposed ABM defense system,
Safeguard, consists of three elements
other than the PAR: Missile Site
Radars (MSR's) and Spartan and
Sprint missiles. The MSR is used to
control these two missile interceptors.
The Spartan would engage targets
generally outside the earth's atmos-
phere at several hundred miles' range.
The Sprint generally would engage
Military Review
40
within the earth's atmosphere at a
range of about 15 to 25 miles. Both
can be nuclear armed. When they make
intercepts, ground elrects of their det-
onations would be negligible for blast
and radiation; no lethal fallout would
be produced.
The adequacy of an ABM defense
system to meet potential threats is
the subject of conSiderable argument
in many quarters. But it is a fact
that, until Safeg'lU1.rd is operational,
the United States has no effective
"damage-limiting" posture.
AntisatellHe Defenses
Two systems provide for US satel-
lite tracking and identification. Sptl8'Ur
gives a warning when a new space
object passes through its field, and
Spacetrack tracks and computes the
orbits of objects in space. A tested
capability of intercepting and destroy-
ing a hostile weapon in space uses
the Thor, a fully operational inter-
mediate-range ballistic missile.
At present, US strategic defensive
forces can detect, determine the in-
tention of, and destroy manned bomb-
ers; they can detect, determine the in-
tention of, and provide a warning
against ICBM's; they can detect the
launching of satellites, predict their
orbits, probable purpose, and can de-
stroy in space those that appear hos-
tile; but they cannot destroy ICBM's.
The United States has earned an
unenviable record for underestima-
ting its enemies. As a result, habit-
ually it must react rather than act
which is a dangerous modus oper-
andi when the stakes are so high.
It was not too long ago that US ex-
perts predicted strife-tom China
would take many years to develop
sophisticated nuclear warheads and
missiles to carry them. Its progress
has astounded these "experts" and
us STRATEGY
won for it considerable recognition
and prestige throughout the world.
It was not too long ago that many
in thl! United States considered the
Soviet Union to be a tractor-driving
nation of collective farmers who did
not know how to miniaturize a ther-
monuclear warhead. Are we to con-
tinue denying these countries, adver-
saries though they are, the credit they
have earned? Are we to continue dis-
counting their achievements?
Soviet Development
It is quite apparent that the Soviets
are developing new generations of
submarines, aircraft, and missiles to
close the "gap" with the United
States in strategic weapons. As
Soviet offensive forces are increased,
so will the need for a "damage-limit-
ing" capability, and damage cannot
be limited to an acceptable level by
offensive means. Until an ABM system
is deployed, the United States has no
effective "damage-limiting" posture.
The system has other strategic im-
plications. By protecting US strategic
retaliatory missiles, it will contribute
to the stability of deterrence by keep-
ing US ICBM's relatively invulnerable
and, therefore, credible. The system
also should assist in inhibiting the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons by mak-
ing a credible nuclear force prohibi-
tively expensive for smaller powers.
If Soviet leaders should come to
believe their ABM defense, coupled
with a "first-strike" nuclear attack on
the United States, would limit damage
to the USSR to a level acceptable to
them, regardless of what it may be,
US forces no longer would be a reliable
deterrent. The respected British Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies cites re-
ports, if unconfirmed, indicating the
USSR may deploy a full-scale or
"thick" system. That would give us
41
US STRATEGY
no choice butto expand our ABM de-
fenses.
The Soviet development of an or-
bital bomb increases their offensive
capability. An operational Soviet
FOBS meansourmanned aircraftare
more vulnerable on the ground. Sub-
orbital missiles scarcely stay aloft
long enough for antisatellite radars
.and computers to establish a track.
It appears, then, that US defenses
to counter such a threat effectively
areinadequate. ThatFOBS isless ac-
curate than an ICBM and, given the
same booster, cannot carryas large a
warhead offers little comfort. To ex-
pect one element of strategic defen-
sive forces-radars-to provide suf-
ficient warning topermitmanned air-
crafttoget airborne-and, therefore,
toignoredeveloping a weaponcapable
of successfully engaging FOBS-is
riskyatbest.
Informulating a military program
to support its national strategy, the
United States too rarely acts in an-
ticipation of Soviet or Chinese mili-
tary-technological developments. In-
stead, thephilosophy has been almost
totally defensive. Unless the United
States places proper emphasis on
bothstrategicoffensive and defensive
forces so as not just to maintain,
but to improve, its position, within
the midrange period, the balance will
shiftinfavor oftheSoviets.
Defense planning is not, as some seem to believe, the result of
gazing into a crystal ball. When properly done, it represents an informed
judgment that can serve as the basis for responsible recommendations to
the;President and the Congress on onr defense program
. Two factors are critic:al: The rapid rate of teehnologic:al progress and
thettme requirementsfor production of weapons systems. These two factors
taken togetherrequire nstobegin work on major weapons systems often as
longasfive or10 yearsbeforetheyactuallybecomeoperational.Thismakesit
necessary to try to anticipate what kind of a situation we will face dnring
thattimeperiod intermsof the threatfrom potential enemies.
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird
MIIItarJ Revl
42
Peacekeepingand
Peacemaking
Brigadier Michael N. Harbottle, British Army, Retired
W
HEN the United Nations
came into being in 1945, ita
founder members appreciated that
there might be occasions when it would
be required to intervene militarily to
maintain international peace, possibly
to the extent of deploying forces capa-
ble and prepared to en;force any meas-
ures necessary to sectlre that peace.
The UN Charter provided for this
eventuality and was invoked in the
case of the Korean War.
The possibility of having to intro-
duce a force purely with the responsi-
September 1969
bility for "holding the ring" and for
maintaining peace without resorting
to force of arms, was, I believe, never
visualized by the founder members.
However, it is this exact characteristic
of peacekeeping that has dictated the
mandates and governed the operations
of the UN peace-keeping forces that
have been deployed since the Korean
War. Without intending to minimize
the importance of the UN contribution
to restoring peace in Korea, that op-
eration does not fit accurately into the
definition of peacekeeping.
43
PEACEKEEPING
Admittedly, the prOVISIons of the
charter were appr(lpriate to the estab-
lishment of the Korean force, and the
collection and deployment of the vari-
ous national contingents followed a
similar pattern to that used later for
the Middle East, the Congo, and Cy-
prus. But the UN force in Korea, for
the only time so far in the history of
the organization, supported and fought
for one side against the other. There-
fore, when studying the role that the
United Nations, can play in the world
as a peace-keeping agency, it should be
in the context of the keeping rather
"than of the enforcement of peace, and
we should look on Korea as an excep-
tion to, rather than a standard exanl-
pie of, the rule.
Major Operations
To date, eXcluding the Korean War,
there have been three major peace-
keeping operations mounted under the
stewardship of the United Nations-
United Nations Operation in the
Congo (ONUC); Sinai-Gaza, United
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF);
and Cyprus, United Nations Forces in
Cyprus (UNFICYP). All of these,
with varying degrees of effectiveness
and success, have been conducted on
h the principle of "no force except in
_\ self-defense." The mandate given to
Brigadier Michael N. Harbottle,
British Army, Retired, was Chief of
Stafl of the United Nati01l8 Forces
in. C'IIfWUB and commanded the British
contingent from 1966 to 1968. He
was educated at Marlborough CoUege,
WiltBhire, and at the Royal Military
CoUege, Sandhurst. He served in Italy
during World War II, and also saw
military service in India, n.orthwest
Europe, Cyprus, Egypt, Africa, and
Aden. He commanded the lS9th In-
famry Brigade of the Territorial
Army from 1964 to 1966, and was
retired in October 1968.
each force was different, but in gen-
eral terms, it was to keep the peace
and prevent a renewal in the fighting.
It was largely through mediation
and negotiation that these peace-keep-
ing forces had to maintain their con-
trol over the situation. This is not easy
to accomplish, particularly when those
whom the United Nations has come to
help are openly hostile to its soldiers.
This was often the case in the Congo
where many UN soldiers were seri-
ously assaulted and some were killed.
In the Gaza Strip, a number of Indian
soldiers of the UN Expeditionary
Foree were killed by advancing Israeli
troops at the time of the force's final
evacuation.
Happily, it has been a different story
in Cyprus where the neutrality and
special status of the UN soldiers have
been respected by both communities.
But the fact remains that the blue
beret of the United Nations is not al-
ways accepted as a passport to im-
munity or as a visible safeguard
against attack.
Separate Processes
Peacekeeping and peacemaking are
two quite separate processes. The task
of the peacekeeper is to provide the
atmosphere and moderate temperature
in which the peacemaker can negotiate
and arbitrate for peace. Too often,
misunderstanding of this basic differ-
ence has unjustly and erroneously
resulted in misplaced criticism and
ridicule of the United Nations. Peace-
making is clearly the more difficult.
To be successful, the mediators and
the arbitrators must have the full co-
operation and the wholehearted and
genuine intent of the two sides in the
dispute to resolve their differences and
to reach an equitable settlement. If
this intent and purpose are missing
in the hearts and minds of the two or
MIIHIrJ InI..
44
more contestants most directly con-
cerned, then the task of the peace-
maker is well-nigh impossible. It re-
quires indefatigable patience and un-
daunted perseverence on the part of
the negotiator.
The presence of a force can have a
considerable deterrent effect against a
renewal of fighting. It can, on occa-
sions, provide a face saver to both
sides by its very presence. But more
than anything else, as in Cyprus, it
can> keep the peace effectively. If it
can do this protractedly, despite the
slow and painful progress of peace-
making, it justifies its existence and
is worth the money spent on it.
Success or Failure
Many people have termed the UNEF
a failure because of its hasty with-
drawal after President Gamal Abdel
Nasser's demand for it to leave Egyp-
tian territory. Leaving aside for a
moment the reasons for the with-
drawal, can one honestly say that an
operation that had kept the peace in an
area for all of 11 years has been a
failure? That is what UNEF accom-
plished.
Success or failure are relative and,
in this instance, no one can really deny
that the UNEF operation was a valu-
able and successful contribution to
world peace. When its withclrawal took
place, it was not on the initiative of the
United Nations, but on the demand of
the head of the "host" country-the
country that had accepted the UN in-
tervention in the first place, but on the
understanding that it would leave at
any time that it was so requested by
the Egyptian Government.
In November 1956, it was vitally
important for world peace that a UN
force should be interposed between the
Israeli and Arab forces as quickly as
possible to prevent yet another war in
Stptutlttr 1889
PEACEmPING
the Middle East. It was, therefore, not
surprising and perfectly understand-
able that the then Secretary General,
Dag Hammarskjold, should have ac-
cepted the condition.
In Cyprus, the tale is the same ex-
cept that operation is not yet con-
cluded. The omens are good, however,
for the completion of what could be
the first truly successful UN operation
where not only haS peace been kept,
but peace also is in the making. If
this happens, then it will have been
achieved without any use of force on
the part of the UN peacekeepers.
This question of the use of force is
controversial. There is a large section
of opinion that believes that the United
Nations could be more effective in set-
tling its peace-making problems were
it to give its peacekeepers a tougher
mandate-more teeth with which to
bite. There is an inherent danger in
this because it would be too easy to
convert a purely peace force into a
''third'' force capable of enforcing de-
cisions of its own.
Executive Authority
At the time of the Cyprus crisis in
November 1967, when there was an
imminent danger of a Turkish inva-
sion and of war between Turkey and
her neighbor Greece, there was a
clamor for more executive authority
to be put into the hands of UNFICYP.
I am sure this wou1d have been a ret-
rograde step had it happened, and
would have led to greater rather than
smaller differences of opinion between
the United Nations and the two com-
munities concerned.
What we needed at that time was the
complete cooperation of both, and the
best way of obtaining it was by re-
maining stolidly impartial. To have
followed a tougher line at that moment
would have impaired our effectiveness.
45
PEACEKEEPING
To have changed from persuasion to
enforcement could have jeopardized
our position as "guests" and, like
UNEF, could have brought about the
withdrawal of the force. In so doing,
a question mark would have been
placed over the entire concept of peace-
keeping in the future in the eyes of
,
the member states of the United Na-
tions.
The implications of whether or not
a UN peace-keeping force should use
strong-arm tactics need to be carefully
and thoroughly examined because it is
on this fundamental principle that I
h belie'le the future of UN peacekeeping
j will depend.
Those who advocate the tougher line
and strong-arm tactics are forgetting
the basic principle governing the es-
tablishment of a UN peace-keeping
force in a country or state. This prin-
ciple is that the force is so established
at the request of, or with the approval
of, the government of the territory
concerned in order to provide a stabi-
lizing influence and presence for the
maintenance of peace. If it is to be
successful in its purpose, then its mem-
bers must be scrupulously impartial to
both sides. Were it to act with force,
48
then that force must also be used im-
partially, if necessary even against the
"host" state or government that ac-
cepted it on its territory in the first
place.
The inference, if this were to hap-
pen, is only too clear. It would be like
turning on your host in his own house
and hitting him over the head after
you had accepted his invitation to stay
the weekend and help him settle an
argument between him and his neigh-
bor. There is little doubt what your
host would do next-ask you to leave.
This is likely to be the outcome if the
UN force were to act in a similar man-
ner toward its ''bost.'' In fact, it is
doubtful if a force would be accepted
in the first place were it known that it
would be empowered to enforce its
mandate given it by the United Na-
tions Security Council.
Negotiation and Arbitration
Peacekeeping can only be effected
by a force whose sole aim and object
is to keep two adversaries apart. This
cannot be accomplished by armed
force, but, rather, by negotiation and
arbitration, by stepping in to part
them if they show any inclination to-
ward renewing the fight, and, by its
very presence, acting as a stabilizing
factor and a deterrent to more extreme
action. Therefore, we must be careful
not to overlook the dangers of giving
to any UN peace force the appearance
of a "third force" aimed at imposing
peace on all and sundry. I doubt that
the United Nations would be any more
successful if it were to exchange its
peace-keeping principles of negotiation
and persuasion for more stro/lg-arm
tsctics.
On the other hand, the use of force
may be absolutely required in the event
of collective or individual self-defense
becoming necessary at any time dur-
MUltlry RnI..
J
PEACEKEEPING
I ing a UN peace-keeping operation.
I There have been frequent occasions
I during past operations where UN soI-
l diers have lost their lives at the hands
f of one or other of the sides in the dis-
< pute in which they have become in-
! volved. Whatever the extent of its neu-

trality, a UN force can never expect to
go unscathed if it is to carry out its
peace-keeping responsibilities with
maximum effect. Therefore, the re-
solve, and, possibly more important,
the capability to defend themselves,
must be there in the national contin-
gents that make up the force.
Weapons and Equipment
No contingent should be committed
to a peace-keeping tssk without its full
complement of weapons and equip-
ment. The line probably should be
drawn at tanks and field artillery be-
cause in most circumstances, these
could only be classified as offensive
rather than defensive weapons. How-
ever, the full complement of an infan-
try battalion's weapo.ns, plus armored
cars, would provide a viable protection
potential. In operations such as Cy-
prus, they would probably not have to
be used, but would simply be present
as a safeguard, an insurance, and even
as a deterrent to any extreme elements
who might take it into their heads to
fight the United Nations.
In operations like that of the Congo,
self-defense and protection would be a
matter of constant concern. The UN
soldier must feel confident that his
protection is well catered for. Psycho-
logically, this is an important point for
it has a considerable bearing on the
soldier's morale and, in difficult cir-
cumstances, the manner in which he
carries out his duties.
No one should delude himself that
the peace-keeping soldier is any dif-
ferent from any other soldier. His re-
September 1889
sponsibilities are the same except that
he cannot enforce his authority and
command over the situation by use of
arms. He must, therefore, have more
than adequate proteCtion because prob-
lems and instances when self-defense
becomes necessary are not prenotified,
but are the result of spontaneous ac-
tion.
Good Relations
In a situation where the soldier is
taught to use his weapon in the last
resort, and only then in self-defense,
and his chief weapon is that of negoti-
ation and friendly impartiality in ar-
bitration, his natural reaction is to
build up an easygoing relationship
with those with whom he has to nego-
tiate and arbitrate. At some later date,
when one or the other of the two sides
turns against him, it can and does
happen that he hesitates before taking
firm positive action for fear of upset-
ting the good working relationship
that has been built up over the previ-
ous months. This hesitation can be
fatal.
Firmness of action is just as im-
portant here as in any other type of
operation. Any lack of determination
and resolution can undo in minutes
many months of careful and tireless
negotiation. It can demolish the work-
ing relationship which those concerned
have been at such pains to preserve.
The peacekeeper is the prerequisite
of the peacemaker. His approach and
his status must be based on the prem-
ise that he negotiates from strength,
but does not enforce his will upon
those he has come to help. To use force
to implement his aim could nullify the
entire effectiveness of his miBSion and
result, through his withdrawal, in a
renewed threat to peace. Whatever the
cynics may think, Cyprus has shown
that a peace-keeping force can achieve
47
PEACEllEEPIN8
its required objectives without resort
to arms.
A professional military mind might
well wonder how national contingents,
with such diverse backgrounds of
creed and culture, and sharing no com-
mon ground of military procedure and
technique, can be thrown together with
little or no warning and be expected to
operate successfully as a unified force.
Even were that force to be made up of
professional soldiers, no one would
deny the difficulties involved. Few,
however, would give it any chance of
. success were it to be a mixed force of
professionals and amateurs, as invari-
ably has been the case.
Ol1anizatlon and LOJistics
The problems facing the commander
of a peace-keeping force are primarily
those of organization and logistics
rather than of unification. Unification
of purpose comes quickly and with it
a spontaneous mutual regard between
contingents.
There is no central planning staff at
UN Headquarters in New York with
the task' of preparing contingency
plans for possible future peace-keeping
operations. So far, each operation has
been mounted on an ad hoc basis with
. ) contingents being gathered from those
. - countries which are prepared to pro-
vide them and which are politically
acceptable to the countries in which
they are called upon to serve. Notice
of the requirement is, of necessity,
short, and the buildup, if intervention
is to be effective, comparably rapid.
It is not surprising, therefore, that,
in the early days of the operation,
there can be considerable disorganiza-
tion and administrative confusion.
Major General Carl von Horn's book,
SolAliermg for Peace, leaves little doubt
regarding his feelings on the Congo
situation.
48
In Sinai and Cyprus, the problem
was greatly eased by the fact that
there were already "peace-keeping"
forces in the area on which the new-
comers could lean during the early
stages of the operation.
UNFIOYP benefited from two vital
assets which neither of its predeces-
sors had. It was able to take over a
firm base already established by the
British force which had been ''holding
the ring" since the start of the emer-
gency. But more important, it inher-
ited a built-in logistic "tail" which
supplied it with most of its needs
throughout its years of existence. Al-
though it is probable that no future
peace-keeping operations will enjoy
such advantages, useful lessons can be
drawn which, if adopted, could ease
their organizational and logistic prob-
lems.
ThreeDlmenslonal Foree
UNFICYP is a three-dimensional or-
ganization with the military forces
providing by far the largest part of
it-S,OOO troops spread among seven
national contingents from Austria,
Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Ireland, and Sweden. It also has a
small civilian police element with de-
tachments from Australia, Austria,
Denmark, and Sweden. The third ele-
ment is a civil service secretariat and
political division made up of about 50
people of 20 or more nationalities. At
its head is Lieutenant General Armas
Martola of Finland, alongside whom
sits Secretary General U Thant's Spe-
cial Representative, Bibiano F. Osorio-
Tafall of Mexico who leads in the p0-
litical field.
Multinational forces and headquar-
ters are nothing new these days, but
what distinguishes this particular op-
eration is the extraordinarily fine
working relationship which not only
MIIitIIJ .nI..
