CHALLENGESTOPHILIPPINECULTUREOFCORRUPTION:CAUSES, 1 CONSEQUENCESANDCHANGE

2 Dr.EdnaEstifaniaA.Co

Introduction Corruptionandgovernancelieontwoendsofasociopoliticalcontinuum.Where goodgovernance(asasubsetofgovernance)ismeanttoservethepublicinterest, corruptionthroughtheuseofpublicofficeandresources,servesthenarrowinterestsof family,associatesandfriends,andtheselfinterestofthosewhoholdpublicoffice. Wheregovernanceupholdstransparencyandaccountability,corruptionoperatesthrough discreetwaysandencouragesdecisionsthataremadeoutsideoftheofficialchambers andoffices.Governanceisrulesboundandispredictablecorruptionskirtsaroundthe rulessetforthbydemocraticinstitutionsandmakesarbitrarydecisions.Governancehas becomethebibleofWeberianmanagersseekingtheonebestwaytoruntheaffairsof societyusingtransparentandaccountablemechanismshowever,corruptioncontinuesto challengescholars,policymakers, anddevelopmentplayersachievefairness,equity,and optimumefficiencyinthedeliveryofthecommongood.Thenormativeperspective holdsthatgoodgovernancedoesnotorcannottoleratecorruptionbecausethelatteris inimicaltosocietyhowever,thediscourseismorecomplexthanthenormativerhetoric. Corruptionhasfastbecomeafocusofscrutinybothbyscholarsanddevelopment practitioners,anduponthesuggestionoffinancinginstitutionssuchastheWorldBank andtheAsianDevelopmentBank,ithasalsotakencenterstageonmattersofpolicy.Itis nowthelocusofmanyreengineeringeffortsoninstrumentalitiesofthestate.Corruption offersacomplex,enigmaticdimensionofapoliticalprocesswhich,insomesocietiesisa culturalrealitytheyhavetolivewithratherthanasocialpoliticalnuisancethatshouldbe stompedout.Culturaldeterminismpositsthatcorruptionispartofthesocialdynamics commoninadevelopingsocietycharacterizedbytoomanycomplexrulesontheone handandinformaltransactionsontheother.Assuch,corruptionsitsasacultural phenomenonthatbegsunderstandingratherthanblight.Takethefollowingviewsthat persistinadevelopingsociety:corruptionisnotthesolecommissionofthoseinpower corruptionisatransactionalprocessthatgraduallybuildsintotheadministrativesystem asmuchasintothesocialnorms.Corruptionisafacilitativeactandameansthat simplifiesacomplexprocessbroughtaboutbythebureaucraticrulesandformalisms oftenextremely(andbadly)translatedinourinstitutions.Theformalrules institutionalizedintheadministrativeandpoliticalsystemhavebecomeaburdenrather thanamechanismthatfacilitatesserviceandtherefore,tobeatthebureaucraticmaze,

PaperpreparedfortheconferenceRedesigningtheState?PoliticalCorruptioninDevelopmentPolicy andPractice,heldattheUniversityofManchester,25November2005aderivativeofanongoingbigger workonPhilippineDemocracyAssessment,MinimizingCorruption. 2 AssociateProfessor,UniversityofthePhilippinesandTeamLeader,PhilippineDemocracyAudit

