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$6*17(/18 This aiticle suiveys anu evaluates the answeis that philosopheis anu
animal ieseaicheis have given to two questions. Bo animals have thoughts. If so,
aie theii thoughts conceptual. Along the way, special attention is paiu to
uistinguish uebates of substance fiom meie battles ovei teiminology, anu to isolate
fiuitful aieas foi futuie ieseaich.

Bo animals engage in conceptual thought. 0pinions among philosopheis uiveige, ianging fiom a
iesounuing "no" (e.g. Baviuson 197S) to an emphatic "yes" (e.g. Caiiutheis 2uu4), with many
qualifieu answeis in between. This papei chaits this contioveisy. At issue is not only oui inheient
cuiiosity about the animals that suiiounu us, but also oui unueistanuing of oui own human
uniqueness.
I begin in section 1 by biacketing issues of concepts anu consiueiing whethei animals have
thoughts in any sense. In section 2 I then explain what makes some thoughts conceptual, anu
consiuei seveial aiguments that puipoit to show that animals have conceptual thoughts. Finally, in
section S I extiact some lessons fiom oui uiscussion that can be applieu going foiwaiu.

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To a fiist appioximation, thoughts aie contentful mental states that meuiate between peiception
anu action. Two basic types of thoughts aie 82$#29&, whose contents specify how the thinkei takes
the woilu to be, anu :2&#/2&, whose contents specify how the thinkei woulu like the woilu to be.
Wheieas beliefs can be evaluateu as accuiate oi inaccuiate, uesiies can be evaluateu as satisfieu oi
2
unsatisfieu. Foi example, my belief that theie is a cat on the mat is accuiate just in case theie is, in
fact, a cat on the mat; anu my uesiie that the cat move to my lap is satisfieu just in case the cat uoes,
in fact, move to my lap.
It is essential to thoughts that they be capable of paiticipating in /2,&%4#45. Thus, when
thoughts meuiate between peiception anu action they must uo so not just 0,7&,$$(, but /,1#%4,$$(, in
a way that is explaineu by theii contents. Foi example, if I believe that the cat is on the mat anu that
the uog is on the mat, anu then concluue that at least two things aie on the mat, my conclusion is
explicable in teims of the contents of my initial beliefs. Similaily, if I walk to the mat because I
uesiie to pet the cat anu believe that the cat is on the mat, my action is explaineu by the contents of
my uesiie anu belief.
This iough chaiacteiization of thought skips ovei many points of contioveisy, some of
which will be intiouuceu below. 0ne point woith flagging iight away, howevei, is that oui
chaiacteiization uoes not uictate that thoughts be composeu of concepts. 0bviously, this is paitly a
teiminological choice. 0ne coulu use the teim 'thought' such that thoughts aie constitutively
conceptual (Buige 2u1u, SS7, n. S). But oui less stiingent chaiacteiization helpfully allows us to
sepaiate the question whethei animals have thoughts fiom the question whethei animal thought is
conceptual (cf. ulock 2uuu anu 2u1u).
-.; <4 </57+241 9%/ <4#+,$ 6"%75"1
Even aftei the fall of behavioiism as a geneial theoiy of human cognition, many animal ieseaicheis
have continueu to opeiate in a bioauly behavioiist paiauigm that emphasizes associative leaining,
such as instiumental conuitioning, togethei with inflexible piocesses such as impiinting. This
paiauigm has unueniably succeeueu in explaining many aspects of animal behavioi without
appealing to contentful mental states oi ieasoning. It is thus natuial to question whethei theie is
ieally any neeu to appeal to animal thoughts.
S
Pioblems foi this paiauigm aiise, howevei, when we consiuei ceitain foims of complex
animal behavioi that seem to call out foi explanations in teims of thoughts. Foi example,
ethologists have obseiveu chimpanzees in the Congo using two uiffeient tools to extiact teimites
fiom theii nests: a laigei stick that punctuies a hole in the mounu; anu a smallei stick that they
collect at a uistal location, stiip the leaves fiom, anu then ueploy as a fishing iou (Sanz, Noigan, anu
uulick 2uu4). Since this behavioi exhibits consiueiable vaiiability among chimpanzee communities
(many communities uon't ueploy the technique at all), it appaiently isn't haiu wiieu. Anu since the
behavioi seems to involve auvanceu planning, it uoesn't natuially succumb to tiauitional
associative mouels of leaining such as instiumental conuitioning eithei.
