Held, David and Anthony McGrew. 2000. The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction.

The Global Transformations Reader same ed. Theme of globalization called upon to account for huge range of recent de elopments. !i"e modernization# it has become the leitmotif of our age. Globalization$s origins %as an academic sub&ect' go bac" to the () th centur* +hen intellectuals li"e ,aint-,imon recognized ho+ modernit* +as integrating the +orld. In the ().0s and ()/0s# the term first began being used. In debates on the interconnectedness of human affairs# +orld s*stems theor*# and theories of comple0 interdependence all addressed this 1uestion of ho+ states +ere becoming more intert+ined. 2ith the collapse of communism and the consolidation of capitalism# discussion of globalization intensified dramaticall*. 3onceptualizing Globalization: Definitions differ in their emphasis on the material# spatio-temporal and cogniti e aspects of globalization. 4aterial: increasing material flo+s of people# capital# trade# etc.# different t*pes of infrastructure. ,patio-temporal: significant shift in the spatial reach of social action and organization to+ards the interregional or intercontinental scale# time and geograph* are no longer such important constraints. 3ogniti e: changing public perceptions of shrin"ing time and space# public a+areness of +a* distant e ents effect them. ,impl* put# globalization denotes the e0panding scale# gro+ing magnitude# speeding up and deepening impact of interregional flo+s and patterns of social interaction. The 4*th of Globalization 2hat is the 5global$ in globalization6 %Hirst 1997'. The global cannot necessaril* be interpreted as uni ersal. There is a lac" of spatial specificit* in the +or". It is precisel* because much of the literature on globalization fails to specif* the spatial referents for the global that . . . the concept becomes so broad as to become impossible to operationalize empiricall* and# therefore# largel* meaningless as a ehicle for understanding the contemporar* +orld. 7ne sort of criti1ue: compares toda*$s global trends compare +ith golden age of globalization of (8)0-()(9 %Gordon 1988, Jones 1995, Hirst 1997'. Another sort: constructs an abstract model of the globalization argument then measures up actual trends to the model % Dore 1995, Boyer and Drache 1996, Hirst and Tho !son 1996'. Trouble +ith these: strong assumption that statistical e idence b* itself can establish the 5truth$ about globalization Alternate approaches: use internationalization or regionalization instead so that +e +ill continue to see the continuing primac* of territor*# borders# place and national go ernments to the distribution and location of po+er# production and +ealth. If globalization is a m*th in realit*# then +h* the discourse6: ideological construction# a con enient m*th +hich . . . helps &ustif* and legitimize the neoliberal global pro&ect# that is# the creation of a global free mar"et and the consolidation of Anglo-American capitalism +ithin the +orld$s ma&or economic

regions %"allinicos et al# 199$, Gordon 1988, Hirst 1997, Hoo%velt 1997'. Globalization +ouldn$t get far +ithout :, %or other big po+er$s' support. &alt' argues that internationalization of economic or social relations ultimatel* relies on the preferences of those +ith the militar* and economic po+er to create and maintain the conditions for this openness. Gil!in also supports this argument that American po+er supports the liberal order. In this argument# internationalization is contingent on po+er relations in I;. The Globalist ;esponse ,cholars accept that the discourse of globalization ma* support neo-liberal pro&ects# but this doesn$t change the fact that it reflects real structural changes in the scale of modern social organization. If +e consider the range of scholars in this categor*# +e see that globalization cannot be reduced &ust to economic considerations. ;ather# globalization is a set of interrelated processes operating across all the primar* domains of social po+er# including the militar*# the political# and the cultural. <ut the patterns in each +on$t necessaril* be the same. The* are see"ing to differentiate the 5global$ from other spatial le els. The globalist anal*sis identifies globalization primaril* +ith acti ities and relations +hich cr*stallize on an interregional or intercontinental scale %Geyer and Bri%ht 1995( "astells 1996( Dic)en 1998'. It is also an attempt to position globalization in er* long-term patterns of secular historical change *Helleiner 1997+. ,ometimes globalization intensifies and sometimes its slo+s do+n# and it must be seen in relation to other historical de elopments that +ill influence this speed. ,ince it pulls and pushes societies in different directions it simultaneousl* engenders cooperation as +ell as conflict# integration as +ell as fragmentation# e0clusion and inclusion# con ergence and di ergence# order and disorder *Har,ey 1989( Giddens 199-( .o,ertson 199/( H0rrell and &oods 1995( .osena0 1997'. Globalist$s see globalization as in ol ing a reordering of the relationship bet+een territor* and socio-economic and political space. =ut simpl*# as economic# social and political acti ities increasingl* transcend regions and national frontiers this deli ers a direct challenge to the territorial principle of modern social and political organization. . . social# economic and political acti it* can no longer be understood as coterminous +ith national territorial boundaries. This doesn$t mean that territor* is irrele ant# but rather that it is being rein ented and reconfigured. The ;econfiguration of =olitical =o+er6 The formation and rule of the modern state: 2e largel* "no+ this stuff %rise of >uropean nation-state# 2estphalian s*stem of states# challenges of decolonization'# see state outlines. To+ards a global politics: The state has become a fragmented polic*ma"ing arena# permeated b* transnational net+or"s . . . as +ell as b* domestic agencies and forces. !i"e+ise# the e0tensi e penetration of ci il societ* b* transnational forces has altered its form and d*namics. 2e can point to the rise in the number of I?G7s# international cooperati e bodies#

