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SPECIFIC INTENT: Not just the mere doing of the act but the manner which crime is committed

will provide evidence of intent. SIO: Solicitation; Attempt; Conspirarcy; 1 st D Premed Murder; Larceny; Burglary; Foregery; False Pretenses; Embzzlmnt Note! Attempt crimes r all SI even when the crime attempted is not. GENERAL INTENT: Awareness of all factors that constitue crime; D nd not be certain all AC exist, sufficient that Ds aware of high likelihood. Inference of Intent to Act: Jury may infer intent merely on act. Transferred Intent: Intent of act transferred from targeted to untrgtd indvi. GIO: Battery; Rape; Kidnapping; False Imprisonment. Burglary. MALICE: CL -Intent not reqd only reckless disregard. Defenses that apply to SI crimes are n/a to Malice. MO: CLMurder; Arson. Justification= Self Defense/ Excuse=Insanity /Mitigating Circumstances=Provocation Mistake of Fact: Unfair to C&P one who has sufficient culpable SoM to merit pnshmnt, but whose degree of clpblty & dangerousnes varies from intentional wrongdoer/Define Unreasonable? Legal Wrong: A: D commits AR of crime x w/MR of crime y R: If G of lesser crime then G of greater offense -Lewd actminor. Cr: May result in grossly dsprprtnl pnshmnt reltv to blameworthiness Moral Wrong: A/R: Althgh u made a reasonable mistake re. AC, may still have demonstrated moral culpability worthy of pnshmnt. Prince N: CC w/GI Cr: Runs afoul of PoL -Legsl intent; ImmoralIllegal General Intent: A: Culpability Approach: NG if- AR of offense occurred w/non-culpable SoM re. prohibited conduct (consent/rape). R: Depends jrsdctn applies GI/SI

Principal of Legality: Unduly Vague/ No Arbitrariness/ Lenity Doctrine- No crime w/o a preexisting law
Vagueness Doctrine: DP clauses 5th &14t amendment Law is unconstitutional if unduly vague --- GD: must be one that men of common intelligence must not guess at its meaning & differ to its application. Must provide sufficient warning (FN) to person of CI of conduct thats being prescribed. (1) Fair Notice & (2) Avoid undue discretion in law enforcement (arbitrariness) --- Determining Statutory Clarity Crts consider:(1) Purpose of (2)Whether ambiguity was necessary to further legislative goal (3)Impact on the protected rights of the indiv. Even if conduct stipulated in is not in fact constitutionally protected, courts apply strict standard if touches on fundamental constnl rights SS: interpret meaning to determine if its susceptible of application to a constnl right x: Crime-Vulgarity against police, touches on Freedom of Speech --- Criticism of VD: Focuses on Lawyers Notice (1) DP clause not violated u/l person wld still have to guess at meaning of after attorney conducts research. But OI lacks $ to seek legal advice prior to acting. (2) Even w/vague , not unconstitutional if its meaning can be determined by reading prior court opinions OI may be held responsible for learning law of various jurisdictions & learning terms found in through CL sources. --- Skate on Thin Ice: not invalid simply bc it requires conformity to an imprecise normative standard x: negligent, cruel - OI shld steer clear of proscribed area - U skate on thin ice, u cant expect to find a sign which denotes spot where ull fall Hlms Mans fate depends his estimating rightly Avoid Undue Discretion in Law Enforcement: DP forbids vesting fcomplete discretion in hands of police--Vagrant/Loiter City of Chicago v Morales Gang loiter. Narrower ordinance ok; Papachristou v C. of Jacksonville Vagrant. What is common drunkard? Too subjective. MPC Sec. 250.6 Rule of Lenity: Used when is ambiguous after seizing aid to determine interpretation. Purpose: Prevent cts from inadvertently enlarging the scope of a criminal through interpretive powers. CL: Judicial interpretation of ambiguous should be biased in favor of the accused MPC: Doesnt recognize lenity principle. Section 1.02(3) instead requires ambiguities be resolved in a manner that furthers the general purposes of Code & the specific provision at issue. -Critic: Overuse of LD may result in application of contrary to legislative intent; many states abolished . PoL: Constitutional Foundations: Bill of Attainder & Ex Post Facto / DP Clause -- Art. I Sec. 9 & 10 prohibit Fed. & State Legltr (Judicial) from enacting BoA/ExPFto Bill of Attainder: Special legislation that declares a person guilty & punished w/o trial or conviction Ex Post Facto: After the Fact Retroactive Disallowances: (a) No person may be punished under a law that did nt exist at the time act was committed (b) Cant increase penalty of a crime after its commission -Jaywalk from misdemeanor to felony (c) Cannot inflict greater punishment than at time crime was committed -Increase 5yr to 10 yr penalty (d) Allow less or different evidence to convict - Convict of rape w/lesser evidence in order to convict. Due Process Clause: 5th & 14th Amendment Due Process Clauses require Judicial Branch to enforce Fair Notice reqmnt - Courts r prohibited from enlarging scope of crim. . doing so violates 2 aspects of LP: (1) Retroactive Criminalization & Punishment (2) Exceeds judiciary authority (legislature enacts laws not courts) Keeler v Superior Fetus killer. Other Constitutional Constraints: 8th Am: Punishment is Cruel & Unusual if -.(1) Its grossly disproportionate to the crime No death penalty for crimes that arent homicide (2) If crime doesnt measurably advance either deterrence or retributivism. x: Retard cant be executed b/c of their lack of moral reasoning.

