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Survival: Global Politics and Strategy

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Colombia: Ending the Forever War?

Kyle Johnson & Michael Jonsson Version of record first published: 31 Jan 2013.

To cite this article: Kyle Johnson & Michael Jonsson (2013): Colombia: Ending the Forever War?, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 55:1, 67-86 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.767407

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Colombia: Ending the Forever War?

Kyle Johnson and Michael Jonsson

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Is the worlds longest active civil war finally coming to an end? In November 2012 the Colombian government and the left-wing guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) began full-fledged peace negotiations in Havana, Cuba. But the mood in Bogot is ambivalent, with a yearning for peace tempered by a deep-seated distrust of FARC and its negotiating tactics. Developments over the past decade have brought Colombia to a point where the prospects for peace are better than at any previous time during its 48 years of conflict. Since 2002, FARC has been steadily weakened; it has lost five members of its seven-person Secretariat, a majority of its foot soldiers and a substantial proportion of its vital, experienced mid-level commanders. The group may now have decided that it is time to seek a dignified exit rather than face a seemingly inevitable decline and further deaths on the battlefield. And the international dynamics of the conflict are shifting as well. Venezuelas President Hugo Chvez seems to finally have tired of playing informal host to the group, potentially depriving FARC of a crucial safe haven and its senior commanders of the possibility of keeping out of harms way. Meanwhile, political pressure on Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa has led to greater action against FARC in that country. And if the current peace negotiations falter, it seems likely that Colombias President
Kyle Johnson is an investigator at the Corporacin Nuevo Arco Iris think tank in Bogot, Colombia, with an MA in political science from the Universidad de los Andes. Michael Jonsson is a Lecturer at the Department of Government, Uppsala University and the editor of The Political Economy of Conflict in Eurasia: Organized Crime and Armed Conflict in the Post-Communist World (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).
Survival | vol. 55 no. 1 | FebruaryMarch 2013 | pp. 6786DOI 10.1080/00396338.2013.767407

68 | Kyle Johnson and Michael Jonsson

Juan Manuel Santos would be replaced in the 2014 elections by a far-right candidate, who would not be inclined to negotiate further. This may thus be FARCs best chance to seek a negotiated exit, and any concessions the group is able to obtain should be considered a bonus, given how weak it has become. But the Colombian civil war is the quintessential intractable conflict, making the coming negotiations profoundly challenging.1 Structurally, Colombias illegal markets, large inaccessible territory, vast inequality and
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weak state institutions in peripheral regions make any outright military victory against FARC highly improbable. This is also the fourth attempt at peace negotiations during the conflict and FARC has used previous episodes to buy time and gain publicity. No one has forgotten the last round of talks in Cagun in 19992002, when FARC used a demilitarised zone it was granted as a base to plan attacks against the Colombian military in other regions, increase coca cultivation and recruit extensively, fully believing that with more fighters they could take over the country. But even if FARC is negotiating in earnest this time, several challenges to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement remain. Firstly, mutual distrust between the negotiating parties is strong and deeply seated. Secondly, FARC seems to be trying to expand the issues under consideration beyond those agreed upon in preliminary discussions. Thirdly, while FARC has announced a one-sided ceasefire, the government has continued military operations, creating a risk that military confrontations will impede progress at the negotiating table. Finally, even if these issues are overcome, there are significant barriers to agreement and successful implementation over each of the five points under negotiation, illustrating in part why this conflict has lasted for almost five decades.

A legacy of ashes While most analysts consider FARC to have been founded in 1964, the guerrillas themselves trace their roots back to a liberal self-defence militia created during the 19481958 civil war known as La Violencia. The militia was founded by the 21-year-old Pedro Marn, better known under his aliases Manuel Marulanda or Tirofijo (Sureshot). After La Violencia ebbed, the

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group did not demobilise but lived on, controlling what they called independent republics in and around Marquetalia, in the department of Tolima. In 1964, a large contingent of government troops attempted to re-establish government control, but Marulanda and a group of 48 fighters managed to survive the onslaught and escape into the mountains. In 1966, they changed their name from the Southern Block to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and shifted their goals from agrarian reform to complete overthrow of the government. These roots created a credo and organisational
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culture of military resilience inside the group, and a foundational myth used to instil a FARC identity in combatants even today. While FARC propagates a left-wing agenda, the group has first and foremost remained an armed rural organisation, which prides itself on its military skills and resilience, and nurtures a self-image of protecting the rural poor from the Colombian oligarchy.2 During the 1960s and 1970s, FARC was merely one amongst at least seven small- to medium-sized left-wing rebel groups in Colombia. But the group grew organically, spreading southeast from Tolima into Huila, Caquet, Magdalena Medio and Meta, which to this day remain some of the areas where the group finds its strongest support.3 The organisational structure of the group is modelled on regular armed forces, with a hierarchical, top-down command-and-control structure. The group is formally governed by a seven-member Secretariat, although Marulanda maintained extensive personal power until his death in 2008. Many of the day-to-day and tactical decisions are made by the Estado Mayor Central, which is composed of some 20 individuals, most of who are also commanders of FARC fronts. Below them, the group is divided into six regional blocks. Each of the blocks has somewhere between a handful and 2025 fronts (the basic operational unit, with anywhere from 50 to several hundred members in each).4 This bureaucratic organisation, which is reinforced by a strict disciplinary code known as the statutes, with harsh punishments and meticulous record-keeping on both the behaviour of combatants and the management of funds, was long the source of FARCs remarkable military capability and resilience. During

