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T/Ed Dyck

Topos and Enthymeme

Abstract: This paper is a modern reformulation of Aristotles concepts of topos and enthymeme and the relation between them. Brie y, a topos may be understood as a binary relation which replaces implication in the syllogism to yield an enthymeme. If a syllogism is an argument of the form, (1) If P, and P implies Q, then Q,

then an enthymeme is an argument of the form, (2) If P, and T(P,Q), then Q.

All of Aristotles twenty-eight topoi in the Rhetoric may be shown to have the form (2), and the enthymeme can thus be understood as a generalized (or weakened) syllogism.

1. Introduction
tudents of Aristotles Rhetoric1 typically come away with as many questions as answers. What is a topos? An enS thymeme? What is the relation between them? Is an enthymeme different from a syllogismand if so, how? The critical literature suggests that professional readers fare but slightly better:
The impetus for this paper comes from the authors Ph. D. dissertation, Topos, and the Rhetoric of Prairie Poetry (University of Manitoba, 1988). The present de nition of topos (p. 5) is a re nement of the one developed there. 1 Aristotle, Rhetoric, rev. Oxford translation, in Jonathan Barnes ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton University Press, 1984). All further references to this work will be given parenthetically in the text of the essay.

The International Society for the History of Rhetoric, Rhetorica, Volume XX, Number 2 (Spring 2002). Send requests for permission to reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St, Ste 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223, USA 105

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they raise the same questions, their answers are usually varied and complicated, often incomplete and confusing. Most agree that two of the crucial terms of the Rhetoric are topos and enthymeme, that the relation between them is important, and that the explication of neither is clear. The Rhetoric opens in a way that clearly establishes the signi cance of enthymeme and topos. In the rst two chapters of Book I, we are given the following assertions: rhetoric is the art or science of persuasion; it is useful because persuasion aids the natural tendency of the good to prevail; persuasion by speech is effected in three ways by ethos, logos, pathos; logos, the speech itself as well as its argument, is based on either the example or the enthymeme; and the enthymeme, the most important of the speci c means of persuasion, is related to the topoi.

2. Topos
The technical term topos (literally place) is variously translated as topic, line of argument, or commonplace (as in Barness Revised Oxford Translation, which I am using as my standard edition). These translations, together with several variants of koinoi (common), have contributed to an ongoing dispute about both the kinds of topoi in the Rhetoric and the meaning of the term.2 Brie y, readers have held that the Rhetoric seems to refer to three kinds of topoi: (1) the common topoiMore or Less, Possible or Impossible, Past or Future Fact (1358a21, 1397a6, 1391b231393a20); (2) twenty-eight general topoi (1358a21, 1397a61400b33); (3) and an unspeci ed but very large number of special topoi (1358a18 and 23). Of these, the common and general topoi are usually considered most important for the study of rhetoric. Grimaldi holds that the common topoi are not topoi at all,3 and that the only two kinds are the special (propositions about the speci c subject under discussion) and the general.4 Ochs concentrates on only the general topoi, by which

2 For an historical summary of the dif culties, see William M. A. Grimaldi, S. J., The Aristotelian Topics, in Keith M. Erickson ed., Aristotle: The Classical Heritage (New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1974) pp. 1763. A modern view of topos is given in Richard McKeons Creativity and the Commonplace, Rhetoric: Essays in Invention and Discovery (Woodbridge CT: Ox Bow Press, 1987) pp. 2536. 3 William M. A. Grimaldi, S. J., Aristotle: Rhetoric I: A Commentary (New York: Fordham University Press, 1980) p. 144. 4 Grimaldi, The Aristotelian Topics, p. 186.

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he means either formal patterns of relationships existing between classes of terms (for example, genus / species) or an amalgam of modes into which rhetorical arguments are usually cast (for example, more/ less).5 For Ryan, the general topos is an arguments pattern.6 More recently, Lawson-Tancred holds that the topoi are arguments of a quite general kind.7 To resolve these disputes is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but one of the so-called common topoi, the More or the Less, may serve as an entry into what Aristotle means by the term itself. Aristotle offers the More or the Less as his rst instance of topos in the Rhetoric: Take for instance, the commonplace concerned with the more or the less (1358a14). The Greek text8 in this case does use the word topos, and Aristotle does discuss this topos at length elsewhere in the Rhetoric.