regional integrati e bodies# and international trade %illicit included' net+or"s. 4ilitar* s*stems are becoming e0tremel* interconnected as are s*stems of production. The autonom* of states is compromised as go ernments find it increasingl* difficult to pursue their domestic agendas +ithout cooperating +ith other agencies# political and economic. The state no+ depends on cooperation +ith other states and non-state actors to sol e polic* problems *1eohane 198$( McGrew 199/+. The @ate of ?ational 3ulture The stor* of national culture: the s"eptic$s resource: ,ee nationalism outline on the reasons for the emergence of national culture. ?ationalism is the force that lin"s states to nations. . . ,ince national cultures ha e been centrall* concerned +ith consolidating the relationships bet+een political identit*# self-determination and po+ers of the state# the* are# and +ill remain# the s"eptics suggest# formidabl* important sources of ethical and political direction. ?e+ technolog* ma"es it possible to reinforce these common cultures. And ne+ technolog* ma"es it possible for denser communications bet+een ethnic communities. Access to other is apt to increase a+areness of difference +hich often leads to an accentuation of +hat is different %Gilroy 1987( .o,ins 1991( Massey and Jess 1995'. ?ational cultures appear to remain robust despite the in asion of :, and 2estern media and mass-mar"et cultural products. @inall*# defenders of national culture point out that there is no common global poor of memoriesA no common global +a* of thin"ingA and no 5uni ersal histor*$ in and through +hich people can unite. Despite globalization# nationalism and local culture doesn$t appear to be declining. 3ultural Globalization: ?ationalism is constructed for certain purposes# no+ it is at odds +ith the +orld in +hich +e li e. <ut people are slo+ to change identities and the comple0ities of national identit* politics are li"el* to remain. ,till# arguing for the persistence of cultural nationalism is not the same as arguing for political nationalism. =olitical nationalism +a ers in the face of the realit* that politics can onl* be conducted +ith reference to forces outside of state as +ell. The speed and olume of cultural e0ports and imports is increasingl* rapidl*. Technolog* has made instant communication possible. ?ational controls o er info ha e become largel* ineffecti e. > en language problems are being o ercome +ith the spread of >nglish. Interestingl*# this cultural spread is being dri en b* companies not countries. Also ne+ technolog* is brea"ing do+n the normal connection bet+een ph*sical location and social situation. ?e+ understandings# commonalities and frames of meaning are elaborated +ithout direct contact bet+een people. As such# the* can ser e to detach# or disembed# identities from particular times# places and traditions# and can ha e a 5pluralizing impact$ on identit* formation. %Hall 199/'.

A Global >conom*6 Debate around: (' the e0tent to +hich economic acti it* is being globalized# 2' +hether a ne+ form of capitalism# dri en b* 5the third industrial re olution$# is ta"ing hold across the globe# B' ho+ far economic globalization remains sub&ect to proper and effecti e national and international go ernance# and 9' +hether global competition spells the end of national economic strateg* and the +elfare state. The persistence of national economies: The current economic integration isn$t as considerable as the integration of earlier Cpo1ues %Gordon 1988( &eiss 1998( Hirst and Tho !son 1999'. >conomies aren$t necessaril* all that open to trade. In addition# migration is much smaller than in pre ious periods. 3an +e spea" of a globalized econom*6 Theoreticall*# in a globalized econom* +orld mar"et forces ta"e precedence o er national economic conditions as the real alue of "e* economic ariables %production# prices# +ages# and interest rates' respond to global competition'. <ut again e idence is argued to fall short of this claim %Garrett 1998'. > en multinationals remain predominatel* the capti es of national or regional mar"ets %Tyson 1991( .0i%ro) and T0lder 1995'. 3ritics argue that +e are seeing an increased internationalization of the econom*# increased lin"s bet+een national economies. > en this is suspect# because man* nations are not in ol ed in the international econom*. @urthermore# regional mar"ets appear to be of much more import than global mar"ets %this is +hat A%%arwal argues'. Also# distinct capitalist social formations continue to flourish on the models of the >uropean social-democratic mi0ed econom*# the American neo-liberal pro&ect and the de elopmental state of >ast Asia %&ade 199-'. Despite the aspirations of its most po+erful protagonists# the neoliberal tide of the ())0s has not forced a genuine or substanti e con ergence bet+een these %2char!3 1991( Hart 199/'. If +e loo" at the global distribution of +ealth and economic po+er# nation-states and geograph* are still important. 