Actus Reus: (VA Causes SH) IV- Burden of Proof/B. of Persuasion -Time Frame - Excptns -- Omission/Causation/SH
CL: Commission of some VA or omission to perform act; Broad: Defense. lacked sufficient FW to be blamed for conduct. Narrow: willed contraction of a muscle MPC: 2.01(1) person not guilty of an offense u/l his liability is based on conduct which includes a VA or the omission to perform an act of which hes physically capable (See 2.01(2) p1201 IV acts.) Excld from VA req- violations [2.05] Involuntariness Defenses of IV- MPC (2.01(2) Consciousness is a matter of degree: Mental Disorders -MPD (Grimsley Jen drove drunk not R) CL:one state of consciousness or another, so long as personality then controlling behav. was conscious; wont begin to parcel crim. accountability out among the various inhabitants of the mind. SW CL & MPC: IV (Cogdon Case- SW mom kills kid) Habitual Acts CL&MPC: VA. Liability for IV Acts: Threat of punishment cannot deter person that acts IV, but can motivate them to adjust their IV (but dangerous) behavior so as to reduce the risk to others. Torts B<PL; Decina. Burden of Proof: Under DP: VA (AR) is a prerequisite to crim. responsibility; Govt must prove BRD every element of offense, must prove BRD s conduct included a VA. IV is not a defense, rather an essential element of the offense -Unconsciousness not like insanity (No AR v Affirmative Defense) Burden of Persuasion: Time Framing: How far back well allow action to go to be VA? (Narrow- V/Broad-IV) Key: Look at prox. cause & foreseeability Decina seizure, Martin Drunk, highway. Foreseeability found for D, not for M.- See Causation VA at earlier moment may create liability: Decina seizure; Powell alcohol cc w/Robinson addict. Quasi-Exception to VA: Poorly drafted (bed) Crts imply VA Status Offense (addict/vagrant) 8th C&U; Possession-No act,but failure to rid self of x consdrd omssn Omission: GR: OI has no LD to act to prevent harm-Not every moral oblgtn creates a LD (Religion shld instill sense of MO) Pope v. State (Baby. s VA did not constitute but-for causation; no foreseeability; no LD) GR Rationale: Proving MR (hard to prove u/l theres LD to act) Line Drawing (Genovese-who shld b prosecuted) Indiv. Liberty (Law shld prevent harm not used to coerce ppl to benefit others; Lose sense of indiv respnsblty) $; Exceptions: Jones v US (convicted; LD present- K & AoC) Statues (Good Samaritan/taxes); K (Dr.,nanny) Relationship (Parent, Spouse) Assumption of Care (Assume care of stranger, LD to ensure S is ok) Create a Parallel (u create danger car accdnt). MPC 2.01(3) Liability: (1) If law-defining offense provides for it Authority Facts VOLUNTARINESS -- Rule Notes (2) Duty of Act is otherwise imposed by law (K/Tort law) Possession MPC 2.01(4) (general rule) not guilty of an offense unless liability is based on conduct which includes a 1) voluntary 2) act or the unconsciousness fllwd by MPC Social Harm: Destruction of, injury to, endangerment of, some socially valuable interest . Identifying: Definition of offense will set out AR (lists of IV Acts) omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable. VA may be liable based 2.01(1) component, which will ID the proscribed SH (Killing of a HB. Kill=AR/Death=SH) Elements: Conduct (DUI)-No result is req- Enough that SVI upon earlier conduct. 2.01(2) have been endangered; Result Doesnt matter how R occurred; C is irrelevant. C/R: Killing of HB by poison- Death=R/Poison=C; Attendant People v. man unconscious during mind blacked out; unconscious means no voluntary act : defendant may not be convicted if he was mind never told body to do Circumstances: Fact that exists in defin of offense thats reqd to be proven (Age of victim in stat rape)- R/C not an offense u/l certain ACs exist. Newton shootout, shot cop; not convict unconscious, unless his unconsciousness was self-inflicted via drugs/alcohol. "x" Constnl: Constnl Rights>Certain SVI (Nazi) Expands timeframe 4 when People v. woman epilepsy causes car crash; involuntary after voluntary; can be a voluntary act: D may be convicted if she takes a voluntary act that sufficient VA may occur Causation: Actual Cause: IDs potential candidates for legal respnsblty -Used for result crimes, esp. homicide- MPC 2.03(1)(a) & CL: Conduct is Decina convicted. poses a risk that a second involuntary act may occur. the actual cause of SH if the result would not have occurred but for s conduct. AC+MR: CL treats them independent; each must be proven; can Jones v. illegal to sit/sleep sidewalk; no no punishment for status; status not a voluntary act: a law may not criminalize being or status, it may have AC w/o MR. MULTIPLE CAUSES: Accelerating Result: Ask: but for VA of , wld harm have occurred when it did? Concurrent Sufficient City of LA homeless shelters. only criminalize conduct; if D is left q/no alternative, he has not acted volntry Causes: 2 indep. s commit same harm- CL Ask: Was each act alone sufficient to have cause the result that occurred when it did. Determine by: CL: no punishment for mere thoughts; thoughts not a voluntary act: a law cannot punish for the mere Robinson law made it illegal to be addict Substantial Factor: Was s conduct a SF in the resulting SH?MPC doesnt apply SF, only but for test. Code suggests instd of SF, the result in propensity to commit a crime, nor can the law punish merely for having culpable thoughts quest shld be reworded but for s acts, death from two mortal wounds wld occurProximate Cause: determines who among those candidates shld be held accountable. Intervening causes Independent force causing harm after D's act ct decides if it's superveningIf D only caused minor harm, more likely to be supervening /If intervening act is coincidental & unforeseeable, probably severs causal chain, if it's foreseeable& dependent. Apparent Safety Doctrine D liable for harms resulting from dangerous situation D created, but chain is severed if victim continues or worsens the dangerSimilar to free, delib, informed human interventionCases: People v. Acosta CA 1991 p510 Helicopters crash was a possible consequence, but not highly extraordinarybroad prox cause, but no recklessness for intent DISSENT: traditional reasonable apprehension test Ct applies broad foreseeability for prox cause, but keeps the scope of mens rea limited; People v. Brady: D recklessly started a fire and is liable for two firefighting planes that crashed together Firefighter planes are known an required to fight forest fires, but helicopters arent always in police chases;
Authority MPC 2.03(1) MPC 2.03(2) Facts direct factual causation legal causation for purpose/ knowing mental state CAUSATION Rule conduct is the cause of a result when it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred (unless other requirements are stated). when purposefully or knowingly is an element of an offense and the actual result is not within the design or contemplation of the actor, the element is not established unless either: a) the actual result differs from that designed or contemplated only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or that the injury would have been more serious than that caused. b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury as was designed or contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability. (if d is "culpable" expands universe of causation for which d can be liable when recklessly or negligently is an element of an offense and the actual result is not within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which he should be aware, the element is not established unless either: a) the actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused. b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense. (if d is "culpable" expands universe of causation for which d can be liable). highly extraordinary test: in evaluating legal cause, any extraordinary results stemming from the defendant's conduct must be excluded; extraordinary results are not based on the defendant's state of mind, but the objective circumstances present when the defendant acted. (similar to mpc) alt. view one: reasonable relation test: an individual is criminally liable if his conduct was a sufficiently direct cause of the result and the ultimate harm is something that should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to his acts. (i.e. if the consequences were foreseeable as a result the risk his conduct created, there is legal cause, even if it was attenuated and more remote). D does not need to the exclusive cause of death; all that is required is that the risk created result in the harm suffered.

MPC 2.03(3)

legal causation for reckless/ negligent mental state

People v. Acousta People v. Arzon (NY) People v. Warner Lamber State v. Shabazz

drives recklessly thrgh streets, helicopters crash; d not convicted for deaths. d sets fire, second fire kills firemen; convicted.


Acting in Concert

d was warned that explosive materials might go off; explosion occurs but direct factual causation required: where defendant creates a condition of danger and that danger actually occurs, he is not liable unless there is a sufficiently direct cause between his actions and the resulting harm. unclear why; not convicted contrast: (People v. Deitsch; employee killed when trapped on 6th fl. from fire, fire exit locked): merely creating a condition of danger can be considered the harm itself for which one may be liable. (creation of harmful condition= harmful=sufficientfor conv.) d stabbed x, x taken to hosp. and dies, docs gross. neg.; convicted. gross negligence rarely breaks chain: gross negligence may permit the defendant to escape liability only when it was the sole cause of the death. ASSISTED SUICIDE: although providing the means for a person to commit suicide does not constitute murder, if u participate in the overt act by which the person commits suicide, u r culpable for murder. (people v. kevorkian - D assisted in two old ladies suicides.). INDUCED SUICIDE/DURESS: If Ds criminal conduct creates duress or incapacity in another, such an infliction may render D liable for that persons suicide/death. (stevenson v. state; d rapes girl, kidnaps her, she buys poison and kills herself; convicted) COUNTER: Intervening, informed & un-coerced act of the victim is the ultimate cause of the harm tht breaks the causal chain. (separation in time might also break chain). MPC 210.5(1): permits convicting someone of homicide for causing another to take his life, but only if he purposely causes such suicide by force, duress, or deception. MPC 210.5(2): felony of assisted suicide to purposely aid or solicit someone to commit suicide. Drag Racing: Reckless & Suicidal act of the deceased serves as an intervening & superseding cause of his death/not sufficiently direct (commonwealth v. root) VS. when crimes r predicated on recklessness or negligence, the cts will likely say that as long as there is commonality & risk creation, theres causation & intervening human act will not break the chain (state v. mcfadden) Russian Roulette: where indiv participate in a reckless activity thats certain to result in the death of another, such indiv shld be held crim. liable, even w/o evidence of force or coercion. (Commonwealth v. Atencio)