--
exists among the different nationali-
ties within the headquarters, but also
between the headquarters and the con-
tingents. Soldier and civilian work to-
gether in harm!)ny regardless of the
extremes of nationality and divergent
ideologies. I believe this is due largely
to the essential esprit and sense of
common purpose that exists in the
PEACEKEEPING
intelligence branch, but in UN opera-
tions, the word "intelligence" is not
used nor are intelligence teams de-
ployed.
Once the United Nations uses mili-
tary intelligence methods to collect its
information, it is likely to lose the
trust of those involved in the dispute
and the label of impartiality by which
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NAHONS FORCES IN CYPRUS
----CO(ItI)IM1lII
force, but also because of the caliber
of the persons themselves.
Militarily, the headquarters staffing
is similar to that found at a divisional
headquarters. There are the opera-
tions, personnel, and logistic depart-
ments operating under the over-all
coordinating control of the Chief of
Staff. There are two peculiarities on
the operational side. Operations is
divided into three branches: opera-
tions and planning (Operations A),
information (Operations B), and eco-
nomics (Operations E). Operations A
equates to its equivalent in any North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Army.
Operations B could be described as the
it sets so much store. A UN force de-
pends greatly upon the confidence and
cooperation of the people it has come
to help. Therefore, to use anything but
overt means to establish the facts
would lead inevitably to suspicion and
distrust of those whose full coopera-
tion is vital to its work. Observation,
both visual and sensorial, can, under
these circumstances, pay better divi-
dends than elaborate intelligence net-
works and underground cells.
Economics might appear to be a
strange bedfellow alongside planning
and information and out of place as a
staff branch of the operations depart-
ment. More appropriately, one might
September 1969
49
PEACEKEEPIIIG
expect to find it included under the
responsibilities of the political or sec-
retariat divisions. The political staff
is deeply involved in economic prob-
lems, but economics also plays an im-
portant part in the peacekeeping field.
In areas of military confrontation-
toward economic normalcy, but new
problems have appeared to take their
place. Those directly concerned with
grazing and harvesting will remain
until the day of the final withdrawal
of the force. The tasks have included:
Assistance in providing food,
and it is clothing, beds, medical supplies, tent-
problems are found-it is the soldier
on the ground, not his civilian counter-
part, who has /0 try to sort them out.
It makes sense that there should be a
military staff branch to coordinate and
direct field economic assistance while
leaving the more intricate problems of
political economic policy to the experts
in UNFICYP's political section with
whom it works in close collaboration.
The economics branch has under-
taken an entire patchwork of tasks.
Some of them have disappeared as the
island has advanced more and more
age, and building materials for refu-
gee camps.
Military observers to oversee and
encourage agricultural activity.
Arbitration of land and water
rights disputes. .
Investigation of cases of theft or
damage to crops.
Distribution of certain classes of
mail to Turkish officials in major cen-
ters.
Distribution of examination pa-
pers and stationery supplies to Turk-
ish Cypriot schools.
MUlta" Rewl.w 50
Supervision of import and dis-
tribution of nitrate base fertilizers by
the Turkish Cypriots.
Arrangements for supplies of
diesel oil for tractors and veterinary
serums to Turkish Cypriot communi-
ties.
Arrangements with the Cyprus
Government for the movement of
school teachers, students, doctors, and
nurses to and from Turkish Cypriot
enclaves and for the evacuation of the
seriously ill from outside areas into
Nicosia.
Coordination of the physical
movement twice yearly of relief sup.
plies from the docks at Famagusta to
major urban centers.
Ratation
The recurring problem affecting all
branches of the staff and the force as
a whole is the problem of continuity.
Each country rotates its contingent
every six months. The rotations are
complete and not staggered unless
some key personnel elect to extend or
some volunteer for a second tour. In
the same manner, the staff officers at
headquarters, with few exceptions, re-
turn to their home countries after six
months. It was possible during my two
years as Chief of Staff to expand the
number of extended tour staff officers,
but these were in the key appoint-
ments and meant that operationally,
we had a nucleus of experience.
The saving grace in the six-month
turnover was the high standard of of-
ficers appointed to these posts by the
parent country. They did much to
maintain the balanced efficiency neces-
sary to the successful direction of the
operation. Because of the short man-
date given to the force, no contrib-
uting country felt obliged to post its
officers or contingents for longer peri-
ods. In the case of the Scandinavian
September 1969
PEACEKEEPING
countries, the volunteers signed a con-
tract of service. It is understandable
that the governments of these coun-
tries should be hesitant of making
longer term contracts so long as there
was the possibility of the mandate not
being extended when the time for re-
newal came.
I always considered that a six
months' ''hitch'' was enough for any
soldier on the monotonous and unre-
mitting tasks of observation and pa-
trolling to which he was committed. A
staggered rotation every three months
would be an advantage and would pro-
vide the continuity on the ground in
spite of the additional expense in-
volved. In the case of contingent com-
manders and their key staff officers,
as well as the staff officers at the head-
quarters, extended tours of a year at
least would greatly ease the problems
of continuity and avoid the rapid and
often upsetting staff upheavals that
took place.

Not least affected by the problems
of continuity was the communications
branch. From the headquarters for-
ward to contingents, this is a military
responsibility and radio controls are
soldier manned. External communica-
tions to New York are the responsi-
bility of a small element of the UN
Field Service Organization. The rapid
rotation of contingents means the com-
plete turnover in radio operators.
The experience of the individual con-
tingent radio detachments varies enor-
mously between that of the British
and Canadian professional and that of
the Scandinavian volunteer who has
only a short period before coming to
Cyprus to brush up on his techniques.
Training these detachments is a con-
stant, wearying process.
Since the importance of good com-
51
PEACEllEEPING
munications is paramount, it would be
better, if one of the contingent coun-
tries provided the complete radio net-
work among all contingents and the
headq)larters. Within the contingents,
each country would be responsible for
its own communications and equip-
ment and would use its own working
procedures. This arrangement would
also simplify the repair and mainte-
nance facilities; which otherwise would
be cumbersome
t
There is no doubt, however, that
there is a need for a more sophisti-
cated system of communication for
commanders along the fixed frequency
principle. This exists in UNFICYP in
the form of the American commercial
car radio. At one time, it was neceS-
sary for me to be followed everywhere
by a radio jeep so that I could always
be in touch with my headquarters.
With the introduction of the new radio
system as an alternative command net,
I was able to listen into and often
talk to most of the contingent com-
manders and receive reports at any
time and any place from the operations
room.
Air Mobility
Another aspect of communication
whicll should not be ignored is the
vital capability for quick deployment
and mobility-air mobility. In UNFI-
CYP, the air capability is confined to
a fiight of We88ex (Royal Air Force)
and a fiight of Sioux (Army) helicop-
ters. The former are primarily re-
sponsible for resupply to isolated and
inaccessible observation post detach-
ments while the latter performs liaison
tasks. Both are used for casualty evac-
uation in emergencies. Although their
utilization is almost wholly on routine
tasks, their usefulness is never in
doubt. No force would be without
them, . but air transportability effec-
52
tiveness must be sufficient to lift at
least one platoon in one sortie. This
capability is not present in Cyprus,
but luckily, so far it has not been
needed.
Civilian Police
The UN civilian police also play a
significant part. This component of 174
policemen, led by a capable Australian
chief superintendent, fulfills an essen-
tial function. Military policemen the
world over often are viewed with sus-
picion by the civilian. population,
especially a foreign one, despite genu-
ine efforts on their part to help.
Equally, a soldier has limitations and
a lack of experience when dealing with
the civic problems of the civilian. At
these times, a civilian prefers to talk to
a policeman rather than to a soldier.
In a situation like Cyprus, there are
many occasions when the civilian can
be more effective than the soldier in
preventing trouble.
The UN civilian police, like its mili-
tary counterpart, has no executive
power to maintain law and order. It
cannot arrest, search, interrogate, or
detain anybody. It is only able to ob-
serve, advise, investigate, and nego-
tiate. It is surprising that, with these
limitations, it has been so successful.
This is due in no small measure to per-
sonality, the friendly wholehearted
manner in which this multinational
police "force" combines together, and
to the painstaking way in which it car-
ries out its investigations.
It mans police posts in sensitive
areas during periods of tension; pro-
vides liaison officers at police stations;
carries out street, urban, and rural
patrols, some of which are conducted
jointly with the Greek Cypriot police;
assists Operations E in patr011ing and
observing mixed areas during harvest
and cultivation months; but, more
Military Revle.
than anything else, it is concerned
with the safety and human rights of
the individual, whether Greek or Turk.
The remarkable and effective per-
formance of thill small body of police-
men working to the dictates of a com-
mon rule of law inspires the respect
and deep regard of all and clearly un-
PEACEIEEPIM8
by the United Nations or the contin-
gent countries-and its maintenance
and hospital facilities. It goes without
saying that the contribution is a con-
siderable asset, and one that cannot be
ignored when it comes to assessing the
relative success of this operation com-
pared to those that have gone before.
potential there The administration of force is
United: NAtion.
UN soldiers patrol the "Green Line" in the city of Nicosia
is in including similar police elements
in future peace-keeping operations.
Soldier and policeman working to-
gether can increase each other's effi-
ciency-a dual concept which needs
developing.
As part of its contribution to the
upkeep of UNFICYP, Great Britain
makes available to the United Nations
the facilities of her administrative
base at of her sover-
eign areas in the south of the island.
From here, the force receives all its
daily supply needs, much of its mate-
rial than that provided
a responsibility jointly shared by the
chief administrative officer, who is a
senior UN staff member, and the chief
logistics officer, a British lieutenant
colonel. The chief administrative offi-
cer heads the secretariat and has over-
all direction of the administrative and
financial requirements of UNFICYP.
Working closely with him, but in
executive charge of all material sup-
port and supply, is the chief logistics
officer. His staff includes representa-
tives from all contingent countries who
besides being staff officers also act as
logistic liaison officers for their re-
53
PEACEICEEPING
spective contingents. The coordination
and planning of the logistic support,
as well as its implementation, are in
the hands of this multinational staff.
Maintenance and Repair
Contingent countries have brought
their own weapons, some radios and
vehicles, and other indigenous equip-
ment. The United Nations has pur-
chased or hired locally what neither
Britain nor the contingents could pro-
vide. However, l Britain, besides sup-
plying the bulk pf the force's require-
ments, provides the administrative
subunits needed for day-to-day supply
and maintenance. These include a
transport squadron, a stores detach-
ment, and a vehicle workshop. The
commanders act as departmental ad"
visors to the chief logistics officer in
their respective capacities. Engineer
provision and "onsite" construction
and maintenance are in the hands of a
small, mixed detachment led by an
Irish colonel.
Each contingent has a different ra-
tion scale, and national tastes also are
accommodated. The system has worked
well, and all contingents seem satisfied
with the service and supply they re-
ceive.
Since the bulk of the vehicles and
equipment is British, maintenance and
repair are done by the base installa-
tions at Dhekelia. Support costs, ex-
cept for those of the British, are paid
for by the United Nations. Britain
pays her own as part of her contribu-
tion.
A further problem is the inability
of the force, due to periodical reviews
of its mandate, to plan logistically for
more than a few months ahead. Long-
term contracts are out of the question
if .the future of the force's tenure is
uncertain. This, in turn, makes im-
practicable an advance provisioning
''''''_ 00. o j ~ - Ad ". pro- J
visioning is expensive and inefficient, :]
but under UNFICYP's existing man- l
date, there is no alternative. 1
The evidence of all operations so far ~
is that, whatever high hopes there "
were at the start for them to be short-
term, they have become protracted op-
An isolated UN observation post
erations running into years. Perhaps
we should accept this as inevitable and
at least plan our provision program
initially for one year, adjusting it as
the situation permits.
Cyprus has been the logistic excep-
tion to the rule. It must not be taken
as a standard guide for how to operate
in the future. But one lesson that
stands out above all others is the
enormous advantage there is in one
nation undertaking to provide the to-
tal logistic support organization for
such an operation. Using one member
state for the logistic support system
is more economic, more efficient, and
MilltllY Review 54
insures smoother running. Cyprus has
proved that there are few difficulties
with a single-nation logistic organiza-
tion-national contingents' require-
ments have been met.
Operational Tasks'
Operationally, the nature of the con-
flict in Cyprus does not dictate a stand-
ard pattern of tasks for the force as
a whole. Although the common factor
is peacekeeping without force of arms,
each contingent has to suit its method
of application of this guiding principle
to the environment in which it oper-
ates-urban or rural, mountain or
plain. This leads to different tech-,
niques and appraisals on the part of
the individual contingent as how best
to meet the requirement of its zone or
district.
The close armed confrontation that
exists in most parts of the island be-
tween Greek and Turk provides little
room for maneuver, and the task is
necessarily static rather than mobile.
This is not true in the British and
Swedish zones where confrontation is
not the prime problem and where room
for maneuver is possible and vitally
important. A survey of the tasks fac-
ing the various contingents underlines
the essential need for complete flexi-
bility of mind, thought, and tactical
performance.
In and around Nicosia-the capital
of Cyprus-the Danes and the Finns
keep guard and observation along a
line of confrontation separating the
two communities. This line-the Green
Line-has been in existence for more
than five years. When the initial
British force was deployed into the
Republic soon after the start of the
emergency in December 1963, the in-
tercommunal fighting had been tempo-
rarily halted and an uneasy truce pre-
vailed. Armed irregular bands of
September 1969
PEACEKEEPIIIQ
Greek and Turkish Cypriots faced each
other in close proximity along the rec-
ognized boundaries of their respective
communal quarters.
It was unlikely that the truee would
last for long. Therefore, in the opinion
of the commander of the British foree,
Major General Peter Young, it was es-
sential to establish a CQTdun sanitaire
from which all but his own troops
should be excluded. After some days
of negotiation, this was agreed to by
the leaders of both communities at a
meeting where General Young, using
a green map-marking pencil, outlined
where the line should run. Neither he
nor anyone else at that meeting fore-
saw how this thin green line, drawn
over a map, would become a "china-
graph frontier" over which no Greek
or Turk would step voluntarily for
four years, and an unremitting barrier
to progress toward normalization and
disengagement.
Close-Range Observation
The Green Line was UNFICYP's in-
heritance, and as long as it existed, it
had to be patrolled and observed. To
do this, it was necessary to deploy the
complete contingents from Denmark
and Finland along the entire length.
In the case of Denmark, this involves
policing the center of the old city of
Nicosia where sometimes the line is
only the width of a narrow street. In
the case of the Finns, whose responsi-
bility lies along that part of the "line"
which passes through the suburbs of
Nicosia, the confrontation is not al-
ways so close, but its course is confus-
ingly serpentine.
For both, it is a matter of close-
range observation measured often in
tens rather than hundreds of yards.
Their object is to dissuade both sides
from occupying houses overlooking
each other on the line and to have any
55
PEACEKEEPING
armed persons attempting to do so,
ejected-through negotiation, not by
force.
The close confrontation makes it
virtually impossible to prevent shoot-
ing incidents from. occurring, but,
thanks to the vigilance and alertness
of these men from the Scandinavian
great patience, tact, and courage be-
cause often the UN observation posts
are in the line of fire.
Many observers who have visited the
Green Line and seen the task that the
Danes and Finns have to cope with
along these narrow bazaar streets sug-
gest that this is a misapplication of
The BrItish use Ferret _t ears to patrol the south part of the islaud
countries, there have been few serious
clashes 4uring the last couple of years.
This is a remarkable feat when it is
realized that shouted abuse across the
street, the throwing of a stone, the
accidental discharge of a rifle, or un-
due activity on one side or the other to
excite a reaction can turn temporary
peace into a serious and dangerous
situation.
When such a situation arises and
shooting breaks out, the only interven-
tion possible by UNFICYP is through
negotiation-first to bring about a
and then to remove the
cause of the incident. This requires
5&
peace forces, and that they could be
deployed more usefully elsewhere in a
more mobile role. Much as UNFICYP
would have liked to have done this, it
has to be supervised as long as the
Green Line exists. This underlines the
dangers inherent in the establishment
of such lines of demarcation or cordon
8tJnitaire.
The Green Line was born out of
necessity. It was an immediate meas-
ure to separate the contestants and to
insure a viable cease-fire arrangement.
It was never meant to be anything but
a temporary measure and certainly
never intended to acquire the pro-
MIIIbrJ .nI..
traeted international significance that
subsequently it did.
Situations have a way of developing
far beyond the first concepts. There-
fore, it does seem important that the
most careful consideration must be
given to the likelihoods of the future,
to the steps that need to be taken, and
to the safeguards required to insure
that advantage is not taken later of
emergency measures. Perhaps a firm
promise by the interested parties and
the imposition of a time limit on the
existence of neutral zones or armistice
lines might provide the basis for a
cease-fire formula. Apprehension of
the future must not be allowed to
dictate the actions of those responsible
at the outset for reestablishing peace,
and whose decisions are based on what
is expedient at that time.
Militant Areas
The contingents from Canada and
Ireland are deployed to the north and
northwest of Nicosia. Their situation,
although similar, is by no means like
that of the Danes and the Finns.
Theirs are the northern mountainous
areas of the Kyrenia Range and the
Troodos. Within their districts are
situated three Turkish Cypriot en-
claves, including the main one which
lies between Nicosia and the northern
harbor town of Kyrenia. The confron-
tation around these enclaves is the
most militant and has produced the
greatest proportion of shooting inci-
dents.
The Canadians and Irish man a
series of observation positions estab-
lished within a kind of no man's land
between the opposing armed posts of
the Greek National Guard on one side
and the Turkish Cypriot fighters on
the other. This no man's land is UN
controlled, and within it, UN patrols
have the right of full freedom of move-
Septndter 18&1
PEACElEEPlIIC
ment. Occasionally, this has been chal-
lenged and patrols molested as a result
of the impetuosity and arbitrary be-
havior of junior commanders on botIi
sides.
Here, the confrontation is less prox-
imate than in Nicosia, varying from
hundreds to thousands of yards apart,
but it still gives little opportunity for
anything but spirited negotiation and
mediation once the shooting starts.
Intervention by the interpositioning
of a force would be a dangerous and
hazardous operation and would be
unlikely to achieve results. The op-
ponents in these areas have been much
more inclined in recent years to shoot
at e c ~ than physically attack
one an'other's positions. Little purpose
would be served in interposing a force
if it is only going to be shot over or
shot through. The practice, therefore,
is, 8S in Nicosia, to parley a cease-fire
and then endeavor to find out who
started it all.
Isolated Posts
Many of the observation posts occu-
pied by the Canadians and Irish are
isolated and not easily accessible by
foot. Resupply and relief in these
places are carried out by the flight of
transport helicopters from Nicosia.
The observation post detachments re-
main two or three weeks on post-not
unlike lighthouse keepers observing an
uncertain sea for signs of trouble. The
task is monotonous and requires
equally as much vigilance and alert-
ness as is required from the Danes
and Finns. The mental and physical
reactions on the part of every man of
these detachments are all important-
for on them depends UN ability to
stop trouble in the making.
It has been suggested that it is un-
economic in manpower and tactically
inflexible to dissipate the force in such
57
PEACEKEEPING
''penny packets" around the island on
static duties of the type being carried
out by the Canadians and Irish. It
might be better to concentrate them
and use the "flying column" method
when trouble occurs. This. of course.
is a sensible military approach. but
there are considerations that militate
against it.
One is that the force would need a
larger helicopter air-transportable ca-
pability because of the limited accessi-
bility to many of the posts. However.
this is not the anSwer since the UNFI-
CYP is not there to enforce a situation
once the situation gets out of hand.
It is there to stop the situation from
getting out of hand at any time and
at any place. It can only do this by be-
ing right on the spot when the trouble .
starts thereby preventing it from
spreading.
Escalation Deterrent
By their presence. the observation
post detachments act as a deterrent
to escalation. Equally important. their
presence provides a sense of security
to the villagers in these confrontation
areas to an extent where they are pre-
pared to go out into their fields to work
and on to the mountains to graze their
goat herlls.
