~. .~ ~. .14.

0-4 '0-^02 647 7660 OIG/FO

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DISCUSSION DRAFT
Sensitive but Unclassified

Review of Nonimmigrant Visa Issuance Policy and Procedures

Memorandum Report No. 02 - XXXX

December 2002

Introduction

The Office of the Inspector General (DIG) reviewed Uie procedures and processes
involved in ths issuance of nonimmigrant visas (NTVs) at U.S. missions worldwide at the
request of Senator Charles Grassley. The objectives of the review ware to determine
wrx :her: 1) visa policies adequately satisfy ihu requirements of national security, 2)
procedures in place, particularly concerning the? waiver of peroonal appearances and rh*
invx Ivemcm of dive) agencies in the process, are appropriate. 3) consular ofSccra and staff
are iroperly trained to adjudicate visa applications to maintain national security, utid 4.1
resc urccs are adequate TO meet the demands of visa processing.

This study was co.ndiicl.erl prior tn the passage of the Homeland Security Act';
however, the recommendation! were made taking the^ct into consideration and with the
;liif that they are consistent with its provisions.

kground and Summary: Visa Processing, a Svstem Currently Inadequate to the

The events of September 11, 2001, Aotably changed our perspective on the admission
o f ; liens to the Uniied Suuea. Li i-etrospeet., the previous emphasis on immigraLiun left the
Un ted States vulnerable to the threat of aliens intent not on remaining in the country 15
irru liin-iinis;. but in harming American citizens and institutions. The NTV issuance process as
it a::isted before September 11 was inadequate to jneei that threat. Since September 11 steps
have been token to address this problemlthough existing policies find resources remain
inadequate. This report addresses several elements of this issue including policy, staffing,
secure workspace, and training. A classified annex addresses findings concerning the Visas
Vijrer Program established in 1993 to identify potential terrorists and make th«ir names
available in chc Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS).

<(/ NTV processing has long been the largest function of most consular sections abroad,
^jj '^ nti i:.5na ci'irtrmous resource demands, both human and physical, and only recently providing
Nj thei DepartiTient %vith a unique source of revenue used in part to expand and motleniixc visa
ser-'ices. V^Tiili* demand for NTv's to travel to the United Stales grew, security concerns ai
X^1 / enibaisies njul consulates abroad rapidly escalated as arueks oti overseas missions"
\ ini:rcoscd. Traditionally the fbcu.s of concern has been on immigration, leg«<l iinO illegal.

1 Pur. L. No. 107-296 (2002).

* Li this ripon "mission" is undasluod lo mean (lie dfliis'e U.S. presence in a foreign iounny under Ihc auiiiuiiiy
^ . °f rl'e "ehief of /mssion". (Le ambascador. F.mbuiies and consulate z:t referred livas '^justs", usually by the
\ - i cii / in v.-bi^h Oicyaie lycatsd, e.g. Cmbassj1 London or "posu in du: Middle Eastx)
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DISCUSSION DRAFf
Sensitive but Unclassified
Pressures to increase immigration to the United States have gro^-n in periods of economic
prosp cnty in our country and hardship iliroad. The "pull" factor of American prosperity and
the ";ju.sh" factor* of economic hardship and political and social unrest abroad have focused
r.oDjjessional aeiion and Department policy on immigration. As a result of this emphasis,
stating, training, and procedures were nil directed at deteiwining whether visa applicants
WCT: "intending immigrants." Other considerations, including identifying potential terrorist,
raidvsd less attention. The Department's major security consideration was the safer/ of the
emt assies and consulates and their employees rather lhan wiih Ilifc visa process. To that end,
effo us were made lo reduce the number of visitors to consular sections.

The immigration and Nationality Act (INA). as amended" considers all aliens
upp ying for a nonimmigrant visa permitting entry to the United States to be intending
immigrants, unless they can prove otherwise to the officer adjudicating the NTV application.
Tht burden ol'proofis on the applicant, and a finding that the applicant has nui mfci the
burlen und^r section 214b4 is the basic and most frequent reason Tor an NTV denial. The
IN.'!. also contains a list of specific categories of applicants who arc automatically ineligible,
inclading convicted felons and terrorists. The primary tool available lo the aUjudiesiinjs
eojiiul_a/ officer in preventing NIV issuance to these categories of applicants is CLASS.

9/11 Closed by Statute

All applicants for A NIV are required by law and'reguTaUon (DMA sec. 222«, 22 Qr'K.
•'.02 : 9FAM4U01 N3 and 9 FAM 41.102 N2/3)Tb appear for a personal]
cr, the LNA provides for a waiver of this personal appeiirance rRqvircme^t-rf'it is J
df.?.:ned TO be in the national interest. The rapidly UK leasing volume ofjpplications v^
beginning in. the 1970s, coupled with »crioiis staffing, led to policy-decisions that encouraged
consular officers to waive personal appearances far ever lar^ur^ombers of NIV -applicants.
passage of visa waiver legislation ft! some cDuatrii.£? u#i$& automation of the MTV
pic ;ss5 in tha 199Us made the visa process more secure, but significantly mine time-
consuming due to more requited steps in the process. This increased pressures nn visit
ssc.ion* to "work smarter" and seek any efficiencies possible ia the NTV process.

All of these changes occurred in an environment that sought to maximize Iftgitimats

travel to *h« United States, while identifying illegal immigrants and preventing them &om
ira\. Indeed, in 1998 the General Accounting Office was asked to study the ttiusca of
/is:i delays at posts around the world ^ith an eye towards speeding up the NIV process
(Tourist Visas Processing Backlogs Persist at U.S. Consulates T.eltcr Report, 03/13/9S,
Despite the firsi ailack on Ibe World Trade Center,

' P;it>. L No X2-H4. js amended (1952); 8 U-S.C. 1101.

