The Tay Bridge Disaster

The Tay Bridge was a lattice-grid railway bridge built across the Firth of Tay near Dundee, Scotland. It connected the city of Dundee to the suburb of Wormit, Fife on the other side of the firth. The bridge, designed by noted engineer Sir Thomas Bouch, was built of wrought and cast iron supported on concrete caissons. North British Railway was the main client of the bridge. The bridge was completed on 1st June 1878 after being passed safe by the Board of Trade (BoT). At its time, the Tay Bridge was the longest bridge in the world with a length of 3264m (Swinfen, 1994). The Tay Bridge consisted of 85 spans, reaching a total length of 3264m (Swinfen, 1994). 72 of these spans, each measuring 44 m in length were supported on spanning girders below the level of the track. The other 13 spans, numbered from 28-41 each measured 74m and had high girders spanning above the level of the track. This gave a clearance of 26.8m below the level of the track enabling shipping along the Tay. The girders were supported by piers reaching up to the track (for spans 28-41), while for the other 72 spans, the piers reached the supporting girders. The first 14 piers were made with a solid structure brick and masonry. The rest of the piers consisted of 6 cast iron columns, braced by wrought iron ties, struts and bars. The columns were essentially circular pipes with flanges at ends through which bolts connected one column on top of another. At the high girders section of the bridge, one column consisted of 7 such pipes bolted together at the flanges. Figure 2 shows the layout of the 6 columns Figure 2 on their foundations. The inner columns had inner diameter of 15 inches (OpenLearn) while the two outer columns measured 18 inches in diameter (OpenLearn). The outer columns were made to tilt slightly inwards offering more stability to the piers. Bracings were connected to the columns using lugs that were designed into the ends of the column pipes and fastened by bolts. The most important of these bracings were the diagonal ties in between the inner columns. These were the main wind loading braces of the structure. The columns were supported at the base by concrete caisson foundations that sat deep into the bed of the estuary. Two courses of brick masonry were laid between the base of the columns and the concrete caissons. The columns were bolted to the top masonry layer.

Work on site started on 22nd July 1871 (Swinfen, 1994). Work started from the South bank of the estuary, with piers being built onto solid rock foundations. Initially piers were to be built using brick and masonry, supported by foundations built into the rock shelf. However, after the first 14 piers, it was realized that the rock shelf was too deep below the river bed. A different approach was required. Piles were driven into the estuary bed to support the piers and the piers were redesigned to be made using lighter materials. Sir Thomas Bouch decided to use a space frame made up of cast iron columns and wrought iron braces. In February 1877, an accident occurred that showed the problem of high winds on the structure. As two high girders were being lifted into position, a strong gale blew them off their temporary supports and into the estuary below. When recovered, the girders were found bent and damaged. Due to time constraints, only one of the girders was replaced, the other one was repaired and positioned between piers 28 and 29, the 4th high girder span. Construction was completed in early 1878, and after extensive testing by Major-General Hutchinson, the bridge was opened to public on 1st June 1878 (Swinfen, 1994). On 28th December 1879 at 7:15 pm, the high girders section of the Tay Bridge collapsed into the Firth of Tay. A train, with 75 people on board was crossing the bridge at the time. Winds speed estimated at a Beaufort Force of 10/11 (75 mph) (Martin) was blowing along the Firth of Tay, at right angles to the bridge. The Tay Bridge Disaster is to date the worst structural failure in the British Isles. The Board of Trade ordered a full investigation into the collapse. Photographs of the bridge from different angles were taken and the site was analyzed. The high girders sections of the bridge had almost totally disappeared. 10 of the 12 piers had collapsed completely while two piers suffered partial collapse. Figure 5 to the left shows the two lowest tiers on pier 5 pointing towards East, indicating they fell in this direction during collapse.

Figure 5: Collapsed pier 5, looking west, upriver.

Figure 6 shows diagonal ties that have broken at the lug ends, and some bent due to buckling from compression. The horizontal struts keep the columns together. The strong base casting are missing their standing columns. Some piers had experienced upward movement of the top course of masonry on the windward side of the bridge (Figure 11).

Figure 6: Collapsed pier 5, looking west, looking upriver

Figure 7 shows the partially collapsed pier 3. The lowest tier of the structure is intact except for the diagonal wind bracing ties that attached to the base of the inner columns. These were the ties that experienced extreme tension force in the wind conditions. The ties failed at the lugs which can be seen broken off the columns. Their corresponding members are intact since they did not experience the same tension forces.

Figure 7: Remains of pier 3, looking west. The broken eastfacing lugs are indicated by the arrows

Figure 8 shows a platform of pier 3. 9 broken lugs are easily distinguishable among the debris. This shows that on the higher levels, failure of tie bars was primarily due to failure of the lugs.

Figure 9: Platform of pier 3 showing nine broken lug ends.

Figure 10 shows the broken flanges at the top of the second tier of columns on the leeward side of the pier. The column to right of centre is similarly damaged and the lug for the horizontal strut and tie bar has broken off. The diagonal wind bracing ties have failed in a similar manner to pier 3. A few more diagonal ties on the side columns have also failed. A huge chunk of metal has broken off near the base of the easternmost column, probably due to the excessive bending at the base during collapse. This illustrates the brittle nature of the cast-iron. Pier 1 and pier 3 show similarities in fracture damage. This points to similar failure mechanism on both piers.

Figure 10: Pier 1, looking north, showing two upstanding tiers of columns and damage to column flanges

The low girders sections of the bridge did not collapse, however, damage was evident on standing piers 28 and 41. A few diagonal ties had lost their shape. Some of them failed at the lugs, and a lot of debris littered the platform. This damage was likely caused in the aftermath of the initial collapse. Many theories have been put forward as to how the failure occurred. The findings of the Court of Inquiry conclude that, "The fall of the bridge was occasioned by the insufficiency of the cross bracing and its fastenings to sustain the force of the gale (Inquiry, 1880). Had the piers and, in particular the wind bracings been properly constructed and maintained, the bridge could have withstood the storm. Another similar theory was proposed by Tom Martin. He suggested that that the force of the wind created an overturning effect on the bridge around its base. The presence of the train increased this effect eventually causing the windward column to lift. This increased stresses on the critical tie- which in this case is the inner diagonal tie on the second level going upwards from left to right (Fig 4). The tie fails followed by gradual failure of critical ties in the upper level. The structure starts swaying, the leeward side column fails at the second level and the whole pier falls around the second level towards the East of the bridge. The first level structure is brought down by the pulling effect of the falling structure and ends up as wreckage on the pier platform. Had the base columns been bolted down to the concrete below the masonry, the overturning effect could have been resisted by the structure. Also, wrought iron or steel columns could have fared much better in the given conditions. Bill Dow, retired lecture from Dundee College of Education has his own theory. He believes one of the train carriages derailed due to a slight bend in the rails between piers 28 and 29, the bend being caused by the returning of the girder to the bent shape it had after the accident of February 1877. The derailed carriage could have been towed along for a slight distance before a heavy gust of wind pushed it into the cover plate at the end of the girder, followed by the heavy duty guards van. The two vehicles were found heavily entangled, something that could not have been by falling into the river. The force from the impact then led to the failure of the weak and brittle cast iron lugs. The theories mentioned above point to some common faults. The bridge had an insufficient design, with no consideration of wind loading. The lugs were poorly design and of low strength.