Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 66

Caldebate.

com

Readiness Good/Bad

Index
Index........................................................................................................................................................................................................1 *** Readiness Good ***.........................................................................................................................................................................2 Allied Prolif- Generic Scenario (1 of 2)..................................................................................................................................................3 Allied Prolif- Generic Scenario (2 of 2).................................................................................................................................................. Allied Prolif- !a"an Scenario..................................................................................................................................................................# Allied Prolif- !a"an- Asian Prolif $%...............................................................................................................................................& Allied Prolif- !a"an- 'as(mir )...............................................................................................................................................................* Allied Prolif- !a"an- Confidence Re-arm.......................................................................................................................................+ Allied Prolif- ,ai-an Scenario (1 of 2)................................................................................................................................................... Allied Prolif- ,ai-an Scenario (2 of 2)................................................................................................................................................1/ Allied Prolif- Interal for Asia Scenarios- Readiness 0..........................................................................................................................11 Asian Stabilit1 Scenario........................................................................................................................................................................12 Asian Prolif Scenario............................................................................................................................................................................13 2e3e Scenario (1 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................................1 2e3e Scenario (2 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................................1# 2e3e- Readiness 0 deterrence4-arfi3(tin3 (1 of 2)..............................................................................................................................1& 2e3e- Readiness 0 deterrence4-arfi3(tin3 (2 of 2)..............................................................................................................................1* $' Scenario..........................................................................................................................................................................................1+ $'- Readiness 0...................................................................................................................................................................................1. Re3ional Conflicts Scenario (1 of 2).....................................................................................................................................................2/ Re3ional Conflicts Scenario (2 of 2).....................................................................................................................................................21 Re3ional Conflicts- Perce"tion of Readiness 0e1.................................................................................................................................22 Re3ional Conflicts- Readiness 0e1 (1 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................23 Re3ional Conflicts- Readiness 0e1 (2 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................2 Re3ional Conflicts- Prolif )...................................................................................................................................................................2# Re3ional Conflicts- ,errorism ) (1 of 2)...............................................................................................................................................2& Re3ional Conflicts- ,errorism ) (2 of 2)...............................................................................................................................................2* Re3ional Conflicts- 5a6ndr1 list )........................................................................................................................................................2+ Re3ional Conflicts- ) Calc Probabilit1..................................................................................................................................................2. ,ai-an Scenario (1 of 2).......................................................................................................................................................................3/ ,ai-an Scenario (2 of 2).......................................................................................................................................................................31 ,ai-an- Readiness 0e1 (1 of 2)............................................................................................................................................................32 ,ai-an- Readiness 0e1 (2 of 2)............................................................................................................................................................33 ,errorism Scenario (1 of 2)...................................................................................................................................................................3 ,errorism Scenario (2 of 2)...................................................................................................................................................................3# ,errorism- Readiness 0e1 (1 of 2)........................................................................................................................................................3& ,errorism- Readiness 0e1 (2 of 2)........................................................................................................................................................3* ,errorism- 7ailed States 0e1.................................................................................................................................................................3+ A, Inter8ention 9ad- ) t4 S(ield (1 of 2)..............................................................................................................................................3. A, Inter8ention 9ad- ) t4 S(ield (2 of 2).............................................................................................................................................. / A, Inter8entionism- Its Good (1 of 2).................................................................................................................................................. 1 A, Inter8entionism- Its Good (2 of 2).................................................................................................................................................. 2 A, Inter8entionism ,errorism......................................................................................................................................................... 3 A, $o s"ecific scenario "ro8es no )..................................................................................................................................................... *** Readiness 9ad ***......................................................................................................................................................................... # Co6nterbalancin3 Scenario................................................................................................................................................................... & Inter8ention4Pre-em"tion Scenario (1 of 3).......................................................................................................................................... * Inter8ention4Pre-em"tion Scenario (2 of 3).......................................................................................................................................... + Inter8ention4Pre-em"tion Scenario (3 of 3).......................................................................................................................................... . Inter8entionism- ,errorism (1 of 2).................................................................................................................................................#/ Inter8entionism- ,errorism (2 of 2).................................................................................................................................................#1 Inter8entionism- A, Ine8itable.............................................................................................................................................................#2 Inter8entionism- %on:t deter conflict...................................................................................................................................................#3 Readiness 6nnecessar14-on:t colla"se.................................................................................................................................................# $o ) (1 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................................................## 1

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

$o ) (1 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................................................#& A, Asian Stabilit1................................................................................................................................................................................#* A, German1.........................................................................................................................................................................................#+ A, !a"anese Prolif................................................................................................................................................................................#. A, Iran..................................................................................................................................................................................................&/ A, Israel...............................................................................................................................................................................................&1 A, 'as(mir...........................................................................................................................................................................................&2 A, ,ai-an -ar.....................................................................................................................................................................................&3 A, ,ai-anese Prolif (1 of 2)................................................................................................................................................................& A, ,ai-anese Prolif (2 of 2)................................................................................................................................................................&#

*** Readiness Good ***

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Allied Prolif- Generic Scenario (1 of 2)


A. Perception of a decline in U.S. military readiness allied prolif.
O'Hanlon 01
(;ic(ael <.-= Sr. 7ello- in 7orei3n Polic1 St6dies > t(e 9roo0in3s Instit6tion= Defense Policy Choices: For the Bush Administration 2001-05= P. 3= (tt"?44broo0in3s.na".ed64boo0s4/+1#*//*.24(tml4@ !acob) Some obser8ers belie8e t(at A.S. defense s"endin3 s(o6ld be drasticall1 red6ced. $otin3 t(at it no- comm6tes one-t(ird of 3lobal defense o6tla1s= ro63(l1 as m6c( as t(e -orldBs next ei3(t militar1 "o-ers combined= abo6t fi8e times more t(an eit(er C(inaBs or R6ssiaBs defense s"endin3= and abo6t t(irt1 times t(e s6m of Iranian= IraCi= and $ort( 'orean militar1 s"endin3= t(e1 C6estion -(1 AmericaBs ann6al defense b6d3et remains at aro6nd D3// billion toda1 .see tables 1-3 and 1- ). 2o-e8er s6c( broad ar36ments are 6n"ers6asi8e. ,(ere are 3ood reasons -(1 t(e Anited States s(o6ld s"end far more t(an an1 ot(er co6ntr1 on its militar1. ,(e Anited Stares (as 6niC6e 3lobal interests and m6lti"le militar1

commitments far from its national territor1. It maintains -orld-ide militar1 de"lo1ments to 0ee" alliances credible. It ri3(tl1 desires a militar1 so 6nambi36o6sl1 stron3 t(at it can 3enerall1 deter -ar and= failin3 t(at= -in decisi8e 8ictories -it( minimal cas6alties. 7inall1= 3i8en t(at its armed forces are not "artic6larl1 lar3e (constit6tin3 onl1 abo6t & "ercent of 3lobal militar1 man"o-er)= it relies on (i3(-C6alit1 and t(6s ex"ensi8e eC6i"ment and man"o-er rat(er t(an s(eer siEe for its -ar-fi3(tin3 ed3e. <8en if t(e Anited States c6t its defense s"endin3 in (alf= it -o6ld still o6ts"end Ian. IraC= and $ort( 'orea b1 a factor of fifteen= and C(ina b1 more t(an 2 to 1. Fet it -o6ld t(en (a8e far too small a militar1 to maintain its 3lobal commitments. As a res6lt= "otential foes mi3(t be tem"ted to attac0 A.S. allies in 0e1 re3ions s6c( as t(e Persian G6lf and $ort(east Asia. Reco3niEin3 t(e "otential dan3er t(ese A.S. allies -o6ld be li0el1 to embar0 on militar1 b6ild6"s= "er(a"s e8en "6rs6in3 n6clear -ea"ons ca"abilities= in a manner t(at co6ld be destabiliEin3. So broad defense b6d3e com"arisons resol8e little= es"eciall1 -(en made bet-een co6rtiers -it( different t1"es of
3lobal militar1 res"onsibilities= economies= and "olitical s1stems.

B. Allied prolif NW
Millo !"
(;arc Gean-= S6mmer= ,(e %as(in3ton H6arterl1= I7acin3 t(e <mer3in3 Realit1 of Re3ional $6clear Ad8ersariesJ= Kol. 1* L3= 5exis@ !acob) ,(e lac0 of credible sec6rit1 ass6rances -ill "6s( allies of t(e Anited States to-ard n6clear arsenals of t(eir o-n to restore t(e militar1 eC6ilibri6m 6"set b1 t(eir local n6clear ad8ersaries or b1 more 3eneral re3ional n6clear instabilities. ,(ese allies ma1 -ell see a realiEation of t(eir 8irt6al n6clear arsenal as t(e onl1 alternati8e to losin3 all infl6ence o8er t(eir o-n national sec6rit1. ,(is de8elo"ment= (o-e8er= -o6ld lead do-n a -orrisome "at(= -it( dan3ero6s im"lications for re3ional stabilit1 and 6ltimatel1 for t(e sec6rit1 of t(e Anited States itself. Mne lesson A.S. defense decision ma0ers s(o6ld ta0e from t(e 3ro-in3 6nderstandin3 of A.S.-So8iet crises is t(at n6clear stabilit1 is not a6tomatic. 91 t(e end of t(e Cold %ar n6clear stabilit1 -as "racticall1 an instit6tion@ in t(e 3

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

be3innin3 it -as barel1 a conce"t. As (istorians re"ort t(eir findin3s on s6c( e8ents as t(e C6ban missile crisis= it is becomin3 a""arent t(at t(e s6"er"o-ers learned to create stabilit1 on t(e basis of trial and error. n&2 Readin3 t(e res6lts of t(is researc( it is diffic6lt not concl6de t(at= "artic6larl1 in t(e earl1 da1s of A.S.-So8iet com"etition= l6c0 "la1ed an 6ncomfortabl1 si3nificant role in a8oidance of n6clear -ar. It is "ossible t(at t(e ne- n6clear "o-ers -ill learn from t(e (istor1 of A.S.-So8iet n6clear crises= N6st as t(e1 (a8e learned to ta0e ad8anta3e of A.S. tec(nolo3ical inno8ations in t(e de8elo"ment of t(eir o-n n6clear -ea"ons "ro3rams. Per(a"s t(e relati8el1 ra"id de8elo"ment of a stable re3ional n6clear balance is feasible. Mn t(e ot(er (and= A.S. leaders s(o6ld be concerned t(at nations -it( -idel1 8ar1in3 8al6es= t(o63(t "rocesses= and c6lt6res ma1 3o t(ro63( t(e learnin3 ex"erience -it(o6t t(eir o-n 3ood fort6ne. It is (ard to 0no- -(ere an1 n6clear -ar mi3(t end= or -(at lessons onloo0ers -ill ta0e a-a1 from it.

Allied Prolif- Generic Scenario (2 of 2)


It is do6btf6l t(at an1one is ea3er to r6n a real -orld ex"eriment on t(e 6ni8ersalit1 of t(e s6"er"o-ersB n6clear lo3ic. Indeed t(e 8ision of ex"erimental fail6re on a massi8e scale (as "robabl1 infl6enced A.S. decision ma0ers to 3i8e "re8ention its "ri8ile3ed role in t(e national res"onse to t(e "roliferation t(reat. 96t no- t(at re3ional ad8ersaries of t(e Anited States are 3oin3 n6clear= t(e ex"eriment -ill be3in if A.S. allies follo- s6it. As "er(a"s se8eral of t(ese ex"eriments "la1 t(emsel8es o6t= t(e odds increase t(at one -ill lead to n6clear -ar. %(en A.S. leaders come to reco3niEe t(at t(ese ex"eriments are o6t of t(eir (ands= t(e1 -ill face t(e C6estion of -(at to do -it( t(e remainin3 for-ard "resence of t(eir forces on allied territories. If t(e1 sta1= t(e Anited States r6ns t(e ris0 of bein3 s6c0ed into n6clear -ars t(at are not of its ma0in3 a3ainst its -ill. If t(e1 lea8e= t(e Anited States -ill lose an1 (o"e of re3ional infl6ence= b6t ma1 at t(e same time "reci"itate a crisis t(at ma1 itself increase t(e ris0 of n6clear conflict. $eit(er c(oice is a""ealin3@ bot( (old 3ra8e ris0s for A.S. national sec6rit1.
Pre8entin3 t(e need of f6t6re leaders to confront t(at c(oice s(o6ld be t(e 3oal of A.S. "olic1.

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Allied Prolif- #a$an Scenario


A. readiness Japanese prolif, arms races, and NW
%ellis 00
(As(le1 !.-= Sr. Polic1 Anal1st > t(e RA$G Cor"oration= A"ril 1= 2erita3e 7o6ndation Polic1 Re8ie-= ISmo0e= 7ire= and %(at to Go in Asia@ ;ilitariEation of Asia and its affect on t(e A.S.J= 5exis@ !acob) ,(e t(ird critical interest consists of ens6rin3 t(e s6r8i8al of American allies. ,(e first and most ob8io6s reason for t(is obNecti8e is t(at t(e Anited States (as treat1 obli3ations to t(ree im"ortant Asian states -- !a"an= So6t( 'orea= and A6stralia -- and "olitical commitments to anot(er= namel1 ,ai-an. %(ile meetin3 t(ese obli3ations is certainl1 im"ortant to maintain t(e credibilit1 of t(e Anited States in t(e international arena= it is also conseC6ential for directl1 s6bstanti8e reasons t(at 3o ri3(t to t(e (eart of 9rac0enBs boo0? controllin3 t(e lea0a3e of disr6"ti8e tec(nolo3ies in Asia. In at least t-o of t(ese t(ree instances= t(e ass6rance of A.S. "rotection (as res6lted in im"ortant im"licit bar3ains t(at are indis"ensable to t(e American conce"tion of stable international order. ,(an0s to American sec6rit1 36arantees= So6t( 'orea and !a"an (a8e bot( enNo1ed t(e l6x6r1 of esc(e-in3 n6clear -ea"ons as

36arantors of sec6rit1. S(o6ld American "rotecti8e "led3es be seen as -ea0enin3= t(e tem"tation to res6rrect t(e n6clear o"tion on t(e "art of bot( states -ill increase -- to t(e conseC6ent detriment of AmericaBs 3lobal anti"roliferation "olic1. <C6all1 si3nificant= (o-e8er= is t(at !a"an= and "ossibl1 So6t( 'orea as -ell= -o6ld of necessit1 (a8e to embar0 on a si3nificant con8entional b6ild6"= es"eciall1 of missile= maritime and air forces. ,(e res6ltin3 force "ost6re -o6ld in "ractice be indistin36is(able from a lon3-ran3e "o-er "roNection ca"abilit1 "ossessin3 an offensi8e orientation. <8en if s6c( forces are de8elo"ed "rimaril1 for defensi8e "6r"oses= t(e1 -ill certainl1 3i8e rise to ne- sec6rit1 dilemmas re3ion--ide -- -(ic(= in t6rn= -o6ld lead to an intense arms race= 3ro-in3 s6s"icions= and "ossibl1 -ar.

B. The impact is the whole world blowing p.


&enned' ( Irie 00
(Prof. Pa6l-= Prof. A0ira-= Gail1 Fomi6ri= !an. 1/= I21st Cent6r1--Gialo36es on t(e 76t6re4 GlobaliEationBs s-a1 in e8ol6tion of states "6t in foc6sJ= 5exis@ !acob) 'enned1? M8er t(e "ast t-o or t(ree decades= man1 Asian nations (a8e increased t(eir defense b6d3ets= -(ile <6ro"ean co6ntries (a8e done ot(er-ise. G6rin3 t(is time= t(ere (a8e been man1 flas( "oints in Asia= s6c( $ort( 'orea= ,ai-an and 'as(mir. Some Asian co6ntries (a8e de8elo"ed n6clear -ea"ons= as contrasted -it( fe<6ro"eans -(o e8en -ant n6clear "o-er stations toda1. %e (a8e 3ood reason to feel -orried t(at Asia co6ld become a tinderbox s(o6ld t(ere be an1 conflict in dis"6ted territories li0e t(e S"ratl1 Islands and an a6tistic $ort( 'orean re3ime t(at does not bot(er to 6nderstand t(e o6tside -orld. ,ai-an is often ras( to "ro8o0e 9eiNin3= -(ile t(e 'as(mir conflict co6ld 3ro- into an IndiaPa0istan -ar. #

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

,(ere is 3reat concern abo6t (o- -e s(o6ld ens6re t(at bitter ri8alries in t(e Asian "art of t(e 3lobe -ill not brin3 do-n a s1stem t(at is emer3in3 in t(e -orld no-. %e do not -ant a re"eat of 1.1 . I am concerned t(at an armed conflict mi3(t arise in So6t( or <ast Asia in 2//+= for exam"le= and brin3 do-n t(e credit= financial floand ca"ital in t(e re3ion. Irie? I s(are Prof. 'enned1Bs sense of "essimism abo6t some serio6s "roblems facin3 t(e -orld toda1. ,(ere are man1 more so8erei3n nations toda1= and t(e maNorit1 of t(em are ne-l1 inde"endent states. ,(erefore= t(e1 are e8en more nationalistic. $ationalism (as often ser8ed as t(e onl1 s1mbol of national 6nit1 for some African= Asian and ;iddle <astern co6ntries t(at (a8e been 3rated in t(eir re3ions -it(o6t national traditions com"arable to t(ose of <6ro"ean co6ntries. ,(is (as made matters e8en -orse. $ationalism is all t(at can 0ee" a co6ntr1 to3et(er. It is essential to ens6re t(at local conflicts -ill be 0e"t from blo-in3 6" t(e entire -orld.

Allied Prolif- #a$an- Asian Prolif )*


The impact is world!wide proliferation and n clear war
+irincione 00
(!ose"(-= March 22, Forei n Policy, I,(e Asian $6clear Reaction C(ainJ= P. 12/= 5exis@ !acob)

,(e bloc0s -o6ld fall C6ic0est and (ardest in Asia= -(ere "roliferation "ress6res are alread1 b6ildin3 more C6ic0l1 t(an an1-(ere else in t(e -orld. If a n6clear brea0o6t ta0es "lace in Asia= t(en t(e international arms control a3reements t(at (a8e been "ainsta0in3l1 ne3otiated o8er t(e "ast / 1ears -ill cr6mble. ;oreo8er= t(e Anited
States co6ld find itself embroiled in its fo6rt( -ar on t(e Asian continent in six decades--a costl1 reb60e to t(ose -(o see0 t(e safet1 of 7ortress America b1 (idin3 be(ind national missile defenses. Consider -(at is alread1 (a""enin3? $ort( 'orea contin6es to "la1 36essin3 3ames -it( its n6clear and missile "ro3rams@ So6t( 'orea -ants its o-n missiles to matc( P1on31an3Bs@ India and Pa0istan s(oot across

borders -(ile r6nnin3 a slo--motion n6clear arms race@ C(ina moderniEes its n6clear arsenal amid tensions -it( ,ai-an and t(e Anited States@ !a"anBs 8ice defense minister is forced to resi3n after extollin3 t(e benefits of n6clear
-ea"ons@ and R6ssia---(ose 7ar <ast n6clear de"lo1ments alone ma0e it t(e lar3est Asian n6clear "o-er--str633les to maintain territorial co(erence. 7i8e of t(ese states (a8e n6clear -ea"ons@ t(e ot(ers are ca"able of constr6ctin3 t(em. 5i0e ne6trons firin3 from a

s"lit atom= one nationBs actions can tri33er reactions t(ro63(o6t t(e re3ion= -(ic( in t6rn= stim6late additional actions. ,(ese nations form an interloc0in3 Asian n6clear reaction c(ain t(at 8ibrates dan3ero6sl1 -it( eac( ne- de8elo"ment. If t(e freC6enc1 and intensit1 of t(is reaction c1cle increase= critical decisions ta0en b1 an1 one of t(ese 3o8ernments co6ld cascade into t(e second 3reat -a8e of n6clear--ea"on "roliferation= brin3in3 re3ional and 3lobal economic and "olitical instabilit1 and= "er(a"s= t(e first combat 6se of a n6clear -ea"on since 1. #.

&

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Allied Prolif- #a$an- &as,-ir .


A. Japanese rearm wo ld be rapid and ca se "ndia#Pa$istan arms races
&/nii 00
(Irene ;.-= !an. 2/= 96siness %ee0= I%(1 !a"an !6st ;i3(t 96ild $60esJ= $6mber 3+1&= P. 22= 5exis@ !acob) If !a"an co6ld 3et be1ond t(e (6rdles1 it li0el1 -o6ldnBt need lon3 to de8elo" a bomb. It (as fi8e tons of "l6toni6m stored in t(e n6clear researc( center of ,o0ai-m6ra= nort( of ,o01o= and its scientists 0no- (o- to con8ert it to -ea"ons-3rade material. 2ide160i 9an= director of t(e non"rofit CitiEensB $6clear Information Center= sa1s !a"an co6ld b6ild a n6clear bomb -it(in mont(s. And its ci8ilian roc0et and satellite la6nc(in3 s1stem co6ld easil1 be con8erted to militar1 6se. !a"an also (as s6"erbl1 eC6i""ed land= sea= and air forces t(at co6ld deli8er medi6m-ran3e n60es to $ort( 'orea. 96t if !a"an decides to b6ild its o-n n60es= 3et read1 for an Asian arms race. C(ina -o6ld li0el1 -ant to boost its arsenal= -(ic( -o6ld "rom"t India to de8elo" more n6clear -ea"ons= -(ic( -o6ld s"6r Pa0istan to do t(e same -- and on and on into an e8er more "erilo6s f6t6re.

B. The % is n clear winter.


*as,in2 on Times 01
!"uly #, I,(e most dan3ero6s "laceJ= 5exis@ !acob) ,(e forei3n "olic1 of t(e Anited States in So6t( Asia s(o6ld mo8e from t(e lac0adaisical and distant (-it( India cro-ned -it( a 6nilateral 8eto "o-er) to a33ressi8e in8ol8ement at t(e 8ortex. ,(e most dan3ero6s "lace on t(e "lanet is 'as(mir= a dis"6ted territor1 con86lsed and ille3all1 occ6"ied for more t(an #3 1ears and sand-ic(ed bet-een n6clear-ca"able India and Pa0istan. It (as i3nited t-o -ars bet-een t(e estran3ed So6t( Asian ri8als in 1. + and 1.&#= and a t(ird co6ld tri33er n6clear 8olle1s and a n/clear 3in er t(reatenin3 t(e entire 3lobe. ,(e Anited States -o6ld enNo1 no sanct6ar1. ,(is a"ocal1"tic 8ision is no idios1ncratic 8ie-. ,(e director of central intelli3ence= t(e Gefense Ge"artment= and -orld ex"erts 3enerall1 "lace 'as(mir at t(e "ea0 of t(eir n6clear -orries. 9ot( India and Pa0istan are racin3 li0e t(oro63(breds to bolster t(eir n6clear arsenals and ad8anced deli8er1 8e(icles. ,(eir defense b6d3ets are climbin3 des"ite -ides"read miser1 amon3st t(eir "o"6lations. $eit(er co6ntr1 (as initialed t(e $6clear $on-Proliferation ,reat1= t(e Com"re(ensi8e ,est 9an ,reat1= or indicated an inclination to ratif1 an im"endin3 7issile ;aterial4C6t-off Con8ention.

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Allied Prolif- #a$an- +onfidence Re-arJapan wo ld go n clear in a crisis.


+a-$4ell 02
('6rt ;.-= Senior Kice PreE and 'issin3er C(air in $ational Sec6rit1 > CSIS= %inter= %as(in3ton H6arterl1= I$6clear Proliferation be1ond Ro36esJ= Kol. 2& L1= 5exis@ !acob)

States in decline often s6ffer from a 0ind of societal insec6rit1 o8er f6t6re economic and sec6rit1 s(ortfalls. S6c( anxiet1 co6ld -ell tri33er national consideration of n6clear o"tions to forestall t(e (ei3(tened 86lnerabilit1 t(at nat6rall1 accom"anies decline. !6st as failin3 or sli""in3 states (a8e (istoricall1 so63(t to -a3e "re8enti8e -ar a3ainst risin3 and com"etiti8e states in t(e international s1stem= declinin3 states ma1 -ell consider t(e n6clear o"tion as a relati8el1 cost-effecti8e and tec(nicall1 ac(ie8able eC6aliEer t(at co6ld "re8ent t(e stateBs descent into obli8ion or trial b1 risin3 re3ional ri8als. ,(is com"lex societal d1namic of Ore3ime "essimismO is c6rrentl1 in "la1 amon3 8irt6all1 all t(e states in t(e ;iddle <ast= and some mi3(t e8en ar36e in !a"an as -ell. Co6ntries t(at once as"ired to international 3reatness or at least a le8el of "rominence b6t t(at no- fear irrele8ance or -orse mi3(t re3ard n6clear -ea"ons as a -a1 to "ro8ide not onl1 a "s1c(olo3ical (ed3e b6t "otentiall1 a strate3ic one.

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Allied Prolif- %ai3an Scenario (1 of 2)


A. military readiness in Asia perception of imminent U.S. withdrawal.
5ersia !0
(!o(n C.-= Staff %riter= $o8. 1 = Mrlando Sentinel= IIn Asia= M""ort6nit1 'noc0s Clinton at t(e Goor? 9i33er Role for t(e A.S.J= 5exis@ !acob) !6st beca6se t(e Cold %ar is o8er= t(e Anited StatesB sec6rit1

concerns in t(e Asia-Pacific re3ion (a8enBt

e8a"orated. Commission on P6blic Gi"lomac1? t(e Anited States is -idel1 8ie-ed in t(e re3ion as an essential balancin3 force= a 36arantor of "eace and stabilit1 in a "art of t(e -orld -(ere territorial dis"6tes= n6clear "roliferation= ci8il -ar and ot(er ris0s of militar1 ad8ent6rism -arrant A.S. 8i3ilance and readiness.O C(ina offers a 3ood exam"le of t(e c(allen3es= beca6se of a massi8e militar1= n6clear -ea"ons= a "ro"ensit1 to sell destabiliEin3 militar1 eC6i"ment= "roblems -it( ,ai-an= testiness o8er t(e "lanned reinte3ration of 2on3 'on3 in 1..*= and territorial dis"6tes -it( R6ssia and some ot(er former So8iet re"6blics= Kietnam= India=
O,oda1 9(6tan= t(e P(ili""ines= ;ala1sia and 9r6nei. Ironicall1= a $erce$ ion co6rses t(ro63( m6c( of Asia t(at t(e Anited States co6ld be contem"latin3 -it(dra-al from t(e re3ion. ,(at "erce"tion is fed b1 t(e forced closin3 last 1ear of (63e A.S. militar1 installations in t(e P(ili""ines= b1 "o-erf6l "olitical infl6ences in t(e Anited States t(at see0 to foc6s national attention in-ard and b1 American b6d3etar1 constraints. In "art= t(ose fears ma1 (a8e been laid to rest b1 ClintonBs stated sec6rit1 "riorities for t(e re3ion. ,(e1 incl6de a contin6ed A.S. militar1 commitment= stron3er efforts a3ainst -ea"ons of mass destr6ction= ne- re3ional dialo36es on sec6rit1 c(allen3es and s6""ort for democrac1. ,(e most "rominent exam"les of t(e A.S. sec6rit1 commitment to Asia are bases in !a"an and So6t( 'orea. ,(e1 (el" to 0ee" "eace in t(e re3ion and "ro8ide a s"ecific co6nter-ei3(t to "otential a33ression from $ort( 'orea. ,(atBs a central concern= man1 anal1sts a3ree. ,(is national interest -as s6mmed 6" b1 t(e Anited States Ad8isor1

B. That perception will scare Taiwan into n cleari&ing.


+a-$4ell 02
('6rt ;.-= Sr. K.P. P 'issin3er C(air in $ational Sec6rit1 > CSIS= %inter= ,(e %as(in3ton H6arterl1= I$6clear Proliferation be1ond Ro36esJ= 5exis@ !acob) C6rrentl1= t(e increasin3l1 militariEed relations(i" bet-een C(ina and ,ai-an across t(e ,ai-an Strait (as s"ar0ed similar concerns. C(inaBs seemin3l1 inexorable b6ild6" of a con8entional arsenal of fi3(ter "lanes= medi6m-ran3e ballistic missiles= na8al assets= and ex"editionar1 forces s633ests a -orrisome trend. ;an1 fear t(at= at some "oint in t(e f6t6re= absent external assistance= ,ai-an co6ld become 86lnerable to a con8entional onsla63(t b1 t(e mainland. 7or t(is reason= ,ai-an (as considered a n6clear alternati8e at "oints in t(e "ast b6t -as diss6aded t(ro63( .

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

C6iet "ress6re from %as(in3ton. An increasin3 con8entional imbalance and an' sense of alienation or lac6 of s/$$or fro- *as,in2 on co6ld ca6se ,ai-anBs leaders to reconsider s6c( an a""roac(.

'. The % is n clear war.


Sieff 07
(;artin-= !an. 1.= A.P.I.= I9;G 7oc6s? ,(e ;issiles of ,ai-anJ= 5exis@ !acob) ,ai-anBs decision to "rod6ce no less t(an #// cr6ise missiles ca"able of t(reatenin3 so6t(ern C(ina dramaticall1 escalates its missile arms race -it( t(e Peo"leBs Re"6blic of C(ina and ma1 tem"t C(ina to-ard ta0in3 "reem"ti8e militar1 action in t(e 2//+-2/1/ "eriod.