Strict Liability Offense: Crimes that do not contain MR reqt regarding an AR element ( Strict Liability Doctrine: Mistake of Fact Cases) FMR are SL CL Interpreting SL: (1) crime is not derived from CL (2) there exist a legislative policy that wld be undermined by MR reqt. (3) Standard imposed by is reasonable & adherence thereto properly expected of OI. (4) violation penalty is small (5) conviction doesnt gravely slander. Critic: one cannot rely on crt to apply 5 factor in a consistent way. Public-Welfare Offense: Wrongful b/c its prohibited (Sale bad food; envrnmntl laws; traffic). Why PWO is SL? (1) not derived from CL; (2) single violation can injure great # of ppl; (3) standard imposed is reasonable (sale liquor to minor). (4) Penalty violation is minor (5) conviction rarely damages reputation of violator. Non-Public-Welfare: (S. RAPE) (statutory rape). AR: Focus -Attendant Circumstances (dont lk at act intercourse, instd AC- female is under specified age) Why NPW is SL? (1) Policy Matters- SVI (2) Crime grave in nature -qualitative v. quantitative. NPW v PW: (1) NPW result in severe punishment. (2) Violators r stigmatized Policy: SL is Utilitarian- Mitigate unfairness to more effectively deter dangerous conduct. Advocate: (1) Keep ppl who doubt their capacity from engaging in dangerous activities (2) those who engage in risky activity will act w/greater caution. (3) othrws wld exhause crts Constitutionality: SL not per se unconstitutional. Crts held do not violate 5th DPC; exception: Morisstte (p284) if evolved from CL offense that reqd MR then new will require it Ct: Reqt of MR wld be presumed in absence o f contrary legislative purpose.Steer clear of SLO that touch on fundamental CR Vicarious liability courts generally uphold convictions of employers for the illegal conduct of their employees even in the absence of evidence o f employer fault; some states impose parental responsibility laws that subject parents to criminal liability for contributing to delinquency or failure to supervise their children. Result matters to the reputation of the individual being convicted; criminal stigmatism. MPC: 2.02(1): No conviction may be obtained u/l prosecution proves some form of culpability regarding each element of an offense. Exception (2.05): Violations Cases: Morisstte is really a version of CL offense that reqd MR (intent), as such no SL. Staples Some indication of congressional intent is reqd to do away w/MR reqmnt. Regina v City of Sault Ste. Marie. When full MR reqt not there, its a good defense for defense to show D wasnt negligent. Mistake of Fact: CL: Specific/General Intent -Moral Wrong/Legal Wrong- Not Defense since no MR, only defense in sense that D may produce evidence he was mistaken. --SL no MoF allowed. Specific Intent -Element Approach: MoF if it negates the element of MR (specific intent) in defin. of offense, regrdlss if mistake is unreasonable. General- Culpability Approach: MoF is crime committed w/a culpable state of mind. MoF must be reasonableReasonabillity determined by jury. Moral Wrong Doctrine: One can make a reasonable mistake re. AC & yet demonstrate moral culpability.Lk at the world thrgh eyes of D & assume facts as D understd them.- Garnett -Intent to commit immoral act is enough to satisfy culpability, even if theres reasonable MoF. Prince 14yo taken from father; faulted not bc of age bc of AC element taken from father; thgh reason fueled by moral. Ct.:person who knowingly performs a morally wrong act, assumes risk that AC are not as they rsnbly appear & that therefore his conduct is not only immrl but illgl. Legal Wrong: Olsen D commits AR of crime X w/MR of crime Y. Guilty of greater crime despite D reasonable mistake he was guilty of a lesser crime indecent actupon a minor. MPC 2.04(1)/2.02: Based on Ds subjective believe; Mistake of age is no defense (>10); No distinction betwn Specific/General. -Apply Specific Intent for ALL crimes even those tht r GI. In MPC all crimes have a SI element defined by the . If defin. is silent re. MR, code states each material element is established if D acted Ppsly/Knwngly/Rcklssly - Excptn: If D had be guilty of another crime had circmstnc been as he supposed; permits punishment at the level of lesser crime. Cases: Prince v Regina -14yo/Dad. Ppl v Olsen LW, lewd act minor. Garnett- MW Mistake of Fact for Rape: Two views (1) actual knowledge of victims lack of consent is not required (Sherry), (2) actual knowledge is required (Morgan) Commonwealth v. Sherry 4 doctors bring girl from party to house in another town, proceed to have sex with her in turn Held: A mistake of fact cannot constitute a defense to rape. The defendant does not need to have actual knowledge that the victim did not consent for it to be rape; essence of the crime is a lack of consent, any implication other than non-consent that may arise in Ds psyche is irrelevant and thus no defense Regina v. Morgan Man brought 3men to have sex w/his wife, Ds claim they had permission,wife consented Held: cannot be convicted of rape if he honestly held a subjective belief that the v. consented, even if it was unreasonable. The mental element in rape is not knowledge but intent. Mistake of Law: Excptn: If the term wilful is present in definition of offense (Cheek v US/State v Azneer -Believed he had legal right not to answer quest. Lang in offense wilful refusal to answer q. NG bc he intentionally but not wilfully refused) MENS REAS

