Global Briefing Booklet 2013

Crisis Group|Global Brieng|Brussels|24 25 October 2013
Global Briefing 2013

Background information
ICG 2013 GLOBAL BRIEF ING
1 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013
Maps
Afghanistan58 Central African Republic38 Colombia14 Democratic Republic of Congo39 East China Sea 19 Egypt48 Georgia44 Libya49 Mali24 Nagorno-Karabakh45 North Caucasus 42 Pakistan59
Sahel25 South China Sea 18 South Sudan 55 Sudan54 Syria28 Syria34 Tunisia50 Turkey32
Contents
Page Thursday 5 B roken Promises? Conict and Conict Prevention in 2013 and 2014 9 The European Union and Conict Prevention 13 17 23 Colombias Moment of Truth Tension in the China Seas Stability in the Sahel: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso
Friday
27 31 37 41 47 53 57
Syria and the Region A Kurdish Spring? Turkey, Iraq, Syria and the Kurds Militias and Peace Enforcement in Central Africa The Troubled Caucasus Democracy, Stability and Islam in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia The Sudans: No Unity in Diversity ake or break or more of the same? Afghanistan and M Pakistan in 2014
61 Crisis Group Board and Donors
A panel discussion that will introduce some of the conicts and themes that will feature in subsequent sessions.
24 OCT
09:3010:45
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Broken Promises? Conict and Conict Prevention in 2013 and 2014

Ko Annan (Board Member), Thomas Pickering (Board Chair) and George Soros (Board Member). Moderated by Lyse Doucet (Chief International Correspondent, BBC).
hat do events in 2013 tell us about conict today, our ability to prevent or resolve it, and what the year ahead holds? What are the legacies of the rst post-9/11 generation, as NATO pulls its troops from Afghanistan? Does the Security Councils paralysis over Syria reect the difculties of conict prevention in an era of more diffuse power or just the challenges of a particularly intractable conict? Is the West heading into isolation, fed by economic downturn and disillusion with its ability to shape events abroad? How will rising nationalism inuence the years ahead, particularly given the sectarian or ethnic tone of many contemporary conicts? Afghanistans political transition with elections to determine President Karzais successor set for April next year will probably prove as challenging as the military one. But whatever happens there, NATOs drawdown will end, in some ways, the rst generation of this post 9/11 era, an era which perhaps more than any other since 1945 has brought into such stark relief debates over how best to ensure security: through protecting individual liberties or curtailing them; through democracy or strongmen; through development aid or military force; through state building or counter-terrorism; through international law or outside of it; multilaterally or alone; through engagement or retreat. It has also been marked by perhaps has accelerated a shift of power away from the West. That Western dominance of the post-Cold War years has ended is clear. Less apparent is what comes next. Does multi-polarity
help conict prevention or complicate it? Does it inevitably mean deeper international polarisation as being witnessed over Syria? Might we now be seeing twin phenomena: of isolationism, at least in the West; and growing nationalism, more broadly. Combined with both, there is perhaps a sense that security despite the rhetoric of tackling root causes and sustainable development is increasingly understood in narrow terms. Hence the lure of drones; the appeal of special forces; the increasingly fraught debates on immigration; and a seemingly limitless willingness to compromise on individual freedoms. Are shrinking aid budgets borne simply of nancial woes? Or does this austerity reect a deeper malaise, a sense in the West that external forays are not simply unaffordable but somehow unwise, too complicated, too ineffective, events abroad too divorced from immediate concerns? This is not just a question of development; in matters military, too, we appear to be entering a period of retrenchment. The West nances UN peacekeeping but has become ever more reluctant to deploy its own troops as blue helmets. The UK parliaments vote against intervention in Syria was a landmark moment. The difculties the White House clearly would have faced in securing congressional support for the same were striking. France intervened in Mali, true. But that took jihadi groups marching on the capital, and perhaps serves more as a postscript on an interventionist era than a reection of its continuation. The ghosts of Iraq and Libya very much agitate in the background. Clearly Western politicians and publics have learnt from these adventures and Afghanistan, too. But have they drawn the right conclusions? If nationalism is the bedfellow of isolationism, we dont have to look far to nd traces of its presence. Western democracies are seeing the resurgence of right-wing movements, suspicious of foreigners, emphasising security threats, and questioning the wisdom of international engagement. In Asia
nationalist tensions seem somehow more prominent, well-illustrated by the rhetoric deployed by China and Japan in their current maritime feud. Africa now irts with a wholesale rejection of the international justice project. At the same time many of todays deadliest conicts whether over land, resources or control of the state have a predominantly ethnic or sectarian hue. From Myanmar, to Afghanistan, to Syria and Iraq to Africas Horn or the Sahel, were seeing a surge in ethnic or sectarian tensions often violent which the old centralised state model so dear to great powers has been unable to manage thereby rendering it less and less suitable for export. In short, how atomised are we willing to become? Amid all this, is it fair to say that national sovereignty remains, overwhelmingly, the trump card? Is multilateralism, at least when it comes to matters of peace and security, in serious decline? Will we see in its stead a preference for informal alliances and bilateral arrangements? Are we witnessing a fateful erosion of our commitment to the normative gains that have been made in the pursuit of international human rights and justice protections? In short, are we witnessing the decline of the liberal peacebuilding model? Certainly since the end of the Cold War, the prevailing drive of the international community in rebuilding states has been a focus often imperfect, and with patchy commitment, but clear nonetheless on elections, with an emphasis on the rule of law, and centralised states. Coupled with this has been our growing comfort with the language of womens and minority rights and a period of UN activism unprecedented in that organisations history. Is this model still valid (assuming it ever was)? Events over recent years show that democratisation, while probably best for peace over time, can in the short term destabilise especially when elections leave little for losers. The same goes for the imperative of justice. We want it. We rightly rail against the inequity and danger of impunity. But we have yet fully to grapple with the risks and practical difculties of imposing judicial demands on complex and fragile transitions in which criminal prosecutions can seem politicised, unrealistic or divisive. Looking back to the headlines for our Global Brieng 2012 Syria, the Sudans, the Sahel, Islamic extremism, the fragility of Europe, stasis on the UN Security Council one could pretty much transpose them to the introduction for this 2013 gathering. Indeed, when it comes to the countries and issues in focus, theres a remarkable similarity between this year and last. What does that reveal about our collective ability effectively to manage crises? First, clearly, a year is not long in conict prevention. But does it suggest too that the system for addressing these challenges the means we have for preventing or stopping violent conict is, if not broken, in urgent need of help? More fundamentally, was it ever adequate? Or does our ambition outstrip our collective capacity requiring us to dial down our aspirations accordingly?
24 OCT
11:1512:45
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The European Union and Conict Prevention