3. The More or the Less: An Exemplary Topos

After referring to this topos in Book I Chapter 2 (1358a14) and once again in Chapter 3 (not using the word topos but again in connection with the common topoi 1359a1125), Aristotle seems to forget about it until Book II. Here he returns to the modes of persuasion ethos and pathos in Chapters 117, logos and the common topoi in Chapter 18:
We now proceed to discuss the arguments common to all oratory. All orators are bound to use the topic of the possible and impossible; . . . [and] that a thing has happened or will happen. . . . [T]he topic of size is common to all oratory. (1391b2330)

Chapter 19 treats the rst two of these, and concludes with another reference to More or Less:
For arguments about . . . the greater and the lesser, . . . what we have already said show the line to take. In discussing deliberative oratory, we

5 Donovan Ochs, Aristotles Concept of Formal Topics, in Keith M. Erickson ed., Aristotle: The Classical Heritage (New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1974) pp. 197 and 200. 6 Eugene E. Ryan, Aristotles Theory of Argumentation (Montreal: Bellarmin, 1984) p. 19. 7 H. C. Lawson-Tancred, Introduction to his translation, Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991) p. 19. 8 Rudolfus Kassel, Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976).

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RH ET ORICA have spoken about the relative greatness of various goods, and about the greater and lesser in general. (1393a912) (italics added)

Taking Aristotle at his word, we return to Book I Chapter 7, where he does indeed treat the greater and the lesser in general in the context of deliberative oratory. What do we learn if we take this treatment as an explication of the topos the More or the Less? First, the More or the Less, a binary relation, is used in the following statement:
(a) When two things surpass a third, that which does so by the greater amount is the greater of the two (1363b34). (italics added)

In other words, writing greater than for this relation, (a1) If A and B are both greater than C, and if A less C is greater than B less C, then A is greater than B.

Second, this binary relation is used to construct a number of ifthen statements, of which (a1) is a particularly simple example because it involves only the relation greater than. More complicated ifthen statements, all involving the relation greater than, may involve also other predicates or even relations. Here are three such statements:
(b) A number of goods is a greater good than one of a smaller number, if that smaller number is included in the count (1363b19). (c) If the largest member of one class surpasses the largest of another, then the one class surpasses the other (1363b22). (d) If one of two things is an end, and the other is not, then the former is the greater good (1364a13).

Each of these ifthen statements differs from statement (a) in a similar way: whereas (a) involves only the relation the More or the Less, (b) through (d) involve also other predicates and/or relations. If the predicate is good is denoted by G, the relation is the largest member of by L(,), the predicate is an end by E, we may rewrite these statements, making the roles of the predicates and relations clearer: (b1) (c1) If x is greater than y, then G(x) is greater than G(y). If L(x,Y), L(w,Z), and x is greater than w, then Y is greater than Z.

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(d1)

If E(x) and not-E(y), then G(x) is greater than G(y).

On the basis of the above, the following tentative de nition may be formulated:
De nition 3.1: A topos T is a binary relation which, alone or in combination with other relations and predicates, is used to construct ifthen statements.

Of course these ifthen statements are all deductions of some kind, but since the meaning of deductions of some kind is still in question, I have used the more neutral expression until this meaning has been clari ed. For now, my point is simply that a topos is a binary relation used to construct some unspeci ed kind of deduction.

4. Enthymeme
Burnyeat has argued that the enthymeme, which he calls one of Aristotles greatest and original achievements, is a degenerate (elsewhere he uses the term relaxed) deduction that can be applied to contexts where conclusive proof is not to be had.9 Aristotles repeated and unequivocal statements actually show, further, that the enthymeme is [a relaxed form of] a deduction constructed using one or more topoi:
By an element [of an enthymeme] I mean the same thing as a commonplace (topos); for an element is a commonplace embracing a large number of enthymemes. (1403a1720; see also 1358a30, 1396b20 ff., 1403b14)

Many readers confuse topos, which I am arguing is a relation, with enthymeme, which according to Aristotle is a deduction built using topoi. But in the Rhetoric, the difference is absolutely clear: a topos is an element (a part) of an enthymeme, that is, a thing out of which an enthymeme is constructed.10 The question is what sort of deduction does this make of the enthymeme (1355a8)?

9 M. F. Burnyeat, Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Rationality of Rhetoric, in Amelia Olsenberg Rorty ed., Essays on Aristotles Rhetoric (University of California Press, 1996) p. 99. 10 Ochs, Aristotles Concept of Formal Topics, cit. in note 3 above, p. 195.