The contiolleu expeiiments of compaiative psychologists paint a similai pictuie. Foi
example, Clayton anu Bickinson (1998) showeu that sciub jays, which aie uisposeu to hiue foou foi
latei ietiieval, will flexibly aujust theii ietiieval stiategies accoiuing to what they subsequently
leain about the uecay iates of the uiffeient types of foou they have hiuuen, togethei with the time
elapseu since the foou was hiuuen. Clayton, Emeiy, anu Bickinson (2uu6) aigue that this anu othei
iemaikable behaviois of the sciub jay aie too flexible, anu geneialize too quickly, to be explaineu
thiough association. The sciub jay must have 82$#29& about what types of foou it has cacheu
togethei with wheie anu when it cacheu them.
0thei compaiative psychologists uo not explicitly employ teims such as 'belief' oi 'thought',
but neveitheless appeal to mental states that satisfy oui chaiacteiization of these states. Foi
example, uallistel (199u) piesents eviuence that mammals, biius, anu even insects ueploy a vaiiety
of contentful mental states that iationally meuiate between peiception anu action, incluuing
cognitive maps anu magnituue iepiesentations of numbei, time, anu iate (cf. Caiiutheis 2uu6, 6S-
8S).
Although tiauitional mouels of association built on classical anu instiumental conuitioning
aie almost suiely incapable of explaining the complex foims of animal behavioi we have ievieweu,
4
one might wonuei whethei moie sophisticateu associative mouels, such as aitificial neuial
netwoiks tiaineu by the poweiful backpiopagation algoiithm, coulu pick up the slack. While many
ieseaicheis aie skeptical (e.g. Fouoi anu Pylyshyn 1988; Naicus 2uu1; Caiiutheis 2uu6, 46-Su),
the issues heie aie complex, anu almost ceitainly uepenu on how such mouels aie uevelopeu in the
futuie. But whatevei the futuie holus, explanations in teims of neuial netwoiks aien't obviously
incompatible with explanations in teims of thoughts. Rathei, the two types of explanation aie
natuially vieweu as opeiating at uiffeient levels of giain, like physics anu chemistiy. 0n this view,
even if neuial netwoiks eventually tell us how thoughts aie implementeu in the biain, they won't
eliminate thoughts.
The aigument we have been consiueiing in favoi of animal thought has the following foim:
animals engage in complex behavioi; thoughts paiticipate in goou explanations of that behavioi; so
animals piobably have thoughts. This aigument anu its conclusion have been subject to seveial
lines of attack. In the iemainuei of this section, I consiuei thiee of them.
-.= >4&1/7+241,$#&+
Instiumentalists about animal thought such as Baviuson (197S), Bennett (1987), anu }amieson
(2uu9) aumit that attiibuting thoughts to animals yielus useful explanations of theii behavioi, but
ueny that such explanations aie liteially tiue. It is not liteially tiue that sciub jays have beliefs
about the foou they cache, oi that chimpanzees believe that baie bianches facilitate teimite fishing.
Such explanations aie to be taken no moie seiiously than explanations of a theimostat's behavioi in
teims of its 'uesiie' to keep the ioom at 72 uegiees Fahienheit, anu its 'belief' that the ioom has
ueviateu fiom that tempeiatuie.
Theie is, howevei, a significant uiffeience in oui unueistanuing of animals anu theimostats.
Wheieas appealing to a theimostat's 'thoughts' allows us to explain nothing that we cannot alieauy
explain in teims of its ciicuitiy, appealing to an animal's thoughts uoes affoiu explanations of its
behavioi that we cannot pioviue in othei teims. Noieovei, if instiumentalists about animal
S
thought aie to avoiu instiumentalism about science in geneial, they incui a uebt. They must
explain why we shoulu be instiumentalists about animal thought, but not (say) elections oi
evolution. Aftei all, just as the explanations of physicists anu biologists aie stiuctuieu aiounu an
appeal to elections anu evolution, the explanations of ethologists anu psychologists aie stiuctuieu
aiounu an appeal to animal thoughts. So instiumentalists must explain why ethology anu
psychology shoulu be tieateu uiffeiently fiom othei sciences.
