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Franafrique and regime theory

Maja Bovcon European Journal of International Relations 2013 19: 5 originally published online 23 August 2011 DOI: 10.1177/1354066111413309 The online version of this article can be found at: http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/19/1/5

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EJTXXX10.1177/1354066111413309BovconEuropean Journal of International Relations

Article

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European Journal of International Relations 19(1) 526 The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permissions: sagepub. co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1354066111413309 ejt.sagepub.com

Franafrique and regime theory

Maja Bovcon

University of Oxford, UK

Abstract I position Franafrique within the theoretical framework of International Relations, and analyse it using regime theory. I show how this approach elucidates the nature and structure of Franafrique, and why it is especially valuable for assessing the continuity and changes of Franco-African relations during the past two decades. This approach helps us to determine whether we may speak of the normalization, the incremental adaptation or, instead, the confusion of Frances African policy today. The question is discussed using the concrete example of Frances foreign policy towards Cte dIvoire since 2000. I argue that this dynamic model of the interaction between structure and agents, which takes into account the complexity of the interplay of the systemic and domestic factors in state actors foreign policy decision-making, contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics of NorthSouth relations. Keywords Cte dIvoire, Franafrique, Frances African policy, NorthSouth relations, regime theory

Introduction
The general argument goes that France cultivated exceptionally strong links with its former sub-Saharan African colonies for at least the first three decades after their gaining of independence in 1960 (Bach, 1986; Bayart, 1996; Bourmaud, 2000; Chipman, 1989; Golan, 1981; Gregory, 2000a; Huliaras, 1998; Mdard, 1997). Ever since the first president of Cte dIvoire, Flix Houphout-Boigny, used the expression France-Afrique in 1955 to encapsulate the close and amicable ties between his own country and the former colonial power, France, works referring to the specificity of the Franco-African1 relationship have proliferated. The multiple scandals involving Frances support for corrupt
Corresponding author: Maja Bovcon, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3UQ, UK. Email: maja.bovcon@politics.ox.ac.uk

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and autocratic regimes, as well as the clandestine financing of French political parties through official public aid allocated to sub-Saharan African states, however, stained the idyllic image of France-Afrique. In 1994, Franois-Xavier Verschave renamed it Franafrique and focused in his works on the clientelistic and corrupt activities of the clandestine networks of the French and African political, economic and military actors. Franafrique thereafter gradually became a cherished subject of French journalists, and also of French and African leftist activists campaigning for a more transparent FrancoAfrican relationship, devoid of an underlining neo-colonial character (Pan, 1983; Verschave, 1994, 1998, 2002). While these authors have certainly contributed substantially to public awareness of the less laudable elements in Franco-African relations, they have also, unfortunately, too often resorted to an oversimplified enumeration of corrupt deals, based on rumours and sometimes pure speculation, thereby making even less rigorously academic the already ambiguous and vague notion of Franafrique. In fact, the meaning of the concept tends to oscillate between its narrower sense focusing on the corrupt informal Franco-African networks (Verschave, 1998) and a broader description of the Franco-African relationship, in which these informal networks are only one, even if an important, part (Mdard, 2002: 2). The starting point for this article is the latter, broader meaning. Today, only a few academics, such as Jean-Pierre Dozon, Daniel Bourmaud, JeanFranois Bayart or Tony Chafer, still consider it relevant to discuss Franafrique from historical and political perspectives. The objective of this article is to revive this academic debate by analysing Franafrique within the theoretical framework of International Relations, more specifically regime theory. I will show how the application of this theory to Franco-African relations elucidates the nature and structure of Franafrique, and is especially valuable in assessing the continuity and changes in Franco-African relations during the past two decades. This will help to determine whether we can speak of the normalization, the incremental adaptation or even the confusion of Frances African policy today. This question will be explored using the case study of Frances foreign policy towards Cte dIvoire since 2000. Finally, it will be argued that regime theory contributes to a better understanding of the complex dynamics of NorthSouth relations.

Franafrique and IR theory

In its simplest sense, Franafrique can be interpreted within IR literature as meaning Frances sphere of influence or its pr carr (backyard), which presupposes the hierarchical order of an otherwise anarchical international system. According to one of the leading English School scholars, Hedley Bull (1977), the international system is composed of units or states of varying degrees of importance or power, this power being determined by each states military and economic capability and its consequent ability to influence the behaviour of other, minor states. This perspective is close to the realist position; namely, that national interests, defined in terms of a states survival and power, precede ethical concerns, such as the equality of states. As Bull (1977: 206) argues, the inequality of states in terms of their power, and the subsequent organization of the international system into various great powers spheres of influence, simplifies the pattern of

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international relations, by privileging the voices of some states and muffling those of the others. Whether this benevolent perception of spheres of influence is right or wrong, and however unethical it may sound to proponents of more equitable relations between truly sovereign states, these contentions seem still relevant in understanding Franco-African relations. Ole Waever (1997: 25) claims that, in recent years, one can observe an increasing interest in the English School and in its quasi-philosophical and historical reflection on the institutions in the system and the cultural colouring of the international systems. He finds this new enthusiasm for the English School scholars to be a productive way forward in terms of International Relations theorizing. He further argues that the American mainstream can find a moderate and not too dangerous way to extend its institutionalism by using Bull (and reading him almost as a regime theorist or neo-liberal institutionalist). Regime theory, or neo-institutionalism, is in fact the principal lens through which Franafrique is analysed in this article.