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Aristotelian deduction is based on the syllogism.11 That is, it has the implicative form if P and Q then R and uses the so-called law of the syllogism as its rule of inference:12 (LS) If P implies Q, and Q implies R, then P implies R.

In its modern formulation, we would write this rule as modus ponens (the two are equivalent 13 ): (MP) If P, and P implies Q, then Q.

This reductive formulation bypasses many of the subtleties of Aristotles treatment, for he distinguishes among demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical deductions.14 A modern approach, moreover, has no dif culty in formalizing those arguments in the Rhetoric which Aristotle could not because he had only the categorical, not the hypothetical syllogistic.15 One crucial aspect of both the rhetorical syllogism or enthymeme and the dialectical one, however, is that one or more of the premisses (and therefore the conclusion) may be true only for the most part:

Paul Thom, The Syllogism (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1981) p. 22. Edna E. Kramer, The Nature and Growth of Modern Mathematics (New York: Hawthorne, 1970) pp. 12224. 13 Elliott Mendelson, Introduction to Mathematical Logic (Princeton: D. van Nostrand, 1964), shows that If p q, and q r, then p r, (where is the conditional de ned by not-p or q) is a theorem of the usual predicate calculus of modern logic, which uses modus ponens as its rule of inference (pp. 3032). The proof of the converse, that the law of the syllogism implies modus ponens, is straightforward. 14 Brie y, as follows: (1) A syllogism is demonstrative if the premisses are true or accepted as true, the implication is necessary, and its subject belongs to a particular science (Posterior Analytics 24a1617, 24b19). (2) It is dialectical if the premisses are chosen for the sake of argument or are reputable opinions (Topics 100a20100b22) and, as the ensuing treatment shows, the topoi are used in its construction (101b15 ff.). (3) It is rhetorical if, in addition to (2), its subject is that with which the divisions of rhetoric (deliberative, forensic, and epideictic oratory) are concerned (Rhetoric 1355b291358a35). 15 According to Jan van Ophuijsen, Where Have the Topics Gone?, in William W. Fortenbaugh and David C. Mirhady eds, Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 1994) pp. 131 and 15761, the hypothetical syllogistic was begun by Aristotles student, Theophrastus.
11 12

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When it is shown that, certain propositions16 being true, whether universally or for the most part, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether universally or for the most part, this is called the [syllogism] in dialectic and the enthymeme in rhetoric (Rhetoric 1356b15 ff.) (italics added)

As I shall show below, Aristotles enthymemes (and, for that matter, his dialectical syllogisms) overwhelmingly and consistently share another feature: they substitute another relation, a topos, for the relation of implication as they move from syllogism to enthymeme. If this is indeed so, then the typical enthymeme would have the form (compare MP): (MPE) If P, and T(P,Q), then Q (where T is a suitable topos).

Of course, typical syllogisms and enthymemes are not as simple as the above discussion would suggest. Syllogisms typically involve predicates P and Q, variables x and y, both with suitable restrictions, and take forms like: (S1) (S2) If P(x), and x implies y, then P(y); If P(x), and P implies Q, then Q(x);

and so on. Similarly, typical enthymemes appear in forms such as: (E1) (E2) If P(x), and T(x,y), then P(y) (T a suitable topos); If P(x), and T(P,Q), then Q(x);

and so on. Further complications naturally involve the presence of other predicates and even topoi in the premisses and/or the conclusions, as we shall see below. Tentatively, then, we have the following:
De nition 4.1: An enthymeme is a syllogism in which one or more premisses may be probable and a topos replaces implication.

If this de nition actually captures the treatment of the enthymeme in the Rhetoric, then it articulates precisely the sense(s) in which the enthymeme is a (relaxed) sort of deduction (1355a8).
16 Lawson-Tancreds translation avoids the anachronistic proposition by rendering this if certain conditions obtain, then something else beyond them will result because of them and through their obtaining (p. 77).

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5. Exemplary Enthymemes Using the Topos the More or the Less

Returning now to the topos greater than, we recall the forms of the enthymemes constructed with it: (a1) (b1) (c1) (d1) If A and B are each greater than C, and A less C is greater than B less C, then A is greater than B. If x is greater than y, then G(x) is greater than G(y). If L(x,Y), L(w,Z), and x is greater than w, then Y is greater than Z. If E(x) and not-E(y), then G(x) is greater than G(y).