*S IJ.S.C. 1124(2002).
5 1 .t;i ui' Visa v.'r.ivcr Couiim'es: Andorra. AusTia. ^iwtrAiy, BaljiunJ, Bmn«i, Denmark, Jrinlanci, France,
y, Tcelind, Irclafld. Italy. Jipan. LiwhiccsteuarruTeiDbours, Monaco, The Netherlands, New Zealand.
. Poncsal. San Marino, Smjapo;1*, Sluv*uia, Spaia. Sweden, Su-iteerland, Umtcd Tiicgdom, ond
Uruguay.
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DISCUSSION DRAFT
Sensitive but Unclassified
sec nity WCTC perceived as problems primarily for U.S. missions abroad where large numbers
of \ appiiCiinis queuing in Jiyul uf the chancery were perceived as a. threat. llipJouiauc
sec'.iriiy officers continued to work with consular officers to limit and control access to
uoumlar sections.

Also adding to the complexity of managing N1V operations worldwide are the vast
disi: MI lies amon^ the over 200 visa-issuing posls. The majority of NTVs are issued ai a
handful of posts, including Mexico City and Seoul, staffed hy dozens of officers and directed
by i cntor consular officers. Many more posts issue a few thousand NIVs annually and are
staffed by a few officers of lesser rank and experience. Some missions issue even fewer
NTVs and also experience a low demand for other consular services. These posts are usually
staffed by one officer, who may perform consular operations in conjunction with other
mw si on responsibilities.

As NTV' demand grow steadily from the 1970s through the 1990s, consular managers,
encouraged hy Washington, have addressed the lack of officers with a variety of approaches,
oftnQ referred to under the term "customer service." The-se approaches have included
"in:;rview by exception" and a variety of other means of limiting the number of applicants
aci .ally visiting consular sections. At the same time, the Bureau or Consular Affairs (CA)
spent millions of dollars on modem computer-based processing equipment designed to
improve the security of the system. Although providing tools that, properly used,
siglifitcinllv enhanced the: security of Uje U.S. visa aud the adjtJclication process, rlmie
developments have slowed the process and required more hurnan resources. Visa sections
\(&\"; had ro make hard decisions about how to allocate their limited rcsouj'ces to manage the
woflcload.
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DISCUSSION DRAFT
Sensitive but Unclassified

pigur i 3: g/nni vi» AppMest'anj; Issuances, »na 'Wttiing, rueai mar* laso-iaxti
•i-c •<<*»« BjmM'iiU-':

Mi: »:

1535 13DJ 7i«» ?oqi

f.'olo,
3ou-?»i Sulo Dwarimwii dab.

This survey' addresses Lhe several aspects of NfV processing at posts abroad under the
po i:y direction of the Visa Office in the ljurcau of ComaulM Affairs. The report identifies
weaknesses and rpcorwntinds actions to remedy Ihe problems. The assumption underlying
the sc recommendations is that national security is the first priority, hut that the need to limit
ill«:t;a! immisratidn also remains an important priority. The ficldwork for this survey was
eoT.pleiwi prior IQ the passage oflegistalion creating Lhe Department of Homeland Security
an 3 vesting it with\auihority in the visa process. 'iTie finding? and recommendations made in
this report remain valid cvcn/with this transfer of autlionty.

Methodology
OIG conducted thi$ veviaw b«r*'een July aira November 2002. Two questionnaire*
w:;r i sen! to all visa Is&uing postyis listed in Appiwidix A. The first surveyed policies oiid
pior.cdurss conccmiag N1V/ application and adjudication. The second, a classified
qut-ulkuuiaire, surveyed the Viab Viper Prog/aan. Sxtii visits were condiicted'by OIG
insp ec-tors at 27 posts, ws listerf hi Appendix B. The posts visited wew selected because they
•: in the Middle East, or because they processed h-igh numbers of applications from aliens
intertst. Site visits included interviews with ambassador:? and deputy chids of
(OCM). agency heads, section chiem, and consular personnel. OIG fieldwork also
ireluded personal intRrvieys in "Washingtonp
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DISCUSSION DRAFT
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Department of State Bureaus

Bureau of Consular Affairs

Executive Office
Visa Office
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Bureau of Human Resfturccs
Foreign Service .Institute

Oth st
Central Intelligence Agency
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Immigration and Naturalization Service
National Security Agency
Drug Eaforccrrieui
L.S. Customs Service
General Accounting Office
U.S. Secret

fvfajor contributors to this report were Charles Anderson (issue area manager), Rob«ri
Mu ;tain (project manager), and inspectors, Douglas Elliee, Norbort Kriejj, Joe T.ihnstein,
K..n: Lutz. John Pinker, Marlene Schwartz, and Michele Truirt. The portion of this report
wiih the Visas Viper Program is classified.