Wadah Khanfar (Board Member), Mark Malloch-Brown (Board Member) and Pierre Vimont (Executive Secretary General, European External Action Service). Moderated by Natalie Nougayrde (Le Monde).
he EUs record in foreign policy and conict prevention in the past year has reinforced its credibility as an international actor while illustrating the constraints it still faces. In its immediate neighbourhood the EUs facilitation of the breakthrough agreement on the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo in April illustrated it could take the lead role in resolving a seemingly intractable conict. This achievement also demonstrated the leverage exercised by EU enlargement and the Eurozones nancial troubles notwithstanding the continued attraction of EU membership. The EUs impact has continued to strengthen further east, where Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia have sought deeper political and economic integration, negotiating Association Agreements and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU. While strong-arm diplomatic and economic tactics by Russia derailed Armenias EU ambitions, Moscows pressuring betrays concern over the EUs growing role in the region. When it comes to post-Soviet Europes protracted conicts, however, the EU has failed to gain real security leverage and advance conict resolution. It has played only a marginal role in the standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Its mediation and security mandate on Georgias breakaway conicts have failed to bring the parties closer together or tangibly normalise daily life in the conict zones. The EU is steadily losing traction with Turkey as its accession negotiations stall, weakening EU leverage on issues from energy diversication to illegal migration to inuence over Turkeys critical policies on Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East. On the international scene the European External Action Service (EEAS) has played a more visible role. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy Catherine Ashton heads the E3+3 (P5+1) talks with Iran, and stepped up as a facilitator when the current political crisis erupted in Egypt in July moves which have strengthened her diplomatic weight. The EU deployed a military training mission (EUTM) in Mali in February in the aftermath of the French military intervention there, and in May a civilian border security mission in Libya (EUBAM). However, while the EU has taken up post-conict peacebuilding roles, the crises in Libya and Mali show that individual states or NATO still lead conict response and crisis management. Moreover, the EUs contribution in other major crisis and conict arenas where it has attempted to carve out a role, including the Middle East peace process, is still unclear. Foreign policy remains an area of intergovernmental decision-making and a sovereign member state prerogative, though steps have been taken to better coordinate the EUs and member states priorities and action. The implementation of the recent EEAS review has the potential to bring more coherence and focus to the EUs external action, streamline internal communication between the Commission and the EEAS and improve interac-
tions between EU delegations and national embassies. Along with the budget increase for the EEAS, this is a hopeful sign. Nonetheless, a strategic vision of the EUs foreign policy mandate and the division of responsibilities between the Union, its member states and other major international players such as the UN and NATO is still lacking. Difculties in aggregating resources and lack of efcient crisis management infrastructures compound these problems. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Summit in December this year will attempt to address some of these issues. Supporters of a strong and effective EU role in the worlds most pressing political and security challenges would hope that the summit will send a clearer message about the EUs purpose and interests as a global strategic actor. This session will explore: What can be done to strengthen the coherence and political clout of EU foreign policy? What are the main challenges? What are the EUs strategic security interests? What are the criteria for where the EU should play a prominent role and take the lead in crises? How can a strengthened EU role t within member states foreign policy agendas? How is the EU perceived as a conict prevention actor by the rest of the world? What reforms are needed to improve the effectiveness of the EUs foreign and security policy architecture and tools? What can be expected from the December CSDP summit? What will be the impact of this and the EEAS review on the EUs crisis management capacity? Does the EU need a new security strategy?
The desire to hold thousands of FARC members accountable through criminal trials should not be allowed to become an insurmountable obstacle to Colombias best chance to end a conict that has already cost the lives of over 200,000 people and has displaced more than ve million.
Christian Voelkel and Anna Crowe, The Five Challenges of Negotiating Transitional Justice in Colombia, Latin America Crime and Politics, 19 September 2013
24 OCT
14:0015:30
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Colombias Moment of Truth

Louise Arbour (President and CEO), Javier Ciurlizza (Latin America Program Director) and Mark Schneider (Senior Vice President and Special Adviser on Latin America). Moderated by Frank Giustra (Board Member).
eace talks between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) that began in November 2012 offer the best chance yet of ending more than 50 years of armed conict. They are also testament to how far both sides have come in their willingness to pursue peace. Negotiators in Havana have agreed on the critical areas of rural development, and appear to be close to reaching agreement on FARCs participation in national politics. However, negotiators face a diverse set of challenges: political spoilers, public scepticism, approaching elections and their own state of denial regarding responsibilities for serious crimes perpetrated during the conict. Finding common ground on transitional justice, crucial to the sustainability of any peace deal, has proven particularly challenging. Sustainable peace requires that negotiators produce an agreement that balances legal certainties for the parties and the rights of victims to truth, reparation and justice. Opponents of the peace talks, many of them aligned with ex-president Uribe, frame their criticism as a rejection of impunity for FARC and accuse the government of sacricing justice to satisfy short-term political imperatives. The sides are under signicant pressure to reach a nal deal before elections in early 2014, thus allowing parliament time to pass the necessary legislation and avoid further politicisation, particularly of the transitional justice issue, during the campaign. Colombia faces other security challenges too. It remains unclear whether the National Liberation Army (ELN), the countrys second largest guerrilla group, will join peace talks. The Santos administration is also intensifying its ght against New Illegal Armed Groups (NIAGs) and other criminal gangs
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Map courtesy of The General Library, The University of Texas at Austin.
that run drugs, extort mining operations and commit widespread abuses against civilians, often forcibly displacing them. Any deal with the FARC will have to include effective measures to disarm, demobilise and especially vital reintegrate its ghters, ensuring they have alternative, legal ways of supporting themselves and their families. The communities which have borne the brunt of the conict must also receive development support, especially since they are now likely to be home to the bulk of FARC demobilisation. Without such measures, reintegration will be difcult if not impossible and would raise the risks of former guerrillas swelling the ranks of criminal gangs or forming new FARC fronts, posing fresh challenges to security forces. This session will explore: What are the obstacles and who are the spoilers of the peace process and of implementing a peace agreement? How can the government respond to those who say a peace agreement will yield impunity for perpetrators for atrocities and crimes against humanity? Which constitutes a credible offer for victims, in terms of transitional justice? Can we be still moderately optimistic that the negotiators will reach a peace agreement and that it can be implemented effectively?
Despite expressions by both governments that they wish to avoid a war, potential for escalation has increased and there is deepening pessimism on both sides over the prospects of a peaceful settlement.
Crisis Group Asia Report N245, Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks, 8 April 2013
24 OCT
14:0015:30
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Tension in the China Seas

Daniel Pinkston (North East Asia Deputy Project Director), Karim Raslan (Board Member) and Wu Jianmin (Board Member). Moderated by Jim Della-Giacoma (Asia Program Director).
entring on an island dispute, tensions are now the norm between China and Japan. The past year has seen regular standoffs between patrol vessels of the two countries and a number of dangerous military encounters in the East China Sea and the airspace above. Aside from a brief impromptu meeting between their leaders at the G20 summit in September, top ofcials have not met since the dispute erupted. Chinas actions are a continuation of the reactive assertiveness tactic that it deployed in its maritime disputes in the South China Sea in 2012: responding heavy-handedly to perceived provocations with countermeasures that change the status quo in its favour. Chinas new leadership, facing increasing domestic pressure for a tougher foreign policy, has vowed to respond decisively to provocations on territorial disputes. In Japan too the dispute has strengthened nationalist calls for a more assertive foreign policy. In January the government announced plans to increase the defence budget for the rst time in a decade in response to increased tensions with China (and North Koreas growing nuclear capability). Prime Minister Shinzo Abes Liberal Democratic Party, which won a landslide victory in July parliamentary elections, has called for amending Article 9 in Japans 1947 constitution renouncing war and repudiating armed forces, to allow a full-edged military. Beijing and Tokyo have both stated that they want to avoid war. But risks are high for an accidental clash that could send tensions spiralling out of control. Crisis mitigation and management capacity between the two countries has been unravelling for years: top leaders mistrust each other; back-
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channel diplomacy between high-level politicians has waned; weakened foreign ministries have proven incapable of dialogue beyond reciting ofcial statements. Attempts to establish new and more stable communication channels have failed. With both sides constrained and internal dynamics driving towards escalation, there is a real danger that they could become stuck in a conict neither side really wants. In the event of a clash between law enforcement vessels patrolling the contested waters, heightened
CHINA
Taiwan
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Luzon Hainan Paracel Islands Luzon
S tr ait
SOUTH CHINA SEA