peoplewhohavelittleaccesstoandknowledgeofthebureaucracyresorttosome comfortablemeansofdealingwiththemysteriousformalrules,andcreativelyweavesin andoutofthemaze,evenskirtingoutoftherules.Corruptionisawayoutof such complexprocess.Therefore,onecantblameothersforresortingtocorruption. Ontheotherhand,corruptionisanexplanationtoeconomicunderdevelopment, i.e.,itcompetesforresourcesandresourceallocation.Corruptionleadstoareductionof publicresourcesandeffectivelydeprivespeopleofthebasicservicesandgoodsthat shouldhavebenefitedespeciallythevastnumberofthepoor. Corruptionisanantidemocraticactbecauseittendstomanipulateorskirt aroundorsimplyignoretherulesandpoliciessetforthbydemocraticinstitutions.Fora robustdemocracy,peopleshouldhavetheconfidenceintheirgovernmentandinstitutions thatcorruptionispreventedoratleastminimized,andthatpublicofficesandservicesare asmuchaspossible,freefromcorruptionanddonotcompromisethepublicinterest. TheassessmenttakesstockoftheextenttowhichPhilippinepublicinstitutions andthesocietyatlargeaddresstheproblemsofcorruption,byexaminingthelaws, policies,programsaswellaspracticeandculture,andexamineshowcitizensdealwithor mayevenbeparticipantstocorruption.Indoingso,theassessmentcontributestoan enlightenmentoncorruptionanditsmeaningtothelifeofPhilippinedemocracy. Corruption:TheField Corruptionislinkedtopoliticalprocessi.e.,theuseandabuseofauthorityand powerontheonehandandconsequentlythedisenfranchisementofthosewhohavelittle powerontheotheritisanexplanationtoeconomicunderdevelopment,i.e.asapractice thatcompetesforresourcesandresourceallocationandrecently,corruptionisseenasa factorandtoolofgoodgovernancei.e.,anexplanationaboutwhethergovernance structureseffectivelypromotetransparency,accountability, andasoundmanagementof resources.Mostdonorsanddevelopmentaidagenciesjointheperspectivethatcorruption isinimicaltogoodgovernanceandshouldbedealtwith.Activecitizenshipabhors corruptionbecauseitdivertsresourcesfromthepopular needsforservices,facilities,and thepromotionofsocietyswelfare.Italienatesthemajorityofthepeoplefromaccessing thebureaucracyanddealingwithitsproceduresinafairandsquaremanner. Corruption asa fieldof study hasexpanded andevolved from how scholarsin thepostwar perceivedcorruptiontobe.Then,corruption washighlighted as aprocess andpracticethatsystematicallytranspiredwithinthebureaucraticstructure.(SeeCarino, etal.BureaucraticCorruptioninAsia,1979).Nowadays,corruptionisnotmerelyviewed asabureaucraticmalfeasancebutalso as anexplanation tohowcorruptionisbroadly a social malaise. Corruption is commonly perceived as a malfeasance that pervades the bureaucracy, being the seat of authority and the machinery with which the public unavoidably transacts and as such, bureaucracy can then command the time, the mood, andtheconditionsofthetransaction.SusanRoseAckerman(2000)discussescorruption within a political economy perspective, mostly explaining how politicaleconomic

players sustain corruption in high institutions of society and spills the broad consequencesoftheactresultingtomassdeprivationofresources,diminishinggainsfor thepublicsector,andfurthersustainingtheexclusivepartnershipbetweenbusinessanda few individuals in the bureaucracy for private gains. Furthermore, Ackerman explains corruptionasifitwasaneconomictransaction,i.e.,arelationshipbetweenaselleranda buyerwhilststronglypointingoutthecostsofcorruption.J.S.Nye(2000)complements Ackerman as the former deals with the costbenefit analysis of corruption. M. Shahid Alam (1989) joins Ackerman and Nye in explaining corruption within the political economylenswhilstAlamgoesontotackletheanatomyofcorruptionandestablishes thelinkbetweencorruptionandunderdevelopment.Otherscholarswhoareinthesimilar politicaleconomywagonincludePaoloMauro(1995)andJ.P.OliverdeSardan(1999). AmadoMendoza,Jr.(2000)focusesonthegovernmentprocurement,biddingandaward of contracts in the Philippines as a contribution to an understanding of the anatomy of corruption and unravels how these transactional processes of procurement and bidding are themselves bearers and channels of corruption. Emmanuel de Dios and Ricardo Ferrer, both Filipino economists, dissect the transactional corruption that takes place betweengovernmentandbusiness.Thegoodsinthesetransactionsarebids,contracts, government purchases, and auctions, in the course of which, opportunities for rules evasion and the exchangeof the goods and the illicit or opaque private benefits are clinched, sometimes even resulting to political harassment by government on business when the former plays it hard to grant permit or license to the latter. In the same environmentofgovernmentbusinesstransaction,EricBatalla(2000)observesthemany acts involving unqualified and blacklisted contractors who continue to win bids, the paymentofbribes inorder tosecure contract award, andthemisrepresentationof labor costsinpayroll,amongotherfraudulentpractices. RobertKlitgaard(1998)explainshowcorruptiontakesplaceinhighoffices wherepoweranditsexerciseisthelocusofandtheexplanationtocorruption.Hesays, corruptionisaresultofthefatalcombinationofmonopolyofpower,widelatitudeof discretion,andtheabsenceofaccountability.Thus,thepopularformula:C=M+DA whereCiscorruption,Mismonopoly,Disdiscretion,andAisaccountability.Belinda nd AquinowhowrotePoliticsofPlunder.ThePhilippinesunderMarcos(19992 ed.) affirmsKlitgaardsstatementandshowcasesprobablywhatisAsiasscandalous corruptioninalongtime.Similarlyprovidingthelinkbetweencorruptionandthe bureaucracyandadministrativegovernmentareSimchaWerner(1983)includingCarino, etal(1979). PaulHutchcroftconnectscorruptiontoapoliticsofprivilege,ofrentseeking,and clientelismspeciallyobservedinthedevelopingcountries(1997).Corruptionoccurs moststrongandisinfactsustainedwhenproppedupwithpoliticalpowerandwhichthen servesastoolforcoddlingfollowersandsupporters.However,theparadoxisthatthe samesupportersandfollowersareamongthefactorsthatpressurepoliticalpowerholders toengageincorruption,i.e,sotherewouldberesourcestospreadoutandsplurge. JamesC.Scott(2000)providesahistoricalexplanationtocorruptionandrootsit backtocolonialism,corruptionbeinganecessary instrumentofdominationovera