Homicide: CL: (1) Murder (2) VA ML (3) IV ML MPC- Murder / ML / Negligent Homicide CL - Murder:Unlawful killing of HB being w/malice aforethought. MA if- No justification/excuse/mitigation (to reduce killing to va ml) AND one the following SoM: (i) Intent to kill (ii) Intent to inflict SBI (iii) Reckless indifference to a substantial[ly] unjustifiably high risk to human life. (iv) Intent to commit a felony (felony murder). Note- Extreme indifference to HL. Express /Implied: Ex- (i); Imp- (ii),(iii), (iv). Note Must have BOTH components otherwise, 2nd DM. Intent to Kill: One who intentionally kills HB w/o justification. Intntl+PreM&Delib= SI & ExMA = Subjective Fault/ RP = N&PC-foreseeability = GCL (JGOD)=1DM - Premedidated: No specific quantity time; Req D not only had time to form intent but also give matter 2nd thght. Deliberate: Cool Purpose=Cold Blooded; Quality. Specific Intent: Conscious Object & Awareness of AC. Not enough that shld have know. Per MR: If the crime req.s proof that the actors conscious object or purpose is to cause SH-Must: (1) Special Motive for Conduct & (2) Have awareness of AC. - N&PC Rule (general prop): Intentional killing=Subjective Fault. -Prosecutor must prove BRD D formed intent to kill, rather than RP wld have known such conduct wld result in death SF Proved: 1) OIs intend the N&P (foreseeable) consq of their actions. 2) D is OI (no defense arise) 3) Therefore..OI intended NPC. DW Rule (specific prop): When D intentionally uses a DW, an intent to kill may be inferred. Intent to Inflict SBI (2nd DM*): Constitutes Malice but w/o W/D/P so 2nd DM (u/Penn Model). Note- If V dies, then D found G of M. Unjustifiably & inexcusably intends to cause injury of this level of severity. Extreme Recklessness (2nd DM*): Note If V dies, G of M, e/t not intnl.- Depraved Heart. Regrdless of social duty. Wanton&Wilful. Extreme: MPC/CL, recklessness is req for Crim. Neg., extreme recklessness is req form of risk that wld constitute M. Implied Malice: Conduct invlvs deliberate perpetration of a knowingly dangerous act w/indiff.to HL (or) Killing was proximately caused by an act, which the N&PC r dangerous to HL, act deliberately prfrmd by person who knows conduct endangers the life another & acts w/conscious disregard. - Substantial[ly] & Unjustifiable risk - PLB (PrbltyHarm/Loss/Burdern). FMR: G of M if death results from cndct during the commssn or attempted commission of any felony. SLO. No MR Constitutes 1DM if death result from specific felony list; if death results from unspecified felony-> 2DM. Note FMR w/o special limitation wld allow Disproportional Punishment (8th A, which applies to homicide). Felony is intended the result is not- cc w/ IVA re:deter unintended. Transferred Intent: Misuse of TID. Law doesnt recognize the transference of intent to cause one SH (rob) to a different & greater (kill) harm the same victim. Inherently Dangerous-F Rule: limit homicids that occured during c of a felony dangerous to HL. Abstract Rule:Does the crime, by its very nature, carry a high prblty that death will result? ppl v Philips, cancer. FMR n/a bc invlvd cndct not considered particularly dangerous. Facts of the Case: Does the felonious conduct, under the crcmstncs, make death a foreseeable consq. that its rsnbl for the law to inter the malice that qualifies the homicide as M.? Indepndnt-F (Merger) Limitation: Only applies if predicate felony is independent of the homicide. If not, felony merges w/homicide. Note- w/o some limitation, cant have IV ML, as latter offns wld always merge into f-m. Ppl v Wilson, killed estranged wife, CA. A felony doesnt merge w/a homi when the act causing death was committed w/indpndnt design, separate from intent to kill/SBI. Even if predicate act invlvs assaultive cndct, dsnt merge since purpose of (predicate) cndct is indpndnt of homi. Res Gestae Req. Time:when the killing conduct occurred, not when the death ensued. FMR na if killing occurs before the f. attempted or after reached point of safety.Casuation:Shld be held respnsbl for death which direct & almost inevitable sequence results initial crime. Reasonable & foresable result (few cts req malum in se). Agency: Not liable for FM when innocent party killed unless death caused by D or agent (accomplice). -When bystander kills felon, justifiable, excusable homi. Note PC Theory: D may still be liable when innocent p dies. Note -Agency Jrsdctn. Provocative Act: Felon respnsbl for 3rd p if basis for charge is not FM, instd PA( form of reckless homi.). V. ML: Intent to kill but adequate provocation mitigates M to VML. A. Provocation Test: (1) D acted in HoP (2) Passion result of AP. (3) D musnt have had reasonable time to cool off (4) Causal link b/w homi & provocation. Misdirected Realition Rule- AP defense only if D attempted to kill indiv that performed provocative act, not innocent bystander. MPC- IV ML -Crim.Neg. (Unintnl killing+Crim. Neg) -Blurs Deprave Heart -Must show s&j risk but awareness no req. Criminal Neg.: Gross deviation from SoC that RP (objective standard) wld exercise in same siutation. -Does act, lawful in itself (drive) but in an unlawful manner (wreckless) & w/o caution. Unaware of risk. Misdmnr ML:Analog to FMR.: 1)Some states allow on all misdmnr-traffic. 2)Some limit to dangerous msdm. 3)Some distinguish b/w mala in se & mala pro-hibita.4)Note FMR-Other Felonies: killing occurs during commission of excluded f. may constitute ML. MPC- Abandons CL: MA, GI/SI, Degress of M., Misdmnr ML, Unlawful, & loosens up HoP w/EMED. Murder: Must prove (PKRN): Purposefully: Conscious Object. Knowingly: Awareness. -Need to be aware that ur conduct is likely to bring upon a prohibited result. Recklessly: Gross deviation from the norm in consciously disregarding a substantial & unjustifiable risk. Negligently: Gross deviation of the norm in failing to be aware of a substantial & unjustifiable risk. Reckless vs. Negligently: Consciously vs. Awareness; the more dangerous the activity, the more likely it is the person was aware of the risk. CL: Negligently Same definition as MPC.Crim gross departure Recklessly Same as MPC- Gross departure in the face of risk one knows Intentionally Encompasses both knowingly & purposefully (a) Consciously trying to achieving a particular goal (b) Knowingly Being aware thats going to happen Maliciously Modern: Intentionally or (most commonly) Recklessly. Depends on jrsdctn. Archaic: Any culpable state of mind. General Intent; Any culpable SoM (b) Cld have multitude of meanings; apply above under different assumptions Homicide: if one take the life of another HB being - purposefully, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. No degrees of M., only degrees of felonies - M. is a felony of the 1st D. (not the same as M. in the 1st D). Manslaughter: Felony of the 2nd D. (1) Recklessly kills another (2) Kills under crcmstnc normally considered M. but as the result of EMED, theres a reasonable explanation or excuse. Negligent Homicide: F of 2nd D - (MPC) Person who kills another recklessly vs. Must manifest extreme disregard to the value of HL (CL M.). Lesser offense to CLs Reckless M.- Not extreme enough to merit M.. EMED Determined from the VP in his situation under the crcmstncs as he believe them to be (subjective) - D has burden to produce evidence re. AD. Two Components: Subjective: SoM nd not be so far from norm as to be insane. Intense feelings is enough. Reasonable Explanation Excuse: Objective standard but partially subjective in nature- Relates to the mental/emotion condition not to the homi.. HoP v EMED: (1) Specific provocation not necessary. Cld have combination of factors. (2) Provocation nd not involve an injury or other provo. act. imposed on D from victim. - Can kill bystander in rage. (3) Words alone can warrant provo. (4) No cooling off period necessary - Can rekindle. Insanity: McNaghten Rule - Irresisitble Impulse Test - Durham Test - ALI (aka) MPC ( 4.01 and 4.02) McNaghten: Under this rule D is entitled to qauitally only if had a mental disease or defect that caused him to either (i) not know that his act wld be wrong - OR- (ii) not understand the nature & quality of this actions. Note Loss of Control bc of mental illness is no defense. Know v Appreciate: Althgh originally asked whether D knew, nowadays ct ask appreciate. Right/Wrong Prong: Asking D if his belief of what he did was morally wrong is not the stndrd. Ought to ask jury: Did D know that society thght what he did was MW? - If yes, then no insane. Cts splits on whether is refers to moral or legal wrongfulness. Note - LoP/MW Doctrine. Irresistible Impulse:Insane if: As a result of MI or defectm D acted w/an irresistible & uncontrollable impulse -or- lost the power to choose b/w right and wrong and to avoid doing the act in quest., her free agency atm was destroyed. Durham: excused if act was the product of a mental disease or efect. Two Matters Must be Proven: i) D suffered from a MD or defect at the time of the crime. AND ii) but for the MD, defect, he wld not have committed crime. But for MPC Test: Substantial Capacity: Not respnsble for ur condct if MD cause u to lack substantial capacity to appreciate the legal wrong or wrongnfulness (moral wrong) of ur conduct -OR- to confrom ur conduct to th dictates of the law. 4.01 Note- MPC doesnt recognize diminished capacity. 4.02- Med./Psychiatric evidence may be used to prove insanity and also as proof of lacking certain MR. AUTHORITY
MPC 210.2 MPC 210.3

Murder Manslaughter

criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or(b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape. Manslaughter when 1) committed recklessly or 2) a homicide which would otherwise be murder may be reduced to manslaughter when it is committed under the influence of 1) extreme mental or emotional disturbance (subjective; must actually have it) 2) for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be (perception may have been inaccurate). actor's situation: it is clear that external circumstances & personal handicaps are included (blindness, shock from traumatic injury) & that an indiv. particular moral values r excluded. however, mpc's formulation allows for flexibility in determining what other aspects of the actor's situation shld be considered material for grading & leaves that quest. to the juror. (MPC Comm. 210.3) criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently. #1) premeditation for first degree murder: no time is too short to create the premeditation and intent murder sufficient for murder in first degree. (law should not reduce culpability for impulses; premeditation may track culpability poorly; hardened killers protected by it). #2) premeditation for first degree murder: in order for premeditation to be formed, the defendant must have had an opportunity to reflect on the nature of his intention after is was formed. (provides deterrence; person should have chance to reflect before such serious charge). depraved indifference: extreme recklessness involving a callous disregard of the consequences and indifference to human life may satisfy the requisite malice for a charge of murder. (similar to mpc 210.2) G for IVML req. D's wanton or reckless conduct proximately caused the death of a person. wanton or reckless: grave danger must have been apparent & D must have chosen to run the risk rather than alter his conduct. Note! contributory negligence never a defense to a crime must have mental state before its too late: where a homicide conviction requires a defendant needed to have acted recklessly or negligently and the defendant only satisfied the requisite mental state after medical help could save a person's life, d's mental state will not be a proximate cause of the death.

MPC 210.4 Murder CW v. Carrol State v. Guthrie People v. Malone Manslaughter CW v. Welansky State v. Williams

Negligent Homicide d impulse grabbed gun pillow/shot wife; d stabbed coworker; flipped sensitive nose. 17 yr; Russian roulette, shot friend; G nightclub,danger conditions, fire kill; G thgh hos d. didn't supply baby w. medical attention, gets sick, dies; convicted.