Policy Iss

y. /a ivRr^ pf Parsorial Appearance

Each visa issuing post establishes its own policy and conditions for a waiver of
cer.onul appearance. Policies differ widely based on local conditions and the perceived risk
i. f Irani! or security threat. At some posts The policy is not clearly articulated and wide
differences exists in ho*' restrictive or expansive individual policies are. (.'.A and the
i cgional bureaus have not evaluated or approved these policies in the past. Tn general, posts
H-ith low refusal raies and a lower incidence of fraud in the context of 2Mb have had the
;no;;t liberal waivers of personal appearance. Posts with, higher incidence oi'Iravirf usually
:'sq;iirii i.riUirvicv.'s of a much hichei percentage of applicants. After September .11 most of
:Hc posts visited as part of ihis survey told the inspectors thai they had sharply restricted
ivai vers of personal appearance and now interview virtuaUy all appHcanls. Oth«r post
sspscinlly Jiigh volume posts, contiuue to interview a lower percentage of applicants put have
nevertheless significantly increased i.hts percentage of intavfews. Almost all posts reponed
sonie waivers of personal appearance, especially for the lowest risk categories of foreign
dip omats and U.S. government-sponsored travelers.
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DISCUSSION DRAFT
Sensitive but Imclnssified
Personal appearance waiver programs utilize a variety of tools that have been
to minagr workload and reduce the security threat to overseas missions.
Applications arc accepted by mail in many countries. In others, applications arc submitted
tlirnii£h a drop box, ii courier agency, or a travel agency. At a few posts applications ar«i
rec- :ivcd from airlines, banks, OT other companies approved by posts. Government ministries
ant agencies have also been allowed to submit applications directly. Although Ihc waiver of
ihe personal appearanc* requirement is viewed by the applicant as a. benefit, the various
programs serve lo limit crowds and allow for efficient scheduling of applicants who are
required to appear. One consular manager noted, "I walva the personal appearance whenever
il c-;r.elits yur visa operation, not to accommodate the applicant, regardless of perceptions."
Th;5 was said in the context of the officer just having waived the personal appcaiaiicc o.f an
iui'ii'iiationally Vuown entertainer whose appearance would e&'ia inly have disrupted normal
operations.

As consulates were closed in many countries and communications were improved, the
lumber of visa-issuing posts was reduced. Ac NIV operations vvere consolidated, the
pressure to waive personal appearances incre<i$ed Potential applicants sought referrals lo
avoid traveling;, sometimes for long distances and across intemalional boundaries, to the
mission for an interview. The waiver of personal appearance policy at any post will affect
the asc of the post's referral policy. The more restrictive policies increase ihe number of
request* made to other elements of the mission fur referrals/ Applicant assume thai a
referral will guarantee the issuance of an NTV. . ^.s^tt^ff"
^<x2£* ^s*"**"^^
Policies coucemio/lhe waiyp of personal appearance Hhuukl livn-u infill, and
ini-erriewing tcchniques'improveflrTHowcver, interviewing all applicants Mill not entirely
eliiiiinate the risk of a potential terrorist with a visa entering, the United States. Commiued
<mi.l trained terrorists will probably he ahl< to defeat interview procedures. Because tl>e
limitations on the N!V interview, even with better training for the interviewers and more time
for '.hurouali questioning, there is no guarantee thai terrorists will be IdeiuifierJ. The
m,tf rv'i«w is no l a subsritule for good intelligence information available to visa adjudicators
through CLASS. /- &+ *.

A/rtatter halaTice is needed btJrvieen interviews, waivers of personal appearance, and

doc'ancnt review and analysis The interview iyi fundamental information collection tool thai
oUen improves the consular officer's ability to/wsess an appliciail's credibility.'. It enables the
visa adjudicator to look behind pat or evasivc/answers on an application form and it adds
ir.ic.jrity to the adjudication process. Information can be verified and applicants held
personally responsible for their statements.' Waivers uf personal appearance gre sometimes
bur miKi be carefully managedj
9/11 Closed by Statute

" A r^feml is 3 rtcommCDdarioD by ilic cbief of auotbcr section o/ihe miisior. that ihe cnn.ular qeL-rion issue A
NIV withuul au iniurvicw. This procers, intended in part as » nwnagenwat control to provide acvunntabili^, is
&£d in
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DISCUSSION DRAFT
Sensitive but Unclassified
Recommeudation 1: The Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Visa Services, should
dewlor) and fmplemem ii polky requiring each mission w create a personal appearance
war'cr program that is based on local conditions and approved by the chief of mission.
Projiam requirements should be in writing and available to the entire mission. Bach
proj yarn should he reviewed and approved by t"c Office of Visa Services anJ the i
rs^i >nal bpt&it^ Anv changes should be submitted for review and approval pnor to b&ng
»: CA/VO)

/ Tra- -el Agency Referral Program

/ Travel agents have played a role in the visa process since at Jeasi the early 1.9\0s.
Son .A posrs find that agencies are helpful in collecting applications from clients and '
J-^==-~^ sob; nirting them for NIV processing. In countries where NJVs ore not ofr.cn required, sv.
./•" 1 i hclc explain the process to applicants. Travel agents often provide a first revje-.v and r-nsure^
/ Vv* Vir" / Ti::it ctf"Unn biuiic requirements are met before applications arc- sent to the visa section. These.
^-N -tr / include a valid passpoii and a coin,[.'l«*d application. Improved technology fesulr^d in some
appiovcd travel c»jent?perfonni.ng initial data entry, taking the burden of that task from
com ular scaiuu employees. Having the applications in ha/)d also allows jjosis io prescrceti
thcjii and schedule necessary interviews, while specifying any additional inforniatioii or
documentation required. Travel ajencics have proved to be useful at a limited number of
pos:;. Tn>: majority of visa issuing posts, however, have found travel agents either
uniVtcrcsrcd m the extra work or unreliable. At present travel agent referral programs exist at
3S j.-osts Uiai arc listed in Aypuidix C.

There arc wide variations in how travel agency referral programs (TARPs) are
usr,'.'jlished ajid arimiru'stertd. There are no standard criteria and no guidance to recruit and
scJc^.-t crave! agent?. Training varies from e.slensivc to almost nonexistent. Some posts meet
k'ith txavel agents to review regulations and discuss problems. Others rely on
telephone contacts. Sonic posts tgudyct validation studies ro identiri' the sources
of kid eiiies, including those from travel agents. Others had never done so, and CA guidance
oji conducting ^-alidatioi) studies is not widely known or followed' Some posts have
removed travel age/Us from the program, while others have not. Some posts include their
1'AKP in the Chief of Mission annual certification and risk assessment review.* Others do
not. E>;ix-pi where all applications were channeled through travel agents, mere is uo evidence
tha: travel i'.««iis were: being used to submit visa applications fov terrorist suspects. VTicrc
era"-:! agents had been dropped lirom a program, or pro-ams stopped entirely,, the problems
ofl;:i related to illegal immigration cases.