VIET NAM
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SULU SEA
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CRISIS GROUP/KJELL OLSSON
nationalism, especially in China, could constrict the room for diplomatic manoeuvres to de-escalate the situation. In contrast, tensions from territorial disputes in the resource-rich South China Sea (SCS) have shown signs of moderating. Beijing has begun mending fences with Vietnam and agreed to talks with ASEAN on a code of conduct in the area, although warning that the process will be long. Its relations with the Philippines, however, remain contentious. China responded angrily to the Philippines ling a complaint with a UN tribunal over the dispute, while the Philippines has accused China of causing increased militarisation of the SCS. Maritime tensions in the Asia Pacic unfolded on the backdrop of the U.S. rebalancing toward Asia, which is widely seen in China as an attempt to contain its rise. Many in Beijing are convinced that Washingtons pivot emboldened if not encouraged rival claimants to stir up troubles with
Copyright: Stratfor 2012. www.stratfor.com. Reproduced with permission.
China and prescribe vigorous pushbacks. Ironically, Chinas assertiveness is driving U.S. allies, especially Japan and the Philippines, to seek tighter alliances not only with Washington but also between each other. This session will explore: What long-term impact will recent tensions have on the regions security structure? The region still has tremendous potential for further economic integration. Will this encourage cooler heads to prevail, or is it more likely that tensions resulting from territorial disputes and other grievances will disrupt economic cooperation? What lessons can we learn from the fact that decades of economic and people-to-people exchanges between China and Japan seem to have done little to prevent the revival of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute? What concrete steps can leaders take to reverse rising nationalism? Premier Li Keqiang recently talked about ushering in a diamond decade between China and ASEAN. Is that still possible given the mistrust sown by disputes in recent years? What purpose do talks on a code of conduct serve for China and ASEAN countries? Given that resolution to any of the maritime territorial disputes in either the South or East China Sea appears remote, is setting aside the disputes the best option? What steps are necessary to achieve that?
Cooperation on joint resource management in the East China Sea while setting aside but not renouncing maritime claims could be a practical way to build mutual trust and reap tangible benets.
Crisis Group Asia Report N245, Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks, 8 April 2013
Malis challenges remain legion. Failing to address them systematically risks undoing the good work done to date in addressing the immediate security crisis. This in turn will pose dangers not just for Malis stability but for the stability of the entire Sahel.
The War in Mali Is Not Yet Won By Jonathan Prentice and Jean-Herv Jezequel
24 OCT
16:0017:30
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Stability in the Sahel: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso

Jean-Marie Guhenno (Board Member), Gilles Yabi (West Africa Project Director) and Lionel Zinsou (Board Member). Moderated by Comfort Ero (Africa Program Director).
ali has taken signicant steps forward after last years coup and the capture of its north by separatist Tuareg rebels and armed jihadi groups. But it still faces serious challenges. Although recent presidential elections, which Ibrahim Boubacar Keta won handily, passed off reasonably smoothly, the armys continued inuence over politics in Bamako bodes poorly for the countrys democratic health, particularly as the underlying political weaknesses highlighted by the coup, including the failure to build robust political institutions and a reliance on personal clientelistic alliances, have not been addressed. Security remains precarious too, especially in the north. Despite the French military campaign against the jihadis earlier this year and the deployment of UN peacekeepers, unrest continues, including recurrent bombing attempts, limited but repeated clashes between government forces and rebels, and intercommunal violence. The army, riven by factionalism between troops loyal to ousted president Amadou Toumani Tour and those who supported coup leader Captain Amadou Sanogo, has proven incapable of preventing its soldiers from committing abuses against civilians in the north, notably Tuaregs, Arabs and Peuls suspected of sympathy with rebel or jihadi groups. Malis neighbours appear vulnerable too. Terrorist activity in Niger has increased over recent months, as ghters and weapons enter through its porous borders and militants exact reprisals for the governments participation in peacekeeping missions in Mali. Twin suicide attacks in May targeting army barracks in Agadez and a French-run mine in Arlit were swiftly
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MALI
National capital Regional capital Town, village Major airport International boundary Regional boundary Main road Other road Track Railroad
0 0 100 100 200 300 km 200 mi
A L G E R I A
Taoudenni Poste Maurice Cortier
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The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Map No. 4231 Rev. 2 UNITED NATIONS June 2012
claimed by al-Qaeda offshoot Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), while al-Qaeda splinter group Blood Signatories staged a prison break in June freeing several suspected terrorists. Despite institutions willing to protect democracy and rule of law, political tensions, corruption and the increasing marginalisation of those in rural areas also threaten to erode the countrys fragile stability. Thanks to its internal stability and a robust security apparatus, Burkina Faso has thus far resisted the insecurity plaguing its neighbours. But it faces a difcult period ahead. The constitution bars President Blaise Compaor, in power for more than a quarter century, from contesting the presidency in 2015. Any attempt to amend it and seek another term could provoke unrest. Even if he leaves power then, succession and a transition away from his highly personalised rule are likely to prove challenging. Political turbulence at home could make Burkina Faso vulnerable to the militant groups, drug trafckers and arms proliferation that blight its neighbours. It could also mean the loss of a key ally and a strategic base for France and the U.S., and given President Compaors canny positioning of himself as an indispensable mediator of West Africas conicts it could reduce capacity to deal with regional conicts.
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Department of Field Support Cartographic Section
Algiers Madeira Is. (PORTUGAL) Canary Is. (SPAIN) Laayoune Rabat
TUN IS IA
Tripoli
Tunis
M OR OC CO A L GERIA
L IBYA
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Praia Dakar Bamako Niamey
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Nouakchott
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Based on UN map No. 4045 Rev. 7, November 2011. The approximate area of the Sahel has been added to this map.The boundaries and names shown and the designation used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations or International Crisis Group. Final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.
This session will examine: What unique security and stability challenges confront the Sahel countries? Are the threats really different from those faced by other West African countries or by North Africa? What has been the impact of the jihadi occupation of northern Mali and the international military response on the progress of violent extremism in the Sahel? Is there a risk of prioritising security in the Sahel at the expense of socioeconomic development? What are the various manifestations of the security and development agenda in individual countries? What are the factors of stability in the countries of the Sahel and are there reasons to be more optimistic about some more than others? What are the biggest risks and dangers ahead for the new UN multinational mission in Mali? What can it hope to achieve? What does an exit strategy look like for UN peacekeeping? How have developments since Malis crisis in January 2012 shaped French security thinking on the Sahel? France has signalled its intention to reduce its military presence in Mali by the end of the year, but will the Malian army be in a position to secure the north by then?
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With incremental indecisive interference from all sides, further escalation is almost inevitable. Syrias all-out civil war, if it comes to that, will no doubt go down in conventional wisdom as an outburst of communal hatred, inevitable within a mixed society. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the product of an international standoff. However much Syrians suffer, the war in their country is not in their hands: it is a conict that disgures Syrian society more than reects it.
Peter Harling and Sarah Birke, The Syrian Heartbreak, Middle East Research and Information Project, 16 April 2013
25 OCT
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Syria and the Region