These roots created a credo of military resilience

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the past decade, however, this structure has been turned into a major weakness, since it is fairly easy to map out the command structure of the group. Combatants have also grown tired of the draconian discipline and records have been captured and used to collect extensive intelligence and criminal evidence against both combatants and civilian collaborators. In 1982, FARC celebrated its 7th National Conference, after which the group began to advance from the distant, rural areas of Colombia towards medium-sized cities and economic centres.5 The number of fronts was
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doubled by splitting the existing fronts in two and adding more combatants. Recognising that this strategy required extensive financing, FARC increased extortion and took the historic decision to become involved in the emerging drug trade in Colombia. This was initially through taxes and ensuring that coca farmers were paid fair prices, but over time FARC became involved in all steps of the trade, including selling cocaine to international traffickers.6 From interviews with defectors and intelligence analysts, it is clear that FARC has mainly used income generated from this trade to finance its military struggle and does not pay wages to members. Recent research has also pointed out that more than half of FARCs members attend ideological training on a weekly basis.7 Few analysts with a deep knowledge of Colombia argue that FARC commanders are motivated by money, since the life-style and risks involved do not reflect such an aim. This implies that if FARC demobilises, large-scale recidivism into organised crime is unlikely, although units or commanders that are particularly deeply involved in drug trafficking may choose such a path. Among previous defectors from FARC, recidivism into organised crime has been limited, especially compared with ex-combatants from the right-wing paramilitaries. From 1982 to 1999, the group grew from some 2,000 to an estimated 18,000 full-time members and 12,000 militia members.8 Income from the drug trade was supplemented by kidnapping, extortion or taxation in regions under their control, and possibly state sponsorship.9 As FARC became stronger militarily, it began to be viewed as a threat by the countrys traditional, local elites, as well as by organised crime groups vying for control of the drug trade. Drug traffickers and wealthy landowners started funding private militias or paramilitary self-defence groups that targeted FARC.10 Whereas

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the guerrillas had long carried out executions of civilians, these paramilitary groups (typically autonomous but allied with the state) turned dirty war tactics into their main modus operandi, killing thousands of members of the Unin Patritica, a political party with links to the guerrillas. The armed forces also escalated their war against FARC during this period, attacking the guerrillas negotiation headquarters in 1990 on the same day that Colombians voted for delegates to create a new constitution, signalling to the guerrillas that they were not welcome in the new Colombia.11
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Paramilitary groups, too, increased their attacks on the FARCs perceived civilian support base, carrying out massacres to drive out guerrilla supporters before establishing a new, oppressive social order. FARC responded in kind, leading to a degradation of the conflict with mounting civilian casualties during the 1990s. FARCs hierarchical structure and strict discipline proved adept, as its troops were successful in battle, both against demoralised government troops and irregular paramilitary forces. In the mid-1990s, FARC inflicted a series of stinging military defeats on the Colombian armed forces by overrunning military and police outposts and taking countless police and military hostage. In a poll conducted in 1999, a majority of the respondents believed that FARC would win the military conflict; in academic circles, there were extensive discussions regarding the possibility of state failure in Colombia.12 But while this period highlighted the guerrillas military strength, it simultaneously undermined prospects for transforming FARC into a political party. Peace negotiations between the FARC and the government of President Andrs Pastrana began in 1999 in a demilitarised zone in southern Colombia. These negotiations in Cagun were doomed from their inception, since neither FARC nor the government were honestly pursuing a negotiated settlement. FARC unilaterally froze the negotiations several times and brazenly used the demilitarised zone as a rear operating base where it expanded coca cultivation, recruited extensively, planned attacks in other regions of the country and conducted military training.13 A handful of FARC excombatants interviewed in 2012 had been recruited inside the demilitarised zone and others remarked that the perceived plausibility of a military victory motivated them to join FARC.14 The negotiations also turned into a