All applications submitted through travel agents must be processed through the
CLASS name check system and adjudicated by an officer. In most cases these applications
,ire f.uhjscwd io the same scrutiny as a!) other appJicarionS- However, there are incidences

7 Tiu; guicLuiie ii contained in 93 Stale 046225 aad svailable oa the CA/fPP

' 2 -AM 022.5. IE compliance with the Federal Managers' financial Integrity Act (31 U.S. C. 3512), requires
duYf; of mission is rtpori yearly on die «atui ofmanajcment coawols aad financial systems.
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DISCUSSION DRAFT
Sensitive but Unclassified
where, m l^ast in the past, applications ^rtJrmttcd thio^^i travel agents were not reviewed,
rigorously as those from other iource§/

Recommendation 2: The DepaTUQGin should create a model travel agent referral program
that iieludes regular reviaw ofparticipating navel agencies and .regiilsu- validation studies.
The Department should thctfscnd this model to all visa issuing posts requiring each to
est.vlish its own written travel agency referral program policy consistent with lotaj
conoiiions and send a copy of the resulting policy, and any subsequent modifications. 10 ihe
Office of Visa Services/prior to implementation^ (Action: CA/VO, in coordination with
regional bureaus.) ^ ^

CA Over&ighr and P^rocetlural Guidance

C A has allowed posts to develop their own procedures and. to some degree, policies
con :=rning ihe visa processj as long as they were consistent wilh law and regulations. Posts
are f squired to use approved forms ar d to clear post-specific forms with CA. In recent
CA developed standardized signage J 3r consular sections.-, and the Bureau of Overseas
Building Opersiinn); dftvdoperi standards for interviewing booths. However, oversight lias
bee: uneven, and, as local conditions change and olticers rotate, posts often make changes
without nolii* to ami approval from »Washington. CA frequently learns of these changes
only when problems develop. Some of these procedures are well conceived and could be
adopted elsewhere, but there is no central clearing procedure. At least three systems of
cradling Visas Cyndw clearances'1 have been developed by posts with high numbers of
clecirance cases to track, but none was in general use and none had been submitted to
VVa:hini4ion. Oth i-r posts that hove not developed a system arc struggling to keep track of
the;;': casss.

Various posts arc initiating new methods of handling visa applications and applicants
to simplify the process and free up more staff lime fix critical, security related functions.
Onu post no longer uses officers to reinterview Section 221(g) cases that h^ve been
, but simply has a Foreign Service national (FSN) determine that documents
subt.iiued are adequat* to meet the requirements for issuance. AooTlier is ccsnrracting with a
collier 5cr-'icc, avoiding the need for visa applicants to collect their passports and immigrant
vis;i» ;ii ine iii'insular section. A third pu^i is coiiiracikig out the NTV7 remote data entry
fun: lion to its appointment system contractor to preclude the n*«<] for section siaffio
the laborious task of electronically kcying-in basic applicant biographic information.
/
Document fraud is endemic in $r»m* parts of the world and could lead to $«a:uriry
in visa processing. The activities of fraud prevention units (FPUs)

ssi Coadofis 'he name given lo 2 request froui die post to Washington for clearance to iisuc a vLsa iu a
, rnal ; nArinnal hetween ihe ages of 16 aad 45 fron a clat sifted list of counlrics. A visa cajfiflot be i5£.icd without
J a pr • irlve respoas? from Washington .igencies.
\ |0 Si:ii9n221g of'Jhc IN-* (S U.S.C. 1 20 1(j;).) provides for a quaii-reJusal when an applicaai is fouad to be
. V' • iaciias l spscific document ur clearanue bui is found in he nlhcr*ise qualified. On?C th? dt-ilcicin; Y is satisfied
C jff ih: ciss Cf^i be issued.
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DISCUSSION DRA>T
Sensitive but Unclassified
noi .:ffcciivdv coordinated or integrated into the visa systems technology. CA's Office of"
Frai'.i Prevention Programs similarly lacks full integration into ihe visa process. The results
of fi lud investigations are not systematically collated or stored in ihe Coneular Consolidated
Djit: ibitse that could be linked with other information on pertinent applicants. Visa officers
com n ue lo vvork with link, information or training when examining applicants' documents or
rii'vi; wing their travel history. The current database is incomplete and not linked to other
ustJ'ul domestic databases. Posts that process large volumes unemployment related visas arc
not linked with U.S. databases thai could be used to verify financial and credit data or job
hisi.ry.

9/11 Closed by Statute

Recommendation 3: The Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Visa Services should

dtv; lop standard operating procedures^ covering all aspects of die visa application, process
appropriate to different sue missions. Evciy visa-issuing post should be required to propose
wjiiVOT, posr-spftdfic modifications lo these standard opera U nig procedures and submit them
for Tsvjew and approval by CA'VU. Changes in the procedures should b* eubTn.invin' to
C.VVO for approval prior to implementation. (Action: CA/VO)
In the months after September 11, CA has struggled to revise or establish policies and
pro:edures lo iuklress the new awareness of the threat of potential terrorists. This effort has
incji:ded nevv clearance procedures and clunge.? in extsiing procediues. Previously, for
example, jnost vVashingion clearances had an established time period, 20 or 30 days, after
which, if no dero^iory inforniatlonwas received at post, a visa could be issued. This
prorcdure has been tightened@how^equire an affirmative clearance from Washington- A
ncv,- clearance procedure, "Visas Condor." was required for certain aliens from a classitied
list n.f countries. These insIruclious have been modified several limes, and some wcrix- iisucd
and remain in classified cables. Officers in die field have 6trv>ggJed to apply these regulations
1:01 -;cr]y and Jceep currrat with clianges as they appear. Tc^v consular sections are approved
to i'.ere classified infonnation. As a result, (hesf.i;<struc.tions ai'e often noi available to the
adj jdicaiing officers where and when they ore n**ded. It should be i:ored rlisr rhe new
cl&irajic* procedures, especially Visaj Condoryh<iv« uct identified any potential terrorists
applying for visas. The time spent processina'lhtst: elegances may actually distract consular
officers from rntcivicwing and other tasks barter suited to making the proce$5 mftnt wcurc. li
wo .-Id l>e most effective if one database check wcic used and thai be made as comprehensive
ar- ])?ssible. IfCLASS contained an up-tQadatc list of known or^Juspfiaed terrorists it would
prcr-i'de the best defense against terroris«"obtaining a visa.
Re.commendation 4: The Department should review the o/earance procedures i
sin :s September 11 and determine which clearance requirements are providing improved
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DISCUSSION DRAFT
Sensitive but Unclassified
sec jrity. Such a. review should, inter ajia, address Ihe development of a single database
chs ;lr for all vi.su. application? After this review, clearance procedures should be revised and
ncv instructions issued- (Action: D/HS, ID coord hiatioo with CA/YO)