Franafrique and regime theory

The regime theory approach has not yet been employed for analyses of the FrancoAfrican complex called Franafrique. Nevertheless, as will be shown in the ensuing pages, it seems very suitable for determining the continuity and changes in FrancoAfrican relations, and for understanding such relations resilience to change. It also provides an insight into the implications of state actors behaviour for the overall structure of Franafrique. Susan Strange (1982: 488491) contends that the concept of regime distorts the picture of world politics by overemphasizing the static quality of international arrangements. By contrast, I will show in the following pages that regime theory provides a dynamic model of the interaction between structure and agents, and takes into account the complexity of the interplay of the systemic and domestic factors in state actors foreign policy decision-making. The broadest definition of regimes simply refers to patterned behaviour in international relations (Haggard and Simmons, 1987). The most influential definition, however, is that proposed by Stephen Krasner (1982a: 186), who understands regimes as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations. The issueareas can cover a wide variety of cases such as trade (Lipson, 1982), security (Jervis, 1982), monetary systems (Cohen, 1982), communication arrangements or even seabed exploitation (Haas, 1982), and states are usually interconnected with other states simultaneously by numerous regime networks. After their independence, France established with its former sub-Saharan African colonies a network of interdependent links, covering numerous issue-areas such as trade (trade agreements), the monetary system (CFA franc), security (defence agreements), the education system and so on. Indeed, these issue-areas, tying France to the newly established African states, were so tightly intertwined that together they could be perceived as constituting one great regime, which I refer to as Franafrique. While regime theory is generally understood to refer to cooperation among advanced industrial states (Haggard and Simmons, 1987), or to interdependence between equal

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states, this is actually not, and need not be always, the case. In fact, as Krasner (1981: 138) argues, numerous international regimes were created by a hegemonic power to serve its own interests. Moreover, Keohane and Nye (1977: 24) suggest that most real situations of interdependence between states fall somewhere on the spectrum between the extremes, these two being the ideal type of asymmetrical interdependence and the ideal type of complex (egalitarian) interdependence. Moreover, when Young (1982: 284) discusses regime formation, he differentiates between spontaneous, negotiated and imposed orders or regimes. The last category, the imposed regime, is fostered deliberately by a dominant power, through some combination of coercion, co-optation and the manipulation of incentives. This, however, does not imply that the dominant power is forced to continuously coerce the subordinate actors into the desired imposed order. Habits of obedience on the part of subordinate actors can be cultivated over time (Young, 1982: 285). Puchala and Hopkins (1982), for example, apply the concept of regime to colonialism. They suggest that elites, which comprise the practical actors in international relations, always act within a communication net, embodying rules, norms and principles. Given the colonial origin of Franafrique, this regime is closer to Keohane and Nyes ideal type of asymmetrical interdependence, as well as to Youngs definition of the imposed order.

Regime evolution
Regimes are generally created in times of fundamental discontinuity in the international system (like the end of major wars, such as World War II) by powerful states that want to enhance their interests (Krasner, 1982b: 499). As will be demonstrated below, this is exactly the kind of context in which France created the Franafrique regime for the purpose of promoting its interests. At the point of the regimes origin, we may speak of congruence between power distribution and related behaviour and outcomes. However, power distribution can change over time, while the behaviour of state actors remains basically the same, which implies that regimes may assume a life of their own. In fact, regime theory originated from the need of American scholars to explain the following anomaly of international affairs during the 1970s and beyond: why did governments not respond to important changes in the international system at that time, the most significant of which was the alleged decline of US hegemony? The argument was advanced that regimes continued in some measure to constrain and condition the behaviour of states towards one another, despite systemic change and institutional erosion (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986: 760). Indeed, principles and norms that were involved in the creation of regimes may prove very durable and resilient. As Krasner (2001: 22) contends:
participants in international society public officials, diplomats, statesmen, political leaders hold the same fundamental views about the nature of the system, the actors, and how they can behave. Actions follow particular patterns not because they are dictated by some higher authority, or coerced by the threat of force, or constrained by the power of other states, but because players have a shared intersubjective understanding.

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While the decline of US hegemony is arguable and can be interpreted as symptomatic only of American IR scholars constant paranoia (Strange, 1995: 6466), the argument reveals one important issue: regime theory is a useful lens through which one can analyse cases where a states behaviour does not correspond to its capabilities and thus appears somehow irrational, outdated or misplaced. As will be shown in the case of Frances response to the Ivorian crisis since 2000, the interaction between France and its former sub-Saharan colonies in many cases seems to reveal incongruities between Frances actual power and its behaviour towards these African countries. The Franafrique regime thus offers a tool for explaining this incongruity. This disparity between distribution of power and actual state behaviour can arise for several reasons, including custom and usage, uncertainty, and cognitive failing. State elites can continue, out of habit, to adhere to particular rules and norms simply because they have done so in the past. In addition, states may continue to behave according to the established regime rules because they are uncertain about the durability of the environmental change. As Stein (1982: 322) contends, The institutions may be required again in the future, and their destruction for short-term changes may be very costly in the long run. Furthermore, uncertainty may arise from the fact that the consequences of a new regime are very unpredictable, as is the willingness of other actors to abide by the new rules and norms. And lastly, state actors may be unable to formulate alternative cognitive frameworks. Consensual or shared knowledge plays an important role in establishing and maintaining regimes, but agreements are difficult to achieve in a world of independent, individualistic actors. Despite the usual resilience of regimes, they may nevertheless eventually change over time. Apart from the shifts in the underlying power structure or distribution of power within issue-areas, internal contradictions of the regime itself may equally lead to serious failures and regime alterations. In addition, exogenous forces, such as societal developments (population growth, shifting tastes within existing populations), and technological and economic changes may also affect the regime (Keohane and Nye, 1987: 732733; Young, 1982: 291, 294). All these three categories of factors can occur simultaneously and interact to form a complex pattern. Regime theorists make a distinction between the principles and norms of a regime on the one side, and its rules and decision-making procedures on the other. This distinction enables one to determine the stage which the regime is at. Namely, various rules and decision-making procedures are compatible with the same set of norms and principles establishing a regime. Changes on the level of rules and decision-making procedures thus imply changes within regimes. Only alterations on the level of norms and principles cause the actual change or disappearance of the regime itself. By contrast, if the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures of a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, and procedures, the regime has weakened (Krasner, 1982a: 189). To give some examples, when Benjamin Cohen (1982) analysed the balance-ofpayments regime after World War II, he concluded that, in the 1970s, rules and procedures were changed through a substantial increase in the role of private bank financing. The norms and principles of the regime, namely, the opinion that access to financing should be controlled by lenders and conditioned on the behaviour of the borrowing

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countries, has remained, however, unaltered (Cohen, 1982). John Ruggie came to a similar conclusion in his analysis of the international economic regimes that have been in place since the 1940s. Changes that occurred in the 1970s were norm-governed changes, while the underlying norms and principles of the embedded liberal regime remained the same (Ruggie, 1982). The first step in our analysis of the Franafrique regime is thus to determine the establishing principle or norm of the regime, and its rules and decision-making procedures. Once these are established, it will be possible to reach a conclusion about what has been happening with the regime in recent years.