-.? >4:212/+#4,0(
0ne '/#+, 9,0#2 embaiiassment foi iealists about animal thought is the uifficulty we face piecisely
specifying animal thought contents. Foi example, while an ethologist might say that a chimpanzee
is stiipping the leaves off a bianch because it believes that 8,/2 8/,40"2& 9,0#$#1,12 12/+#12 9#&"#45, it
is questionable whethei the content of this sentential attiibution is a peifect match foi the content
of the chimpanzee's belief. The contents of oui sentences, it might seem, aie simply too piecise anu
stiuctuieu to accuiately chaiacteiize the mental states chimpanzees actually have. As a iesult of
such woiiies about the inueteiminacy in oui attiibutions of thoughts to animals, many
philosopheis have questioneu whethei animals ieally have thoughts at all (Nalcolm 1972-S;
Baviuson 197S; Bennett 1987, 1991; Putnam 1992; }amieson 2uu9).
Theie aie, howevei, two ieasons to iesist this skeptical conclusion. Fiist, while we cleaily
finu it :#99#07$1 to chaiacteiize the contents of animal thoughts, it haiuly follows that we aie uoomeu
to eteinal failuie. uiven sufficient time anu effoit, animal ieseaicheis might meet with gieatei
success (Allen 1992). Seconu, even if caieful obseivation anu expeiimentation uon't allow us to
piecisely chaiacteiize the contents of animal thoughts in human language, it woulu be iash to
concluue that animals uon't think. Animal thoughts may simply be too uiffeient fiom sentences of
human language, in content anuoi foimat, to be amenable to exact expiession theiein. Thus, the
appaient inueteiminacy in oui attiibutions of thoughts to animals gives us little ieason to concluue
that animals lack thoughts altogethei.
6
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A final ieason that some philosopheis have been uncomfoitable attiibuting thoughts to animals is
that they uoubt whethei animals genuinely /2,&%4. Baviuson (197S, 1982) anu NcBowell (1994)
uevelop this line of aigument by maintaining that genuine ieasoning must incluue the capacity foi
/29$201#%4, which involves the ability to think about one's thoughts (Baviuson), oi to think about
ieasons as such (NcBowell). Since they also believe that language is necessaiy foi such ieflection
(cf. Beimuez 2uuS, Ch. 8), they ueny that animals have thoughts.
Philosopheis have objecteu to both steps in this aigument. Fiist, whethei ieasoning must
be ieflective is aiguably just a teiminological issue. We can use the woiu 'ieason' in a stiongei
sense, such that it iequiies ieflection, oi we can use it in a weakei sense, such that it uoes not.
uiven that most philosopheis who claim that animals think only seem to mean that animals ieason
non-ieflectively, theii claim is not obviously thieateneu by Baviuson anu NcBowell's contention
that animals uo not ieason ieflectively. 0i at any iate, it isn't thieateneu unless theie is a
compelling aigument that ieflective ieasoning is a pieiequisite foi non-ieflective ieasoning, a point
on which most philosopheis have founu Baviuson anu NcBowell's uiscussions to be wanting
(}effiey 198S; Waiu 1988; ulock 2uuu; Anuiews 2uu2; Caiiutheis 2uu4; Camp 2uu9a; Buige 2u1u,
Ch. 7). Seconu, the claim that language is necessaiy foi ieflection is subject to two empiiical
challenges: eviuence foi metacognition in animals (Smith 2uu9; but cf. Caiiutheis 2uu8); anu
eviuence of aphasics with intact minu-ieauing abilities (vailey 1998).