3orporations are still tied to nation-states %.0i%ro) and T0lder 1995'. 2hen loo"ing at changes in production# globalists emphasize changes in the di ision of labor at the cost of missing the real continuities in the di ision of labor and production. That is# most de eloping countries still e0port primar* products and industrial manufacturing remains primaril* a source of support for de eloped countries %Gordon 1988'. In the realm of international economic regulation# the dominance of the G/ means that economic multilateralism has not re+ritten the basic principle . . . might trumps right % Gil!in 1987'. International economic regulation is the sub&ect of huge debates at present and s"eptics of the globalization ie+ argue that the* ma* end in more <retton 2oods li"e s*stems than in deregulation. ?ational go ernments remain central to economic regulation. 3ontemporar* conditions pose no real threat to states. In fact# states can use economic interdependence to their ad antage in so much that it allo+s for sustained national economic gro+th. ;ather than a sign of +ea"ened states# the >: can be ie+ed as mo e to pool resources to ha e more control o er e0ternal conditions. The states are not &ust responding to the global mar"et# rather it is states that create the necessar* national and international conditions that allo+ for the global mar"et in the first place. ,tates are both the architects and the sub&ects of the +orld econom*. <ut state$s don$t all

respond the same +a* to international pressures# such pressures are mediated b* domestic structures and institutional arrangements +hich produce enormous ariations in the capacit* of national go ernments to respond %Garrett and 4an%e 1996( &eiss 1998'. ?ational go ernments remain . . . the sole source of effecti e and legitimate authorit* in the go ernance of the +orld econom*# +hile also being the principal agents of international economic coordination and regulation. The ne+ global econom*: Trends point undeniabl* to+ard intensif*ing integration. @inancial integration is +ide spread and 4?3s incorporate national economies into global and regional production s*stems % "astells 1996'. According to 5h ae# this is a 5borderless econom*$ +here the distinction bet+een domestic and global economic acti it* is hard to sustain. Globalists see one global econom* transcending regional ones# something +hich didn$t happen in the past %Geyer and Bri%ht 1995( Dic)son 1997'. ;egionalism facilitates global integration b* pro iding a mechanisms for national economies to engage in the global econom* % Ga ,le and 6ayne 1991( Hanson 1998'. The* also see the s*stem as post-hegemonic. =o+er differentials are there# but are being diluted. The change to post-industrialism %"astells 1996( 6iore and 2a,el 198$'# has brought a big alternation in the form and nature of global capitalism# to a capitalism sometimes labeled turbo-capitalism. 4?3s pla* a "e* role in this ne+ form. The* are more and more important. The deindustrialization of >urope and the :, can be seen as the result of 4?3 policies of outsourcing to ?I3s# etc %&ood 199$, .odric) 1997'. This results in an increasingl* united elite across boundaries# but also much more ine1ualit* +ithin states. The +orld is being di ided into +inners and losers %.odric) 1997, .eich 1991, "astells 1998'. Giddens argues that in this ne+ capitalist s*stem economic globalization ris"s creating a 5runa+a* +orld$. Go ernments# therefore# ha e no real option other than to accommodate to the forces of economic globalization % A in 1996( "o7 1997'. There is considerable debate about the capacit* of international regulation bodies to deal +ith the effects of the run+a* global econom*. 5h ae sees nation-states as a passing phenomena because the* don$t correspond +ith the needs of current economic organization. 7thers %Gill 1995( 2tran%e 1996( etc#+ argue that states are being pushed into adopting similar neo-liberal policies. 7thers point out that +ith increased global competition states cannot maintain e0isting +elfare states % "o7 1997( .eich 1991'. This scares of in estment. And states cannot &ust borro+ mone* to support the +elfare state. 7thers argue that globalization e1uals the end of the +elfare state %Go0revitch 1986( .odri) 1997'. Di ided ?ations# :nrul* 2orld To+ards one +orld6: 5h ae is basicall* a modernization theorist. All societies +ill ad ance and all +ill do +ill under neo-liberal globalization. ,ocial-democratic globalists offer a different ision: global +or" force is di ided into +inners and losers %.al) 1995( Gill 1995( "astells 1997'A social solidarit* is eroded as +elfare states become ulnerable % "o7 1997( 2char!3 1999'. Globalization creates affluence at the e0pense of po ert* for others# but this is no longer confined to the south. The globalization of po ert* di ides states and societies# generating conditions for a more