Principle and rules and decision-making procedures of the Franafrique regime

The main principle or norm guiding the creation of this regime was General de Gaulles overarching political ideology of preserving Frances grandeur (Bach, 1982, 1986; Cerny, 1980; Mahoney, 2000; Vasse, 1998; Wauthier, 1995). World War II and the lost colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria had considerably weakened France. Close links with its former sub-Saharan African colonies seemed to offer one way of restoring its image as a great power and imposing France onto the international stage as a counterbalancing force between the two Cold War superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The rules and decision-making procedures of the Franafrique regime involved institutional, semi-institutional and informal levels, and comprised political, economic, military and cultural spheres. African policy was a shared responsibility of the president and his closest advisers on African matters, known as the African cell. The only exceptions were the periods of cohabitation during the late 1980s and 1990s, when the prime minister of a different political party espousing an opposing ideology could effectively block the presidential African policy. This means that most decisions concerning Africa circumvented any broader political debate involving either parliament or civil society actors such as NGOs. The cell preferred instead to cooperate with powerful networks of businessmen of important public and private French companies and the French Secret Service (Mdard, 1997; Pan, 1983; Smith and Glaser, 1992). Another important decision-making centre was the Ministry of Cooperation, which emerged from the old Ministry for Overseas France. This ministry was regarded by francophone African leaders as their ministry, since almost all Frances financial support to the African continent was channelled through it in the form of official public aid (Meimon, 2007). There were other governmental structures, such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Finance and the Caisse Franaise de Dveloppement, which were involved in the decision-making concerning Africa. Their efficiency and transparency were often hindered by the interference of the president, personal ambitions and bureaucratic rivalry, and the lack of a clear delineation of their responsibilities. The Franafrique regime was further institutionalized in various issue-areas: economic (CFA franc zone, trade agreements), military (defence accords) and cultural (agreements of cultural cooperation of francophonie). The most striking feature of the Franafrique regime, however, was the salience of its informal component, which was put in place by Jacques Foccart, a former intelligence

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member during the Resistance movement and de Gaulles chief adviser on African affairs. This informal structure was composed of highly personalized, family-like relations between the French and African political leaders and the parallel networks of economic and political elites, organized around a handful of pivotal actors such as Foccart, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, Charles Pasqua and the leading members of the Elf petroleum company (Mdard, 1997; Smith and Glaser, 1992). This is why Franco-African diplomacy resembled domestic politics more than formal inter-state relations (Clapham, 1996: 89). This tight interconnectedness of the states supports our argument that Franafrique can be analysed as an international regime. Patrimonialists generally limit themselves to pointing to the patronclient character of these networks and to their opaque and corrupt nature, which blurs the line between public and private spheres (Mdard, 1997). Regime theory, by contrast, offers an additional, functional explanation of this informal level encroaching onto the institutional level of the Franafrique regime. First, these networks and the informal setting provided an efficient communication channel that enabled a continuous exchange of information between French and African political and business elites and eliminated possible misunderstandings. According to Keohane (1984), reducing uncertainty by making the provision of information more symmetrical is one of the main functions of the regime. Second, the highly personalized, family-like relationship enhanced the urge to comply with the patterned behaviour and constrained divergence from common expectations. This informal level, therefore, often further enhanced the institutional structure of the Franafrique regime, rather than undermined it. For three decades, this regime proved to be mutually beneficial to the French and African elites. On one hand, it enhanced Frances standing in the international arena. On the other hand, France guaranteed protection to its loyal African clients. Moreover, individuals on both sides profited from the possibilities of personal enrichment and political empowerment that were offered by the formal and informal avenues of the Franafrique regime. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, several factors severely undermined the established regime and called for the reassessment of Frances African policy. On the systemic level, the end of the Cold War put into question Frances claims to be a balancing force in a bipolar world. In addition, the disintegration of bigger Eastern state structures, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, into numerous new states, all of whom gained membership of the United Nations, meant that the votes of the friendly African states, on which France could count for support for its diplomatic stance, lost their relative weight. Moreover, Frances integration into the European Union greatly weakened its capability to continue with its opaque African policy, and prompted it to reassess its geostrategic interests. On the domestic level, there were several other factors that undermined the Franafrique regime: budgetary constraints; public criticism of the corrupt nature of the Franafrique regime, supported by numerous legal investigations into the affairs of some leading figures of African networks; the increasing fragmentation of these networks into various individual business lobbies; and the death of some pivotal Franafrique figures, such as Foccart, Mitterrand and Houphout-Boigny (Smith and Glaser, 1997). For many, however, the true turning point occurred with Frances implication in the Rwanda genocide in 1994 (Chafer, 2001; Kroslak, 2007; Prunier, 1995).

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One should not forget, however, that the African continent itself underwent many changes during the 1990s. Economic globalization, the great indebtedness of most African countries and political instability provoked by the democratization process and multi-partyism substantially diminished the attractiveness of the African continent in political or economic terms (Clapham, 2005). All these factors prompted France to reconsider the viability of its African policy and to envisage institutional changes in the Franafrique regime. Arguably, the most important institutional changes occurred in the domains of Frances cooperation and defence. After many failed attempts, the French government finally placed the Ministry of Cooperation under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1998 and created the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Cooperation and Development (CIDIC) (Meimon, 2007). In the military sphere, it professionalized the Army, closed down some of its military bases and reduced and repositioned Frances standing forces on the African continent (Utley, 2002). All these reforms aimed at achieving a more transparent and coherent, and above all less costly, African policy. Increasing budgetary constraints seemed to lie behind numerous other important reforms: the devaluation of the CFA franc by 50% in 1994, and multilateralization of Frances defence and cooperation policy. With the Balladur doctrine from 1993, France preconditioned the distribution of its aid to African countries on signature of structural adjustment programmes with the Bretton Woods institutions (Cumming, 1995). Moreover, since the Rwanda genocide, France has refrained from unilateral military operations, her speciality in the past, and has preferred to support military programmes that will enhance African capabilities for self-defence, such as RECAMP (Gregory, 2000b; Renou, 2002; Utley, 2002). In addition, following a more pragmatic economic agenda, France further extended its relations to non-francophone African states, such as Nigeria, Angola and South Africa (Mdard, 2003). While there exists a certain consensus among scholars and public officials that the golden era of the exceptionally close and amicable relations between France and its former sub-Saharan colonies is over, and that these relations are currently undergoing, or have already undergone, a deep crisis, the conclusions that these people reach are nevertheless rather different and sometimes even contradictory (Bayart, 1993; Chafer, 2001; Mdard, 2005). On the basis of their arguments, I develop a tripartite classification, differentiating between disengagement/normalization, incremental adaptation and confusion paradigms. The normalization or disengagement paradigm argues that Frances African policy has undergone a substantial change, whereby France is no longer willing to maintain its exceptional, strong and neo-colonial links with its former African colonies (Mdard, 2003). By contrast, the incremental adaptation paradigm, adopted primarily by international realists, states that although Frances African policy has changed over time, this does not in any way indicate Frances disengagement from Africa. Without any overarching strategy, France is merely adapting its African policy in a reactive and incremental way to ever-changing circumstances on the international and national levels (Chafer, 2001). The propagators of the confusion paradigm, for their part, argue that Frances African policy is confused, and they usually deplore the overall declining role of France in sub-Saharan Africa (Bayart, 1996). It has to be stressed that this classification