Allied Prolif- %ai3an Scenario (2 of 2)


As "re8io6sl1 re"orted in o6r com"anion 9;G %atc( col6mn= t(e res"ected 9ritis( No6rnal !aneBs Gefense %ee0l1 re"orted earlier t(is mont( t(at ,ai-an (as (i3(l1 ambitio6sl1 "lans "rod6ce at least #/ of its o-n 2si6n3 7en3= or 9ra8e %ind= 2< cr6ise missiles b1 2/1/ and e8ent6all1 it "lans to "rod6ce and de"lo1 no less t(an #// of t(em. ,(e ,ai-anese Gefense ;inistr1 (as sta1ed silent on t(e re"ort. It stri0in3l1 (as not denied it. !G% also re"orted t(at ,ai-an (as alread1 (ome-"rod6ced t(ree "rotot1"es of t(e -ea"on. ,(is sin3le re"ort s(o6ld so6nd alarms in t(e Penta3on and for defense strate3ists and 3o8ernments in t(e Anited States and t(ro63(o6t <ast Asia and t(e Pacific Rim. 7or it is t(e clearest si3nal 1et t(at a "ossible militar1 confrontation bet-een ,ai-an and ;ainland C(ina t(at co6ld easil1 dra3 in t(e Anited States ma1 no- be onl1 a matter of time. <8en -it( onl1 con8entional -ar(eads= a massi8e cr6ise missile force de"lo1ed on ,ai-an co6ld "ose a 8er1 serio6s national sec6rit1 t(reat to C(ina? ,(e re"orted 3&/-mile ran3e of t(e 2si6n3 7en3 -o6ld "6t t(e 2on3 'on3 and S(an3(ai= t(e financial (6b of C(ina= -it(in its ran3e. Also= ,ai-anBs cr6ise missile force mi3(t not sta1 merel1 con8entionall1 armed. ,ai-anBs ad8anced ind6strial econom1 alread1 (as n6clear reactors and= li0e !a"an= So6t( 'orea and man1 ot(er ad8anced ind6strial nations= ,ai-an (as ca"abilit1 to de8elo" its o-n n6clear -ea"onr1 "robabl1 -it(in onl1 a fe- mont(s if its leaders t(o63(t it faced an o8er-(elmin3 national emer3enc1 76rt(ermore= alt(o63( cr6ise missiles are far slo-er t(an ballistic missiles= t(e1 can be far (arder for state-of-t(e-art antiballistic missile interce"tors to s(oot do-n. Cr6ise missiles are "ro3rammed to (63 t(e 3ro6nd and re36larl1 c(an3e co6rse b1 (633in3 t(e conto6rs of t(e landsca"e. ,(is means it is 8astl1 more diffic6lt= if not im"ossible for 3ro6nd-based radar s1stems to loc0 on to t(em. IsraelBs s6"erb Arro- A9; interce"tor for exam"le= last 1ear s6ccessf6ll1 s(ot do-n an intermediate ran3e ballistic missile confi36red to fl1 li0e an Iranian S(a(ib-3. 96t Israel -o6ld (a8e to rel1 on its air force aircraft -- C6alitati8el1 abo6t t(e best in t(e -orld -- and airborne A%ACS radar aircraft to detect and s(oot do-n an1 of t(e doEen cr6ise missiles t(at A0rainian President Ki0tor F6s(c(en0o (as ac0no-led3ed -ere secretl1 sold to Iran 6nder t(e re3ime of (is "redecessor 5eonid '6c(ma. Also= it is far easier to (ide cr6ise missiles or to ma0e t(em road mobile t(an it is for m6c( lar3er ballistic missiles. ,(e1 are far smaller and easier to (andle. ,(e forer6nner of t(e cr6ise missile= t(e German K-1= or 7l1in3 9omb= s(o-ed t(is ca"abilit1 in 1. . <normo6s massed bombin3 raids b1 9ritainBs Ro1al Air 7orce 9omber Command and t(e A.S. <i3(t( Air 7orce -ere 6nable "re8ent t(e 56ft-affe from r6nnin3 6" ne- la6nc(in3 ram"s for t(em to bombard 5ondon -it(in a matter of (o6rs. ;odern cr6ise missiles are eC6all1 eas1 and flexible in t(eir la6nc(in3 reC6irements. And !aneBs re"orted t(at t(e 2si6n3 7en3s are alread1 desi3ned to be mobile.B ,(at means t(at if ,ai-an b6ilds and de"lo1s a n6clear-ca"able cr6ise missile force of e8en #/ -ea"ons as it "lans to do b1 2/1/ -- let alone t(e (63e #//--ea"on force it 6ltimatel1 en8isa3es -- C(ina -o6ld almost certainl1 react b1 "lannin3 an o8er-(elmin3 "reem"ti8e stri0e b1 t(e enormo6s force of *// ballistic missiles it (as alread1 assembled to t(reaten ,ai-an and deter t(e Anited States from o"eratin3 its n6clear aircraft carrier stri0e forces in t(e ,ai-an Strait. If C(ina did t(at= ,ai-an in t6rn -o6ld most li0el1 res"ond b1 "6ttin3 its o-n cr6ise missile force on (air tri33er alert. ConseC6entl1= t(e dan3ers of a f6ll-scale missile -ar bein3 set off b1 miscalc6lation= or at a far earlier sta3e in an1 crisis= -o6ld be 3reatl1 increased. ,ai-an e8en (as "lans to im"ro8e on t(e c6rrent 2s6in3-7en3 desi3n to 3i8e later models a ran3e of &// miles. ,(e islandBs militar1-r6n C(6n3s(an Instit6te of Science and ,ec(nolo31= t(e de8elo"er of t(e cr6ise missile= is "lannin3 to extend its ran3e to &// miles= !G% said. 2o-e8er= O,(is -o6ld reC6ire t(e acC6isition of s"ecialiEed en3ine com"onents from t(e Anited States t(at %as(in3ton (as so far ref6sed to allo-= "er(a"s lin0ed to "ro8isions 6nder t(e ;issile ,ec(nolo31 Control Re3ime= !aneBs said. ,(e cr6ise missile "ro3ram a""ears desi3ned to become t(e center"iece of ,ai-anBs Oacti8e defenseO "olic1= -(ic( aims to co6nter an1 a33ression before it reac(es ,ai-anese territor1= !G% said. 1/

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

2o-e8er= t(e "roblem -it( t(at 0ind of Oacti8e defenseO is t(at it co6ld instead ra"idl1 "ro8o0e t(e 0ind of Oacti8e attac0O it is meant to "re8ent. %o6ld C(ina sit bac0 and allo- ,ai-an to effecti8el1 36arantee its "er"et6al de facto inde"endence for t(e foreseeable f6t6re b1 de"lo1in3 t(e 0ind of missile ca"abilit1 t(at= it co6ld be ar36ed= -o6ld be com"arable to t(e one t(e So8iet Anion tried to "lace in C6ba in t(e earl1 1.&/s to t(reaten t(e Anited States from close at (andQ President !o(n 7= 'enned1 did not sit bac0 and allo- t(e So8iets and t(eir comm6nist C6ban allies. Instead= (e ris0ed a f6ll-scale n6clear -ar in t(e C6ban ;issile crisis of 1.&2 to force t(e -it(dra-al of t(e missiles. %ill C(inaBs President 26 !intao 3o as far as !7' did in dealin3 -it( t(e missiles of ,ai-anQ Mr mi3(t (e e8en 3o f6rt(erQ ;iscalc res6ltin3 from 0ee"in3 -ea"ons on (air-tri33er alert C(inese 7irst Stri0e

Allied Prolif- In eral for Asia Scenarios- Readiness 6


(igh readiness is the only way to ass re U.S. allies in Asia of its commitment to deterring conflict.
*aldron !7
(Art(6r $.-= Prof. of Strate31 P Polic1 > A.S. $a8al %ar Colle3e= ;arc( 2/= ,estimon1 before t(e 2o6se $ational Sec6rit1 Committee= ISec6rit1 C(allen3es- C(inaJ= 5exis@ !acob) 96t -ili ar' $re$ara ion is best t(o63(t of as ins6rance@ some(o- -e li0e it t(e best if in face -e ne8er need to 6se it. ,(e next se8eral 1ears -ill be an im"ortant test for t(e Anited States in Asia= C(ina= R6ssia= India=

and ot(er statesRincl6din3 o6r allies and friendsR-ill be siEin3 6s 6"= to see -(et(er -e (a8e t(e resol8e to face t(reats and deter t(em= and t(e di"lomatic s0ill in "eacetime to mana3e friends(i"s and alliances (a8in3 com"lex "olitical and economic= as -ell as sec6rit1 dimensions. If t(e ans-ers are 1es= and o6r alliances remain stron3= t(en -e ma1 mo8e in Asia= as -e did in t(e <6ro"ean Cold %ar= from t(e eC6i8alent toda1 of t(e (air-raisin3 9erlin Crises of t(e 1.#/s and 1.&/s= to some f6t6re eC6i8alents of Mst"oliti0 and Getente= ca""ed off= "er(a"s= b1 3en6ine liberaliEation in C(ina. 96t if 3e flinc,= t(en Asia -ill become a sec6rit1 free-for- all= li0e <6ro"e in t(e first (alf of t(is cent6r1= -it( e8er1 state armin3= none tr6l1 allied= and none able to find t(e -a1 to "eace.

)N*T+! 'ard also appears elsewhere ,the internal for Asian prolif-)

11

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Asian S a4ili ' Scenario


A. Strong U.S. military readiness is $ey to Asian stability! . scenarios.
S /-$ 02
(9ob.-= Re". (R-AS)= ;arc( 2/= 2o6se Armed Ser8ices Committee 2earin3= I7F :/3 Gefense 96d3et ReC6estJ= 5exis@ !acob)

As -e 6nderta0e t(is cam"ai3n to combat terrorism in t(e Asia- Pacific re3ion= t(e critical missions end6re -(ic( -e -ere dealin3 -it( before .411 and -(ic( are still t(ere. ,(e ,ai-an Strait militar1 balance= a $ort( 'orea -(ic( is star8in3 its "o"6lation -(ile sellin3 missiles= and contin6ed tensions bet-een n6clear nei3(bors India and Pa0istan? all of t(ese still 0ee" me a-a0e at ni3(t and contin6all1 0ee" t(e A.S. Pacific Command extremel1 b6s1 maintainin3 deterrence t(ro63( readiness and t(ro63( t(eater sec6rit1 coo"eration.

B. The impact is the whole world blowing p.


&enned' ( Irie 00
(Prof. Pa6l-= Prof. A0ira-= Gail1 Fomi6ri= !an. 1/= I21st Cent6r1--Gialo36es on t(e 76t6re4 GlobaliEationBs s-a1 in e8ol6tion of states "6t in foc6sJ= 5exis@ !acob) 'enned1? M8er t(e "ast t-o or t(ree decades= man1 Asian nations (a8e increased t(eir defense b6d3ets= -(ile <6ro"ean co6ntries (a8e done ot(er-ise. G6rin3 t(is time= t(ere (a8e been man1 flas( "oints in Asia= s6c( $ort( 'orea= ,ai-an and 'as(mir. Some Asian co6ntries (a8e de8elo"ed n6clear -ea"ons= as contrasted -it( fe<6ro"eans -(o e8en -ant n6clear "o-er stations toda1. %e (a8e 3ood reason to feel -orried t(at Asia co6ld become a tinderbox s(o6ld t(ere be an1 conflict in dis"6ted territories li0e t(e S"ratl1 Islands and an a6tistic $ort( 'orean re3ime t(at does not bot(er to 6nderstand t(e o6tside -orld. ,ai-an is often ras( to "ro8o0e 9eiNin3= -(ile t(e 'as(mir conflict co6ld 3ro- into an IndiaPa0istan -ar. ,(ere is 3reat concern abo6t (o- -e s(o6ld ens6re t(at bitter ri8alries in t(e Asian "art of t(e 3lobe -ill not brin3 do-n a s1stem t(at is emer3in3 in t(e -orld no-. %e do not -ant a re"eat of 1.1 . I am concerned t(at an armed conflict mi3(t arise in So6t( or <ast Asia in 2//+= for exam"le= and brin3 do-n t(e credit= financial floand ca"ital in t(e re3ion. Irie? I s(are Prof. 'enned1Bs sense of "essimism abo6t some serio6s "roblems facin3 t(e -orld toda1. ,(ere are man1 more so8erei3n nations toda1= and t(e maNorit1 of t(em are ne-l1 inde"endent states. ,(erefore= t(e1 are e8en more nationalistic. $ationalism (as often ser8ed as t(e onl1 s1mbol of national 6nit1 for some African= Asian and ;iddle <astern co6ntries t(at (a8e been 3rated in t(eir re3ions -it(o6t national traditions com"arable to t(ose of <6ro"ean co6ntries. ,(is (as made matters e8en -orse. $ationalism is all t(at can 0ee" a co6ntr1 to3et(er. It is essential to ens6re t(at local conflicts -ill be 0e"t from blo-in3 6" t(e entire -orld.

12

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Asian Prolif Scenario


A. /ecline in readiness Asian prolif 0 war
*aldron !7
(Art(6r $.-= Prof. of Strate31 P Polic1 > A.S. $a8al %ar Colle3e= ;arc( 2/= ,estimon1 before t(e 2o6se $ational Sec6rit1 Committee= ISec6rit1 C(allen3es- C(inaJ= 5exis@ !acob)

ar' $re$ara ion is best t(o63(t of as ins6rance@ some(o- -e li0e it t(e best if in face -e ne8er need to 6se it. ,(e next se8eral 1ears -ill be an im"ortant test for t(e Anited States in Asia= C(ina= R6ssia= India= and ot(er statesRincl6din3 o6r allies and friendsR-ill be siEin3 6s 6"= to see -(et(er -e (a8e t(e resol8e to face t(reats and deter t(em= and t(e di"lomatic s0ill in "eacetime to mana3e friends(i"s and alliances (a8in3 com"lex "olitical and economic= as -ell as sec6rit1 dimensions. If t(e ans-ers are 1es= and o6r alliances remain stron3= t(en -e ma1 mo8e in Asia= as -e did in t(e <6ro"ean Cold %ar= from t(e eC6i8alent toda1 of t(e (air-raisin3 9erlin Crises of t(e 1.#/s and 1.&/s= to some f6t6re eC6i8alents of Mst"oliti0 and Getente= ca""ed off= "er(a"s= b1 3en6ine liberaliEation in C(ina. 96t if 3e flinc,= t(en Asia -ill become a sec6rit1 free-for- all= li0e <6ro"e in t(e first (alf of t(is cent6r1= -it( e8er1 state armin3= none tr6l1 allied= and none able to find t(e -a1 to "eace.

96t -ili

B. The % is worldwide prolif 0 n clear war.


+irincione 00
(!ose"(-= ;arc( 22= 7orei3n Polic1= I,(e Asian $6clear Reaction C(ainJ= P. 12/= 5exis@ !acob)

,(e bloc0s -o6ld fall C6ic0est and (ardest in Asia= -(ere "roliferation "ress6res are alread1 b6ildin3 more C6ic0l1 t(an an1-(ere else in t(e -orld. If a n6clear brea0o6t ta0es "lace in Asia= t(en t(e international arms control a3reements t(at (a8e been "ainsta0in3l1 ne3otiated o8er t(e "ast / 1ears -ill cr6mble. ;oreo8er= t(e Anited States co6ld find itself embroiled in its fo6rt( -ar on t(e Asian continent in six decades-a costl1 reb60e to t(ose -(o see0 t(e safet1 of 7ortress America b1 (idin3 be(ind national missile defenses. Consider -(at is alread1 (a""enin3? $ort( 'orea contin6es to "la1 36essin3 3ames -it( its n6clear and missile "ro3rams@ So6t( 'orea -ants its o-n missiles to matc( P1on31an3Bs@ India and Pa0istan s(oot across

borders -(ile r6nnin3 a slo--motion n6clear arms race@ C(ina moderniEes its n6clear arsenal amid tensions -it( ,ai-an and t(e Anited States@ !a"anBs 8ice defense minister is forced to resi3n after extollin3 t(e benefits of n6clear
-ea"ons@ and R6ssia---(ose 7ar <ast n6clear de"lo1ments alone ma0e it t(e lar3est Asian n6clear "o-er--str633les to maintain territorial co(erence. 7i8e of t(ese states (a8e n6clear -ea"ons@ t(e ot(ers are ca"able of constr6ctin3 t(em. 5i0e ne6trons firin3 from a

s"lit atom= one nationBs actions can tri33er reactions t(ro63(o6t t(e re3ion= -(ic( in t6rn= stim6late additional actions. ,(ese nations form an interloc0in3 Asian n6clear reaction c(ain t(at 8ibrates dan3ero6sl1 -it( eac( ne- de8elo"ment.
13

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

If t(e freC6enc1 and intensit1 of t(is reaction c1cle increase= critical decisions ta0en b1 an1 one of t(ese 3o8ernments co6ld cascade into t(e second 3reat -a8e of n6clear--ea"on "roliferation= brin3in3 re3ional and 3lobal economic and "olitical instabilit1 and= "er(a"s= t(e first combat 6se of a n6clear -ea"on since 1. #.

He2e Scenario (1 of 2)
A. 1eadiness is the bac$bone of U.S. leadership!deters co nterbalancing.
&,alil8ad !9
(Salma1-= S"rin3= %as(in3ton H6arterl1= I5osin3 t(e ;omentQ ,(e Anited States and t(e %orld After t(e Cold %arJ= Kol. 1+= L 2= 5exis@ !acob)

main deterrent to t(e rise of anot(er 3lobal ri8al is t(e militar1 "o-er of t(e Anited States= an inadeC6ate le8el of A.S. militar1 ca"abilit1 co6ld facilitate s6c( an e8ent. ,(is ca"abilit1 s(o6ld be meas6red not onl1 in terms of t(e stren3t( of ot(er co6ntries= b6t also in terms of t(e A.S. a4ili ' o carr' o/ t(e strate31 o6tlined (ere. A.S. tradition ma0es t(e "ros"ect of defense c6ts belo- t(is le8el a serio6s "ossibilit1? (istoricall1= t(e Anited States (as made t(is error on se8eral occasions b1 do-nsiEin3 excessi8el1. It faces t(e same dan3er a3ain for t(e lon3er term. ,(e iss6e is not onl1 -(at le8els of reso6rces are s"ent on defense b6t also on -(at= for -(at= and (o- t(e1 are s"ent. 7or t(e Anited States to maintain its militar1 "reeminence= in addition to meetin3 "ossible maNor re3ional contin3encies (;RCs)= it needs s"ecific ca"abilit1 in t(ree areas.
7irst= besides maintainin3 a rob6st n6clear deterrent ca"abilit1 beca6se of concerns -it( R6ssian and C(inese existin3 or "otential n6clear "ost6res= t(e Anited States needs to acC6ire increased ca"abilit1 to deter= "re8ent= and defend a3ainst t(e 6se of biolo3ical= c(emical= and n6clear -ea"ons in maNor conflicts in critical re3ions. ,(e re3ional deterrence reC6irements mi3(t -ell be different from t(ose -it( re3ard to t(e So8iet Anion d6rin3 t(e Cold %ar beca6se of t(e c(aracter and moti8ations of different re3ional "o-ers. A.S. abilit1 to "re8ent and defend a3ainst 6se is c6rrentl1 8er1 limited. In t(e near term= t(erefore= to deter 6se of %;G a3ainst its forces and allies= t(e Anited States ma1 (a8e to t(reaten n6clear retaliation.,o co6nter t(e s"read of %;G and t(eir means of deli8er1 (es"eciall1 ballistic and cr6ise missiles)= t(e Anited States s(o6ld see0 to de8elo" t(e ca"abilit1 to "rom"tl1 locate and destro1 e8en -ell-"rotected facilities related to biolo3ical= c(emical= and n6clear -ea"ons and t(eir deli8er1 s1stems. <C6all1 im"ortant -ill be t(e abilit1 to defend a3ainst t(e 6se of t(ese -ea"ons= incl6din3 bot( acti8e and "assi8e defense. Ge"lo1in3 rob6st= m6ltila1ered ballistic missile defenses is 8ital for "rotectin3 A.S. for-ardde"lo1ed forces and extendin3 "rotection to A.S. allies= t(6s 3ainin3 t(eir "artici"ation and coo"eration in defeatin3 a33ression in critical re3ions.

A 3lobal ri8al to t(e Anited States co6ld emer3e for se8eral reasons. 9eca6se t(e

im"ro8ed ca"abilit1 for decisi8e im"act in lesser re3ional crises (5RCs) -- internal conflicts= small -ars= (6manitarian relief= "eace0ee"in3 or "eacema0in3 o"erations= "6niti8e stri0es= restoration of ci8il order= e8ac6ation of noncombatant Americans= safe36ardin3 of sec6rit1 Eones= and monitorin3 and enforcement of sanctions. Gi8en t(e end of t(e Cold %ar= t(e Anited States can be more selecti8e in
decidin3 -(en to become in8ol8ed militaril1. It (as not been selecti8e eno63( d6rin3 t(e "ast t(ree 1ears. Gettin3 in8ol8ed in 5RCs can erode A.S. ca"abilities for dealin3 -it( bi33er and more im"ortant conflicts. $e8ert(eless = some crises ma1 occ6r in areas of 8ital im"ortance to t(e Anited States -- e.3.= in ;exico= C6ba= So6t( Africa= or Sa6di Arabia -- and ot(ers

Second= t(e Anited States needs

mi3(t so c(allen3e American 8al6es as to "rod6ce A.S. militar1 in8ol8ement. ,(e Anited States mi3(t also consider "artici"atin3 -it( allies in some 5RCs beca6se of a desire eit(er to extend t(e Eone of "eace or to "re8ent c(aos from s"readin3 to a critical re3ion and t(ereb1 t(reatenin3 t(e sec6rit1 of members of t(e Eone of "eace.

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

B. The % is n clear war


&,alil8ad !9
(Salma1-= 9adass= S"rin3= %as(in3ton H6arterl1= I5osin3 t(e ;omentQ ,(e Anited States and t(e %orld After t(e Cold %arJ= Kol. 1+ L2= P. + = 5exis@ !acob)
Ander t(e t(ird o"tion= t(e Anited States -o6ld see0 to retain 3lobal leaders(i" and to "recl6de t(e rise of a 3lobal ri8al or a ret6rn to m6lti"olarit1 for t(e indefinite f6t6re. Mn balance= t(is is t(e best lon3-term 36idin3 "rinci"le and 8ision. S6c( a 8ision is desirable not as an end in

itself= b6t beca6se a -orld in -(ic( t(e Anited States exercises leaders(i" -o6ld (a8e tremendo6s ad8anta3es. 7irst= t(e 3lobal en8ironment -o6ld be more o"en and more rece"ti8e to American 8al6es -- democrac1= free mar0ets= and t(e r6le of la-. Second= s6c( a -orld -o6ld (a8e a better c(ance of dealin3 coo"erati8el1 -it( t(e -orldBs maNor "roblems= s6c( as n6clear "roliferation= t(reats of re3ional (e3emon1 b1 rene3ade states= and lo--le8el conflicts. 7inall1= A.S. leaders(i" -o6ld (el" "recl6de t(e rise of anot(er (ostile 3lobal ri8al= enablin3 t(e Anited States and t(e -orld to a8oid anot(er 3lobal cold or (ot -ar and all t(e attendant dan3ers= incl6din3 a 3lobal n6clear exc(an3e. A.S. leaders(i" -o6ld t(erefore be more cond6ci8e to 3lobal stabilit1 t(an a bi"olar or a

m6lti"olar balance of "o-er s1stem.

He2e Scenario (2 of 2)
'. "ndependent of the strength of U.S. hegemony c#b NW 0 e2tinction
)'e !1
(!ose"(-= Gean of 'enned1 Sc(ool of Go8. > 2ar8ard= Bound to $ead= P. 1*)

Perce"tions of c(an3e in t(e relati8e "o-er of nations are of critical im"ortance to 6nderstandin3 t(e relations(i" bet-een decline and -ar. Mne of t(e oldest 3eneraliEations abo6t international "olitics attrib6tes t(e onset of maNor -ars to s(ifts in "o-er amon3 t(e leadin3 nations. ,(6s ,(6c1dides acco6nted for t(e onset of t(e
Pelo"onnesian %ar -(ic( destro1ed t(e "o-er of ancient At(ens. ,(e (istor1 of t(e interstate s1stem since 1#// is "6nct6ated b1 se8ere -ars in -(ic( one co6ntr1 str633led to s6r"ass anot(er as t(e leadin3 state. If= as Robert Gil"in ar36es= O international "olitics (as not c(an3ed f6ndamentall1 o8er t(e millennia=O t(e im"lications for t(e f6t6re are blea0 . # And if

fears abo6t s(iftin3 "o-er "reci"itate a maNor -ar in a -orld -it( #/=/// n6clear -ea"ons= (istor1 as -e 0no- it ma1 end.

1#

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

He2e- Readiness 6 de errence:3arfi2, in2 (1 of 2)


1eadiness diss ades enemy b ild p
Polic' Pa$ers 02
(Se"t.= I,(e national sec6rit1 strate31 of t(e Anited States of AmericaJ= 5exis@ !acob) It is time to reaffirm t(e essential role of American militar1 stren3t(. %e m6st b6ild and maintain o6r defenses be1ond c(allen3e. M6r militar1Bs (i3(est "riorit1 is to defend t(e Anited States. ,o do so effecti8el1= o6r militar1 m6st? * ass6re o6r allies and friends@ * diss6ade f6t6re militar1 com"etition@ * deter t(reats a3ainst A.S. interests= allies= and friends@ and * decisi8el1 defeat an1 ad8ersar1 if deterrence fails. ,(e 6n"aralleled stren3t( of t(e Anited States armed forces= and t(eir for-ard "resence= (a8e maintained t(e "eace in some of t(e -orldBs most strate3icall1 8ital re3ions. 2o-e8er= t(e t(reats and enemies -e m6st confront (a8e c(an3ed= and so m6st o6r forces. A militar1 str6ct6red to deter massi8e Cold %ar-era armies m6st be transformed to foc6s more on (o- an ad8ersar1 mi3(t fi3(t rat(er t(an -(ere and -(en a -ar mi3(t occ6r. %e -ill c(annel o6r ener3ies to o8ercome a (ost of o"erational c(allen3es. ,(e "resence of American forces o8erseas is one of t(e most "rofo6nd s1mbols of t(e A.S. commitments to allies and friends. ,(ro63( o6r -illin3ness to 6se force in o6r o-n defense and in defense of ot(ers= t(e Anited States demonstrates its resol8e to maintain a balance of "o-er t(at fa8ors freedom. ,o contend -it( 6ncertaint1 and to meet t(e man1 sec6rit1 c(allen3es -e face= t(e Anited States -ill reC6ire bases and stations -it(in and be1ond %estern <6ro"e and $ort(east Asia= as -ell as tem"orar1 access arran3ements for t(e lon3-distance de"lo1ment of A.S. forces. 9efore t(e -ar in Af3(anistan= t(at area -as lo- on t(e list of maNor "lannin3 contin3encies. Fet= in a 8er1 s(ort time= -e (ad to o"erate across t(e len3t( and breadt( of t(at remote nation= 6sin3 e8er1 branc( of t(e armed forces. %e m6st "re"are for more s6c( de"lo1ments b1 de8elo"in3 assets s6c( as ad8anced remote sensin3= lon3-ran3e "recision stri0e ca"abilities= and transformed mane68er and ex"editionar1 forces. ,(is broad "ortfolio of militar1 ca"abilities m6st also incl6de t(e abilit1 to defend t(e (omeland= cond6ct information o"erations= ens6re A.S. access to distant t(eaters= and "rotect critical A.S. infrastr6ct6re and assets in o6ter s"ace. Inno8ation -it(in t(e armed forces -ill rest on ex"erimentation -it( ne- a""roac(es to -arfare= stren3t(enin3 Noint o"erations= ex"loitin3 A.S. intelli3ence ad8anta3es= and ta0in3 f6ll ad8anta3e of science and tec(nolo31. %e m6st also transform t(e -a1 t(e Ge"artment of Gefense is r6n= es"eciall1 in financial mana3ement and recr6itment and retention. 7inall1= -(ile maintainin3 near-term readiness and t(e abilit1 to fi3(t t(e -ar on terrorism= t(e 3oal m6st be to "ro8ide t(e President -it( a -ider ran3e of militar1 o"tions to disco6ra3e a33ression or an1 form of coercion a3ainst t(e Anited States= o6r allies= and o6r friends. %e 0no- from (istor1 t(at deterrence can fail@ and -e 0no- from ex"erience t(at some enemies cannot be deterred. ,(e Anited States m6st and -ill maintain t(e ca"abilit1 to defeat an1 attem"t b1 an enem1---(et(er a state or non-state actor--to im"ose its -ill on t(e Anited States= o6r allies= or o6r friends. %e -ill maintain t(e forces s6fficient to s6""ort o6r obli3ations= and 1&

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

to defend freedom. M6r forces -ill be stron3 eno63( to diss6ade "otential ad8ersaries from "6rs6in3 a militar1 b6ild-6" in (o"es of s6r"assin3= or eC6alin3= t(e "o-er of t(e Anited States.