Peter Harling (Iraq, Lebanon and Syria Project Director, Senior Middle East and North Africa Adviser) and Ghassan Salam (Board Vice-Chair). Moderated by Scott Malcomson (Communications Director).
he conict between the Assad regime and Syrias rebel groups, now in its third year, continues to exact a horric toll on Syrian society and drag down the rest of the region. The regime and the opposition, both kept aoat by support from their regional and international allies, have evolved in ways that make both military and negotiated solutions more elusive, while increasing prospects for escalation. Condent it has avoided the threat of U.S. military action following the largest chemical weapons attack yet that killed over a thousand outside Damascus in August the regime has re-escalated its campaign to drive rebels from remaining strongholds around Damascus. Its hopes for Western intervention again disappointed, the political opposition is pushing to establish a provisional government that will renew its relevance. Inghting between factions within the rebel movement has worsened, with groups shifting energy and resources toward confronting each other. Meanwhile the spread of ghting across Syrias borders, and over two million refugees eeing the violence, places a burden that looks increasingly untenable on its vulnerable neighbours. What was once a Syrian conict with a regional spillover has become a regional sectarian struggle with a Syrian focus, drawing in regional and international actors and generating a transnational arc of crisis. Lebanons crippling political and confessional divide has deepened, giving rise to a level of sectarian violence unseen since the civil war. Iraq has also seen a dramatic surge in sectarian violence as Sunnis, marginalised since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and empowered by the Syrian opposition, demand more political participation in a system dominated by Shiites and
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Kurds. Syrias conict is increasingly framed as an existential battle opposing a Shiite axis, encompassing Iran, Hizbollah, Iraq and Iraqi Shiite militants, against a Sunni Islamism reinvigorated by the Arab uprisings, with a radicalised Sunni street, Islamist networks, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Gulf states and Turkey taking leading roles. The likeliest scenario for the foreseeable future is more of the same: the regime and the rebels international allies give both sides enough support to survive but not prevail, perpetuating a proxy war, with Syrians as primary victims, and the region further destabilised. A diplomatic solution driven jointly by the U.S. and Russia, in which regime and opposition settle for a power-sharing agreement with the acquiescence of their respective backers in the region would be the best way out, but remains illusory in the current climate. The UN Security Council resolution passed at the end of September aimed at destroying Syrias chemical weapons ended two and a half years of the Councils paralysis on Syria and laid the groundwork for a second peace conference in November to discuss a political transition. However there is no agreement going beyond bringing Syrians to the table, which in itself
cannot achieve much. Until this changes, the focus should be on immediate steps to de-escalate the conict and on mapping out an endgame that could serve as the basis for a diplomatic settlement a process which will entail addressing questions over interim power-sharing arrangements, the nature of the state and its institutions, and how to accommodate the concerns of rival regional actors. This session will discuss: What does the failure to resolve the Syria conict or prevent it from escalating tell us about the international system? What does the impact of the Syrian conict on its neighbours tell us about the state of the region? What is coverage of the conict not telling us about Syrian society?
Peace talks between Ankara and the PKK have stalled amid a heightening of hostile rhetoric on both sides. The PKK needs to do more to convince Turks it wants a compromise peace; the government needs to spell out a comprehensive conict-resolution strategy, including democratic reforms, not as a concession to insurgents but because reforms would both satisfy Kurds demands and benet everyone in the country.
Crisis Group Europe Report N227, Crying Wolf: Why Turkish Fears Need Not Block Kurdish Reform, 7 October 2013
25 OCT
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A Kurdish Spring? Turkey, Iraq, Syria and the Kurds

Joost Hiltermann (Chief Operating Ofcer) and Hugh Pope (Europe and Central Asia Deputy Program Director). Moderated by Scott Malcomson (Communications Director).
yrias conict has given its Kurds an opportunity to escape from years of systemic discrimination and sue for autonomy. As regime security forces withdrew from relatively unscathed majority-Kurdish areas on the Iraqi and Turkish borders to concentrate on other parts of the country, Kurdish groups have stepped in to replace them, providing security and essential services. These groups ultimately seek to ensure improved status and rights for Kurds in a future Syria. They are, however, deeply divided over what this would mean in practice and how they will achieve this. The most inuential group on the ground is the Partiya Yektiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party, PYD), an offshoot of Turkeys PKK rebel group. It is competing with a coalition of small Kurdish parties which, under the patronage of Iraqs Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), form the Kurdistan National Council (KNC). The security and political vacuum in Syrias Kurdish areas has intensied competition between these two main trends. The intra-Kurdish struggle in Syria has exacerbated the wider struggle for leadership of the Kurdish national movement between the two predominant models of Kurdish nationalism, represented by the PKK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq, and their leaders, Abdullah calan and Masoud Barzani, respectively. These two models are split on whether to extract concessions for Kurds by force or by engagement and compromise. They present two competing paradigms for dealing with Turkey, whose territory encompasses much of what Kurds see as their historic homeland, and which is increasingly trying to position itself as the dominant external
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Mike Shand/International Crisis Group, 2013.
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actor in Kurdish-speaking areas of Iraq and Syria. The PKK has used armed struggle to try to force Ankara to extend greater rights to Kurds in Turkey, while also laying claim to hegemony over all Kurdish populations, whereas the KDP, using its dominance over Iraqi Kurds, has worked hard in recent years to develop economic interdependence and political ties with Turkey to reduce Iraqi Kurds dependence on Baghdad. In exchange for Turkeys political and diplomatic support, the KRG in Erbil has cooperated with Ankara in its ght against the PKK, and in this context has engaged in an attempt to win the hearts and minds of Syrian Kurds in direct competition with the PYD. Developments in Syria keep Ankara and Erbil on the same page: both hope for the collapse of the Assad regime and seek to roll back the PKKs inuence through the PYD. KDP leader Masoud Barzani sees the fall of the Assad regime as an opportunity to increase Kurdish power throughout the region under KDP patronage through the establishment of a KDP-sponsored autonomous Kurdish region in Syria. Fo r its part Turkey fears that a PYD stronghold on the other side of its border with Syria could provide a staging ground for PKK-backed militancy in Turkey. Barzani is currently trying
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Most Kurds still want a settlement inside Turkey as equal citizens, and the government must take urgent steps to get the majority on its side. The greatest risk for the AKP is not a possible loss of marginal votes, but that the process fails and the ghting rolls on into a fourth decade.
Didem Collinsworth, Crisis Group Media Release, 7 October 2013
As occurred in Iraq in 1991 and again in 2003, the current acute crisis presents Kurds with an opportunity to rectify or at least start rectifying what they consider an historic wrong: the decision by the French and British Mandatory powers to divide the Near East in a way that left them as the largest non-state nation in the region. They appear determined to seize it, though hobbled by competing visions about how best to do so.
Crisis Group Middle East Report N136, Syria's Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle, 22 January 2013
Damascus
Baghdad
to contain the PYD, and perhaps wean it from its traditional PKK sponsor, by forging an alliance between the PYD and his own Syrian Kurdish allies. Turkey, shunning direct military intervention against the PYD, has likewise reached out to the groups leaders, and hopes that the peace process underway with the PKK though currently hanging by a thread will enable it to resist spillover from the Syria crisis. However, though Turkey and Barzani share common interests in the short term, eventually their goals seem bound to conict. Erbils vision is a Kurdish region in Syria consolidating a broad, Kurdish-dominated area straddling the Iraqi-Syrian border; Ankara will fear that such an outcome will inspire similar separatist sentiment among its own Kurds. It is easy to see how the Syrian Kurds push for greater rights risks getting entangled in this broader regional battle over Kurdish independence. However, their best chance of success in securing greater rights in Syrias future political order might well lie in becoming full partners in this political struggle, with like-minded allies inside Syria and with a common political and negotiating platform. This session will explore: Will the Kurdish Spring lead to a pan-Kurdish dynamic for one of the worlds larger nations without a state? Could Turkeys increasingly intimate relationship with Iraqi Kurds, including on the hydrocarbons front, lead to the break-up of Iraq, and what would the implications of this be? By asking Barzani to control Kurds in Iraq and Syria as a way to roll back the inuence of the PKK over Kurds everywhere, is Turkey deepening its perennial Kurdish problem or helping to resolve it? Is Turkeys current PKK peace process sustainable, and how serious is the risk of renewed conict?
But without an understanding of local issues, the peace process initiated by the UN, African Union (AU), Southern African Development Com munity (SADC), International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and regional countries risks addressing symptoms rather than causes of conict in the Kivus.
Crisis Group Africa Report N206, Understanding the Conict in Eastern Congo (I): The Ruzizi Plain, 23 July 2013
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Militias and Peace Enforcement in Central Africa