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represents a rather ideal model and that most real situations, as in the case of Keohane and Nyes asymmetrical and complex interdependencies, fall somewhere on the spectrum between these three ideal types. In fact, the three paradigms should be understood as three corners of a triangle and any concrete case corresponds to a point lying somewhere in the plane of this imagined triangle. This tripartite model will be applied to the example of Frances foreign policy towards Cte dIvoire since 2000. Being aware of the methodological shortcomings of a qualitative case study, such as limited generalisability or a lack of predictable value of the obtained results, I have therefore restricted my research to an assessment of which of these three paradigms best describes Frances response to the Ivorian crisis, and which of the reforms that were likely to affect Frances African policy more widely were adopted by France as a direct result of the Ivorian crisis. The same model can of course be used for the analysis of Frances policy towards other francophone countries. My conclusions concerning the Ivorian case do not preclude the possibility that some other paradigm might be more plausible in the case of another francophone country. This having been said, I nevertheless think that the Ivorian case deserves special attention because of the countrys geostrategic importance and the privileged place it enjoys within Frances sphere of influence. First, Cte dIvoire is an economic engine of francophone West Africa and, after Nigeria, the second most important economy in the region. Moreover, this francophone country used to be the exemplar of Frances successful decolonization and of the close and amicable FrancoAfrican relationship (Dozon, 2005).2 Because of these two factors, I believe that if anywhere, then it is in Cte dIvoire that France would have a vested interest in maintaining its influence and would therefore try its best to preserve the old state of affairs or incrementally adapt. Another point needing clarification before we proceed with our analysis is the relationship between the Franafrique regime and Frances African policy. In fact, the Franafrique regime is intrinsically linked to Frances African policy, since an IR regime is, apart from institutional arrangements and legal documents, primarily detectable through its continuing realization in practice by international actors. More precisely, it is through the foreign policy decision-makers behaviour and statements that the continuity and changes in the Franafrique regime are primarily revealed. As Keohane and Nye (1987: 743) suggest, we need more careful empirical work, tracing the behaviour of states to see how closely policies follow regime principles, rules, and institutions. The decision-makers behaviour is, in turn, influenced by systemic and domestic factors and by the international relations regime. This is the reasoning behind the claim that regime theory presents a dynamic model of the interaction between structure and agents, and takes into account the systemic and domestic factors which shape foreign policy. Changes within a regime, or changes on the level of rules and decision-making procedures, correspond to our incremental adaptation paradigm. The disappearance of the establishing norm or principle of the regime, on the other hand, implies Frances disengagement from Africa or the normalization paradigm. The case of confused and inconsistent application of norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures is most adequately described by the confusion paradigm.

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Case study: Frances response to the crisis in Cte dIvoire since 2000
In his analysis of Frances security policy in sub-Saharan Africa, Charbonneau (2008) concludes that the countrys new neo-liberal agenda of promoting stability and development has enhanced Frances hegemony and reproduced the old mechanisms of African dependency. Frances military operation in Cte dIvoire would, in his opinion, be one example supporting his theory. However, our detailed analysis of Frances response to the Ivorian crisis under Gbagbo will demonstrate that things are in fact much more complex and less clear-cut. At best, we may say that his contention is plausible only for the first phase of Frances conflict resolution, spanning approximately from Gbagbos contentious election in 2000 until the tragic events in November 2004. The redefined defence policy, resting upon neo-liberal principles, initially helped France to overcome inter-party cleavages3 and these parties competition for African clients, and legitimized its greater interventionism in Cte dIvoire, a move that departed from Jospins political agenda of neither interference nor indifference. Frances involvement in the Ivorian crisis during this phase suggests that France did not renounce its quest for grandeur manifest through playing the role of gendarme in francophone Africa. The greater involvement in the Ivorian case was further supported by the geostrategic importance of Cte dIvoire within the West African region and within Frances sphere of influence (Diplomat 1, 2008 interview; Diplomat 2, 2007 interview). Frances tactic in Cte dIvoire of preventing the conflicts escalation by early intervention, and by containing the fighting within the borders, implied changes in the manner but not in the goal of its African policy. This means that changes at that time occurred on the level of the rules and decision-making procedures of the Franafrique regime, rather than on the level of its constitutive principle of grandeur. At this stage, therefore, Frances African policy towards Cte dIvoire gravitated towards the incremental adaptation paradigm. Between 2000 and 2002, the domestic factor of cohabitation between the centre-right president, Chirac, and the socialist government of Jospin explains the French indulgence towards the socialist Gbagbo amidst general criticism from elsewhere in the international community Fabre and Trean (2000a, 2000b). After the end of the cohabitation, France leaned towards even more determined interventionism, attested to by the centre-right governments serious diplomatic efforts to impose Frances chosen political solution, enshrined in the Linas-Marcoussis agreement. There was also now a less indulgent attitude towards Gbagbo, who did not enjoy much sympathy within Frances centre-right government. However, in this period we can already observe increasing inconsistencies and ambiguities in Frances response to the Ivorian crisis. The intensification of the Ivorian conflict caused inter-party bickering. The initial subsuming of party divisions within broader security issues now gave way to conflicting personal opinions by some important political figures about the best way of resolving the crisis, and especially about Gbagbos role in the peace process (dErsu, 2007: 9496). This conflicting attitude towards the Ivorian crisis was actually observable in the actions and statements of a single person, the then Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin.4 On the one hand, he advocated disengagement, and stressed Africans responsibility to solve their problems