numberofdevelopingnations.Throughdifferentlenses,internationalandlocalscholars havewrittenaboutcorruptionechoingthosewhohavewrittenbeforethemaffirming forexamplebiasedpoliciesandtheirroleintheperpetuationofcorruption(seeJoseph LimandClarencePascual,2000)andunregulatedmarketizationthatleadstocorruption (MarieAntoinetteVirtucioandMechorLalunio,2000),amongothers. Contemporaryworksoncorruptionhighlightthestrategiesthatwouldcurb, reduce,andcheckcorruption.Theworksonthesearevoluminous,includingthose churnedoutbyscholars,donors,anddevelopmentagenciesforemostofthesearethe WorldBank,theAsianDevelopmentBank,USAID,theUNDPandTransparency International.TherecentworksinthePhilippinesandbymultilateralagenciesfocuson themechanisms,strategiesandthewaystodealwithcorruptionandthereforearemore actionorientedandnecessarilymultistakeholdersinapproach.PeterEigen(2000) tacklestheroleofcivilsocietyEmilBolongaitaandVinayBhargavadidaWorldBank commissionedstudyoncasesandframeworkforaction(year?),andOmarAzfarand TugrulGurgur(year)talkaboutdecentralizationandcorruptioninthePhilippines.Some decadesago,theUniversityofthePhilippinesthenCollegeofPublicAdministrationdid anextensivestudyonbureaucraticcorruption(1979),focusingascasestudies, governmentagencieswheretheexerciseofpoweranddiscretionwerestrong,namelyin theregulatory(BureauofTransportation),revenuegeneration(BureauofInternal RevenueandBureauofCustoms),andrevenuespendingfunctions(DepartmentofPublic WorksandHighways).AlanDoigandStephenRiley(1998)andtheTransparentand AccountableGovernance(variousdocuments)extensivelydiscussthestrategieson subvertingcorruption.Recently,theDevelopmentAcademyofthePhilippinesorDAP (2003)preparedaproposaltocombatcorruptioninthePhilippines,thusfarthemost comprehensiveframeworkthatwoulddealwiththebigC.TheDAPframeworkeasily servesasareminderoftheHongKongmodelonanticorruptioncampaignandDAPs IntegrityDevelopmentReview(IDR)isbeingpilotedinanumberofagencies,among whichisthePresidentialCommissionagainstGraftandCorruption(PCGC),the DepartmentofEducation,andtheBureauofCustoms. Indeed,corruptionhasbecomeanotherfieldofexploration.Likeaprism,itnow offersdiverseperspectives.Whatappearscommonamongtheseviewsoncorruptionisa discreetsuggestionforapopularoutrageandthegoaltostampcorruptionoutofthe publicsystemwhereitisembedded,primarilybutnotexclusivelyinthebureaucracy secondlythroughthetransactionaldomainandinterchangebetweenthepublicandthe privateparticularlybusinessspheres,andfinally,inthemindsetandbehaviorofthe citizens,otherwiseconceptuallydescribedandjustifiedastheculturalreality.