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spectacle, with an estimated 25,000 civil-society representatives attending some 1,000 workshops organised by the guerrillas. The government also sent mixed messages as they simultaneously negotiated with the United States on Plan Colombia, which provided them with almost one billion dollars in direct anti-narcotics support (and effectively counter-insurgency) support between 2000 and 2001.15 The negotiations fell apart, predictably, in 2002 and gave way to two years of intensive combat, during which FARC was largely routed from the regions immediately surrounding Colombias
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major cities. Given such painful experience, government negotiators today seem bent on avoiding the mistakes of the past by keeping the agenda narrow, rejecting suggestions of a ceasefire, excluding civil society, allowing only limited international participation and emphasising the importance of fast progress.16 In August 2002, lvaro Uribe was elected president on the basis of his iron-fist stance against the guerrillas. His Democratic Security policy looked to recover territory under control of illegal armed groups, mainly FARC, by military means; clear the roads of guerrilla roadblocks; cut narcotics production; and increase the size of the armed forces and their intelligence capabilities. A soldier from my town programme created a limited military role for locals and massive payments were offered for information regarding illegal actors. Over time, the Colombian police and army approximately doubled in size to some 450,000, and developed critical counter-insurgency skills, particularly special operations and intelligence analysis. In these areas, US technology and know-how were arguably more important than the total amount of money provided. Between 2002 and 2008, these policies forced the FARC off of the main roads and out of the centre of the country. In the north, the FARCs size and capability for armed action had already been severely reduced by paramilitary groups, and this was compounded by state forces. Between 2004 and 2007 FARC deaths in combat reached a high, averaging around 1,500 annually. A government defector/demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration programme invited fighters to demobilise and give information about armed groups, in exchange for education, job training, psychological help,

The negotiations fell apart

Colombia: Ending the Forever War? | 73

and effective legal impunity.17 The number taking advantage nearly tripled in just three years, with more than 3,000 FARC combatants demobilising in 2008 alone. Mid-level commanders who had spent their entire adult lives in FARC began to demobilise, reaching 452 in 2008 alone.18 The number of captured guerrillas spiked at 4,800 in 2003, then decreased as FARC was pushed out of urban areas and the option of demobilising directly after combat, rather than automatically being detained, became available.19 According to official statistics, by 2009 FARCs size had fallen from around 17,000 to
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about 8,500, and it was mainly present in its historical areas of influence.20 While Colombias counter-insurgency strategy was thus largely successful, it also contained a darker side. Pushed to show measurable results, some military units developed a body-count syndrome, leading them to execute captured FARC combatants, or to use proxies to kill civilians, later presenting them as FARC members killed in combat.21 While this false-positives scandal was exposed publicly only in 2008, the practice was widely known inside FARC and often dissuaded members from defecting. Improvements in military signals- and human-intelligence collection capabilities played an integral role in the states fight against FARC. The interception and decoding of radio and phone communications, used in combination with informants, guided air-strikes and special operations led to the deaths of Ral Reyes (the groups number two), Mono Jojoy (FARCs strongest military commander) and Alfonso Cano (supreme FARC commander in 2011), and to tricking the guerrillas into handing over 14 high-profile kidnap victims to the government. After six years of devastatingly successful military operations by the Colombian Army, FARC now seems to have developed effective countermeasures. These include drastically decreasing usage of electronic communications, relying more on snipers and landmines, moving away from populated areas, and recruiting new fighters using faster and more coercive methods than earlier. As a result, the number of FARC combatants that demobilise or die in combat has decreased.22 Meanwhile, the number of attacks and their lethality has increased, causing higher numbers of state casualties, suggesting that FARCs combatant force is at least not diminishing.23 In some parts of southern Colombia the guerrillas have sought improved relations with the

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civilian population to regain voluntary rather than forced support, with some success.24 FARC is rebounding; it has not recovered to its 2000 level but is stronger than five years ago, and just in time for peace talks. The Colombian conflict may thus have reached a mutually hurting stalemate, since FARC has been diminished and cannot realistically expect to return to its former size and military capability, while the Colombian government cannot expect to win the conflict through military means alone.25