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by themselves; yet, on the other hand, he was the person who most actively pursued the Linas-Marcoussis talks. This somewhat schizophrenic attitude could be interpreted as hypocrisy on the part of the French political elite. Yet I prefer to interpret it as a sign of the gradual move of the French foreign policymakers towards the confusion paradigm. Namely, while there exists a desire among French diplomats to redefine their countrys relationship towards Africa in the sense of normalization/disengagement, the decisive step has not been taken yet. The reason for this resilience of old interventionist practices may be attributed to various factors, as proposed by regime theorists (Krasner, 1981; Young, 1982): from the uncertainty of the costs and benefits of the total dismantlement of the existing (Franafrique) regime and the establishment of an alternative regime, to the simple habit of doing things in the same way as in the past. It can also be attributed to the extremely personalized nature of relationships within the Franafrique regime, from which the French political elite can still make some personal gains by maintaining their African clients. More importantly, after the failed military coup in 2002, and especially after the signature of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement, the course of events and the state of the Franafrique regime were, to a great extent, dictated by Ivorian domestic power struggles. Given his increasing international and domestic isolation, Gbagbo resorted to a systematic double politics in his relationship with France. On the one hand, he generally maintained a measured or even amicable attitude towards France, probably aimed at softening up the sceptical centre-right government. On the other hand, he allowed, if not indeed actively supported, the state media and his radical supporters spreading of antiFrench messages and resort to violent expressions of their anti-French feelings. This latter tactic proved efficient in mobilizing the masses for the defence of Gbagbos regime and in widening the Ivorian presidents domestic support. Gbagbos tactic shows how a leader of a weaker state can manipulate the asymmetrical or dependent relationship to his advantage. As Bayart (2000: 218) suggests:
the leading actors in sub-Saharan societies have tended to compensate for their difficulties in the autonomization of their power and in intensifying the exploitation of their dependants by deliberate recourse to the strategies of extraversion, mobilizing resources derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment.

Gbagbos double politics, which in fact mirrored Frances own ambiguous diplomacy following the failed military coup in 2002, introduced a great deal of confusion and uncertainty into Franco-Ivorian relations. Neither France nor Cte dIvoire could be completely sure any longer about the opposite sides next move. The peak of mistrust was reached, however, when Ivorian aircraft unexpectedly bombed the French military base in Bouak in November 2004, to which France responded by destroying the Ivorian air force. These events marked the first direct military confrontation between France and Cte dIvoire and brought Franco-Ivorian relations to their lowest point. The situation further radicalized with the anti-French protests, which were sparked by the French retaliation and which provoked the massive repatriation of French expatriates. A detailed examination of these events, and especially of the manner in which both countries dealt with them in the aftermath, suggests that things had spun out of control.

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Gbagbo, for example, has consistently denied giving direct orders for the bombing of the French military base.5 To some extent his claims sound plausible, especially if one takes into account the fact that the manipulation of the ambiguous relationship with France had served him well in the past in terms of consolidating his power. As Krasner (1982b: 506) contends, actors with limited national capabilities may use the regime as a source of power. Such situations occur when the incongruities between regime characteristics and the capabilities or preferences of the stronger states have developed over time, which enables weaker states to exploit the remnants of the regimes (Krasner, 1981: 139). In fact, France did not show much eagerness in clarifying the events, if the slow progress of the official investigation of the bombing of the French military base is anything to go by.6 This probably indicates Frances wish to conceal its own mistakes in dealing with this unexpected situation, and seems to support the idea that France had gravely underestimated the potential dangers of the Gbagbo regime and its adherents. From the regime theory perspective, this can be interpreted as a sign of the decreased capabilities of a hegemon, which had established the regime but was now unable to adequately respond to the current challenges to its own power (Krasner, 1982a). It also shows how a weaker state is not only capable of manipulating an international relations regime to its advantage, but also of destabilizing it. Indeed, at this point, we can fairly say that the constitutive principle of the Franafrique regime, namely, Frances pursuit of grandeur through close links with its former sub-Saharan colony, had been called into question. This, however, does not preclude the persistence of some of the Franafrique regimes rules and decision-making procedures. For example, most decisions concerning these events have been taken in an old-fashioned way: namely, in a non-transparent manner at the highest level of the French state, bypassing the French parliament and public debate. Moreover, in this case France had once again resorted to the old experts on African affairs: Ambassador Gildas le Lidec, Nathalie Delapalme, General Poncet, Gbagbos special adviser on military equipment Robert Montoya and Jacques Baillet, attorney of the French Military Tribunal in Paris (dErsu, 2007).7 This means that France, in practice, especially in delicate cases, continues to rely, probably out of habit, on the old Franafrique rseaux and practices. According to Young (1982: 285), the structural asymmetrical relationship of power is usually sustained and reinforced by the habitual practices of the actors involved. As discussed above, regime theory accounts for cases where a certain patterned behaviour between states persists, even though the capabilities of the state that established the regime have weakened over time. These old practices, however, have been countered by proposals for institutional reforms that directly or implicitly undermine the workings of the Franafrique regime. For example, the current government is preparing a judicial reform, which includes the abolition of the Military Tribunal in Paris by January 2011 and the transfer of its competencies to a section of the Supreme Court specialized in military issues.8 This reform may affect, in particular, cases concerning Frances notoriously obscure military operations on the African continent, including the case of the 2004 November events. However, while the reform was elaborated with the aim of making legal investigations into military crimes more transparent and efficient, doubts exist as to whether this reform will achieve its goal in practice Guibert and Salles (2010).