unstable +orld %Dic)son 1997'. A ne+ global social democratic pact is re1uired. The challenge of enduring ine1ualit*: 7ld 4ar0ist categories still important# still ha e core and third +orld# deepening ?orth-,outh di ide. >conomic internationalization is nothing more than 2estern Imperialism. ,ocialists- "allinicos et al# 199$ ;ealist accounts: Ine1ualit* is inscribed in the er* structure of the +orld order since a global hierarch* of po+er is a conse1uence of a s*stem +hich ran"s states according to their national economic and militar* po+er %Gil!in 1981( 1rasner 1985'. Dierarch* "eeps order and remains er* rele ant. 2orld 7rders# ?ormati e @utures ,"eptics %Bo,,io, Dahl, Miller 1988, Miller 1999, &al'er 1988+ see: International societ* of statesA political conflict bet+een states ine itabl* persistsA international go ernance and geopoliticsA and communitarianism Globalists %Held 1991( 1ec) and 2i))in) 1998( J# Tho !son 1998+ see: 4ultila*ered global go ernanceA global ci il societ*A global polit*A and cosmopolitianism Geyer, Michel and "harles Bri%ht World History in a Global Agex Ge*er and <right offer a critical histor* of >uropean colonialism and +orld histor* that I +on$t go into. The* do ma"e an interesting point about modernization theor*. The* see the deepening chasms bet+een us and them caused b* >uropean colonialism and racial discourses as gi ing rise to a specialized and instrumental "no+ledge of progress that resulted in modernization theor*. In this ision# >urope gained its uni1ue position in +orld histor* as the 2est +ith all that implies. The histor* of an integrating +orld predicted first# that in dominating the +orld through its master* of the technical and material means of global integration# the 2est +ould actuall* control the +orld and be able to shape the course of global de elopment# and# second# that in shaping the +orld# the 2est held secure "no+ledge# positi e empirical proof of its o+n de elopment# of the direction and outcome of +orld histor*. The +orld +ould become more li"e the 2est in a protracted process of modernizationE.. Things didn$t +or" out this +a*. ?either the :, nor <ritain +as able to use force to establish lasting +orld order. ?or did the 2est$s technolog* e er gi e it the abilit* to mold the +orld into a homogeneous global ci ilization. Ge*er and <right see the rise of the state and globalization as intricatel* lin"ed because the condition of globalit* has al+a*s been organized locall*. ?or matter ho+ po+erful or abstract the net+or"s of global e0change or ho+ remote their nodes of control# each transaction needs articulation in some particular place# in some meaningful idiom# under specific circumstancesA processes of globalization must come to ground in concrete social# cultural# and political conte0ts that mo e people to purposi e endsE <ut to the e0tent that present da* globalization has a tendenc* to b*pass politics# short-circuit the formation of national agenda# and challenge the capacit* of the state for political self-organization# that is# to constitute the nation and organize comple0 social relations +e see a gro+ing disillusionment +ith state politics and the proliferation and strengthening of

famil* and "inship net+or"s and# more generall*# of identit*-based %ethnic or religious' communities as substitutes for national politics in much of the +orld. Hirst, 6a0l and Graha e Tho !son Globalization a Necessary Myth? The* summarize their argument as the follo+ing %note that the* are primaril* addressing the thesis of economic globalization because the* belie e that this notion is largel* behind other notions of globalization in culture or politics': (' The present highl* internationalized econom* is not unprecedented: it is one of a number of distinct con&unctures or states of the international econom* that ha e e0isted since an econom* based on modern industrial technolog* began to be generalized from the (8.0s. In some respects# the current international econom* is less open and integrated than the regime that pre ailed from ()/0 to ()(9. 2' Genuinel* transnational companies appear to be relati el* rare. 4ost companies are based nationall* and trade multinationall* on the strength of a ma&or national location of assets# production and sales# and there seems to be no ma&or tendenc* to+ards the gro+th of trul* international companies. B' 3apital mobilit* is not producing a massi e shift in in estment and emplo*ment from the ad anced to the de eloping countries. ;ather foreign direct in estment %@DI' is highl* concentrated among the ad anced industrial economies and the Third 2orld remains marginal in both in estment and trade# a small minorit* of ne+l* industrializing countries apart. 9' As some of the e0treme ad ocates of globalization recognize# especiall* if the* coordinate polic*# the +orld econom* is far from being genuinel* 5global$. ;ather trade# in estment and financial flo+s are concentrated in the Triad of >urope# Fapan and ?orth America and this domination seems set to continue. G' These ma&or economic po+ers# the GB# thus ha e the capacit*# especiall* if the* coordinate polic*# to e0ert po+erful go ernance pressures o er financial mar"ets and other economic tendencies. Global mar"ets are thus b* no means be*ond regulation and control# e en though the current scope and ob&ecti es of economic go ernance are limited b* the di ergent interests of the great po+er and the economic doctrines pre alent among their elites. The* argue that a trul* global econom* re1uires not &ust changes in flo+s but also substanti e changes in economic structure. A globalized econom* +ould be one in +hich distinct national economies are subsumed and rearticulated into the s*stem of international processes and transactions. The international econom* is one in +hich national policies still dominate and international phenomena reflect interactions of national economies. A globalized econom* +ould ha e serious go ernance problems. 3omplete deregulation +ould li"el* lead to conflict and competition in the +orld. In a globalized econom*# 4?3s +ould become transnational corporations +hich +ould no longer be controlled or constrained. <ut this doesn$t appear to be reall* occurring# companies still prefer to "eep important functions li"e ;HD in the home countr*. Globalization +ould also +ea"en the po+er of labor#