Endgame? Following six months of exploratory talks, peace negotiations were formally announced in Havana on 26 August 2012, together with a framework agreement which focused on five points that were to be negotiated. The agenda covered the core elements of the Colombian conflict rural development, political participation, the end of the conflict, drug trafficking and victims but also emphasised that the negotiations should advance as quickly as possible. The parties met again in Oslo in October and the formal negotiations began in Havana in November. In the interim, however, FARC sought to expand the agenda, the format and the timeline of the negotiations, reducing initial optimism for a rapid, negotiated end to the conflict. The negotiations face three major hurdles: strong distrust between FARC and the government; incompatible expectations on the format, agenda and timeline for the negotiations; and vital difficulties in reaching agreement on even the five points that have formally been included in the negotiations. In selecting its negotiating team, FARC has overwhelmingly chosen political figures, including as spokesperson Ivn Marquez, a recognised if dogmatic ideologue inside the group.26 Unlike the Cagun negotiations,
commanders with a more military or drug-trafficking profile have largely been left on the sidelines, apparently signalling an intention to reach a political agreement.27 But FARC has also included Simon Trinidad amongst its negotiators. Viewed as an ideologue inside the group, Trinidad is currently incarcerated in the United States for drug-trafficking offences.28 Also included is Tanja Nijmeijer, a Dutch citizen who joined FARC in 2002. This is an odd move, since Nijmeiers diaries, found in 2007 in a FARC camp, revealed in detail how disillusioned she had become with injustices inside

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the group.29 These choices may be meant to show solidarity with imprisoned guerrillas and generate international support, but also hint at a limited understanding of how the group is perceived by the outside world, an impression reinforced by a FARC request in November for US President Barack Obama to pardon Trinidad so he could be at the negotiating table.30 Early statements by FARC negotiators also provide worrying signs that they may not be ready to make the painful concessions necessary to reach a settlement. For instance, Secretariat member Andres Paris flatly denied
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FARC involvement in drug trafficking, a claim which is entirely untenable.31 Likewise, a 35-minute speech by Ivan Marquez in Oslo emphasised the victimisation of FARC supporters while refusing to acknowledge the numerous human-rights abuses committed by the rebel group.
32

This reflects FARCs self-perceived history of victimisation and self-defence, harkening back to the attacks against the independent republics during the 1960s

Early statements provide worrying signs

and the dirty war against Unin Patritica. On the government side, Juan Carlos Pinzn, the current minister of defence, has made statements to the effect that FARC members are purely criminals and thus apolitical. The guerrillas have accused him of trying to sabotage the negotiations.33 The government negotiators have remained largely mute on these and other FARC statements. This may be a wise negotiating tactic, but it has left the Colombian public wondering how the government is responding to what many perceive as unreasonable FARC demands. The format of the current negotiations has clearly been designed to avoid the mistakes of Cagun. Whereas the agenda in 1999 included 12 themes and 48 sub-themes, the current negotiations are focused on just the five issues. Likewise, since the extensive involvement of civil-society organisations and international actors in the Cagun negotiations made that process both unwieldy and a major publicity boon to FARC, the framework agreement for the current negotiations almost completely excludes civil society from a direct role in the negotiation phase and only a limited role has been given to Norwegian and Cuban representatives. Finally, FARCs use of the Cagun negotiations to strengthen its military capacity

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explains the adamant refusal by the Colombian state to agree to any ceasefire during the negotiations.34 While FARC initially seemed to accept these ground rules, it then began actively seeking to contravene them. FARC negotiators have sought to include civil society in the negotiations,35 have added last-minute changes to their negotiating team and signalled that negotiations will likely last longer than initially expected.36 These changes may be a negotiating tactic aimed at maximising concessions and political capital, but they inevitably
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raise the spectre of a creeping Caguanisation of the negotiations, leading many to question the guerrillas intentions. Prolonged talks also decrease the likelihood of success, since they leave more time for spoilers to intervene, but also because the Santos administration needs to be able to show palpable progress to maintain the talks.37 The government, frustrated with FARCs attempts to expand the agenda, announced that November 2013 is the deadline for a peace agreement to be signed, a message not only for the negotiating table but also the Colombian public.38 Moreover, government statements announcing the expansion of military forces and acquisition of new airplanes are unsubtle reminders of the alternative to negotiations, and are also intended to keep the army from becoming a spoiler. These issues illustrate some of the differences, perhaps irreconcilable, in the parties expectations. The Colombian government is bent on imposing a victors peace, while FARC seems to expect to negotiate on an equal footing; neither seems realistically achievable. The government will not accept a re-run of the Cagun experience, nor will it willingly elevate FARCs visibility and perceived legitimacy, whereas the guerrillas are highly unlikely to yield to military pressure alone. There is a real risk of an impasse. Even if the negotiators are able to overcome these problems, each of the five points outlined in the framework agreement is likely to present challenges for both the negotiations and implementation of any agreement. Firstly, development is sorely needed in rural areas of Colombia, where up to five of six people live in poverty, useful infrastructure is essentially nonexistent and the Gini co-efficient (a measure of inequality, ranging from 01) for land ownership is above 0.6 in 84% of municipalities. This reflects the massive inequality of rural property in the country, where 41% of land is in