MPC 210.2 (b)

conduct that may raise a crime to murder

Rule FELONY MURDER RULE (committing felony/murder)

criminal homicide constitutes murder when: it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape. (mpc dislikes fmr, but above felonies creates rebuttable presumption d. had extreme indiff. to human life). CL: arson, rape, roberry, burglary. VIEW ONE: Proximate cause approach: an act known to be reasonably dangerous to life and likely itself to cause death, done for the purpose of committing a felony which [then] causes death, should be murder. FMR too far after crime may violate proportionality: to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses 1.02(1)(e)/fmr may deter crime VIEW TWO: Strict Liability Approach: the FMR is not limited to deaths that are foreseeable; a felon is held strictly liable for all killings committed by him or his accomplices in the course of a felony. the defendant takes the victim as he finds him. #1) inherently dangerous in the abstract: only felonies that are inherently dangerous to human life in the abstract can support the application of the felony murder rule. (i.e. all crimes of this type are inherently dangerous) #2) inherently dangerous as applied: the trier of fact may examine all of the circumstances to determine whether a felony is inherently dangerous in the manner and circumstances in which is was committed. #3) dangerous as committed with a foreseeable risk: a felony is inherently dangerous when it is dangerous per se or when the circumstances create a foreseeable risk of death. dissent: there must be a foreseeable risk and a high probability that death will result. (concerned lack of high prob. will reduce seriousness of act d. must commit for murder). merger rule; independent felonious purpose: in order for the felony murder rule to apply, the predicate felony must have an independent felonious purpose from the homicide (otherwise felony will merge into the homicide and cannot be used for fmr purposes). x: predicate felony is assault, causes v. death; felony will merge; can't use mens rea for assault to convict for murder; no independent purpose) (supplying drugs/person dies held to have independent fel. purpose; p v. mattison) in furtherance: the doctrine of felony murder does not extend to a killing, although growing out of the commission of the felony, if not directly attributable to an act of the defendant or his accomplices in furtherance of a common objective or purpose. (court takes this approach). x: d. gets in car crash after robbery; convicted under fmr, felony "continues to be perpetuated" during d's escape (people v. gillis). ex: three ds rape woman, one unexpectedly kills her, no conv. under fmr; killing wasn't part of common plan (us v. heinlein). * proximate cause: liability under the felony murder rule extends to any death proximately resulting from the unlawful activity. (includes deaths of co-felons; odd to hold one accountable for these deaths since they are in a sense legal; store keeper has right to kill in s.d.) (no case) misdemeanor manslaughter: involuntary manslaughter is a killing "in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony". (same kind of analysis/limitations of fmr) rejected by the mpc, although the concurrence of a misdemeanor/homicide may help establish the culpability required for manslaughter.

Regina v. Serne (p. 435) People v. Stamp People v. Phillips (p. 447; CA) People v. Stewart Hines v. State (p. 450) Merger People v. Burton (p. 452) Killings State v. Canola (p. 460)

d bought insurance then allegedly burned house; 2 kids die; not convicted. d burglarized store,leaves v. ground, heart attack dies; G d. lied abt cure kids cancer; grand theft; kid died; NG d. on crack binge, didnt feed baby- died; felony kid suffer. G d. missed/ shot friend while hunting (dark/drinking), conv. of posesss. of firearm by armed felon/murder. Doctrine d. killed person in course of committing armed robbery; convicted under fmr. Not In Furtherance d. and co-felons were rob store, gun fire exchange kills cofelon/ store owner; d. could be conv. for death of owner but not co-felon


Authority MPC 213.1 People v. Warren State v. Rusk State in Interest of MTS MPC 213.1 State v. Lovely

Facts crime of rape guy grabs girl on bike d takes car keys, he gets scared dsnt say anything during sex victims consent/drug store manager hires drifter, wants to break off bc/no sex

Rule - RAPE A male is guilty of rape if: (a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone; or (b) he has substantially impaired her power to appraise or control her conduct by administering or employing without her knowledge drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance; or (c) the female is unconscious; or (d) the female is less than 10 years old. Lack of consent; victim need to communicate: victim must affirmatively demonstrate lack of consent for consent to be invalid. Lack of consent; force by d, resistance by v., or fear in v.: although lack of consent ordinarily req D used actual force or the victim physically resisted, a conviction for rape may be upheld where victim subjectively feared death or SBI if she resisted, so long as the belief was reasonable. Lack of consent: you need positive consent: there will be a lack of consent if the defendant applies any amount of force against another person in the absence of what a reasonable person would believe to be an affirmative, freely given permission to the act. MPC on drugs (213.1): D will only be liable based on victims incapacity w here 1) D administered intoxicant 2) without victims knowledge 3) for the purpose of preventing resistance. contrast state v. al-hamdani: defendant convicted when victim had .15 bac, bc/ victim was incapable of meaningful consent. Crime of coercive sex: New Hampshire makes it a felony to coerce submission to sexual penetration by threatening to retaliate against the victim. (argue about how coercive is it; does woman have a choice) mpc 213.1 (2): a male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife commits the felony of gross sexual imposition if he compels her to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resistance. (or she suffers from a mental defect that renders her incapable of consent, or he knows she is unaware the act is being committed up on her, or she mistakenly submits thinking its her husband). Rule SELF INDUCED INTOXICATION intoxication is only a defense insofar as it negates an element of an offense. when recklessness is an element of the offense, the defendant's intoxication will be immaterial, and he will be deemed to be aware of any risks he would have been aware of if he had been sober. (note: mpc on intoxication not adopted in most courts**) Intoxication that (a) is not self-induced or (b) is pathological is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to 1) appreciate its criminality [wrongfulness] or 2) to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. self-induced intoxication: substances actor knowingly introduces into his body, tendency of which he knows or ought to know would cause him i ntoxication, unless given by a doctor. pathological intoxication means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amoun t of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible. view one: evidence of intoxication is admissible to negate specific intent crimes. (purpose/knowing/intent), but is not admissible to negate general intent crimes (crimes just involve simple action). rationale: can create general intent but not specific while drunk. contrast: assault with intent to kill (specific intent)/assault with deadly weapon (general intent). note: evidence that demonstrates the specific intent for the crime was created prior to the xxintoxication should not be excused by subsequent intoxication.

Authority MPC 2.08 (1) MPC 2.08 (4)

Facts intoxication is generally not a defense exception for some forms of intoxication

People v. Hood

D was drunk, shot cop, conv. of assault w/deadly weapon

State v. Stascio US v. Fleming

D convicted of assault w. intent to rob. drunk driving can become murder Authority