He2e- Readiness 6 de errence:3arfi2, in2 (2 of 2)


1eadiness $ey U.S. ability to deter war
&i field 00
(!ames-= %inter= ,(e $ational Interest= I,(e 7ol0 %(o 5i8e on t(e 2illJ= 5exis@ !acob) Certainl1 t(ere is am"le e8idence to s633est t(at AmericaBs militar1 is nearin3 a critical "(ase as it enters t(e t-ent1-first cent6r1. In recent 1ears t(e armed ser8ices (a8e s6ffered c(ronic s(ortfalls in t(e areas of recr6itin3= militar1 readiness= and eC6i"ment moderniEation and acC6isition. At t(e same time= t(e rate of o8erseas de"lo1ments (as increased more t(an 3// "ercent o8er t(e Cold %ar a8era3e. 5atel1= for exam"le= t(e A.S. militar1 (as been entan3led in stressf6l and drainin3 conflicts in= amon3 ot(er "laces= F63osla8ia= 9osnia= IraC= 2aiti and Somalia. Ges"ite t(is ex"andin3 catalo36e of missions= t(e armed forces still (a8e as t(eir "rimar1 res"onsibilit1 deterrin3= and if necessar1 fi3(tin3 and -innin3= t-o maNor t(eater -ars= a tas0 t(at reC6ires t(e maintenance of for-ard-de"lo1ed= combat-read1 forces in Asia and t(e ;iddle <ast. Sen. 'a1 9aile1 26tc(ison (R-,ex.)= a member of t(e Armed 7orces Committee= sa1s= O%e are stretc(in3 o6r forces so t(in toda1 t(at -e (a8e a crisis in militar1 readiness= retention and recr6itment. . . . %eB8e so dissi"ated o6r reso6rces and ener3ies b1 3ettin3 in8ol8ed in re3ional conflicts and mis36ided "eace0ee"in3 o"erations t(at o6r allies and ot(ers co6ld do as -ell as t(e Anited States= t(at -eB8e t(reatened o6r core ca"abilit1 to accom"lis( t(ose missions t(at onl1 a s6"er"o-er can do.O

1*

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

)& Scenario
A. 1eadiness $ deter North 3orean attac$
;a$or e 0"
(5eon !.-= General A.$. Command= A"ril 2.= 7ederal Goc6ment Clearin3 2o6se Con3ressional ,estimon1= Senate A""ro"riations Committee? S6bcommittee on ;ilitar1 Constr6ction= 5exis@ !acob) Combined 7orces Command ens6res t(e sec6rit1 of t(e "eo"le of t(e Re"6blic of 'orea. Combined 7orces Command "ro8ides t(e militar1 force t(at deters external a33ression and stands read1 to defeat an1 external "ro8ocation a3ainst t(e Re"6blic of 'orea. Combined 7orces Command= com"osed of air= 3ro6nd= na8al= marine= and s"ecial o"erations com"onent= cond6cts combined trainin3 exercises and readiness ins"ections to maintain t(e -arfi3(tin3 readiness t(at is essential to deterrence. ,(e Combined 7orces Command (eadC6arters is a f6ll1 inte3rated staff= manned b1 Re"6blic of 'orea and Anited States militar1 officers. ,(is t(oro63(l1 inte3rated (eadC6arters coordinates t(e o"erations t(at deter external a33ression. In 2//2= Combined 7orces Command assisted -it( t(e s6ccessf6l Anited $ations Command sal8a3e o"eration in t(e %est Sea and militar1 sec6rit1 s6""ort to t(e %orld C6" and Asian Games.

B. The % is an apocalyptic firestorm.


</n2a-3an2o !!
(Pat-= Mct. 2#= Africa $e-s= IAfrica-at-5ar3e@ ,(ird -orld -ar? %atc( t(e 'oreasJ= 5exis@ !acob)

If t(ere is one "lace toda1 -(ere t(e m6c(-dreaded ,(ird %orld %ar co6ld easil1 er6"t and "robabl1 red/ce ear , o a ,/2e s-o/lderin2 cinder it is t(e 'orean Penins6la in 7ar <ast Asia. <8er since t(e end of t(e sa8a3e t(ree-1ear 'orean -ar in t(e earl1 1.#/s= militar1 tension bet-een t(e (ardline comm6nist nort( and t(e American bac0ed So6t( 'orea (as remained dan3ero6sl1 (i3(. In fact t(e 'oreas are tec(nicall1 still at -ar.
A forei3n 8isitor to eit(er P1on31on3 in t(e $ort( or Seo6l in So6t( 'orea -ill C6ic0l1 notice t(at t(e di8ided co6ntr1 is al-a1s on maxim6m alert for an1 e8ent6alit1. $ort( 'orea or t(e Gemocratic Peo"leBs Re"6blic of 'orea (GPR') (as ne8er for3i8en t(e AS for comin3 to t(e aid of So6t( 'orea d6rin3 t(e 'orean -ar. S(e still re3ards t(e AS as an occ6"ation force in So6t( 'orea and -(oll1 to blame for t(e non-re6nification of t(e co6ntr1. $ort( 'orean media constantl1 c(6rns o6t a tirade of attac0s on Oim"erialistO America and its Or6nnin3 do3O So6t( 'orea.

1+

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

,(e GPR' is one of t(e most secreti8e co6ntries in t(e -orld -(ere a 8isitor is 3i8en t(e im"ression t(at t(e "eo"leBs (atred for t(e AS is absol6te -(ile t(e lo8e for t(eir 3o8ernment is total. %(et(er t(is is reall1 so= it is extremel1 diffic6lt to concl6de. In t(e GPR'= a 8isitor is ne8er 3i8en a c(ance to s"ea0 to ordinar1 'oreans abo6t t(e "olitics of t(eir co6ntr1. $o 8isitor mo8es aro6nd alone -it(o6t 3o8ernment escort. ,(e American 3o8ernment ar36es t(at its "resence in So6t( 'orea -as beca6se of t(e constant dan3er of an in8asion from t(e nort(. America (as 8ast economic interests in So6t( 'orea. S(e "oints o6t t(at t(e nort( (as d63 n6mero6s t6nnels alon3 t(e demilitarised Eone as "art of t(e in8asion "lans. S(e also acc6ses t(e nort( of 8iolatin3 So6t( 'orean territorial -aters. <arl1 t(is 1ear= a small $ort( 'orean s6bmarine -as ca63(t in So6t( 'orean -aters after 3ettin3 entan3led in fis(in3 nets. 9ot( t(e Americans and So6t( 'oreans claim t(e s6bmarine -as on a militar1 s"1in3 mission. 2o-e8er= t(e intension of t(e alle3ed intr6sion -ill "robabl1 ne8er be 0no-n beca6se t(e craftBs cre- -ere all fo6nd -it( fatal 36ns(ot -o6nds to t(eir (eads in -(at (as been described as s6icide "act to (ide t(e tr6t( of t(e mission. ,(e AS

mistr6st of t(e nort(Bs intentions is so dee" t(at it is no secret t(at toda1 %as(in3ton (as t(e lar3est concentration of soldiers and -ea"onr1 of all descri"tions in so6t( 'orea t(an an1-(ere else in t(e %orld=
a"art from America itself. Some of t(e armada t(at -as de"lo1ed in t(e recent bombin3 of IraC and in M"eration Gesert Storm a3ainst t(e same co6ntr1 follo-in3 its in8asion of '6-ait -as from t(e fleet "ermanentl1 stationed on t(e 'orean Penins6la. It is tr6e too t(at at

t(e moment t(e $ort(4So6t( 'orean border is t(e most fortified in t(e -orld.

)&- Readiness 6
1eadiness $ deter war with N3
<ar2o 09
(,(omas 9.-= Commander A.S. Pacific Command= A"ril 1= Senate Armed Ser8ices Committee 2earin3= IGefense A6t(oriEation ReC6est for t(e 7iscal Fear T/#J= 5exis@ !acob) I (a8e t(e (onor to re"resent t(o6sands of men and -omen -- acti8e= 36ard= reser8e= and ci8ilians= and of co6rse= t(eir famil1 members -- for "ro8idin3 s6"erior ser8ice to t(e nation in t(e Asia and Pacific Re3ion and= indeed= aro6nd t(e -orld. ,(eir (i3( readiness and effecti8eness can be directl1 attrib6ted to t(e 3enero6s s6""ort to t(is esteemed bod1 and of t(e American "eo"le as a -(ole. ,oda1 IBd li0e to s6r8e1 o6r "rimar1 sec6rit1 concerns in t(e re3ion= and t(en I loo0 for-ard to ans-erin3 1o6r C6estions. And I a""reciate 1o6 "lacin3 m1 statement into t(e record= ;r. C(airman. Gramatic e8ents in So6t(-est Asia= for -(ic( t(e Pacific Command contin6es to be a "rimar1 force "ro8ider= (a8e not ecli"sed t(e im"ortance of t(e Asian-Pacific t(reats to 3lobal sec6rit1= nor o6r attention to t(em. 7irst and foremost= -e are 0eenl1 foc6sed on t(e 'orean Penins6la. General 5aPorte and I caref6ll1 monitor indications of $ort( 'orean militar1 readiness. And fran0l1= I donBt t(in0 t(at -ar is an1 more li0el1 toda1 t(an it -as 1+ mont(s or 2 mont(s a3o= b6t clearl1 t(e sta0es -o6ld be 8er1 (i3( if -ar occ6rred on t(e "enins6la. ;illions of So6t( 'oreans li8e -it(in ran3e of $ort( 'oreaBs artiller1. And t(e sta0es= of co6rse= -o6ld be e8en (i3(er if $ort( 'orea contin6es to "6rs6e a n6clear ca"abilit1. 96t $ort( 'oreaBs abilit1 to t(reaten "eace is not limited to t(e "enins6la. ,(e -orldBs lar3est "roliferator of ballistic missiles alread1 (as demonstrated t(e abilit1 to deli8er missile "a1loads be1ond e8en !a"an. And t(e reac( of its illicit acti8ities= s6c( as narcotics= extends as far as A6stralia= as -as demonstrated N6st last s6mmer. $o-= of co6rse= $ort( 'oreaBs (i3(l1 enric(ed 6rani6m "ro3ram= alon3 -it( its "l6toni6m re"rocessin3 "ro3ram= raise t(e s"ecter of n6clear -ea"ons eit(er in armed conflict or "roliferated into t(e (ands of terrorist 3ro6"s= "er(a"s o6r bi33est fear= and one t(at clearl1 -o6ld t(reaten all nations. President 96s( re"eatedl1 (as stated o6r commitment to a "eacef6l resol6tion of t(e $ort( 'orean n6clear iss6e. A di"lomatic initiati8e is mo8in3 for-ard to t(e six-"art1 tal0s= and o6r role at t(e Pacific Command (as been to ens6re t(at di"lomac1 is bac0ed b1 a 8iable militar1 ca"abilit1. And -e contin6e to do N6st t(at= "ost6rin3 o6r forces not to "ro8o0e b6t to deter conflict. 1.

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Re2ional +onflic s Scenario (1 of 2)


A. /ecline in U.S. military readiness emboldens aggression ca sing massi4e regional conflicts and collapsing American leadership.
Moore !=
(,(omas-= G"t. Girector of 7o.Po. P Gefense St6dies > t(e 2erita3e 7o6ndation= 7eb.= 2erita3e 7o6ndation Re"orts= Mandate for $eadershi% &'( )urin &deas into Actions= I;aintainin3 an <ffecti8e ;ilitar1 in a 96d3et StraitNac0etJ= P. **= 5exis@ !acob)
,oda1= t(is (istoric "attern of a lac0 of 8i3ilance and concern abo6t forei3n "olic1 and defense is bein3 re"eated= e8en in Con3ress and amon3 t(ose for -(om s6c( concerns 6sed to be "aramo6nt. ,(e 6nif1in3 and clarif1in3 t(reat of t(e former So8iet Anion is 3one -- e8en t(o63( a 8ariet1 of ot(er lesser t(reats contin6es to 3ro-. 96t t(e stron3-defense comm6nit1 is not 8ocal or "ers6asi8e eno63( to o8ercome t(e force of t(is (istorical "attern. ,(e do-n-ard s"iral of defense s"endin3 c6ts contin6es for t(e time bein3= and t(e c(oice bet-een Gemocrats and Re"6blicans is sim"l1 one of (o- stee" and (o- fast t(e do-n-ard s"iral -ill 3o. In fact= con3ressional Gemocrats (a8e "ointed o6t -- correctl1= one m6st add -- t(at t(e Re"6blicansB Ofront-loadedO defense b6d3et ma1 s"end more in t(e near term= b6t act6all1 "ro8ides less in f6t6re 1ears t(an t(e "lanned Clinton b6d3et for t(e same "eriod. 76rt(ermore= t(e 1/#t( Con3ress ma1 be tem"ted to

,(e res6lt? ,oda1= t(e Anited States (as too fe- forces to fi3(t t-o nearl1 sim6ltaneo6s re3ional conflicts= and too little mone1 to "a1 for t(e inadeC6ate forces. ,(ere is= (o-e8er= more to t(e (istorical "attern t(an ne3lect and t6rnin3 in-ard. ,(e lac0 of 8i3ilance abroad after -innin3 a -ar al-a1s (as enco6ra3ed ne- a33ression for -(ic( t(e Anited States -as 6n"re"ared. It is safe to "redict t(at toda1Bs A3e of C(aos -ill be no exce"tion. Greed= "assion= and foll1 are imm6table "arts of (6man c(aracter@ and some-(ere= someda1= a ne- dictator= (a8in3 obser8ed t(e lac0 of >?S? -ili ar' $re$aredness= -ill embar0 6"on some mad 8ent6re t(at t(reatens AmericaBs 8ital interests or its allies. Sooner or later= t(ere -ill be anot(er maNor conflict -- or m6lti"le conflicts -- t(at -ill dra- in t(e Anited States. In fact= t(e forces of conflict alread1 are b6ildin3 6" steadil1 aro6nd t(e -orld -- 3reat "o-er com"etition= 6nbridled nationalism= et(nic strife= reli3io6s fanaticism= and (6n3er for ne-l1 disco8ered or diminis(in3 nat6ral reso6rces. %(en t(e ine8itable crisis -- -(et(er a sin3le e8ent or a s6ccession of con8er3in3 re3ional crises -er6"ts a3ain in t(e -orld= t(e (istoric "attern s(o-s t(e American "eo"le -ill rall1 and do -(at is needed. ,oda1Bs a"at(1 and lac0 of interest in national sec6rit1 -ill e8a"orate o8erni3(t. 96t t(e American "eo"le rel1 on t(eir elected leaders to maintain t(e tools t(e1 -ill need to do t(e Nob. If t(e1 find t(e ne3lected militar1 instr6ment r6st1 and brittle in t(eir (ands= t(e1 -ill (old acco6ntable t(ose -(o let o6r defenses decline. ,(e blood of t(eir sons= brot(ers=
c6t defense e8en more to "a1 for "romised tax c6ts.

2/

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

(6sbands= and fat(ers -(o die 6nnecessaril1 -ill demand it. ,(is is -(ere t(e stron3-defense comm6nit1 can -- and m6st -- "la1 a 8ital role. If ex"erts from t(is comm6nit1 cannot sto" or re8erse t(e (istoric "attern of "ost-ar ne3lect= at least t(e1 can concentrate t(eir efforts on "reser8in3 a militar1 t(at -ill remain relati8el1 effecti8e e8en -(ile -earin3 a
b6d3et straitNac0et. U e8idence contin6es U Polic1ma0ers on Ca"itol 2ill -(o s6""ort defense m6st learn to t(in0 more li0e militar1 strate3ists. ,(e misN6d3ments= missed o""ort6nities= and follies of t(e Clinton AdministrationBs forei3n and defense "olicies o8er t(e "ast fo6r 1ears (a8e serio6sl1 -ea0ened A.S. infl6ence and credibilit1 abroad. Anless Con3ress and its concerned allies can become more effecti8e= t(e Clinton fail6res -ill lead ine8itabl1 to t(e decline of t(e Anited States as a 3reat "o-er= -it(o6t t(e means or t(e -ill to defend its 8al6es and interests.

7or t(e Anited States= t(e c(oice is eit(er to lead or be led. ,(e first c(oice leads to freedom= sec6rit1= and 3reatness@ t(e second= to -ea0ness and s6bmission. 7or its o-n -ell-bein3= and for t(at of t(e entire -orld= t(e credibilit1 of t(e Anited States as a 3lobal "o-er m6st be restored. %it(o6t t(e credibilit1 t(at comes from a stron3 militar1 force= t(e Anited States -ill be red6ced to ma0in3 em"t1 -arnin3s and im"otent demarc(es in times of crisis. 7orfeitin3 national credibilit1 -- and moral a6t(orit1 -- means "ossibl1 (a8in3 to resort to force -(en credibilit1 and an ima3e of steadfast resol8e co6ld (a8e "re8ented conflict. 96t -(en t(at moment of crisis comes= t(e Anited States ma1 find itself -it(o6t a militar1 force able to meet t(e demands of conflict. If t(e Administration cannot or -ill not "ro8ide t(is leaders(i"= t(en Con3ress= -it( t(e acti8e aid of a
defense "olic1 comm6nit1 t(at -ants to ma0e America stron3 a3ain= m6st (old it "6blicl1 and "oliticall1 acco6ntable. ,(en= insofar as t(e Constit6tion and 3ood "6blic "olic1 allo-= t(e1 m6st ste" into t(e leaders(i" 8oid to safe36ard A.S. national sec6rit1.

Re2ional +onflic s Scenario (2 of 2)


B. N clear war
@ean !9
(!onat(an- Ad8isor on I Sec6rit1 to Anion of Concerned Scientists= -or0ed -it( A.$. P'ers in t(e field and in G of State= ;arc(= 96lletin of t(e Atomic Scientists= IA stron3er A.$. stren3t(ens AmericaJ= $o. 2= Kol. #1= 5exis@ !acob)

<x"erts t(ro63(o6t t(e -orld ex"ect 3ro-in3 "o"6lation "ress6res and increasin3 en8ironmental stress to de8elo" o8er t(e comin3 decades into intense= far-reac(in3 social 6nrest and re3ional conflict. <conomic de8elo"ment is t(e sol6tion= (o-e8er slo- and 6ncertain it ma1 be in comin3. 96t t(e -orld also needs effecti8e re3ional conflict-"re8ention "roced6res. 5eft on its o-n= re3ional 8iolence can lead to confrontation and e8en -ar bet-een t(e 3reat "o-ers= incl6din3 t(e Anited States= as mi3(t occ6r= for exam"le= in t(e e8ent of conflict bet-een A0raine and R6ssia or bet-een C(ina and its nei3(bors. In t(e final anal1sis= 6nc(ec0ed re3ional 8iolence and t(e fear of f6rt(er 8iolence -ill lead more states to de8elo" n6clear -ea"ons. In "ast decades= t(is "rocess occ6rred in Israel= So6t( Africa= India= Pa0istan= IraC= and "res6mabl1= in $ort( 'orea. A -orld -it( 2/ or 3/ n6clear -ea"on states -o6ld not onl1 ma0e a more effecti8e 3lobal sec6rit1 s1stem im"ossible= it -o6ld lead t(e "resent n6clear -ea"on states to moderniEe and increase t(eir -ea"ons - and it -o6ld mar0edl1 increase t(e 86lnerabilit1 of t(e Anited States to direct attac0. Instead of s(r633in3 at (6man fallibilit1= acce"tin3 -ar as ine8itable= and= reactin3 after it (a""ens= A.S. "olic1 s(o6ld aim at establis(in3 an international "eace0ee"in3 s1stem t(at can (ead off an increasin3 n6mber of conflicts.

21

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Re2ional +onflic s- Perce$ ion of Readiness 6e'


+4en the perception of a decline in readiness conflict
S$encer 00
(!ac0-= Sr. Polic1 Anal1st for Gefense P $ational Sec6rit1 > t(e Instit6te for International St6dies > t(e 2erita3e 7o6ndation= Se"t. 1#= 9ac03ro6nder= I,(e 7acts Abo6t ;ilitar1 ReadinessJ L13. = (tt"?44---.(erita3e.or34Researc(4;issileGefense4 9G13. .cfm @ !acob)

;ilitar1 readiness is 8ital beca6se declines in AmericaBs militar1 readiness si2nal to t(e rest of t(e -orld t(at t(e Anited States is not "re"ared to defend its interests. ,(erefore= "otentiall1 (ostile nations -ill be more li0el1 to las( o6t a3ainst American allies and interests= ine8itabl1 leadin3 to A.S. in8ol8ement in combat. A (i3( state of militar1 readiness is more li0el1 to deter "otentiall1 (ostile nations from actin3 a33ressi8el1 in re3ions of 8ital national interest= t(ereb1 "reser8in3 "eace.

22

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Re2ional +onflic s- Readiness 6e' (1 of 2)


Strong U.S. military readiness $ deter m ltiple regional wars.
S$encer 00
(!ac0-= Sr. Polic1 Anal1st for Gefense P $ational Sec6rit1 > t(e Instit6te for International St6dies > t(e 2erita3e 7o6ndation= ;arc( 21= 9ac03ro6nder= I7oc6sin3 Gefense Reso6rces to ;eet $ational Sec6rit1 ReC6irementsJ L1&3+= (tt"?44---. (erita3e.or34Researc(4$ationalSec6rit14b31&3+.cfm@ !acob)

G6e to t(e emer3in3 3a" bet-een ca"abilities and strate31 ca6sed b1 t(e on3oin3 -ar a3ainst terrorism and t(e increasin3 need to "resent credible fi3(tin3 forces for t(e ;iddle <ast and 'orea= t(e nationBs national sec6rit1 concerns m6st be "rioritiEed. S"ecificall1= AmericaBs armed forces m6st= at a minim6m= be "re"ared for fo6r missions? 1. 7i3(t t(e immediate -ar on terrorism. G6e to t(e se8erit1 of t(e t(reat and t(e sta0es at ris0= t(e -ar on terrorism m6st be AmericaBs to" "riorit1. As President 96s( (as described n6mero6s times= most recentl1 in (is State of t(e Anion Address=& t(is -ar is m6ltifaceted. ,(e nation m6st (arness its reso6rces to en3a3e t(e terrorists and t(eir state s"onsors financiall1= "oliticall1= di"lomaticall1= and militaril1. ,(is 3lobal mission c6rrentl1 incl6des t(e o"eration in Af3(anistan= resol8in3 t(e IraCi crisis= and smaller de"lo1ments to nations li0e Femen= !ordan= and t(e P(ili""ines. 2. 9e "re"ared to fi3(t -it( little or no -arnin3 in 6nantici"ated "laces. ,(e emer3ence of 3lobal comm6nications= ad8ances in tec(nolo31= and t(e 3lobaliEation of terrorism "ro8ide man1 o""ort6nities for s6r"rise attac0s a3ainst t(e Anited States and its interests. ;aintainin3 t(e abilit1 to fi3(t and -in -ars in di8erse sit6ations and en8ironments can disco6ra3e man1 of AmericaBs enemies from (ostile acts. 3. ;aintain adeC6ate ca"abilit1 to deter a33ression a3ainst AmericaBs allies. America faces end6rin3 t(reats be1ond terrorism= as demonstrated b1 $ort( 'oreaBs n6clear -ea"ons "ro3ram. ,(ere are nations in e8er1 re3ion of t(e -orld t(at t(reaten AmericaBs 8ital interests in t(e near term. Ass6rin3 stabilit1 in t(ose re3ions and "rotectin3 A.S. interests reC6ires t(e abilit1 to defeat an1 nation or 3ro6" t(at t(reatens AmericaBs allies= -(ic( itself "ro8ides effecti8e deterrence a3ainst lar3e-scale a33ression. ,(is s(o6ld incl6de bot( con8entional
forces and ot(er ca"abilities s6c( as an effecti8e ballistic missile defense and reliable n6clear forces. ,(e Administration 23

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

s(o6ld ta0e e8er1 ste" to stren3t(en its im"ortant alliances and be read1 to res"ond forcef6ll1 and immediatel1 to a33ression a3ainst AmericaBs allies. . Contrib6te to (omeland defense. ,(e armed ser8ices m6st co6nter t(reats to t(e (omeland as t(e1 e8ol8e abroad and "la1 a secondar1 role as t(at t(reat emer3es -it(in A.S. borders. Alt(o63( t(e Penta3on is not t(e "rimar1 federal a3ent of (omeland sec6rit1= it does (a8e a 8ital role to "la1 and m6st dedicate a "ortion of its reso6rces to t(at mission. ,(e acti8e A.S. militar1 s(o6ld be "rimaril1 res"onsible for defendin3 Americans from a33ression and "re8entin3 attac0s on t(e (omeland. Mnce an attac0 occ6rs= (o-e8er= $ational G6ard 6nits s(o6ld ta0e o8er t(e militar1 acti8ities -(ile ot(er 3o8ernment a3encies and "ri8ate entities s(o6lder t(e rest of t(e b6rden.* ,(e missions necessar1 for t(e militar1 to f6lfill its res"onsibilities incl6de deterrence= intelli3ence 3at(erin3= "reem"ti8e stri0es a3ainst entities "osin3 imminent t(reats= missile defense= and researc( and de8elo"ment of co6ntermeas6res and s1stems to defend a3ainst t(reats to t(e (omeland. Protectin3 t(e militar1 from ex"endin3 its reso6rces on (omeland sec6rit1 "ro3rams t(at are better (andled b1 ot(ers -ill be increasin3l1 im"ortant in f6t6re 1ears. ,(is is "artic6larl1 tr6e as t(e ne- Ge"artment of 2omeland Sec6rit1 comes on-line and acC6ires mandated ca"abilities ("artic6larl1 in researc( and de8elo"ment) t(at -o6ld be red6ndant to existin3 GMG "ro3rams.

Re2ional +onflic s- Readiness 6e' (2 of 2)


Witho t string military readiness the U.S. can5t hope to deter conflict.
5alisle 02
(Rear Admiral P(illi"-= Girector of t(e S6rface %arfare Ga8ison of t(e A.S. $a81= A"ril .= 2o6se Con3ressional ,estimon1= I$a81 and ;arine Cor"s M"erational ReC6irments for t(e 21st Cent6r1J= 5exis@ !acob)

7or-ard de"lo1ed combat forces "ro8ide t(is nation -it( s"eed of res"onse to an emer3in3 crisis from forces t(at can be immediatel1 em"lo1ed from -it(in a re3ion. 9efore t(e most recent action in Af3(anistan= $a8al forces (ad "ro8ided t(e same t1"e of timel1 res"onse on +& occasions in t(e last decade alone= incl6din3
11 different combat o"erations. In fact= e8en before t(e e8ents of Se"tember 11t( = t(e last 1/ $a81 carrier battle3ro6"s to de"lo1= a s"an t(at be3an in 1..+= (a8e en3a3ed in combat as "art of M"eration Allied 7orce in So6t(eastern <6ro"e and4or o"erations in t(e ;iddle <ast. Additionall1= in t(at time s"an= na8al forces cond6cted non-combatant e8ac6ation o"erations= cond6cted t(o6sands of boardin3s in s6""ort of A.S. dr63 "olic1 and Anited $ations sanctions= and "artici"ated in n6mero6s (6manitarian assistance o"erations. G6rin3 crisis or conflict= for-ard-de"lo1ed and for-ard-based na8al forces are "ositioned for timel1 res"onse. ,(e $a81-;arine Cor"s team stands read1= at t(e Oti" of t(e s"ear=O to ass6re access and to "roNect Noint and combined "o-er in s6""ort of $ational "olic1. Strate3ic <n8ironment and $a81 ,ransformation ,(e 2//1 H6adrennial Gefense Re8ie- (HGR) sets clear 3oals to ass6re allies and friends t(at t(e Anited States is a reliable sec6rit1 "artner= to diss6ade f6t6re militar1 com"etition from "otential ad8ersaries= to deter t(reats and

coercion a3ainst A.S. interests and decisi8el1 defeat an1 ad8ersaries -(o (a8e not been deterred from attem"tin3 to im"ose t(eir -ill on t(e A.S.= its allies or its friends. ,(e HGR reC6ires t(at -e restore and t(en im"ro8e c6rrent readiness -(ile transformin3 to address t(e circ6mstances of t(e 21 st Cent6r1. ,o s6""ort
t(ese 3oals= o6r so8erei3n na8al forces m6st be able to en(ance deterrence and= s(o6ld t(at fail= ass6re sea-based !oint force access to "roNect offensi8e and defensi8e "o-er as(ore to defeat all ad8ersaries.

$e- c(allen3es= incl6din3 t(e t(reat of c1ber-ar= -ea"ons of mass destr6ction= contin6ed international terrorism and t(e (a8oc -ro63(t b1 failed states= define a most 6n"redictable f6t6re. ,(ese and ot(er emer3in3 t(reats -ill call for ne- deterrence o"tions s"annin3 t(e f6ll ran3e of t(reats facin3 o6r nation.
2

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Re2ional +onflic s- Prolif .


6ail re of the U.S. to peace$eep globally prolif.
*oollaco !0
(;artin-= !6l1 1 = ,(e G6ardian= IMdd Games $ations Pla1 -it( t(eir $6clear %ea"onsJ= 5exis@ !acob) ,(e connection bet-een con8entional forces and n6clear -ea"ons "reocc6"ied a 3eneration of sc(olars. 2o- did con8entional forces condition t(e t(reat of n6clear -arQ ,(e old ans-er la1 in flexible res"onse= -(ic( -as s6""osed to lessen t(e "ossibilit1 of n6clear -ar b1 ens6rin3 t(at states -o6ld not (a8e to resort to n6clear -ea"ons in t(e face of a minor c(allen3e. 7lexible res"onse -as al-a1s an 6ncertain conce"t. $o- t(e connection bet-een t(e "ro"er 6se of con8entional forces and t(e t(reat of n6clear -ar is in a -a1 clearer. ,(at is -(1 t(e fail6res of "eace0ee"in3 - t(e fail6re in 9osnia and t(e fail6re t(at ma1 come in Somalia - are rele8ant to t(e n6clear iss6e. %(at ma1 "ers6ade n6clear states= -(et(er t(e1 are

establis(ed n6clear states= co8ert (olders of n6clear -ea"ons= or ne- see0ers after n6clear de8ices= to t(in0 a3ain is a stable -orld of r6les= "enalties= and re-ards.