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the hands of less than 4% of landowners.39 Whereas the negotiating agenda does not include a redistribution of land per se, it does speak of access to and usage of land, formalization of ownership and unproductive lands. The aims of FARC and the Colombian government here are not necessarily at odds, but the key question is whether the state can mobilise sufficient resources to produce visible peace dividends in regions with strong FARC influence and poor rural populations. Moreover, any solution that even implies redistribution is likely to meet fierce resistance from wealthy
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landowners, some of whom have already allied with large, armed criminal groups in an effort to keep an already extant land restitution process from affecting them.40 Similarly, if history is any indicator, any land reforms could lead to an escalation in violence.41 The negotiations also call for guarantees for political participation by the opposition in general, and for new movements that arise from the peace process in particular. In the 1990s, the guerrilla group M-19 was guaranteed two seats in parliament as part of its peace agreement. It is, however, difficult to imagine such concessions being granted to FARC, given its deep involvement in illicit economic activities and extensive violence against civilians.42 The most likely political successor to FARC is the Marcha Patritica, a recently emerging social movement in which claims to have around 300,000 members. While formally not related to FARC, the movement shows some indications that it is the modern-day equivalent of Unin Patritica. In early statements, the movement has acknowledged that it shares some of FARCs analysis of Colombias problems and it has not excluded the possibility of including demobilised FARC members within its ranks. The armed forces also claim to have found Marcha Patritica materials in FARC camps and reports indicate that the group has financially supported the movement to some extent.43 Despite these findings, the government has offered to provide security guarantees so that the Marcha Patritica can act as a political party, as long as it maintains no connections to illegal armed groups, which the FARC will not be if an agreement is reached.44 This movement may thus be the seed of a political party that could represent FARC and its political views. How such a movement would fare in parliamentary elections, and whether the Colombian

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police will be able to effectively protect it from political violence, are critical but so far unanswered questions. The end of the conflict will likely prove the most difficult aspect of the negotiations. Firstly, FARC needs to be disarmed; given the mutual distrust this may require some type of international monitoring mission, with the existing OAS mission in Colombia the most likely contender. The next step involves the demobilisation and reintegration of FARC, which will require ex-combatants to find jobs. This has already proven difficult due to social
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stigma, lack of education and insufficient job skills. With their rural backgrounds such individuals often also have trouble adapting to the urban settings where they frequently resettle.45 And if FARC ex-combatants cannot support themselves financially, Colombias illegal economy provides a tempting option given the skill set these fighters have. An additional challenge is what to do with the approximately one-half of FARC ex-combatants who were recruited below the age of 18, formally viewed as child soldiers by international law. Finally, given the precedents of violence against ex-combatants and FARC political representatives, providing security will be a crucial challenge to the successful reintegration of guerrilla members into civilian life, and one that is likely to see intermittent setbacks. That this troubles FARC leaders is plain; the framework agreement specifically notes that the government should increase their combat in particular against whatever organization responsible for homicides and massacres or that [conducts] attacks against human rights defenders, social movements or political movements.46 The murder in late November 2012 of dgar Snchez, a veteran of Unin Patritica and a contemporary leader of the Marcha Patritica, is likely to revive decades-old fear and resentment inside FARC.47 The negotiations will also address the issue of drug trafficking. Here, one question is whether FARC will be able to rein in some of its most notorious traffickers or whether such fronts will splinter off, though this risk is mitigated by the fact that FARC has traditionally been strongly cohesive.48 By contrast, it seems almost unavoidable that, if FARC demobilises, the

Negotiations will also address drug trafficking

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heavily armed organised-crime groups, known as BACRIM, that operate in other regions of Colombia will attempt to move into areas that the guerrilla group currently controls. Given that a power vacuum will emerge, turf wars will most likely ensue and violence could paradoxically increase sharply in the short to medium term after a peace deal, especially given the economic benefits of monopolising the drug trade, even regionally.49 Due to the vast incomes generated by the illegal economy, extreme poverty, a certain bandolero (outlaw) culture and ineffective or absent state institutions
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in peripheral regions of Colombia, this scenario seems difficult to avoid entirely, even if the state increases its security presence. The BACRIM also present a very different opponent from FARC, as they typically do not wear uniforms, rarely mass in large rural encampments, and generally maintain neither neat organisational structures nor keep detailed personal information, and cannot legally be attacked using purely military means. Ironically, these networks may thus prove much harder to combat than FARC, even though they will not actively challenge and attack the state, but rather seek to corrupt and co-opt it. The framework agreement also covers the issue of truth and reconciliation and the human rights of the victims. The Judicial Framework for Peace also provides incentives for combatants to provide information on their crimes and give reparations to victims for which, in return, they will be given weaker or alternative judicial sentences. The peace process will undoubtedly establish some type of truth and reconciliation mechanism. The issue of reparations is a very thorny one in Colombia, especially since support to ex-combatants has been generous compared to aid given to victims. It is also unlikely that FARC can offer much financially in terms of reparations, and the land they have stolen is often in the hands of peasants or middlemen, and contaminated by landmines.50 To tackle these issues and achieve a reasonable trade-off between peace and justice, it is clear that a transitional justice process will have to be established. The current Judicial Framework for Peace has been criticised for offering the possibility of reduced or suspended sentences against those responsible for crimes against humanity. But the highly negative image of FARC amongst Colombian society in general will arguably mean that