+ea"ening social democratic policies. @inall*# +e +ould e0pect that bodies other than states# I?G7s# T?3s# etc. +ould gain po+er is-I- is the state in international affairs. 1eohane, .o,ert Sovereignty in International Society Globalization is happening and the tas" of the +orld$s states is to de ise ne+ institutional arrangements to control it. Mann, Michael# Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation State? De offers up a conceptual distinction bet+een: (' local net+or"sJsubnational net+or"s of interaction# 2' national net+or"s- net+or"s structured or bounded b* the nation-state# B' international net+or"sJrelations bet+een nationall* constituted net+or"s# 9' transnational net+or"sJpassing right through national boundaries# and G' global net+or"sJthat co er the +orld as a +hole or most of it. In order to e0amine the fate of the nation-state +e should loo" at the ans+er to t+o 1uestions: Is the significance of national and inter-national net+or"s Kboth of +hich are structured b* the stateL declining relati e to some combination of local and transnational net+or"s6 And to the e0tent that global net+or"s are emerging# +hat is the relati e contribution to them of nationalMinter-national ersus localMtransnational net+or"s6 De argues that in economic matters# +hat +e see is less transnational capitalism than international capitalism. ?ational and international net+or"s structure the econom*. De does agree that there are a considerable amount of transnational acti ism net+or"s emerging that ta"e ad antage of ne+ communications technolog*# but these aren$t so different from earlier transnational net+or"s that used the technolog* of the da*. Also# he notes that the rise in transnational net+or"s is paralleled# if not b*passed# b* a gro+th in inter-national net+or"s in the form of international agencies. Although transnational net+or"s of ad ocac* are important ironicall* the* strengthen the state in so much as the* are geared to+ard ma"ing more effecti e demands on the state to regulate# pro ide# etc. The emergence of ne+ identities ma* help to rein igorate the state. 2tran%e, 20san# The .etreat o3 the 2tate ,ee boo" re ie+. &eiss, 4inda# The Myth o3 the 6owerless 2tate ,ee boo" re ie+. "astells, Man0el# !he Global Econo"y The global econom* is an econom* +ith the capacit* to +or" as a unit in real time on a planetar* scale. De argues that +e ha e reached this point. Although there are parts of different domestic economies that remain relati el* insulated# the dominant segments and firms# the strategic cores of all economies are deepl* connected to the +orld mar"et# and their fate is a function of their performance in such a mar"et. The* d*namism of domestic mar"ets depends ultimatel* on the capacit* of domestic firms and net+or"s or firms to compete globall*. <ut he sees the change in production processes as the underl*ing force behind the emergence of a global

econom*. =roduction is becoming essentiall* +eb-li"e# transborder production net+or"s# ta"ing bits and pieces from all o er. <ut +e ha e to accept that there are limits to the globalization thesis. The international econom* is not *et global according to critics# in so much as it remains constrained b* national controls# nor is it full* integrated. @urthermore# mar"et penetration is not e en or reciprocal. 2e can see the global econom* as being organized around three regions: ?orth America# >uropean :nion# and the Asian =acific region. Around this triangle of +ealth# po+er and technolog*# the rest of the +orld becomes organized in a hierarchical and as*mmetricall* interdependent +eb. De considers this regionalization to be an attribute of the global econom*# because the interaction of historicall*-rooted institutions and global economic actors creates a certain %regional' outcome. De also argues that the global econom* is not a planetar* econom*# in that it doesn$t touch e er*thing. Its actual operation and structure concern onl* segments of economic structures# countries# and regions# in proportions that er* according to the particular position of a countr* or region in the international di ision of labor. De sees a ne+ di ision of labor in the global econom*. The global econom*# gro+ing out of informational-based production is characterized b* its interdependence# its regionalization# the increasing diversification within each region# its selective inclusiveness# its exclusionary segmentation# and# as a result of these features# an e0traordinaril* variable geometry that tends to dissol e historical# economic geograph*. De argues that toda* the +orld is mar"ed b* a Triad po+er %:,# Fapan# >:'. The old discussions of ?orthM,outh can no longer appl*. <ut +e can still tal" of dependenc* in an as*mmetrical relationship. The configurations of +hat countr* fits +hat are changing. 