Prolif NW
> 2off 02
(Kictor-= Ge"6t1 Girector for t(e Strate31= 7orces= P Reso6rces Gi8ision of t(e Instit6te for Gefense Anal1sis= S6mmer= S6r8i8al= Kol. L2= P. +*-./) In s6m= -ides"read "roliferation is li0el1 to lead to an occasional s(oot-o6t -it( n6clear -ea"ons= and t(at s6c( s(ooto6ts -ill (a8e a s6bstantial "robabilit1 of escalatin3 to t(e maxim6m destr6ction "ossible -it( t(e -ea"ons at (and. Anless n6clear "roliferation is sto""ed= -e are (eaded to-ard a -orld t(at -ill mirror t(e American %ild %est of t(e late 1+//s. %it( most= if not all= nations -earin3 n6clear Bsix-s(ootersB on t(eir (i"s= t(e -orld ma1 e8en be a more "olite "lace t(an it is toda1= b6t e8er1 once in a -(ile -e -ill all 3at(er on a (ill to b6r1 t(e bodies of dead cities or e8en -(ole nations.

2#

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Re2ional +onflic s- %erroris- . (1 of 2)


6ailed states# instability terror
;o4e 0"
(!im-= !6n. += Inter Press Ser8ice= IPolitics? T7ailed States: Seen as a ,(reat to A.S. Sec6rit1J= 5exis@ !acob) Almost t(ree 1ears after t(e Se"t. 11= 2//1 terrorist attac0s on $e- For0 and t(e Penta3on= t(e Anited States is still fallin3 s(ort in its abilit1 to deal -it( -ea0= failin3 or failed states= -(ic( increasin3l1 t(reaten A.S. national sec6rit1= sa1s a maNor re"ort released (ere ,6esda1 b1 a bi"artisan commission. %as(in3ton m6st do far more bot( to "re8ent co6ntries from colla"sin3 and to (el" t(em= (o"ef6ll1 in concert -it( ot(er "o-ers= to stabilise and reco8er= accordin3 to t(e *&-"a3e re"ort= BMn t(e 9rin0? %ea0 States and A.S. $ational Sec6rit1B. O,errorist or3anisations= transnational crime net-or0s= disease and 8iolence flo6ris( in t(ese co6ntries=O said t(e commissionBs co-c(air= former Re"6blican Re"resentati8e !o(n <d-ard Porter= -(o called t(e .411 attac0s a O-a0e-6" callO to t(e ne- realities of international t(reats to t(e Anited States. O$ot onl1 do t(e citiEens of t(ese nations s6ffer= b6t t(e -orld comm6nit1 is im"erilled b1 t(is 3eneral instabilit1 and t(e o""ort6nit1 for safe (a8en it "ro8ides for t(ose -(o -is( to destabilise ot(er fled3lin3 democracies and t(e ind6strialised -orld=O (e added. ,(e re"ort= -(ose recommendations stress t(e im"ortance of "re8ention t(ro63( so6nd de8elo"ment "olicies= 6"3radin3 A.S. ex"ertise in C6ic0l1 stabilisin3 and reconstr6ctin3 co6ntries@ and en(ancin3 international co-o"eration in "eace0ee"in3 and nation-b6ildin3= -as "rod6ced o8er nine mont(s and si3ned b1 nearl1 3/ commission members. It a""eared desi3ned to re-frame t(e debate o8er (o- best to carr1 o6t t(e O-ar on terrorismO in -a1s t(at enco6ra3e "olic1 ma0ers to stress t(e im"ortance of economic de8elo"ment as o""osed to t(e militar1 and sec6rit1 a""roac( ta0en b1 President Geor3e % 96s(. OIt is ne-s to no one t(at t(e A.S. is 86lnerableO= said $anc1 9irdsall= "resident of t(e Centre for Global Ge8elo"ment (CGG)= -(ic( or3anised t(e commission. O,(e flas( is t(at t(e Bslee"in3 3iantB of t(reats exists in t(e form of co6ntries li0e 9oli8ia= Indonesia= $i3eria and 'en1a -"laces -(ic( ... for 8ario6s reasons no- find t(emsel8es -ea0ened to t(e "oint -(ere t(eir instabilit1 t(reatens to derail "olitical and economic "ro3ress and= in some cases= t(e1 (a8e become attracti8e to t(e entities= some 0no-n= ot(ers 6n0no-n= -(o -o6ld -is( to see (arm 8isited on t(e Anited States and ot(er nations of t(e de8elo"ed -orld.O ,(e commission incl6ded t-o former A.S. A3enc1 for International Ge8elo"ment (ASAIG) administrators -- !. 9rian At-ood= -(o ser8ed 6nder former President 9ill Clinton and ; Peter ;cP(erson= -(o -or0ed -it( President Ronald Rea3an. 2&

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

O7or far too lon3= t(e Anited States (as allo-ed -ea0 states -- s6c( as Af3(anistan= 2aiti and Somalia -- to be on t(e "eri"(er1 of A.S. forei3n "olic1 concerns=O said St6art <iEenstat= anot(er commission co-c(air= -(o ser8ed in to" economic "ositions 6nder Clinton and !imm1 Carter (1.**-+1). OAs a res6lt= -e (a8e (ad to 6ltimatel1 en3a3e in militar1 inter8ention and costl1 Bnation-b6ildin3B acti8ities.O O,(e A.S. needs a fres( strate31 t(at identifies -ea0 states before t(e1 fail= or3anises t(e A.S. 3o8ernment to address t(e c(allen3es and o""ort6nities t(ese -ea0 states "ose= and 6tilises on a s6stained basis t(e entire "ano"l1 of de8elo"ment= di"lomatic= and "olitical tools necessar1 to s6cceed=O (e added. ,(e re"ort said t(ree 3a"s distin36is( tro6bled or -ea0 states from t(ose t(at are sim"l1 "oor. If a state cannot control its o-n territor1 or "rotect its citiEens from internal or external t(reats= it s6ffers a sec6rit1 3a" t(at can easil1 be filled b1 terrorists= criminal 3ro6"s or ins6r3ents.

The impact is e2tinction.


Alexander 00
(Fona(-= Prof. P Girector > Inter-Ani8ersit1 for ,errorism St6dies= A636st 2+= %as(in3ton ,imes= I,errorism ;1t(s and RealitiesJ= 5exis@ !acob) 5ast -ee0Bs br6tal s6icide bombin3s in 9a3(dad and !er6salem (a8e once a3ain ill6strated dramaticall1 t(at t(e international comm6nit1 failed= t(6s far at least= to 6nderstand t(e ma3nit6de and im"lications of t(e terrorist t(reats to t(e 8er1 s6r8i8al of ci8iliEation itself. <8en t(e Anited States and Israel (a8e for decades tended to re3ard terrorism as a mere tactical n6isance or irritant rat(er t(an a critical strate3ic c(allen3e to t(eir national sec6rit1 concerns. It is not s6r"risin3= t(erefore= t(at on Se"tember 11= 2//1= Americans -ere st6nned b1 t(e 6n"recedented tra3ed1 of 1. al Haeda terrorists stri0in3 a de8astatin3 blo- at t(e center of t(e nationBs commercial and militar1 "o-ers.

Re2ional +onflic s- %erroris- . (2 of 2)


5i0e-ise= Israel and its citiEens= des"ite t(e colla"se of t(e Mslo A3reements of 1..3 and n6mero6s acts of terrorism tri33ered b1 t(e second intifada t(at be3an almost t(ree 1ears a3o= are still Os(oc0edO b1 eac( s6icide attac0 at a time of intensi8e di"lomatic efforts to re8i8e t(e morib6nd "eace "rocess t(ro63( t(e no- re8o0ed cease-fire arran3ements V(6dnaW. %(1 are t(e Anited States and Israel= as -ell as scores of ot(er co6ntries affected b1 t(e 6ni8ersal ni3(tmare of modern terrorism s6r"rised b1 ne- terrorist Os6r"risesOQ ,(ere are man1 reasons= incl6din3 mis6nderstandin3 of t(e manifold s"ecific factors t(at contrib6te to terrorismBs ex"ansion= s6c( as lac0 of a 6ni8ersal definition of terrorism= t(e reli3ioniEation of "olitics= do6ble standards of moralit1= -ea0 "6nis(ment of terrorists= and t(e ex"loitation of t(e media b1 terrorist "ro"a3anda and "s1c(olo3ical -arfare. Anli0e t(eir (istorical co6nter"arts= contem"orar1 terrorists (a8e introd6ced a ne- scale of 8iolence in terms of con8entional and 6ncon8entional t(reats and im"act.

,(e internationaliEation and br6taliEation of c6rrent and f6t6re terrorism ma0e it clear -e (a8e entered an A3e of S6"er ,errorism Ve.3. biolo3ical= c(emical, radiolo3ical= n6clear and c1ber] -it( its serio6s im"lications concernin3 national= re3ional and 3lobal sec6rit1 concerns. ,-o m1t(s in "artic6lar m6st be deb6n0ed immediatel1 if an effecti8e co6nterterrorism Obest "racticesO strate31 can be de8elo"ed Ve.3.= stren3t(enin3 international coo"erationW.
,(e first ill6sion is t(at terrorism can be 3reatl1 red6ced= if not eliminated com"letel1= "ro8ided t(e root ca6ses of conflicts - "olitical= social and economic - are addressed. ,(e con8entional ill6sion is t(at terrorism m6st be N6stified b1 o""ressed "eo"le see0in3 to ac(ie8e t(eir 3oals and conseC6entl1 t(e ar36ment ad8anced b1 Ofreedom fi3(tersO an1-(ere= O3i8e me libert1 and I -ill 3i8e 1o6 deat(=O s(o6ld be tolerated if not 3lorified. ,(is traditional rationaliEation of OsacredO 8iolence often conceals t(at t(e real "6r"ose of terrorist 3ro6"s is to 3ain "olitical "o-er t(ro63( t(e barrel of t(e 36n= in 8iolation of f6ndamental (6man ri3(ts of t(e noncombatant se3ment of societies. 7or instance= Palestinians reli3io6s mo8ements Ve.3.= 2amas= Islamic !i(adW and sec6lar entities Vs6c( as 7ata(Bs ,anEim and ACsa ;art1r 9ri3adesWW -is( not onl1 to resol8e national 3rie8ances Vs6c( as !e-is( settlements= ri3(t of ret6rn= !er6salemW b6t "rimaril1 to destro1 t(e !e-is( state. Similarl1= Msama bin 5adenBs international net-or0 not onl1 o""oses t(e "resence of American militar1 in t(e Arabian Penins6la and IraC= b6t its stated obNecti8e is to O6nite all ;6slims and establis( a 3o8ernment t(at follo-s t(e r6le of t(e Cali"(s.O

2*

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

,(e second m1t( is t(at stron3 action a3ainst terrorist infrastr6ct6re Vleaders= recr6itment= f6ndin3= "ro"a3anda= trainin3= -ea"ons= o"erational command and controlW -ill onl1 increase terrorism. ,(e ar36ment (ere is t(at
la--enforcement efforts and militar1 retaliation ine8itabl1 -ill f6el more br6tal acts of 8iolent re8en3e. Clearl1= if t(is "erce"tion contin6es to "re8ail= "artic6larl1 in democratic societies= t(ere is t(e dan3er it -ill "aral1Ee 3o8ernments and t(ereb1 enco6ra3e f6rt(er terrorist attac0s. In s6m= "ast ex"erience "ro8ides 6sef6l lessons for a realistic f6t6re strate31. ,(e "r6dent a""lication of force (as been demonstrated to be an effecti8e tool for s(ort- and lon3-term deterrence of terrorism. 7or exam"le= IsraelBs tar3eted 0illin3 of ;o(ammed Sider= t(e 2ebron commander of t(e Islamic !i(ad= def6sed a Otic0in3 bomb.O ,(e assassination of Ismail Ab6 S(anab - a to" 2amas leader in t(e GaEa Stri" -(o -as directl1 res"onsible for se8eral s6icide bombin3s incl6din3 t(e latest b6s attac0 in !er6salem - disr6"ted "otential terrorist o"erations. Similarl1= t(e A.S. militar1 o"eration in IraC eliminated Saddam 26sseinBs re3ime as a state s"onsor of terror. ,(6s= it be(oo8es t(ose co6ntries 8ictimiEed b1 terrorism to 6nderstand a cardinal messa3e comm6nicated b1 %inston C(6rc(ill to t(e 2o6se of Commons on ;a1 13= 1. /? OKictor1 at all costs= 8ictor1 in s"ite of terror= 8ictor1 (o-e8er lon3 and (ard t(e road ma1 be? 7or 3i ,o/ Aic or'= t(ere is no s/rAiAal.O

Re2ional +onflic s- ;a/ndr' lis .


Political disorder terror, W7/ se, ref gee flows, disease, ci4il war, and prolif
<earon ( ;ai in 0"
(!ames G.-= Prof. of Poli. Sci. > Stanford= Ga8id G.-= Prof. of Poli. Sci. > Stanford= S"rin3= International Sec6rit1= I$eotr6stees(i" and t(e Problem of %ea0 StatesJ= 5exis@ !acob) Increasin3l1= (o-e8er= t(e maNor "o-ers m6st -orr1 abo6t bad OexternalitiesO t(at res6lt from t(e combination of t(e scientific re8ol6tion and "olitical disorder= economic colla"se= and an3er in t(e t(ird -orld. ,(ese externalities incl6de ris0s of catastro"(ic terrorism 6sin3 %;G= ref63ee flo-s= (ealt( t(reats= en(anced dr63 sm633lin3 net-or0s= and disr6"tion of oil s6""lies. ;aNor "o-ers can also s6ffer from destabiliEin3 conseC6ences of "rotracted ci8il -ars for -(ole re3ions= as nei3(borin3 states are -ea0ened or re3ional incenti8es for -ea"ons acC6isition and "roliferation increase. 7inall1= t(e maNor "o-ers (a8e faced si3nificant and N6stified "ress6res for inter8ention on (6manitarian 3ro6nds as -ell. ,(ese diff6se t(reats create a classic collecti8e action "roblem for t(e maNor "o-ers. Gi8en t(e dan3ers "osed b1 colla"sed states and ro36e re3imes in a -orld -it( %;G= o"en economies= and eas1 international tra8el= all -o6ld benefit from "olitical order and res"onsible (if "ossible= democratic) 3o8ernments in t(e "eri"(er1. 96t t(e costs to "ro8ide effecti8e s6""ort for "olitical order and democrac1 after a state colla"ses often exceed t(e ex"ected benefits for an1 one "o-er. ,(e lo3ic of t(is sit6ation creates an incenti8e for b6rden s(arin3. Affected states (a8e an incenti8e to s(are t(e costs to miti3ate t(e "6blic bads of state colla"se and ro36e re3imes at an acce"table "rice for eac( one.n22 ,(e str6ct6re of t(e collecti8e action "roblem can be re"resented as follo-s? 5et b X / be t(e ex"ected lon3-r6n cost of a state colla"se to eac( maNor "o-er= and let c X b be t(e total ex"ected cost of remed1in3 it. If t(ere are n states -it( t(ese "references and if c Y nb= t(e1 -o6ld all be better off to stri0e a deal in -(ic( t(e1 Nointl1 contrib6te a total of c to t(e reconstr6ction effort= -it( eac( one contrib6tin3 no more t(an b. Mf co6rse= t(ere is a "ossibl1 intense bar3ainin3 "roblem o8er -(o -ill contrib6te (o- m6c(. See !ames G. 7earon= O9ar3ainin3= <nforcement= and International Coo"eration=O International Mr3aniEation= Kol. #2= $o. 2 (S"rin3 1..+)= "". 2&.-3/&. In s6m= in t(e time of classical im"erialism t(e 3reat "o-ers t(reatened eac( ot(er -(ile facin3 no serio6s= a6tonomo6s t(reats from Africa= t(e ;iddle <ast= or most of Asia. ,oda1= b1 contrast= t(e stron3est and ric(est states face no serio6s militar1 t(reats from one anot(er= b6t 8ario6s sec6rit1 t(reats from a t(ird -orld t(at= as 7i36re 1 ill6strates= is s6fferin3 from a 3reat deal of "olitical 8iolence and c(aos. 9eca6se t(e costs of addressin3 t(e im"lications of state colla"se or t(e dan3ers "osed b1 ro36e 2+

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

re3imes are concentrated -(ile t(e benefits are often diff6se= t(e maNor "o-ers no- confront a collecti8e action "roblem -(ose internal lo3ic s(o6ld fa8or a m6ltilateral res"onse.

Re2ional +onflic s- . +alc Pro4a4ili '


(ere5s comparati4e e4idence! failed state collapse is a greater and more probable threat than great power war
<earon ( ;ai in 0"
(!ames G.-= Prof. of Poli. Sci. > Stanford= Ga8id G.-= Prof. of Poli. Sci. > Stanford= S"rin3= International Sec6rit1= I$eotr6stees(i" and t(e Problem of %ea0 StatesJ= 5exis@ !acob) ;aNor international inter8entions to "ro" 6" and reb6ild failed states are not a tem"orar1 aberration in t(e co6rse of international "olitics. Rat(er= t(e1 reflect more d6rable= e8en str6ct6ral c(aracteristics of t(e "resent international s1stem. Since t(e end of %orld %ar II= t(ere (as been a stead1 3ro-t( in t(e n6mber of (mainl1 "ostcolonial) states rendered d1sf6nctional b1 1ears of r6ral 36errilla -ar= corr6"t r6le= or bot(. 7or t(e maNor "o-ers and man1 ot(er states= t(e bi33est external t(reats no- deri8e not from t(e ris0 of stron3 states -antin3 to conC6er and annex territor1= b6t from di8erse sec6rit1= economic= and e8en (ealt( conseC6ences emer3in3 from "olitical conflict= state colla"se= and misr6le in t(e t(ird -orld. ;oreo8er= inde"endent of t(e 8ario6s t(reats "osed to t(e $ort(= "ersistent ci8il -ar and lac0 of economic de8elo"ment in t(e So6t( are t-o of t(e 3reatest so6rces of (6man s6fferin3 on t(e "lanet.

2.

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

%ai3an Scenario (1 of 2)
8ow U.S. military readiness emboldens 'hina! they5ll thin$ they can safely in4ade Taiwan.
+,ris enson 01
(,(omas= Assoc. Prof. of Poli. Sci. > ;I,= International Sec6rit1= IPosin3 Problems %it(o6t Catc(in3 A"? C(inaBs Rise and C(allen3es for A.S. Sec6rit1 Polic1J= Kol. 2#= P. 2/)

C(inese anal1sts sometimes em"(asiEe t(e "olitical 3eo3ra"(1 not onl1 of <ast Asia= b6t also of t(e 3lobe as anot(er ad8anta3e t(at C(ina (as in settlin3 "roblems s6c( as ,ai-an b1 force. ,(e Anited States as t(e sole s6"er"o-er often finds its militar1 assets tied do-n else-(ere. So one strate31 for addressin3 t(e ,ai-an "roblem -o6ld be to -ait 6ntil t(e Anited States is "oliticall1 and militaril1 distracted in anot(er "art of t(e -orld. ,(is= some C(inese anal1sts belie8e= -o6ld red6ce bot( AmericaBs ca"abilit1 and -illin3ness to inter8ene a3ainst C(ina in a meanin3f6l -a1. In t(e earl1 1../s= C(inese militar1 anal1sts reco3niEed t(is -ea0ness -(en t(e1 obser8ed t(at man1 Asia-based assets -ere 6sed to defeat Saddam 26ssein in t(e distant Persian G6lf. In !6ne 2///= t-o ci8ilian anal1sts made a similar ar36ment to me= statin3 t(at t(e Anited States cannot (andle t(e b6rden of t-o sim6ltaneo6s militar1 en3a3ements in se"arate "arts of t(e -orld. 3/ $i6 !6n ar36es t(at if t(e Anited States is in an intense conflict else-(ere and a -ar brea0s o6t across t(e strait= it mi3(t t(en O3i8e 6" on im"lementin3 militar1 inter8ention in ,ai-an.... ,(o63( American "o-er is 3reat= its "o-er (as limits.O 2e describes American Ostrate3ic linesO as Otoo lon3O and its "o-er as OscatteredO (fensan). 31

That perception ma$es miscalc lation and ma9or war ine4tible


+,in2 0"
(7ran0-= !6ne 3= $e- Straits ,imes= I,ai-an -onBt acce"t s6rrender callJ= 5exis@ !acob) 3/

Caldebate.com
At t(is "oint= none

Readiness Good/Bad

of t(e t(ree "arties - C(ina= ,ai-an and t(e AS - -ants to see -ar brea0 o6t. C(ina is foc6sin3 on t(e de8elo"ment of its econom1= and needs a stable "olitical en8ironment. ,ai-an -o6ld be de8astated b1 an1 o6tbrea0 of (ostilities and t(e AS (as its (ands f6ll militaril1 -it( IraC= Af3(anistan and t(e -ar on terror. 2o-e8er= in t(e absence of dialo36e bet-een 9eiNin3 and ,ai"ei= mis6nderstandin3s can easil1 arise. If (ard-liners in 9eiNin3 belie8e t(e1 can resol8e t(e ,ai-an "roblem -it( a C6ic0 stri0e before t(e AS can inter8ene= t(en t(ere is a real dan3er of miscalc6lation and a maNor -ar t(at nobod1 -ants ma1 er6"t.

%ai3an Scenario (2 of 2)
The impact is n clear Armageddon.
S rai %i-es 00
(!6ne 2#= IRe3ional 7allo6t? $o one 3ains in -ar o8er ,ai-anJ= 5exis@ !acob) ,2< GMM;SGAF SC<$ARIM ,2< (i3(-intensit1 scenario "ost6lates a

cross-strait -ar escalatin3 into a f6ll-scale -ar bet-een t(e AS and C(ina. If %as(in3ton -ere to concl6de t(at s"littin3 C(ina -o6ld better ser8e its national interests= t(en a f6ll-scale -ar becomes 6na8oidable. Conflict on s6c( a scale -o6ld embroil ot(er co6ntries far and near and -- (orror of (orrors -- raise t(e "ossibilit1 of a n/clear 3ar.
9eiNin3 (as alread1 told t(e AS and !a"an "ri8atel1 t(at it considers an1 co6ntr1 "ro8idin3 bases and lo3istics s6""ort to an1 AS forces attac0in3 C(ina as belli3erent "arties o"en to its retaliation. In t(e re3ion= t(is means So6t( 'orea= !a"an= t(e P(ili""ines and= to a lesser extent= Sin3a"ore. If C(ina -ere to retaliate= east Asia -ill be set on fire. And t(e confla3ration ma1 not end t(ere as o""ort6nistic "o-ers else-(ere ma1 tr1 to o8ert6rn t(e existin3 -orld order. %it( t(e AS distracted= R6ssia ma1 see0 to redefine <6ro"eBs "olitical landsca"e. ,(e balance of "o-er in t(e ;iddle <ast ma1 be similarl1 6"set b1 t(e li0es of IraC. In so6t( Asia= (ostilities bet-een India and Pa0istan= eac( armed -it( its o-n n6clear arsenal= co6ld

enter a ne- and dan3ero6s "(ase.


%ill a f6ll-scale Sino-AS -ar lead to a n6clear -arQ Accordin3 to General ;att(e- Rid3e-a1= commander of t(e AS <i3(t( Arm1 -(ic( fo63(t a3ainst t(e C(inese in t(e 'orean %ar= t(e AS (ad at t(e time t(o63(t of 6sin3 n6clear -ea"ons a3ainst C(ina to sa8e t(e AS from militar1 defeat. 31

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

In (is boo0 ,(e 'orean %ar= a "ersonal acco6nt of t(e militar1 and "olitical as"ects of t(e conflict and its im"lications on f6t6re AS forei3n "olic1= Gen Rid3e-a1 said t(at AS -as confronted -it( t-o c(oices in 'orea -- tr6ce or a broadened -ar= -(ic( co6ld (a8e led to t(e 6se of n6clear -ea"ons.

If t(e AS (ad to resort to n6clear -ea"onr1 to defeat C(ina lon3 before t(e latter acC6ired a similar ca"abilit1= t(ere is little (o"e of -innin3 a -ar a3ainst C(ina #/ 1ears later= s(ort of 6sin3 n6clear -ea"ons. ,(e AS estimates t(at C(ina "ossesses abo6t 2/ n6clear -ar(eads t(at can destro1 maNor American cities. 9eiNin3 also seems "re"ared to 3o for t(e n6clear o"tion. A C(inese militar1 officer disclosed recentl1 t(at 9eiNin3 -as considerin3 a re8ie- of its Onon first 6seO "rinci"le re3ardin3 n6clear -ea"ons.
;aNor-General Pan S(an3Cian3= "resident of t(e militar1-f6nded Instit6te for Strate3ic St6dies= told a 3at(erin3 at t(e %oodro- %ilson International Centre for Sc(olars in %as(in3ton t(at alt(o63( t(e 3o8ernment still abided b1 t(at "rinci"le=

t(ere -ere stron3 "ress6res from t(e militar1 to dro" it. 2e said militar1 leaders considered t(e 6se of n6clear -ea"ons mandator1 if t(e co6ntr1 ris0ed dismemberment as a res6lt of forei3n inter8ention. Gen Rid3e-a1 said t(at s(o6ld t(at come to "ass= -e -o6ld see t(e destr6ction of ci8iliEation. ,(ere -o6ld be no 8ictors in s6c( a -ar. %(ile t(e "ros"ect of a n/clear Ar-a2eddon o8er ,ai-an mi3(t seem inconcei8able= it cannot be r6led o6t entirel1= for C(ina "6ts so8erei3nt1 abo8e e8er1t(in3 else.

%ai3an- Readiness 6e' (1 of 2)


'hinese perception of high U.S. readiness $ deter in4asion of Taiwan.
Ross 02
(Robert S.-= Prof. of Poli Sci > 9oston Colle3e= Associate of t(e !o(n 'in3 7airban0 Center for <ast Asian St6dies > 2ar8ard= 7all= International Sec6rit1= I$a8i3atin3 t(e ,ai-an Strait@ Geterrence= <scalation Gominance= and A.S.-C(ina RelationsJ= 5exis@ !acob) C(inese ci8ilian and militar1 anal1sts 6nderstand t(at A.S. domestic "olitics increases t(e li0eli(ood of A.S. inter8ention in defense of ,ai-an. Gomestic "olitical o""osition to-ard C(ina and "olitical s6""ort for ,ai-an in t(e Anited States are at t(eir (i3(est le8els since t(e late 1.&/s. A.S. domestic "olitics (as enco6ra3ed t(e 3ro-t( in A.S. arms sales to ,ai-an since t(e earl1 1../s= and it -ill constrain t(e administrationBs o"tions d6rin3 a mainland-,ai-an conflict. C(inese militar1 and ci8ilian anal1sts also 3ras" t(e extent of %as(in3tonBs strate3ic commitment to ,ai-an. ,(e1 ac0no-led3e t(at t(e ;arc( 1..&

de"lo1ment of t-o A.S. carriers -as a Ostron3 militar1 si3nalO of A.S. readiness to inter8ene in a "ossible -ar o8er ,ai-an. n#+ ;oreo8er= t(e carrier de"lo1ment firml1 co6"led t(e A.S. commitment to defend ,ai-an -it( t(e credibilit1 of its sec6rit1 commitments to its allies in <ast Asia. Since t(en= C(inese leaders (a8e ass6med t(at a -ar -it( ,ai-an means a -ar -it( t(e Anited States. As one obser8er (as noted= O%(at man1= man1 "eo"le realiEe is t(at t(e effecti8eness of VA.S.W deterrence . . . m6st mar0edl1 exceed t(at of 1..&= so t(at t(e li0eli(ood of A.S. militar1 inter8ention is e8en more notable= -it( a li0el1 corres"ondin3 escalation in t(e deterrence d1namics.O n#. Anot(er anal1st (as -arned t(at t(e "ossibilit1 of A.S. inter8ention means t(at an1 C(inese action co6ld enco6nter O6nex"ectedl1 serio6s conseC6ences.On&/

1eadiness $ pre4ent war o4er Taiwan


Asian Poli ical )e3s 09
(7eb. 22= t(e d6de bein3 C6oted (as C6als= IPacific Command c(ief nominee calls for close -atc( on C(inaJ= 5exis@ !acob) 32

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

A.S. Pacific Command Commander nominee Adm. %illiam 7allon said ,6esda1 t(e Anited States m6st closel1 -atc( C(inaBs BB6n"recedentedBB 3ro-t( in militar1 s"endin3 and maintain a BBcredibleBB deterrence a3ainst $ort( 'orea to facilitate t(e six-"art1 n6clear tal0s.
In (is Senate confirmation (earin3= 7allon said t(e "lanned A.S. militar1 3lobal reali3nment -ill not affect t(e ca"abilities to defend So6t( 'orea and !a"an and to deal -it( a "ossible crisis in t(e ,ai-an Strait. BBAlt(o63( t(e economic relations(i" bet-een t(e Anited States and C(ina is ex"andin3= -e m6st 3ain 3reater insi3(t into C(inaBs 3ro-t( in militar1 s"endin3= its intentions to-ard ,ai-an= and its re3ional strate31 in Asia and t(e Pacific=BB 7allon said in (is "re"ared res"onse to C6estions 3i8en in ad8ance b1 t(e Senate Arms Ser8ices Committee.