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the suspension of sentences for top guerrilla commanders will be limited, although it probably will be offered to foot soldiers. This option is, however, conditioned on combatants handing in their arms, recognising their role in crimes, revealing the truth about their actions and giving reparations to victims, as well as liberating all kidnap victims and demobilising all child recruits.51 The most likely scenario for FARC leaders will be the reduction of prison terms as well as application of symbolic forms of punishment, such as public apologies. Given that the guerrillas have demanded amnesty in
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the past, the fact that they are willing to allow victims rights to be part of the agreement represents an important recognition of current political and legal realities regarding the obligatory application of transitional justice. A related challenge is the topic of extradition, as numerous FARC commanders have been indicted by the US Justice Department. In recent decisions, however, the Colombia Supreme Court has turned down requested extraditions of some paramilitary commanders, arguing that the United States does not offer guarantees for the rights of victims to truth and reparations. This implies that the more that FARC leaders actively collaborate in transitional-justice processes, the less likely it will be that they be extradited.52 The issue of possible extraditions, however, remains a challenge, since guerrilla leaders will not trade in their uniforms for a lifetime of incarcerations in a US prison.
* * *

Prospects for peace in Colombia remain precarious. The optimism initially evoked by the announcement of negotiations has since been tempered by FARC statements and their repeated attempts to change the framework of the talks. The likelihood of a peace agreement seems to be slowly but surely diminishing. In mid-November, FARC declared a unilateral end to offensive military operations, seeking to extract political concessions in return. While FARC operations have not stopped completely, they have decreased by approximately 80% since the unilateral ceasefire came into effect, according to Colombia analyst Leon Valencia.53 But Santos has vowed to maintain military pressure and FARCs gesture has not been reciprocated. Early in

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December, for example, some 20 FARC members were killed in a bombardment in Nario, and on 30 December another 14 were killed in Antioquia.54 Surprisingly, according to sources familiar with the process, these military operations do not seem to have impeded the peace negotiations. The next crucial challenge to negotiators lies in reconciling FARCs need for recognition with the Santos administrations need for demonstrable progress in the short term. Beyond the substance of the negotiations, this also involves difficult psychological challenges. Having spent most of their adult lives inside
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FARC and seeing many of their comrades perish in the fighting, FARC commanders will likely require substantial political concessions to lay down their arms. But government negotiators may not have a mandate to agree to this and segments of the Colombian public would have strong objections against legitimising what many see mainly as a terrorist organisation. Peace negotiators for both the Colombian state and FARC have their work cut out for them. But the possibility for peace nonetheless remains greater than at any previous time in nearly 50 years. The Colombian conflict may at last be ripe for resolution, since neither side can feasibly expect to win militarily and the outcome of another failed round of negotiations seem unpalatable to both the Santos administration and the FARC leadership, who can expect political defeat and a very real risk of death on the battlefield, respectively. An agreement would largely remove one of the two main challenges to the Colombian states monopoly on violence. The other left-wing rebel group, ELN, is much smaller than FARC and is ready to restart its own peace negotiations with the government, which were abruptly ended in 2008. The second challenge, organised crime, will require a different set of strategies, will never end in a negotiated settlement and will likely never be entirely resolved, but at best controlled, contained and repressed. Spending fewer resources on military campaigns, however, frees up resources both to combat organised crime more vigorously and to potentially improve state institutional presence and social services in the most neglected municipalities of Colombia. Hence, largely ending political violence would also enable the Colombian state to make progress against criminal violence, and with its highly capable security institutions, Colombia is much better placed to

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achieve this than many other Latin American states facing similar problems. Meanwhile, the Colombian population has already reaped some peace dividends, as kidnappings have dropped precipitously, the economy has grown robustly and the national homicide rate is about one-half of what it was ten years ago. Resolving the conflict with FARC will not be solve all of Colombias challenges, but would allow the country to continue on its surprisingly positive trajectory.