view two: rejects general/specific intent distinction; intoxication is not a defense to a crime except for in a narrow class of exceptions. (exceptions: 1) to show lack of premeditation/deliberation for 1st degree murder, 2) to show intoxication on behalf of d. has risen to fixed state of insanity, 3) to show d was so intoxicated that the mental state was totally lacking). -- tension between this view/above: setting norms and protecting public from harm/mens rea that fits crime malice aforethought req for federal law; normally reckless to drive drunk, supporting manslaughter (driving drunk itself is reckless; ordinary driver wouldn't), here d drove in way indicating depraved indifference for human life (that he was drunk made it part. dang.); G of Murder Rule PROVOCATION a homicide which would otherwise be murder may be reduced to manslaughter when it is committed under the influence of 1) extreme mental or emotional disturbance (subjective; must actually have it) 2) for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be (perception may have been inaccurate). actor's situation: Gravity (of the provocation to OI) & Level of Self-Control - expected of a OP. external circumstances are included (blindness, shock from injury) . moral values are excluded. however, the mpc's formulation allows for flexibility (MPC Comm. 210.3) EMED- extreme mental or emotional disturbance broader than heat of passion, longstanding mental drama, even w. out current provocative event, can reduce grade of murder. In order to find provocation under the common law 1) there must have been the kind of event that would cause a reasonable person to lose control and 2) the defendant must have actually lost self control. Further, 3) there must not have been sufficient time for the defendant to cool off and 4) the defendant must not have actually cooled off. -- why have provocation? partial excuse: recognizes the frailty of human nature, ordinary citizens can be overcome w. passion. partial justification: to some extent the d is justified in making a punitive return against someone who intentionally causes him serious offense narrow view: in order for provocation to be adequate, it must be calculated to inflame the passion of a reasonable man and then cause him to act for the moment from passion rather than reason. restricted to certain offenses: it is not enough that there is psychological provocation in fact, provocation is limited to a set of well defined classes as a matter of law. (battery, mutual combat, ect.) Note -words alone are insufficient to constitute provocation wide view: provocation may be adequate when, anything occurs that would have the natural tendency to produce a sufficiently provoked state of mind in ordinary men of fair disposition and the jury finds was actually produced in the case before them. Note- words alone may be sufficient to constitute provocation when they reveal new information that would create a provoked state of mind in an ordinary person. cooling time: absent a rekindling event, when a lapse of time has passed between the provocation and the killing, there cannot be a rational basis for finding the killing was in the heat of passion. contrast: (people v. berry; x provoked, waits in car for 20hrs before killing): defendant's heat of passion may be the result of a smoldering passage of time that served to aggravate defendant's agitation rather than cool him off.

MPC 210.3(b) People v. Cassasa Common Law on Provocation State v. Girourard Maher v. People US v. Bordeaux

Facts Reducing Murder to Manslaughter applies mpc approach General Requirements army wife verbal taunts d., kills her; G of M d. sees wife enter woods w. guy, told by friend she cheats, kills him; NG of M d finds out x raped his mom, beats up x, then kills x hours later; conv. of murder.

Authority MPC 3.04 (1) MPC 3.04 (2) MPC 3.04 (2) US v. Goetz State v. Norman State v. Abbott US v. Petterson Authority MPC 3.02 People v. Unger US v. Shoon Regina v. Dudley

Facts use of force is a defense if necessary limitations use of deadly force different view of deadly force; subway case battered wife kills husband; convicted. driveway neighbor dispute case D stealng car leaves; d. re prevokes kill Facts can argue conduct was justified d. leaves honor farm; afraid of rape d's break into irs, protest. cannibalism at sea Facts d kills sec to pm. thinks ppl after him insanity defense (minority approach) muscovite kills/cuts up wife

Rule - SELF DEFENSE the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes (subjectively) that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion. actor believes = he must have good faith subjective belief; but if he is negligent or reckless in having such a belief, no defense he will still be convictable of crimes w/ neg/reckless element. (3.09)(2). (*this part ignored in most jurisdictions) the use of force is not justifiable to resist an arrest (even if unlawful), to protect yourself against the use of force by a person claiming property is his, unless the actor has been unlawfully dispossessed of the property and is trying to get it back. The use of deadly force is not justifiable unless the actor believes (see above) that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat. -- nor is it justifiable if: 1) the actor provoked the other party with the purpose of causing serious bodily injury or death (mere minor attack doesn't discharge; com law diff), or 2) he knows he can avoid using force with complete safety by a) retreating, or b) surrendering possession of a thing to person claiming a right to that thing, or c) complying w/ a demand to obtain from an action he had no duty to take. except he is not obligated to retreat from his dwelling or place of work unless he was the initial aggressor. (is the actor being confined? see 3.04(3)) view one; different from mpc on deadly force: even though a defendant may have a subjective belief that his self defense was reasonable, unless that belief was objectively reasonable, he will have no defense (won't be graded lower). objectively reasonable: based on circumstances of actor in situation; includes; relevant knowledge defendant had about person, physical attributes of persons, any prior experiences of defendant that could provide a reasonable basis for thinking force was necessary. immanent requirement: to constitute a complete defense, the defendant must subjectively believe the killing was necessary to protect herself from imminent death or great bodily harm, but this belief must also be reasonable; circumstances would create such a belief in a person w/ mind of ordinary firmness. -imminent: though serious bodily harm/death may appear inevitable, a predicted threat is not enough to constitute imminence, there must be immediate danger at the time of killing. (counter: circumstance of years of abuse make attack appear imminent) retreat requirement; same as mpc: (see above in 3.04 (2)): defendant can use reasonable force necessary to defend himself, but if he intends to use deadly force, he has a duty to retreat if he knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating. stressed knows/complete safety. (see mpc castle rule) no provocation: the right of self defense is denied to those who promote the necessitous occasion for taking life. (if initial aggressor stops being aggressive but then d. provokes, no defense). contrast this to the mpc which only makes provocation if it was w/ purpose of SBI/death. Rule LESSER EVILS (1) Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: 1) the harm sought to be avoided by his conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and 2) there are no applicable exceptions dealing with the specific situation in the statute + contrary legislative purpose. (2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms, there is no justification if the offense requires recklessness or negligence. (reduces any subjectivity) Factors used to evaluate defense of necessity: 1) defendant is faced with threat of serious bodily harm or death (or rape) in the immediate future 2) no time to complain to authorities 3) no chance to resort to the courts, 4) does not create more harm in his act 5) defendant reports incident to authorities when he is safe from the threat. note: the absence of one element does not bar the defense; jury can balance. Factors required to show necessity: 1) faced with a choice of evils and chose lesser 2) acted to prevent imminent harm 3) they reasonably contemplated a direct casual relationship between their conduct and the harm to be averted 4) they had no legal alternatives to violating the law. -- indirect civil disobedience is no defense: the common law does not support a protest in violation of a law or government policy where the law or policy is not the subject of the protest. There is not any absolute or unqualified necessity to preserve one's life. To preserve one's life is generally speaking, a duty, but it may be the plainest and highest duty to sacrifice it. The law may limit the defense where necessity would violate essential and core societal beliefs. Rule INSANITY view one: if the defendant was laboring under a defect of reason or disease of mind such that he 1) did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or 2) if he did, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. (must not know what he is doing or that it is wrong) state v. guido: does not identify specific diseases the will relive liability; but clear it must be from a mental disease (not emotional or moral insanity) that is in operation at the time of the act (p. 893) view two: A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either 1) to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or 2) to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. note the terms: mental disease or defect do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. mpc 4.01(2) (expands defense of insanity; not only covers those who don't know its wrong/what they are doing, but also d's who know its wrong but this doesnt rise to the appropriate affective level and d's whose disorder overrides self control) legal wrong sufficient to convict: an insanity conviction only requires that the defendant was aware his conduct was legally wrong, it is not required the he knew it was morally wrong. contrast: some jurisdictions require that the defendant knew his conduct was morally wrong (state v morgan), though these jurisdictions may imply a standard of societal, not personal moral wrongness. exception: defendant commits an act knowing it is legally wrong, that society would also consider a moral wrong, but believes she is under the command of a god due to a mental defect. (distinguish belief from thinking you are under a command by god) Rule DEMINISHED CAPACITY(dc only reduces the grade of a crime bc/lack of req. mental state; Insanity- complete defense a homicide which wld otherwise be murder may be reduced to manslaughter when it is committed under the influence of 1) extreme mental or emotional disturbance (subjective; must actually have it) 2) for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be (perception may have been inaccurate). -- actor's situation: see above - ML a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to 1) appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or 2) to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. note the terms: mental disease or defect do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. mpc 4.01(2) evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is an element of the offense. view one: evidence may be introduced into evidence if it is relevant to negate, or establish, the specific mental condition that is an element of the crime. view two: although observational evidence is admissible, mental disease evidence and capacity evidence are not admissible to negate the requisite mental intent for a crime. (all are admissible for insanity) 1) observational evidence: testimony of how d behaved, 2) mental-disease evidence: whether at the time of the event, defendant suffered from a recognized mental disease/defect (expert "opinion"), 3) capacity evidence: whether the disease or defect left defendant incapable of performing or experiencing requisite mental state (expert "opinion"). policy for: confuse jury, laws of psych. are diff from law; opinions may be presented too strong policy against: jury can weigh test., permitting obs evd. but not mc is odd. policy against allowing dc at all: law should provide norms for behavior, you don't get to decide how world looks, if you understand what the law is (i.e. not insane), you can be held liable for delusional picture of the world.

