Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 4

Banco Espanol Filipino v Peterson

Facts: On March 4, 1905, Banco Espanol Filipino (BEP) executed a contract of loan in favor of Francisco Reyes for P141 702.00. Reyes was already indebted to the bank for P84 415.00. His total debt was therefore P226 117.38. To secure payment of the P141k and the P84k, Reyes executed a public instrument 1. Mortgaging several of his properties 2. Pledging part of his personal property to BEP (P90 591.75 worth of wines,liquors and canned goods), which were stored at a warehouse he rented in Manila BEP and Reyes agreed that the goods should be delivered to Ramon Garcia(depositary) for safekeeping. Reyes turned over the goods to R. Garcia by giving him the warehouse keys. On September 29, 1905, BEP and Reyes substituted Luis Sierra in place of R.Garcia as the depositary. On October 19, 1905, Juan Garcia (yes, related to Ramon) brought an action against Francisco Reyes and Ramon Agtarat. CFI Manila ruled against Reyes and Agtarat for P15 000.00. On the same day, Sheriff James Peterson entered the warehouse where the goods pledged to BEP were stored under the custody of the depositary, Sierra. Peterson levied upon P30 000 worth of the goods pledged to the bank, depriving the latter of possession of the same, as stipulated in theMarch 4 contract of loan. Issues: Was the contract of pledge between BEP and Reyes to secure a loan valid? Was Reyes still in possession of the pledged property, thereby making thecontract defective? Held : The contract was valid. Reyes was no longer in possession of the pledgedproperty. BEP had symbolic possession of the same. The contract complies with all the requisites of a valid pledge contract, as prescribed by the Civil Code: 1. The property was pledged to secure a debt 2. The date of execution, the terms of the pledge, and the property pledged appeared in a public instrument 3. The property pledged was placed in the hands of a third person (in thiscase, Sierra) by common consent of the debtor and creditor, under the supervision of an agent (in this case, Rodriguez) of the bank Reyes, after the pledge, parted with the possession of his personal property, which was delivered to a third person (R. Garcia, and subsequently, Sierra) who would take care of them for BEP. Sierra was the third person appointed by common consent of BEP (creditor)and Reyes (debtor), to hold possession over the goods pledged in favor of the bank under the direct supervision of Rodriguez, an agent specifically appointed by the bank. The contract in question was, therefore, a perfect contract of pledge under articles 1857 and 1863 of the Civil Code, it having been conclusively shown that the pledgee (BEP) took charge and possession of the goods pledged through a depositary (Sierra) and a special agent (Rodriguez) appointed by it, each of whom had a duplicate key to the warehouse wherein the said goods were stored, and that the pledgee (BEP), itself, received and collected the proceeds of the goods as they were sold. The legality of the pledge was not affected by the fact that the goods remained in the warehouse formerly rented by Reyes the pledgor. This is because after the pledge had been agreed upon, and after the depository appointed with common consent of the parties had taken possession of the said property, Reyes could no longer dispose of the same because BEP was the only party allowed to do so through

Sierra and Rodriguez. The symbolic transfer of the goods through delivery of the keys to the warehouse where the goods were stored was sufficient evidence to show that Sierra, the depositary appointed by both BEP and Rodriguez, was legally placed in possession of the goods. Since the contract of pledge was valid, BEP had a better right to the goods compared to J. Garcia. The Court ordered either the return of the improperly levied goods, or the payment of their value, P30 000.