BBIt is in t(e A.S. interest to "re8ent miscalc6lation and to maintain a stead1 si3nal of deterrence -it( read1= credible forces=BB (e said= addin3 t(at %as(in3ton BBo""oses an1 attem"t b1 eit(er side to 6nilaterall1 c(an3e t(e stat6s
C6o.BB

%ai3an- Readiness 6e' (2 of 2)


'hinese perception of low U.S. military readiness in4asion of Taiwan
+en er for Sec/ri ' Polic' 01
(!6ne 1= Gecision 9rief= I%elcome to %orld %ar IKJ= L =(tt"?44---.centerforsec6rit1"olic1.or34index.Ns"QsectionZ "a"ersPcodeZ/ -G[2#@ !acob) Anfort6natel1= t(e Associated Press re"orted on ;a1 3/ t(at a ne- Gefense Ge"artment re"ort "ercei8es an omino6s C(inese interest in -a3in3 -ar s-iftl1 and decisi8el1 a3ainst t(e Anited States. 7or some 1ears= "art1 and militar1 leaders (a8e 6sed a term t(at translates into <n3lis( ro63(l1 as OAssassinQs ;ace.O ,(e -ire ser8ice C6otes t(e Penta3on anal1sis as sa1in3 t(is Oconce"t a""ears to incl6de a ran3e of -ea"on s1stems and tec(nolo3ies related to information

-arfare= ballistic and anti-s(i" cr6ise missiles= ad8anced fi3(ters and s6bmarines= co6nters"ace s1stem and air defense.O ,(ere is reason to fear t(at t(e C(inese belie8e some s6c( ca"abilities co6ld be s6ccessf6ll1 em"lo1ed= "ossibl1 in t(e relati8el1 near-term= -it( little -arnin3 -(ile t(e A.S. is tied do-n else-(ere to attac0 ,ai-an and assert C(inese (e3emon1 in <ast Asia.

1eadiness $ deter taiwan war


Hall ( &arl 00
(Andria-= !onat(an-= Mct. 21= C$$ %orld8ie-= IGore Attac0s 96s(Bs Plans to Red6ce A.S. ;ilitar1 Peace-0ee"in3 <ffortsJ= 5exis@ !acob) Rice told t(e O,imes=O C6ote= O,(e Anited States is t(e onl1 "o-er t(at can (andle a s(o-do-n in t(e G6lf= mo6nt t(e 0ind of force t(at is needed to "rotect Sa6di Arabia and deter a crisis in t(e ,ai-an Straits. And extendin3 "eace-0ee"in3 detracts from o6r readiness for t(ese 0inds of 3lobal missions. 33

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

%erroris- Scenario (1 of 2)
1eadiness $ W*T! only way to deal with failed states
*es $,al 00
(Ga8id-= A636st #= Scri""s 2o-ard $e-s Ser8ice= I;ilitar1 "romotes A.S. -illJ= 5exis@ !acob) O<8er1 nation no- 0no-s t(at -e cannot acce"t - and -e -ill not acce"t - states t(at (arbor= finance= train or eC6i" t(e a3ents of terror=O 96s( said in a s"eec( on terrorism. 7or t(at reason= t(e Penta3on is b6s1 tr1in3 to ex"and t(e -ili ar''s a4ili ' o reac, an1 re3ion of t(e -orld C6ic0l1. 7rom t(e start of t(e 96s( administration= Gefense Secretar1 Gonald R6msfeld (as been "6s(in3 t(e sometimes rel6ctant armed ser8ices to foc6s on C6ic0-res"onse battlefield strate3ies. $o-= -it( t(e s6ccessf6l Af3(anistan and IraCi

cam"ai3ns as catal1sts= t(e "ace (as C6ic0ened.


5eadin3 t(e -a1 is a maNor re"ositionin3 of A.S. troo"s and bases aro6nd t(e -orld. Alread1 A.S. forces (a8e "6lled o6t of Sa6di Arabia= one of t(e maNor obNecti8es of t(e IraC -ar. A red6ction in t(e &/=/// American troo"s in German1 is 6nder re8ie-= and 1+=/// A.S. soldiers stationed on t(e demilitariEed Eone bet-een $ort( and So6t( 'orea ma1 be re"ositioned. ;ean-(ile= Penta3on strate3ists are ne3otiatin3 ne- basin3 a3reements -it( co6ntries from Africa to <astern <6ro"e to Central and So6t(east Asia - all -it( t(e obNecti8e of broadenin3 t(e Anited StatesB 3lobal N6risdiction. Africa is t(e latest= and "er(a"s most interestin3= exam"le of t(e Anited StatesB ne- basin3 strate31. 96s( came to office 6sin3 t(e continent as an exam"le of -(ere t(e American militar1 3enerall1 o63(t not to inter8ene. 96t last 1ear t(e Penta3on s(i""ed 1=+// troo"s to t(e tin1 <ast African nation of GNibo6ti as a -a1 of dealin3 -it( terrorist 3ro6"s belie8ed to be o"eratin3 in Somalia= S6dan and ot(er nei3(borin3 co6ntries. And increasin3l1= t(e Penta3on is becomin3 interested in t(e m6lti"le ci8il rebellions occ6rrin3 in %est Africa= -(ose 8ast oil reser8es ma1 someda1 ma0e 6" a si3nificant "ortion of American ener31 im"orts. 96s( recentl1 ordered 2=3// ;arines to "osition t(emsel8es off t(e coast of 5iberia for an 6ndetermined role in C6ellin3 t(at co6ntr1Bs rebellion. In man1 ot(er "laces - 96l3aria and Romania in <astern <6ro"e@ '1r31Estan= ,aNi0istan and AEbe0istan in Central Asia@ 9a(rain= Hatar= '6-ait and Mman in t(e ;iddle <ast - t(e Anited States is establis(in3 ne- foot(olds desi3ned to 3i8e t(e militar1 immediate access to some of t(e -orldBs bi33est tro6ble s"ots.

OS"eed is a necessar1 C6alit1 of o6r militar1 ca"abilities= 3i8en t(e t1"es of c(allen3es -e ma1 face=O Ge"6t1 Gefense Secretar1 Pa6l %olfo-itE told Con3ress recentl1. 3

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

9arnett= t(e $a8al %ar Colle3e researc(er= sa1s t(is ne- a""roac( is needed beca6se t(e Anited StatesB "rimar1 sec6rit1 t(reat toda1 comes from doEens of failed or failin3 states t(at can ser8e as breedin3 3ro6nds for terrorism.
9arnett describes an arc across t(e middle of t(e "lanet t(at incl6des "arts of So6t( America= all of Africa= t(e ;iddle <ast= and "ortions of Central and So6t(east Asia= all of -(ic( (e sa1s demand t(e attention of t(e A.S. militar1. %(1Q 9eca6se American troo"s are t(e onl1 ones t(at can do it= (e sa1s. OS(o- me t(e "laces -(ere t(ere is "lent1 of stabilit1=O (e told a %as(in3ton a6dience earlier t(is 1ear= Oand IBll s(o- 1o6 lon3-term sec6rit1 relations(i"s bet-een t(e Anited States and t(at "art of t(e -orld.O

The impact is e2tinction.


Alexander 00
(Fona(-= Prof. P Girector > Inter-Ani8ersit1 for ,errorism St6dies= A636st 2+= %as(in3ton ,imes= I,errorism ;1t(s and RealitiesJ= 5exis@ !acob) 5ast -ee0Bs br6tal s6icide bombin3s in 9a3(dad and !er6salem (a8e once a3ain ill6strated dramaticall1 t(at t(e international comm6nit1 failed= t(6s far at least= to 6nderstand t(e ma3nit6de and im"lications of t(e terrorist t(reats to t(e 8er1 s6r8i8al of ci8iliEation itself. <8en t(e Anited States and Israel (a8e for decades tended to re3ard terrorism as a mere tactical n6isance or irritant rat(er t(an a critical strate3ic c(allen3e to t(eir national sec6rit1 concerns. It is not s6r"risin3= t(erefore= t(at on Se"tember 11= 2//1= Americans -ere st6nned b1 t(e 6n"recedented tra3ed1 of 1. al Haeda terrorists stri0in3 a de8astatin3 blo- at t(e center of t(e nationBs commercial and militar1 "o-ers.

%erroris- Scenario (2 of 2)
5i0e-ise= Israel and its citiEens= des"ite t(e colla"se of t(e Mslo A3reements of 1..3 and n6mero6s acts of terrorism tri33ered b1 t(e second intifada t(at be3an almost t(ree 1ears a3o= are still Os(oc0edO b1 eac( s6icide attac0 at a time of intensi8e di"lomatic efforts to re8i8e t(e morib6nd "eace "rocess t(ro63( t(e no- re8o0ed cease-fire arran3ements V(6dnaW. %(1 are t(e Anited States and Israel= as -ell as scores of ot(er co6ntries affected b1 t(e 6ni8ersal ni3(tmare of modern terrorism s6r"rised b1 ne- terrorist Os6r"risesOQ ,(ere are man1 reasons= incl6din3 mis6nderstandin3 of t(e manifold s"ecific factors t(at contrib6te to terrorismBs ex"ansion= s6c( as lac0 of a 6ni8ersal definition of terrorism= t(e reli3ioniEation of "olitics= do6ble standards of moralit1= -ea0 "6nis(ment of terrorists= and t(e ex"loitation of t(e media b1 terrorist "ro"a3anda and "s1c(olo3ical -arfare. Anli0e t(eir (istorical co6nter"arts= contem"orar1 terrorists (a8e introd6ced a ne- scale of 8iolence in terms of con8entional and 6ncon8entional t(reats and im"act.

,(e internationaliEation and br6taliEation of c6rrent and f6t6re terrorism ma0e it clear -e (a8e entered an A3e of S6"er ,errorism Ve.3. biolo3ical= c(emical, radiolo3ical= n6clear and c1ber] -it( its serio6s im"lications concernin3 national= re3ional and 3lobal sec6rit1 concerns. ,-o m1t(s in "artic6lar m6st be deb6n0ed immediatel1 if an effecti8e co6nterterrorism Obest "racticesO strate31 can be de8elo"ed Ve.3.= stren3t(enin3 international coo"erationW.
,(e first ill6sion is t(at terrorism can be 3reatl1 red6ced= if not eliminated com"letel1= "ro8ided t(e root ca6ses of conflicts - "olitical= social and economic - are addressed. ,(e con8entional ill6sion is t(at terrorism m6st be N6stified b1 o""ressed "eo"le see0in3 to ac(ie8e t(eir 3oals and conseC6entl1 t(e ar36ment ad8anced b1 Ofreedom fi3(tersO an1-(ere= O3i8e me libert1 and I -ill 3i8e 1o6 deat(=O s(o6ld be tolerated if not 3lorified. ,(is traditional rationaliEation of OsacredO 8iolence often conceals t(at t(e real "6r"ose of terrorist 3ro6"s is to 3ain "olitical "o-er t(ro63( t(e barrel of t(e 36n= in 8iolation of f6ndamental (6man ri3(ts of t(e noncombatant se3ment of societies. 7or instance= Palestinians reli3io6s mo8ements Ve.3.= 2amas= Islamic !i(adW and sec6lar entities Vs6c( as 7ata(Bs ,anEim and ACsa ;art1r 9ri3adesWW -is( not onl1 to resol8e national 3rie8ances Vs6c( as !e-is( settlements= ri3(t of ret6rn= !er6salemW b6t "rimaril1 to destro1 t(e !e-is( state. Similarl1= Msama bin 5adenBs international net-or0 not onl1 o""oses t(e "resence of American militar1 in t(e Arabian Penins6la and IraC= b6t its stated obNecti8e is to O6nite all ;6slims and establis( a 3o8ernment t(at follo-s t(e r6le of t(e Cali"(s.O 3#

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

,(e second m1t( is t(at stron3 action a3ainst terrorist infrastr6ct6re Vleaders= recr6itment= f6ndin3= "ro"a3anda= trainin3= -ea"ons= o"erational command and controlW -ill onl1 increase terrorism. ,(e ar36ment (ere is t(at
la--enforcement efforts and militar1 retaliation ine8itabl1 -ill f6el more br6tal acts of 8iolent re8en3e. Clearl1= if t(is "erce"tion contin6es to "re8ail= "artic6larl1 in democratic societies= t(ere is t(e dan3er it -ill "aral1Ee 3o8ernments and t(ereb1 enco6ra3e f6rt(er terrorist attac0s. In s6m= "ast ex"erience "ro8ides 6sef6l lessons for a realistic f6t6re strate31. ,(e "r6dent a""lication of force (as been demonstrated to be an effecti8e tool for s(ort- and lon3-term deterrence of terrorism. 7or exam"le= IsraelBs tar3eted 0illin3 of ;o(ammed Sider= t(e 2ebron commander of t(e Islamic !i(ad= def6sed a Otic0in3 bomb.O ,(e assassination of Ismail Ab6 S(anab - a to" 2amas leader in t(e GaEa Stri" -(o -as directl1 res"onsible for se8eral s6icide bombin3s incl6din3 t(e latest b6s attac0 in !er6salem - disr6"ted "otential terrorist o"erations. Similarl1= t(e A.S. militar1 o"eration in IraC eliminated Saddam 26sseinBs re3ime as a state s"onsor of terror. ,(6s= it be(oo8es t(ose co6ntries 8ictimiEed b1 terrorism to 6nderstand a cardinal messa3e comm6nicated b1 %inston C(6rc(ill to t(e 2o6se of Commons on ;a1 13= 1. /? OKictor1 at all costs= 8ictor1 in s"ite of terror= 8ictor1 (o-e8er lon3 and (ard t(e road ma1 be? 7or 3i ,o/ Aic or'= t(ere is no s/rAiAal.O

%erroris-- Readiness 6e' (1 of 2)


1eadiness $ W*T
S$encer 00
(!ac0-= Sr. Polic1 Anal1st for Gefense P $ational Sec6rit1 > t(e Instit6te for International St6dies > t(e 2erita3e 7o6ndation= ;arc( 21= 9ac03ro6nder= I7oc6sin3 Gefense Reso6rces to ;eet $ational Sec6rit1 ReC6irementsJ L1&3+= (tt"?44---. (erita3e.or34Researc(4$ationalSec6rit14b31&3+.cfm@ !acob)

G6e to t(e emer3in3 3a" bet-een ca"abilities and strate31 ca6sed b1 t(e on3oin3 -ar a3ainst terrorism and t(e increasin3 need to "resent credible fi3(tin3 forces for t(e ;iddle <ast and 'orea= t(e nationBs national sec6rit1 concerns m6st be "rioritiEed. S"ecificall1= AmericaBs armed forces m6st= at a minim6m= be "re"ared for fo6r missions? #. 7i3(t t(e immediate -ar on terrorism. G6e to t(e se8erit1 of t(e t(reat and t(e sta0es at ris0= t(e -ar on terrorism m6st be AmericaBs to" "riorit1. As President 96s( (as described n6mero6s times= most recentl1 in (is State of t(e Anion Address=& t(is -ar is m6ltifaceted. ,(e nation m6st (arness its reso6rces to en3a3e t(e terrorists and t(eir state s"onsors financiall1= "oliticall1= di"lomaticall1= and militaril1. ,(is 3lobal mission c6rrentl1 incl6des t(e o"eration in Af3(anistan= resol8in3 t(e IraCi crisis= and smaller de"lo1ments to nations li0e Femen= !ordan= and t(e P(ili""ines. &. 9e "re"ared to fi3(t -it( little or no -arnin3 in 6nantici"ated "laces. ,(e emer3ence of 3lobal comm6nications= ad8ances in tec(nolo31= and t(e 3lobaliEation of terrorism "ro8ide man1 o""ort6nities for s6r"rise attac0s a3ainst t(e Anited States and its interests. ;aintainin3 t(e abilit1 to fi3(t and -in -ars in di8erse sit6ations and en8ironments can disco6ra3e man1 of AmericaBs enemies from (ostile acts. *. ;aintain adeC6ate ca"abilit1 to deter a33ression a3ainst AmericaBs allies. America faces end6rin3 t(reats be1ond terrorism= as demonstrated b1 $ort( 'oreaBs n6clear -ea"ons "ro3ram. ,(ere are nations in e8er1 re3ion of t(e -orld t(at t(reaten AmericaBs 8ital interests in t(e near term. Ass6rin3 stabilit1 in t(ose re3ions and
3&

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

"rotectin3 A.S. interests reC6ires t(e abilit1 to defeat an1 nation or 3ro6" t(at t(reatens AmericaBs allies= -(ic( itself "ro8ides effecti8e deterrence a3ainst lar3e-scale a33ression. ,(is s(o6ld incl6de bot( con8entional
forces and ot(er ca"abilities s6c( as an effecti8e ballistic missile defense and reliable n6clear forces. ,(e Administration s(o6ld ta0e e8er1 ste" to stren3t(en its im"ortant alliances and be read1 to res"ond forcef6ll1 and immediatel1 to a33ression a3ainst AmericaBs allies. +. Contrib6te to (omeland defense. ,(e armed ser8ices m6st co6nter t(reats to t(e (omeland as t(e1 e8ol8e abroad and "la1 a secondar1 role as t(at t(reat emer3es -it(in A.S. borders. Alt(o63( t(e Penta3on is not t(e "rimar1 federal a3ent of (omeland sec6rit1= it does (a8e a 8ital role to "la1 and m6st dedicate a "ortion of its reso6rces to t(at mission. ,(e acti8e A.S. militar1 s(o6ld be "rimaril1 res"onsible for defendin3 Americans from a33ression and "re8entin3 attac0s on t(e (omeland. Mnce an attac0 occ6rs= (o-e8er= $ational G6ard 6nits s(o6ld ta0e o8er t(e militar1 acti8ities -(ile ot(er 3o8ernment a3encies and "ri8ate entities s(o6lder t(e rest of t(e b6rden.* ,(e missions necessar1 for t(e militar1 to f6lfill its res"onsibilities incl6de deterrence= intelli3ence 3at(erin3= "reem"ti8e stri0es a3ainst entities "osin3 imminent t(reats= missile defense= and researc( and de8elo"ment of co6ntermeas6res and s1stems to defend a3ainst t(reats to t(e (omeland. Protectin3 t(e militar1 from ex"endin3 its reso6rces on (omeland sec6rit1 "ro3rams t(at are better (andled b1 ot(ers -ill be increasin3l1 im"ortant in f6t6re 1ears. ,(is is "artic6larl1 tr6e as t(e ne- Ge"artment of 2omeland Sec6rit1 comes on-line and acC6ires mandated ca"abilities ("artic6larl1 in researc( and de8elo"ment) t(at -o6ld be red6ndant to existin3 GMG "ro3rams.

%erroris-- Readiness 6e' (2 of 2)


1eadiness $ deterrence and pre4enting terrorism
*,i e Ho/se )a ional Sec/ri ' S ra e2' 00
(!an. #= I$ational Sec6rit1 Strate31 for a $e- Cent6r1J= 5exis@ !acob) <n3a3ement acti8ities m6st be caref6ll1 mana3ed to "re8ent erosion of o6r militar1:s c6rrent and lon3-term readiness. ,(e Gefense Ge"artment:s t(eater en3a3ement "lannin3 "rocess= -(ic( -as a""ro8ed b1 t(e President in 1..*= (el"s ens6re t(at militar1 en3a3ement acti8ities are "rioritiEed -it(in and across t(eaters= and balanced a3ainst a8ailable reso6rces. In s(ort= -e m6st "rioritiEe militar1 en3a3ement acti8ities to ens6re t(e readiness of o6r Armed 7orces to carr1 o6t crisis res"onse and -arfi3(tin3 missions= as -ell as to ens6re t(at -e can s6stain an a""ro"riate le8el of en3a3ement acti8ities o8er t(e lon3 term. M6r abilit1 to deter "otential ad8ersaries in "eacetime rests on se8eral factors= "artic6larl1 on o6r demonstrated -ill and abilit1 to 6"(old o6r sec6rit1 commitments -(en t(e1 are c(allen3ed. %e (a8e earned t(is re"6tation t(ro63( bot( o6r declarator1 "olic1= -(ic( clearl1 comm6nicates costs to "otential ad8ersaries= and o6r credible -arfi3(tin3 ca"abilit1. ,(is ca"abilit1 is embodied in read1 forces and eC6i"ment strate3icall1 stationed or de"lo1ed for-ard= in forces in t(e Anited States at t(e a""ro"riate le8el of readiness to de"lo1 -(en needed= in o6r abilit1 to 3ain timel1 access to critical re3ions and infrastr6ct6re o8erseas= and in o6r demonstrated abilit1 to form and lead effecti8e militar1 coalitions. 9eca6se terrorist or3aniEations ma1 not be deterred b1 traditional means= -e m6st ens6re a rob6st ca"abilit1 to acc6ratel1 attrib6te t(e so6rce of attac0s a3ainst t(e Anited States or its citiEens= and to res"ond effecti8el1 and decisi8el1 to "rotect o6r national interests.

3*

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

%erroris-- <ailed S a es 6e'


Witho t state s pport s ccessf l terrorism is impossible.
Gaddis 0"
(!o(n 5e-is-= 7eb. &= Co6ncil on 7orei3n Relations= Inter8ie-= I96s( Pre-em"tion Goctrine ,(e ;ost Gramatic Polic1 S(ift Since Cold %arJ= Inter8ie-er? 9ernard G-ertEman= Cons6ltin3 <ditor= (tt"?44---.cfr.or34"6blication4&*##43addis.(tml@ !acob) And if 1o6 as0 abo6t t(e o8erall obNecti8es of t(e strate31= it seems to me t(at t(e "ict6re is better and a 3ood deal more s6ccessf6l. ,(e lo3ic of t(e administration:s strate31 (as been to sa1 t(at "re-em"tion is necessar1 to deal -it( ad8ersaries li0e t(e .411 terrorists beca6se 1o6 not onl1 (a8e to find t(ese "eo"le t(emsel8es= b6t 1o6 also (a8e to eit(er intimidate or= if necessar1= ta0e o6t t(ose states -(ic( mi3(t (a8e been s6""ortin3 s6c( terrorists in t(e "ast= t(e ass6m"tion bein3 t(at terrorism can:t s6cceed -it(o6t some 0ind of state s6""ort

3+

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

A% In erAen ion 5ad- . : S,ield (1 of 2)


"nter4ention ine4! high readiness inter4ening faster# with less ad4erse effects
&a2an ( &ris ol 00
(Robert-= %illiam-= )he *eocon +eader, ed. Ir-in ;. StelEer= I$ational Interest and Global Res"onsibilit1J= P. &#@ !acob) It is -ort( "ointin3 o6t= t(o63(. c(at a forei3n "olic1 "remised on American (e3emon1 and on t(e blendin3 of "rinci"le -it( material interest= ma1 in tact mean fe-er. nor more. o8erseas inter8entions t(an 6nder t(e B8ital interestB standard. 2ad t(e VfirstW 96s( administration= for exam"le. realiEed earl1 on t(at t(ere -as no clear distinction bet-een American moral concerns in 9osnia and Americas national interest t(ere= t(e Anited States= -it( t(e enormo6s credibilit1 earned in t(e G6lf %ar= mi3(t (a8e been able to "6t a sto" to ;ilose8icBs ambitions -it( a -ell-timed t(reat of "6nis(in3 militar1 action. 96t beca6se t(e 96s( tram "laced 9osnia o6tside t(e s"(ere of B8italB American interests= t(e res6ltin3 crisis e8ent6all1 reC6ired t(e de"lo1ment of t(o6sands of troo"s on t(e 3ro6nd. ,(e same co6ld be said of American inter8entions in Panama and t(e G6lf. A "assi8e -orld-8ie- enco6ra3ed American leaders to i3nore tro6blin3 de8elo"ments -(ic( e8ent6all1 metastasiEed into f6ll-;o-n t(reats to American sec6rit1. ;an6el $orie3a and Saddam 26ssein -ere 3i8en reason to belie8e t(at t(e Anited States did not consider its interests t(reatened b1 t(eir be(a8ior= onl1 to disco8er c(at t(e1 (ad been misled. In eac( case. a broader and more for-ard-leanin3 conce"tion of t(e national interest mi3(t (a8e made t(e later= lar3e. and "otentiall1 costl1 inter8entions 6nnecessar1. ,(e C6estion= t(en= is not -(et(er t(e Anited States s(o6ld inter8ene e8er1-(ere or no-(ere. ,(e decision Americans need to ma0e is -(et(er t(e Anited States s(o6ld 3enerall1 lean for-ard. as it -ere= or sit (ac0. A strate31 aimed at "reser8in3 American (e3emon1 s(o6ld embrace t(e former stance. bein3 more rat(er t(an less inclined to -ei3( in -(en crises er6"t. and "referabl1 before t(e1 er6"t. ,(is is t(e standard of a 3lobal s6"er"o-er t(at intends to s(a"e t(e international en8ironment to its o-n ad8anta3e. 91 contrast. t(e 8ital interest standard is t(at of a BnormalB "o-er t(at a-aits a dramatic c(allen3e before it ro6ses itself into action.

3.

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

"nter4ention ine4! readiness inter4ening faster which is more effecti4e


Haass !=
(Ric(ard $.-= Girector of 7orei3n Polic1 St6dies > t(e 9roo0in3s Instit6tion= )he +eluctant ,heriff= P. #.-&/@ !acob) %orse= o8er time a minimalist forei3n "olic1 co6ld end 6" bein3 more costl1. $e3lect -ill "ro8e to be mali3n. Conflict on t(e 'orean "enins6la= for exam"le= -o6ld disr6"t trade and economic life t(ro63(o6t t(e re3ion. ,(ere -o6ld (e no -a1 t(e Anited States co6ld -all itself off from t(e effects. S6ccessf6l terrorism a3ainst tar3ets in t(e Anited States -o6ld exact a terrible (6man and financial toll. A failed ;exico or ot(er colla"sed states in t(e %estern 2emis"(ere -o6ld increase immi3ration "ress6res on American territor1. 2ostile control of ener31 reso6rces in t(e Persian G6lf co6ld lead to (i3(er "rices for oil and 3as and to tem"orar1 s(orta3es. A "ost6re of isolationism= -(ate8er its near-term sa8in3s= co6ld increase t(e li0eli(ood t(at critical "roblems or t(reats to 8ital A.S. interests -ill emer3e. A.S. rel6ctance to act ma1 -ell enco6ra3e ot(ers to fill t(e "ercei8ed 8oid. Arms "roliferation -o6ld li0el1 accelerate@ a33ression -o6ld almost certainl1 become more common"lace. If t(is occ6rred= t(e Anited States co6ld -ell (a8e no c(oice b6t to act-(6t in a context far less amenable to relati8el1 inex"ensi8e sol6tions. ,(e notion t(at -(at t(e Anited States or an1 ot(er co6ntr1 does o8erseas comes at t(e ex"ense of -(at it co6ld (e doin3 at (ome is fla-ed@ in a dere36lated -orld in -(ic( t(e si3nificance of borders is bl6rrin3 and t(at of distance diminis(in3= forei3n and domestic "olic1 are increasin3l1 t-o sides of t(e same coin.