Cheryl Carolus (Board Member), Jean-Marie Guhenno (Board Member) and Thierry Vircoulon (Central Africa Project Director). Moderated by Ayo Obe (Board Vice-Chair).
n the Democratic Republic of Congo the UNs latest attempts at stabilising the troubled Kivus region has included a regional peace framework agreed in February and a robustly mandated intervention brigade to ght M23 rebels in the east, where violence is increasingly entrenched. Expectations are high, but in the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism the commitments by regional leaders to peace could easily turn into empty promises, as evinced by recent confrontations between DR Congo and Rwanda. Meanwhile the UNs intervention brigade has come up against tensions within the UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO over its mandate. Still lacking is a commitment to address at a local level the competition for land and economic opportunities which underpin the conict. The M23 rebels are only one of a number of militia groups plaguing the country. These groups have shown remarkable resilience to government efforts to rout them, building cross-border economic and logistical networks and forging links with Rwandan and Ugandan civilian and military authorities. The Central African Republic is facing a security and humanitarian crisis following a coup by the Seleka rebel coalition in March. The regional response to the coup a de facto recognition of the new power and a transition framework under international supervision saw Seleka leader Michael Djotodia sworn in as interim president in August, charged with overseeing an eighteen-month transition back to democracy under a gov-
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ernment of national unity. But uncontrolled elements of his former militia are committing atrocities against civilians and engaging in deadly clashes with supporters of deposed President Franois Boziz. Popular support for the government is non-existent, tensions between Christians and Muslims are on the rise, and insecurity is worsening, exacerbating the humanitarian emergency. There is an urgent need for a comprehensive security response and a comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration campaign, as well as longer-term governance and security sector reforms. A collapsed state will create a destabilising grey zone at the heart of the continent, in a country which is already a haven for armed groups and criminal networks. This session will explore: Why do these armed groups seem stronger than the national security forces and UN peacekeepers combined? Is the cooperation between national security forces and UN peacekeepers on the battleeld a problem or a solution? Are there already lessons to be learned regarding robust peacekeeping? Is the international community able to coordinate political and military solutions in CAR and DRC? What are the missing links?
With the approach of the Sochi Winter Olympics, Moscow wants quick solutions for Dagestan. Soft measures and negotiations were working, but they take time; presumably Moscow was more comfortable returning to the traditional heavy-handed approach. But Dagestan is very different today than even a few years ago. The numbers of religious youth have grown signicantly. It is impossible to suppress them all. Pushing them to insurgency, however, would be relatively easy.
Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, Sowing Rebellion in Dagestan?, Across Eurasia, 26 August 2013
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The Troubled Caucasus

Lawrence Sheets (South Caucasus Project Director) and Ekaterina Sokirianskaia (North Caucasus Project Director). Moderated by Paul Quinn-Judge (Europe and Central Asia Program Director).
nrest in the North Caucasus is fuelled by religious and ethnic conicts, political and economic grievances, pervasive governance problems, and disputes over administrative boundaries, land and resources all issues demanding comprehensive, exible policies. But with Vladimir Putins return to the presidency in 2012 and the approaching Sochi Olympics, small but promising moves towards more nuanced solutions to the insurgency have ceased. Dagestan has rolled back its counter-insurgency model based on targeted military operations and soft measures to integrate moderate Salas who do not advocate an armed struggle, which had been credited with a reduction in violence. It has instead adopted the Chechen model based on heavy-handed security measures a move which critics say further alienates religious communities and is behind an escalation in violence. Abusive behaviour by law enforcement personnel, combined with sweeping impunity for human rights abuses, erodes citizens faith in state institutions and the rule of law, and pushes them towards the insurgency and the allure of an alternative, Islamist state model. The authorities are increasingly concerned over North Caucasus and Central Asia militants migrating to Afghanistan, and now increasingly to Syria to ght alongside Islamist opposition militants, and who may return home with combat skills. Very approximate Western gures speak of several thousand such radicals in northern Afghanistan a mix of Central Asian and North Caucasus ghters; in Syria a new grouping headed by a Chechen reportedly numbers over a thousand North Caucasus insurgents. Putin has also rolled back autonomy in Russias regions, creating a highly centralised state in which North Caucasus residents feel estranged
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Mike Shand/International Crisis Group, October 2012
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from decision-making and have few means to hold authorities accountable or meaningfully participate in political life. State legitimacy was further undercut with Moscows reversal of a reform introducing direct elections for regional leaders, instead proposing candidates for the republic assemblies to select a change which recently went into effect in Dagestan and Ingushetia. Lack of accountability and transparency make the governance system amenable to capture by informal networks based on kinship and ethnic ties. Recent measures to tackle corruption and ght these networks criminal activities give grounds for optimism, but only a comprehensive anti-corruption effort will destroy the entrenched system. Looking south, the twenty-year deadlock between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh has entered a particularly unpredictable and sensitive phase. The past year has seen a further uptick in military threats and rhetoric, rendered more dangerous by heightened internal tensions as Azerbaijan holds elections and Armenia struggles to balance its ties with Russia and the EU. The danger is that military miscalculations or gamesmanship could cause increasingly serious skirmishes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, entering into an upward spiral. Since mediation
Despite the appearance of an old dispute caught up in historical resentments and a military standoff reminiscent of World War I trench warfare, changing dynamics have produced an increasingly uid and unpredictable situation in an already tense region.
Crisis Group Europe Brieng N71, Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Season of Risks, 26 September 2013
efforts and direct talks reached a deadlock in 2011, the arms race between the sides has accelerated. Georgias change of government in 2012 stoked optimism about the chances of improving relations with Russia, a key campaign pledge of Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvilis Georgian Dream coalition. However the Geneva talks involving international mediators, Tbilisi and representatives of the Moscow-backed entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have reached a total impasse. Efforts to forge a dialogue have stalled amid tension over Russian troop demarcations or borderisation of the administrative boundary lines between Georgia and its breakaway republics, and even Russian charges that a U.S.-funded facility in Georgia set up to study epidemiological issues is a threat to Russia. Georgias negotiation of association and free trade agreements with the EU ahead of the EU Eastern Partnership summit in November has further antagonised Russia, as has the new governments continuing NATO aspirations. This session will explore: What comes after Sochi? What are the implications of the turn to heavyhanded security measures in the North Caucasus? What are the solutions and scenarios for conict in Dagestan? What are the implications for regional security of North Caucasus ghters in Syria?
Sochi 30km north west of border
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How has Russian military and security doctrine toward the South Caucasus changed over the last year or so? Is the present Russian-U.S.-French mediating format for resolving the Azerbaijan-Armenia conict capable of producing a breakthrough? What are the implications of the drawdown of international troops in Afghanistan for the Caucasus?
The Muslim Brotherhood failed in large part due to its blind belief in majoritarian politics; its putative successors hardly can succeed if they do the same.
Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Brieng N35, Marching in Circles: Egypts Dangerous Second Transition, 7 August 2013
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Democracy, Stability and Islam in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia