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Another institutional reform seems even more consequential for the sustainability of the Franafrique regime. The bombing of the French military base in Bouak in November 2004 moved France to finally revise its defence accords with Cte dIvoire and to decide to close down its military base in Abidjan (Diplomat 3, 2008 interview). While there had been serious talks in France about reducing the number of military bases in Africa, it is debatable whether this would have materialized in the case of Cte dIvoire without the window of opportunity offered by this direct Franco-Ivorian military confrontation. This case demonstrates that the multiplication of unpredictable events that provoke major crises in bilateral relations may substantially disrupt patterned behaviour and induce institutional reforms affecting the established regime. This reform undoubtedly bears important implications for Franco-Ivorian relations, since Frances military protection of the loyal African leaders used to be one of the basic mutual expectations within the Franafrique regime. It can be interpreted as Frances desire to withdraw and normalize its relationship with Cte dIvoire. This reform definitely reduces Frances ability to interfere in Ivorian domestic affairs. At the same time, it makes plain that future Ivorian presidents will not be able to ground their legitimacy primarily on their loyalty to France. Frances increasing inability to defend the constitutive principle of the Franafrique regime as well as its recourse to the opposing rules and decision-making practices, as attested to by the coexistence of the old Franafrique practices with these institutional reforms, make the confusion paradigm the most plausible explanation of Frances policy towards Cte dIvoire at this stage. Similar ambiguity has been observed in the case of the French governments response to the demands of those French expatriates who left Cte dIvoire because of the violent anti-French protests in November 2004.9 While the French expatriates were generally satisfied with the rescue and repatriation actions of the French military, they accused the French government of forgetting them soon after they arrived in France (Ghelber, 2007 interview; Balzer, 2007 interview). Through their associations, the ARCI (Association des Raptaris de Cte dIvoire) and the ADESCI (Association de Dfense des Entreprsises Sinistres en Cte dIvoire), they appealed to France, in the name of national solidarity, to help them as it had received an unprecedented 1 million French Algerian settlers in 1962. The French government response to these demands oscillated between two contradictory attitudes: pure pragmatism, which was in tune with neo-liberal precepts of a slimline and efficient government, clashed with a more sentimental position of national solidarity, which was associated with the memory of Frances past grandeur and the painful experience of decolonization (Bovcon, 2009a). The first attitude was reflected in the French governments refusal to take any further responsibility for the losses that the French expatriates had incurred during the violent anti-French protests, and in its declining to acquiesce in their demand to be treated in the same way as repatriates from Algeria. Instead, it envisaged a reform of the repatriation system, including the creation of a unique Mediator for Repatriates, with the aim of centralizing the system and making it more coherent and efficient (Commission for Foreign Affairs, 2007). This official attitude was undermined by the activity of the Franafrique networks, who, by appealing to national solidarity, have ensured that the term repatriates has been applied to the French expatriates from Cte dIvoire, despite recent restrictions and

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despite the fact that almost five decades have elapsed since Cte dIvoires independence (Bovcon, 2009a: 294). This fact has enabled the French expatriates to be treated, at least partially, as were French settlers from Algeria. While, on the political level, the November 2004 events radicalized Franco-Ivorian relations, the economic level was less affected than expected. Despite Gbagbo supporters claims to be fighting for a second independence and thus for the end of the neocolonial links with France, French multinationals, such as Bouygues and Bollor, showed themselves to be resilient in securing their economic interests in Cte dIvoire, often without help from the French government (Airault, 2004; Hofnung, 2005).The activity of the informal networks of the French and Ivorian business and political elites sometimes even appeared to counter the official position of the French government, especially during periods of strained relations between France and Cte dIvoire.10 This indicates not only the complex interaction of the formal and informal levels of the Franafrique regime, but also the increasing fragmentation and individualization of the political and economic networks (Hugeux, 2007). This supports Smith and Glasers (1997) argument that the compact economicpolitical networks from Foccarts era have gradually fragmented into multiple private business lobbies. It also affirms Stranges (1995) opinion as to the increasing emancipation of the multinationals from the state. In the case of French big business, it was revealed once again that the Ivorian government played an active role in protecting the French economic presence. In fact, many big contracts with French multinationals have been signed with Gbagbos consent, and this during periods when Franco-Ivorian relations were at their worst.11 This suggests that, by helping the French big multinationals, Gbagbo was trying to improve his relationship with the French government. This is an instance showing how a leader of a lesser or dependent state may opt for the regimes perpetuation to consolidate or protect his power. The analyses of Frances military operation and Frances role within the multilateral conflict resolution in Cte dIvoire point in the same direction; namely, to Frances weakened capacity to maintain the Franafrique regime. France certainly played a pivotal role immediately after the failed military coup in 2002. Given its military presence (it has a permanent military base in Abidjan), it was not hard for it to intervene first and interpose its troops between the warring parties, which led to the consequent splitting of the country into a rebel-led north and a governmental south. France also provided logistic and operational support to UNOCI and ECOMICI troops, and enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy within this hybrid military operation (Prazuck, 2007 interview).12 Unlike the ECOWAS forces (ECOMICI and MINUCI), which were absorbed into the UN forces after the establishment of the UNOCI peacekeeping operation, the French Licorne continued to operate as a separate unit, albeit one coordinated with UNOCI with the help of the liaison officers, and provided UNOCI forces with a Rapid Reaction Force. The most obvious example of the autonomy of the French forces vis-a-vis international peacekeeping troops was the destruction of the Ivorian National Air Force by the French Army, at the explicit command of President Chirac, as a response to the bombing of the French military base in Bouak. Until the November 2004 events, France had a leading say in the overall conflict resolution operation. In addition to its prominent role in the military operation, it was also on the front line on the diplomatic level (Bovcon, 2009b). The Linas-Marcoussis accord of