Cuaycong vs Benedicto 13 March 1918 l Property Easement Right of Way Public Highway Benedicto owns Hacienda Toreno which is located in Victorias, Negros Occidental. Two roads pass through the said hacienda: the Dacuman-Toreno Road and the Nanca-Victorias Road. For forty years, the owners of the nearby hacienda, Cuaycong et al, had been using the said roads to transport their products. But in 1911, Benedicto decided to close the road and began asking for toll fees for wagons passing through their hacienda. In 1912, Cuaycong et al sued Benedicto. Cuaycong claimed that they have a right of way over the said Nanca-Victorias Road considering that they have been using it since time immemorial. The lower court dismissed the claim over the Dacuman-Toreno Road for the other parties were in default, but the lower court declared that Cuaycong et al do have a right of way over the Nanca-Victorias Road. Benedicto appealed. Cuaycong then averred that the road is a public highway. ISSUE: Whether or not Cuaycong et al were able to establish their right over the Nanca-Victorias Road. HELD: No. The Nanca-Victorias Road is not a public highway. First it was shown that in the Torrens title held by Benedicto, there was no encumbrance attached to the hacienda, that it is nowhere nearby a road nor does it border a road. Second, the road was not maintained by the local government. Its upkeep was solely supported by the road users for their benefits, convenience and interest. There was no adverse possession by the government. Third, there was no evidence which shows that the land is of the nature of a public highway. It was shown that the road was in existence since 1885, but it was not shown as a public highway, in fact, the other evidence shown pertain to Dacuman-Toreno Road. Fourth, the road was closed in 1911; it was only in 1912 that Cuaycong et al filed their suit. Neither did Cuaycong et al acquired a right of private easement. The lower court ruled that Cuaycong et al and their predecessors in interest had been using the said road since time immemorial yet they only showed evidence that it was in use in 1885 but no other evidence to show a further time of usage was ever shown to prove their claim.

Astudillo vs Board of Directors FACTS: Peregrina Astudillo appealed from the "resolution" dated April 18, 1967 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Ramon P. Mitra and dismissing her petition for certiorari and mandamus. According to the pleadings of respondents Mitra and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), Mitra on December 28, 1957 applied, in behalf of his minor son, Ramon Mitra Ocampo, for the purchase of Lot 16, Block E-155 of the East Avenue Subdivision of the PHHC in Piahan, Quezon City.His application was approved on January 3, 1958. He made a down payment of P840, an amount equivalent to ten percent of the price of the lot. On September 9, 1961 the PHHC and Mitra executed a contract of conditional sale. After Mitra had paid in full the price, which totalled more than nine thousand pesos, a final deed of sale was executed in his favour on February 18, 1965. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89875 was issued to him on March 1, 1965. On May 3, 1965 Peregrina filed in the lower court her aforementioned petition against the PHHC board of directors, the register of deeds of Quezon City and the spouses Ramon P. Mitra and Salud O. Mitra .After the respondents had filed their answers, the Mitra spouses filed a verified motion for summary judgment. They assumed that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. Peregrina Astudillo opposed the motion. The parties submitted memoranda. The lower court treated the motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss. It dismissed Peregrina's petitionon the grounds that she is a mala fide squatter and that the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra cannot be assailed by means of certiorari and mandamus. Peregrina appealed to this Court. She contends that the lower court erred in holding that certiorari and mandamus do not lie in this case and that she has no right to question the award to Mitra, and in not holding that the award of Lot 16 to him was in contravention of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Law and of the constitutional provision that a Senator or Representative should not directly or indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the government of any subdivision or instrumentality thereof during his term of office. ISSUE: whether Peregrina Astudillo has a cause of action to annul the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra and to compel the PHHC board to award that lot to her. HELD: We hold that she has no cause of action to impugn the award to Mitra and torequire that she be allowed to purchase the lot. As a squatter, she has no possessory rights over Lot 16. In the eyes of the law, the award to Mitra did not prejudice her since she was bereft of any rights over the said lot which could have been impaired by that award In the familiar language of procedure, she was not entitled to sue Mitra and the PHHC for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of a wrong. Those respondents did not commit any delict or wrong in violation of her rights because, in the first place, she has no right to the lot. Not being principally or subsidiarily bound in the contract of sale between Mitra and the PHHC, she is not entitled to ask for its annulment (Art. 1397, Civil Code).