A weakei yet still substantive constiaint iequiies thinkeis to be capable of #4&1/7+241,$
ieasoning. The basic iuea is that genuine thought iequiies a ceitain amount of uistance fiom the
heie-anu-now. Thinkeis must theiefoie be able to ieason about how to iealize non-immeuiate
goals, anu so a cieatuie that coulu only 'ieason' about what is iight in fiont of it woulu not ieally be
able to ieason at all. While Bummett (1994) concluues that animals must theiefoie lack thoughts,
Beimuez (2uuS, Ch. S) anu Camp (2uu9a) obseive that theie is ample empiiical eviuence that
7
chimpanzees, iats, anu even biius satisfy this iequiiement. They uiaw the line, howevei, at simple
oiganisms such as honeybees, which uo not seem to ieason instiumentally. By contiast, Caiiutheis
(2uu4) aigues that instiumental ieasoning is only one type of ieasoning, anu thus that bees shoulu
count as genuine thinkeis as well. Again, it is not obvious that the uebate heie is moie than
teiminological. 0nce we uistinguish instiumental ieasoning fiom basic ieasoning, we can uiaw a
coiiesponuing uistinction between instiumental thought anu basic thought, anu investigate
empiiically which animals aie capable of each.

=: >* $%&'() 34"2,41 ."%/-012()5
uoing foiwaiu I will assume that at least some animals have at least some kinus of thought. The
question I now wish to consiuei is whethei any of those thoughts aie 0%402'17,$.
;.- *",/,012/#3#45 *%402'17,$ 6"%75"1
'Conceptual thought' is a teim of ait, anu not eveiyone means the same thing by it. At least one
majoi stianu of usage, howevei, tieats thought as 0%402'17,$ when, anu only when, it is composeu
fiom uisciete elements, oi concepts, in much the way that a sentence is composeu fiom woius. This
view of conceptual thought has echoes in Kant anu Fiege, anu is explicitly elaboiateu in two iecent
philosophical tiauitions, one that analyzes conceptual thought in teims of the exeicise of uisciete
cognitive abilities (Evans 1982; Peacocke 1992), anu a seconu that analyzes conceptual thought in
teims of foimally inuiviuuateu sentences in a 'language of thought' (Fouoi 197S, 1998). Foi oui
puiposes, the uiffeiences between these tiauitions aie less impoitant than theii similaiities. Both
maintain that thoughts aie conceptual insofai as they aumit of a sentence-like compositional
stiuctuie.
What soit of compositional stiuctuie, exactly, must thoughts have to count as 'sentence-like'
anu thus conceptual. Again, theie is no unifoim agieement. Some philosopheis seem to iequiie
solely that thoughts be composeu fiom uisciete elements. But most philosopheis have something
8
stiongei in minusomething that at least incluues pieuicative anu logical stiuctuie. Foi example,
in the couise of spelling out the language of thought hypothesis, Naigolis anu Lauience wiite that it
posits a 'language-like syntax' that 'incoipoiates, at the veiy least, a uistinction between pieuicates
anu subjects, anu that incluues logical uevices, such as quantifieis anu vaiiables' (Naigolis anu
Lauience 2uu7, S62). Similaily, Buige takes concepts to be ceitain constituents in '/%'%&#1#%4,$
stiuctuies, whose 'key element' is pieuication (Buige 2uuS, S2S; cf. Evans 1982, 1u4). Buige also
holus that piopositional stiuctuies have logical foim, anu thus incluue conceptual analogs of logical
constants such as 4%1, 2#1"2/D%/, #9D1"24, anu #& #:241#0,$ 1% (Buige 2u1u, S42-S). 0bviously, the moie
stiictly we upholu the analogy between the stiuctuie of a sentence anu the stiuctuie of thought, the
moie uifficult it becomes foi animals to qualify as conceptual thinkeis. It is woith beaiing this
point in minu as we consiuei seveial aiguments that puipoit to show that animal thought is
conceptual.
Befoie we tuin to these aiguments, howevei, I want to stiess that not all philosopheis anu
psychologists associate the teim 'concept' with the constituents of sentence-like stiuctuies. Foi
example, many compaiative psychologists take the capacity to uisciiminate Xs fiom non-Xs to
suffice foi having the concept E (e.g., Beiinstein, Lovelanu, anu Cable 1976; Cook 2uu2). 0theis
take uisciimination as a staiting point, but emphasize fuithei conuitions foi concept possession,
such as inuepenuence fiom peiception (Allen anu Bausei 1991), uetecting anu leaining fiom
uisciimination eiiois (Allen 1999), oi extiacting classes fiom peiception (Newen anu Baitels
2uu7). Theie is, of couise, nothing wiong with using the teim 'concept' in these ways. It is just
impoitant to iealize that they uiffei fiom the usage that emphasizes sentence-like compositionality,
anu that we will be conceineu solely with this lattei usage as we consiuei aiguments that puipoit
to show that animal thought is conceptual.