Corruption:DefinitionsandVariants Corruptionisthemisuseofauthorityandpublicpowertobenefitonesprivate interest.Whilecorruptionisoftenassociatedwiththepublicsector,thelatterhasno monopolyofitbecausetheprivatesectoris,inmostcasesinvolvedinthecorruption throughdodgytransactionsanddealingswithgovernment.Manipulationofthestock

marketisanexampleandcertainly,thereareotherabusesofcommercialpositionsfor personalgains.Neitheriscorruptionamonopolyofdevelopingcountries,norisit exclusivelyattributedtopovertyandlowincomelevels.Corruptiondoesexistevenin advancedcountrieswheregovernmentsarerelativelymature. Therearedifferenttypesofcorruptionastherearevariousscalesofit,depending onwhichsocietyisinvolvedandthepoliticalinstitutionstherein. Grandcorruption consistsoflargebribesoftenworthmillionsofdollars,tosecurecommercialcontractsor someotherbusinessadvantage(UNDP,undatedsource).Inextremecases,thestateis heldcaptivetothecorruptinterestofprivateindividualsorgroups,andhencethisis calledastatecapturewherecorruptinterestscontrolthestateitselfandtwistthe machineryofgovernmenttoservetheirprivateinterests(UND,undatedsource).Grand kleptocracyduringtheMarcoseraisprobablyanexampleofsuchstatecapture.Theuse ofpublicofficethroughresources,machinery,personnel,andauthoritytoperpetuate onesposition,suchasduringelectoralcampaignsisconsideredaspoliticalcorruption. Pettycorruptionisanother typeandwhichreferstosmallfacilitationorfacilitatingacts (throughpayments)tospeeduptheroutine,legitimatetransactionofbusinessorservice (UNDP).Insomecountriesandsituation,thereiscategoricalallusiontofacilitationas illegal. Pettycorruptioninvolvessmallfacilitationpaymentstospeeduptransaction. Thecommonreferenceofpeopleisthebureaucraticoradministrativecorruption.Asthe wordimplies,theacttranspiresinthebureaucracyandthisinvolvespeoplewho circumventadministrativerulestosuccessfullycompletetheintendedresultsofgaining privatebenefits. Graft,althoughoftenseparatelymentionedfromcorruption,albeit interchangeablyused,isstrictlyspeaking,anotherformofcorruption.Thedistinction betweengraftandcorruptionliesinthatgraftisanactofutilizingresources,time, facilitiesbysomeonewhoisfromwithintheagency,andtheactdoesnotnecessarily engagetransactingwithanotherperson.Ontheotherhand,corruptionsuchasbribery involvesanotherparty,usuallyaclient.Corruptioninvolvesacorruptorandacorruptee. Thoughdifferentfromeachother,graftjustlikecorruption,clearlyinvolvesthe utilizationofpublicresourcestoservenarrowinterest. Therearedifferenttypesofpettycorruption,rangingfrombribery,influencing, andgiftgiving.However,theseactsandbehaviorarecomplexastherearegrayareas betweenwhatareacceptableandunacceptableactsofgiftgiving.Politicalinfluencing similarlyofferssomegrayareasandthereforealsoinvitesdebateonwhetherinfluencing isacorruptone,orsimplyapoliticalactwhichswaysadecisionoraction. Corruptionassumesmanyforms,notjustinvolvingmonetarytransactionsitmay taketheformoffuturebenefitssuchaspromiseofjobsorpositionsorsimilarfavorsin exchangeforsomethingdoneforthecorruptor.Indeedtheformsofcorruptionareso diversetheseraisequestionsastowhenanactiscorruptornot.Inagivensociety, peopleshabitssuchasgiftgivingbetweenanofficeholderandaclientisculturally acceptableandmaybeconsideredasnormalandnotanactofcorruption,howeverthe samebehaviormaybeinterpretedascorruptactinanothersociety.Similarly,abroad