Issandr El Amrani (North Africa Project Director), Wadah Khanfar (Board Member) and Bernardino Len (European Union Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean). Moderated by Richard Atwood (Research Director).
gypts transition appeared to go into reverse in early July as the military leadership ousted President Mohamed Morsi after popular protests against his rule. The army claimed to be putting Egyptian democracy back on track but has continued, if not worsened, the exclusionary, confrontational politics that marked the countrys rst transition under Morsi. The polices violent dispersal of sit-ins organised by Morsis Muslim Brotherhood (MB) resulted in an estimated 1,200 killed over the summer. Most of its national-level leaders have been arrested and media outlets friendly to it closed down. The organisation is now banned, with a court in late September freezing its assets. The fate of its Freedom and Justice Party still hangs in the balance, with the possibility that the most successful political party of post-Mubarak Egypt will not be allowed to contest the next elections. A transition of sorts is underway. A committee of 50 personalities (mostly representing state bodies and corporatist interests, and including only two Islamists) is considering a draft constitution prepared by a technical committee of scholars. The new constitution, once nalised, will be put to a referendum, after which will come parliamentary and presidential elections, scheduled for 2014. Whether Minister of Defence Abdelfattah al-Sisi will seek the presidency is much speculated upon, despite ofcial military denials.
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Egypt and Sudan cite conflicting colonial-era British documents to lay claim to the Halaib Triangle, which is currently under de facto Egyptian administration pending resolution of the dispute.
The overthrow of an elected Islamist government and the subsequent crackdown have had immediate regional consequences. In Tunisia and Libya, resentment of Islamist parties has grown, with some of their opponents even expressing the desire to emulate Egypt. Yet there are cautionary tales: in Egypt anti-state violence has increased dramatically, most notably in Sinai where over 100 soldiers have been killed and a suicide bomber levelled military intelligence headquarters near Rafah. A similar attack also targeted the interior ministers convoy in Cairo, sparing his life but killing four bystanders. Like many of the more spectacular attacks over the past month, it has been claimed by Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, a previously unknown Sinai-based jihadist group. Tunisias relatively calm transition had stood out amid the turbulence elsewhere in the region. But the assassination of opposition MP Mohammed Brahmi at the end of July only months after another opposition
Based on UN map no. 3787 Rev. 7 (February 2012). The town of Tawergha has been added.
leaders killing prompted widespread protests and calls from the secular opposition for the government led by the moderate Islamist party An-Nahda to step down. The parties now appear on the verge of a breakthrough, based on a proposal by the main trade union that bridges the Islamist-secular divide by creating a national unity government and accelerating the process of writing a new constitution before fresh elections. The government led by the moderate Islamist An-Nahda has also agreed to label the Sala Ansar al-Sharia as a terrorist group, countering accusations that it is too tolerant of hardliners. Insecurity in post-Qadha Libya has continued to worsen. The country risks fragmentation at the hands of tribal and militia forces allied to rival political factions. With targeted assassinations, kidnappings and explosions continuing, and the government increasingly incapable of exercising
Map courtesy of The General Library, The University of Texas at Austin.
its writ outside ministerial buildings, the current standoff between different militias threatens to morph into a long-term, low-intensity conict and a total vacuum of central authority. Since July the closure of Libyas main oil pipelines and terminals by forces aligned with non-Islamist factions has crippled the economy and is part of an effort to sabotage the current political order which they claim has been hijacked by the Libyan Muslim Brothers. In the capital Tripoli calls for the removal of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, mostly from Islamists, have mounted. In the south Sala militant groups, including some Tuareg militants escaping French operations in Mali, thrive alongside criminal groups. Given the presence of such groups, Libya spinning further out of control would destabilise its neighbours. This session will explore: With the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, whither political Islam in North Africa? Can Egypts new transition be democratic without being inclusive? Will Libya reach the nish line of its own transitional process, or is a new civil conict brewing? Tunisia increasingly appears like the Arab Springs last best hope what can the world do to help?
To reach a durable peace, both government and international actors should stop pursuing local piecemeal deals and abide by their repeated commitments to an inclusive, national process.
Crisis Group Africa Report N204, Sudans Spreading Conict (II): War in Blue Nile, 18 June 2013
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The Sudans: No Unity in Diversity

Cedric Barnes (Horn of Africa Project Director), EJ Hogendoorn (Africa Deputy Program Director) and Mo Ibrahim (Board Member). Moderated by Comfort Ero (Africa Program Director).
espite formally separating in July 2011, the longstanding feud between Sudan and South Sudan continues to cast a shadow over both nations. Peace between the two remains fragile, and talks have reached an impasse over the issue of border demarcation. Abyeis status and the modalities of any agreed referendum there have become a critical point of disagreement between the two states; the murder of a paramount chief earlier this year while under UN protection dealt a critical blow to local reconciliation. Political leaders in both North and South also face internal political dissent and armed rebellions, making compromise in the international sphere difcult. A recent government reshufe in South Sudan and an agreement to continue oil exports have, however, improved bilateral relations. Sudans internal conicts in a New South comprising South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Darfur, and increasingly the East, have intensied this year, fuelled by the long-term marginalisation of these regions and the continued concentration of power and resources in the centre. The Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an armed opposition alliance, has made signicant military gains but has yet to convince most Sudanese they represent a viable alternative to President Omar Bashirs National Congress Party. There is little cohesion between the SRF and other armed groups and the mainstream opposition political parties, despite attempts to forge a common front. The ruling National Congress Party has also been weakened by bitter inghting within the army, Islamist and internal security wings of the regime. The lifting of fuel subsidies in late September prompted the largest urban pro-
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Map No. 4458 Rev.2 March 2012
UNITED NATIONS
tests in Khartoum and other cities since 2012, prompting a hard security response and few political concessions. As popular discontent, as well as the threat from burgeoning extremist groups, grows in the run-up to elections in 2015, Bashir has sought to tighten his grip on power, rather than making concessions and embarking upon reforms. Over two years since independence, South Sudan is still struggling to establish an effective and inclusive government. The economy, already weak when independence was declared, is slowly recovering from last years halt in oil production over disputed transit fees. Numerous armed groups including rebels and a divided national army have meant little improvement in human security; Jonglei is the most extreme example of unresolved conict. President Salva Kiirs increasing centralisation of power, both in the SPLM and Juba most evident in the dismissal of the entire cabinet, vice president and the suspension of the SPLM secretary general in July threatens to cleave the political elite along ethnic lines ahead of the 2015 presidential polls.
24
26
28 En Nahud
30
32
34
Di nd
er
36
12
SOUTH SUDAN
Al Fula Tullus Buram Ed Da'ein Muglad
Abu Zabad
SUDAN
Nuba Mts.
Ed Damazin
Renk Umm Barbit Kaka
h it e Nile
SOUTH SUDAN
12
Famaka
Kadugli
Talodi Kologi
T
10
Paloich Junguls
Radom Kafia Kingi
hr
el
'A r
ab
War-awar Malek
Riangnom Abyei Wun Rog Gogrial Mayom Fagwir
y Aba
Ba
10
Kodok
WESTERN BAHR EL GHAZAL

Gossinga Raga
Bai
Kuacjok
Bisellia
Po n
Deim Zubeir
Madeir Bir Di Tonj Atum
Bahr
WARRAP
Leer Adok
ez Za raf
Aweil
Akop
Jonglei Can
NORTHERN BAHR EL GHAZAL
Bentiu
Malakal
Fangak Kan Gumbiel
al
Abwong
UPPER NILE Daga