9
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The fiist aigument I want to consiuei begins fiom the piemise that thinkeis can enteitain an
infinite numbei of thoughts. But biains, it is obseiveu, aie finite oigans. They contain a finite
numbei of neuions, synapses, anu even atoms. In oiuei to be stoieu in biains, thoughts must
theiefoie be stiuctuieu. They neeu to be composeu fiom paits that have the capacity to iecombine
with one anothei to make infinitely many thoughts, much like woius can iecombine to make
infinitely many sentences (Fouoi 1987; Naigolis anu Lauience 2uu7).
This aigument faces two uifficulties. Fiist, while it is plausible that "7+,4& can think an
infinite numbei of thoughts, it is fai fiom obvious that animals can uo so. Foi example, Caiiutheis
has aigueu that bees 'aie capable of just a few uozen types of uesiie, anu. just a few thousanu
types of belief' (2uu4, 21S). While bees may be a special case (chimpanzees suiely have many moie
beliefs), a piopei uefense of this aigument woulu neeu to be supplementeu by eviuence that animal
thought tiuly is unbounueu.
Seconu, anu moie funuamentally, language uoes not pioviue oui only mouel foi geneiating
infinities. An aitist is capable of piouucing an infinite numbei of uiawings. But uiawings aie not
composeu fiom uisciete units, let alone units that aie stiuctuially analogous to subjects, pieuicates,
anu logical constants. Thus, even if some animals tiuly can think an infinite numbei of thoughts, it
uoesn't obviously follow that those thoughts must be conceptual. It is thus uoubtful that
piouuctivity '2/ &2 shoulu be taken as eviuence of conceptual thought.
;.= 6"2 </57+241 9/%+ A2#:241#9#0,1#%4
William }ames aiticulates a uiffeient motivation in favoi of animal thought being conceptual.
In this sense, cieatuies extiemely low in the intellectual scale may have conceptions. All that is
iequiieu is that they shoulu iecognize the same expeiience again. A polyp woulu be a conceptual
thinkei if a feeling of 'Bollo! thingumbob again!' evei flitteu thiough its minu. (}ames 19Su, 46S)
1u
}ames' basic iuea is that conceptual thought is necessaiy foi ieiuentification. If a polyp can think
6",1 1"#457+8%8 #& "2/2 on one occasion, anu then 6",1 1"#457+8%8 #& "2/2 ,5,#4 on anothei, it
must ueploy a single concept, 1",1 1"#457+8%8, in two sepaiate thoughts on two sepaiate occasions.
Noie iecently, Beimuez has uevelopeu this iuea into an aigument than animal thoughts must have
a 'subject-pieuicate' stiuctuie (2uuS, S9). In oiuei to explain how a iat can ieiuentify a piece of
foou at uiffeient locations, anu ieiuentify a location with oi without foou piesent, Beimuez aigues
that we must attiibute to the iat a thought with the stiuctuie of an atomic sentence that is
composeu fiom the subject-concept 9%%: anu the pieuicate-concept #& $%0,12: ,1 0%%/:#4,12& FGH (I
(2uuS, 9S-1u4). (See also Campbell 1986 anu Boigan anu Tienson 1996.)
But this aigument is open to challenge. Nany ieseaicheis have pioposeu that animals keep
tiack of items in the enviionment by affixing mental maikeis to a cognitive map, which iepiesents
by viitue of a stiuctuial isomoiphism between the geometiic piopeities of the cognitive map anu
the spatial layout of the enviionment. While this suggestion may seem to be similai to Beimuez 's
pioposal, seveial philosopheis have aigueu that theie aie impoitant uiffeiences between the type
of compositionality that is involveu in affixing a maikei to a map anu the type of compositionality
that is involveu in concatenating a subject anu pieuicate. Foi example, Rescoila (2uu9a) aigues
that neithei cooiuinates noi maikeis, the two basic components of maps, have the piopeities
typically attiibuteu to pieuicates by logicians such as Fiege oi Taiski. Rescoila (2uu9b) fuithei
aigues that the cognitive maps ioboticists anu psychologists appeal to lack logical foim, anu aie in
that iespect also unlike natuial language sentences. Auuitionally, Beck (2uu7) anu Camp (2uu7)
contenu that the geometiic stiuctuie of maps constiain theii contents in ways that uo not apply to
sentences. uiven these appaient uiffeiences between maps anu sentences, anu the possibility that
map-like iepiesentations coulu unueigiiu ieiuentification, it is thus questionable whethei
ieiuentification iequiies conceptual thought.