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January 2003 represented, until the signature of the Ouagadougou accord in March 2007, the most comprehensive document on the origin and solutions to the Ivorian crisis, and a template for the ensuing peace accords and UN resolutions. As regards events before November 2004, we could therefore agree with the proponents of the incremental adaptation paradigm that multilateralization of the conflict management enabled France to pursue its interests while sharing the costs with other actors. In this period, the international community seemed to have tacitly consented to the specific understanding of the international regime as a hierarchical order, in which Cte dIvoire falls into Frances sphere of influence. After the November 2004 events, however, Frances capabilities for imposing its political agenda were considerably weakened. France now further hid behind the mantle of multilateralism. This time, however, the tactic was considerably reduced in its ability to impose Frances own political agenda, which was now focused on the sidelining of Gbagbo through UN resolutions (dErsu, 2007: 100). This case demonstrates that multilateralism cannot be automatically equated with either of the three paradigms. The critical factor in determining the quality of multilateralism is the evaluation of whether Frances position was challenged or supported by other multilateral actors. In the Ivorian case, the limitations of Frances multilateral strategy became especially apparent during the South African mediation, which countered Frances attempt to depict Gbagbo as the primary obstruction to the peace process.13 This means that, while the international community may still accept the old international order as being composed of spheres of influence, it nevertheless does not tolerate imperial excesses by the former colonial powers. The South African mediation also indicated the rising power of South Africa as a credible mediator on the African continent. An even greater blow to Frances hegemonic power to maintain its Franafrique regime was the signature of the Ouagadougou accord in 2007.14 This accord was the fruit of direct talks between the Ivorian president and the rebel leader Guillaume Soro. The talks were initiated by Gbagbo and mediated by the Burkinab president, Blaise Compaor. In many ways, these direct talks and the Ouagadougou accord can be regarded as a restoration of Gbagbos authority. By choosing Soro as his main interlocutor and also as the new prime minister of the interim government, Gbagbo annulled the provisions of the previous UN resolution, which had transferred many of the presidential prerogatives to the internationally appointed prime minister, Charles Konan Banny. Moreover, Gbagbo successfully sidelined the two main political opposition leaders, Henri Konan Bdi and Alassane Ouattara, from direct talks. More importantly, the Ouagadougou accord diminished considerably the decisionmaking role of both France and the international community in the resolution of the conflict. By heralding direct talks, and touting the Ouagadougou accord as the African (Ivorian) solution to the African (Ivorian) problem, Gbagbo reduced France and the international community to mere providers of logistical and financial support.15 Aware of its weakened position and the skyrocketing costs of its military operation, France (together with the international community) endorsed the Ouagadougou accord and used it as an opportunity for further reduction of its troops.16 The Ouagadougou accord is an additional proof that the Ivorian domestic political landscape, and especially Gbagbos astute politicking, had a considerable impact on Franco-Ivorian relations and the Franafrique

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regime. After this accord, and especially since Sarkozys accession to power, Frances policy towards Cte dIvoire could be described as low-key and cautious.

Conclusion
Frances increasingly inconsistent recourse to Franafrique principle, rules and decision-making procedures in the Ivorian case suggests a gradual move of Frances foreign policy regarding Cte dIvoire towards the confusion paradigm. The confusion paradigm indicates that while the regime has weakened, it is not dead yet. Its death has been postponed because of Frances desire to conceal its waning power, and the African leaders manipulations of the old dependency structures for the sake of their own survival. Moreover, the Franafrique regime has been kept alive because of the Franco-African elites apparent inability to conceive of and formulate alternatives. This analysis of Frances diplomacy towards Cte dIvoire since 2000 shows that, while France resolutely stepped in to resolve the Ivorian crisis Operation Licorne was, after all, one of the biggest and most costly French military operations abroad in recent history time eventually showed that its ability to impose its own agenda is diminishing. It is impossible to overlook the increasing inconsistency and ambiguity in Frances policy towards Cte dIvoire, where the will to intervene has been countered by a desire to withdraw, and where budgetary concerns have undermined its pursuit of grandeur. This suggests that France is no longer sure about the constitutive principle of the Franafrique regime, although nor has it yet found a suitable alternative. After the November 2004 events in particular, both those members of the international community involved in the multilateral conflict resolution and the Gbagbo regime constrained Frances capability of pursuing this principle, which implies systemic changes that question Frances position as a great power. The Franafrique regime proved more resilient in the Ivorian case on the level of rules and decision-making procedures, but even here one can detect inconsistencies. French policymaking was still done in a top-down, non-transparent manner, and involved no or scant discussion in parliament or within a broader public arena. Yet, at the same time, on many occasions one may perceive Frances desire to make African policy more transparent and coherent, as the proposed judicial reforms and the revision of the defence accords attest. Most of these attempts, however, have not so far been realized. Moreover, while the activity of the Franafrique networks has persisted throughout the Ivorian crisis, their increasing fragmentation has further undermined the economicpolitical, statebusiness monolith that allegedly existed during Foccarts time, and has led them to pursue their private interests before anything else. It has been shown on many occasions that Gbagbo astutely manipulated the Franafrique regime in order to strengthen his domestic and international support. This supports regime theorists argument that, when a hegemons capabilities reduce over time, minor powers may seize control over that regime for the sake of advancing their own purposes. This brings us to the discussion about NorthSouth relations and, more precisely, to the recent reconsiderations of dependency theory, which has been generally and unfairly neglected since the late 1970s (de Oliveira, 2007: 1314). Without discarding the basic premise of dependency theory, namely, that the relationship between the