The remaining two contingents-the
British and the Swedes-are respon-
sible for the balance of the truce area.
They look after the south of the island
and the west and east coasts. Their
zones are the two largest but, except
in the towns of Famagusta. Lamaca.
and Ktima. theirs is not a problem of
confrontation. It is a question of being
able to interpose forces. quickly and
in sufficient strength. whenever and
wherever a physical clash of armed
force appears imminent.
Apart from the towns and the south-
ern coast along which coastal bunkers
have been constructed. there are no
linear lines of confrontation. However.
in a number of Turkish villages. there
are fighter groups and concentrations
of National Guard ready to react to
any attempt by the Turks to assert
themselves.
The problem of intervention is not
as easy as it might seem. Both con-
tingents are fully extended across
their prescribed zones. Observation
post duties are as necessary here as
elsewhere. and it is not possible for
them to keep standby forces of great
strength in readiness against the day
that they might be required. One pla-
toon and some armored cars are as
much as either can manage. This
has generally been enough for the
initial interposition. but needs to be
capable of rapid deployment. At the
same time. secondary forces must be
available to reinforce this optimum
effort. This is necessary so that a quick
buildup is possible to a point where the
interposed UN force is sufficiently
strong to deter action by either side.
Mixed Task Forces
During 1966 and 1967, it was neces-
sary more than once to interpose UN
troops. Often, the peace task force that
was assembled contained subunits
from three or more contingents. The
recognized practice in such cases is
for the combined force to be under
the command of the contingent com-
mander responsible for the zone or
district in which the operation is tak-
ing place. These mixed, national task
forces combined and operated ex-
tremely well together without any
prejudice or friction. As was the case
in day-to-day relationships with each
other, the instinctive comradeship of
"one force" applied equally well in
these joint operations.
Clearly, the value of early interven-
Military Review
58
tion of this type provides a better
chance of averting a catastrophe. In
Cyprus, there has been no desire, by
either Bide, to kill UN soldiers. There-
fore, even a small force promptly de-
ployed in e t w ~ n can prevent a situa-
tion from developing into a battle.
There were occasions when it was
necessary to make it clear that if any
attempt were made to advance through
the UN positions, the United Nations
would use force in its own self-defense
to stop it.
The UN Forces in Cyprus face many
varied tasks and responsibilities. Dif-
ferent operations will raise different
problems, but common to aU is the
PEACEKEEPING
problem of confrontation. Each one
must be dealt with as the situation
permits. A UN force is not there to
impose its will or its decisions. From
the highestto the lowest, the chief
weapon is negotiation, whether at min-
isterial or squad level. The young non-
commi88ioned officer in charge of an
infantry section is just as important
as a negotiator as is his commander.
The really important people in a peace-
keeping operation are these young
noncommissioned officers and the sol-
diers whom they command. The suc-
cess of the day depends on their alert-
ness, vigilance, and their spontaneous
reaction to any given situation.
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lege. Fort Leavenworth. Kansas 66027.
September 1969 59
KEEPING THE LID ON
IS NOT ENOUGH
Major Riehard B. Fisher, United States Armg
Mllltlry RevIew
60
T
HE extent of Army involve-
ment with domestic disturb-
ances has increased to a point at
which the Army's objectives, role,
millilion, operations, and motivations
should be frankly examined and openly
debated. The dangers and opportu-
nities presented to the Army by a
society in flux must be acknowledged
and studied. We must recognize the
opportunity to reassert our traditional
role vis-a-vis American society-will-
ing service to the country coupled
with a forbearance from imposing our
views. We must recognize the dangers
of a policy founded upon shibboleths
or upon indefensibly :itarrow or un-
imaginative concepts-of failing to
face up to our dilemma.
The Danler
A persistent focusing on narrow,
military technical problems raised by
the violent manifestations of domestic
social change is neither honeat nor
responsible. To cloak ourselves com-
fortably in a mantle of noninvolvement
in politics is self-deceiving. The Army
is force-the most important reposi-
tory of force in our society-and
force is the backbone of politics.
Therefore, to maintain that the res-
toration of law and order is not a po-
litical activity is naive.
One tenet of the present social rev-
olution is that the law is inadequate
and unequal in its effects and that the
social order is grossly unfair. Main-
Major Richard B. Fisher is with
the Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff for InteUigence in Washington,
D. C. He served in Germany from
1961 to 1965 and subsequently in
Vietnam where he was with the Office
of the Assistant Chief of Staff, 12.
He holda a B.A. in History from Har-
vard University, Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts.
Septnrb.r 1889
KEEPING THE UD ON
tenance or restoration of law and
order is, thus, from the practical, as
well as the theoretical, viewpoint pre-
cisely at the heart of the present
political strife.
On the other hand, no one but an
anarchist would deny that society has
. the right to protect itself from law-
lessness and disorder. Our own Con-
stitution guarantees protection for
the states from domestic violence
upon request. A society, to live, must
insist on the observance of certain
agreed-upon rules and expel or sup-
press those who will not observe them.
Congress tries to interpret the needs
and desires of the people. The exec-
utive branch, the Army included, acts
upon Congress' interpretations. The
judiciary checks to see that both have
done their job in accordance with the
Constitution. The Army is in politics,
like it or not.
Unhealthy Symptoms
It is reasonable for the Army to
lag behind society somewhat. Other-
wise, the Army, not society, would
initiate social change. But it cannot
lag too far behind. If this shOUld oc-
cur, the result would be an aggrava-
tion of two conditions which, in a
mild form, are normal to a healthy
nation: separation of the Army from
the society, and identification of the
military forces with one of two poles
of political opinion.
One unhealthy symptom of an ag-
gravation of the former condition may
be the present undercurrent of "neo-
Uptonianism," by which is meant gen-
erally a resurgence of interest in
the idea of a full-time, 100-percent
professional Army-well paid, well
equipped, well trained, and inherently
well insulated from American society.
Emory Upton spawned a school of
thought in the late 19th century which
81
KEEPING 18 UD ON
The Army has profited by lessons learned in Detroit, Miehigan, and Washington, D. ~
concerning means of coping with open, domestic violence
reacted against the Jacksonian faith
in the militia. Now, advancing tech-
nologyand continuing worldwide com-
mitments may warrant a reconsidera-
tion of Upton's ideas.
We do have a realistic apprehension
of attack on our country or on our
forces, and we do have most serious
international responsibilities inherent
to our position as the world's most
powerful democracy. But civil society
must share this burden of defense or
it cannot be borne.
Conscription and large Reserve
forces have been markedly successful
in the past in maintaining a degree
of identity of interests between the
citizenry and their Armed Forces. To
dispense with or radically reduce
these must inevitably result in the
soldier being regarded as a person
apart from society, with all the at-
tendant evil consequences for both.
Already, in this age of the draft card
burner, the draftee is thought by
some to be in some kind of unreal
limbo. His impressment is considered
to be arbitrarily, if not maliciously,
cruel because modern armies are com-
monly thought to be, by and large,
both led and manned by professionals.
There can be no doubt of the spread
of this thinking. This is not to say
that the requirements of complex tech-
Mlllta" Review 62
nologies and of rapid deployment do
not demand that a larger proportion
of the Armed Forces be active duty
professionals than was the case in the
1930's or even the late 1950's.
Aggravation of the latter condition,
with the Army contributing to a po-
larization of the political environ-
ment, could arise from the "neo-
Uptonian" tendencies. But there would
to be less danger in this regard
now than 35 years ago, for instance.
To judge by the events of the spring
of 1968, the Army has assimilated
wel1 the lessons learned from its role
in dealing with the Bonus Army in
1932. The Army must ponder this
danger, however, lest, at some future
time, it be sent clanking off in the
cause of law and order.
Transitional Role
Law has no universal sanction, ap-
plicability, or immutability, but is
merely a codification of accepted
standards. As the stsndards change,
so must the law-this is the essence
of a democracy.
It appears that the law, as presently
interpreted and administered, is at
variance with the ideas of a signifi-
cant, or at least artiCUlate, segment
of the Nation the Army is sworn to
serve. If the Army is to be used to
deal with less than catastrophic vio-
lence, it runs the twin risk of being
committed to and identified with a
state of affairs which cannot long
remain the law of the if this
democracy is to survive, and of being
the for a drastic hardening
of conflicting positions and conse-
quent deterioration of communications
across the social chasm.
But what about the other response?
What is, in fact, the proper role of
the Army in a democratic society
which is undergoing rapid change?
September 1969
mPING THE UD ON
Its first mission is to do al1 it prop-
erly can to ease that transition. This
it can do principal1y in three ways:
By setting an example.
When cal1ed upon, by dampen-
ing violence in a manner that does not
aggravate or contain social forces to
the point where they have explosive
. potential.
By maintaining self-discipline.
Sociopolitical Factors
There is no doubt that one of the
most remarkable advances in our so-
ciety for the past 20 years is the de-
gree to which "equal opportunity" has
become a reslity in the Armed Forces.
The Army deserves a battle streamer
for this "campaign" so gal1antly
fought.
The Army has profited by lessons
learned in Detroit, Michigan, and
Washington, D. C., concerning the
most valid means of coping with open
domestic violence. But are we to con-
sider merely the criterion of tactical
efficiency in examining our methods?
We also should consider them in light
of their SOCiopolitical context.
Final1y, the Army is obliged to main-
tain its self-discipline to the extent
that the private views of its members
are not imposed on the rest of society
-or on its political leadership-with
the aid of the false sanction of its
great economic, moral, and physical
power, or of so-cal1ed military re-
quirements.
The responsibilities of the US Army
regarding politics are not fulfil1ed by
neglecting to study political problems.
The Army must exert itself positively
to insure that its weight is never un-
duly sensed in any form in political
councils and to insure that political
matters are decided in an atmosphere
free from spurious military consider-
ations. The Army cannot make this
63
KEEPING THE UD ON
e1fort unless it has studied and gained
a full and sympathetic understanding
of its social 'and political environment.
The second mission is to be ready
to shelter the society, vulnerable in
this transitional period, from external
enemies and from catastrophic vio-
lence. This is a more traditional and
more easily understood mission. It
has its pitfalls, however, for the line .
between the latter threat and authen-
tic social protest can be a thin line.
It is at this' point that the three
branches of the Government, with the
Army, must draw on all their collec-
tive wisdom, experience, and mana-
gerial skill to reach the correct deci-
sion in time.
The third mission of the Army, in
a sense, is to remain a part of Amer-
ican society through all its changes
lest the society, in exasperation, di-
vest itself of its "shield and protec-
tor."
Methods of Operation
These missions suggest a few tasks.
First, we must continually examine
our methods of operation. Do they
really dampen or defuze violence, or
do they merely suppress the symp-
toms while encouraging the growth
of the disease? Are our methods of
operation appropriate to the political
objectives? Political objectiVes are de-
termined by political authOrities.
But it would be unrealistic to main-
tain that political leaders are not in-
fluenced by what the Military Estab-
lishment insists, rightly or wrongly,
are necessary conditions for effective
military action. This influence is felt
when the political leadership faces the
problem of framing the policy guid-
ance for operations. Logic, then, dic-
tates that the Army examine closely
its demands upon political authority
for operational freedom to insure that
these are not a refiection of an erro-
neous and narrow conception of its
mission.
The Army has learned important
lessons from revolution abroad. It has
learned the necessity to distinguish
legitimate socioeconomic aspirations
from political outlawry. Should we
not now examine the entire array of
nationbuilding programs we have
helped develop, use some of this knowl-
edge, and devote some imaginative
study to identifying for the Govern-
ment those programs which the Army
might be able to apply in dealing with
our own revolution?
It would seem an anachronism if we
were to teach so many foreign armies
to identify themselves with the legit-
imate socioeconomic aspirations of
the citizenry and yet fail to see any
application of this principle in our
own country. The Civilian Conserva-
tion Corps was an imaginative, early
idea. The Medical Civil Action Pro-
gram, schooling, self-help, advisory
programs, and mass communication
merely head the list of the activities
that come to mind.
Squelch Bigotry
While bigotry cannot be rooted
from a man's mind, its manifesta-
tions can be squelched to the point
where the danger of contagion is re-
duced. The simple device of making
evidence of intolerance harmful to a
soldier's career should have some
effect. The officer's efficiency report,
for example, requires discussion of
many personality traits. Why not
place more emphasis on this one?
Is the Army doomed to destroy it-
self or the Nation? Of course not.
But steps can be taken now to make
the way easier than it may otherwise
be. Several have been suggested: Rec-
ognize that American society, as al-
Mill..., Rnlew
KEEPING THE UD DII
ways, ischanging; recognize thatthe
Army may play animportant role in
this process; and take positive steps
to insure that the role which the
Army assumes is appropriate and
beneficial tothesociety.
The Armymustreassure American
society by its conduct, must continue
to study its activities and operations
with an eye to the long-term effects
ontheNation, andmustfind effective
programs to offer to the political
leadership. Whatisrequired isa new
senseofresponsibility, a looking out-
ward, earnest debate, alertness to
change, and imsginative effort.
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85
John J. Pershing
AStudy in Paradox
Donald Smythe
T
HE first point to note about
John J. Pershing is the most
obvious-he was a soldier. As General
of the Armies, he is the highest rank-
ing military figure in US history.
Supreme in military rank, he was
also outstsnding in military bearing
and appearance. He was a soldier who
.Iooked the part. "He was the perfect
picture of the indomitable high com-
mander, tailor-made for monuments,"
said S. L. A. Marshall.' John Virden
summed up what must have been the
impression of many people when he
said:
Pershing was aU soldier-right-
side.-up, upside-down, inside, OUt8ide,
dead or ali'llB-6'11ery day in the week
and twice on Sunday" He was the
1 TM Amtsrica.n BmtaDe: Hutortl 01 World
War I. Simon 6: Schuster, Inc., N. Y 1964. p 206.
IIlnterriew with Colonel .John Virden. 22 Karch
1961.
Mlllta" RevIew 88
v-
ki7ld of soldier who eats and sleeps at
attention and wife probably
called 'him General even when th6'/l
were in the same bed.'
Yet there is a paradox here. This
man-holder of the highest military
rank, outatanding in soldierly appear-
ance-was by no means predestined
to be a soldier. He did not include
the military service in his earliest
thoughts of a career. He backed into
the Army for reasons of expediency
and, even after he had been in the
Army for years, thought of chucking
it for another way of life.
Early Ambitions
His earliest boyhood ambitions
were prosaic and unmilitary. He
thought of being a blacksmith or car-
penter, then a lawyer. He accepted the
appointment to West Point, not in ful-
fillment of any boyhood dreams of
martial glory, but because it offered
him a free, Government-paid educa-
tion, somewhat better than he was
getting in Missouri.
Five years after graduating, he was
stationed at the University of Ne-
braska as instructor in military
science. There, he enrolled in the law
school on the side and got his bachelor
of laws degree in 1893, thus fulfilling
his boyhood ambition. He approached
another lawyer, Charles G. Dawes,
asking to be taken in as a partner.
letter to the author. 24 March 1981.
Revere7ld Do1Wld Smythe is a Jesuit
Roman Catholic priest. He holds a
Doctorate from Georgetown Univer-
sity, Washington, D. C., a7ld is pres-
ently with the Department"of History,
John CarroU University, in Clevew.nd,
Ohio. He is a frequent contrilmtor to
journals on historical subjects.
The 18th of September marks the
109th anniversary of General Per-
shing's birth.
September 1869
PERSHING
Dawes advised against it. He warned:
Better w.wyers than either you or 1
can ever hope to be are starving in
Nebraska. I'd try the Army for a
while yet. Your pay may be small, lmt
it comes very re{l1llerly.'
Military Career
Pershing took the advice and stayed
in the Army. He served in the Spanish-
American War, as did his brother to
whom he wrote in 1898:
1 am disgusted with [the] Army
a7ld the way it is treated. . . 1 don't
know whether you to stay in
the army or not, lmt there's nothing
in it,-but hope deterred.'
Later, Pershing went to the Philip-
pines for service in Mindanao among
the Moros. By 1907, he was a briga-
dier general, yet he still had reserva-
tions about his military career as
revealed in a letter to his wife:
Frank, 1 am not going to stay in the
8ervice away from you. Damn the
8ervice. Damn everything, a7ld every-
body that take8 from me or ever has
taken from me one minute of your
time or one thought ot your mind. I'm
8ick of it a7ld just want you.
He considered sending in his resig-
nation and retiring to Europe or the
Klondike.'
It was during this same period of
service in the Philippines that Robert
L. Bullard-later a division, corps,
and Army commander in the Amer-
ican Expeditionary Forces (AEF)-
formed an opinion of Pershing that he
".Tohn .T. Perahtna. "Autobfosrraph,.." pp. vi.
6-6, John .T. Penhtu&, Papers, Library of Couareaa.
Cited as Library of CoQn!18 Colleetion: Bumm.
N. Timmons. Portmit of 6ft A1II6ricczn: eM"-
G. Dc"",.., N. Y 19&1. iii 28.
ti Letter of John J. PenhfDll' to Ward PerahiD
3 May 1898. John J. Pershins Papers tn the p0s-
session of his son. F. Warren Pershing. Halse?
Neck LaDe. Southampton, L. I. Cited .. F. Wanen
Pershina Collection.
Ltrtter of Pershing to his wife, 25 October 1907.
F. Warren Penbing Collection. 'IIl'B. Penhlna-a
name was Francee: her nickname. ..Frank.,..
67
PERSHING
General John J. Pershing landing at Bonlogne, France, in Jane 191'1
was not a fighter, but a pacifist who
would do no fighting unless forced.
This was a strange remark about a
person who was supposed to be a sol-
dier, who was tailormade for monu-
ments. If Pershing was tailormade, he
himself did the tailoring. If there is
paradox associated with Pershing the
soldier, there is also paradox associ-
ated with one of the prime qualities
of a soldier-obedience.
Pershing stressed obedience, in sea-
son and out of season. "When we enter
the army," he told George S. Patton,
Jr., ''we do so with full knowledge
that our first duty is toward the gov-
ernment, entirely regardless of our
own views." Whatever one's personal
views might be, he insisted, " '.' they
are in no sense to govern our ac-
tions."
Letter of PenhI..., 16 October 1916. Llbnll7
of 00_ o ~ l o n
He demanded perfect obedience of
subordinates, During a Philippine
campaign, Pershing ordered no water
drunk unless boiled because of the
presence of cholera. Two troopers
drank unboiled water, became sick.
and died. "Damn it, let them die!"
Pershing exclaimed. "They disobeyed
my orders."
The obedience he demanded of
others, he practiced himself-most
notably during the Mexican punitive
expedition of 1916-17 in the search
for Francisco (Pancho) Villa. Per-
shing never caught Villa, a fact which
galled terribly. The restrictions under
which the US Government forced him
to operate were repugnant to him, as
they must be to any soldier. He could
not use the railroads, enter towns, or
Interview with a confidential source on Per-
ablna'a _taft who wishes to be left UJlnamed. 13
Mareh 1961.
MIIlIuJ Review 88
retaliate when attacked. During the
KoreanConflictofthe1950's,Douglas
MacArthur remarked that, in war,
there is no substitute for victory. In
the punitive expedition, therewas no
victory.
Reaction to Order
In such circumstances, the natural
tendencyistocriticizeandrebel. Per-
shing did not. He remained quiet.
Years later, General George C. Mar-
shall, testifyingbeforea SenateCom-
mittee, described Pershing's reaction
totheordertoceasehuntingVillaand
retire north:
He told me he didn't mention tluJ,f;
to any of his 8taff, and that he walked
around his tent, and around the biv-
OUGc there most of the night, and gave
the order the nezt morning for the
beginning of the withdrawal without
any BZplana,tion whatever to anybody
concerned. . . 1 think it wa,s a very
good model to follow inthe Army.'