11
In fact, one might even question whethei anything so complex as a cognitive map is
iequiieu foi ieiuentification. Theie is some eviuence that bees make use of a foim of template
matching to ieiuentify theii hives. When a bee leaves its hive, it tuins aiounu aftei flying a few
meteis away anu staies back at the hive befoie continuing on its jouiney. 0n the ietuin tiip, when
it comes back to within a few meteis of the hive, it hoveis aiounu until it gets the hive in view fiom
a peispective that is similai to the one it took in at the stait of its outwaiu jouiney. 0ne theoiy has
it that the bee takes a 'snapshot' of the hive on its way out which it stoies as a visual image. When it
ietuins, it compaies this stoieu visual image to its on-line peiceptual image until they align (Collett
anu Rees 1997). Even if we inteipiet conceptual thought weakly, such that it only involves
composition fiom uisciete elements, nothing in this theoiy seems to iequiie the bees' capacity foi
ieiuentification to be uiiven by conceptual thoughts.
;.? 6"2 </57+241 9/%+ J(&12+,1#0#1(
Fouoi anu his colleagues have maintaineu that animal thought is 'systematic'i.e., that the
thoughts animals can think exhibit sentence-like patteins (Fouoi 1987; Fouoi anu Pylyshyn 1988;
Fouoi anu NcLaughlin 199u).
You uon't finu oiganisms that can leain to piefei the gieen tiiangle to the ieu squaie but can't leain to
piefei the ieu tiiangle to the gieen squaie. You uon't finu oiganisms that can think the thought that
the giil loves }ohn but can't think the thought that }ohn loves the giil. (Fouoi anu NcLaughlin 199u,
SS2)
Fouoi anu his colleagues concluue that animal thoughts must be stiuctuieu like sentences. Foi
what else coulu account foi the fact that animal thought is univeisally systematic.
Neu Block has complaineu that Fouoi's uefense of systematicity is 'uncomfoitably
anecuotal' (Block 199S, 411). But a numbei of philosopheis have uefenueu Fouoi in gieatei
empiiical uetail. Foi example, Caiiutheis (2uu4; 2uu6) anu Tetzlaff anu Rey (2uu9) point to
systematicities in the foiaging behavioi of honeybees, such as the fact that bees that can iepiesent
12
that a feeuei is a ceitain uistance fiom the hive can also iepiesent that the hive is a ceitain uistance
fiom the feeuei. They aigue that such systematicities aie iife even in simple oiganisms.
But even if animal thought is systematic to &%+2 extent, many philosopheis have questioneu
whethei it is 97$$( systematic in the way that human thought is. Foi example, Camp (2uu9a) aigues
that although a chimpanzee can plausibly think that an infant is hungiy anu that an auult male is
uominant, it is questionable whethei it can think that an infant is uominant. Such an outiageous
thought may well be beyonu its capacities. 0f couise, as Caiiutheis (2uu4) obseives, just because
animals :%4K1 think ceitain thoughts uoesn't mean that they 0,4K1. It may simply be that animals
aien't inteiesteu in ceitain thoughts (what use woulu such a thought be to a chimpanzee.), anu
thus uon't bothei to iecombine theii concepts in ceitain ways. But as Camp points out, the meie
possibility that animals +#5"1 have the capacity to think such thoughts haiuly settles the question
whethei they :%.
Replying to Camp, Caiiutheis (2uu9) uistinguishes two types of systematicity, a stiongei
type that involves full iecombinability (oi something close to full iecombinability), anu a weakei
type that involves moie limiteu iecombinability. Caiiutheis aigues that even weak systematicity,
which animals cleaily uisplay, is eviuence of conceptual thought. Be thus concluues that animals as
simple as honeybees have conceptual thought.