A% In erAen ion 5ad- . : S,ield (2 of 2)


U.S. inter4ention is ine4itable! the only : estion is the effecti4eness
@ean !9
(!onat(an- Ad8isor on I Sec6rit1 to Anion of Concerned Scientists= -or0ed -it( A.$. P'ers in t(e field and in G of State= ;arc(= 96lletin of t(e Atomic Scientists= IA stron3er A.$. stren3t(ens AmericaJ= $o. 2= Kol. #1= 5exis@ !acob) In an1 e8ent= in a -orld of interconnectin3 comm6nications and en8ironmental= trade= and financial lin0s= t(e Anited States= a leadin3 ind6strial tradin3 co6ntr1 t(at needs access to ra- materials and mar0ets= 6s6all1 ends 6" "a1in3 in one -a1 or anot(er -(en a maNor re3ional conflict er6"ts. In "ractical terms= it is im"ossible for t(e Anited States to a8oid some de3ree of in8ol8ement -(en maNor re3ional conflicts brea0 o6t. 7or 2// 1ears= t(e Anited States (as been 6r3in3 libert1= freedom= democrac1= (6man ri3(ts= free mar0et 8al6es= 8ol6ntar1 m6t6al aid and collecti8e sec6rit1 on t(e o6tside -orld. ,(e Anited States is t(e sole s6r8i8in3 -orld-class "o-er= -it( militar1 stren3t( and G$P far lar3er t(an an1 ot(er co6ntr1. As a res6lt= -(en lar3e-scale conflict er6"ts= t(e Anited States cannot a8oid bein3 called on for (el"= as it -as in Somalia= 9osnia= R-anda= and 2aiti. 7or t(e Anited States to see0 to stand aside or to res"ond onl1 -ea0l1 in s6c( cases is to ris0 dama3e to its credibilit1 and -orld-ide infl6ence. President Clinton N6stified t(e $A,M bombin3 of Serbian "ositions in 9osnia and t(e A.S. in8asion of 2aiti b1 sa1in3 t(at t(e credibilit1 and reliabilit1 of t(e A.S. -as at sta0e= as it -as. It is tr6e t(at "ast administrations 6sed similar ar36ments to N6stif1 contin6ed A.S. in8ol8ement in Kietnam lon3 after it -o6ld (a8e been -ise to -it(dra-. $onet(eless= -(en t(e collecti8e disa""ointment of -orld o"inion o8er t(e be(a8ior of t(e Anited States (or of an1 maNor co6ntr1) becomes intense and end6rin3= it be3ins to 6ndermine t(e international "resti3e and standin3 of t(e entire nation. /

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

A% In erAen ionis-- I s Good (1 of 2)


"nter4entionism ;ood
O'Hanlon 01
(;ic(ael <.-= Sr. 7ello- in 7orei3n Polic1 St6dies > t(e 9roo0in3s Instit6tion= Defense Policy Choices: For the Bush Administration 2001-05= P. #- &= (tt"?44broo0in3s.na".ed64boo0s4/+1#*//*.24(tml4@ !acob) Some Americans see A.S. commitments in t(e 9al0ans as an in(erent distraction from t(e militar1:s main missions and obNect to an1 and all s6c( commitments on "rinci"le. S6c( a dismissi8e ar36ment is ill ad8ised= (o-e8er. ,(e alternati8e to en3a3ement in t(e l../s -as to stand b1 and tolerate (orrific ci8il conflict= t(e -orst in <6ro"e since t(e end of %orld %ar II= incl6din3 man1 3enocidal acts. ,(at "olic1 of disen3a3ement -as attem"ted and abandoned b1 t(e 96s( administration in 1..2= -(en it first 0e"t t(e Anited States o6t of t(e -ar in 9osnia b6t t(en "led3ed A.S. militar1 in8ol8ement in t(e e8ent of a conflict in 'oso8o. President Clinton 3ot off to no better a start= failin3 to find a sol6tion to t(e 9osnian ci8il -ar for more t(an t-o 1ears. 7inall1= (o-e8er= -it( t(e s6""ort and sometimes t(e "roddin3 of Con3ress= (is administration contrib6ted to endin3 t(e 9osnian ci8il -ar.3\ 7rom t(at "oint in 1..# on= t(e deat( toll from 8iolence in t(at re3ion -as limited to abo6t 1/=///= incl6din3 t(e 'oso8o -ar in contrast to t(e loss of 1//=/// or more "eo"le in t(e t(ree "recedin3 1ears. ,(e 8ictor1 in 'oso8o -as an 63l1 one attained onl1 after a militar1 cam"ai3n t(at be3an 8er1 "oorl1- b6t it did ac(ie8e a relati8el1 3ood o6tcome com"ared -it( -(at mi3(t (a8e been ex"ected in t(e absence of $A,M inter8ention.32 2o-e8er one sees t(is trac0 record= t(e Anited States no- finds itself in t-o "eace o"erations in t(e 9al0ans. 5ate in t(e 2/// "residential race= Go8ernor 96s( and (is national sec6rit1 co6nselor= CondoleeEEa Rice= made (eadlines -(en t(e1 declared t(at a 96s( administration -o6ld see0 to t6rn t(ese "eace o"erations o8er to t(e <6ro"ean allies. ,(e basis for t(is ar36ment -as t-ofold. 7irst= A.S. forces are o8ercommitted 3loball1 and in need of relief. Second= A.S. forces carr1 o6t demandin3 tas0s= 6" to and incl6din3 combat= in t(eaters s6c( as t(e Persian G6lf and t(e -estern Pacific. <6ro"ean co6ntries= -it( t(e exce"tion of 9ritain and to a lesser extent 7rance= 3enerall1 do not. ,(is ma0es it onl1 fair t(at t(e -ealt(1 <6ro"ean allies ta0e "rinci"al res"onsibilit1 for sec6rit1 on t(eir o-n continent.33 1

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

,(at "olic1 ma1 (a8e some "romise= b6t it needs to be ado"ted 8er1 selecti8el1 and caref6ll1. 7irst= A.S. abdication of dan3ero6s sec6rit1 mis-sions in <6ro"e -o6ld 8iolate t(e lesson learned not onl1 in t(e -orld -ars= b6t also in 9osnia from 1..2 to 1..#. M8er t(at "eriod= t(e Anited States sta1ed a-a1 from t(e 9osnian conflict= lea8in3 its allies to fo6nderRand to lose doEens of soldiers to sni"ers= mines= and acci-dents in t(e A.$.:s ill-fated A$PRM7MR mission. Kirt6all1 aG st6dents of <6ro"ean sec6rit1 on bot( sides of t(e Atlantic (a8e concl6ded t(at t(is t1"e of sit6ation needs to be a8oided in t(e f6t6re? in ot(er -ords= t(e Anited States m6st "artici"ate in f6t6re diffic6lt and dan3ero6s sec6rit1 missions in <6ro"e= "artic6larl1 if it -is(es to maintain its leaders(i" of t(e $A,M alliance. Second= it -o6ld be 6nfort6nate to codif1 a sit6ation in -(ic( <6ro"eans do little for sec6rit1 be1ond <6ro"e. ,(e Anited States s(o6ld not condone s6c( a territorial di8ision of labor= since most of t(e -orId:s diffic6lt f6t6re sec6rit1 tas0s -ill "robabl1 be o6tside t(at continent. <nco6ra3in3 <6ro"e to remain militaril1 ins6lar -o6ld not onl1 be bad for t(e ca6se of eC6itable defense b6rden s(arin3@ it co6ld also reinforce existin3 differences in strate3ic "ers"ecti8es bet-een t(e Anited States and <6ro"e on matters s6c( as "olic1 to-ard IraC and Iran. ,(ird= t(e "ro"osed "olic1 raises certain "ractical C6estions. 7or exam"le= R6ssian troo"s in t(e 9al0ans ser8e 6nder A.S. command= and a A.S. de"art6re -o6ld "6t at ris0 an im"ortant collaborati8e effort bet-een $A,M and R6ssia.3 7inall1= one s(o6ld not for3et t(at t(e allies are alread1 contrib6tin3 most of t(e troo"s in t(e '7MR mission in 'oso8o and t(e S7MR mission in 9osnia. A.S. troo" contrib6tions constit6te less t(an 2/ "ercent of t(e total in t(e 9al0ans toda1 (see table 2-31.3s

A% In erAen ionis-- I s Good (2 of 2)


"nter4entionism $ hege! allies will bac$lash against a s perpower that doesn5t fight to stabili&e the international order
&i field 00
(!ames-= %inter= ,(e $ational Interest= I,(e 7ol0 %(o 5i8e on t(e 2illJ= 5exis@ !acob) ,(e strate31 ad8anced b1 26tc(ison 3oes e8en f6rt(er. Ander (er "ro"osal= t(e Anited States -o6ld redefine its strate3ic role b1 "ro8idin3 itself and its allies "rotection 6nder a missile defense 6mbrella= -(ile maintainin3 air s6"eriorit1 and strate3ic lift ca"abilities. 96t t(e Anited States -o6ld lea8e t(e b6rden of "acif1in3 re3ional conflicts and t(e 8ast maNorit1 of "eace0ee"in3 o"erations to its allies. 2ence= in t(e 7iscal Fear 2/// Gefense A6t(oriEation= 26tc(ison inserted a "ro8ision callin3 on t(e administration to examine -(ere t(e Anited States mi3(t red6ce its 3lobal commitments and -it(dra- its forces from missions -(ose time (as "assed= incl6din3 t(ose in So6t( 'orea and Sa6di Arabia. Gi8en t(e ob8io6s strains on t(e militar1 res6ltin3 from a frenetic "ace of de"lo1ments and o"erations= s6c( a (ard-(eaded and realistic a""roac( to militar1 inter8ention is certainl1 defensible. It is nonet(eless diffic6lt to fat(om exactl1 (o- America is to retain its s6"er"o-er stat6s if it esc(e-s all re3ional crises and insists t(at its allies s(o6lder t(e ris0s on t(e 3ro6nd. 7or nearl1 t(ree 1ears= t(e Clinton administration ado"ted s6c( an arms-len3t( "olic1 -(ile 9osnia b6rned= <6ro"ean allies 8acillated= and t(e 9al0ans im"loded. ,(e calamito6s res6lts of t(is indifference are b1 no- -ell 0no-n.

7+ inter4entions good
5oo 0"
(;ax-= Sr. 7ello- > t(e Co6ncil on 7orei3n Relations= ;a1 #= %ee0l1 Standard I%(at:s $extQJ= 5exis) 2

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

As IraC 5iberaliEes= t(e next tas0 -ill be to s"6r t(e liberaliEation of its nei3(bors. 2o- to ac(ie8e t(is 3oal is no- t(e s6bNect of intense debate. ,(e familiar cr1 is alread1 3oin3 6" from <6ro"e= t(e Anited $ations= t(e Arab -orld= and $ational P6blic Radio? Restart t(e O"eace "rocessO bet-een Israelis and Palestinians. Alas= t(ere is no reason to ima3ine t(at OMslo IIO -ill t6rn o6t an1 better t(an t(e ori3inal. Indeed itBs (ard to see (o- an1 Israeli 3o8ernment co6ld ma0e Fasser Arafat a more 3enero6s offer t(an t(e one (e reNected at Cam" Ga8id in 2///. If (e t6rned do-n .+ "ercent of t(e %est 9an0 t(en= -(at co6ld Israel "ossibl1 offer (im no-Q ,(e -a1 to ac(ie8e "eace -it( t(e Palestinians--as President 96s( (as reco3niEed--is to c(an3e t(eir 3o8ernment and liberaliEe t(eir societ1. ,(is is not a "rocess t(at can be com"leted o8erni3(t= and it -ill not be (el"ed b1 "remat6re Israeli concessions t(at a""ear to re-ard terrorism. 91 (an3in3 to63(= Israel seems to be defeatin3 t(e s6icide bombers and e8en forcin3 intros"ection and reform in t(e Palestinian A6t(orit1. A.S. inter8ention no- -o6ld set bac0 t(is o8erd6e "rocess. !6st as in t(e %est 9an0 and GaEa Stri"= so in t(e rest of t(e ;iddle <ast? ,(e "roblem isnBt t(e existence of Israel= t(e onl1 democrac1 in t(e re3ion. ,(e "roblem is t(e existence of so man1 nondemocratic re3imes. Pro3ress reC6ires liberaliEation. GemocratiEation alone is not eno63(= since= as Al3eria s(o-s= elections ma1 brin3 to "o-er Islamist radicals committed to Oone man= one 8ote= one time.O In IraC= not(in3 -o6ld be more disastro6s t(an to allo- forei3n-bac0ed reli3io6s extremists bent on establis(in3 a t(eocrac1 to ta0e "o-er t(ro63( t(e ballot box. Secretar1 R6msfeld reiterated t(e ot(er da1 t(at Oan Iranian-t1"e 3o8ernment . . . isnBt 3oin3 to (a""en.O Still= t(e Anited States s(o6ld be doin3 m6c( more to "romote S(iites committed to a "l6ralist state (1es= t(e1 do exist). It is 8ital to im"lement t(e r6le of la-= freedom of s"eec(= "ro"ert1 ri3(ts= and ot(er 36arantees t(at can act as a safe36ard a3ainst maNoritarian o""ression. ,(at s(o6ld not tem"er o6r commitment to democrac1@ it merel1 means t(at -e are committed to liberalism= too.

A% In erAen ionis- %errorisTerrorist resentment ine4itable! strong military $ minimi&e the damage
5roo6s ( *o,lfor , 02
(Ste"(en G.-= Assist. Prof. in t(e Ge"t. of Go8. > Gartmo6t( = %illiam C-= Assoc. Prof. in t(e Ge"t. of Go8. > Gartmo6t( = !6l14 A636st= 7orei3n Affairs= IAmerican Primac1 in Pers"ecti8eJ= 5exis@ !acob) Some mi3(t C6estion t(e -ort( of bein3 at t(e to" of a 6ni"olar s1stem if t(at means ser8in3 as a li3(tnin3 rod for t(e -orldBs malcontents. %(en t(ere -as a So8iet Anion= after all= it bore t(e br6nt of Msama bin 5adenBs an3er= and onl1 after its colla"se did (e s(ift (is foc6s to t(e Anited States (an indicator of t(e demise of bi"olarit1 t(at -as i3nored at t(e time b6t looms lar3er in retros"ect). 96t terrorism (as been a "erennial "roblem in (istor1= and m6lti"olarit1 did not sa8e t(e leaders of se8eral 3reat "o-ers from assassination b1 anarc(ists aro6nd t(e t6rn of t(e t-entiet( cent6r1. In fact= a slide bac0 to-ard m6lti"olarit1 -o6ld act6all1 be t(e -orst of all -orlds for t(e Anited States. In s6c( a scenario it -o6ld contin6e to lead t(e "ac0 and ser8e as a focal "oint for resentment and (atred b1 bot( state and nonstate actors= b6t it -o6ld (a8e fe-er carrots and stic0s to 6se in dealin3 -it( t(e sit6ation. ,(e t(reats -o6ld remain= b6t t(e "ossibilit1 of effecti8e and coordinated action a3ainst t(em -o6ld be red6ced.

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

A% )o s$ecific scenario $roAes no .


"f only it were that simple! we gotta prepare now for conflicts we can5t predict
@o/2las 09
(!o(n-= ;ember of t(e $ational Sec6rit1 Co6ncil staff d6rin3 t(e Rea3an administration= !an. 1*= Gefense $e-s= IRis01 C6ts@ A.S. Rolls t(e Gice %it( Gefense In8estmentJ= 5exis@ !acob) Anderc6ttin3 f6t6re militar1 readiness for tem"orar1 s(ort-term needs is ris01. ,(e last t-o decades (a8e been a star0 reminder of a defense fact -- itBs all b6t im"ossible to "redict t(e militar1 needs e8en fi8e or 1/ 1ears into t(e f6t6re. %(o -o6ld (a8e -a3ered t(at -it(in t(e s"an of less t(an 1# 1ears t(e bi33est A.S. militar1 c(allen3e -o6ld mo8e from a n6clear-armed comm6nist bloc to el6si8e terrorist cells scattered o8er t(e 3lobeQ ,(e "ro3rams -e in8est in toda1 -ill be t(e cornerstones of defense for t(e next 2/- 3/ 1ears or lon3er. ,(e t(reats to o6r sec6rit1 in 2/3/ are li0el1 to be m6c( different t(an t(ose -e see toda1.

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

*** Readiness 5ad ***

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

+o/n er4alancin2 Scenario


"ncreasing force post res ma$es them loo$ offensi4e c#b
*al 00
(Ste"(en ;.-= Robert P Ren]e 9elfer Prof. of Int. Affairs > t(e 'enned1 Sc(ool of Go8. > 2ar8ard= Mct. 11= I'ee"in3 t(e %orld TMff-9alance:? Self-Restraint and A.S. 7orei3n Polic1J= 0s3notes1.(ar8ard.ed64...42/afada3#1c3c2+ +#2#&..1//#cf/#e4D7I5<4 Mffbalance.doc@ !acob) 9alance of t(reat t(eor1 im"lies t(at states -ill be more li0el1 to balance a3ainst t(e Anited States if its militar1 ca"abilities a""ear to be (ea8il1 oriented to-ards offense. 91 contrast= militar1 forces t(at are desi3ned to "rotect t(e A.S. or its allies -ill be less dan3ero6s to ot(ers and less li0el1 to "ro8o0e a balancin3 res"onse. As critics of offense-defense t(eor1 (a8e noted= distin36is(in3 bet-een offense and defensi8e -ea"ons and force "ost6res can be extremel1 diffic6lt"artic6larl1 at t(e le8el of indi8id6al -ea"ons s1stems. In 3eneral= (o-e8er= force "ost6res t(at "rotect territor1 -it(o6t t(reatenin3 ot(ers= and t(at lac0 t(e ca"acit1 to conC6er and occ6"1 forei3n territor1= are li0el1 to be less t(reatenin3 t(an force "ost6res t(at em"(asiEe offensi8e conC6est.

"ndependent of the strength of U.S. hegemony c#b NW 0 e2tinction


)'e !1
(!ose"(-= Gean of 'enned1 Sc(ool of Go8. > 2ar8ard= Bound to $ead= P. 1*)

Perce"tions of c(an3e in t(e relati8e "o-er of nations are of critical im"ortance to 6nderstandin3 t(e relations(i" bet-een decline and -ar. Mne of t(e oldest 3eneraliEations abo6t international "olitics attrib6tes t(e onset of maNor -ars to s(ifts in "o-er amon3 t(e leadin3 nations. ,(6s ,(6c1dides acco6nted for t(e onset of t(e
&

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Pelo"onnesian %ar -(ic( destro1ed t(e "o-er of ancient At(ens. ,(e (istor1 of t(e interstate s1stem since 1#// is "6nct6ated b1 se8ere -ars in -(ic( one co6ntr1 str633led to s6r"ass anot(er as t(e leadin3 state. If= as Robert Gil"in ar36es= O international "olitics (as not c(an3ed f6ndamentall1 o8er t(e millennia=O t(e im"lications for t(e f6t6re are blea0 . # And if

fears abo6t s(iftin3 "o-er "reci"itate a maNor -ar in a -orld -it( #/=/// n6clear -ea"ons= (istor1 as -e 0no- it ma1 end.

In erAen ion:Pre-e-$ ion Scenario (1 of 0)


1eadiness inter4entionism 0 pre!emption collapsing hege
S,eA soAa 00
(5ilia-= -it( t(e ;osco- Carne3ie Center= ;a1 *= ;osco- $e-s= I$e- Gan3er? 21"er"o-er on t(e 5ooseJ= 5exis@ !acob) ,(e Obattle of 3iantsO - State Secretar1 Po-ell and Gefense Secretar1 R6msfeld - (as once a3ain come into t(e o"en= 3ainin3 ne- moment6m. ,(e former is see0in3 to reconcile t(e Anited States -it( <6ro"e and brin3 t(e Anited States bac0 into t(e Sec6rit1 Co6ncil. ,(e latter is tr1in3 to le3itimiEe t(e O96s( GoctrineO - t(e A.S. ri3(t to "reem"ti8e stri0es and an 6nlimited 6se of militar1 "o-er. Fo6 mi3(t 3et t(e im"ression t(at R6msfeld in effect recei8ed carte blanc(e from 96s( and t(at %as(in3ton is mo8in3 to-ard a to63(= forcef6l "olic1 line. %e s(o6ld not= (o-e8er= N6m" to concl6sions? $eo-conser8ati8es are not t(e sole force in %as(in3ton. ,(ere are also moderate elements t(at are increasin3l1 8ocifero6s in sa1in3? GonBt let 6s 3o o8erboard. 2ea81-ei3(t Sen. 9iden ar36es= -it( 3ood reason? In IraC= -e s(o6ld act to3et(er -it( t(e international comm6nit1. ,(e %as(in3ton Post "oints o6t sarcasticall1 t(at t(e %(ite 2o6se deliberatel1 ca6sed -ides"read dama3e in IraC to enable friendl1 cor"orations to cas( in on t(e reconstr6ction "ro3ram. In ot(er -ords= t(e Americans are still ca"able of ta0in3 a critical 8ie- of t(eir administration. As for 96s( (imself= (e does not be(a8e at all li0e a tri6m"(er. ,(e reason is clear. 96s( needs= first= to find -ea"ons of mass destr6ction in IraC= and second= (e needs s6ccess -it( Ore3ime c(an3eO in IraC. Mnl1 in t(is e8ent -ill t(e -ar be N6stified. C(ances are t(at t(e Americans -ill indeed find -ea"ons of mass destr6ction - or traces t(ereof - in IraC. Gemocrac1 b6ildin3 (o-e8er co6ld be more of a "roblem. M8er t(e "ast cent6r1 t(e Anited States (as made 1& attem"ts to c(an3e re3imes in ot(er co6ntries= onl1 t-o of t(em s6ccessf6l? namel1= democratiEation of "ost--ar German1 and !a"an. 96t t(ese attem"ts -ere le3itimiEed b1 t(e international comm6nit1 and -ere accom"anied not onl1 b1 (63e financial in"6ts (t(e ;ars(all Plan -as -ort( abo6t one-t(ird of t(e A.S. national b6d3et) b6t also b1 A.S. militar1 "resence in bot( co6ntries. All ot(er attem"ts at Ore3ime c(an3eO are 0no-n to (a8e failed. Af3(anistan= -(ere formation of a democratic state (as been mar0in3 time= is 1et anot(er ar36ment s(o-in3 t(at t(e O96s( GoctrineO s(o6ld be treated -it( ca6tion. *

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

76rt(ermore= 96s( (as 1et to translate t(e militar1 s6ccess into s6""ort for (is domestic "olic1 -(ile all is not so sim"le (ere. In (is time= 96s( Sr.= (a8in3 -on t(e first IraC -ar in 1..1= lost t(e election. ;ean-(ile= after t(e -ar= 96s( Sr. (ad a +. "ercent "o"6larit1 ratin3= as com"ared to (is sonBs && "ercent no-. ,(is= 3i8en t(at a""roximatel1 &/ "ercent of Americans disa3ree -it( (is tax "olic1. In t(is context= t(e %(ite 2o6se co6ld s6cc6mb to t(e tem"tation to score ne- militar1 8ictories as a means of mobiliEin3 t(e nation and -innin3 elections. ;essianism -it( a Problem ,(e Anited States toda1 remains t(e onl1 ;essianicall1 minded co6ntr1. All ot(er democracies "refer calm to re8ol6tionar1 6"(ea8als. AmericaBs idealism= bac0ed 6" b1 its 8ast reso6rces= ma0es it b1 far t(e most d1namic societ1= ca"able of s1stemic s(ifts on t(e 3eo"olitical field. 76rt(ermore= t(e A.S. mi3(t dictates a to63( and 6ncom"romisin3 line of cond6ct on t(e international arena. As one commentator "6t it= 3,en 'o/'Ae 2o a ,a--er in 'o/r ,and1 all $ro4le-s 4e2in o loo6 li6e nails. ,(e s(eer "ossibilit1 of -a3in3 8irt6all1 stand-off -ars -it( minim6m cas6alties be3ets an as"iration to deal -it( -orld "roblems b1 stri0in3 a (ammer. ,(ere is no 3ettin3 a-a1 from t(e fact t(at t(e im"otence of international instit6tions= t(e (el"lessness of <6ro"e in militar1 affairs and its obsession -it( its internal "roblems of inte3ration do little to enco6ra3e t(e Anited States to dis"la1 collecti8ist instincts. Gra8itation b1 t(e A.S. elite to-ard forcef6l "olic1 "rod6ces a 8icio6s circle? ,(e 6se of force is reNected b1 t(e rest of t(e -orld= ma0in3 America more 86lnerable= -(ic( in its t6rn leads to f6rt(er 6se of force. As a res6lt= t(e Anited States ris0s endin3 6" as a destabiliEin3 factor in t(e -orld. ;ean-(ile= t(e f6t6re of a ne- -orld order toda1 is in t(e (ands of t(e Anited States -(ic( can t6rn it eit(er -a1. ,(is "6ts to t(e test American societ1Bs abilit1 to realisticall1 assess bot( international t(reats and its o-n limitations= b6t most im"ortantl1= its abilit1 to a""l1 democratic "rinci"les in t(e forei3n "olic1 s"(ere. $onet(eless= t(is also is a moment of tr6t( for t(e rest of t(e -orld -(ic( s(o6ld 6nderstand t(at t(ere are t(reats - abo8e all t(e dan3er of "roliferation of mass destr6ction -ea"ons and international terrorism - t(at reC6ire an immediate and to63( res"onse. So t(ere is a need to t(in0 abo6t "6ttin3 in "lace a le3al 3ro6nd-or0 -it( a""ro"riate ne- instit6tions to ens6re s6c( a res"onse. ,(is -ill ma0e it "ossible to a8oid sit6ations -(ere t(e Anited States co6ld once a3ain find itself in isolation= -(ic( is dan3ero6s bot( for itself and for t(e international comm6nit1.

In erAen ion:Pre-e-$ ion Scenario (2 of 0)


The pre!emption won5t wor$ and ris$s destroying the world! . scenarios.
Hirs, 09
(!or3e-= Prof. of P(1sics > A.C.S.G.= $o8. 1=J ,(e Real Reason for $60in3 Iran? %(1 a n6clear attac0 is on t(e neocon a3endaJ= (tt"?44---.anti-ar.com4ori34 (irsc(."("QarticleidZ*+&1@ !acob) Fes= 1o6 read it ri3(t? ,(e A.S. is "re"ared to brea0 a &/-1ear-old taboo on t(e 6se of n6clear -ea"ons a3ainst non-n6clear co6ntries ^ not beca6se t(e s6r8i8al of t(e co6ntr1 is at sta0e= not beca6se t(e li8es of man1 Americans or allies are at sta0e ^ N6st to demonstrate t(at it can do it. ,(e A.S. (as maintained for some time no- t(at it reser8es t(e ri3(t to res"ond -it( n6clear -ea"ons to

attac0s or intended attac0s -it( %;G= and t(at it intends to 6se n6clear -ea"ons to destro1 6nder3ro6nd enem1 facilities. It is ar36ed t(at s6c( statements (a8e deterrent 8al6e= and t(at maintainin3 ambi36it1 as to -(at mi3(t tri33er a A.S. n6clear attac0 deters co6ntries from "6rs6in3 militar1 initiati8es t(at are contrar1 to A.S. interests. $onsense. ,(ose statements (a8e no deterrent 8al6e beca6se no one in (is or (er ri3(t mind -o6ld belie8e t(at t(e 3reatest democrac1 in t(e -orld -o6ld do s6c( a t(in3.
Anless t(e A.S. demonstrates= b1 act6all1 doin3 it once= t(at it is indeed "re"ared to do so. 2o- do 1o6 create t(e conditions to "erform s6c( a demonstration and a8oid immediate 6ni8ersal condemnationQ U a6t(or contin6es U 2o-e8er= t(e real -orld does not al-a1s follo- t(e scri"t en8isioned b1 A.S. "lanners= as t(e IraC ex"erience ill6strates. So (ere is a more li0el1 O"ost-demoO scenario? +

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad a

* ;an1 non-n6clear co6ntries= incl6din3 t(ose c6rrentl1 friendl1 to t(e A.S.= -ill r6s( to de8elo" n6clear deterrent= and man1 -ill s6cceed. * ,errorist 3ro6"s s1m"at(etic to Iran -ill do t(eir 6tmost to retaliate in-0ind a3ainst t(e A.S.= and e8ent6all1 -ill s6cceed. * %it( t(e taboo a3ainst t(e 6se of n6clear -ea"ons bro0en= 6se of t(em b1 ot(er co6ntries -ill follo- in 8ario6s re3ional conflicts= and s6bseC6ent escalation -ill lead to 3lobal n6clear -ar. 91e-b1e -orld= incl6din3 t(e Anited States of America.

"nter4entionism W7/ terrorism.


Bland !C
(I8an= Girector of Gefense Polic1 St6dies > t(e Cato Instit6te= ;a1 #= CA,M Polic1 Anal1sis= IProtectin3 t(e 2omeland? ,(e 9est Gefense Is to Gi8e $o MffenseJ= (tt"?44---.cato.or34"6bs4"as4"a-3/&.(tml@ !acob)

A st6d1 com"leted for t(e A.S. Ge"artment of Gefense notes t(at (istorical data s(o- a stron3 correlation bet-een A.S. in8ol8ement in international sit6ations and terrorist attac0s a3ainst t(e Anited States. Attac0s b1 terrorist 3ro6"s co6ld no- be catastro"(ic for t(e American (omeland. ,errorists can obtain t(e tec(nolo31 for -ea"ons of mass terror and -ill (a8e fe-er C6alms abo6t 6sin3 t(em to ca6se massi8e cas6alties. ,(e assistant secretar1 of defense for reser8e affairs maintains t(at s6c( catastro"(ic attac0s are almost certain to occ6r. It -ill be extremel1 diffic6lt to deter= "re8ent= detect= or miti3ate t(em. As a res6lt= e8en t(e -ea0est terrorist 3ro6" can ca6se massi8e destr6ction in t(e (omeland of a s6"er"o-er. Alt(o63( t(e Cold %ar ended nearl1 a decade a3o= A.S. forei3n "olic1 (as remained on a6to"ilot. ,(e Anited States contin6es to inter8ene militaril1 in conflicts all o8er t(e 3lobe t(at are irrele8ant to American 8ital interests. ,o satisf1 -(at s(o6ld be t(e first "riorit1 of an1 sec6rit1 "olic1--"rotectin3 t(e (omeland and its "eo"le--t(e Anited States s(o6ld ado"t a "olic1 of militar1 restraint. ,(at "olic1 entails inter8enin3 onl1 as a last resort -(en tr6l1 8ital interests are at sta0e. ,o "ara"(rase Ant(on1 Sinni=
t(e commander of A.S. forces in t(e ;iddle <ast= t(e Anited States s(o6ld a8oid ma0in3 enemies b6t s(o6ld not be 0ind to t(ose t(at arise.