It was. But it did not come easy.
And here is another paradox. This
man who stressed obedience often
found it extremely difficult to obey.
One should not be misled into believ-
ing that he was a fiat, colorless man
without strong opinions of his own,
placidlyawaitingtheordersofasupe-
riorlike a puppet on a string. No, he
wasa strong-willedmanofpassionate
feelings on manysubjects.
WhentheGermanssanktheLusitG-
nia. in 1915, Pershing felt only scorn
for Washington's reaction which he
considered weak. He told his wife:
Good God. deliver us from the dis-
grace of the pre8ent administmtion.
It make8 me a,shamed to be inits serv-
ice. We need strong and !laura-
--;USC:;;;K!'eBs. Senate. Altuta", SitutiOfl in t1a.e
li'tJr EMt. B_ritt/l. Bel",.. tAe CQtIltllittu Oft.
Af'WM!d Set"Vieea and the Commit"_ on FOffi(Jft
ReI4_. 82d Con........ 1st Beulon. 1951. Vol
ume 1, p 881.
PERSHING
geous men at the head of affairs and
not meek sops."
When President Woodrow Wilson
issued his "too proud to fight" state-
ment, Pershing almost had apoplexy.
Pershing personslly considered the
withdrawalofthepunitiveexpedition.
with Villa still uncaught, one of the
dark pages of US history. When the
order came to call off the Villa hunt
and retire north, Pershing did some-
thing of which few people thought
himcapable.Whathedidrevealedthe
immensity of his feelings and just
what itcost him to obey. Inthe pri-
vacyofhistent,hewept."
Complex Man
A general who is a pacifist; a gen-
eralwho crieslike a baby-whatsort
ofman is this?
In truth, he was a complex man,
morecomplexthanmanypeople imag-
ine,revealinginhimselfstrangequal-
ities,strangemixtures.
It has been said that he was a
martinet, and his record seemed to
substantiateit. As a tacticalofficer at
the Military Academy in 1897-98. he
was disliked bycadeta for inspections
atunusualhours,doublingbackonhis
tracks for second inspections, heavY
punishments, and "unrealistic stsnd-
ards." In 1916, during the Mexican
punitive expedition, he would make a
man open his shirt on a hot day to
seeifhehadon theprescribedunder-
shirt. Veterans of World War I still
remember standing out in the cold
rainfortwoandahalfhours,mudup
to their shoe tops, waiting for Per-
shingto finish an inspection.
Yet this was not the whole story.
AtChaumont,theheadquartersofthe
AEF, Pershing paid no attention to
10 Letter of Penhlv to hla wife, 11 ...,. 1916,
F. Warren Penhlu CollectIon.
11 Interview with lladem.oiseIle Kfehetme Reseo.
Pam. Fmnee. 11 Ib.y 196&. who 'WU told thla
d1roct1F by Penhln&,.
88
PERSHING
the regulation which prescribed that
men must rise and salute when supe-
rior officers entered. He waved them
down and told them to go on with
their work.
The picture of Pershing the marti-
net is overdrawn. Other generals have
been far more excessive than Pershing
in his demands on men. When Per-
shing reprimanded, the victim of his
tongue lashing was generally not the
deficient dou,ghboy nor even the com-
pany commander, but the regimental
colonel or a higher officer.
Pertinent Examples
Certainly, there was none of the
martinet in Pershing's relations with
Charles G. Dawes who was not the
neatest of soldiers. In Paris, after the
Armistice, Pershing once entered a
room, whereupon Dawes brought ev-
eryone there to their feet with a rous-
ing "Attention!" in the best drill
sergeant manner. Dawes felt rather
proud of his performance and asked
the general how he liked it. Pershing
replied: "Well, it might have looked a
little better if you'd taken your pipe
out of your mouth.""
Instructive also is the incident in
esrly 1919 at Saint-Aignan, France,
where Pershing inspected about 20,000
casual troops awaiting return to the
United States. These casuals had been
sorely abused and neglected by their
local commanders, and their mood was
not improved by standing in the rain
for several hours waiting for Per-
shing who, as often happened, was
late.
When he arrived, they refused to
take the position of a soldier, stood
slouched, and refused to answer ques-
tions. Pershing mounted a platform
and began to speak. He had not spoken
UI Interview with Edward Bowditeb. 29 Deeem-
ber 1960.
four sentences when he was inter-
rupted by boos, catcalls, and cries of
''We want to go home!" Mud and
stones began to fly at the platform.
Pershing wheeled, entered his car,
and drove off. Punishments followed,
but not of the men. Pershing removed
the local commanders and sent in new
ones to raise living standards and
morale. His handling of the incident
was not that of a martinet concerned
only with discipline.
Tradition has it that Pershing was
a cold man. Acquaintances tended to-
ward the use of such adjectives as
'remote," "austere," "unfeeling," "hu-
morless."
But often those who thus describe
Pershing knew him only at a distance.
He was in a sense two different men
-chilly on the outside because of his
shyness, but warm and friendly be-
neath. "He was not a cold fish," as-
serted General Henry J. Reilly. "He
was a man of strong emotions. At
times he was a living volcano.""
When the first casualty lists arrived
in France, he wept. When he visited
the hospital at Saveney, France, he
wept. On both occasions, however, it
was afterward, when he was alone or
almost so. In public, he was the Great
Stone Face, the Iron Commander.
Contradictory Reactions
Paradoxically, Pershing was capable
of inspiring the most contradictory
reactions in people--extreme devotion
or extreme animosity. At the Univer-
sity of Nebraska, during 1891-95, he
had unparalleled success with the ci-
vilian student body. They tried to
walk, talk, and look like Pershing.
Said one:
His personality and strength of
character dominated us ... as 1 have
13 Interview with General Henry I. Reilly. 26
May 1960.
Mllltlry RlYlew
70
never known in the case of any indi-
vidual before or eince, in or out of the
Army. We loved him devotedly!'
He whipped the cadet battalion into
such shape thatan inspector rated it
second only to West Point's. The Var-
sity Rifles voluntarily changed their
name in his honor to the Pershing
Rifles-the first of scores of compa-
nies throughout the United States to
bear that name. When he left Ne-
braska, the cadets asked for a pair of
his breeches to cut up and wear as a
sign of association with him.
PersoDal RelatiDDs
Yet several years later, at West
Point as a tactical officer, his personal
relations with the cadets were disas-
trous. He was considered arrogant,
proud, and tactless, and the most un-
popular of al1 the "Tacs." His rela-
tions with cadets were so bad that
they gave him the famous "silence"
in the messhal1, in which suddenly, as
Pershing passed through, al1 talking,
eating, and movement ceased. The
"silence" said more than a thousand
words-that the officer was disliked,
intensely so, not just by the members
of his own company, but by the whole
cadet battalion. The "silence" was not
given often at West Point, but they
gave it to Pershing.
It was at this time that he picked
up the nickname "Black Jack," and it
was not a compliment. The cadets
discovered that Pershing had previ-
ously served with a Negro regiment
so appended that nickname to him.
During World War I, Pershing's
relations with his troops were mark-
edly better. Nonetheless, few would
claim that he aroused in men intense
personal enthusiasm and devotion
such as General George S. Patton, Jr.,
1.1 Wmlam Hayward, T'M Boaton. Globe. 6 AUI[USt
1917.
September 1969
PERSHING
did during World War II. Yet here,
too, is a paradox. Patton, who was
widely idolized, himself idolized Per-
shing. He considered him the greatest
man he ever knew. Before Patton left
for North Africa in 1942, he visited
Pershing in WaIter Reed Hospital and
knelt down before him for his blessing,
like a son before his father."
AddltiDnal Paradoxes .
Other paradoxes are associated with
Pershing. He was remarked1y open-
minded and had great success in deal-
ing with men of other races such as
the Sioux Indians, the American Ne-
gro, and the Philippine Moros. Yet he
was not above a certain racism when
he wrote in 1905 in a private note-
book: "The white race made [a] mis-
take in permitting the Japanese-Russo
W a r ~ 10
He was notoriously late for ap-
pointments. Yet he had a fantastic
memory for names and faces, being
able to recall casual acquaintances of
40 to 50 years before.
As a public speaker, in formal sit-
uations, he was poor or, at best, indif-
ferent. He hated to speak, was nervous
about it, and communicated his nerv-
ousness to his audience. But in in-
formal speech situations, in smalI
groups, talking off the cuff, he was
exce\lent-a real spellbinder who could
hold people for hours.
He had a most fasCinating life. He
was in the Indian Wars, the Spanish-
American War, the Russo-Japanese
War as an observer, the Philippines,
in Mexico chasing Vi1la, in Europe
with the AEF, and Chief of Staff
after the war. His life contained trag-
edy such as the death of his wife and
til. Lett"r to the author from General Geot'lre S.
Patton, 3r: dauahter. Mrs. Ruth Patton Totten.
6 Nmrember 1968.
1. Pershing notebook. undated. but probahly 1901.
Library of Congress eolleetion.
71
PUSHING
daughters in a fire, and controversy
such as surrounded his rocket-like
promotion from captain to brigadier
general.
Yet when he came to write about
this interesting life, he seemed in-
capable of telling an interesting story.
His two volume, My Eillperience8 in
the World War, which somehow won
a Pulitzer Prize, is dull, fiat, and
colorless. He was afraid of offending
anybody when he wrote. He eschewed
controversy aild preferred the bland.
A man of paradox, it is not surpris-
ing that there should be parad!'x in
what history books often credit as
Pershing's grcatest accomplishment-
holding out for a separate US Army
in France against Allied pressure. The
legend in the history books ignores
two items:
This was not a Pershing accom-
plishment. His orders when he went to
Europe explicitly stated that there
should be a "separate and distinct"
US Army although he was given
discretion to make exceptions in par-
ticular circumstances.
Pershing did make exceptions,
notably during the German break-
throughs of March and May 1918. As
S. L. A. Marshall has noted:
Legend to the contrary, Per8hing
. . . permitted his divisions to fight
under foreign commo,nd more o p ~
handedly than . . . [did] either the
French or the British during four
year8 of warfare in the West."
What manner of man was Pershing,
the real Pershing, the man behind the
legend?
He was a complex man, an interest-
ing man, a man of paradox. He was a
great military figure who kept think-
ing of quitting the Army and who
was alleged to be a pacifist. He was a
man whose life personified obedience
yet who inwardly rebelled. He was a
martinet who suffered himself to be
pelted with mud and stones by his
men, a cold man who was moved to
tears by casualty lists and sick sol-
diers, a man inspiring contradictory
reactions. He was an amazing man
and far more warm and human than
many people give him credit for.
In 1960, on the 100th anniversary
of his birth, a member of his staff
was asked in a radio interview:
"Have you ever known a man to com-
pare to General Pershing?" He an-
swered by quoting William Shake-
speare: "He was a man. Take him all
or no. I shall not look upon the like
again." 18
1':' The AmericlJft Heritage: Histof1l 01 Wotid
Wa,. 1. OfJ. Cit., P S80. ,
].JJ US Department of the Al'ttlT. Oftlee of the
Chief of Intonnation. MUitary District of Wash..
ington. "'Tribute to General John J. PershlDl'o"
A Washington. D. C radio broadcast over Station
WRC. 12 September 1980.
Military Review
72
F""..
!
The Problem of Power
Raymond J. Barrett
W
E CANNOT ignore the fact
that the United States is a
great power. If we value our freedom
and the hope of a better world, we can-
not escape the responsibilities that
being a great power thrusts upon us.
Our freedom and our power are thus
inextricably linked. Our only rational
approach is to seek better ways to use
our power responsibly and effectively.
We need to understand realistically
the problem of power.
Septelllber 1989
No matter what happens in Viet-
nam, the United States will continue
to be the world's most important
power. In much of the discussion in
the United States today, we can detect
a decidedly wishful note. It seems to
consist of a belief that US involve-
ment in Vietnam is some type of aber-
ration, and if we got out of Vietnam,
our problems in the world would all be
relatively simple. The protests against
our role in Vietnam often extend to a
73
POWER
contention that many US goals in the
world are either invalid or unattain-
able. It is important that the implica-
tions of this attitude be made explicit
because to pursue this approach would
vitally affect the security of the United
States.
Vietnam, in a sense, may obscure as
much as it clarifies. Emotion can eas-
ily influence reason. It is easy to slip
into the fallacy that, since the prob-
lem is difficult and jumbled, the
solution is to avoid the problem. Un-
fortunately, we cannot avoid these
problems if we are to maintain our
national security.
Future Problems
Hopefully, future problems will not
be as confusing as Vietnam has been ..
But the choicil is not really ours. Vio-
lence may be used by others, and, if it
is, we can ignore it only within rather
narrow limits. The need is to reduce
the problems by finding better ways
to deal with them. We only make a
bad situation worse by trying to run
away from the problems that we
inevitably confront as a great power.
The United States was projected
into a great power role by a combina-
tion of factors. There may be some
debate regarding details, but the prin-
Raymond J. Barrett is Deputy Chief
of the Program Staff, Office of Inter-
national Conferences, Department of
State. A US Foreign Service officer,
he has served at American Embassies
in Madrid, MerIJico City, Managua,
Dublin, and Cairo. He has also been
assigned to the Office of East and
Southern African Affairs and was US
SelYretary of the Permanent Joint
Board on Defense-United State8 and
Canada, in Washington, D. C. A fre-
quent contributor to the MILITARY RE-
VIEW, he is the author of "The Ant-
arctic Treaty in Operatitm!' which
appeared in the March 1969 issue.
cipal elements include the bountiful
resources of our land; our geographic
location; the talents of our people; our
dedication to education and research;
and our system of liberty, opportunity,
and incentive. History and the world
situation create great powers. They
are not appointed by anyone, and they
are not the result of caprice or ambi-
tion. Thus, the role that the United
States occupies in the world is not the
result of accident or connivance, and
it is not something that we can ignore
or make go away.
Responsible Position
It should also be understood that a
great power is not just a bigger small
power. There is a clear qualitative dif-
ference between the two categories.
What a great power does not do can
have as much impact as what it does
do. A great power does not have the
range of freedom of action that a
small power has. In particular, it can-
not ignore many matters that a small
power can.
A great power, in short, cannot es-
cape from responsibilities. Its action
or inaction affects the rest of the
world. The fact that its sway extends
throughout the world does not make it
"imperialistic." It simply cannot avoid
the fact that what it does or does not
do has impact on other countries.
Therefore, the great power itself is af-
fected by what these nations do or do
not do. If it stands idly by, interests
inimical to its own may prevail. Then,
slowly or suddenly, it may find itself
confronted with a clearly perilous sit-
uation. The great power can have no
hope of a quiet and contented exis-
tence.
There is considerable talk that the
United States should avoid becoming
involved in areas of the world "that
are not important to the security of
MIlIbIJ R." 74
POWER
US A....
No matter what happens in Vietnam, the United States will continue being a world
power with accompanying responsibilities and problems
the United States." There may be
such areas. When the question is put
to the test, however, it is all but im-
possible to win any consensus among
the American people as to which spe-
cific areas safely fit in that category.
Significantly, many of those who call
most strongly for the United States to
get out of Vietnam feel differently
about the Middle East. During the
1967 Arab-Israeli war, they urged
equally strongly that the United States
had a vital role to play in the Middle
East which it did not fulfill.
Many of these same voices also back
the Alliance for Progress and strong
US efforts within Latin America to
foster democracy and social develop-
ment. These are r o e s s e ~ that require
deep involvement in the internal af-
September 1969
fairs of other countries. Many of
these people also condemn South
Africa and Rhodesia and urge more
forceful measures by the United
States against these regimes. These
are proposals that include many sensi-
tive and complex issues.
The pros and cons of these positions
are not at issue here. They are not
mentioned to show that the advocates
of withdrawal from Vietnam are in-
consistent. Other groups of Americans
hold equally conflicting views on what
areas of the world should be of pri-
mary concern to the United States.
These positions are cited simply to
demonstrate that the United States-
on behalf of interests held important
by substantial segments of the Amer-
ican people-is indisputably, inti-
75
POWER
mately involved in events throughout
the world.
Obviously; we must have some de-
gree of selectivity in the extent to
which we become involved in individ-
ual problems. But examined pragmat-
ically, the list of areas in which we
cannot help but become substantially
involved if we are to safeguard our
of aggression exists in the world,
there remains the possibility' of com-
binations of circumstances endanger-
ing the security of the United States.
There are circumstances in Asia that
could imperil the security of the
United States; such a set existed in
1941. The idea that the United States
can ignore substantial aress of the
One of our most pressing problems is to find new formulas for the effective uiie of
our power
security, is long and varied. We must
be wary even in those areas that we
might be prepared to consider as mar-
ginal to our interests.
If we opt out of, these areas, forces
inimical to our interests may achieve
a slow transformation of what had
been the prevailing situation; a sub-
stantial change may thus result. The
new situation may well be incompat-
ible with our interests and one that
we can no longer safely ignore. It may
be much more difficult to deal with
than if we had reacted sooner before
the situation changed.
'The domino theory is much derided
these days, but the basic fact cannot
be contradicted. As long as the threat
world is attractive in theory, but does
not hold up in fact.
It bears repeating that the United
States does have to be discriminating
in how and to what extent it becomes
involved in problems. Our power is not
infinite, and we have to use it judi-
ciously. Problems also vary greatly
and are susceptible to various ap-
proaches. The means we use will vary
throughout the range of diplomacy,
aid, and military force. It is obviously
most profitable if we forecast and
head off problems. Thus, to emphasize
our need to meet the problems that
we confront is not to insist on our
full-scale and debilitating immersion
in every difficulty that we face. The
Military Review
78
real need is to find new and better
ways to meet the problems so that
they can be handled with less diffi-
culty.
The burden on the American people
of being a great power hurts, but it
cannot be escaped simply by trying to
forswear our power. Power and re-
sponsibility are the two sides of an
insoluble equation. Power must be
used responsibly. That is the crux of
the problem. But power cannot be
forsworn. The responsible use of our
power cannot be accomplished by wish-
ful thinking or idealism. There are no
simple solutions for which a large ele-
ment of the American people seems
to long.
Primary Goal
Our primary goal is a peaceful
world where we and all other peoples
can live secure from aggression, either
direct or indirect, by subversion. We
accept diversity-the United States
was built on it. We value the better
life as a primary human goal. Despite
our faults, we are probably further
toward this aspiration than any other
people on earth. But there are those
who insist their views are the only ac-
ceptable views and who insist, by force
or any other means available, that
other peoples accept tteir views. That
is the essence of aggression.
In addition, the instabilities inher-
ent in economic and social development
contain the threat of violence that,
without due care, could escalate to
threaten peace in large areas of the
world. Frustrating though it may be,
we live in a world in which we must
have power in order to have a chance
to achieve our aspirations for peace,
diversity, and development.
The United States lives in a real
world with real threats, not in an
ideal world in which all our options
September 1969
POWER
are happy. We cannot sit out history.
The basically humane aspirations of
the American people have led us to
assume that peace is the normal condi-
tion of international life. We have
looked for long periods of tranquility
that would only occasionally and
briefly be interrupted by warfare. His-
tory has not sustained that comfort-
ing view.
National security has proved to be
a constant and relentless struggle. It
is carried on by political, economic,
and diplomatic means sustained by
potent military power in the back-
ground. The problem of national secu-
rity is not intermittent but continu-
ous. We chafe under this insatiable
requirement. Because we did not seek
the role of a great power, the mantle .
of responsibility rests uneasily on our
shoulders.
World Role
We have no rational choice but to
fulfill responsibly the role that has
been thrust upon us. We cannot shirk
our responsibilities unless we are pre-
pared to see other nations with dif-
ferent standards and objectives-
many inimical to those we hold dear
-gradually take over the world and
eventually us with it.