definitionofcorruptionincludesinfluencingbuttheboundarybetweenacceptableand unacceptableformsofinfluenceishardtodefine.Politicallobbyingisaformof influencingandislegitimate,butsecretivecontactsorsuspicionoffavoritismor influencethataresuspectedtobedisproportionatetopublicinterestmaybeconsideredas corruptactsandbehavior.Again,connectionsandmakinguseofcontactstofacilitate termsarecommonpracticeandmaybebeneficialforsomecountries(China,Japan, Korea, Pakistanareexamples),buttheseactsbecomeproblematicwhenrulesare breachedbyofficialsonbehalfoffriendsandrelatives.Somelawsanddefinitionsof corruptiontendtodefyuniversalacceptance. Itisdifficulttomeasuretheactualextentofgovernmentlossesduetocorruption. Thereareonlyestimatesonthemagnitudeofcorruptionforexample,theOfficeofthe OmbudsmanestimatesthatthereisroughlyUS$48billionlosttocorruptionbythe Philippinegovernmentoverthelast20years(Romero,undatedarticleCivilSociety OrientedMeasuresforCombatingCorruptioninthePhilippines).Fromthesamesource, theCommissiononAuditestimateofcorruptioncostsisaboutPhP2billionorUS$44.5 millioneachyear.TheWorldBankhasroughlyplacedat20%oftheannualbudgetthe amountbeinglosttocorruption.Sluggisheconomicgrowthanddevelopmentof developingcountriessuchasthePhilippinesareattributedtocorruption.However,a correlationbetweeneconomicgrowthandcorruptionremainstobeestablishedyet,in spiteofstrongsuspicionsandallusionstocorruption.Theremayindeedbeacorrelation betweencorruptionandslowgrowthanddevelopment,butcorruptionshouldbe differentiatedfrominefficiencywhichisanotherexplanationtoslowgrowthand development.

HistoricalRootsofCorruption PriortothePhilippinecolonialconquest,i.e.beforethe1520s,Filipinoslivedand believedinsomenormsofhonestyandfairness,evidentintheirdealingsparticularly withtheChinesetraderswhoexchangedgoodsintheearlytimes.(Carino,etal., 1998).Normsofconductupheldaccountabilityofpublicofficebyrulers.Inthefirst place,rulerswereselectedmoreonthebasisofcommonacceptancebyall,ratherthanon anindividualswealthandpower(Carino,etal.1998).Acceptancewasachievedthrough aprocessofconsultationsandpactsamonggroups.Replacementwasaconsequenceon anyleaderwhodidnotperformwell.Evenwithoutawrittencode,therewerenormsof conduct.
th th DuringtheSpanishcolonialperiod,i.e.fromthe16 thruthelate19 century, publicofficewasviewedandtreatedasthekingspropertyandthereforedependedonhis discretionastohowtodisposeofitwhethertoawarditortograntasfavor(Endriga, 2003).Itwasnotonlyamatterofphilosophythatpublicofficewasviewedandtreatedin suchmannerbutitwasalsoaboutdistance.Thephilosophythatthecolonywasthe kingspersonalpropertyguidedthewidediscretionexercisedbytheking.Hegaveaway lands,properties,includingpublicofficetoanyonewhoshowedloyaltytohim.The