Authority M'Naghten Case MPC 4.01 State v. Crenshaw

Authority MPC 210.3(b) MPC 4.01 MPC 4.02 United States v. Brawner (p. 901) Clark v. Arizona (p. 902) yankah note

Facts Reducing Murder to Manslaughter Mental capacity legitimate to negate mens rea Evidence of mental capacity is admissible Takes same approach as mpc. (no facts) D shot female cop; convicted of first deg. murder ("intent/know"). D stated aliens were trying to kill him/imp. cops; D conv; no dc evd. admitted.

Authority MPC 2.02

Facts (general rule)

MPC 2.02 (6)

(purpose satisfied if conditional)

MPC 2.02 (7)

(knowledge satisfied if high probability)

State v. Hazelwood Regina v. Faulkner Concept Reasonable Doubt

captain accidentally crashes oil tanker; convicted D lights match to steal rum, burns ship down; not convicted.

Rule MENTAL STATES (argue in the alternative for lower mental states) Unless some element of mental culpability is proven with respect to each material element of the offense, no valid criminal conviction may be maintained. 2.02 (1) If a statute states a given mens rea that state of mind stated will apply to all material elements of a crime (unless otherwise indicated); if no state of mind is stated, D must have at least been reckless). 2.02 (2) 1. Purpose: a person acts purposely when it is his conscious objective to engage in conduct of the prohibited nature or to cause such a result. 2. Knowledge: a person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct if he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist. a person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. 3. Recklessness: a person acts recklessly when he 1) consciously disregards (must be aware of and ignore) a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow and 2) that this disregard constitutes a gross deviation of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. (must subjectively disregard a risk, that is an objective risk) 4. Negligence: a person acts negligently when he 1) fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow and 2) such failure constitutes a gross deviation (beyond tort negligence) from that a reasonable person would exercise under the circumstance. (entirely objective). conditional purpose; can satisfy purposeful mental state: when a particular purpose is an element of an offense, the element is established although such purpose is conditional (unless his conditional purpose negates the harm the law seeks to prevent 2.02(6). (United States v. Holloway; d carjacked, w/ conditional intent to harm; convicted). if the condition was not likely to occur (improbable), d can argue it was not his conscious objective to engage in the prohibited conduct. punishment for improbable condition also seems to be punishing person for who he is rather than crime. probable knowledge; can satisfy knowing mental state: when knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such 1) knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, 2) unless he actually believes that it does not exist. willful ignorance can satisfy knowing mental state: US v. Jewell (D "knowingly" transported marijuana; convicted.): a defendant can be considered to have acted knowingly if he is aware of a high probability that a particular fact exists (unless actually and subjectively believes it does not exist); willful ignorance of a fact in order to avoid culpability may take the place of actual knowledge. ordinary negligence sufficient to satisfy negligent mental state; different from mpc: gross negligence is not required to impose criminal liability, ordinary negligence is sufficient. - Imposing ordinary liability will increase chances ppl. act more carefully v. social stigma follows conviction, law should require a mental state that corresponds w/ the contempt. requisite mental state must be shown for each crime charged with: culpable state of mind is required for each separate crime that D is charged for; d does not automatically have the state of mind for a second crime because he had it for the first. tracking; may indicate lack of mental state: u shoot down a plane taken over by terrorists; argue intent to kill does not "track" passengers (no purpose, thgh in practical sense intended; at least knwldg) ppl v. acousta; no rklssnss; d's conduct didn't track pilots). Notes tradeoff: a reasonable doubt stndrd(as opposed to the state having to prove a lesser burden) will result in less cnvctn, means fewer innocent ppl are convicted, but more guilty people will go free. reasonable doubt standard is difficult to quantify; perhaps better left to jury to interpret.

Rule BURDEN of PROOF Prosecution must prove every element of a charge beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is that which, after consideration of all of the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in the condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. (Curley v. United States).

Authority MPC 2.02(9) MPC 2.04 (1) MPC 2.04 (2) MPC 2.04(3) People v. Marreo (p. 267) Cheek v. US Lambert v. CA Rex v. Esop Authority MPC 2.01(3) MPC 2.01(4) People v. State Jones v. United States People v. Beardsley CW v. Cardwell ) Barber v. Superior Court (p. 208).

Facts no complete defense basic rule no defense if wrong crime exceptions; mistake of law legit here federal marshal carrying a gun in club pilot doesn't pay taxes to irs la law makes illegal for criminal to be in la w.out reg. foreign sailor commits sodomy; not crime in foreign Facts no liability for omissions

Rule MISTAKE of LAW the meaning and application of the criminal prohibition is not an element of the offense, and so mistakes about interpretation do not absolve D of liability [mistakes are only relevant when they negate an element of the offense] Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of law is only a defense insofar as: the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense. (ignorance/mistakes is only a defense insofar that it may reduce the level of culpability required for the crime) (limited: can't overcome obj. elements of reck/neg. crimes) the defense of mistake of law is not available if the defendant merely thinks he is committing a different crime from the one he supposed. however, his mistake can reduce the mental state to the level at which it would be at if he was convicted of the crime he thought he was committing. mistake of law is a defense where: 1 ) the statute or other enactment defining the offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged or 2) he acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous (contained in (i) a statute or other enactment; (ii) a judicial decision, opinion or judgment; (iii) an administrative order or grant of permission; or (iv) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation of the law defining the offense). where statute is official statement; reasonable but mistaken interpretation not permitted: although a defendant may raise a defense that he relied on an official statement of the law, a reasonable but mistaken interpretation of the statute itself will not be afforded protection. (MPC 2.04 (3)) in order to prove willfulness, the prosecution must negate D's claim he had a subjective, good faith belief he wasnt violati ng law. Of course, the more unreasonable the belief, the more likely the jury is to find mere disagreement w/the LD & not an honest mistaken belief. mistake of law legitimate if conduct passive and no reason to know: a conviction will be in violation of due process where a person takes a wholly passive act and did not know of the law and where there was no proof of the probability of obtaining notice of the law. (passive= failure to do something affirmatively; here to register). cultural ignorance of the law is generally not a defense, a person is put on constructive notice of the laws of the land. -- individualized justice v. norms for behavior Rule ACTS & OMISSIONS Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless: (a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or (b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law Possession is an act, within the meaning of this Section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession. moral duty insufficient: a legally recognized duty is required, not just a moral duty, is required to impose criminal liability for failure to act. legal duties imposed by law; where omissions can be unlawful: 1) a statute imposes a legal duty 2) one party stands in a certain status relationship to another (parent to child, husband to wife, master to apprentice, innkeeper to tenants, doctor to patients, teacher to student ect.) 3) one party has a contractual obligation to the other 4) one has voluntarily assumed the duty of helping another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others from rendering aid. reluctant to expand legal relationships: courts are reluctant to expand upon traditionally legally recognized duties; provides clear rules, court does not want to be in the business of analyzing human relationships. alternatively; (step mom did not prevent her husband from killing his daughter; convicted). court must take into account the reality of "modern day" parenting functions when recognizing a legal duty. (People v. Carrol). if you have a duty, must meet sufficiency of duty: a person charged with a duty of care is required to take steps that are reasonably calculated to achieve success. no duty to continue treatment: a physician has no duty to continue treatment once it has proven to be ineffective and the patient no longer consents to the treatment. though the physician's withholding further treatment was viewed as an omission, it could alternatively be viewed as an affirmative act (pulling the plug).

possession can be considered an act woman let crazy mother/her baby into her home, did not call authorities after mom beat the baby; no conviction. man let baby not his starve, mom was around; no conviction. man witnessed woman he was having an affair overdose on morphine tablets, did not contact authorities; no conviction. mom & daughter were abused by stepdad for yrs, mom wrote letters asking him to stop; mom convicted child abuse Dr. pulls takes dying patient off life support; no conviction.