2ith some of the south mo ing into the a more dominant position in the relationship. <ut e en as countries ma* ad ance# much of their population is losing outJhence his discussion of selecti e inclusi eness and e0clusionar* segmentation. The phenomena of dependence as such has not disappeared# +hat has changed is the +a* in +hich +e percei e of geograph*. ;ather than seeing it as fi0ed +e should see it as a ariable geometr*. Hirst, 6a0l and Graha e Tho !son# Globalization and the History of the International Econo"y Another argument that the international econom* +as more open pre-()(9 than toda*- if +e loo" at 4?3s# labor migration# and trade. @inancial trade has changed considerabl* in form# but isn$t necessaril* more open or globalized. Garrett, Geo33rey# Global Mar#ets and National $olitics !oo"ing at trade in goods and ser ices# multinationalization of production# and financial capital mobilit*# he argues that globalization has not constrained national policies as much as thought. There are t+o basic reasons +h* globalization constraints on polic* choice are +ea"er than much contemporar* rhetoric suggests. @irst# mar"et integration has not onl* increased the e0it options of producers and in estorsA it has also heightened feelings of economic insecurit* among broader segments of societ*. This

situation has strengthened political incenti es for go ernments to use the polic* instruments of the state to mitigate mar"et dislocations b* redistributing +ealth and ris". ,econd# although there are costs associated +ith inter entionist go ernment . . . numerous go ernment programs generate economic benefits that are attracti e to mobile finance and production. Toda* it is not contro ersial to argue that good go ernment entails protecting propert* rights and increasing human capital and ph*sical infrastructure. It is e en possible that this could go further to the benefits of reducing ine1ualit*. Nariation can be seen on the capital e0it ersus state inter ention continuum arising from different political and social institutions in a gi en countr*. .odri), Dani# Has Globalization Gone too %ar? Globalization is creating deep fault-lines bet+een +inners and losers# and states are caught in the middle. Globalization is not at present compatible +ith domestic political stabilit*. ,ources of tension: (' reduced barriers to trade and in estment accentuate the as*mmetr* bet+een groups that can cross international borders. . . and those that cannot. 2or"ers get scre+ed o er in this# the* incur +age loses and insecurit*. Their bargaining po+er erodes. 2' globalization engenders conflicts +ithin and bet+een nations o er domestic norms and the social institutions that embod* them. Ner* different nations %norms# institutions# alues# etc.' are re1uired to compete for er* similar things. Different de elopment le els ma"e this hard. Trade becomes contentious +hen . . . it undermines norms implicit in domestic practices. B' globalization has made it e0ceedingl* difficult for go ernments to pro ide social insurance. International economic integration is ta"ing place a against the bac"ground of receding go ernments and diminished social obligations. The +elfare state is under attac"# ta0es are lost +ith footloose capital# but need is up. 3oined the term--;A3> T7 TD> <7TT74 >arlier globalization also raised ine1ualit* and partiall* led to the closing of borders in the inter+ar period. ;estrictions on immigration +eren$t so common bac" then# so the tension tal"ed about in ( +asn$t so pre alent. Also loo"ing at number t+o# the competition +asn$t so head-on or in similar things. Also the +elfare state hadn$t *et reached its maturit* and so it +asn$t under as much public pressure# people didn$t percei e the state$s role as one of po ert* relief and social ser ices. ,o +hat +e need is some "ind of global social insurance. .ei%er, 9l ar and 2te!han 4ei,3ried# Welfare State &i"its to Globalization ,ee photocop*. About ho+ domestic interest groups resist reductions in +elfare state +hen faced +ith globalization and ho+ the* st*mie reform. Interesting for +elfare state discussion as +ell. :verson, Tor,en and Tho as "0sac) ;The "a0ses o3 &el3are 2tate 97!ansion< Deind0striali'ation or Glo,ali'ation=>

This article actuall* has much more to do +ith the +elfare state stuff. <ut it does offer some interesting food for thought for globalization. The* point out that there is a common argument that globalization caused the e0pansion of the +elfare state. .odri) argues that 4ore open economies ha e greater e0posure to the ris"s emanating from turbulence in +orld mar"ets. 2e can ie+ larger go ernment spending in such economies as performing an insulation function# insofar as the go ernment sector is the 5safe$ sector . . . relati e to other acti ities# and especiall* compared to tradables. @or Garrett# =erhaps the most important immediate effect of globalization is to increase social dislocations and economic insecurit*# as the distribution of incomes and &obs across firms and industries becomes increasingl* unstable. The result is that increasing numbers of people ha e to spend more time and mone* tr*ing to ma"e their future more secure. De argues that leftgo ernments +ill be more responsi e to these demands for compensation. "a eron, .0%%ie, and 1at'enstien all ma"e similar arguments about openOris" causes pressures for +elfare state. <ut the* disagree# +hile the* belie e that e0posure to ris" causes demands for state protection and public ris" sharing# the* see the origins of ris" in changes in production and deindustrialization. Deindustrialization is caused b* domestic changes not b* competition from Third 2orld %or ?I3' producers. Technological progress# demand conditions# and shifting consumption patterns caused deindustrialization +hich caused gro+th in +elfare state. ?ote that deindustrialization +as not the same e er*+here. %4* 