To state our situation in the world
smacks of bombast, if not of manifest
destiny. The United States has no
mandate to run the world. The present
danger, in fact, sterns from the Amer-
ican people's longing to be rid of hav-
ing to worry about the rest of the
world. But we cannot withdraw from
our world role without imperiling our
freedom. It is, therefore, essential to
state the situation quite baldly so that
the facts are starkly clear.
The decisive fact is that the United
States bears the ultimate responsi-
bility for the safety of the Free
77
POWER
World. We, of course, must seek con-
stantly and imaginatively for ways
toward a better world. Flexibility and
compromise are important in these ef-
forts. Ultimately, our future and that
of the world depend on the success of
these efforts.
But meanwhile, such efforts can
only take place if those who oppose
the Free World cannot see any chinks
in its armor that would offer a quicker
route to their goal through violence.
The aspirations and efforts of much of
the world toward a better life insure
that there will be abundant instability
and violence in years to come. It is
vital that we actively encourage
progress. It is also vital that the
United States be sure, beyond all
avoidable human doubt, that its abil-
ity to deter attack is not jeopardized.
In the final analysis, the United States
cannot afford the luxury of "maybe."
Vietnam has been a hard school. Its
lesson is not that the United States
can or should avoid becoming involved
in such complex situations. Its true
lesson is that the difficulties that the
United States is likely to face will
probablY be protracted and highly
complicated. The difficulties will not
go away. What we need to do is to
seek effective ways to meet them, not
run from them.
State of Evolution
We have been reminded at painful
cost that change is constant. Warfare,
too, is always in a state of evolution.
We cannot solve our problems byab-
juring the use of force. To the con-
trary, one of our most pressing
problems is to find new formulas for
the responsible use of our power. We
need responsible and effective ways to
r\lbuff and eliminate the violence that
we are bound to face for the presently
foreseeable future.
The implications for the United
States are manifold. We need, for
instance, to find more effective mili-
tary means for defeating lower spec-
trum violence. We have come a long
way in this field but, if we are honest,
we know that we have a long way to
go. Our effort in Vietnam has pre-
vented the success of violence, but it
has not contained, much less elimi-
nated, the violence which is the fun-
damental problem.
Areas of Study
Can we do more in population and
resource control? Can airpower be
more effectively used against infiltra-
tion or sanctuaries in developing
areas? What can be done to improve
security in urban areas? How should
local military and police forces best be
trained, equipped, and employed? Can
surveillance against infiltration be
improved through electronic means,
physical barriers, and other tech-
niques?
This is an almost random list of
areas in which intensive research may
be fruitful. Progress may be possible
in all or none of them. Other areas
may be more promising. The essential
point is that we can and should find
better ways to deal with violence.
Our techniques for providing eco-
nomic aid and development training
constitute another area for imagina-
tive study. This is a truly complex
field, but also one with tremendous
potential. It is in the area of provid-
ing a better life that we are most
likely to win the allegiance of the
populace; this is the secret of lasting
success in countering lower spectrum
violence.
We have learned many bitter Jes-
sons, but again we have much to learn.
How can land reform be linked to
agricultural development? How can
MUllary RevIew
78
we miDlmize corruption while still
supplying the products needed to
stabilize a beleaguered economy?
What psychological or sociological ap-
proaches are likely to be conducive to
economically desirable change?
Our public relations techniques also
need to be overhauled. Portraying the
lower level violence that we are
responding to is inherently difficult
because of its piecemeal nature. Assas-
sination, terror, and destruction usu-
ally happen in small-scale and scat-
tered incidents.
On the other hand, our troops and
equipment, our movements, and our
bombings are readily apparent and
substantial in impact. These are the
elements which are reported in the
newspapers and on the radio and tele-
vision. This is particularly true in
countries other than the United States
which have many concerns of their
own. The public in those areas tends
only to see that US military forces
have taken some action. It is under-
standable that they view the United
States as the protagonist of violence.
We need to have the strength of
character to publish widely the details
of terrorism which should include
ample photographs, gruesome though
they may be. We do not want to ex-
ploit human misery, but we must make
clear the viciousness of the threat to
which we are responding. And we
must carry out this publicity
promptly. We want the world to be
aware that we did not start the vio-
lence. We want it to be clear that we
are going to the assistsnce of vi-
Ciously attacked innocent people.
There seems to be little doubt that
we did not explain our involvement in
Vietnam effectively. We must examine
POWER
all facets of this effort to be sure we
do better in the future. The key ele-
ment is obviously to show plainly and
promptly that we are responding to
human suffering.
The international context of our
actions should also be carefully as-
sessed. Improved public relations
would help enormously. But what else
can we do to maximize understanding
of, and support fQr, our actions in
other countries and in international
organizations? What can we learn
from our frustrating experiences
about the delicate business of opening
channels for negotiations and creating
and maintaining the climate necessary
to get talks started?
Perhaps most important of all, we
need better means for both predicting
destabilizing violence and persuading
the governments concerned to take the
progressive measures likely to head
off the violence. Much study and theo-
rizing has been done in this area. Per-
haps we need a concerted effort to
sort out the most promising ideas and
find ways to test them and see if they
are useful.
Simply to cite these needs indicates
the magnitude of our problem. Viet-
nam has been a hard lesson. We need
new approaches. We need the tech-
niques to enable us to be selective and
more effective. We want to head off
as many difficulties as we can. We
want to be able to mitigate the con-
sequences if we do become involved. It
is in these ways that we want to avoid
any more Vietnams.
Nations, like individuals, have to go
on learning in order to survive. It is
vital that we learn correctly the lesson
of Vietnam. For our sakes, and for the
world's sake, we cannot escape the re-
sponsibility of power.
September 1969
79

From Interplag
ARMS 'AND MEN
The Balance in Europe
Alain C. Enthoven
T
HE greatest obstacle to clear
thinking about North Atlantic
Treaty Organization military strategy
has been the exaggeration of the
Warsaw Pact forces. This exaggeration
has been fostered by the widely held
belief that the safe thing to do, when
in doubt, is to overstate the enemy's
strength in the hope that the various
N'ATO governments will thereby be
led to provide more forces.
But this notion has been proved
wrong. It can, in fact, be as danger-
ous to overestimate the enemy as to
underestimate him. Overestimation
has led to strategies of desperation,
to a feeling that our military forces
are irrelevant, and to a failure to take
many necessary and useful actions to
improve the readiness and effective-
ness of our forces.
In the Berlin crises in 1961 and
Military Retl
80
1962, for example, NATO leaders felt
obliged to consider seriously the use
of nuclear weapons to counter Soviet
aggression. The danger and destruc-
tiveness of such a course would have
been enormous. Today, some of the
NATO allies have only a few days' or
weeks' supplies for their forces on
hand. They justify this by saying
that, since their forces are so greatly
outnumbered, a conventional defense
could last only a few days. Of course,
if they buy only a few days' worth of
ammunition, they can be sure their
forces will not be able to fight longer.
This is a good example of the harmful
consequences of overestimating the
enemy.
Conlldence Undermined
The steady flow of exaggerated esti-
matea of pact forces, relative to
NATO, also undermines public con-
fidence in the flexible response strat-
egy officially adopted by the NATO
Ministers in 1967. It also makes
many Americans wonder what useful
. purpose our forces in Europe serve if
they would only be overwhelmed by
the enemy.
The main vehicle for the exaggera-
tion of pact land forces is the number
This article was condensed
from the mginal, published in
INTERPLAY, May 1969. under the
title, "Arms and Men: The Mat.
tary Balance in Eur(Y[Je." C(Y[J1I-
right 1969 by the Welkin Cor-
poration. New York. AU Righta
Reserved.
Dr. Enthoven received a B.A.
from Stanford Univer8ity, a B.
Ph. from Ozford University.
England, and his Ph. D. from the
Massachuaetta Institute of Tech-
nology. He was an Economist
with the Rand Corporation and
is a former A8BiBtant Secretary
of Defense for Syste1M AnalyBiB.
ARMS AND MEN
of divisions. Press stories frequently
compare some 170 pact divisions with
about 25 in NATO's Center Region,
without making clear that the pact
total includes many cadre and "paper"
divisions, that the NATO total ex-
cludes many divisions that would be
available for reinforcement, and that
a typical NATO division is much
larger than its pact counterpart.
The main vehicle for the exaggera-
tion of pact tactical air strength is
the count of deployed tactical air-
craft without adequate reflection of
the important and costly qualitative
advantages of NATO aircraft and
reinforcement capability.
aetalled Review
The leaders of the NATO govern-
ments should review the military bal-
ance in detail, and not stop at a
count of divisions and aircraft. They
should consider real elements of mili-
tary power---soldiers, guns, vehicles,
and training activity rates. They
should make sure that the same cri-
teria are used to evaluate pact and
NATO forces.
Also, the NATO leaders should be
sure to reconcile the arguments used
by NATO military establishments to
justify expensive items of equipment
with the estimates of capability the
pact is assumed to get from simpler,
cheaper items. If we find that the
pact countries get equal capability
with fewer men or cheaper equipment,
we should find out why and, perhaps,
adopt some of their concepts for the
future design of our own forces.
According to a widely believed
myth, the Western forces are inher-
ently less efficient than the Soviet
forces because of "differences in the
standard of living." The Western
forces do, in fact, have more of such
things as bomb computers, self-pro-
81
ARMS AND MEN
AeocorclIIIfI to
the author, the Warsaw Pact numerical advantage in tanks is not neeesaarily derisive
because North Atlantic Treaty OrgaDization tanks are superior and more antitank
weapons are available.
pelled artillery, high-capacity signal
equipment, military transport, and
military engineers. However, these
are not provided to "raise the stand-
ard of living" of the troops, but to
Contribute directly to combat power.
I have assembled some unclassified
data on the military balance in central
Europe which will, I hope, serve two
A wider appreciation of the fact
that the forces on both sides are
roughly equal in size suggests, to
begin with, that a satisfactory NATO
conventional capability is feasible, at
planned or moderately increased
budget levels, provided that NATO
supplies, protects, and employs its ex-
isting forces effectively. Thus, it also
purposes: first, to show that there is
a rough equality in the size (although
not necessarily the effectiveness) of
the NATO and pact forces and, sec-
ond, to suggest the kinds of criteria
that should be developed and utilized
to replace such crude and misleading
indicators as the numbers of divisions
and aircraft. Although the indicators
used in this analysis should be refined
further, I am convinced that the use
of rough, but relevant, indicators
would lead to more sensible discus-
sion and to better planning.
suggests that an effective military
strategy of lIexible response is feasi-
ble. This is vitally important to our
security. Without effective nonnuclear
forces, NATO would be politically
weak in a crisis. Nuclear weapons are
too dangerous and destructive to be
a credible response except in tbe most
extreme circumstances.
Also, a general appreciation of the
rough balance would help the Amer-
ican people to understand the impor-
tant military purpose served by US
forces in Europe in helping to main-
MIJIWy Review
82
f
;
tain the balance. If NATO really
, were outnumbered 170 to 25, it would
make much difference if we re-
f dueed the- US forces to a ''tripwire.''
, - As it is, the US forces are needed to
maintain the balance, and should not
ARMS AND MEN
Figure 1 gives some indication of
the land forces ilJllJlediately available
to each side. These figures describe
the situation prior to the invasion of
Czechoslovakia. Although there have
been some increases in the readiness
M-Day Land Forces In the Center Reat.. * In M1II-1968
North AtlIutIie
Treatr Orgtmhation
IV_Pad
282/8** 46***
Manpower in Divisions 889,000 868,000
Manpower in Division Forces 677,000 619,000
Riftemen (NATO as Percentage
of Pact) 100 percent
Equipment (NATO as Percentage
of Pact)
Tanks 55
Antitank Weapons 150
Armored Personnel Carriers 180
Artillery and Mortars (Number
of Tubes) 100
Divisional Logistic Lift 150
Total Vehicles 185
Engineers 187
---
Center Region includes West Germany, Belaium. the Netherlands, and France tor NATO; East
Germany. Poland. and CaecboslovaJda tor the pact eonntriea.
Includes five French division&.
T'WenQr.two wbleh are Soviet. and 24 of whfch ant Eat EQl'OpeiIlD. fnchuUq elabt Cseeho-
slOVak.
Figure 1.
be reduced without being replaced
by other NATO allies or unless cor-
responding reductions are made in
the pact forces. The NATO-Warsaw
Pact balance is close enough that mod
erate increases or decreases in forces
make a significant difference in NA
TO's over-all politicalmilitary options.
and deployment of the Soviet forces
since then, they do not invalidate the
basic point of the comparison.
If one counts divisions, NATO is
obviously outnumbered in ilJllJlediately
available forces, but if one counts the
number of men in those divisions, or
in the division forces (the divisions
S.ptemb.r '919
83
ARMS AND MEN
plus their combat and service sup-
port), NATO actually has slightly
more men available. This is true even
at the rifle platoon level: NATO has
as many men available as the pact.
The reason for this disparity be-
tween division counts and manpower
counts is that the term "division" has
little significance. Soviet divisions at
full strength have only 8,000 to 10,000
men while a West German division
has 20,000. The average NATO di-
vision force in the Center Region has
about 23,600 men (actual peacetime
strength), compared to about 13,500
for the average pact division. The
average US division force has about
40,000 men. In the face of such enor-
mous differences in size, discussions
of the number of divisions on each
side CII1l only lead to gross misunder-
standings.
Equal Manpower
The fact that manpower on both
sides is roughly equal is significant.
A soldier, unlike a division, is a rela-
tively equivalent unit on either side
if he is similarly trained and equipped.
Also, manpower is by far the largest
cost-about 80 percent--in maintain-
ing a Western army. Thus, since the
number of soldiers is about equal,
we are, in fact, already paying most
of the cost of an equal military capa-
bility.
Because of the considerable dif-
ferences in the structure of NATO
and Warsaw Pact divisions, it is not
too helpful to use the traditional
method of calculating division "equiv-
alents." There is no satisfactory way
of adding up the different capabilities
provided by tank firepower, infantry
firepower, and artillery firepower. A
better approach is to compare each
major element of the force-that is,
tanks and artillery.
Shown in Figure 1, the pact's
largest potential advantage is in
tanks; NATO has only 55 percent as
many as the pact in central Europe.
But it is not clear that this numerical
superiority in pact tanks is a decisive
advantage. NATO tanks are better,
especially the M60, the Leopard, and
the Chieftain which are more accurate
at long range than the principal
Warsaw Pact tanks, the T54 and T55.
Also, since NATO would be on the
defense along most of the front, its
50-percent advantage in infantry anti-
tank weapons would be important.
Kill Potential
Studies show that the NATO tanks
and antitank weapons have a high
kill potential against the pact tank
force. Although we cannot draw the
conclusion that we would necessarily
defeat the enemy tank force, we
clearly are not in a hopeless situation,
especially when one considers the ad-
ditional large tank kill potential of
our tactical aircraft.
In nearly every other area of land
forces' capability, the NATO forces
hold the advantage in immediately
available forces. As Figure 1 shows,
NATO has 30 percent more armored
personnel carriers than the pact. The
number of artillery and mortar tubes
is about equal on both sides.
However, because of more effective
ammunition, the greater accuracy of
certain weapons, and because of
greater logistic capability, NATO's
firepower is superior to that of the
pact. Since NATO forces have con-
siderably more men engaged in logis-
tics tasks in and behind the division,
and more transport vehicles per com-
bat vehicle, NATO's ability to sup-
ply ammunition and fuel and to keep
tanks operating should be greater. The
Soviets apparently plan on lower artil-
MillWy Revle. 84
lery ammunition expenditure rates
than NATO does.
I conclude from this analysis that
the forces facing each other on M-day
are roughly eqUal in many measures
of size. The pact forces are structured
differently-for example. they place
greater emphasis on tanks-but this
is more a question of force mix than
of force size. We could change our mix
ARIIS AND lIEN
the pact forces might begin to mobi-
lize before NATO does.
Reinforcement ~ mobilization ca-
pability is a particularly important
problem, and one that is extremely
difficult to evaluate. Most studies
indicate that the Soviets can put more
men and equipment into the Center
Region than NATO in the first weeks
of a mobilization. It is important to
WDrldwlde North Atlalle Treatr Drpalzatlon ad Wusaw Pact
Mapowlr MId-l988
(Excluding United States Increases for Vietnam)
North Atltmtle
Treat, Orgtmkation War_PtId
Army-Marines 3,000,000
2.850,000
Navy 1,070,000 470,000
Air Force 1.400,000 880,000
---- ----
TOTAL MEN 5,470,000 4,200,000
Figure 2.
of weapons within the same budget
levels if we thought it would be more
effective.
Rough equality in force size does
not necessarily mean that we have
enough or more land forces than we
need. Before drawing conclusions on
the adequacy of our forces. one must
consider carefully a number of other
important factors, including readi-
ness, state of training, geography.
deployments, reinforcement capability,
and the political circumstances in
which these forces might be used.
NATO should ideally have some
margin of superiority in its land
forces on Moday to offset pact ad-
vantages in reinforcement capability,
and to allow for the possibility that
understand what is behind this evalua-
tion since it is clear that the estimated
greater capability does not arise sim-
ply from the pact countrieS having
more men under arms in peacetime.
As Figure 2 shows. the NATO coun-
tries have 30 percent more men under
arms than the Warsaw Pact countries,
excluding US increases for Vietnam.
Nor does the pact forces' superior
reinforcement capability arise from
a greater reserve of trained military
manpower. Because of their short
terms of service, the NATO countries
train more men per year than the
pact. Even geographical deployment
does not explain much of the differ-
ence. While the United States has
several hundred thousand men in or
Sepllmblr 1969 15
ARMS AND MEN
committed to the Pacific area (in ad-
dition to the personnel added for the
Vietnam war who are not included in
Figure 2), a surprisingly large pro-
portion of the USSR's forces is also
deployed far from central Europe,
along the southern and Chinese bor-
ders.
I

ment required to transform their )
large reserves of trained men into
effective combat units. Improved mo- 1
bilization capability is only one of the
important, and relatively inexpensive,
measures that NATO countries can
and should take to realize the full
potential effectiveness of existing
Two circumstances manpower and expenditures. The pro-
stocks,
F_
A formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization aircraft from seven nations. The
author believes effectiveness factors of payload, crew training, and loiter time would
give NATO greater tactical airpower than the Warsaw Pact forces despite the fact
that NATO has fewer planes.
ability of the Soviets to mobilize and
deploy large numbers of understrength
divisions, as adequately supported
units, has probably been
overstated while our own mobiliza-
tion ability has been understated.
Western experts assume that the So-
viets can mobilize and deploy re-
servists much faster than we can,
even though our reservists are orga-
nized into units and trained regularly
while theirs are not.
Second, the people of the European
countries, especially the Germans,
have not provided the relatively in-
expensive unit training and equip-
the institution of improved unit train-
ing, and the attainment of a greater
ability to deploy to wartime locations
are other needed improvements.
As for tactical air forces, NATO
has about 28 percent fewer aircraft
immediately available in the Center
Region than the pact countries, as
shown in Figure 3.
NATO, however, has considerably
more aircraft in its worldwide inven-
tory, and thus a greater reinforcement
capability. Equally important, the
NATO aircraft have much better
performance. NATO forces have a
much higher proportion of multipur-
Military Review
86
ARMS AND MEN
Marti! Atlantic Treaty OrpnJzatlon and Warsaw Pact Tactical AIr Forces
In the Center Rellon In MId-1988
North Atlmttk
..