Nasser
Boing
Post
Jur
Wang Kai
UNITY
Kigille
Fathai
Waat Akobo
Pibor
Soba t
Wau
Wakela
Lo l
Duk Fadiat
ETHIOPIA
S
u
go
Bo River Post
LAKES
Rumbek
Akot Lol
JONGLEI
Kongor Jonglei
d
Wh ite Yirol
Rafili
Peper Pibor
Akelo Ukwaa
Kenamuke Swamp
d
Ni
le
Om
o
6
National capital State (wilayah) capital Town Major airport International boundary Undetermined boundary* State (wilayah) boundary Abyei region** Main road Railroad
* Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. ** Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.
Khogali
Tambura
Boli
Pap Mvolo Amadi Lanya Jerbar
Bor
Malek
Lowelli
Towot
Kobowen Swamp
Li Yubu Ezo
WESTERN EQUATORIA
Yambio
Administrative boundary
Terakeka Bunduqiya
Madreggi
EASTERN EQUATORIA
Lafon Kapoeta Nagishot Lofusa
Lotagipi Swamp
Maridi
DEM. REP. OF THE CONGO

0 0 100 200 km 100 mi
Juba CENTRAL Roue EQUATORIA

Yei Kajo Keji
Alb ert Ni le
Torit
Opari
L. Turkana (L. Rudolf)
KENYA UGANDA
34 36
22
Map No. 4450 Rev.1 UNITED NATIONS October 2011
26
28
30
This session will explore: What is the impact of increasing conict in Sudans peripheries? Why have past peace agreements failed, and what does this mean for current efforts to stop the ghting? How signicant are the recent protests in Khartoum and other cities in Sudan; how far did they further NCP divides and/or cement opposition unity? What is, or should be, the role of the UN, AU, EU and other bilateral partners in peacebuilding efforts? Does President Salva Kiirs summer clear-out of the cabinet indicate a more decisive and cohesive government, or the narrowing of a ruling clique? There are continued reports that both Juba and Khartoum arm and assist rebel groups in each others territory; will improved relations mean an end to insurgencies in their peripheries?
The main forces that were killing a lot of insurgents in recent years are leaving. The insurgents dont have a whole load of incentive to negotiate until they nd out where the military balance lies after the withdrawal.
Graeme Smith in Afghanistan to begin peace talks with Taliban in Qatar, The Telegraph, 18 June 2013
25 OCT
16:0017:30
FLOOR
27
Make or break or more of the same? Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2014

Samina Ahmed (South Asia Project Director, Senior Asia Adviser), Asma Jahangir (Board Member) and Graeme Smith (Afghanistan Senior Analyst). Moderated by Jonathan Prentice (Chief Policy Ofcer).
ext year will mark a signicant turning point in Afghanistans transition. As preparations get underway for presidential and provincial polls, NATOs scheduled withdrawal is looming. Political parties, many still in the process of shedding their legacy as armed groups, have unied in their calls for electoral reform. But despite some signs of progress, President Karzais administration has yet to assure either political leaders in Afghanistan or external observers that measures are in place to prevent the disorganisation and manipulation that characterised past polls, most recently in 2010. Nor has the government been willing or able to combat the deep-rooted factionalism and corruption that has plagued its rule. Attempts to begin peace talks with the Taliban have made no tangible progress, and thus far little suggests the group is willing or even coherent enough to make the compromises necessary for a peace deal. Instead, UN gures suggest the conict is escalating, with violence returning to peak post-2001 levels. As many states are already drawing down troops, and the full withdrawal of U.S.-NATO forces is scheduled for 2014, national security will soon rely on the Afghan National Security Forces whose ability to ll the gap is still in question. With much of Afghanistans insurgent leadership based in Pakistan, Islamabads role will be crucial in determining stability and security in post-
57
2014 Afghanistan. But Pakistans own domestic challenges, particularly civil-military relations, will inevitably impact its policies towards its troubled neighbour. Though the successful transfer of power that followed the May 2013 general elections bodes well for the fragile democracy, signicant hurdles remain. Endemic governance shortfalls, a shattered economy and ongoing terrorist activities all threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the state and its institutions. Militancy continues to engulf much of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA regions, and violence is on the increase in urban centres where ethnic conict, religious extremism and rampant criminality pose an increasing threat to domestic stability. Further, it remains to be seen how clashes on the Line of Control and developments within Jammu and Kashmir might shape Pakistans policy towards India. At the same time Pakistans new government will have to contend with an activist judiciary and a still ambitious military whose interventions could all too easily erode the countrys democratic institutions. This session will explore: In Afghanistan, what are the most likely short-term scenarios for the transition period of 2014/2015? Will provincial and district capitals fall to the insurgency? Why have Taliban negotiations proven so difcult, and what could be done better?
How will the presidential election, scheduled for April 2014, affect stability? What will the results mean? In Pakistan, what are the most pressing challenges confronting the transitions second phase? How well has the Sharif government performed so far? Why has the new government opted for a policy of dialogue with militants? What are the chances of success? Can it also change the direction of Pakistans policy towards Afghanistan? The Sharif government has made peace with India the focus of its foreign policy. If it fails to deliver, what is the likely impact on regional stability?
PAKISTAN
38
66
Am uD
ar
UZBEKISTAN
Qarshi
68
Dushanbe
Qurghonteppa
TAJIKISTAN
Da ry
e Panj a-y
khs h 70 V a
72
Line Of Control as promulgated in the 1972 SIMLA Agreement

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
ya
Mary Iolotan'
Kerki
TURKMENISTAN
Sheberghan
rgab Mu
Tedzhen
ar ut
H
ah
Termiz
Kulob
- Feyzabad - Taloqan
Khorugh
r mi Pa
Ku n
ar
Kunduz Mazar-e Sharif Samangan
CHINA
H
Gilgit
36
Baghlan Dowshi -- Charikar -- Jalalabad

Khyber Pass
Ku
Meymaneh
Mor ghab
Chitral
i m
Skardu
Herat
34
Qal'eh-ye Now
-d -ru H a ri
- -Bamian
Chaghcharan
(Kabul)
Kowt-e 'Ashro w Baraki
Kabol
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA
Saidu Muzaffarabad
J a m m ul a
L
sh k
Mt. Godwin Austen (K2)

8611 m
36
Mardan
an
Shindand Farah
- sh K ha
A F G H A N I S TA N
d
Ghazni
ah
Parachinar Gardeyz
Peshawar
Rawalpindi
- - Islamabad Anantnag
Rajauri Jammu Sialkot
Indu Sopur s Kargil Srinagar 34
and
f ine o
nto Co l
Kashmir
Bannu
e - Kowt H Tarin
nd ab
Zaranj
Lashkar Gah
Kandahar
Zhob Chaman
na b
32
ar
- Delaram
- dQalat ow
R
eL u-
Ar
FED. ADMIN. Tank TRIBAL AREAS
ha
FED. CAPITAL TERRITORY ISLAMABAD
lum Gujrat Jhe Gujranwala
Sargodha Dera Ismail C h e Lahore Faisalabad Khan Jhang Sadr

vi Ra
32
Amritsar Ludhiana Chandigarh Patiala
Kasur
Zho
30
H el m and
Gowd-e Zereh
Quetta
Sibi
P U N JA B
Dera Ghazi Khan
Sahiwal
j Multan Sutle Shujaabad