At this point, it is ciucial to iemembei that the notion of conceptual thought aumits of
uispaiate inteipietations, uepenuing on just how stiongly we take the analogy to sentences. If
conceptual thought is meiely thought that is composeu fiom some uisciete elements oi othei, then
weak systematicity aiguably is eviuence of conceptuality. But if conceptual thought is supposeu to
exhibit pieuicative anuoi logical stiuctuie, then it is fai fiom obvious that weak systematicity uoes
signal conceptuality. Foi example, although cognitive maps aiguably lack pieuicative oi logical
stiuctuie, they aie weakly systematic (Rescoila 2uu9b; Camp 2uu7).
1S
Fuithei eviuence that at least some animal thoughts aie 4%1 stiongly systematic ueiives
fiom so-calleu ,4,$%5 +,54#17:2 thoughts, which a wiue iange of animals use to iepiesent
magnituues such as numbei, time, uistance, anu iate. 0ne featuie of these thoughts is that they give
iise to L282/K& M,N, which entails that the ability to uisciiminate any two magnituues is a function
of theii iatio. As a iesult, when the iatio of two magnituues appioaches 1, animals can no longei
uisciiminate them. Beck (foithcoming) aigues that stiong systematicity is thus violateu since an
animal might be able to think thoughts along the lines of O #& $2&& 1",4 -P anu -Q #& $2&& 1",4 ;Q, but
not O #& $2&& 1",4 -Q oi -P #& $2&& 1",4 ;Q. Beck fuithei aigues that such violations of systematicity
ueiive fiom the analog foimat of the iepiesentations unueilying animals' magnituue thoughts.
;.@ 6"2 </57+241 9/%+ >492/2402
Nany philosopheis believe that we human beings must have conceptual thought because we aie
capable of uiawing infeiences (Evans 198S, SS7; Ciane 1992, 146-7; Buige 2u1u, S42-7). Foi
example, you can uiaw infeiences of the following foims:
F, F,
, = 8 !G(FG!uG)
F8 u,
If you believe that Amy is fiienuly, anu then come to believe that Amy = 8, you can infei that 8 is
fiienuly, no mattei what 8 is. Anu similaily, when you believe that Amy is fiienuly, anu come to
believe that eveiything that is fiienuly is also u, you can concluue that Amy is u. uiven that you aie
able to uiaw such infeiences foi youi thousanus of beliefs, you must suiely have one state that
allows you to think of any aibitiaiy object that it is fiienuly (foi how else coulu you come to believe
that 8 is fiienuly no mattei what 8 is.), anu a seconu, inuepenuent state that enables you to think
about Amyi.e., to think of any aibitiaiy piopeity that Amy satisfies it (foi how else coulu you
come to believe that Amy is u no mattei what u is.). Thus, youi thoughts must be &1/7017/2:. They
must be composeu fiom multiple, uisciete elements in much the way that sentences aie.
14
uiven that we uefineu thoughts as states that paiticipate in ieasoning, anu aigueu that
animals aie capable of at least some foims of ieasoning, it may seem to follow that animals must
have conceptual thoughts too. But a lot uepenus on what R#4:& of infeiences animals aie capable of
uiawing when they ieason. Some tiansitions ovei mental states, such as laying uown a maikei on a
cognitive map, oi summing two analog magnituue iepiesentations, might ieasonably be consiueieu
infeiences, but uo not seem to iequiie an appeal to states with pieuicative oi logical stiuctuie. By
contiast, $%5#0,$ infeiences, such as those isolateu in the pievious paiagiaph, uo seem to iequiie an
appeal to sentence-like states. Thus, while one's infeiential capacities seive as a winuow into the
stiuctuie of one's thoughts, only logical infeiences aie ievelatoiy of conceptual thought.