Treatr/ Organization War_Pad
Number of Deployed Aircraft 2,100 2,900
Percentage of Total Inventory 20 percent 40 percent
(of Center Region Countries)
Percentage of Force by Mission
Capability (Center Region)
Primarily Interceptors 10 percent 42 percent
Multipurpose Fighter-Attack
48 15
Primarily Attack
9 6
Reconnaissance
18 8
Low Performance 20 29
--- ---
TOTAL 100 percent 100 percent
Effectiveness Indicators (NATO
as Percentage of Pact)
Average Payload 240 percent
Typical Loiter Time 250 to 500
Crew Training 200
Figure 3.
pose aircraft with a greater bomb-
carrying capacity while the pact coun-
tries have a much larger proportion
of interceptors not well suited to of-
fensive action. NATO aircraft have
about 2.4 times more payload capa-
bility per aircraft than pact aircraft
on typical combat missions.
Calculations of the number of tanks
or personnel the NATO and Warsaw
Pact air forces could kill per day
under varying tactical assumptions
suggest that the NATO forces have
two and one-half to five times the
kill potential of the pact forces, when
both sides use ordinary bombs and
rockets, and an even greater advan-
tage if the best available munitions
are used. These estimates take into
account the sortie rates, pilot ac-
curacy, and payloads of each air
force.
NATO air forces also have two and
one-half to five times the loiter time
capability of pact firstline fighters. A
key question is how effective the So-
viet interceptors would be in stopping
NATO fighter bombers. NATO, with
its high percentage of multipurpose
aircraft, has more flexibility than the
September 1969 87
I
ARMS AND MEN
pact countries since its aircraft can from this discussion of the military
be used partly for offensive attacks
balance?
and partly for protection against pact
interceptors, as the situation requires.
Finally, the average NATO pilot
gets twice as many flying hours per
month as the average pact pilot.
Pilot training and aircraft mainte-
nance are expensive, but they provide
a more effective air force.
All these factors change the con-
clusions derived from simple counting
of aircraft.' The NATO air forces
have much greater tactical airpower
than the pact air forces.
However, as with land forces, many
of NATO's air advantages are po-
tential only because relatively inex-
pensive, but critically important, mat-
ters are neglected. For example, the
present Vulnerability of aircraft on
our airbases is a problem which could
be solved by building aircraft shelters
(which cost only about one-twentieth
as much as a plane), and providing
greater runway repair capabilities.
Otherwise, we are in danger of losing
many aircraft in the first few days
or hours of a war, as the Arabs did in
1967.
What conclusions should be drawn
First, no one should conclude that
any NATO nation could safely reduce
its military forces. The balance is
close; even moderate changes can
significantly affect the balance of mili-
tary power.
Second, the state of the NATO
forces is unsatisfactory. We are not
getting what we are paying for be-
cause we are not providing the "horse-
shoe nails" needed to reach the full
potential effectiveness of our existing
forces. We could have a military force
as effective as the pact countries
without a big increase in cost. But
to get it we must concentrate on solv-
ing problems of military readiness and
effectiveness against the real threat,
instead of spending so much time and
thought on devising ways of meeting
an exaggerated threat.
Third, we are not going to get clear
thinking in NATO, or attain the mili-
tary capability we need at acceptable
cost, until we manage to overcome the
obstacles of the simple and misleading
division and aircraft counts and ex-
aggerations of the threat.
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MIlItarJ Revl
81
Propaganda for the PLA
SOVIET AnEMPTS TO SUBVERT THE RED CHINESE ARMY
Richard B. Giza
T
HE withdrawal of Soviet mili-
tary advisors and aid from Com-
munist China in 1960 halted the mod-
ernization of the Chinese armed
forces-the People's Liberation Army
(PLA). Already in the late fifties, a
debate was underway in China's mili-
tary circles between professionals fa-
September 1869
voring an independent role for the mil-
itary and the Maoist's who advocated
stronger party controls over the army.'
The Soviet Union, seeking to exac-
1 The beRt known ot these doetrinee are eon..
eemed with the defense of mainland China and
the Chinese Communist theo1'7 on revolUtional'7
war. See Balh L. PoweJJ. "Mao"" MUI...... Doc
trines," ~ S"ntq!. No.4, Aprfi 1968, pp
289256.
89
PROPAGANDA
erbate tensions between the opposing
military lines in China, began a so-
phisticated propaganda campaign in
early 1967 using radio broadcasts, es-
pecially designed and beamed to PLA
listeners, to play upon the discontent
within the armed forces. The tenor of
these broadcasts makes it quite clear
that the Soviets are attempting to sub-
vert the PLA.
PLA Weaknesses
While the pLA with its approxi-
mately two and' one-half million men is
the only nationally effective, compara-
tively unified body in China, it has
weaknesses. It is divided by regional
alliances, personal loyalties, and politi-
cal, as well as professional, aspira-
tions. It is, however, the only organ
with sufficient power to challenge the
Maoist regime. Now that the PLA is
playing a role in practically all aspects
of Chinese society, its loyalty is a vital
factor in the Great Proletarian Cul-
tural Revolution and the future of
China.
The Chinese Libera-tion Army Daily
admitted that a struggle existed be-
tween the "proletarian revolutionary
line" represented by Mao Tse-tung and
the ''bourgeois reactionary line" in
the PLA. It urged that troops be loyal
to Mao and that they eliminate his
opponents "who have wormed their
way into the PLA."
S Samuel B. Grimtb n. The CliM8Er People's
Li681'Gtiml. A11ft.II. McGraw-Sill Book Co N. Y.
1967. p 802.
Richard H. Giza, is fL ResefLrch
Analyst with the Department of De-
fense in WllBhington. He holds a- B.A.
in Politica.! Science from PrO'Vidence
CoUege, Rhode lsla.nd, and fLn M.A.
in RU8si4n Studies from Fordham
Uni'IJersity in New York. His educa,-
tion includes M'lJfLnced grtLdua.te work
in Sino-SO'Viet fLflairs fLt the Amerioon
Uni'IJersity, WllBhington, D. C.
The Soviet Union probably decided
sometime in 1966 to take advantage of
the growing opposition to Mao in mili-
tary circles and openly intervene in
the cultural revolution. Moscow no
doubt felt that the area was fertile for
exploitation and that there was not
too much risk involved on her part.
The beginning of the Soviet attempt
to subvert the Maoist leadership and
provoke discontent within the PLA
was signaled by an editorial in the 29
December 1966 issue of Red StfLr, the
Soviet daily military newspaper, en-
titled "Events in the Chinese People's
Republic and the People's Liberation
Army of China,'''
Anti-Soviet Campaign
The article begins with a commen-
tary on the anti-Soviet campaign cur-
rently being waged in China and
praises the PLA as representatives of
the working class and true revolution-
aries. It further states that the Maoist
leadership is attempting to make the
army a blind weapon for implementing
its anti-Marxist-Leninist, anti-Soviet
course. On purges, it stresses that
those purged:
were experienced militfLry lead-
ers and Communists who tried to bllBe
and strengthen the combfLt ca.ptLbility
of the PLA with a- considemtion for
national peculfurities and re'IJolutitm-.
ary tra.ditions.'
Having purged the army of all those
disagreeing with Mao's politico-mili-
tary theoretical concepts, the article
accuses the Maoists of attempting to
strengthen the army's role in the na-
tion's political life and make it a bas-
tion for Mao's ambitions. The article
closes recalling the history of friend-
ship between the PLA and the Soviet
Army and expressing the hope that
Rod Star. 29 December 1966.
"Ibid.
MllitaJy Revllw 90
PROPAGANDA
they will march together again united. Soviet Army are recalled before the
The Radio Moscow phase of the commentator attacks various Maoist
campaign to turn members of the PLA policies said to be harming the armed
against Mao's military thought began forces. The program usually closes
slowly in 1967 and picked up momen- with a summary of the main theme
tum the' end of the year. In and the hope that the PLA will over-
February the Soviets sharply come the grave obstacles put before it
Chinese fighter pilots display Chairman' Mao Tse-tUDg's book Wore B ftight. Soviet
broadcasts say success is due to Sovietbuilt MiG aircraft, not Mao's quotes.
escalated the attack by increasing their and become united once again with the
half-hour programs to PLA listeners Socialist camp.
from three broadcasts a week to daily The propaganda effort by Radio
programing with each broadcast re- Moscow toward the PLA is based on
peated four times per day.' six basic themes: a general attack on
The general format of a "Program Maoist military doctrine, combat weak-
for the PLA" usually consists of a ness and training, the cultural revolu-
commentary by a military officer. He tion and the army, the purge, the use
holds the rank of colonel or above and of the PLA for nonmilitary purposes,
in many instances is identified as a and the recall of historical ties be-
former Soviet advisor to the PLA. tween the PLA and the Soviet Union.
Frequently, the previous warm ties of It is evident that the aim of these
friendship between the PLA and the programs is to cause a breakdown in
Radio Moscow In mandarin to China, 1 Feb- I the morale of the PLA which could
lead to an open revolt against the
to 81 December Maoists.
Allplt 1989 91
PROPAGANDA
The following is a typical Soviet
attack on Maoist militsry doctrine:
Mao's theOf"l/ is basically e1T01le0UB,
neglltive 11M defensive 11M points to
defelltism. Mao proposell retrellt 11M
defensive m4neUVBrS; giving the 1It.>il
to the enemy. Who.t WQ,8 thrmght t& be
correct during the period &f guerrillD.
wllr CQ,nnot be made the bllBia &f pres-
ent da.y combllt m4neUvers.
The broadcast closes with the fol-
lowing appeal:
We know the PLA is lin IIrmy which
hII8 spirit, pa.triotiam 11M 1000e for the
fo.therlaind. It wiU wt be II silent 11M
pliable tool in the 1ul.nds of Mao.
On gU,errilla warfare, Radio Moscow
exhorts:
MM's yuerrillo. wllr the8ia is not
onl1l II misto.ke of II m4n who hII8 w
knowleageo! military IIffllirs but lin
it!eologico.l IItto.ck aimed at s1ul.ttering
the Chinese people's belief in the So-
viet UnWn:1I oovanced militllry science.
Combat Defects
The broadcasts which probably have
the greatest impact on professional
soldiers are those which attsck combat
weakness in the PLA. This weakness
is attributed to the lack of modern
weapons and realistic training.
In a program for the PLA entitled
"Fatsl Elrects of Mao Tse-tung's Mili-
tsry Thought on the Development of
the Chinese PLA" on 14 July 1968,
the Soviets played on their favorite
theme with this quote from V. I. Lenin.
The oneil who win the upper 1ul.M in
wllr lire those equipped with the bellt
techwlogico.l weap011S, good discipline
11M be1ul.vior. . war tactics depend.
on the l6'IJel of military technological
equipment. the finest IIrmy wiU
l>e instantl1l mopped up b1l the enemy
i! it does wt 1ul.ve the necellBllry IIrms,
8'lLppliell 11M tmining.
The program concluded: "There are
no planes or tsnks in the PLA and the
lack of spare parts makes useless those
given by the Soviet Union."
Radio Moscow often quotes official
Chinese Communist sources and then
attscks the ststement. In January
1968, it quoted a People's Do.ily stste-
ment that ''the best weapon is Mao's
thought as far as the Revolutionary
Army in the contemporary era is con-
cerned." The broadcast then charged
that no PLA fighter can seriously ac-
cept this view and that planes and
weapons are necessary for victory-
not Mao's thought.
Rhetorical Question
The Soviets often use the rhetorical
question to make their point. The
query "Why does Mao's propaganda
deny the importance of modern weap-
ons in warfare?" is answered: "To
have weapons you must first have a
strong economy. The cultural revolu-
tion has dislocated the economy so that
new equipment for the PLA is out of
the question."
Individuals such as Lo Jui-ch'ing,
former Chief of Stslr of the PLA, are
used as propaganda vehicles. One pro-
gram stressed that Lo's purge was due
to his suggestion that weapons play
an important role in modern warfare
and his insistence on the moderniza-
tion of the army instead of following
the thought of Mao.
The Soviets boast of their assistsnce
to other countries. One program de-
tsiled the modern equipment and
training the Soviet Union was pro-
viding to the North Vietnamese Army.
The idea apparently is to make the
PLA jealous of the North Vietnamese
Army and indignant at Chinese leaders
for the poor relations with the Soviets.
Ridicule is sometimes injected into
the campaign. The New China News
Agency is quoted in one program as
Military Review
92
PROPA6AIIDA
announcing that a U-2 spy aircraft
was shot down while the Chinese air
commander used Mao's quotes. The
Soviets say this is laughable and that
all Chinese people know that the vic-
tory was achieved not through quotes,
but through the use of Soviet MiG
aircraft.
No doubt the ultimate insult was a
sessed by Soviet troops, and for the
PLA to guard the Socialist camp with
the Soviet Union.
The Soviets set up the military
school system in China, and many
Chinese officers W!lre trained in the
Soviet Union. In the late fifties, the
Maoists launched a campaign to deem-
phasize Soviet methods and doctrine.
PLA soldiers doing eonstruetion work. Soviet propaganda ateuses the government of
using the armed forees for nonmilitary purposes to the detriment of their eombat
readiness.
broadcast statement that the PLA was
even inferior to Chiang Kai-shek's
troops in technology and equipment.
Maoist policy on militsry training
stresses learning through actual com-
bat. Moscow criticizes this policy as
leading to great bloodshed at the hands
of green leaders and points out that
poorly trained troops cannot compete
against modern armies. Mao is ac-
cused of betraying resolutions adopted
at the 8th Party Congress which called
for modern training for PLA cadres,
for the PLA to master the skills pos-
RadIo Moscow in mandarin to Southeast Asia.
September 1967
....at 1989
Today, Moscow broadcasts use ridicule
to promote distrust of the present
school system as a means for military
preparedness. Commenting on a Chi-
nese article announcing the estsblish-
ment of an academy for training navy
minesweeper personnel, a Soviet pro-
gram had this to say:
The rruz,jor BUbjects in the cu1T'icu-
lum are cku!s struggle and the struggle
between the two roads . Mao claims
there was not a Bingle qIUllified milt.
tary acakmy prior to the Cultural
Revolution. Training of two to three
years is too long involving too much
book work . . only one month is
93
PROPAGANDA
needed to train a good pilot. . . . An
army which loudly recites Mao's slo-
gans does indeed only need a couple of
months of training.
The Soviets devote the largest per-
centage of programing to the cultural
revolution and its effect on the PLA.
They charge that opposition exists
within the army and that Mao needs
the anqy for the cultural revolution to
succeed. In discussing an editorial in
a PLA organ,' which advises the army
to keep away from factional conflicts,
a Soviet broadcast concludes that this
testifies to disturbances and disorder
within the army and the factional con-
flict between supporters and oppo-
nents of Mao.'
In two programs in 1968 dealing
with the opposition problem, Moscow
claimed that 12 military corps do not
support Mao, that Mao's policy in
splitting this once closely knit group
(the PLA) is contrary to China's na-
tional interest, and that Mao is afraid
of the PLA. The only answer for Mao
is to split the army and sow discord.
Purge Statistics
When a nation is in turmoil, the
purge is no doubt the most feared
consequence for those in power. Six
programs for PLA listeners in 1968
were directly concerned with purges,
and many other broadcasts alluded to
them.
Statistics are frequently employed
in exploiting this theme as indicated
in an October 1968 broadcast;
Ninety percent of the CCP [Chinese
Communist Party] military aflairs
committee in the laBt two years were
ezpelled . . . as well as sixty top leilel
PLA commanders.
Probably the best ploy used by
Radio Moscow is the threat that the
., Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 29 June
1967.
purge will be extended to the lower
levels of the PLA. For example;
Mao Tse-tung does not limit his
purge to high ranking commanders,
but has decided to ea:pand the purge
to reach the middle and low ranking
commanders, such as commanders of
regiments, battalions, and companies.
Secret Police
The Soviets also promote suspicion
in the ranks of the PLA by referring
to a secret police organization set up
within it by Mao. The claim is stressed
that anyone can be arrested and units
can be disbanded at any time by the
secret police.
The opposing military line in China
has frequently complained that gov-
ernment use of the armed forces for
nonmilitary purposes was detrimental
to morale and combat preparedness.
This theme is exploited by broadcasts
which claim that the use of the PLA
in propaganda efforts to spread Mao's
thoughts and in military police work
to put down clashes by the Red Guards
detracts from its combat readiness and
mastery of weapons. Radio Moscow
calls on the PLA to refuse these tasks
and not be manipulated.
For consumption by the Chinese
civil populace, the Soviets claim "the
army is everywhere having assumed
the roles of police, judges, workers,
executioners, peasants, and school-
teachers." To further opposition to
the PLA and promote discontent
among minority groups in China,
broadcasts are directed to these peo-
ples in their dialect. The aim is to
unite the minority groups against the
army and possibly provoke open oppo-
sition.
Stress is also placed on the deteri-
oration of the PLA since the break
with the Soviet Union. Weakness in
the PLA is said to be due to the ab-
Military Review
94

~ sence of cooperation with the Soviet


_ Union, and this is Mao's fault. In
l contrast, the Warsaw Pact is held up
t as a symbol of unity and strength.
~ The PLA is asked in another broad-
~ cast why Mao attempts to incite hatred
[- within the army for the Soviet Union.
[ Moscow answers the question by stat-
ing that it does not matter what Mao
attempts since Soviet and Chinese
troops know the real value of combat
friendship.
These programs stress the "good old
days" and contrast them with the tur-
PROPAGANDA
moil of the present day. There always
appears to be the hint lurking in the
background that conditions would im-
prove if Soviet aid were provided.
This two-year propaganda campaign
by the Soviet Union to subvert the
PLA began to taper off in late 1968,
and, by the end of the year, it had vir-
tually stopped. The Soviets may have
felt that they had exhausted the sub-
ject or that the campaign was not
accomplishing the results desired and
quite possibly that it was becoming
counterproductive.
SOVIET VIEW OF LIFE IN COMMUNIST CHINA
A society built along the lines of Mao's recipe would look something like
this. In the field of eeonomics: labor organized on army lines (labor battalions,
regiments, etc.) in fact, slave labor; consumption limited to the very basic
needs; concentration of all means for building up the military might of the
state in the interests of a great-power foreign policy. In the field of social
relations: the human personality reduced to a mere cog in the state machine.
In the field of ideological life: relection of all the wealth of national and
world culture, making "Mao's ideas" the only spiritual food of the nation;
idealization of self-denial and rejection of natural human needs and emotions.
In the political field: complete liquidation of democratic institutions. dicta-
torial regime of personal power, and complete disregard for any form of
legality or constitutional rights.
Colonel G. Gorelov
Soviet Military Review
April 1969
AUlust 1969
95
Mao's Thoughts
In response to Mr. Arenberg's com-
ment (Reader Forum, July 1969), I
submit a powerful State Beeks to exer-
cise hegemony in its surrounding area
as an historiCally true axiom. Mr.
Arenberg attributes the war in the
Pacific to Japan's expansionist policy.
It could be argued that the Pacific war
was caused by the containment policy
of the United States and the Europea,n
colonial powers. A moot point.
Defeat in war does not invariably
alter a people's national destiny. I be-
lieve a nation must not only be de-
feated but effectively destroyed to
prevent its rise again as a phoenix
from the ashes. It took Germany less
than 20 years to recoup after World
War I.
We, as well as Russia, I'm sure, re-
gret Russia's awakening of the Chi-
nese' giant. But who is whose friend?
Russia and the United States versus
China? China and Russia versus the
United States? China and the United
States versus Russia? With proper
tutelage Japan could be our strong
partner in East Asia. Let us make
sure she remains on our side. Get her
involved in East Asian affairs now!
COL H. Martin Hays, USAR
Okinawa-A Different View
I thought the Hilsman article in the
July issue of Military Review was a
seriously inadequate treatment of the
Okinawa question.
. There is rising pressure for the
United States to retrocede to Japan de
facto sovereignty over Okinawa. Agi-
tators in Japan have used the issue to
arouse anti-American sentiment. The
Japanese Government is asking for
early action. Soviet subversion stirs
the brew. Some Americans argue that
prudence requires the early restora-
tion of Japanese sovereignty.