Keommendfltiou 5: All NTV processing instructions should be issued in unclassified fomi

so that they can be readily available in the visa section of every post. If it is inipossiblf: io
declassify all the itiiUijciions, the Department should create classified storage areas in each
consular section to allow for storage of material classified up to the secret level. (Action:
OJJO in coordination with DS)

Executive Oversight

srfto and atv supcivlsed by the

ami isssador and DCM, collectively referred to ,LS the executive office. The IpCM is tlia
revj ?wjng officer for all junior officer efficianc f rcpons. Consular manager! are directly
supervised by the DCM and reviewed by the ambassador. Although by la\ aii officer cannot
be crdcrcd to issue- a NIV, the executive office oVrhc mission etui influence individual cas«s
overall visa policy. Othev sections ot'ilie mission often appeal to the executive office for
the issuance of certain visis - for example, the commercial section may appeal for favorable
for Travelers seeking to visit the Unilw,Stat« as pan of a trade mission.
local iigures often appeal directly to the rt Jautivp affiee for rcconsicltration of the
vs: refusal of a relative or friend. General NlV piMicy can also be influenced when the
anil -assador believes refusal rales are loo highoor personal appearance policies arft loo strict.
A
. tl>cicscc«ive-&S:tcc often has a. more direct role to play in NTV
ID 4 All visa, refusals vwd a percentage of issuances must be reviewed by an officer1:
rn/isor. In a large section, this review is performed by the senior, and experienced,
CCM.1 .iular manager.!

9/11 Closed by Statute

J Recent
instmctions (2002 State 111 136 and 2002 State 147564) provided guidelines for
pojis with only one consular officer on how oversight of th* visa function should be
pcrlyrmctl The problem of executive office influence over tln> adjudmaiion of visas is
coc-mon in missions with smal.1 consular sections.

Rerornmendatioii 6: The Department regulations requiring Ui* review of all NIV refusals
anc. a percentage of NIV issuances shnuld set forth procedures for doing so at posts where the
extcuiivc office is directly responsible for such reviews. Procedures should also be put into
effi: :t when tlie deputy chief of missio.a or aziibassiidyi is not trained to perform an adequate
rcvi iw. (Action: CA/VO, in coordioatiOD with HR)

The NI\ ref*n-al system is designed io facilitate the issuance of visas to those foreign
nationals whose travel is deemed to be clearly in U. S. government's interest. It is a formal.
 * - » - - — * « • w -r M*v.feU-ftr(Ut>U UH»/ .MJ ©Oil

i2.'lt>/u2 :0:CU ®202 647 7660 OIG/FO "S011

DISCUSSION DRAFT
Sensitive but Unclassified
policy and procedure (described in Appendix K of Volume 9 of the Foreign Affairs
) -.vhoie purpose is to record mission requests to expedite certain NlVs. When
pro jwfly administered, it is a useful method to facilitate visa issuance in cases that involve
U.S. government interests or promote U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Class "A" referrals
firorr. other embassy sections and agencies almost invariably lead the visa officer to waive ihe
personal appearance, because the applicant is personally known to the. referring officer who
clair.iSythdr proposed travel will promote U.S. national interests. The beneficiaries can also,
and ire likely to, be excused from a nc*' security advisory opinion requirement (Visas
Co/i'lor) mid are also likely to be exempted from the new Department ofJuslice "National
finny ExH Registration System" (NSEERS)."
/
individuals wha otherwise would not have mmMed for an NTV have sometimes
misused the referral system.!
9/11 Closed by Statute
\ With
i , aga; ist a Drug Enforcement Administration employee in Africa, arid a. Department o,. , . .
^—• Cor umerce employee in Mexico. / ^L s^t-J *—- .- 1

The Department has attempted to address the problem ofjmprepef-iwssion influence

on \. officer* by issuing clearer policies on NTV referrals intended to put responsibility for
Cli z "A" referrals with the referring agency head or scchoivthief (7.002 StAtft 096111).
The ;e instructions have helped clarify referral system policy and niakejt
wor id \«, ida.': Additional improvements need to lie implemented (
rcsp onsibiliry- and accountabi lit)' tor these requests ou tcs the actual refcrrcrs. M.-my rtfen'als
cire icrually initiated and promoted by FSNs in the rraamng otftcer's section or a^t-icy. The
intlivjOiial FSN is not mentioned on the referral forp&JMily ihe (American) section chief
transmitting ih; form. Signature responsibility for sypminin?, the Class "A" form ciuicrntly is
limited only to section/agency heads. {Although die chief of inlsr-ion is uliirnalcly responsible
for enforcing th* referral system and ensuring that iidjudicating officers are free 10 follow
thei .-judgment in all NTV' cases, chiefs of mission may also submit Class "A" referrals.) The
rcitf Tin.si officers for Class "A" NTV referrals do not specifically spell out their accountability
on tne form. Kn.r example, a certification could read as follows: "I certify that, to tic best of
my uiou-iedge. this alien does tot pose a threat to the safety or national security of ths U.S."
'On! • a chief of mission should he authorized 10 waive Class "A" referral beneficiaries from
rhs visas Condor security clearance requirements.