If we coulu show that animals aie capable of logical infeience, we coulu theieby aigue that
they have conceptual thought. The extent to which animals ,/2 capable of logical infeience,
howevei, is still hotly contesteu. Some ieseaicheis aigue that vaiious types of logical infeience aie
exhibiteu by animals, incluuing: exclusionaiy infeiences (uisjunctive syllogisms) in gieat apes (Call
2uu6a, 2uu6b) anu uogs (Eiuhegyi et al. 2uu7); tiansitive infeiences in monkeys (Ncuonigle anu
Chalmeis 1977, 1992), baboons (Seyfaith anu Cheney 2uu2), anu sea lions (Schusteiman, Kastak,
anu Kastak 2uu2); anu causal infeiences in apes (Call 2uu6a), monkeys (Bausei anu Santos 2uu6),
anu iats (Bickenson anu Shanks 199S; Blaisuell et al. 2uu6). But otheis have ieacheu moie
skeptical conclusions (e.g. Beimuez 2uuS, Ch. 6; Penn anu Povinelli 2uu7; Penn, Bolyoak, anu
Povinelli 2uu8). The issues heie aie uelicate because behaviois that may at fiist seem to iequiie
logical infeience can sometimes insteau be explaineu moie mouestly. Foi example, exclusionaiy
ieasoning might be explaineu in teims of Bayesian upuating ovei cognitive maps (Rescoila 2uu9c)
oi pioto-logical infeience (Beimuez 2uuS, Ch. 7; 2uu6); tiansitive infeience might be explaineu by
associative leaining (Zentall 2uu1; BeLillo, Floieano, anu Antinucci 2uu1; Allen 2uu6) oi
manipulations ovei uiagiammatic tiee-like stiuctuies (Camp 2uu9b); anu causal ieasoning might
be explaineu thiough some combination of associative leaining anu innate biases (Penn anu
1S
Povinelli 2uu7) oi causal Bayes nets (Blaisuell et al. 2uu6). Whethei the aigument fiom infeience
can be extenueu to animals is thus still veiy much an open question.

?: 34- @"(A $4-(A
We began with the question whethei animals have conceptual thought. If oui inquiiy hasn't paveu
the way to a uefinitive veiuict, it has at least naiioweu oui seaich.
We have seen that theie exists consiueiable empiiical eviuence that animals have
thoughtscontentful mental states that causally anu iationally meuiate between peiception anu
action. The moie uelicate question is whethei those thoughts aie conceptual.
0ne issue to emeige fiom oui uiscussion is that the notion of conceptual thought is itself
impiecise. Because it iests laigely on an analogy that likens thoughts to sentences, it aumits of
uispaiate inteipietations. As we have seen, many philosopheis take the analogy to incluue a
commitment to both pieuication anu logical uevices, although some otheis seem to iequiie little
moie than compositionality. While theie is little point aiguing about how stiongly the analogy
'ieally' ought to be taken, futuie ieseaich woulu benefit if ieseaicheis weie explicit about how they
unueistanu the analogy when they make claims about animals having, oi not having, conceptual
thought. Aftei all, theie aie ieal uiffeiences in the expiessive powei of uiffeient meuiums of
iepiesentation, so when we attiibute mental states to animals we ought to be explicit about exactly
what stiuctuie is being assumeu.
0ui uiscussion has also taught us something about the soits of consiueiations that seive as
eviuence foi conceptual thought in animals. Neiely asking whethei animals' thoughts aie
piouuctive, oi whethei animals aie capable of ieiuentification, will not teach us much about the
stiuctuie of animal thought since piouuctivity anu ieiuentification can occui in the absence of even
the weakest foims of conceptual thought. By contiast, consiueiations baseu on systematicity anu
infeience aie moie likely to speak to whethei animal thought is conceptual. But these
16
consiueiations neeu to be tieateu with caie. It is not sufficient to ask if animal thoughts exhibit ,4(
systematic patteins, oi if animals aie capable of ,4( types of infeience. We neeu to be explicit
about exactly what soits of systematic patteins anu infeiences animal thoughts entei into. 0nly
then will we be able to use those patteins anu infeiences as a winuow into the stiuctuie of animals'
thoughts.

$/B%"C)-A,'-%1*
Foi comments on eailiei uiafts, I am giateful to Petei Langlanu-Bassan, an anonymous iefeiee foi
Philosophy Compass, anu the Euitoi, Ron Nallon. This papei was completeu with the assistance of
a postuoctoial fellowship fiom the }ames S. NcBonnell Founuation anu Washington 0niveisity in
Saint Louis.


@-D-7-%/-*
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