MPC- DEFENSES 1. subjective belief in danger of death or great bodily harm o 3.04(b) fear of rape, robbery, kidnap= self defense o 3.09(3) if D subjectively believes and is charged with purpose or knowing crime = perfect defens o if charged with negligent or reckless crime= manslaughter (ie no self defense) 2. 3.04(1) relaxed standard--sufficient to honestly believe immediately necessary on present occasion 3. 3.04(2)(b) deadly force ok in response to deadly force, risk of serious bodily injury, serious crime like kidnapping/violent rape that often lead to violent injury o If kill innocent bystander while self defense only liable if neg/reckless re: 3rd person 4. cant be initial aggressor= purpose to cause death/harm 5. 3.04(2)(b)(ii) duty to retreat ONLY if know can safely retreat o Only duty to retreat from home/work if initial aggressor or assailed by coworker in work place COMMON LAW 1. honest and reasonable fear of death/great bodily harm o Goetz (NY) does typical= reasonable? (look to race as proxy for socioeconomic class and possibility of harm) o Factors allowed in: 1. physical attributes 2. Ds prior experience 3. movements/ words of victims -- Trend toward more subjective objective approach -- BSW evidence comes in to go HONEST (subjective) not reasonable(objective) **if honest but UNreasonable fear= imperfect self defense voluntary MSL if unreasonable fear provoked; involuntary MSL if reckless/crim neg. killing 2. imminent and unlawful threat- Traditionally threat must be @ that moment b/c if not could pursue legal means to resolve - BWS differing views on what is imminent- Norman maj. Sleeping husband not imminent v. dissent constant and impending doom makes possibility ever imminent 3. proportional response to the threat - Must be deadly force SELF-DEFENSE 8.01 Use of Non-deadly force [A] Common Law A non-aggressor is justified in using force upon another if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect himself from imminent use of unlawful force by the other person. However, the use of force must not be excessive in relation to the harm threatened. One is never permitted to use deadly force to repel a non-deadly attack. [B] Model Penal Code A person is justified in using force upon another person if he believes that such force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the exercise of unlawful force by the other on the present occasion. [MPC 3.04(1)] In a departure from common law principles but in accord with the modern trend, a person may not use force to resist an arrest that he knows is being made by a police officer, even if the arrest is unlawful (e.g., without probable cause). [MPC 3.04(2)(a)(i)] However, this rule does not prohibit use of force by an arrestee who believes that the officer intends to use excessive force in effectuating the arrest. - The provision does not specifically require the defendants belief to be reasonable. However, nearly all of the Code justification defenses, including the defense of self-protection, are modified by 3.09, which re-incorporates a reasonableness component. 8.02 Use of Deadly force [A] Common Law Deadly force is only justified in self-protection if the defendant reasonably believes that its use is necessary to prevent imminent and unlawful use of deadly force by the aggressor. Deadly force may not be used to combat an imminent deadly assault if a non -deadly response will apparently suffice. [B] Model Penal Code The Code specifically sets forth the situations in which deadly force is justifiable: when the defendant believes that such force is immediately necessary to protect himself on the present occasion against: (1) death; (2) serious bodily injury; (3) forcible rape; or (4) kidnapping. The Code prohibits the use of deadly force by a deadly aggressor, i.e., one who, with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself in th e same encounter. [MPC 3.04(2)(b)(i)] 8.03 Retreat Rule [A] Common Law If a person can safely retreat and, therefore, avoid killing the aggressor, deadly force is unnecessary. Nonetheless, jurisdictions are sharply split on the issue of retreat. A slim majority of jurisdictions permit a non-aggressor to use deadly force to repel an unlawful deadly attack, even if he is aware of a place to which he can retreat in complete safety. Many jurisdictions, however, provide that a non-aggressor who is threatened by deadly force must retreat rather than use deadly force, if he is aware that he can do so in complete safety. -- A universally recognized exception to the rule of retreat is that a non-aggressor need not ordinarily retreat if he is attacked in his own dwelling place or within its curtilage [the immediately surrounding land associated with the dwelling], even though he could do so in complete safety. [B] Model Penal Code One may not use deadly force against an aggressor if he knows that he can avoid doing so with complete safety by retreating. Retreat is not generally required in ones home or place of work. However, retreat from the home or office is required: (1) if the defendant was the initial aggressor, and wishes to regain his right of self-protection; or (2) even if he was not the aggressor, if he is attacked by a co-worker in their place of work. However, the Code does not require retreat by a non-aggressor in the home, even if the assailant is a co-dweller. 8.04 Reasonable Belief The privilege of self-defense is based on reasonable appearances, rather than on objective reality. Thus, a person is justified in using force to protect himself if he subjectively believes that such force is necessary to repel an imminent unlawful attack, even if appearances prove to be false. Courts are increasingly applying a standard of the reasonable person in the defendants situation in lieu of the reasonable person standard. Factors that may be relevant to the defendants situation or circumstances include: (1) the physical movements of the potential assailant; (2) any relevant knowledge the defendant has about that person; (3) the physical attributes of all persons involved, including the defendant; (4) any prior experiences which could provide a reasonable basis for the belief that the use of deadly force was necessary under the circumstances. 8.05 Imperfect Self-Defense Claims [A] Common Law The traditional common law rule is that if any element necessary to prove self-defense is lacking, the defense is wholly unavailable to a defendant. Some states now recognize a so-called imperfect or incomplete defense of self-defense to murder, which results in conviction for the lesser offense of either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. For example, a defendant who fails to satisfy the reasonableness component, although his belief was genuine, might be able to assert an imperfect or incomplete claim of self-defense, mitigating his crime to manslaughter. [B] Model Penal Code The Model Penal Code likewise recognizes an imperfect defense where the defendant asserts a justification defense, evaluated in terms of the defendants subjective belief in the necessity of using the force or other material circumstances. However, justification defenses are subject to section 3.09(2), which provides that when the defendant is reckless or negligent in regard to the facts relating to the justifiability of his conduct, the justification defense is unavailable to him in a prosecution for an offense for which recklessness or negligence suffices to establish culpability. 8.06 Battered Woman Syndrome : A special type of self-defense is the battered woman syndrome defense. Cases in which this defense arise may occur under three scenarios: (1)Confrontational homicides, i.e., cases in which the battered woman kills her partner during a battering incident. In such cases, an instruction on self-defense is almost always given. It is now routine for a court to permit a battered woman to introduce evidence of the decedents prior abusive tr eatment of her, in support of her claim of self-defense. (2) Non-confrontational homicide, where the battered woman kills her abuser while he is asleep or during a significant lull in the violence. Courts are divided on whether self-defense may be claimed if there is no evidence of threatening conduct by the abuser at the time of the homicide, although the majority position is that homicide under such circumstances is unjustified. (3) Third-party hired-killer cases, in which the battered woman hires or importunes another to kill her husband, and then pleads self-defense. Courts have unanimously refused to permit instructions in third-party hired-killer cases. 8.07 Risk to Innocent Bystanders [A] Common Law Courts apply a transferred-justification doctrine, similar to the transferred-intent rule: a defendants right of self-defense transfers (just as intent to kill does) from the intended to the actual victim. While the defense is absolute in some jurisdictions, other courts do not treat this rule as absolute. If the defendant, acting justifiably in self-defense against an aggressor, fires a weapon wildly or carelessly, thereby jeopardizing the safety of known bystanders, some courts hold the defendant guilty of manslaughter (or of reckless endangerment if no bystander is killed), but not of intentional homicide. [B] Model Penal Code If a person justifiably uses force against an aggressor, but uses such force in a reckless or negligent manner in regard to the safety of an innocent bystander, the justification defense, which is available to the person in regard to the aggressor, is unavailable to him in a prosecution for such recklessness or negligence as to the bystander.