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Notes
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Cynthia J. Arnson and Theresa Whitfield, Third Parties and Intractable Conflicts: The Case of Colombia, in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds), Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), pp. 23168. Mario Aguilera Pea, Las FARC: La Guerilla Campesina 19492010. Ideas Circulares en un Mundo Cambiante? (Bogot: ARFO Editores e Impresores Ltda, 2010), pp. 4656; and Eduardo Pizarro Leongomez, Las FARC (1949 2010) De Guerilla Campesina a Mquina de Guerra (Bogot: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2011), pp. 16778. Aguilera Pea, Las FARC, pp. 545. Juan Guillermo Ferro Medina and Graciela Uribe Ramn, El Orden de la Guerra. Las FARC-EP: Entre la Organizacin y la Poltica (Bogot: Centro Editorial Javeriano, 2002), pp. 4057. Jacobo Arenas, Cese al Fuego: Una Historia Poltica de las FARC (Bogot: Editorial Oveja Negra, 1985), pp. 935. Arenas was the ideological leader of FARC until his death in 1990. Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramn, El Orden de la Guerra, pp. 98100.

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Juan E. Ugarriza and Matthew J. Craig, The Relevance of Ideology to Contemporary Armed Conflicts: A Quantitative Analysis of Former Combatants in Colombia, Journal of Conflict Resolution, published online 5 July 2012, DOI 10.1177/0022002712446131. Mark Chernick, Economic Resources and Internal Armed Conflicts: Lessons from the Colombian Case, in I. William Zartman and Cynthia J. Arnson (eds), Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed and Greed (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), pp. 178205. Jerry McDermott, Colombian Report Shows FARC is Worlds Richest Insurgent Group, Janes Intelligence Review, 1 September 2005. Carlos Medina, Autodefensas, Paramilitares y Narcotrfico en Colombia, El Caso de Puerto Boyac, (Bogot: Editoriales Periodsticos, 1990). Corporacin Observatorio para la Paz, Guerras Intiles: Una Historia de las FARC (Bogot: Intermedio Editores, 2009), p. 162. Harvey F. Kline, Colombia: Lawlessness, Drug Trafficking and

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Carving up the State, in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pp. 16182. Pizarro Leongomez, Las FARC (1949 2010), pp. 25662. Authors interviews with FARC ex-combatants in Villavicencio, June 2011 and Manizales and Bogot, September 2012. The total amount of aid just for Colombia was about $1.23 billion, of which over $900 million went to anti-narcotics and in effect counterinsurgent military aid. Dilogos de Paz: Cinco Dudas en La Habana, Semana, 17 November 2012. Ariel Fernando vila Martnez, La Guerra Contra las FARC y la Guerra de las FARC, Arcanos, no.15, 2010, pp. 1819. Gerson Ivn Arias, Natalia Herrera and Carlos Andrs Prieto, Mandos Medios de las FARC y su Proceso de Desmovilizacin en el Conflicto Colombiano, serie informes no. 10 (Bogot: Fundacin Ideas para la Paz, 2010), p. 12. Ariel Fernando vila, La Guerra contra las FARC y la Guerra de las FARC, Arcanos, no. 15, 2010, p. 19. Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH, Impacto de la Poltica de Seguridad Democrtica sobre la Violencia y los Derechos Humanos (Bogot: 2010), p. 211; Soledad Granada, Jorge A. Restrepo and Andrs R. Vargas, El Agotamiento de la Poltica de Seguridad: Evolucin y Transformaciones Recientes en el Conflicto Armado Colombiano, in Jorge A. Restrepo and David Aponte

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(eds), Guerra y Violencias en Colombia: Herramientas e Interpretaciones (Bogot: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2009), pp. 27124. Centro de Investigacin y Educacin Popular, Colombia: Deuda con la Humanidad 2: 23 Aos de Falsos Positivos (Bogot: CINEP/PPP, 2011). Based on statistics from the Ministry of Defence for 20022012, available in the monthly Logros de la Poltica de Seguridad Democrtica for 20022006, Logros de la Poltica de Consolidacin de la Seguridad Democrtica for 20062010 and Logros de la Poltica Integral de Seguridad y Defensa para la Prosperidad for 20102012, as well as specific data provided by the Ministry of Defence. See Logros de la Poltica Integral de Seguridad y Defensas para la Prosperidad, 2012. Authors interviews with peasants and peasant leaders in Putumayo, 2009. I. William Zartman, The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments, Global Review of Ethnopolitics, vol. 1, no. 1, September 2001, pp. 818. Sergio Gmez Maseri, Infiltrada en las FARC se Convirti en Informante de la DEA porque le Hicieron Conejo en un Negocio, El Tiempo, 19 January 2007. Pizarro Leongomez, Las FARC (1949 2010), p. 259. Authors interviews with FARC excombatants, 10 and 17 September 2012, Bogot. La Historia de Tanja Nijmeier, Semana, 27 October 2012. FARC piden indulto para Simn Trinidad, Semana, 23 November 2012.