Rec ommendation 7; The Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Visa Seivicesi should
i\irt ier strengthen the MV refeaa! system by adding an accountability certificarioti to Class
"A* referral forms. If a Foreign Service national is recommending a Class "A" referral to his
.•?eci ion chief, that Foreign Service national's name should be included on rhe form. (Actiou:
CAVO)

Xs \* ^*»j»»< *v> {414 ^

jT uC'i'nsiiiar ofn:*r: rriaia the ducrcuoa 10 requir* personal appoarauce snct name checl^in all cases:
VT . ''* SI..K 0961.'. of May IS, 2U01. ''Ncv/Guidauor oji Visa Referral Systems." s«ts ihe stanclards for rcfcnnls i'or
'' \)L ill niL»sioa '.kmcms and defines executive responsibility. .
12/16/0:: J O : 04 ©202 647 7660 OIG/FU

,1,
DISCUSSJON DRAFT
Sensitive but Unclassified ^ V"1 \ v vf

immendation 8: The Department should require that only upon the specific \vritten X-
\n of the chie
\
lion ihe Visas Condor clearance'requirement. (Action: CA) „

^<
Consular sections, responsible for the visa function and providing services lot -^j,-^
;>
American citizens abroad, are staffed by consular cony13 officers and by junior officers from
all i ones who Traditioaally serve at least one year in a/consular position during their first four
yea -s in the Foreign Service. Tllis "rite of passage" for most officers anticipating careers in
the. idinimstranivc;, economic, public nffnirs, of political conca is often considered a period to
be. <;ndured arid kepi as short as possible. The Bureau of Human Resources (HR) created
increasing numbers of "rotational assignments" worldwide in whicVi junior officers serve one
year in a consular s-ectioa follow&d by a year in K rosilion in another section of an embassy
conesponding to the officer's future career track. KR favors this policy because it gives
brc adcr experience to new officers. The policy, however, makts cousalar section managers
iniM perpeuuJ triiinin^ officers; frequently, junior officers bear the burden of training new
arri'/als •!•? well.
As hiring failed to match attrition, than* were fewer experienced nud-Level consular
co }•: ofticers ro till mid-level positions worldwide. Jiuuor ofTic£rsC$ij#?rw«r^isigned to
these positions in "sireich" Jissignments. The Department also developed a variety of other
sna'.esics to fill vacant consular positmnsj sucK ;i.<i hiring American family members, iuicl
encouraging C.ivil Sci^'icc employees to tike one-time assignments to vacant positions
abroad (excursion tours). Other strsregies, however, have not be.«ti developed, including
hi ring language qualified applicants on limited nonrdnewable Foreign Service appointments
for up 10 five years, as authorized by Section 309 of the Foreign Service Act, as amended.14 •
Worldwide consular staffing, particularly in large visa units and at one-person
consular sections, is inadequate to meet the increased demand. Established positions are
unfilled for long periods, or are fitltiJ by inexperienced junior officers. The dearth of mid-
c;ireer officers is particularly evidentJ
9/11 Closed by Statute

ilccommcndauon y: The Department should discontinue most junior officer rotational

asfsi jyuncnbi ihat include oru: year in a consular section and insiead ^ssiga each junior officer
to a two-year consular tour. (Action: HR !n coordination >vitli CA)

. ^. , _.. _.
C< nels ihe Department tf.rm for l generalise officer's functional specialty, Tbfii'e are five:
c. polirical. economic, and public
1: 22 U.S.C. 3949 f200').

12
 121013
12/1B.-02 :.0:0l ®;02 647 76CO OIC/FO IgjOU

DISCUSSION DRAFT
Sensitive but Unclassified
Recommendation 10: The Bureau of Humsm Resources should utilize all alternate stiffing
pioj.iams that are available, including Wring languugtf-HualiJlcd employes on limited nou-
carssr appointments, to staiT consular sections. (Action; HR)

Consular positions typically are classified using criteria that emphasize workload
statistics and supervisory responsibilities. Before .September 1 1, position classification did
not jocus primarily on the political ramifications, complexity, or scope of decisions that
con:; aim y flVers w^re required to make. Virtually all one officer consular sections were
graced as junior officer positions, even though, incumbent*; had to respond to and make
decisions on the gamut of consular responsibilities.

Two-officer consular sections are typically supervised by an FS-03 tenured consular

offv;:r. Junior o fficws, as noted above, often fill positions at this level because there arc
mar y more FS-03 positions available iliau officers at grade- to fill them. For some officers,
the*:: arc their first assignments in the Foreign Service. The Department has attempted to
militate this problem by assigning seasoned officers as regional consular officers ^ho can
-;e and mentor their more junior colleagues. Some regional officers supervise their own
sections along with their mentoring responsibilities; others hava no post specific
?L«i jrnments. Regional officers are assigned up to 15 posts. They have no supervisory
res; oneibihties for these post.1? and arc limited to advising the consular officers and posi
. They visit posts as best they can, often less than once a year.

In the smallest sections, the designated consular officer traditionally is nsr,ign«d many
por ."ulios. Nonconsular rcsponsibih'ties often are givwi precedence over consular duties and
dtliMd from the officer's responsibilily to be current on regulations, procedures, and
s, particularly in today's security conscious post-September 1 1 environment.