In erAen ion:Pre-e-$ ion Scenario (0 of 0)


The impact is e2tinction.
Alexander 00
(Fona(-= Prof. P Girector > Inter-Ani8ersit1 for ,errorism St6dies= A636st 2+= %as(in3ton ,imes= I,errorism ;1t(s and RealitiesJ= 5exis@ !acob) 5ast -ee0Bs br6tal s6icide bombin3s in 9a3(dad and !er6salem (a8e once a3ain ill6strated dramaticall1 t(at t(e international comm6nit1 failed= t(6s far at least= to 6nderstand t(e ma3nit6de and im"lications of t(e terrorist t(reats to t(e 8er1 s6r8i8al of ci8iliEation itself.
<8en t(e Anited States and Israel (a8e for decades tended to re3ard terrorism as a mere tactical n6isance or irritant rat(er t(an a critical strate3ic c(allen3e to t(eir national sec6rit1 concerns. It is not s6r"risin3= t(erefore= t(at on Se"tember 11= 2//1= Americans -ere st6nned b1 t(e 6n"recedented tra3ed1 of 1. al Haeda terrorists stri0in3 a de8astatin3 blo- at t(e center of t(e nationBs commercial and militar1 "o-ers. 5i0e-ise= Israel and its citiEens= des"ite t(e colla"se of t(e Mslo A3reements of 1..3 and n6mero6s acts of terrorism tri33ered b1 t(e second intifada t(at be3an almost t(ree 1ears a3o= are still Os(oc0edO b1 eac( s6icide attac0 at a time of intensi8e di"lomatic efforts to re8i8e t(e morib6nd "eace "rocess t(ro63( t(e no- re8o0ed cease-fire arran3ements V(6dnaW. %(1 are t(e Anited States and Israel= as -ell as scores of ot(er co6ntries affected b1 t(e 6ni8ersal ni3(tmare of modern terrorism s6r"rised b1 neterrorist Os6r"risesOQ ,(ere are man1 reasons= incl6din3 mis6nderstandin3 of t(e manifold s"ecific factors t(at contrib6te to terrorismBs ex"ansion= s6c( as lac0 of a 6ni8ersal definition of terrorism= t(e reli3ioniEation of "olitics= do6ble standards of moralit1= -ea0 "6nis(ment of terrorists= and t(e ex"loitation of t(e media b1 terrorist "ro"a3anda and "s1c(olo3ical -arfare.

contem"orar1 terrorists (a8e introd6ced a ne- scale of 8iolence in terms of con8entional and 6ncon8entional t(reats and im"act.
.

Anli0e t(eir (istorical co6nter"arts=

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

,(e internationaliEation and br6taliEation of c6rrent and f6t6re terrorism ma0e it clear -e (a8e entered an A3e of S6"er ,errorism Ve.3. biolo3ical= c(emical, radiolo3ical= n6clear and c1ber] -it( its serio6s im"lications concernin3 national= re3ional and 3lobal sec6rit1 concerns. ,-o m1t(s in "artic6lar m6st be deb6n0ed immediatel1 if an effecti8e co6nterterrorism Obest "racticesO strate31 can be de8elo"ed Ve.3.= stren3t(enin3 international coo"erationW.
,(e first ill6sion is t(at terrorism can be 3reatl1 red6ced= if not eliminated com"letel1= "ro8ided t(e root ca6ses of conflicts - "olitical= social and economic - are addressed. ,(e con8entional ill6sion is t(at terrorism m6st be N6stified b1 o""ressed "eo"le see0in3 to ac(ie8e t(eir 3oals and conseC6entl1 t(e ar36ment ad8anced b1 Ofreedom fi3(tersO an1-(ere= O3i8e me libert1 and I -ill 3i8e 1o6 deat(=O s(o6ld be tolerated if not 3lorified. ,(is traditional rationaliEation of OsacredO 8iolence often conceals t(at t(e real "6r"ose of terrorist 3ro6"s is to 3ain "olitical "o-er t(ro63( t(e barrel of t(e 36n= in 8iolation of f6ndamental (6man ri3(ts of t(e noncombatant se3ment of societies. 7or instance= Palestinians reli3io6s mo8ements Ve.3.= 2amas= Islamic !i(adW and sec6lar entities Vs6c( as 7ata(Bs ,anEim and ACsa ;art1r 9ri3adesWW -is( not onl1 to resol8e national 3rie8ances Vs6c( as !e-is( settlements= ri3(t of ret6rn= !er6salemW b6t "rimaril1 to destro1 t(e !e-is( state. Similarl1= Msama bin 5adenBs international net-or0 not onl1 o""oses t(e "resence of American militar1 in t(e Arabian Penins6la and IraC= b6t its stated obNecti8e is to O6nite all ;6slims and establis( a 3o8ernment t(at follo-s t(e r6le of t(e Cali"(s.O

,(e second m1t( is t(at stron3 action a3ainst terrorist infrastr6ct6re Vleaders= recr6itment= f6ndin3= "ro"a3anda= trainin3= -ea"ons= o"erational command and controlW -ill onl1 increase terrorism. ,(e ar36ment (ere is t(at la--enforcement efforts and militar1 retaliation ine8itabl1 -ill f6el more br6tal acts of 8iolent re8en3e. Clearl1= if t(is "erce"tion contin6es to "re8ail= "artic6larl1 in democratic societies= t(ere is t(e dan3er it -ill "aral1Ee 3o8ernments and t(ereb1 enco6ra3e f6rt(er terrorist attac0s. In s6m= "ast ex"erience "ro8ides 6sef6l lessons for a realistic f6t6re strate31. ,(e "r6dent a""lication of force (as been demonstrated to be an effecti8e tool for s(ort- and lon3-term deterrence of terrorism. 7or exam"le= IsraelBs tar3eted 0illin3 of ;o(ammed Sider= t(e 2ebron commander of t(e Islamic !i(ad= def6sed a Otic0in3 bomb.O ,(e assassination of Ismail Ab6 S(anab - a to" 2amas leader in t(e GaEa Stri" -(o -as directl1 res"onsible for se8eral s6icide bombin3s incl6din3 t(e latest b6s attac0 in !er6salem - disr6"ted "otential terrorist o"erations. Similarl1= t(e A.S. militar1 o"eration in IraC eliminated Saddam 26sseinBs re3ime as a state s"onsor of terror. ,(6s= it be(oo8es t(ose co6ntries 8ictimiEed b1 terrorism to 6nderstand a cardinal messa3e comm6nicated b1 %inston C(6rc(ill to t(e 2o6se of Commons on ;a1 13= 1. /? OKictor1 at all costs= 8ictor1 in s"ite of terror= 8ictor1 (o-e8er lon3 and (ard t(e road ma1 be? 7or 3i ,o/ Aic or'= t(ere is no s/rAiAal.O

In erAen ionis-- %erroris- (1 of 2)


U.S. inter4entionism ca ses W7/ terrorism! restraint sol4es.
Bland 02
(I8an= Girector of Gefense Polic1 St6dies > t(e Cato Instit6te= Gec. 1*= 7orei3n Polic1 9riefin3 IGoes A.S. Inter8ention M8erseas 9reed ,errorismJ= L #/)

Accordin3 to Secretar1 of State ;adeleine Albri3(t= terrorism is t(e most im"ortant t(reat t(e Anited States and t(e -orld face as t(e 21Jt cent6r1 be3ins. 2i3(-le8el A.S. officials (a8e ac0no-led3ed t(at terrorists are no- more li0el1 to be able to obtain and 6se n6clear= c(emical= and biolo3ical -ea"ons t(an e8er before. Fet
most attention (as been foc6sed on combatin3 terrorism b1 deterrin3 and disr6"tin3 it before(and and retaliatin3 a3ainst it after t(e fact. 5ess attention (as been "aid to -(at moti8ates terrorists to la6nc( attac0s. Accordin3 to t(e Penta3on:s Gefense

Science 9oard= a stron3 correlation exists bet-een A.S. in8ol8ement in international sit6ations and an increase in terrorist attac0s a3ainst t(e Anited States. President Clinton (as also ac0no-led3ed t(at lin0. ,(e board= (o-e8er= (as "ro8ided no em"irical data to s6""ort its concl6sion. ,(is "a"er fills t(at 3a" b1 citin3 man1 exam"les of terrorist attac0s on t(e Anited States in retaliation for A.S. inter8ention o8erseas. ,(e n6mero6s incidents catalo3ed s633est t(at t(e Anited States co6ld red6ce t(e c(ances of s6c( de8astatin3-and "otentiall1 catastro"(icR terrorist attac0s b1 ado"tin3 a "olic1 of militar1 restraint o8erseas.

#/

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

U.S. globocop role pro4o$es W7/ terrorism.


Bland 02
(I8an= Girector of Gefense Polic1 St6dies > t(e Cato Instit6te= $o8. 2&= Polic1 Anal1sis= I,(e <m"ire Stri0es M6tJ= L #.= (tt"?44---..11in8esti3ations.net4I;G4"df4doc-.3 ."df@ !acob) 7inall1= t(ose -(o ar36e t(at America s(o6ld em6late t(e 1.t(-cent6r1 9ritis( <m"ire i3nore t(e fact t(at toda1:s -orld bears little resemblance to t(e one o8er -(ic( 9ritain once "resided. ,-o differences s(o6ld be ob8io6s? 7irst= t(e

-orld is far more interconnected toda1= -(ic( ma0es t(e conseC6ences of sanctimonio6s= arro3ant= or cl6ms1 international be(a8ior ris0ier "oliticall1= di"lomaticall1= and economicall1. Second= t(e "otential costs associated -it( ma0in3 enemies toda1 are far 3reater t(an t(e1 -ere for em"ires "ast. Indeed= t(e 9ritis( and Romans -ere t(e tar3ets of assassinations= arson= and ot(er forms of anti-im"erial bac0las(= b6t t(at acti8it1 -as t1"icall1 small-scale and too0 "lace far a-a1 from t(e mot(er co6ntr1. In contrast= forms of bac0las( a3ainst t(e A.S. role as 3loboco" toda1 co6ld be lar3e-scale and lon3-ran3e and ma1 be directed at America:s (omelandRas s(o-n b1 t(e attac0s on Se"tember 11= -(ic( -ere la6nc(ed b1 Msama bin 5aden in retaliation for t(e A.S. militar1 "resence in Sa6di Arabia= A.S. s6""ort for Israel= A.S.-led economic sanctions a3ainst IraC= and A.S. bac0in3 of corr6"t re3imes in t(e ;iddle <ast. In t(e f6t6re= terrorists retaliatin3 for A.S. actions o8erseas co6ld 6se more "o-erf6l -ea"ons a3ainst t(e A.S. (omelandRfor exam"le= n6clear= biolo3ical= and c(emical -ea"ons. ,(6s= t(e resentment of A.S. neoim"erialism co6ld "ro8o0e catastro"(ic terrorism a3ainst t(e Anited States itselfRt(ereb1 dramaticall1 red6cin3 A.S. sec6rit1.

In erAen ionis-- %erroris- (2 of 2)


"nter4ention is the root ca se of terrorism! p tting an end to this policy diff ses tensions.
#o/rnal of +o--erce !C
(Mct. *)

9eca6se terrorist attac0s 6sin3 -ea"ons of mass destr6ction are extremel1 diffic6lt to "re8ent or miti3ate= t(e administration needs to concentrate its efforts on minimiEin3 t(e moti8ation for s6c( attac0s in t(e first "lace. ,(e Anited States s(o6ld resist t(e tem"tation to inter8ene o8erseas in sit6ations not critical to its 8ital interests. ,(is tem"tation -ill be es"eciall1 3reat -(en (6manitarian ar36ments are offered for inter8ention. 96t e8en -(en it is not a co8er for ot(er moti8es= inter8ention for (6manitarian "6r"oses is 6s6all1 not "ercei8ed as ne6tral b1 all "arties to a conflict. Some of t(ose "arties ma1 e8ent6all1 see0 re8en3e for A.S. inter8ention t(e1 resent. In s(ort= A.S. "olic1-ma0ers s(o6ld 3et bac0 to basics and remember t(at a nationBs sec6rit1 "olic1 s(o6ld first "rotect its o-n citiEens= bot( o8erseas and at (ome. Americans s(o6ld not (a8e to li8e in fear of terrorism N6st so %as(in3tonBs forei3n "olic1 elite can attem"t to ac(ie8e amor"(o6s and e"(emeral 3ains on t(e -orld c(essboard.
#1

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

"nter4ention ma$es the U.S. a lightning rod for terrorism.


Bland 02
(I8an= Girector of Gefense Polic1 St6dies > t(e Cato Instit6te= $o8. 2&= Polic1 Anal1sis= I,(e <m"ire Stri0es M6tJ= L #.= (tt"?44---..11in8esti3ations.net4I;G4"df4doc-.3 ."df@ !acob) ,(6s= li0e t(e "ro8erbial man -(o finds (imself st6c0 in a (ole= toda1:s

ad8ocates of em"ire recommend more di33in3. 96t di33in3 -ill neit(er 3et t(e man o6t of t(e (ole nor ma0e t(e Anited States safer. America and its citiEens -ill become an e8en 3reater li3(tnin3 rod for t(e -orld:s "olitical malcontents. As former Rea3an ad8iser and Cato Instit6te senior fello- Go63 9ando- -arns? I%it( t(e 3ro-in3 abilit1 of small "olitical mo8ements and co6ntries to 0ill A.S. citiEens and to t(reaten mass destr6ction= t(e ris0s of forei3n entan3lements increase. . . . In comin3 1ears= t(e Anited States co6ld concei8abl1 lose one or more lar3e cities to demented or irrational retaliation for American inter8ention.J1//

"nter4ention n clear terrorism


5ando3 !"
(Go63-= !an.47eb.= Cato Instit6te= C6rrent= P. 2.) 7inall1= inter8ention co6ld one da1 t(reaten t(e 8er1 national s6r8i8al of t(e Anited States. 9iolo3ical= c(emical= and n6clear -ea"ons are s"readin3 and ballistic missiles increasin3l1 a8ailable. ,errorism (as become a fixt6re of international life. %it( t(e 3ro-in3 abilit1 of e8en small "olitical mo8ements and co6ntries to 0ill Anited States citiEens and to t(reaten mass destr6ction= t(e ris0s of forei3n entan3lements increase. $o lon3er are t(e (i3( costs limited to soldiers in t(e field. In t(e comin3 1ears t(e Anited States co6ld concei8abl1 lose one or more lar3e cities to irrational retaliation for American inter8ention. A modest Strate3ic Gefense Initiati8e "ro3ram -o6ld red6ce t(ese ris0s= b6t it -o6ld ne8er be able to "ro8ide f6ll "rotection.

In erAen ionis-- A% IneAi a4le


US won5t be drawn into conflict! empirically pro4en
;a'ne !=
(C(risto"(er-= Associate Prof in t(e Sc(ool of International St6dies > A. of ;iami= %inter= International Sec6rit1) ,(e ar36ment t(at t(e Anited States in8ariabl1 is dra-n into maNor o8erseas conflicts is fa6lt1. Since t(e Anited States ac(ie8ed inde"endence= 3reat "o-er -ars (a8e been -a3ed in <6ro"e in 1*.2-1+/2= 1+/ -1#= 1+#3-##= 1+#.-&/= 1+&&=A*/= 1+**-*+= 1.12 13= 1.1 -1+= and 1.3.- #. ,(e Anited States (as been in8ol8ed in t(ree of t(ese -ars= b6t it safel1 co6ld (a8e remained o6t of at least t-o of t(e -ars in -(ic(-it fo63(t. In 1+12= (o"in3 to conC6er Canada -(ile t(e 9ritis( -ere "reocc6"ied -it( t(e $a"oleonic %ars= t(e Anited States initiated -ar -it( 9ritain. And as Robert <. Ms3ood (as demonstrated= t(e Anited StatesT inter8ention in %orld %ar I -as not dri8en b1 an1 tan3ible t(reat to its sec6rit1 interests. V./W ,(e Anited States -as not com"elled to enter t(e Great %ar@ it c(ose to do so= ar36abl1 -it( disastro6s conseC6ences.

'laims that hege pre4ent war are wrong! U.S. act ally e2acerbates conflicts
+onr' !=
(9arbara-= forei3n "olic1 anal1st > t(e Cato Instit6te= 7eb #= Cato Polic1 Anal1sis= IA.S. OGlobal 5eaders(i"O? A <6"(emism for %orld PolicemanJ= L2&*= (tt"?44---.cato.or34"6bs4"as4"a-2&*.(tml@ !acob) #2

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Mt(er "ro"onents of A.S. "olitical and militar1 leaders(i" do not "oint to "artic6lar benefits@ instead= t(e1 -arn of nearcertain disaster if t(e Anited States relinC6is(es its leaders(i" role. C(risto"(er "aints a blea0 "ict6re? !6st consider -(at t(e -orld -o6ld be li0e -it(o6t American leaders(i" in t(e last t-o 1ears alone. %e -o6ld (a8e fo6r n6clear states in t(e former So8iet Anion= instead of one= -it( R6ssian missiles still tar3eted at o6r (omes. %e -o6ld (a8e a f6llt(rottled n6clear "ro3ram in $ort( 'orea@ no GA,, a3reement and no $A7,A@ br6tal dictators still terroriEin3 2aiti@ 8er1 li0el1= IraCi troo"s bac0 in '6-ait@ and an 6nresol8ed ;exican economic crisis= -(ic( -o6ld t(reaten stabilit1 at o6r border. V##W Gin3ric( (as "rono6nced a f6t6re -it(o6t American leaders(i" Oa bi3 mess.O V#&WAnd former 9ritis( "rime minister ;ar3aret ,(atc(er (as -arned= %(at -e are "ossibl1 loo0in3 at in 2/.# Vabsent A.S. leaders(i"W is an 6nstable -orld in -(ic( t(ere are more t(an (alf a doEen O3reat "o-ers=O eac( -it( its o-n clients= all 86lnerable if t(e1 stand alone= all ca"able of increasin3 t(eir "o-er and infl6ence if t(e1 form t(e ri3(t 0ind of alliance= and all en3a3ed -ill1-nill1 in "er"et6al di"lomatic mane68ers to ens6re t(at t(eir relati8e "ositions im"ro8e rat(er t(an deteriorate. In ot(er -ords= 2/.# mi3(t loo0 li0e 1.1 "la1ed on a some-(at lar3er sta3e. V#*W In ot(er -ords= if America abdicates its role as -orld leader= -e are condemned to re"eat t(e bi33est mista0es of t(e 2/t( cent6r1--or "er(a"s do somet(in3 e8en -orse. S6c( t(in0in3 is serio6sl1 fla-ed= (o-e8er. 7irst= to assert t(at A.S. leaders(i" can sta8e off ot(er-ise ine8itable 3lobal c(aos 8astl1 o8erestimates t(e "o-er of an1 sin3le co6ntr1 to infl6ence -orld e8ents. ,(e Anited States is "o-erf6l= b6t it still can claim onl1 # "ercent of t(e -orldBs "o"6lation and 2/ "ercent of -orld economic o6t"6t. ;oreo8er= re3ardless of t(e reso6rces Americans mi3(t be -illin3 to de8ote to leadin3 t(e -orld= toda1Bs "roblems often do not lend t(emsel8es -ell to external sol6tions. As ;a1nes (as "ointed o6t= ,oda1= t(e 3reatest fear of most states is not external a33ression b6t internal disorder. ,(e Anited States can do little abo6t t(e latter= -(ereas it 6sed to be able to do a 3reat deal abo6t t(e former. In ot(er -ords= t(e coina3e of A.S. "o-er in t(e -orld (as been de8al6ed b1 t(e c(an3e in t(e international a3enda. V#+W Indeed= man1 of t(e forei3n "olic1 "roblems t(at (a8e confo6nded %as(in3ton since t(e demise of t(e So8iet Anion are t(e 0inds of "roblems t(at are li0el1 to tro6ble t(e -orld -ell into t(e next cent6r1. O7ailed states=O s6c( as Somalia= ma1 not be 6ncommon. 96t= as t(e ill-fated A.S. and A$ o"erations in t(at co6ntr1 s(o-ed= t(ere is 8er1 little t(at o6tside "o-ers can do abo6t s6c( "roblems. <xternal "o-ers 6s6all1 lac0 t(e means to "re8ent or end ci8il -ars= s6c( as t(ose in R-anda and t(e former F63osla8ia= 6nless t(e1 are -illin3 to ma0e a tremendo6s effort to do so. Fet t(ose t1"es of internecine conflicts are li0el1 to be one of t(e "rimar1 so6rces of international disorder for t(e foreseeable f6t6re. Ges"ite t(e doomsa1ers -(o "ro"(es1 3lobal c(aos in t(e absence of A.S. leaders(i"= (o-e8er= %as(in3tonBs limited abilit1 to dam"en s6c( conflicts is not ca6se for "anic. Instabilit1 is a normal feat6re of an international s1stem of so8erei3n states= -(ic( t(e Anited States can tolerate and (as tolerated for more t(an t-o cent6ries. If 8ital American interests are not at sta0e= instabilit1 itself becomes a serio6s "roblem onl1 if t(e Anited States bl6nders into it= as it did in Somalia and 9osnia. V#.W

In erAen ionis-- *onD de er conflic


American inter4entionism doesn5t deters conflict
S ed-an !0
(Prof. > !o(n 2o"0ins Sc(ool of Ad8ances International St6dies= 7orei3n Affairs= *2 L1) ,(ere are no "anaceas for international conflicts. ,(e (o"e t(at international inter8ention in one -ar -ill "ro8e a deterrent else-(ere is sim"l1 t(atRa (o"e= -it( little e8idence to N6stif1 it as a "ro"osition and "lent1 to s633est t(at domestic t1rants do not learn from ot(er cases. Ci8il -ars and et(nic ri8alries (a8e (istories and d1namics all t(eir o-n t(at diminis( t(e effects of "recedents sent else-(ere.

American inter4ention fails d e to contradictory goals! 3oso4o pro4es


Pfaff 01
(%illiam-= s1ndicated col6mnist for t(e International 2erald ,rib6ne= !an47eb.= 7orei3n Affairs) ,(e Anited States enNo1s a (e3emonic "osition in t(ese first 1ears of t(e ne- cent6r1= in terms of bot( its militar1 "o-er and its economic -ei3(t and d1namism. ,(e tec(nolo3ical ca"abilities of t(e former extend to somet(in3 resemblin3 a doomsda1 #3

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

extermination of ci8iliEation= 1et t(e exercise of American "o-er (as re"eatedl1 "ro8en in-com"etentl1 conce"t6aliEed and directed and in si3nificant res"ects irrele8ant to t(e -orld:s militar1 and ["olitical c(allen3es. <xam"les of s6c( mis(andlin3 incl6de not onl1 t(e Kietnam %ar= t(e maladroit Central American and Caribbean inter8entions= and t(e Somalia fiasco= b6t also t(e 1... inter8ention in 'oso8o. ,(ere= $A,M fo63(t a -ar t(at "ro8ed to be different from t(e one Serbia -as fi3(tin3= lea8in3 t(e Serbian arm1 intact -(ile failin3 to "re8ent t(e "6r3e of et(nic Albanians from 'oso8o. In t(e end= R6ssian di"lomatic inter8ention -as reC6ired to "rod6ce an o6tcome t(at "reser8ed $A,M:s re"6tation. ,(e 'oso8o cam"ai3nR-ell-meant b6t lac0in3 co(erent "olitical direction or 3eo"olitical 8ision= reliant on tec(nolo31 b6t[ recoilin3 from t(e ris0 of cas6altiesRre8ealed an American a""roac( to t(e exercise of "o-er t(at is scarcel1 one of a determined (e3emon. Mne of 7rance:s commanders in t(e 9osnia cam"ai3n= General P(ili""e ;orillon= as0ed at t(e time= I2o- can 1o6 (a8e soldiers -(o are read1 to 0ill= -(o are not read1 to dieQJ

Readiness /nnecessar':3onD colla$se


U o4erwhelms the 8! no readiness crisis! and readiness is seless nyways
>?S? )e3s3ire 00
(Mct. 1*= I$e- Cato Instit6te St6d1? ;ilitar1 Readiness Crisis Is Ill6sor1J= 5exis@ !acob) 96t accordin3 to a ne- st6d1 from t(e Cato Instit6te= t(e Gefense Ge"artment doesn:t need more mone1 beca6se t(e readiness "roblem is o8erstated. In IA 2ollo- Gebate on ;ilitar1 Readiness=J Girector of Gefense Polic1 St6dies I8an <land "oints o6t t(at A.S. forces (a8e bone-cr6s(in3 dominance o8er an1 ot(er militar1 on t(e "lanet. I,(e American militar1 is more "otent relati8e to its "otential enemies t(an -ere t(e militaries of an1 3reat "o-er in -orld (istor1=J (e sa1s. Alt(o63( A.S. defense s"endin3 exceeds t(at of t(e next se8en co6ntries combinedRand is 1. times (i3(er t(an t(e combined s"endin3 of Iran= IraC= 5ib1a= S1ria= S6dan= C6ba and $ort( 'oreaRt(e candidates (a8e la6nc(ed a biddin3 -ar to see -(o can t(ro- t(e most cas( at t(e Penta3on for "olitical 3ain= accordin3 to <land. 96t -(ile t(e militar1 (as Iex"erienced s(orta3es of "ersonnel= s"are "arts and trainin3= t(e Treadiness crisis: is lar3el1 ill6sor1=J (e -rites. ... a6t(or contin6es U 96t t(e t(reat en8ironment (as also c(an3ed. Since no co6ntr1 comes close to bein3 able to t(reaten t(e A.S. militaril1= OA.S. armed forces do not need to be 0e"t in t(e (i3( states of readiness t(e1 -ere d6rin3 t(e Cold %ar=O (e sa1s. #

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

)o . (1 of 2)
'laims that U.S. military presence pre4ents war are wrong! U.S. act ally e2acerbates conflicts.
+onr' !=
(9arbara-= forei3n "olic1 anal1st > t(e Cato Instit6te= 7eb #= Cato Polic1 Anal1sis= IA.S. OGlobal 5eaders(i"O? A <6"(emism for %orld PolicemanJ= L2&*= (tt"?44---.cato.or34"6bs4"as4"a-2&*.(tml@ !acob) Mt(er "ro"onents of A.S. "olitical and militar1 leaders(i" do not "oint to "artic6lar benefits@ instead= t(e1 -arn of nearcertain disaster if t(e Anited States relinC6is(es its leaders(i" role. C(risto"(er "aints a blea0 "ict6re? !6st consider -(at t(e -orld -o6ld be li0e -it(o6t American leaders(i" in t(e last t-o 1ears alone. %e -o6ld (a8e fo6r n6clear states in t(e former So8iet Anion= instead of one= -it( R6ssian missiles still tar3eted at o6r (omes. %e -o6ld (a8e a f6llt(rottled n6clear "ro3ram in $ort( 'orea@ no GA,, a3reement and no $A7,A@ br6tal dictators still terroriEin3 2aiti@ 8er1 li0el1= IraCi troo"s bac0 in '6-ait@ and an 6nresol8ed ;exican economic crisis= -(ic( -o6ld t(reaten stabilit1 at o6r border. V##W Gin3ric( (as "rono6nced a f6t6re -it(o6t American leaders(i" Oa bi3 mess.O V#&WAnd former 9ritis( "rime minister ;ar3aret ,(atc(er (as -arned= %(at -e are "ossibl1 loo0in3 at in 2/.# Vabsent A.S. leaders(i"W is an 6nstable -orld in -(ic( t(ere are more t(an (alf a doEen O3reat "o-ers=O eac( -it( its o-n clients= all 86lnerable if t(e1 stand alone= all ca"able of increasin3 t(eir "o-er and ##

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

infl6ence if t(e1 form t(e ri3(t 0ind of alliance= and all en3a3ed -ill1-nill1 in "er"et6al di"lomatic mane68ers to ens6re t(at t(eir relati8e "ositions im"ro8e rat(er t(an deteriorate. In ot(er -ords= 2/.# mi3(t loo0 li0e 1.1 "la1ed on a some-(at lar3er sta3e. V#*W In ot(er -ords= if America abdicates its role as -orld leader= -e are condemned to re"eat t(e bi33est mista0es of t(e 2/t( cent6r1--or "er(a"s do somet(in3 e8en -orse. S6c( t(in0in3 is serio6sl1 fla-ed= (o-e8er. 7irst= to assert t(at A.S. leaders(i" can sta8e off ot(er-ise ine8itable 3lobal c(aos 8astl1 o8erestimates t(e "o-er of an1 sin3le co6ntr1 to infl6ence -orld e8ents. ,(e Anited States is "o-erf6l= b6t it still can claim onl1 # "ercent of t(e -orldBs "o"6lation and 2/ "ercent of -orld economic o6t"6t. ;oreo8er= re3ardless of t(e reso6rces Americans mi3(t be -illin3 to de8ote to leadin3 t(e -orld= toda1Bs "roblems often do not lend t(emsel8es -ell to external sol6tions. As ;a1nes (as "ointed o6t= ,oda1= t(e 3reatest fear of most states is not external a33ression b6t internal disorder. ,(e Anited States can do little abo6t t(e latter= -(ereas it 6sed to be able to do a 3reat deal abo6t t(e former. In ot(er -ords= t(e coina3e of A.S. "o-er in t(e -orld (as been de8al6ed b1 t(e c(an3e in t(e international a3enda. V#+W Indeed= man1 of t(e forei3n "olic1 "roblems t(at (a8e confo6nded %as(in3ton since t(e demise of t(e So8iet Anion are t(e 0inds of "roblems t(at are li0el1 to tro6ble t(e -orld -ell into t(e next cent6r1. O7ailed states=O s6c( as Somalia= ma1 not be 6ncommon. 96t= as t(e ill-fated A.S. and A$ o"erations in t(at co6ntr1 s(o-ed= t(ere is 8er1 little t(at o6tside "o-ers can do abo6t s6c( "roblems. <xternal "o-ers 6s6all1 lac0 t(e means to "re8ent or end ci8il -ars= s6c( as t(ose in R-anda and t(e former F63osla8ia= 6nless t(e1 are -illin3 to ma0e a tremendo6s effort to do so. Fet t(ose t1"es of internecine conflicts are li0el1 to be one of t(e "rimar1 so6rces of international disorder for t(e foreseeable f6t6re. Ges"ite t(e doomsa1ers -(o "ro"(es1 3lobal c(aos in t(e absence of A.S. leaders(i"= (o-e8er= %as(in3tonBs limited abilit1 to dam"en s6c( conflicts is not ca6se for "anic. Instabilit1 is a normal feat6re of an international s1stem of so8erei3n states= -(ic( t(e Anited States can tolerate and (as tolerated for more t(an t-o cent6ries. If 8ital American interests are not at sta0e= instabilit1 itself becomes a serio6s "roblem onl1 if t(e Anited States bl6nders into it= as it did in Somalia and 9osnia. V#.W

)o . (1 of 2)
U.S. attempts to deter regional conflicts fail! its enemies always ha4e less to lose and more to gain
;a'ne !=
(C(risto"(er-= Associate Prof in t(e Sc(ool of International St6dies > A. of ;iami= S6mmer= International Sec6rit1= I7rom Pre"onderance to Mffs(ore 9alancin3=J Kol. 22 L1) A cr6cial factor in -ei3(in3 t(e credibilit1 of a defenderBs extended deterrence commitments is t(e extent of its interest in t(e "rotected area 8i I lad t(e So8iets contem"lated serio6sl1 an attac0 on %estern <6ro"e= t(e ris0 calc6l6s "robabl1 -o6ld (a8e diss6aded t(em. In a bi"olar settin3 %estern <6ro"eBs sec6rit1 -as a matter of s6"reme im"ortance to t(e Anited States for bot( strate3ic and re"6tational reasons. In t(e earl1 t-ent1-first cent6r1= (o-e8er= t(e intrinsic 8al6e of man1 of t(e re3ions -(ere t(e Anited States ma1 -is( to extend deterrence -ill be do6btf6l. Indeed= in t(e "ost Cold %ar -orld Bfe- ima3inable dis"6tes -ill en3a3e 8ital A.S. interests.O It t(6s -ill be diffic6lt to con8ince a "otential attac0er t(at A S. deterrence commitments are credible. ;oreo8er= t(e atten6ated nat6re of AS. interests -ill res6lt in moti8ational as1mmetries fa8orin3 "otential c(allen3ers list is= t(e Obalance of resol8eO -ill lie -it( t(e c(allen3er= not -it( t(e Anited States= beca6se t(e c(allen3er -ill (a8e more at sta0e It is do6btf6l t(at t(e 6nited States co6ld deter a R6ssian in8asion of t(e 9altics or A0raine= or= se8eral decades (ence= a C(in assa6lt on ,ai-an. ,o en3a3e= in s6c( actions= ;osco- or 9eiNin3 -o6ld (a8e to be (i3(l1 moti8ated@ con8ersel1= t(e obNects of "ossible attac0 are 6nim"ortant strate3icall1 to t(e Anited States= -(ic( -o6ld ca6se t(e c(allen3er to disco6nt A.S. credibilit1 #&

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

,(e s"rin3 1._ Grids bet-een C(ina and ,ai-an s633ests t(e diffic6lties t(at A.S. extended deterrence strate31 -ill lace in comin3 decades (C(ina "ro - 8o0ed t(e crisis b1 cond6ctin3 intimidatin3 militar1 exercises in an attem"t to infl6ence ,ai-anBs "residential elections.) fairin3 t(e crisis a C(inese official said t(at C(ina co6ld 6se force a3ainst ,ai-an -it(o6t fear of A.S. inter8ention beca6se American decision ma0ers Ocare mom abo6t 5as An3eles t(an t(e1 do abo6t ,ai-an.O Alt(o63( an em"t1 t(reat toda1= as C(ina becomes more "o-erf6l militaril1 and economicall1 in comin3 decades= t(reats of t(is nat6re from 9eiNin3 -ill be more "otent.