Every policy question has varied
aspects. The art of making sound pol-
icy lies in bringing these aspects
into favorable combination for our
side. Regrettably, US policy has in
recent years \;leen shaped by officials
who have a faculty for selecting com-
binations injurious to our interests.
Their strategy on every issue is re-
treat.
In the question of Okinawa, a pol-
icy of retreat offers this analysis:
Japan, the world's third largest
industrial power, is joined with us in
a vital partnership to maintain peace
in East Asia.
US de facto sovereignty over
A prim ..,. purpose of tile MILITARY REVIEW is to provide a forum for the uchanae of ideas
and informed opinion eonminl' military _train. When controTenlal matters are presented in the
REVIEW, readen du.reein.. with the theories or conclusion. presented are invited. to write brief
COllulleata of dl'fel'l'ent viewlo Concln dlscDl!Jlions on aDY topies of pneraJ mUllan Interest are .bo
welcomed lor pautble publication.
Beeallle of limited .pace. the editor reserves the riaht to select those eommenta and dileuulonl of
areatut reader Interest for pablieation and to edit 01' eliminate pusu fol' brevity. Edltina will not
intentionally modi',. a meanina or conte:.t.
ContributioDl to the Reader Forum should be addressed to: Editor in Chief, Military Review. US
Mill)' Command and GeDen] Staft' Cone.e. Fort Leavenworth. KalUM 66D27w
Mlrltary RevIew
Okinawa is a thorn to Japanese pride
which should be removed before its
poison disrupts our alliance.
The limitations on our use of
Okinawa through restoratiQn of Japa-
nese sovereignty would have minimal
effect on our military requirements.
This is the superficially plausible
argument for instant US surrender of
its sovereignty over Okinawa. It coun-
sels American retreat before the pres-
sures stirred by Soviet subversion. It
proposes a course which will increase
-not decrease--our alliance frictions.
An alliance is a joint undertaking
in the common interest of the parties
concerned. The proposition that only
the United States must sacrifice to
maintain alliance cooperation is an
immature approach to questions of
world power and interest. 1t refiects
the naive quality of American diplo-
macy. It dissipates our credit and in-
terest. The adjustment of an alliance
to changed conditions must be made
in the interests of all the parties.
The present realities are these:
For 24 years, the United States
has paid for the security of Japan.
The arrangement was necessary after
World War II but long has been out-
moded by increasing Japanese wealth
and power. Japan should take full re-
sponsibility for its own security.
In the present state of the world,
the restoration of Japanese sover-
eignty over Okinawa would increase
troubles for both the United States
and Japan. It would divide the de- ,
fense against subversive attack on the
American presence. For subversives,
two governments are better than one.
Present authorities are defined
by treaty and there is no substantial
change in alliance relations to war-
rant their revision. It is incompatible
with Japan's obligations to the al-
READER FORUM
liance for it to press the issue now.
The right time for the return of
Okinawa to Japan will be after Japan
has assumed full responsibility for its
own defense and all US forces have
been withdrawn. It will come when the
United States can withdraw from
Okinawa and transfer the mission of
Free World defense to Japan.
In the light of these realities, it
would be irresponsible and imprudent
to change the treaty status of Oki-
nawa at this time. Japan is not ade-
quately armed in its own defense. It is
not prepared to take over the respon-
sibilities which the United states now
exercises from Japanese territory.
The first goal of Japanese pride
should be to take over its own defense
and release the US forces presently
operating from Japanese territory.
The immediate task is to arrange the
transfer of responsibility as fast as
Japan can fulfill its new role.
The general plan should provide for
the restoration of Japanese sover-
eignty over Okinawa when its military
installations are transferred to Japan
and US forces are withdrawn.
This is the sound framework for
Okinawa policy. We show our con-
fidence in Japan by adjusting to its
early assumption of full partnership
in the Free World alliance. We return
Okinawa as soon as Japan is prepared
to accept responsibility of sover-
eignty. We reject the course of timid
adjustment to Soviet pressures.
If our leaders are to become pris-
oners of Soviet propaganda, they will
produce no sound policy. But if
they give constructive and creative
strength to our Free World alliances,
Communist tyrannies will wither
away. Okinawa is a good place for the
United States to begin the New Order.
MG Thomas A. Lane, USA, Retired
87
MiliTARY
NOTES
UNITED STATES
'OH58A Kiowa'
BeU Helicopter N61D8
The Army's first OH-58A Kiowa
The first of 2,200 new observation helicopters was recently delivered to the
Army. The OH-5SA helicopter, named Kiowa, weighs 2,760 pounds (mission
gross weight), has an airspeed of 130 knots, and a range of approximately 350
miles. The Kiowa carries a crew of two.-Bell Helicopter News.
Foamlnflated Tire
A foam inflation material for "flat- the tires may find use on military and
proof" tires is being developed by a off-the-road construction equipment;
US manufacturer. It consists of a agricultural implements and tractors;
coarse-textured, black, resilient foam and forklifts.
which completely replaces the air in a Conventional tires inflated with the
conventional tire. Tires inflated with new foam are heavier and more ex-
the material remain serviceable even pensive than ordinary tires and have
after punctures by spikes, rifle bullets, a speed limitation. However, new
sharp rocks, or broken bottles. With design approaches may overcome this
additional development and testing, problem.-News release.
The MILITARY REVIEW adthe ~ s. Arm7 Command and General Staff eonqe assume no re-
.porudbllltJ' lor aCC1lratT of information eontalned In tbe MILITARY NOTES seedon of thfa pub-
Heatlon. lulftl are printed ..a '8"leeto the readen. No ofBda' endonement of tbe viewl!!, opinions,
or tactaal statements iB intended.-The Editor.
Military Revl.w 98
r
MILITARY NOTES
I

HighSpeed AirDrop System
1- The US Army Combat Develop- high-altitude, low-opening (HALO)
f ments Command has proposed the de- parachuting techniques. This would be
~ velopment of a high-speed aircraft done at heights up to 14,000 feet and
. personnel air-drop system that would speeds as high as 1,000 knots.
~ operate at both low and high altitudes. Purpose of the proposed system is
! It would permit air dropping of bat- to permit airborne tactical maneuver
talion-size and smaller tactical units elements to be employed as a high-
at altitudes as low as 500 feet and at speed, quick-reaction force for mis-
air-drop speeds of 350 to 500 knots sions independent of local weather or
under all weather conditions. visibility. The added capability will
The proposal also includes a man- also provide a high-altitude, high-
ually or automatically steerable per- speed, deep-penetration potential for
sonnel deployment system to provide limited numbers of mission-oriented,
for self-guided and safe air dropping specialized teama or forces.-US
of men and equipment employing Army release.
Brazil Joins Caribbean Exercise
BodRa Bdlcopter News
CH-16 Sea Knights launch from a carrier during Exercise Veritas II
United States and Brazilian Marines joined forces in a combined training
exercise recently on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico.
Conducting the assault landing phase of the combined United States-Bra-
zilian naval exercise tabbed Veritas II, a battalion of United States and a com-
pany of Brazilian Marines stormed the island in landing boats and helicopters.
During a week-long training program prior to the assault, the US troops
instructed the Brazilians in day-and-night helicopter operations and other small-
unit tactics. The landings included a two-day field problem for the alIied force
in clearing and securing the area.-Boeing Helicopter News.
September 1969 99
MILITARY NOTIS
Navy rests New Cun
The Navy is conducting final evalua-
tion of the first completely new major
shipboard gun system produced in 18
years.
The compact new five-inch 54 caliber
rapid-fire weapon weighs only one-
third as much as the current five-inch
gun and needs a guncrew of only six
men instead of the 16 now required.
A unique feature is that the guncrew
need The
A....... ' ......r...maI
Navy's newest lightweight gun, desig-
nated the Mark 16, installed on an
ordnance testing ship
weapon is loaded, controlled, and fired
from remote positions below deck. To
facilitate servicing and isolating trou-
ble spots promptly, a lighted, remote-
control panel provides a continuous
display of the status of the gun's
various components.
The gun system has been designed
to accommodate all existing types of
five-inch 54 caliber ammunition, as
well as the long-range, rocket-assisted
projectiles the Navy has just devel-
oped. Delivery to ships of the fleet
wi\l begin next year or early in 1971.
-:ArmedForce8Management, 1969.
MOL PrOlram Canceled
The Department of Defense has an-
nounced that the Manned Orbiting
Laboratory (MOL) Program has been
canceled and that the cancellation will
save about 1.5 billion dollars in Fiscal
Years 1970-74.
The primary objectives of the MOL
Program were to advance the develop-
ment of both manned and unmanned
defense-oriented space equipment, and
to ascertain the full extent of man's
utility in space for defense purposes.
The primary factors given in the
decision to cancel the MOL Program
included:
The continuing urgency of reduc-
ing Federal defense spending.
Advances in automated tech-
niques for unmanned satellite systems.
According to the Department of De-
fense, 1.8 billion dollars had been ex-
pended on the program prior to can-
CellatiOn.-DOD release.
(
Close AiroSupport GUidance)
A new system, known as T ASCS
(for Tactical Air-Support Control
System), is being developed under an
Air Force contract. The system is
designed to provide pilots of tactical
aircraft with navigation, guidance,
and weapon-release information for
such missions as close air support,
blind bombing of selected targets
obscured from the pilot's vision, de-
livery of troops and material to des-
ignated landing or drop zones, and
air reconnaissance.
MIlItaJy Rn'l. 100
MILITARY NOTES
TASCS consists of a lightweight,
manportable ground station and an-
tenna system, and electronic equip-
ment designed for installation in ex-
isting tactical aircraft.
A forward air ~ o n t r o l l r using the
system could guide simultaneously a
number of j;actical aircraft to any
selected target. The forward air con-
troller inserts the range, bearing, and
height of a selected target area into
the manpack ground station-although
the target may be locsted as much
as 20 miles from the ''homing'' an-
tenna. The "ofl'set" target capability
is one of the advantages that TASCS
has over beacon devices.-News re-
lease.
Amphibious Ship
Artist's concept of new amphlbions warfare ship
The Navy has awarded the first increment of a billion-dollar contract for
a new type multipurpose amphibious warfare ship (LHA).
According to the Navy, the LHA is faster and more versatile than any
modem amphibious warfare ships now in service. It will perform a mission
which currently requires four difl'erent types of vessels, including the am-
phibious assault ship, the amphibious transport dock, the amphibious cargo
ship, and the dock landing ship.
The contract calls for delivery of nine such ships to commence in the spring
of 1973 and continue into 1975.
The new LHA will be as large as an Essere class aircraft carrier and will
incorporate several new safety features to protect the crew and embarked
Marines.
It has a modern steam propulsion plant with full automation, as well as
built-in logic circuitry to handle engineering casualties automatically.-DOD
release.
51ptn1ber 1969
101
MILITARY NOTES
River Assault Flotilla
All Rando.
Improved armored troop carrier
US A"".
Riverine field artinery barge
Military RlYle.
Monitor lIal1 a l05-nlillimeter
l
Several improved US Navy boats
are now operating with the Navy com-
ponent of the Army-Navy mobile
riverine force in the Mekong Delta.
A modernized SO-foot Monitor gun-
boat is the most heavily armed craft
of its size in the Navy. It carries a
105-millimeter howitzer in a tank-type
turret l!8ther than the 4O-miIlimeter
can lion found on the previoUS model.
In addition, it has 20-millimeter can-
non, 40-millimeter automatic grenade-
launching equipment, and several 7.S2-
millimeter machineguns.
Another improved model is the up-
dated command and control boat for
Army and Navy field commanders. It
cOlltains a larger and more e1Iicient
communications center with air-con-
ditioning to protect the electronic
equipment from the delta heat and
humidity.
AU Rando
New command and control boat
It is armed with 20-miIlimeter can-
non, 40-miIlimeter grenade-launching
equipment, and assorted machineguns.
The newest version of the armored
troop carrier also has arrived in Viet-
nam. It is armed with 20-millimeter
cannon, caliber .50 machineguns, 40-
millimeter grenade launchers, 7.S2-
millimeter machineguns, and shot-
guns. It has a slightly larger heli-
copter landing pad than previous
models.
All of the improved boats are pro-
tected by bar trigger armor, a grat-
ing .of thin steel rods which detonate
rocket and recoilless rifle rounds pre-
maturely, spending much of their
force before they strike the boats'
heavy armorplate.
Local initiative has also provided
floating firing platforms to maintain
artillery support for the riverine
102
MILITARY NOTES
force. Barges fabricated in Vietnam Housing for the crews is amidships on
from pontons have proved stable for the barge, and storage sheds on each
accurate fires from the light 105-milli- end hold up to 1,500 rounds of ammu-
meter MI0S howitzer. nition. The barges are towed by Army
Each barge has firing positions for LeM-S's which also carry additional
two howitzers alid has armor siding. ammunition.-News item.
Amphibious Assault Fuel System
The Marine Corps has awarded production contracts for a new Amphibious
Assault Fuel System. The system consists of 36 collapsible rubber-coated nylon
tanks and five and one-half miles of hose in addition to connectors, meters,
manifolds, separators, and pumps.
In an assault, the Marines will begin assembling the system on a beach
as soon as it is secured. Two of the 20,OOO-gallon tanks, together with a pump
and other portable equipment, will be set up close to shore in shallow trenches
for protection against shrapnel and small arms fire. Fuel will then be piped in or
transported in amphibious vehicles from a tanker offshore.
LUtott Ind1&Ittiu New. Btir8G1l
Diagram shows layout of a complete Amphibious Assault Fuel System developed for
the Marines
As ground further inland is secured, hose will be laid from the beach
tanks, through booster tanks, a total of five, to small tank farms using the same
collapsible tanks. Depending on the tactical situation and terrain factors, an en-
tire system able to store 600,000 gallons of fuel can be functioning within 72
hours of the initial assault landing.-News release.
September 1989 103
MILITARY NOTES
SWEDEN
Ships Get Missile Systems
Two Swedish destroyers, the Hal-
!and and Smaland, have been equipped
with the RB"(}8 missile system. RB is
short for robot, which is the Swedish
name for a ship-to-ship guided missile.
When the two ships were built in
the mid-1950's, room was provided for
future installation of a guided-missile
system. As early as 1955, a missile
Swedish destroyer Smaltmd with RB-DB
missile system
called 815 was tested, but this weapon
did not meet all the requirements. In
1959, development of the RB-08 mis-
sile started. Although performance
details are not available, the missile
is based on the French CT-BO, a cruise
missile with a speed of 500 knots and
an effective range of 135 nautical
miles.-US Naval Institute Proceed,..
ingB, 1969.
UNITED ARAB REPUBUC
Soviets Train Pilots
Some 200 Egyptians have recently
completed military flight training in
the Soviet Union and returned to
the United Arab Republic.-Armed
Forces Management, 1969.
ARGENTINA
French Howitzers Purchased
The French Government has ap-
proved the sale of 24 self-propelled,
155-millimeter howitzers to Argen-
tina. The sales price was not disclosed.
Delivery will be made later this year .
-Armed Forces Management, 1969.
REPUBUC OF KOREA
To Receive Modern Arms
The Republic of Korea is to receive
jet fighters, modern automatic wesp-
ons, and high-speed patrol boats from
the United States.
The long-term aid program, which
includes delivery of an lS-plane squad-
ron of F-.t. fighters which began in
August, is expected to cost about 150
million dollars per year. Also high on
the priority list are MID rifles to re-
place the Ml.t. and Ml rifles now being
used.
High-speed patrol boats are needed
by the Republic of Korea Navy to
challenge North Korean infiltrators at
sea. More coastal radar is also needed
to detect North' Korean vessels.-
Armed Forces Journal.
COMMUNIST CHINA
'Alouette Ill's' Purchased
Communist China has purchased 15
Alouette III helicopters from France.
Whether the aircraft were to be the
civil or military version was not dis-
closed. In its military role, the
Alouette III can be used either to
~ - ~ ~ . -,..-""r . . ~ - ~ ~ -
_ / F___.....--=. --:'x
, "
~ . ,-,.. ~ "i
Ja:ns'. AU the WOt'ld'. Ait'Cf'Gft
An Alouette III of the Swiss Air Foree
transport six fully equipped troops or
as an assault helicopter. A wide range
of armaments can be fitted: wire-
guided missiles, a quick-firing 20-
millimeter cannon, machineguns, or
rockets.
If used with the armed forces, Red
China will be the 30th nation to place
military orders for the Alouette Ill.
-Flugwehr uncL-Technik, 1969.
Militaly Revi
104
I


"
lReduction of
r. The Canadian Ministry of Defense
has announced that Canada will reduce
its armed forces from 98,000 to be-
"t tween 80,000 and 85,000 men during
the next three years. The announce-
ment reflects the latest step in Can-
ada's review of its defense policies.
Earlier, the government announced
that is would reduce the size of its
forces in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (MR, Aug 1969, p 104).
Along with reductions in the reg-
ular force, the government plans to
reduce Canadian reserve forces, but
will continue to support the cadet
training program, currently involving
100,000 men.
The reduction is designed to main-
tain Canada's defense budget at its
current level of one billion dollars for
the next three years.-News item.
MILITARY NOTES
ITALY
Nuclear Vessel
Italy is building its first nuclesr-
powered ship. Named the Enrico
Fermi, it will be the world's fifth nu-
clear-powered, merchant-type ship. It
is being designed and built under the
supervision of the Italian Navy. With
a displacement of 18,000 tons, the ship
will have a designed service speed of
21 knots and a cruising range of
300,000 miles.
The vessel has marked potentialities
as a logistic support ship and fast
,fleet-replenishment tanker, and is be-
ing made adaptable for military pur-
poses. A hangar is being built on the
stern for helicopters, of which the
ship will be able to carry eight, and a
large workshop is being constructed
for the maintenance and repair of sub-
marines. Itwas originally scheduled
to enter service in 1970-71.-Navy.
YUGOSLAVIA
AirDefense Weapon
Sol44t vnd TecAnik
M5S air defense weapon
The Yugoslavian Army is being equipped with three-barreled, air defense
weapons designated the M55. Designed primarily to defend against low-fln,ng
aircraft, the 20-millimeter cannon is, nevertheless, reported to be effective to an
altitude of 5,000 feet.-Soldat und Tecknik, 1969.
Septembel 1968 105
MIUTARY NOTES
CZECHOSlOVAKIA
Soviets Use Airbl$8S
The Czech Air Force has recently
provided seven of its airbases for use
by the Soviet Union. The Soviets have
stationed MiG-$l and Yak-$8 inter-
ceptors and Su-7 fighter bombers at
the bases. The bases are also being
used as a terminal for air operations
to and from the Balkan and Mediter-
ranean areas.-Flugwehr um1-Tech-
nik. 1969.'
l
GREAT BRITAIK
Anglo-French Helicopters
Progress is being made by Britain
and France in the joint production of
helicopters. Under an agreement be-
tween the two countries in 1967, three
ve required by the two nations' militsry
. forees.
l
ielicopters for military use are being
developed. The helicopters are the
British design WG-18 and two French
designs-the SA 880 and the SA 8J,1.
The SA 81.1 is to be used as a light
observation helicopter of the standard
light observation helicopter type and
is destined for the British and French
Armies. A prototype of the SA 81.1
has been produced, and the test pro-
gram is moving ahead rapidly and
satisfactorily. An advanced, general
-purpose, five-seat helicopter, it has a
turboshaft engine and highly stream-
lined body that give it an unusually
high-speed performance. A novel fea-
108
ture of the SA 81.1 is its shrouded
antitorque tail rotor, so designed to
l'educe the damage possibility while
flying a few feet off the ground or
An armed reconnaissance version of the
WG-13 will have advanced weapon sight-
ing and delivery systems
during excessively flared-tail-down
landings.