11: TUe Bureau of Human Resources, in conjunction with the Bureau of

Coi.sular Attairs, should review all consular positiori-5 to detennine appropriate position
clas sifitaiions 2nd grade 'in light of new complexities in consular work, security concerns,
antiierronst initiatives. (Action: HR, in coordination with CA/VO)

12: Tlic Department should establish procedures lo ensure that only

officer* who h.we completed at leiisl one consular assignmein'are assigned to a one-person
consular section. (Action: H'R in coordination with CA)

Re.i 'ommendftf ion 13: The Departm«Jt should iwsess and reallocate consular workloads
\voj Id wide, and. where missions do not have sufficient consular work to justify,.* full rime
con suliir position, tr> the extern possible, the work should be performed regionally. Any
dut.es that must be performed in country should be assigned to a tenured officer. (Action:
, i» coordination with HR)

Rei ommendnrion 14: The Department should conduct a worldwide review to determine
wh -.re regional consular positions, vested with supervisory responsibilities and mandated to
vi$;i each post quarterly, are appropriate and create the appropriate positions. (Action: C.\,
10 « oordin:uion with HR)
 10:05 0202 GAT 76eo DIG/TO

DISCUSSION DRAFT
Sensitive but Unclassified

RESOURCES

The review found that data concerning the number of consular officers assigned to
adj jdicate requests for NTV» is nut readily available. The present assignment process
prcjierly assigns consular officers to consular posilions. not to functions within tht positions.
It f jrther assigns consular cone ofllccrs to other, noncorcsular positions and does not calculate
the ;:ime spent by nonconsular junior officers doing consular work or officers on rotational
assi/jnmenis. Given all the variable, it is not possible to estimate staff hours devoled to NIV
processing within the rime paiod of this review. The resource assumptions made throughout
ihi > report are based nil the collective experience of the leaijo members.

Recommendation 15: The Bureau of Consular Affairs, in conjunction with the HR, should
sunly the utilization nf staff hours assigned to the various consular functions lo create a
basoliiie for the number of hours needftd to perform the consular work. (Action: CA, in
coo'dinatiou with HR)

Workspace Problems

Many consular sections have inadequate workspace. Access i.s sometimes poorly
controlled and often difficult due to security concerns. Interview-- windows arc frequently
tc tally inartequatfi with little or no privacy and arrangements that male* speakinsj or hearing
almost impossible. Many booths are outdated and do not have space for terminals that would
a. low the officer to do name checks or make online cose notes. Line of sight for supervision
not avail.-i.bk, even in recently renovated sections.

The Balanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 200215 requires thai, "all
consular officers responsible for adjudicating visa applications, before undertaking to
pcronu consular responsibilities, receive specialized training in the effective screening of
visa applicants who pose a jifitential threat to the safely or security of the United States. SucK
ofncsrs shall be specially and extensively trained in the identification of aliens in^Jmi^ible
section 212(aJ(3) (A) tuid (D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. interagency and
ional inlclli^ence shar.it.ig regarding terrorist and terrorism, aud cultural sensitivii.v
visa applicants."

Visa adjudicators sawu be nblc tn interview applicants in their native language and be
faniiliar with local culture a&A conditions, but they are often sent to post without language
training or area studies. The/Department intentionally restricts language training for first-
;\nO second-tour officers, because it is reluctant tu invest much time and money in an

u r.;b. L. No. 107-173(2002).

14
 •« >/
12'-lli'02 10:05 S202 647 7660 CUCi/l-U

DISCUSSION DRAFT
Sensitive but Unclassified
officer «/ho nii^ht nol make the Foreign Service a career. In addition, training it:
hard" languages is necessarily leugthy, requiring up to two years • Q long time for a
candidate tiviny to establish professional competence and gain tenuif.

The Department considers a speaking and reading level of 3 on a 5-point scale (S-
3 /'A -3) lo be a pro fcssiwial competency. Average students reach lu« 3/3 level after fuur or
five months of concentrated full-time training, if they are learning one of the "easy"
languages sucb as French or Spanish. To reach Ihc same level in a "hard" language, such as
Cliiif.se or Arabic, normally takes two years of full-time study. The second year is taught
overseas in a country where that language is spolcen.

Many language-trained consular officers have reported that the training was nol
tnik.rcd to their needs, particularly interviewing. Little or no training is given in makipp,
e(Tb:.;ivc use of an interpTCtcT, although KSN viti clerks often translate on the %'isa line.

9/11 Closed by Statute

"Aica srudies" coui'ses. wlu'ch familiaiize students with the social and pulitical
cull ires cf a region, generally do nol provide Ihe information visa yflkers must nseu. Puti-
s pec i lie language insights and inten'iswing techniques, acquired during a two- or three-year
assi.jmncni, arc rarely gassed on to succcssoi-s because of pervasive staffing gaps.

KccommendatioiL 16: The Department shouid require language training for consular
p'Obitiuni, and all cousular ufJicers should be required to be able to coirixiiuiiic-aie at least ai
the '?as»c level (S-2/R-2'). (Action: KR)

Recommendation 1 7: language training should be adapted to serve better the needs of

officers r.nH .^houlii include int=;rvie*-ing techniques. (Action: M/FSI)

Jiecownien nation 18: The Dcparonent should assign officers v.'ith appropriate Middle East
'ani.nages and area knowledge to major vi.<ca>processing posts outside the Middle Rasf.
(Action; HR)

Visa officers' interview skills are sometimes weal;./

9/11 Closed by Statute

12.'16'02 iO:Oi 'JT202 64" "660 OlG/FO ig)016

DISCUSSION DRAFT
Sensitive but Unclassified

Kecnmniendatkm 1 V: The Department should. ftBxtfhe development of interview Training

mannals designed to^tisfyvjsa officers' ncofiSmd dkpand the basic consular course to
include this additional training.