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developed and developing worlds is uneven or asymmetrical, there are authors who point to African leaders skilful manipulation of this asymmetrical relationship for the sake of their regime survival (Badie, 2000; Bayart, 2000; Clapham, 1996; de Oliveira, 2007). The less secure a leader is on the domestic level, the more his strategies will focus on pure survival (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). It is thus not surprising that Gbagbos manipulation of the Franafrique regime intensified above all during periods of increased internal pressure for greater social and political inclusion of the marginalized segments of the Ivorian population. This means that Gbagbos strategy is far from being a selfproclaimed fight for a second independence, since it has proved to be much more efficient in keeping him in power without elections than in promoting Cote dIvoires positive sovereignty. In truth, one cannot detect any improvement in Cte dIvoires economic and political standing or the empowerment of its civil society. In fact, the revised dependency theorists emphasize African agency or African elites active participation in the formation of the state of dependency. This corrects the somehow static, unidirectional and undialectical classic dependencia model, where the hegemon assumes the role of omnipotent oppressor (Wolfe, 1997: 396). This having been said, however, one should not forget that these political strategies take place within the limits defined by the asymmetries of the relationship itself. As de Oliveira (2007: 14) puts it, while African leaders are constrained agents, they are not mere puppets in the fixed structure of unequal economic relations imposed by the imperialist powers. Finally, in this article I attempted to establish how the perpetuation of the international relations regime crucially depends on the foreign policy decision-makers on both sides. Furthermore, I showed that the leaders of a lesser state may considerably challenge it or manipulate it to their own advantage. In the Ivorian case, Frances foreign policy was considerably shaped by the Ivorian domestic power struggles and especially by Gbagbos duplicitous politics. This is why I think that my case study elucidates NorthSouth relations. The lesser state (South) is not a mere passive recipient of the imperialist North. While the leaders of the lesser states are constrained in their actions, they are nevertheless partially responsible for the perpetuation or undermining of the dependency relations. Notes
1. When I talk about the Franco-African relationship I refer to Frances relationship with its former sub-Saharan African colonies. 2. Another model Franafrique country is Gabon. However, Gabon is much smaller than Cte dIvoire in terms of its population, GDP and geographic size. Moreover, its economy primarily relies on oil, which according to experts will be expended by 2025 (de Oliveira, 2007). This will doubtless further decrease the countrys relative importance. 3. Les partis politiques franais diviss sur lissue du scrutiny. Le Monde 28 October 2000. 4. See, for example, extract from an interview with Dominique de Villepin by RFI on 6 January 2003, available at: http://www.un.int/france/documents_francais/030106_mae_villepin_ afrique.htm (accessed 15 June 2009). 5. Gbagbo firmly denies his responsibility: I am not an idiot: you can concede at least this. The minimum of intelligence, the minimum, says that you do not shoot on French soldiers or on UN soldiers. See Cte dIvoire: requette sur nos soldats, tlvision report on France 3, 2006.

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6. The judiciary investigation of the bombing of the French military base in Bouak at the Military Tribunal in Paris was opened in January 2005. The parallel investigation at the Military Tribunal in Abidjan began one year later, in January 2006. The French authorities proved to be less than cooperative with the judicial investigators in Paris and Abidjan. For example, they continue to refuse to arrest the two Belarusian pilots, Yuri Sushkin and Barys Smahin, who were supposedly involved in the air raid (see Hofnung, 2006, 2007). The legal investigation has been substantially hindered by the decision of the French Ministry of Defence to classify many of the important documents concerning the bombing in Bouak as strictly confidential. 7. Gildas le Lidec was also ambassador in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1999 and 2000, when the country descended into chaos. Nathalie Delapalme, daughter of an engineer devoting his career to the oil company Elf, worked in the cabinet of Jacques Godfrain (1995 97), then Minister for Cooperation, and was the executive secretary of the Senate group of the FrenchWest African friendship. During her time in the senate, she was a close friend of JeanPierre Camoin, another key person of Franafrique. He established the Circle for Friendship and Support to Franco-Ivorian renewal (CARFI), and is one of the most influential of Gbagbos advocates at Elyse and the general promoter of the close Franco-Ivorian relationship. She curiously succeeded in maintaining her position as a counsellor for African affairs in the cabinets of the three subsequent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Dominique de Villepin, Michel Barnier and Philippe Douste-Blazy. General Poncet led the French military operation following the bombing in Bouak and was responsible for the evacuation of the expatriates from Abidjan. Born in Algeria, he was trained at the prestigious military school of Saint-Cyr and is a member of the airborne troops and of the elite naval troops (marsouin), which are specialized in interventions on the African continent. In fact, General Poncet served in Chad, Djibouti and Runion, and was responsible for the evacuation of foreigners during the Rwandan genocide. 8. Transfert des comptences du tribunal aux armes de Paris une formation spcialise du TGI de Paris, accessible on website of the French Ministry of Defence: http://www.defense. gouv.fr/sga/actualite_et_dossiers/transfert_des_competences_du_tribunal_aux_armees_de_ paris_a_une_formation_specialisee_du_tgi_de_paris. 9. For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Bovcon (2009a). 10. The contract with Bouygues, for example, was renewed at the end of 2005, at the time when Franco-Ivorian relations were at their worst (Diplomat 3, 2008 interview). 11. On 23 October 2003, the Vridi terminal was awarded to Bollors affiliate, Socit dexploitation du terminal de Vridi (SETV), behind closed doors and with the apparent consent of President Gbagbo. All the main opposition parties, the PDCI, RDR and MPCI, denounced the concession. When the tribunal in Abidjan finally annulled the concession, a year after it was signed, President Gbagbo received a representative of Bollor to reassure him about the validity of the contract. The concession was then re-approved at the beginning of 2004 (see Airault, 2004; Kouassi, 2008). 12. On the analysis of Frances military operation, see Bovcon (2009b). 13. See Cte dIvoire: les Sud-Africains sexpliquent. Radio France International, 1 September 2005, available at: http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/069/article_38269.asp; Les demi-mesures ne suffiront pas. International Crisis Groups Africa Briefing No. 33, 12 October 2005, p. 6. 14. Cte dIvoire: Can the Ouagadougou agreement bring peace? International Crisis Group, 17 June 2007. 15. Cte dIvoire: Whats needed to end the crisis. International Crisis Group, 2 July 2009. 16. See Un retrait de la communaut internationale envisageable ds maintenant. AFP 4 March 2007; Bernard and Bolopion (2007); Cte dIvoire: la force franaise Licorne a t rduite de moiti. AFP 2 June 2009.

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26 Interviews

European Journal of International Relations 19(1)

French diplomat, working for French Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Cte dIvoire, requested to remain anonymous, therefore I refer to him in the text as Diplomat 1, Paris, 30 November 2007. French diplomat, working for French Embassy in Cte dIvoire, requested to remain anonymous, therefore I refer to him in the text as Diplomat 2, Abidjan, 20 February 2008. French diplomat, working for French Embassy in Cte dIvoire, requested to remain anonymous, therefore I refer to him in the text as Diplomat 3, Abidjan, 19 February 2008. Xavier Ghelber, legal representative and member of ARCI, Paris, 6 November 2007. Marc Balzer, president of ADESCI, Strasbourg, 27 November 2007. Captain Cristophe Prazuck, French Ministry of Defence, Paris, 26 June 2007.

Biographical note Maja Bovcon is finishing her PhD at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, UK. Her research focuses on current Ivorian politics, Franco-Ivorian relations and Frances African policy in general.