All these enthymemes use the topos greater than in that place where we would ordinarily expect implies; most of them employ also various predicates in their premisses and/or conclusions. In other words, the de nitions of topos (3.1) and enthymeme (4.1) are adequate to the treatment of the topos the More and the Less and the enthymemes constructed using it. These de nitions prove also to be adequate for the two other common topoi by default: these two so-called topoi are not relations but predicates. Thus, the topos Past or Future Fact is a predicate (has happened), as is the topos the Possible or Impossible (is possible). What Aristotle actually does is to construct enthymemes using these predicates and other topoi (binary relations):
(e) If it is possible for one of a pair of contraries to happen, then it is possible for the other (1392a9).

Letting P be the predicate is possible, this enthymeme has the form If P(x) and x is contrary to y, then P(y). Opposites is one of the 28 topoi discussed later in the Rhetoricand below in this paper.
(f) If a thing was going to happen, then it has happened (1392b25).

Letting P now denote has happened, C denote the relation causes (i.e. one of the ways one knows that a thing was going to happen), this enthymeme has the form If P(x), and C(x,y), then P(y). Causation, too, is one of the 28 topoi discussed later and below.

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There are no doubt other ways of analyzing the so-called common topoi.17 My method does show, however, that those who hold that the common topoi are not topoi at all are nearly correct: for only one of the three is a binary relation (albeit a very important one).

6. The General Topoi and Their Enthymemes

It will not be necessary to show here that all twenty-eight of the general topoi and their related enthymemes are satisfactorily subsumed by my tentative de nition. Some of these topoi are in fact predicates (of deciding, making mistakes, choosing), several of the later ones are applications of former ones, and so on. Some topoi, however, gure so prominently in enthymematic argumentation that they must be discussed. 6.1. The Topos Opposites
Observe whether that opposite [of the thing in question] has the opposite quality. If it has not, you refute the original proposition; if it has, you establish it. (1397a6 ff.)

Let Opp( ,) denote the topos, a binary relation, is the opposite of, and P, Q be predicates. The two enthymemes have the forms: If not-Q(y), and Opp(x,y), Opp(P,Q), then not-P(x). If P(y), and Opp(x,y), Opp(P,Q), then Q(x). 6.2. The Topos Correlatives
Another [enthymeme] is based on correlative ideas. If it is true that one man gave noble or just treatment to another . . . [then] the other must have received noble or just treatment. (1397a23 ff.)

Let Corr(,) denote the topos is a correlative of, and P, Q be arbitrary predicates. The enthymeme has the form:

17 For example, one may treat predicates as unary relations, as is done in contemporary logic, and extend the de nition of topos to include both unary and binary relations.

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If P(x,y) and Corr(P,Q), then Q(y,x). The topos Correlatives is related to Similarity, below. 6.3. The Topos A Fortiori
[It] may be argued that if even the gods are not omniscient, certainly human beings are not. The principle here is that, if a quality does not exist18 in fact where it is more likely to exist, it clearly does not exist where it is less likely. Again . . . if the less likely thing is true, then the more likely thing is true also. (1397b14 ff.)

Let L( ,) denote is more likely than, and P be a predicate. The enthymemes have the forms: If not-P(y), and L(P(y),P(x)), then not P(x). If P(x) and L(P(y),P(x)), then P(y). The implicit presence of the topos the More or the Less suggests that A Fortiori could equally well be expressed as a combination of the former and a probability predicate. 6.4. The Topos De nition
All persons mentioned [in several examples just noted] de ne their term and get at its essential meaning, and then use the result when reasoning on the point at issue. (1398a15ff.)

Let D( ,) denote de nes, and P be a predicate. The enthymeme has the form: If P(x), and D(x,y), then P(y). 6.5. The Topos Logical Division
Another line is based on logical division. Thus, all men do wrong from one of three motives, A, B, or C: in my case, A and B are out of the question, and even the accusers do not allege C. (1398a29 ff.)

18 Again, other translations, for example, Lawson-Tancreds (p. 198), avoid the words exist and true, which are not in the original Greek.