1uestion from a globalization point of ie+ is ho+ +e can argue that changes in technolog*# demand# and consumption are not someho+ international. Aren$t the*6' "oo!er, ?rederic)# ;&hat is the conce!t o3 %lo,ali'ation %ood 3or= An A3rican Historian@s 6ers!ective> I am not going to go into the entiret* of his argument# seeing as +e$ e all read it. I$m &ust going to pull out +hat might be important for ans+ering a 1uestion. De ta"es issues +ith the global in globalization# because it implies a single s*stem of connection has penetrated the entire globe +hen this is not entirel* true. ,econd# he ta"es issue +ith the ization as impl*ing that this is someho+ the global age. In accepting the concept of globalization# +e fail to as" about the limits of interconnection# about the areas +here capital cannot go# and about the specificit* of structures necessar* to ma"e connections +or". De argues that the +orld has long beenJand still isJa space +here economic and political relations are er* une en . . . ,tructures and net+or"s penetrate certain places and do certain things +ith great intensit*# but their effects tail off else+here. De points out that the use of this term demonstrates social scientists$ inabilit* to deal +ith large-scale# but not uni ersal processes. 2e ha e a hard time e0plaining the fact of crucial lin"ages that cut across state borders and lines of cultural difference but +hich nonetheless are based in specific mechanisms +ithin certain boundaries. De characterizes se eral ie+s of globalization. The ban"er$s boast I la 7hmae# totall* neo-liberal argument. The ,ocial Democrat$s !ament# that accepts the realit* of neo-liberal globalization and see"s protections against its negati e effects. And the Dance of the @lo+s and @ragments +hich argues

that globalization reconfigures the local. That is culture is unattached from special locations and crosses borders# but this ironicall* leads to increasing a+areness of cultural particularit*. De argues that the* are all to totalizing and presentist. 7pen trade# financial mobilit*# labor# etc. +ere part of the Golden Age of the late (800s. In fact it might ha e been more open than no+. Also# +e need to point out that labor is ?7T allo+ed to mo e freel*. Also# the social democrat$s are +rong to thin" that the state is becoming +ea"er and incapable of meeting social needs. The +elfare state isn$t shrin"ing. Globalization b* definition must mean e0panding integration to a planetar* scale. <ut +e should note that globalization shares a lot +ith modernization: something not full* realized but on-going and ine itable# ie+ change as rapid and per asi e# both depend for their e ocati e po+er on a sense that change is not a series of disparate elements but the mo ement of them in a common direction. 2e should be +ar* then of the fla+s of modernization theor*# +hich parallel those of globalization: see change as something that is self-propelled# mas"ing of real 1uestions of the da*. De loo"s at historical interrelationships of Africa# >urope and the Americas to demonstrate ho+ one might loo" for specificit* of interrelatedness or transnational net+or"s# etc. De argues that +e might loo" more at changing relationships of firms# states# transnational net+or"s# etc. instead of emphasizing globalization per se. 2hat is often gi en as proof of globalization is generall* something else# something larger than the local but smaller than the global. Issue net+or"s# diasporas# etc. ma* appeal to the uni ersal in pushing for their causes# but +e must realize that the discourse is more uni ersal than the practices. Milner, Helen and .o,ert 1eohane# ;:nternationali'ation and Do estic 6olitics and :ntrod0ction> Define internationalization as the processes generated b* underl*ing shifts in transaction costs that produce obser able flo+s of goods# ser ices# and capital. The* ha e t+o propositions about internationalization and domestic politics. (' As internationalization progresses# the tradables sector +ill e0pand and the econom* +ill become more sensiti e to +orld mar"et price trends and shoc"s. The li"elihood of ma&or domestic polic* and institutional reforms +ill gro+ as internationalization ma"es the econom* more ulnerable to e0ternall* generated economic shoc"s. 2' Internationalization +ill undermine the autonom* and efficac* of go ernment macroeconomic polic*. It +ill more seriousl* constrain the beha ior of left-+ing go ernments than right-+ing go ernments. 3apital mobilit* +ill ha e more far-reaching conse1uences than trade openness. The* also point out that industrialization +ill effect e en closed economies because it +ill change opportunit* costs globall*. @urthermore# internationalization +ill put capital at the fore. Internationall* mobile capital +ill gain political po+er# relati e to labor and political officials# as internationalization proceeds. Domestic institutions and politics ma* resist internationalization b* (' bloc"ing relati e price signals from the international econom* from entering the domestic one# thus obscuring actors$ interestsA 2' freezing coalitions and policies in place b* ma"ing the costs of changing these coalitions and policies