The WG-18 is being developed for
the British Army, Royal Navy, French
Army, and French Navy. It is a multi-
purpose machine adaptable to various
roles ranging from combat helicopter
The SA "", designed as a medium-lift
transport, is being mass produced
to medium transport. It has yet to
make its maiden flight.
The SA 880, a medium helicopter of
modern design, is being mass produced
in Britain and France.-Air Force
and Space Digest, 1969.
MllitarJ Review
CHILE
Dental Vans for Remote Areas
In response to a Chilean Govern-
ment request, the US Army has helped
design and procure four new dentsl
vans for assistsnce in providing mod-
ern dentsl service for Chilean Army
units in remote' places, frequently
where only pack animals venture.
Each van is a complete dentsl fa-
cility, including an X-ray unit and a
US A,...
Chilean dental van
darkroom. Air conditioning and heat-
ing provide comfort. While self-sus-
tsining, with their own power system
and water supply, the vans may also be
served by locally available electricity
and water sources.-News item.
JAPAN
Two New Destroyers
Japan's largest modern antisub-
marine destroyer, Mochizuki, has been
delivered to the Japanese Maritime
Self-Defense Force. The Mochi:zuki
was built by a Japanese shipyard at a
cost.of 18.5 million dollars. The 8,100-
ton ship is propelled by a 60,OOO-horse-
power engine and has a cruising speed
of about 32 knots. The vessel is
equipped with a variety of sophisti-
cated weapons.
MIUTARY NOTES
Also recently launched at a Japa-
nese shipyard was the Nagatauki, a
new 3,050-ton destroyer. It is the first
of four 3,OOO-ton class destroyers to
be built under the second defense
buildup program. Its crew complement
will be 270 men, and it will be able to
cruise at 32 knots. The totsl cost of
construction, including equipment, is
estimated at 14 million dollars.-
Armed Forces Management, 1969.
FRANCE
Navy to Modernize
Two classes of ships are under con-
sideration by the French Navy to up-
date or replace its escort vessels. The
"frigate" is a 5,OOO-ton ship capable
of speeds up to 30 knots and equipped
with elaborate radar and sonar detec-
tion systems. It will be able to destroy
submarines with three 100-millimeter
automatic cannon and Mala/on mis-
sile homing torpedoes launched either
from aboardship or from helicopters.
Three frigates are under construction
and are due to replace present French
escorts in 1980.
The second ship of an unidentified
class weighs 1,000 tons. Powered by
diesel engines, it will reach speeds up
to 25 knots. Equipped with inexpen-
sive radar and sonar, it is also armed
with torpedoes, antisubmarine mis-
siles, and 100-millimeter automatic
cannon.
The primary function of this ship
will be to monitor shallow depths as
part of a force to protect the conti-
nentsl shelf and coastline. Capable of
transporting a small commando group,
it will also be incorporated into the
French Navy's overseas forces. Since
the ship is considered relatively inex-
pensive, a considerable number of the
craft may be incorporated into the
navy's five-year pIan.-Armed Forces
Management, 1969.
107
1
MILIIARyl
..1111111111111111111111111111........111 4



AMBUSH: The Battle of Dau Tieng, Also
Called The Battle of Dong Minh Chau, War
Zone C, Operation Atteboro, and Other Dead
falls in South Vietnam. By Brigadier General
S. L. A. US Army Reserve, Retired.
242 Pages. Cowles Education Corp., Inc.,
N.Y., 1969. $5.95.
By COL JOHN E. OLSON, USA,
Retired
In his inimitable style, the author
describes in detail the battle of Dau
Tieng, one of the first big battles of
theVietnamwar. Thebook, likeall of
S. L. A. Marshall's works, is more
than entertainingreading, for itana-
lyzes the commonplace, but usually
enigmatic,events ofthebattlefield.
As Marshall says of this engage-
ment, it "must be termed the blood-
iest, the most confused or tbe out-
lastingest." The bloodiness is readily
apparent as there is hardlya pageof
tbe book thatdoes not carry a refer-
encetoatleastonecasualty.Thecon-
fusion was so universal thatMarshall
confesses an inability to sort it out
eveninretrospect.It was"outlasting"
inthatitmushroomed from a routine
engagement into a maze of basically
uncoordinated operations.
Inaddition to tbe comprehensive
treatment of tbe battle, Marsball bas
included accounts of several other
typical engagements. These serve to
broaden the reader's appreciation of
thedifficulties ofcombat under condi-
.tions that exist in Vietnam.
.:rhisbookwillprovideseveralbours
of enjoyment while enhancing the
reader's military.education.
PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA, 1947-
19&8. By G. W. Choudhury, 341 Pages.
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., N. Y., 1968. $7,50.
ByLTC PAUL S. WILLIAMS, JR., USA
This full-scale study of Pakistan's
unsatisfactory relationships with In-
diaspotlightsoneofAsia'sugliestun-
solved problems. The author, in tbis
fifth book on Pakistan, identifies and
examines the many disputes tbat
plagued both nations after partition.
The most important dispute con-
tinues to be the control of Kashmir.
Pakistan is determined never to ac-
cept the current state of affairs in
which Kashmir, with Moslems com-
prising 80 percent ofthe population,
is governed byHindus in Delhi. This
dispute led to a limited war in 1948,
and in 1965 to"the biggesttankwar
sincethesecond World War."
Pakistan'sforeignpolicy hasmoved
ina two-decadeperiodfrom defensive
alliances withtheWestto recent rap-
prochement with China. Contributing
factors cited by Choudbury include
JohnF.Kennedy'sattempttoturnIn-
dia into a "showplace," and massive
US military aid to India.
Implicit througbout tbis study is
the need for renewed effort by polit-
ical leaders and intellectuals of both
Pakistan and India to overcome, in
the mutual interest of peace and de-
velopment, the many disputes of the
pasttwo decades. Ofparticular inter-
estto themilitary reader arethe au-
thor's descriptions ofthemilitary al-
liances, andthe1965 armedconllict.
Military Raview
108
.CONQUERORS OF THE AIR: THE EVOLUTION
OF AIRCRAFT, 1903-1945. Telt by Heiner
.' md.. Illustrated by Carlo Demand. 201
]'aps. lbe VIking Press, Inc., N. Y., 1968.
$30.00.
ByLTC FRANCIS A. IANNI, USA
This book highlights the develop-
mentoftheairplanewithaccounts of
. theheroeswho flew them and the ge-
: nius of the inventors who created
them. The historical narrative serves
as background for the many hand-
some,accurateillustrationsofthe"fly-
ing machines," most of which are in
full color on 10 x 12 pages.
Pictured are such planes as the
flimsy Wright Flyer and Bellanca's
rugged Columbia; Santos-Dumont's
butterfly-like DemoiseUe; the planes
of the Russians, Sikorsky and Tu-
polev; those oftheGermans, Dornier,
Heinkel,and Messerschmitt; thecraft
ofde Havilland and Handley Page of
Britsin; and Fokker of the Nether-
lands; as well as the planes of other
pioneers.
Man'srapid,dramatic,andfascinat-
ing progress in aviation is recorded
in an unforgettsble manner in this
book. It isdefinitelya collector's item.
PLAINS INDIAN RAIDERS: lbe Final Phases
of Warfare from the Arkansas to the Red
River. With Original Photographs by William
S. Soule. By Wilbur Sturtevant Nye. 418
Pages. University of Oklahoma Press. Nor-
man, Okla., 1968. $9.50.
By IVAN J. BmRER
The volume is really two books in
one: a thoroughly documented, de-
tailed, and interesting history of the
subjugation of the Plains Indians in
Kansas and Oklahoma in the period
1864-75; and a collection of photo-
graphsofthePlains Indiansmade by
the photographer Soule.
September 1969
t MILITARY BOOKS
,--
The history tells the story of that
portionoftheIndianWarwithstrik-
ing clarity. The dangers, hardships,
and courage by Indians, the Army,
and the few settlers are described in
convincing manner. Interest in the
volumeisheightenedbytheprominent
roleoffamousleaderssuchasWilliam
T. Sherman, Philip H. Sheridan,
George A. Custer, and Chief Roman
Nose. Army life on the early prairie
forts-Larned, Harker, WalIace, and
Hays-is depicted in its stark primi-
tiveness.
Complementingthetextarethemore
than 1'90 full-page photographs show-
ing exactly how the Indians looked,
what they wore, and how they lived.
ZAPATA AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION.
By John Womack, Jr. 452 Pages. Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., N. Y., 1968. $10.00.
This is an excellent description of
the conditions responsible for the
Mexicanrevolutionof1910andaclose
study of the heroes and villains of
that revolution.
Emiliano Zapata never gained con-
trol of the national government. He
remained a regional chief until his
assassination in 1919. But his nine-
year guerrilla campaign eventually
helped force the central government
tofulfill the promises ofthe Mexican
Constitution to the peasants and vil-
lagers of Mexico. Zapata's program
ofagrarianreformlargelybecamelaw
following his death and forms theba-
sisforMexico'sagrarianpolicytoday.
This well-written and well-docu-
mented account of Zapata dispells
some ofthemyths which have grown
up around him. The military reader
will find the account of the Mexican
villager as an insurgent particularly
interesting.
109
MILITARY BOOKS
P.O.W.8)'Douglas Collins.310 Pag8s.W. W.
Norton "Co..Inc., N. Y., 1968. $5.95.
By LTC BENJAMIN G. SPIVEY, USA
This is a personal chronicle offour
years spent asa prisonerofwar dur-
ingwhich the authormanaged 10 es-
capes from captivity.
ThestoryhasitsbeginningatDun-
kirkin1940whentheauthor, a mem-
ber of Great Britain's 2d Glosters,
was captured. Ittells of prisoner-of-
war camps !rom France to Germany
toHungarytoRomaniawhen, in1944,
the US Air Force evacuated the pris-
oners of war from Bucharest.
All of the escapes were carefully
planned and executed. The persever-
ance, endurance, and attention to de-
tailswere,nodoubt,thefactorswhich
carriedtheauthorthroughhis ordeal,
although he indicates that it was
hatredandthedesire toreturntothe
warthatsustainedhim.
This is an exciting book which has
humorous, as well asserious, content.
GRANT TAKES COMMAND. By Bruce Catton.
With Maps by Samuel H. Bryant. 556 Pages.
Uttl8, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1969.
$10.00.
By COL DONALD J. DELANEY, USA
ThisthirdvolumeofBruceCatton's
comprehensive biography of Ulysses
S. Grant takes the story ofthe Civil
War general from the lull following
his capture ofVicksburg in thesum-
merof1868,throughfinal victoryand
theassassinationofAbrahamLincoln
in the spring of 1866. Grant is re-
vealed as a general of great strength
and a man of deep sensibility. Far
from being merely a simple soldier,
innocent of political intrigue, Grant
shows that he thoroughly understood
the politics of the War Department
and how to circumvent it. .
Grant's success in dealing withp0-
litical generals such as Benjamin F.
ButlerandJohnA. McClernand,while
still retaining his own position and
thesupportofLincoln, was as impor-
tanttothesuccessofthewarasmany
ofhis strategic decisions. His ability
to size up a critical situation and to
drawfromhissubordinatestheappro-
priaterecommendationforitssuccess-
ful solution-a solution which he
would have ordered in any case had
itnotbeen forthcoming-marked him
as a greatgeneral.
The often-told story of Grant's
meeting with Robert E. Lee at Ap-
pomattox and his understanding and
compassionhaveneverbeenbetterre-
lated.
MANY ROADS TO MOSCOW: Three Historic
Invasions. By Leonard Cooper. 240 Pa.es.
CowardMcCann, Inc., N. Y., 1968. $5.95.
By LTC JACK G. CALLAWAY, USA
Russiahasbeeninvadedthreetimes
since the beginning of the 18th cen-
tury: by Sweden's Charles XII in
1708,NapoleonBonapartein1812,and
by Adolf Hitler's Wehrmacht in July
1941.
All three of these men were con-
querorswithalongstringofvictories
totheircredit.Eachleaderwasacutely
aware of the wretched state of the
Russian Army at the time. Napoleon
and Hitler knew ofthe mistakes and
tragedy of their predecessors' efforts
tobring Russiatoher knees, and yet
each was doomed to an identical fate
for almost identical reasons. Initially,
each invasion rode a rising tide of
incredible successes only to end ulti-
mately indisaster.
Thisisnota definitivework, butit
isengrossingreadingbecauseitiden-
tifies the principal problems encoun-
teredbyeachinvader.
Milltaly Review
110
':.,.LO.CKHEED P.3S LIGHTNING: A Pictorial
,I'IstoIJ. AnthOll, Shennall. 30 Pages. His
torlan Publishers,Sydney, Aus., 1968.$2.95.
I
,: By LTC IRWIN M. JACOBS, USA

f
This compilation of photographs
traces the historyofone ofthemost
, famousfighteraircraftofWorld War
j II. The narrative highlights some of
the operational aspects of the air-
craft'slifespan. Thebook is tailored
I forthemodelplaneenthusiastandair-
craftbuff, and is ofonly passing in-
teresttothegeneralreader.
EAST WIND, RAIN: The Intimate Account of
! an Intelligence Ofticer In the Pacific, 1939-
49. By BrfIadler General Elliot R. Tharpe,
US Army, Retirad. 307 Paps. Gambit Inc.,
Boston, Mass., 19&9. $6.95.
ByCOLJOHNE.OLSON, USA,Retired
From 1938, when he became sn
instructorwiththeHawaiianNational
Guard on the island of Maui, until
1949, when he completed his tour as
Army attache to Thailand, General
Thorpe was an astute and intimate
observer of political and military
events that occurred throughout the
Pacific.
The months immediately preceding
and follOWing Pearl Harbor found
him in the Dutch East Indies where
his excellent rapport with the Dutch
resulted in his being given copies of
intercepted Japanese radio messages
that foretold their plans to strike
throughout the area, including Pearl
Harbor. The signal for execution,
"EastWind, Rain," provides the title
for this interesting book.
Escaping from Java just ahead of
theJapanese, Thorpe became chief of
General Douglas MacArthur's coun-
terintelligencecorps. Inthis capacity,
hemovedwiththeheadquartersnorth-
wardthroughthePhilippinestoJapan
where he remained until 1946.
MIUTARY BOOKS
In,his official capacity, he encoun-
tered most of the leading military
andpoliticalpersonalitiesoftheAllies
and Japan, including the local quis-
lings and the war criminals. He re-
counts many heretofore unpublished
actionsandconversationsofsuchwell-
known figures asGeneral MacArthur,
Emperor Hirohito, General Hideki
Tojo, Presidents Sergio Osmena and
Jose Laurel of the'Philippines, and
FieldMarshalPibulsonggramofThai-
land.
The student of the war in the Pa-
cific and theoccupation ofJapanwill
find thisbookinformativeandprovoc-
ative.
REPORT ON THE ASIANS. By William L
White. 289 Pages. Reynal & Co., Inc., N. Y.,
1969. $5.95.
By LTC VLADIMIR A. POSPISIL, USA
William L. White, who for more
than 20 years has been publisherand
editorofthefamousEmporiaGazette,
spent several months in Asia inter-
viewing people about their problems
andtheirthoughtsforthefuture.His
trip included stops in Paris, India,
Bangkok, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Tai-
wan, the Republic of Korea, and Ja-
pan. While visiting the Asian coun-
tries. he gave special attention tothe
effortstoincreasethefood supplyand
contain the population. Hesoughtout
experts on mainland China and dis-
cussed with these "China Watchers"
theimpactofWesternthinkingonthe
ancient patterns of conflict. Careful
attention was given to the "close eco-
nomic and political ties of non-Com-
munist countries ofAsia and the ef-
fect of Western technology."
The military reader will find this
work an informative contribution to
understanding of the turbulent con-
ditions in Asia.
111
1
MILITARY BOOKS
NEW BOOKS RECEIVEO
THE AJlA8.ISRAELI IMPASSE: Expressions of
Mo_lrate" _olnts an tile Arab-Israeli
CoItUct br Well. Known. Western. Writers.
Edited by Majdla D. Khaddurl. 223 Paps.
Robert B. Luce, Inc., Washlnatan, D. C.,
1988. $4.95.
MILITARIA. By Frederick Wilkinson. 256
PIps. Hawtilorn Books, Inc., N. Y., 1969.
$5.95.
EMPIRE AND REVOLUtiON: A Radical Inter
pr,laUo!! of Contemporary History. By David
Horowlti. 274 Pages. Random Hause, Inc.,
N. Y., 1989. $5.95.
PATTERNS OF TYRANNY. By Maurice Latey.
331 Pages. Atheneum Publishers, N. Y.,
1969. $7.95.
REVOLUtiONARY NOTES. By Julius Lester.
209 hies. Richard W. Baron, N. Y., 1969.
$5.95.
HUSSEIN OF JORDAN: My "War" with Israel.
As Told to and With Additional Material
by V1tk Vance and Pierre Lauer. 170 Pages.
William Morrow & Co., Inc., N. Y., 1969.
$5.95.
RED ARMOR IN COMBAT. By Martin J. Mil-
ler, Jr. Illustrations by Sydney P. Chivers.
80 Pages. Grenadier Books, Canoga Park,
Card., 1969. $4.95.
THE COMMODORES. By Leonard F. Guttridge
and Jay D. Smith. 4DD Pages. Harper & Row,
Inc., N. Y., 1969. $7.95.
THE SECOND DDAY. By Jacques Robichon.
Translated From the French by Barbara
Shuey for Army Times Publishing Co. 314
Pages. Walker & Co., N. Y., 1969. $6.95.
THE GERMAN NAVY IN WORLD WAR II. By
Edward P. Von der Parten. 274 Pages.
Thomas Y. Crowell Co., N. Y., 1969, $7.95.
HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR: From the ..
Korean War to the Present By Andre Fan .
taine. Translated From the French by Rey,
naud Bruce. 523 Pages. Pantheon Books, '1!
Inc., N. Y., 1969. $10.00.
THE BOMB AND THE COMPUTER: Wargam i
Ing From Ancient Chinese Mapboard to !
Atomic Computer. By Andrew Wilson. 218m
Paps. Delacorte Press, N. Y., 1968. $5.95.
'-
AN INTRODUCTION TO SOVIET FOREIGN)
POLICY. By Richard F. Rosser. 391 Pages.
PrenticeHall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J.,
1969. $8.50 clothbound. $4.95 paperbound.
ISSUES IN THE fUTURE OF ASIA: Com
munlst and Non-l:o_unist Alternatives.
Edited by Richard Lowenthal. 177 Pages.
Frederick A. Praeger, N. Y., 1969. $6.00.
BETWEEN THE BULLET AND THE LIE: Ameri
can Volunteers In the Spanish Civil War.
By Cecil Eby. 342 Pages. Halt, Rinehart &
Winston, Inc., 1969. $7.95.
THE GENERAL! By Pierre Galante. 242 Pages.
Random House, Inc., N. Y., 1969. $5.95.' .
HOW TO CONTROL THE MILITARY. By John
Kenneth Galbraith. 69 Pages. Doubleday &
Ca., Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1969. $3.95.
ALL THE NEWS THAT FITS: ACritical Analy
sis of the News and Editorial Contents of
The New York Times. By Herman H. Dins
mare. 376 Pages. Arlington House, New
Rochelle, N. Y., 1969. $7.00.
FORT SMITH: Little Gibraltar an the Arkan
sas. By Ed Bearss and Arrell M. Gibson.
349 Pages. University of Oklahoma Press,
Norman, Okla., 1969. $6.95.
ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES: The Six Day War.
EdHor, Israel Ministry of Defense. 239 Pages.
ChiHon Ca., Philadelphia, Pa., 1968. $22.50.
Military Review
112