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Let D(; ,, . . ., or ) denote divides logically into ,, . . ., or , and P be a predicate. The enthymeme has the form: If P(x), and D(x; y, . . ., or z), then P(y), or . . ., or P(z). 6.6. The Topos Consequences
[S]ince a thing usually has both good and bad consequences, . . . use those consequences as a reason for urging that a thing should or should not be done. (1399a11 ff.)

Let Con(,) denote the relation is a consequence of, G denote the predicate good. The enthymemes have the forms: If G(x), and Con(x,y), then G(y). If not-G(x), and Con(x,y), then not-G(y). 6.7. The Topos Rational Correspondences
Another line is that of rational correspondences . . . If you count tall boys men, you will soon be voting short men boys. (1399a34 ff.)

Let A( ,) be the relation of analogy (i.e. rational correspondences), and P, Q be predicates. The enthymeme has the form: If P(x) and A(x,y), then P(y). The speci c example uses an analogy in the form of a proportion: If and B(x) is M(x), and A(T /M, S/ B), then S(x)and M(x) is B(x). 6.8. The Topos Antecedents/ Consequents
Another line is the argument that if two results are the same, their antecedents are also the same. (1399b6 ff.)

Let AC be the relation is the antecedent of the consequent, A be the relation of analogy. The enthymeme has the form: If A(y,z), and AC(x,y), AC(w,z), then A(x,w).

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6.9. The Topos Cause/ Effect

Another is to show that if the cause is present, the effect is present, if absent, absent. (1400a29 ff.)

This topos is identical to AC above, and the enthymemes have the forms: If x, and AC(x,y), then y. If not-x, and AC(x,y), then not-y. 6.10. The General Topos T(,) In general, then, an enthymeme constructed from a topos T has the following form: If P, . . ., and T(P,Q), . . ., then . . ., Q,. . . . Compare the general form of modus ponens, involving implies: If P, . . ., and P implies Q, . . ., then . . ., Q,. . . .

7. Conclusions
I have argued that Aristotles topoi are binary relations which replace implication to construct the generalized (relaxed, weak) syllogisms called enthymemes. If the binary relation of implication is considered as the topos, implies, then the syllogism can be seen as a special case of the more general (weak) enthymeme. Although neither rhetoric nor logic has noted it to date, rhetorical deduction may then be understood as a generalization of logical deduction (or, logical deduction as a specialization of rhetorical). An open question is whether or how other logicsfor example, fuzzy logic, less restrictive than the classical, can be accommodated within the generalized deduction of enthymematic argumentation. Another open question: How or to what extent can the relations between style and thought as they are implied in the Rhetoric and the Poetics be illuminated by the fuller understanding of topos and the enthymeme? It is usually held that the intersection between the two is slight indeed: a somewhat cursory treatment of style in the Rhetoric (1403b15 ff.) refers the reader to the Poetics; a decidedly brief

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treatment of thought in the Poetics (1456a35 ff.) refers to the Rhetoric. Yet the gure is the very essence of style in poetics, as the enthymeme is the essence of thought in rhetoricand both are founded on the topoi. Aristotle notes that metaphor is of great value in both prose and poetry because it gives style clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can (Rhetoric 1405b5 ff.); it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh; both speech and reasoning are lively in proportion as they make us seize a new idea promptly (1410a13 ff.); and the liveliest metaphor is the kind based on proportion (1411a1,1411b22). Liveliness is especially conveyed by metaphor, and by the further power of surprising the hearer (1412a18). Because it is based on proportion, on the topos rational correspondences, as Aristotle is careful to note, metaphor may well function like an enthymeme constructed from the same topos. A metaphor is after all a metaphor precisely because the properties of an x applyin a clear, charming, memorable wayto a y: each of these properties P is transferred from x, the vehicle of the metaphor, to y, its tenor. Thus, if x is the vehicle (a name that applies to something else Poetics 1457b7), and y is the tenor (the something to which the name is mis-applied), then: If P(x), and x corresponds rationally to y, then P(y). Consider a metaphor which Aristotle singles out for commendation: the arrow ies (Rhetoric 1411b35). The vehicle ( ies) imparts a host of properties of a bird to the tenor (arrow), none of which is more important than the qualities of a birds motion. We may write this as follows: If a bird ies, and the motion of a bird is analogous to the motion of an arrow, then the arrow ies. Thus, if metaphor, the centre-piece of style, is an enthymeme, then rhetorical deduction is part of poetics just as much as style is part of rhetoric. The fuller explication of that enthymeme, however, belongs to another place and time.