er* highA and B' b* channeling leaders$ strategies in response to international economic change. ?rieden and .o%ows)i# ;The : !act o3 the :nternational 9cono y on Aational 6olicies< An Analytical 5verview> Tr*ing to sho+ ho+ economic integration affects domestic politics# policies# and institutions b* using international trade theories to generate testable propositions about the preferences of important groups +ithin societies. Their independent ariable is internationalization seen as an e0ogenous decrease in the costs# or an increase in the re+ards# of international economic transactions. Their dependent ariables are threefold: (' the polic* preferences of rele ant socioeconomic and political agents +ithin countries to+ard national policies and national polic*-ma"ing institutionsA 2' gi en these preferences# the adoption or e olution of national policies and of national polic* institutionsA and B' gi en preferences# policies# and institutions# the relationship bet+een a gi en set of institutions and a gi en set of policies. The* mainl* focus on ( though and lea e the institutional 1uestions to Garrett and !ange. In loo"ing at costs# the* loo" primaril* at prices +hich the* thin" can reflect a lot of different stuff. The* see t+o "inds of price changes# price con ergence and price shoc"s. The* argue that easing of international trade raises the share of tradable goods in each countries econom*. It also heightens the transmission of +orld economic trends to domestic political economies. In doing so# it intensifies actors$ preferences concerning go ernments$ foreign economic policies. If +e loo" at these t+o effects of eased international trade# +e can see that it +ill also (' increase pressure +ithin each countr* to liberalize international trade and pa*ments# including the dismantling of structural impediments to tradeA 2' create such broad political pressures as an increasing function of the degree to +hich the national econom* +as pre iousl* closedA B' generate such aggregate pressure for change as an increasing function of the degree to +hich the econom* has readil* e0ploitable gains from trade a ailable. <ut easing international e0change isn$t great for e er*one. 7nl* those +ho stand to profit# not those competing +ith imports. The ,tolper-,ameulson model sho+s that those +hose good re1uires a factor in +hich the countr* has an abundance %labor# capital# land' +hile those +hose prices ha e fallen and are factor-intensi e +ill lose out. The Dec"scher-7hlin model implies that e0ogenous easing raises the domestic prices of goods +ho production is intensi e in the gi en countr*$s abundant factors and lo+ers domestic prices of goods intensi e in the countr*$s scarce factorsA hence easier trade benefits a countr*$s abundant factors but harms its scare factors. ;icardo-Niner focuses on factor specificit*. @actors specific to particular uses bear the full +eight of price changes in their distincti e products. >ach of these predicts different preferences is-I- is easing. The* h*pothesize that different domestic institutions +ill ha e the follo+ing effect on national policies to+ard easing of international e0change. (' 7n a erage# democratic regimes +ill liberalize more readil* than nondemocratic ones. 2' Among e1uall* democratic regimes# and among different electi e

bodies +ithin the same countr*# the tendenc* to liberalize +ill increase as the number of distinct constituencies decreases. B' All else e1ual# the li"elihood of liberalization +ill decline +ith increasing partisan fragmentation. %I$d e0plain the logic of these but I don$t reall* get itP' Garrett and 4an%e ;:nternationali'ation, :nstit0tions, and 6olitical "han%e> 2ant to sho+ ho+ changing preferences caused b* easing of international change get translated into policies# so "e* ariable is institutions. >ssentiall* game theoretic. 3oncentrating on t+o t*pes of institutions: socio-economic that organize interests in pri ate sector and formal that aggregate pri ate interests into the public sector and determine go ernments$ responsi eness to them. <asic assumption of ho+ go ernments +or": politicians +ant to sta* in office# distribute benefits to their constituencies to do this. Distributional game more important than o erall macro-economic situation. 7penness changes preferences of actors %see @rieden and ;o+gos"i' Q Depending on e0isting socio-economic institutions %labor organized6 3apital organized6 >tc.' get Q constraints on macroeconomic polic* A?DM7; pressures on distributional s*stem of politics (st h*pothesis: the better the e0isting socioeconomic institutions perform under changing conditions in global mar"ets# the greater is the latitude for go ernments to maintain policies that further their distributional interests despite preference changes in pri ate sector and the policies +ill also be compatible +ith macro-economic performance. 7nce through these socioeconomic institutions preferences go through the formal institutions. 9 point here: (' the responsi eness of go ernments to changes in domestic preferences differs b* regime. The easier it is for opposition to challenge the policies of the incumbent go ernment# the more responsi e +ill the s*stem be to changes in societal preferences. 2' the more institutions pri ilege groups that form the core bases of support for incumbent go ernments# the stronger are the incenti es for go ernments to maintain policies and institutions that benefit these constituencies. B' The responsi eness of polic* and institutional change to a gi en change in societal preferences +ill be in ersel* correlated to the number of eto points in a political s*stem. 9' The more authorit* o er polic* rests in the hands of independent bureaucratic agencies# the less polic* change should be associated +ith a gi en change in the constellation of preferences in the pri ate sphere.