managementofthecolonialgovernmenteffectivelyrunfrom10,000milesawayalsoled tosomebureaucraticcorruption.DuetodistancefromSpain,Philippinebased administratorsusedwidediscretionwhichthenledtoabuseofauthorityandto corruption.Inthosedays,publicofficesweredisposedofinanumberofways:through awardasmentionedearlier,orthroughsale,orthroughabid,fromwhichgains,monies wereaddedintothecolonialcoffers.Thus,corruptionwasdeemedassomethingnatural. WidespreadcorruptpracticeswerenotnotedundertheAmericancolonial government,anexplanationforsuchwasthatcivilservicewasformallyintroducedby theAmericansduringthisperiodandtheinculcationofprofessionalismingovernment mighthavereducedcorruptacts.TheintroductionandtheinstitutionalizationoftheCivil ServiceCommissioninthe1900wasatransplantoftheAmericaninfluencedPendleton Act,thepolicythattriedtocorrectthespoilssystemundertheJacksoniandemocracy, andwhichledtotheprofessionalizationofthepublicofficeandpublicpersonnel management.Asaresultoftheinstitutionalizationofthecivilservice,arbitraryhiring andpromotionofpersonnelwasreducedandthemeritprincipletookreignssomehow. TheperiodofmeritocracywasshortlivedandcutshortbytheSecondWorldWar duringwhichtime,force,coercionanddeathencouragedtreasonandloyaltytothe Japaneseimperialarmy.Thus,thenotionofloyaltyandservicewascorrupted.The messageamongstFilipinoswasthatloyalty,nationalism,andtruthfulnessmeant punishment,whiletreasonandbetrayalwouldbringrewardsbytheJapanesecolonizers. AfterthewarandthroughtotheIndependentRepublic(1946),thePhilippines hadtogothroughaperiodofrehabilitationfromtheravagesoftheSecondWorldWar. Besidetechnicalassistance,internationalfinancialaidsandgrantsfloodedthePhilippines forphysicalinfrastructureandreconstructiontherebyalsoprovidingtheopportunitiesfor andmakingpublicpersonnelvulnerabletocorruption.Certainly,underaconditionof extremepoverty,moneyfloodsofferenormoustemptationforcorruption.Thus,bythe late1940sthroughtotheearly1950s,oneofthemostoutrageousissuesthatcontributed tothefastexpansionoftheHukrebellioninthecountrysidewastheerosionofthe peoplestrustingovernmentlargelyduetowidespreadcorruption. Colonialismdidnotonlywreakhavoconthepatrimonyofthecountrybutitalso pavedthewayforcorruption.Themixedsignalsandincoherentvaluesunderdifferent colonialepochssentthehintthatcorruptionwasanaturalactandpeoplefastgained toleranceforit.Subjectedacrossnearly5centuriesofcolonialism,thePhilippineswent througharollercoasterofdifferentformsofcorruptionfromoneachievedthroughthe subtlemeansofpublicofficesale,highestbiddingofpublicpost,rewardbasedonloyalty ratherthanmerit,tooneofoutrightvaluedistortionrewardingpositionsinexchangefor nationalbetrayalandtreason.Thus,corruptionwhichhaditsrootsincolonialismbrought withitthemisconceptionsaboutpublicofficeasaselfrewardandaselfserving opportunityratherthananoblemissionandanhonorablepositionofservicetopublic interestbythosewhohavethemeritandqualificationsforit.Thosewhopurchased publicofficebehavedlikeaholocaustaimingtogetbackwhatevertheyinvestedinitin thefastesttimepossible.

TheStrongOneManRuleandMarcosPlunder TheMarcosRegime,overextendingfrom1965thru1986,isassociatednotjust withabuseofpowerandmassiveviolationofhumanrights,butalsowithunparalleled corruption.Plunderaptlydescribestheextentofcorruptioncommittedbytheregime. PowerandauthoritywereusedbyMarcostothehilt,andgiventheabsenceofcongress andotherrulemakinginstitutions,rulesandlawsrevolvedaroundMarcosandhis presidentialdecrees.Marcosorderedtheshutdownofcongressandotherdemocratic institutions.Whateverhewantedanddeclaredwerelaws.BelindaAquinosuccinctly describestheMarcosabuseofpoweranditsconsequencesonPhilippinebusinessand economyachievedthroughtheassistanceofhiscronies. FollowinghisloftypronouncementsontheevilsofoligarchyinPhilippinesociety, MarcosgraduallytookoverthebusinessempireownedbytheLopezfamily, consistingofthenationslargestcorporation,sixtelevisionand21radiostations,one oftheleadingnewspapers,andtheBenpresCorporation,whichhadseveral investmentsinvariouscompaniesaroundthecountry.TheheadoftheLopezfamily, EugenioSr.,wasintheU.S.whenmartiallawwasdeclaredinSeptember1972,and hissonEugenioJr.wasimprisonedamonthlaterforallegedcomplicityinan assassinationplotagainstMarcos.Breakinghissilencein1974,theelderLopez revealedthathisfamilyspropertieswerenotreallysoldtobutextortedbythe MarcosRomualdezgroup.OurpropertiesweregiventotheMarcosfamilythrough itsfrontmeninexchangeforthereleaseofmysonandthesafetyofourfamily.Some ofourpropertiesarenowownedand/oroperatedbythefrontmenthroughsome artificialagreementsandsomeofthemhavebeentakenoverwithoutanytypeof agreement,legalorillegal.TheMarcosesnegotiatedonthesaleofMeralcowith assetstotalingmorethan$400million.andthereweremoredemandsbythe MarcosesinexchangeforthereleaseofLopezsson.Amongtheseotherdemands werethathisfamilymaintainedtheirsilenceandnotcriticizeMarcosandhismartial lawrule,andthatheshouldvisitthePhilippinestoprovethathewasnotapolitical opponentinexile.Inanotherswiftmove,theMarcosgovernment,thistimethrough themilitary,seizedallthecorporationsownedorcontrolledbyanotherelitefamily, headedbyindustrialistFernandoJacinto.Thesecapturedpropertiesincludedthe IliganIntegratedSteelMills,Inc.(IISMI)theonlyoneofitskindinthecountry. Numbering26inall,theywereworth$21million.LikeLopez,Jacintowasawayfrom thePhilippineswhenhisassetsweretakenover.ClaimingthatJacintoowed$60 million,thegovernmentusedhisabsenceasapretextfornotcomingtoa