CLASS and the Visas

The; Department created the visas vipt^ program i;i August 1993 in response lo the
»;ecl to improve information sharing among foreign policy, intelligence and law enforcement
a;zenci« of ihe U.S. government. Current Viper instructions are contained in 2002 Stale
1 .57:520. The program is designed to increase lemaian reporting from Foreign Service posts
abrc ad by providing a consular channel for "watch listing" suspected terrorists who .may ill
some future time apply for a visa to the United States. It is important that the list is
prospective;. To qualify for wiUehlistin^ there must be information that would provide
"reasonable suspicion" that the individual has or might engage in terrorism against Hie
IMued States or its interests., but it docs not require that the indivi dual have ever applied or
attempted TO apply for a visa in the past.

; viper information is collected at each visa issuing post by terrorist lookout

SKS (fbnncrly Visas Viper Committees). These committees included a broad range
oj'nu'ssion elements. The committee is chaired by the DCM and a consular section
reprrseniative acts d$ coordinator. Names and biographic information on persons believed
e1ie:bl<? for watch-listing are submitted by cable to Washington, and a decision i.s made by
the ]3ure3.u of Information and Research as to their inclusion.

Th* names of those idantified as poteatiaJ terrorists are added to CLASS. CLASS Js
the single watch list available to consular officers adjudicating visas, and every visa applicenr
must be name checked patu lo adjudication and issuance. CLASS is the best tool lo consular
oifii;ers to prevent visa issuance to terrorists.

OTG conducted a review of the visas viper process as part of this survey of visa
is;;u mce procedures. The findings and recommendations are contained in a classified portion
of this report. For the purposes of this unclassified portion the findings can be summarized
as fuj]y ws. The visas vipcx program is a valuable luol in ihe war on terrorism and the effort
to strengthen American security. More resources should be devoted to the program,
hcv-cvcr. and the guidance should be clearer. The headquarters of the participating age/icies
sh Duld have a larger role in the program and give it a higher priority.

Si mmary

Until lie events of September 1 i, the visa process was seldom considered a major
cement of national security. This is so despite the fact that after the first attack on the World
Truic Cciitcr, Congress mandated the issuance of machine readable visas and CLASS name
ch xks worldwide, while authorizine a visa application fee to provide fundins to rnalce this
12/10'02 10:06 'S'202 C4T 7660 OtC/FO

DISCUSSION DRAFI
Sensitive but Unclassified
possible. The Visas Viper Program w^ also created. The post-September 1 1 era should
hiiVt! witnessed immediale and dramatic changes in CA's direction of tbt: visa process. This
h:.s act happened. A fundamental readjustment by Department leadership regarding visa
is ;iiince until item'&l has nor raten place. The Department still dots not fully appreciate the
cc n;;ular function as pan_pj.'a coordinated national effort to manage border security iuicl
implement the FNA, (fiTbothfcrevent the iravcl of those who might present risks to iht-s United
Star;? and its citizens and also to facilitaie legitimate travel. CA continues to experience
sl:oiTcom.inss that include;

• • Lack of uniformity in visa processing from post 10 post, and

• Lack of a planning staff to develop and pnxfapt options for consular input
inly border security initiative and directio

If the visa process is to be made inort secure, ii raySt be considered as a part of a

lavgsv process beginning wiih Ihe vis? process and continuing through the admission of aliens
to the United States and tracking them while they remain in this country. As f:ongre<;<;
rea-gnizeil when il mandated worldwide implementation of machine readable N'lV's,
financial and Imman resources must be provided to n&ilize These changes. The Department at
evc-y level must rethink its approach to this task and devote the necessary resources
efiit toil.

This review was bcfun before the passage of legislation creating the Department of
Security and mliug it with major responsibilities with regard to visas.
Nevertheless, the .findings of this report and $c recommendations reomin valid no matter
the ultimate authority for visa policy jfnd issuance resides.
 DISCUSSION DRAFT
Sensitive but Unclassified

December 11,2002
MEMORANDUM
/9/11 Personal Privacy
TO: OIG - Clark Kenl Ervin

FROM: FSI - {Catherine H. Peterson

o
SUBJECT: Prafl Inspection Memorandum Report orfVisa Issuance Policy and Procedures
Below, please find FSI's comments on recommendations 1,7 and 19 in the draft inspection
memorandum report. If you have anv questions, please pontnct Ms. Catherine J. Russell,
Executive Director for Management alj |

KS1 Response to OIG Drafl Inspection Memorandum Report on

Visa Issuance Policy and Procedures

Recomir.endaiion 17: Language training should be adapted to serve better the needs of consular
offlcecs ;md should include interviewing techniques. (Action: M/'FSI)

FSI concurs with the recommendation. Currently in most language curricula, there are
specialized modules developed in coordination with postS!=and FSI's Consular Training Division.
Language students assigned to consularpositions are given the opportunity to work with
consular modules in rhe laller stages of their scheduled training. The topics include interview
practice on the topics of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas as well a* arrests, deaths, welfare-
and-whereabouts of U.S. citizens, and telephone inquiries. There is also work with documents
such as birth and marriage certificates, government forms, etc. FSI isjjurrenlly updating
consular badecraft materials in Arabic jn_gonsultalion with posts and CA, andjplajjgjLojacpand
consular tradecraft training throughout the languagc'school. These materials will increase the
emphasis on interviewing skills.

Recommendation 19: The Department should fund the development of interview training
materials designed to satisfy visa officers' needs and expand the basic consular course lo include
this additional training. (Action M/FSI)
/~
FSI concurs with this recommendation. As noted bythe OIG^jluaConsular Training Division
already augmented the training previously provided on.inLcrvicwtng in ConGen. In addition,
/ we have developed a plan to use the expertise of an outside expert on interviewing, which is
/ intended 10 give ConGen students additional, substantial help in identifying illegitimate- travelers/
I applicant'.. We hope to give our students the benefit, of the knowledge of the best interviewing
experts in the U.S.

44