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Whereas the level of involvement in drug-trafficking varies between different FARC fronts, the authors interviews with ex-combatants from the 16th and 48th fronts among others provide ample examples of FARC collaborating closely with international drug traffickers. John Otis, Colombian Peace Talks Start and so do FARCs Delusional Tirades, Times, 22 October 2012. For just one example of the ministers remarks see Las FARC y el ELN aliados con las Bandas Criminales: Mindefensa, El Universal, 13 November 2012. The minister, referring to FARC, also said, What conflict? Killers are what they are. FARC no Tendrn Perdn Nunca: Mindefensa, El Tiempo, 30 October 2012. For FARCs comments see, FARC Afirman que Ministro de Defensa Intenta Sabotear los Esfuerzos de Paz, El Colombiano, 24 November 2012. On the Caguan negotiations, see Pizarro Leongomez, Las FARC (1949 2010), pp. 25862. The government has conceded on this point, allowing for a forum on agrarian development to be carried out in December in Bogot so that civil society can present its proposals on the topic. FARC also admitted to still having prisoners of war, (in other words, kidnapping victims), that they were looking to exchange for imprisoned FARC guerrillas, a topic that had not been discussed at all as FARC had stated they no longer had any kidnapped people. See FARC afirman que tienen Prisioneros de Guerra Canjeables, El Espectador, 2 December 2012.

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Dilogos de Paz: Cinco Dudas en La Habana, Semana, 17 November 2012. Dilogos con las FARC, Mximo hasta Noviembre de 2013: Santos, El Tiempo, 2 December 2012. Colombia Rural: Razones para la Esperanza (Bogot: PNUD Colombia, 2010), p. 201. One armed group known as the Urabeos has found support in large landowners in the Urab regin and southern Crdoba. Hay gente interesada en mantener a los Urabeos: General Naranjo, El Tiempo, 26 February 2012. There is also a group called the Anti-Restitution Army formed by landowners throughout northern Colombia. Maurico Romero, Paramilitares y Autodefensas: 19822003 (Bogot: Instituto de Estudios Polticos y Relaciones Internacionales, 2003). Alejandra Guqueta, The Way Back In: Reintegrating Illegal Armed Groups in Colombia Then and Now, Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 7, no. 3, October 2007, pp. 41756. Marcha Patritica, Pieza en el Engranaje de la Paz, Semana, 4 September 2012; Hallan Bonos a Nombre de Marcha Patritica en Caleta de las FARC, Seala Ejrcito, Semana, 24 October 2012. Gobierno abro Dilogo de Participacin Poltica con Marcha Patritica, El Tiempo, 28 November 2012. Authors interviews with FARC excombatants, Bogot, September 2012. Acuerdo General para la Terminacin del Conflicto y la Construccin de una Paz Estable y Duradera [General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict

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and the Construction of a Stable and Durable Peace], p. 3, 3.4. Quien era el Lder de la Marcha Patritica que Termin Asesinado?, Semana, 23 November 2012. La Historia de John 40, el Chupeta de las FARC, El Tiempo, 4 April 2011; Francisco Gutierrez-Sanin, Telling the Difference: Guerrillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War, Politics & Society, vol. 36, no. 1, March 2008, pp. 334. Kyle Johnson, Neo-paramilitares y BACRIM, con su Mirada en la Paz, 17 October 2012, http://www.arcoiris. com.co/2012/10/neo-paramilitares-ybacrim-con-su-mirada-en-la-paz/. Colombian agricultural minister, cited in 70% de Tierras Despojadas por la Guerrilla pueden Tener Minas, El Tiempo, 3 October 2012.

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Marco Jurdico para la Paz [Judicial Framework for Peace], available at http://congresovisible.org/proyectos-de-ley/ por-medio-del-cual-se/6437/#. 52 Corte Suprema neg la Extradicin de Don Mario, Verdad Abierta, 17 March 2010, http://www.verdadabierta.com/component/content/ article/47-extraditados/2302-cortesuprema-niega-la-extradicion-de-donmario. 53 Corporacin Arco Iris dice que Violencia de las FARC Disminuy un 80%, Caracol Radio, 7 January 2013. 54 Golpes contra las FARC en Cauca, Nario y Meta, El Tiempo, 2 December 2012; El Quinto Frente de las FARC fue Desmantelado: Comando FAC, Vanguardia, 2 January 2013.

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