Bahawalpur
Bhatinda
30
Nok Kundi
- Hamun-iMashkel
Dalbandin Surab Khuzdar Jacobabad Shikarpur
Ind
us
Bikaner
Delhi New Delhi
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
28
B A L O C H I S TA N
Panjgur
s R ak
Rahimyar Khan
Ramgarh Jaisalmer
Mashk ai
Na r a
Dadu Bela
SIND
Moro
Khairpur
Canal
IRAN
an
Larkana
Sukkur
I N D I A
Ajmer Jodhbur
Barmer
Ratangarh
28
Jaipur
s na
sht Da
Hoshab Pasni
Sonmiani Bay
Mirpur Khas
Jiwani
Gwadar
Ormara
Hyderabad
Matli Thatta Palanpur
M
ou Indth of t us h e
Karachi
24
Udaipur
24
Ran of Kutch Bhuj

ch G ulf ot Ku t
Ahmadabad
National capital Provincial capital Town, village Airports International boundary Provincial boundary Main road Secondary road Railroad
ARABIAN SEA
22
Jamnagar
Rajkot Bhavnagar Gulf of Khambhat

72
62
64
0 0
50 100 150 200 250 300 km 50 100 150 200 mi

66 68 70
Diu
Based on UN Map No. 4181 Rev. 1 (January 2004), North-West Frontier has been changed to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section
Ba
26
Turbat
Nawabshaw
Sanghar
PAKISTAN
26
Ind
us
Kota
International Crisis Group Board of Trustees October 2013
CHAIR Tom Pickering Former U.S. Undersecretary of State; Am bas sa dor to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and Nigeria PRESIDENT & CEO Louise Arbour Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the In ter national Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda VICE CHAIRS Ayo Obe Legal Practitioner, Lagos, Nigeria Ghassan Salam Dean, Paris School of International Affairs, Sciences Po EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Cheryl Carolus Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and Secretary General of the ANC Maria Livanos Cattaui Former Secretary General of the Inter national Chamber of Commerce Frank Giustra President & CEO, Fiore Financial Corporation Mark Malloch-Brown Former UN Deputy Secretary-General and Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) George Soros Chairman, Open Society Institute Pr Stenbck Former Foreign Minister of Finland OTHER BOARD MEMBERS Mort Abramowitz Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey Ko Annan Former SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations; Noble Peace Prize (2001) Nahum Barnea Chief Columnist for Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel Sandy Berger Chair, Albright Stonebridge Group LLC; Former U.S. National Security Adviser Micheline Calmy-Rey Former President of the Swiss Confedera tion and Foreign Affairs Minister
Wesley Clark Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Sheila Coronel Toni Stabile Pro fessor of Practice in Investigative Journalism; Director, Toni Stabile Center for Investigative Journalism, Columbia University, U.S. Mark Eyskens Former Prime Minister of Belgium Joschka Fischer Former Foreign Minister of Germany Lykke Friis Former Climate & Energy Minister and Minister of Gender Equality of Denmark; Former Prorector at the University of Copenhagen Jean-Marie Guhenno Arnold Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University; Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Lena Hjelm-Walln Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden Mo Ibrahim Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim Foundation; Founder, Celtel International Asma Jahangir President of the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan; Former UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief Wadah Khanfar Co-Founder, Al Sharq Forum; Former Director General, Al Jazeera Network Wim Kok Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Ricardo Lagos Former President of Chile Joanne Leedom-Ackerman Former International Secretary of PEN In ter national; Novelist and journalist, U.S. Lalit Mansingh Former Foreign Secretary of India and Ambas sa dor to the U.S., High Commissioner to the UK Benjamin Mkapa Former President of Tanzania Laurence Parisot President, French Business Confederation (MEDEF) Karim Raslan Founder, Managing Director and CEO of KRA Group Paul Reynolds President & CEO, Canaccord Financial Inc.
Javier Solana Former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, NATO Secretary General and Foreign Minister of Spain Liv Monica Stubholt Senior Vice President for Strategy and Com munication, Kvaerner ASA; Former State Secretary for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Larry Summers Former Direc tor of the U.S. National Eco nomic Council and Secretary of the U.S. Treasury; President Emeritus of Harvard University Wang Jisi Dean, School of Inter na tional Studies, Peking University; Member, Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Wu Jianmin Executive Vice Chairman, China Institute for Innovation and Development Strategy; Member, Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Chinese Foreign Ministry; Former Ambassador of China to the UN (Geneva) and France Lionel Zinsou CEO, PAI Partners
PRESIDENTS COUNCIL A distinguished group of individual and corporate donors providing essential support and expertise to Crisis Group.
CORPORATE INDIVIDUAL
BP Investec Asset Management McKinsey & Company Shearman & Sterling LLP White & Case LLP
Anonymous (3) Stephen & Jennifer Dattels Frank Holmes Steve Killelea Pierre Mirabaud
Ford Nicholson & Lisa Wolverton Neil Woodyer
INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL Individual and corporate supporters who play a key role in Crisis Groups efforts to prevent deadly conict.
CORPORATE INDIVIDUAL
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Anonymous Ryan Beedie Stanley Bergman & Edward Bergman David Brown & Erika Franke Neil & Sandra DeFeo Family Foundation Neemat Frem Seth & Jane Ginns Rita E. Hauser George Kellner Faisel Khan Zelmira Koch Polk David Levy
Leslie Lishon Harriet Mouchly-Weiss Ana Luisa Ponti & Geoffrey R. Hoguet Kerry Propper Michael L. Riordan Nina Solarz Horst Sporer Stelios S. Zavvos
GOVERNMENT AND FOUNDATION DONORS Crisis Group gratefully acknowledges the donors for their support and cooperation in 2013.
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Global Briefing 2013

ICG 2013 GLOBAL BRIEF ING

1 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

  61 Crisis Group Board and Donors

Broken Promises? Conict and Conict Prevention in 2013 and 2014

6 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

7 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

The European Union and Conict Prevention

10 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

11 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

Colombias Moment of Truth

Map courtesy of The General Library, The University of Texas at Austin.

14 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

15 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

Tension in the China Seas

Luzon Hainan Paracel Islands Luzon

SOUTH CHINA SEA

CRISIS GROUP/KJELL OLSSON

Copyright: Stratfor 2012. www.stratfor.com. Reproduced with permission.

19 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

20 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

21 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

Stability in the Sahel: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso

Timiaoune Ti-n-Zaoutene In Guezaam ms Aguelhok Assamakka Tessalit

Nioro du Sahel Dima

Map No. 4231 Rev. 2 UNITED NATIONS June 2012

24 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

Douentza Oullam Djibo Ouahigouya Dori Tera Bogand Tillabri

Birnin Madaoua Konni

Sgou Bani San

Sokoto Birnin Kebbi Gummi

Banfora CTE D'IVOIRE Gaoua

Department of Field Support Cartographic Section

Algiers Madeira Is. (PORTUGAL) Canary Is. (SPAIN) Laayoune Rabat

kry Cona wn Freeto O N E

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

E Q U ATO R IAL G U IN E A S A O T OME AN D P R IN CIP E

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Syria and the Region

29 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

A Kurdish Spring? Turkey, Iraq, Syria and the Kurds

Central Anatolia Region

Mike Shand/International Crisis Group, 2013.

South-eastern Anatolia Region

Eastern Anatolia Region

33 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

34 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

35 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

Militias and Peace Enforcement in Central Africa

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BAMINGUI-BANGOR AN Makouma Ndl

Markounda Batangafo Bocaranga

Bouca Dkoa KMOGRIBINGUI

Baboua Baoro A NA-MAMB R R N ANA-MAMB

Carnot HAUTE SANGHA

Gamboula S A N H A Tomori Nola Salo

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Map No. 4048 Rev. 4 November 2011

38 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

39 CRISIS GROUP GLOBAL BRIEFING BRUSSELS 2013

The Troubled Caucasus

SEA OF AZOV Krasnodar Krai

61 Crisis Group Board and Donors