A% Asian S a4ili '


6orward deployment in asia fails! perceptions of s ccess are based on threat con
#o,nson 00
(C(almers-= President of t(e !a"an Polic1 Researc( Instit6te= Blo-.ac/: )he Costs and Conse0uences of American 1m%ire= P. &3@ !acob) ,(at t(e for-ard de"lo1ment of American troo"s brin3s Ostabilit1O to <ast Asia is= of co6rse= a false s1llo3ism and= as militar1 strate3ist Col. 2arr1 S6mmers !r. "6ts it= t(e eC6i8alent of 6sin3 ele"(ant bane in $e- For0 Cit1. <le"(ant bane is a c(emical re"ellent s"read b1 African farmers to 0ee" ele"(ants o6t of t(eir 3ardens and orc(ards. Penta3on t(eorists= Colonel S6mmers s633ests= are li0e t(e $e- For0er -(o s"reads ele"(ant bane aro6nd (is a"artment and t(en extols its benefits beca6se (e enco6nters no ele"(ants. ,(e strate31 O-or0sO beca6se t(e t(reat is ill6sor1

#*

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

A% Ger-an'
*ther + ropean powers chec$ ;erman prolif
Mears,ei-er 01
(!o(n !.-= Se"t.4Mct.= 7orei3n Affairs= I,(e f6t6re of t(e American "acifierJ= (tt"?44it.stla-6.ed64\3o8t43&17/2;ears(imer.(tml) Fet e8en t(o63( German1 is li0el1 to become a "otential (e3emon if it (as to "ro8ide for its o-n sec6rit1= t(e Anited States is still li0el1 to "6ll its forces o6t of <6ro"e. %(1Q 9eca6se des"ite German1:s si3nificant militar1 "otential= ot(er <6ro"ean "o-ers s(o6ld be able to 0ee" it from dominatin3 <6ro"e -it(o6t (el" from t(e Anited States. ,(e Anited 'in3dom= 7rance= Ital1= and R6ssia to3et(er (a8e abo6t t(ree times as man1 "eo"le as German1 does= and t(eir combined -ealt( is ro63(l1 t(ree times 3reater t(an German1:s. ,(e Anited 'in3dom= 7rance= and R6ssia all (a8e n6clear -ea"ons= moreo8er= "ro8idin3 a stron3 deterrent a3ainst an ex"ansionist German1 e8en if it does de8elo" its o-n n6clear o"tion.

;ermany can5t re!arm e4en if it wanted to! str ct ral barriers


S$erlin2 01
(!ames-= A"ril =19ritis( !o6rnal of Poli Sci, I$eit(er 2e3emon1 nor Gominance? Reconsiderin3 German Po-er in Post Cold-%ar <6ro"e@ forei3n "olic1 and economics anal1sisJ= 5exis@ !acob) #+

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

German 6nification in 1.+. raised t(e s"ectre of German (e3emon1 in "ost-cold -ar <6ro"e. In t(is article= I demonstrate t(at German1 lac0s t(e str6ct6ral "o-er consistent -it( <6ro"ean (e3emon1 or dominance@ t(at t(ere is little e8idence s6""ortin3 an a""reciable 3a" bet-een German1Bs str6ct6ral "o-er and forei3n "olic1 ambitions@ and t(at a""arent s1m"toms of German (e3emon1= "artic6larl1 t(e "rocess of instit6tional em6lation in Central and <astern <6ro"e= reflect ot(er international "rocesses and incenti8es emanatin3 from t(e state s1stem itself. ,(is reassessment and do-n3radin3 of German1Bs relati8e and absol6te "o-er resol8e t(e "aradox of German str6ct6ral "o-er and German rel6ctance identified b1 ot(ers. 96t t(is alternati8e narrati8e raises anot(er more im"ortant C6estion? -(1 is German1 treated as a "otential or e8en as"irin3 (e3emon in <6ro"eQ ,(e ans-er to t(at C6estion is located in t(e interconnected le3acies of A6sc(-itE and t(e occ6"ation re3ime. ,(is Noint le3ac1 constit6tes an im"ortant "ar t of t(e (istorical context -it(in -(ic( -e frame o6r assessments and N6d3ements of German "o-er@ ex"lains t(e freC6entl1 6n-arranted exa33eration and s6s"icion of German "o-er@ and demonstrates (o- t(e "ast can f6nction as a "o-erf6l "rism t(o63( -(ic( -e inter"ret t(e intentions= ambitions and ca"abilities of a state.

A% #a$anese Prolif
Japan will ne4er re!arm
#o,nson 01
(C(almers-= ;a1 1 = ,(e $ation= I,ime to 9rin3 t(e ,roo"s 2ome ? AmericaBs "ro8ocati8e militar1 "ost6re in Asia ma0es -ar -it( c(ina more li0el1J= $o. 1.= Kol. 2*2@ P3. 2/= 5exis@ !acob )

forces sa1 t(e1 m6st remain in Asia= "artic6larl1 in !a"an= is t(at !a"an itself ma1 once a3ain become a t(reat to its nei3(bors. ,(is ar36ment is increasin3l1 distastef6l to !a"anese= -(o "oint o6t t(at "a1in3 for American bases on t(eir o-n soil as -atc(do3s is tantamo6nt to "a1in3 for t(eir o-n Nailers. ,(e !a"anese also ar36e t(at t(eir "ast (istor1 and c6rrent demo3ra"(ics (1& "ercent of t(e "o"6lation o8er &# and a belo--re"lacement birt(rate) ma0e re8i8ed militarism abo6t as li0el1 as re8i8ed sla8er1 in t(e Anited States.

Still anot(er reason -(1 AS

Japan won5t prolif and e4en if they did no %


G,ol81 Press1 ( Sa$ols6' !=
(<63ene= Gar1l G.= doctoral candidates in Poli Sci > ;I,= 2ar8e1-= Prof. of P6blic Polic1 P Mr3aniEation in Poli Sci > ;I,= S"rin3= International Sec6rit1= ICome 2ome AmericaJ= Kol. 21 L ) #.

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Ges"ite t(e fa8orable Asian con8entional balances= some Asian "o-ers mi3(t feel "ress6re at t(e n6clear le8el from an American -it(dra-al. !a"an and So6t( 'orea c6rrentl1 enNo1 t(e sec6rit1 of t(e American n6clear 6mbrella= and some of t(eir nei3(bors= -it( -(om t(e1 s(are a (istor1 of conflict= alread1 (a8e n6clear arsenals.B It -o6ld not be s6r"risin3 if So6t( 'orea and !a"an -is(ed to re"lace t(e American n6clear commitment -it( t(eir o-n deterrent forces. Mn t(e ot(er (and= t(e1 mi3(t be restrained b1 t(e c(ance t(at "roliferation -o6ld scare t(eir nei3(bors@ t(e !a"anese are at least officiall1 sensiti8e to t(e Ofallac1 of t(e last mo8e.OO 7ort6natel1= if t(e1 do decide to de8elo" n6clear -ea"ons= !a"an and So6t( 'orea are 3ood candidates for safe "roliferationBs 9ot( co6ntries (a8e t(e militar1 "o-er to "rotect t(eir n6clear forces from con8entional attac0= miti3atin3 fears of inad8ertent escalation and bot( "ossess t(e tec(nolo3ical "ro-ess to de8elo" sec6re= second-stri0e arsenals. ,(e onl1 "roliferation dan3er lies in transition. ,(e Anited States= t(erefore= s(o6ld maintain its c6rrent n6clear commitments -(ile it "6lls o6t o Asia. G6rin3 t(at time America s(o6ld offer assistance on n6clear tec(nolo31 iss6es to t(e So6t( 'oreans and !a"anese if t(e1 decide to "6rs6e t(eir o-n deterrent forces.

A% Iran
1eadiness won5t deter "ran
Heis4o/r2 09
(7rancois-= 7eb. .= 7inancial ,imes= I%e need a common "olic1 on IranJ= 5exis@ !acob) It is tem"tin3 to describe t(is as a O3ood co"= bad co"O di8ision of labo6r bet-een a (ard-"o-er AS= -it( its militar1 forces in readiness= and a soft-"o-er <6ro"e tem"tin3 ,e(ran -it( assorted trade and tec(nolo3ical 3oodies. 96t t(is is not t(e -a1 t(in3s -or0 toda1. AmericaBs sabre-rattlin3 is not li0el1 to deter Iran? t(e last t(in3 t(e o8erstretc(ed AS forces in IraC need is Iran aidin3 and abettin3 ins6rrection in S(ia areas t(at are no- C6iescent. It -o6ld reC6ire a s6bstantial red6ction of AS ex"os6re in IraC to restore credibilit1 to militar1 "ress6re.

&/

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

A% Israel
Non!U 0 e#d! "srael is paranoid now
%,e A lan ic Mon ,l' Gro/$ 00
(!6ne= I,(e 5o3ic of S6icide ,errorism= Kol. 2.1 L #) $earl1 e8er1-(ere in t(e -orld it is ta0en for 3ranted t(at one can sim"l1 "6s( o"en t(e door to a resta6rant= caf]= or bar= sit do-n= and order a meal or a drin0. In Israel t(e "rocess of enterin3 s6c( a "lace is more com"licated. Mne often enco6nters an armed 36ard -(o= in addition to as0in3 "ros"ecti8e "atrons -(et(er t(e1 t(emsel8es are armed= ma1 C6ic0l1 "at t(em do-n= feelin3 for t(e telltale b6l3e of a belt or a 8est containin3 ex"losi8es. <stablis(ments t(at cannot afford a 36ard or are 6n-illin3 to "ass on t(e cost of one to c6stomers sim"l1 0ee" t(eir doors loc0ed= res"ondin3 to 0noc0s -it( a C6ic0 3lance t(ro63( t(e 3lass and an instant N6d3ment as to -(et(er t(is or t(at "erson can safel1 be admitted. %(at -o6ld (a8e been 6nima3inable a 1ear a3o is no- not onl1 ro6tine b6t reass6rin3. It (as become t(e "rice of a redefined normalit1. In t(e Anited States in t(e t-ent1 mont(s since .411 -e= too= (a8e (ad to become acc6stomed to an arra1 of ne-= often "re8io6sl1 inconcei8able sec6rit1 meas6resRin air"orts and ot(er trans"ortation (6bs= (otels and office b6ildin3s= s"orts stadi6ms and concert (alls. Alt(o63( some are more noticeable and "er(a"s more incon8enient t(an ot(ers= t(e fact remains t(at t(e1 (a8e redefined o6r o-n sense of normalit1. ,(e1 are acce"ted beca6se -e feel more 86lnerable t(an before. %it( e8er1 ne- t(reat to international sec6rit1 -e become more -illin3 to li8e -it( strin3ent "reca6tions and reflexi8e= almost 6nconscio6s -ariness. %it( e8er1 ne- t(reat= t(at is= o6r e8er1da1 life becomes more li0e IsraelBs. &1

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

U.S. engagements don5t effect "sraeli sec rity decisions.


G,ol81 Press1 ( Sa$ols6' !=
(<63ene= Gar1l G.= doctoral candidates in Poli Sci > ;I,= 2ar8e1-= Prof. of P6blic Polic1 P Mr3aniEation in Poli Sci > ;I,= S"rin3= International Sec6rit1= ICome 2ome AmericaJ= Kol. 21 L ) 7or decades America (as been a close friend of Israel= and a "olic1 of restraint -o6ld not c(an3e t(is. ,(e Anited States is better off -(en its friends are safe and sec6re= e8en if t(eir safet1 (as no effect on American sec6rit1 or "ros"erit1. S6rro6nded b1 enemies= Israel (as al-a1s fo63(t its o-n battles= ne8er reC6irin3 American troo"s to "rotect its borders. IsraelBs determination to defend itself -it(o6t American troo"s s(o6ld embarrass AmericaBs allies in <6ro"e and Asia. As lone as Americans (eel stron3l1 abo6t IsraelBs -ell-bein3= loan 36arantees. direct economic aid= and militar1 sales -ill contin6e. 96t Israeli sec6rit1 ma0e no demands on American force str6ct6re and in no -a1 N6stifies American militar1 en3a3ement.

A% &as,-ir
U.S. can5t deter a war o4er the 3ashmir
5/lle in's <ron r/nner 02
(!6ne 3= India-Pa0istan ,ensions Gra-in3 7orces A-a1 7rom Al Haeda= ,aliban 26nt= 5exis@ !acob) ,(e %all Street !o6rnal (&43= Clo6d= Robbins) re"orts= O,(e A.S. (as no ob8io6s militar1 o"tions for (eadin3 off a clas( bet-een India and Pa0istan= one t(at co6ld escalate into t(e first -ar bet-een n6clear- armed states= and lea8e millions of cas6alties. Instead= President 96s( and (is to" aides (a8e "l6n3ed into ro6nd-t(e-cloc0 di"lomac1. 96t AmericaBs "o-er to steer e8ents ma1 be limited.O ,(e !o6rnal adds= OIndia and Pa0istan (a8e a million troo"s alon3 t(e border= nearl1 (alf of t(ose facin3 off at t(e 5ine of Control di8idin3 'as(mir. ,(ere is no c(ance of A.S. troo"s 3oin3 in to sto" t(em from fi3(tin3.

&2

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

A% %ai3an 3ar
No ris$ 'hina will attac$ Taiwan b#c they do bt the credibility of the U.S.5s deterrent
Ha22ard 0"
(Ste"(an-= !an. 1= !o6rnal of <ast Asian St6dies= I,(e balance of "o-er= 3lobaliEation= and democrac1? international relations t(eor1 in $ort(east AsiaJ= 5exis@ !acob) %(at abo6t t(e intentions of t(e "o-ers t(at (a8e been deemed Ore8isionist=O t(at is= C(ina and $ort( 'oreaQ ,(ere is one iss6e on -(ic( t(e PRC o"enl1 "refers a c(an3e in t(e territorial stat6s C6o= and t(at is -it( res"ect to ,ai-an. ;oreo8er= t(e cross-strait conflict is one in -(ic( C(inaBs risin3 "o-er "ro8ides it o""ort6nities to exercise infl6ence. %e m6st as0 t-o C6estions? does C(ina (a8e t(e ca"abilit1 to c(allen3e t(e stat6s C6o militaril1= and -o6ld it be inclinedto do so 3i8en "ossible A.S. res"onsesQ In s(ort= N6st (o- re8isionist is C(inaQ ,(e ans-er to t(e first C6estion abo6t ca"abilities is almost certainl1 no. C(inaBs militar1 moderniEation efforts (a8e been de8oted toca"abilities t(at are of "olitical as -ell as militar1 6se in dealin3 -it( ,ai-an. 96t t(ese ca"abilities do not c6rrentl1 constit6te a credible t(reat to t(e territorial stat6s C6o= in "art beca6se of contin6in3 s(ortcomin3s in C(inese ca"acit1 to "roNect force= in "art beca6se of t(e manifest -illin3ness of bot( ,ai-an and t(e Anited Statesto balance C(ina on t(e iss6e. (3 ) ,(e second C6estion is -(et(er C(ina -o6ld be inclined to test t(ecredibilit1 of t(at commitment or to 6se its militar1 ca"abilit1 as it de8elo"s. C(inaBs a""roac( to ,ai-an encom"asses a n6mber of elements= of -(ic( militar1 le8era3e is onl1 one. ,(e C(inese leaders(i" is also rel1in3 on economic inte3ration and a O6nited frontO strate31 of reac(in3 o6t to b6siness"eo"le and factions in t(e '6omintan3= t(ePeo"le 7irst Part1= and t(e Gemocratic Pro3ressi8e Part1 itself. ,(es(ift in tactics a-a1 from t(e o8ert militar1 &3

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

"ress6re demonstrated d6rin3 t(e 1..#-1..& crisis is ar36abl1 N6st t(at? a s(ift in tactics. Per(a"s t(e Anited States s(o6ld be as concerned -it( inte3ration t(ro63( economic and "olitical Ostealt(O as t(ro63( more o8ert means. (3#) Fet from t(e "ers"ecti8e of t(e ris0 of militariEed crisis= t(e C(inese Comm6nist Part1 a""ears to (a8e concl6ded t(at a confrontational a""roac( to resol8in3 t(e cross-strait conflict -as co6nter"rod6cti8e. ,(e reassessment of ,ai-an strate31 no- a""ears to be "art of a -ider ree8al6ation of C(inese 3rand strate31 t(at be3an in t(e mid-1../s. (3&) Concerns abo6t C(inaBs be(a8ior (ad anta3oniEed t(e AS<A$ (Association of So6t(east Asian $ations) states -it( res"ect to t(e So6t( C(ina Sea= contrib6ted to t(e rise of t(e C(ina (a-0s in t(e AnitedStates= and stirred !a"anBs fears. ,(ese de8elo"ments occ6rred in t(e context not of A.S. -ea0ness and disen3a3ement b6t a boomin3 A.S. econom1= a rein8i3oration of 0e1 alliance relations(i"s -it( !a"an andA6stralia= and a series of reminders of t(e 6niC6e A.S. ca"acit1 to "roNect force? in t(e first G6lf %ar= in t(e ,ai-an Strait in 1..#-1..&= in t(e 9al0ans= and finall1 in IraC. ,(ese 3eo"olitical de8elo"ments 6nfolded in t(e context of a ra"idl1 3ro-in3 C(inese de"endence on t(e A.S. mar0et and on forei3n direct in8estment (7GI) more 3enerall1 (see belo-).

U.S. can5t deter a war o4er Taiwan


O'Hanlon 01
(;ic(ael <.-= Sr. 7ello- in 7orei3n Polic1 St6dies > t(e 9roo0in3s Instit6tion= Defense Policy Choices: For the Bush Administration 2001-05= P. 1+/= (tt"?44broo0in3s.na".ed64boo0s4/+1#*//*.24(tml4@ !acob) Mne mi3(t (o"e leaders in 9eiNin3 -o6ld be deterred from an1 attac0 on ,ai-an o6t of fear of t(e enormo6s "olitical and economic conseC6ences t(at -o6ld follo-. S6rel1= 3lobal trade and in8estment -it( C(ina -o6ld s6ffer for 1ears to come= re3ardless of t(e o6tcome of t(e battle. 2o-e8er= C(ina ma1 belie8e t(at -estern co6ntries are so foc6sed on ma0in3 mone1 t(at t(e1 -o6ld soon for3i8e and for3et an1 -ar t(at (ad onl1 limited direct effect on t(em. 7ailin3 t(at= t(e1 mi3(t feel t(at t(e1 (ad no c(oice b6t to attac0 ,ai-an 6nder certain circ6mstances= 3i8en t(e emotions t(at s6rro6nd t(e ,ai-an iss6e in C(ina and t(e fear amon3 some in 9eiNin3 t(at lettin3 ,ai-an 3o co6ld enco6ra3e ot(er se"-aratist mo8ements in t(eir co6ntr1.

A% %ai3anese Prolif (1 of 2)
U.S. 7ilitary doesn5t affect Taiwan5s n clear decision
G,ol81 Press1 ( Sa$ols6' !=
(<63ene= Gar1l G.= doctoral candidates in Poli Sci > ;I,= 2ar8e1-= Prof. of P6blic Polic1 P Mr3aniEation in Poli Sci > ;I,= S"rin3= International Sec6rit1= ICome 2ome AmericaJ= Kol. 21 L ) ,ai-an is a less li0el1 candidate for n6clear "roliferation. Americas -it(dra-al from Asia -o6ld not de"ri8e ,ai-an of an American n6clear commitment= beca6se ,ai-an ne8er (ad one. <8en -it( t(e Anited States en3a3ed in Asia= ,ai-an is 86lnerable to a n6clear first stri0e 7rom C(ina? restraint -ill do not(in3 to c(an3e t(is-,ai-an seems to (a8e concl6ded t(at t(e ris0s of a C(inese n6clear stri0e do not reC6ire a n6clear deterrent. ;an1 anal1sts (a8e lon3 do6bted t(e 6tilit1 of n6clear -ea"ons in ci8il -ars= and if C(ina reall1 belie8es it Oo-nsO ,ai-an= t(en a n6clear attac0 -o6ld be li0e an attac0 on itself. V#/W ,(e bottom line for American defense "olic1 is t(at= -(ile t(e iss6e of ,ai-anBs n6clear 86lnerabilit1 is tric01= AmericaBs c6rrent militar1 "ost6re in Asia does little to relie8e an1 n6clear tension t(ere. %it( or -it(o6t American "o-er in t(e re3ion= ,ai-an -ill do -(at it (as to do to defend itself.

&

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

Taiwan can5t n cleari&e e4en if they wanted to a. "A+A safeg ards


Mi c,ell 0"
(Gere0 !.- Sr. 7ello- for Asia in t(e International Sec6rit1 Pro3ram > CSIS= I,(e $6clear ,i""in3 Poin1 %(1 States Reconsider ,(eir $6clear C(oicesJ) 76rt(ermore= o8er t(e "ast decade= ,ai-an:s n6clear "ro3ram became t(e first Is6bstantialJ (defined as in8ol8in3 bi3 "o-er reactors) "ro3ram to become s6bNect to t(e additional "rotocol to t(e IA<A Safe36ards A3reement instit6ted after t(e IraC -ar. 9e3innin3 in 1..&= t(e "rotocol ex"anded t(e ran3e of items s6bNect to IA<A ins"ection from In6clear materialJ to In6clearrelated acti8it1=J a m6c( broader sco"e t(at se8erel1 restricts a nation:s abilit1 to c(eat. Indeed= ins"ectors re"ort t(at t(e1 (a8e (ad no maNor iss6es concernin3 t(e safe36ard re3ime on ,ai-an. At t(e same time= t(e A.S. State Ge"artment and ,ai-an "artici"ate in t(e I!oint Standin3 Committee on Ci8il $6clear Coo"eration=J a confidence-b6ildin3 meas6re t(at "romotes (ealt( and safet1 in ci8ilian n6clear 6se and incl6des elements t(at ens6re t(e island meets its n6clear obli3ations stemmin3 from inte3ration of A.S. n6clear com"onents. In addition= t(e Anited States contin6es to enNo1 consent ri3(ts to all n6clear material in ,ai-an 6nder t(e 1.#/s-era $6clear Coo"eration A3reement.

b. No scientists
Mi c,ell 0"
(Gere0 !.- Sr. 7ello- for Asia in t(e International Sec6rit1 Pro3ram > CSIS= I,(e $6clear ,i""in3 Poin1 %(1 States Reconsider ,(eir $6clear C(oicesJ) Second= t(e scientists -(o led ,ai-an:s n6clear "ro3ram (a8e retired or "assed a-a1= re"ortedl1 incl6din3 t(e t-o most ca"able n6clear en3ineers of t(eir da1. %(ile tec(nical 0no--(o- (as ass6redl1 been "reser8ed for a ne- 3eneration of C(6n3s(an Instit6te scientists and tec(nicians= t(e1 (a8e not (ad t(e o""ort6nit1 to en3a3e in "ractical trainin3 in t(e field. Indeed= ,ai-an obser8ers note t(at 1o6n3 en3ineers are not interested in "6rs6in3 s6c( -or0= 8ie-in3 it as irrele8ant and not Icareer-en(ancin3.JI ,ai-an scientists claim t(at a -(ole ne- 3eneration of n6clear scientists -o6ld need to be Ino6ris(ed=J reC6irin3 a s6bstantial in8estment of mone1 and time.J A.S. monitors note t(at tec(nicians (a8e not been maintainin3 t(eir ex"ertise in t(e rele8ant areas of n6clear "(1sics= incl6din3 sol8ent extraction c(emistr1= 6rani6m f6el fabrication and re"rocessin3= 6rani6m "6rification= and related as"ects of c(emical en3ineerin3= for exam"le. %ere tec(nicians indeed "6rs6in3 s6c( trainin3= t(ese monitors contend= it -o6ld be detectable.

A% %ai3anese Prolif (2 of 2)
c. No material and processing capability
Mi c,ell 0"
(Gere0 !.- Sr. 7ello- for Asia in t(e International Sec6rit1 Pro3ram > CSIS= I,(e $6clear ,i""in3 Poin1 %(1 States Reconsider ,(eir $6clear C(oicesJ) ,(at said= des"ite its clear n6clear -ea"ons ambitions and ca"abilities of t(e "ast= ,ai-an (as se8eral tec(nical and "ractical obstacles to C6ic0l1 becomin3 a n6clear "o-er toda1. 7irst= accordin3 to ex"erts= ,ai-an is in far -orse s(a"e toda1 in terms of materials and "rocessin3 ca"abilit1 t(an it -as fifteen 1ears a3o -(en it reno6nced its n6clear "ro3ram and s(6t do-n its lar3est researc( reactor and its re"rocessin3 facilities. ,(e researc( reactor is no- re"orted b1 o6tside so6rces to be entirel1 clean= a (ollo- s(ell disassembled in t(e "resence of A.S. and IA<A obser8ers= -it( 0e1 com"onents b6ried and onl1 t(e f6el "ondRand s"ent f6elRremainin3 inside 6nder 0een IA<A obser8ation. All ,ai-an "o-er reactors are d6tif6ll1 ins"ected C6arterl1. An informed A.S. so6rce confirms t(at ,ai-an "ossesses less t(an t-o 0ilo3rams of "l6toni6m and less t(an t-o tons of 6rani6m= lefto8ers from 1.++ t(at are closel1 monitored b1 t(e Anited States and t(e IA<A. ,(e island toda1 lac0s 6rani6m enric(ment or s"ent f6el re"rocessin3 ca"abilities. Its facilit1 for (andlin3 "l6toni6m (as been dismantled. Mbser8ers confirm t(at I$<R itself is &#

Caldebate.com

Readiness Good/Bad

o6t of t(e f6el c1cle b6siness= does not do n6clear material (andlin3= (as ended its n6clear researc( "ro3rams and li3(t--ater reactor f6el de8elo"ment -or0= and foc6ses toda1 instead on t(e Nob of de8elo"in3 alternati8e ener31 so6rces.

&&