settlementwithhim.. TheIISMIlaterbecamethenucleusforthegovernmentoperatedNationalSteel Corporationanditssubsidiarities. Thetakeoversextendedtonumerousbanks,utilities,andotherinstitutions, particularlythosewithlargeunpaidloans.AndinthecaseofPhilippineAirlines(PAL), thecountrysflagcarrier,itsmanagerBenignoTodaapparentlyincurredtheireof ImeldaMarcoswhenhepresentedherwithamillionpesobillforherconstanttravels abroad.PALwassubsequentlytakenoverandputinthehandsofanotherMarcos crony,RomanCruz,Jr.whowasalreadyheadingupanothergovernmentcorporation, theGovernmentServiceInsuranceSystem(GSIS). Beforelong,largesectorsoftheeconomycameundertheeffectivecontrolofthe Marcoscronies.RobertoBenedictoalsosharedcontrolovermassmediawithBenjamin Romualdez.EduardoCojuangcoandJuanPonceEnrilehadcorneredthecoconut industry.Theformerwasalsoapowerfulfigureinotherindustriesandactivitieslike nationalathletics.Campos,anotherloyalcrony,wastheundisputedleaderofthe pharmaceuticalindustry.Floreindotookchargeofthebananatradeandwasactivein therealestatebusinessaswell.GeronimoVelasco,theEnergyMinister,was responsibleforallmattersrelatedtooilandenergy.HerminioDisini,acounsininlaw toImeldaMarcos,builtanempireontobaccorelatedindustriesandseveral corporations.RicardoSilveriowasgivenamonopolyofthesaleandassemblyofcars, particularlyToyotas,bythegovernment.RomanCruz,Jr.controlledtwopowerful governmentcorporations,GSISandPAL.BankingwasputintheorbitofBenedicto again,MarcossoninlawGregorioAranetaIII,andMarcosfinancialadviser RolandoGapud.Themammothconstructionindustrywasvirtuallythepreserveof Marcosgolfpartner,RodolfoCuenca.Andthehighlylucrativecasinogambling industryfellintothehandsofAlfredoRomualdez,anotherImeldabrother. Marcosalliesinthemilitary,notablyGeneralVer,likewisebecameextremely powerfulfiguresinthepalacecircleofcronies.Historicallyexcludedfromthe traditionalelite,thegeneralsgainedanewprominencewiththeirlavishmansions, frequenttripsabroad,andchanginglifestyles.TheCorinthianGardens,aposhenclave inMetroManila,becameasymboloftheirnewpower. Throughaseriesofpresidentialdecrees,Marcoscreatedstatemonopoliesfor mostofthenationsmajorindustriesandawardedthemtohisloyalfollowers.These Newmonopolies,backedbythegovernmentbutsetupasprivatenationalcartelsunder thecronies,weredesignedtocontroldomesticindustrialproductionandtohandle everyaspectofthenationsprimecommodities,fromfinancingtoproductionto shipping..Withlegalrestraintsremoved,withthevoicescallingforfairnessand moderationsilenced,thecroniesquitenaturallybecameevenmoreaudaciousintheir wheelinganddealing.TheybecamethenewoligarchsinMarcosregime.Bythis time,thetermcronycapitalismhadgainedcurrencyasMarcosversionoftheroleof thestateinPhilippineeconomicdevelopment.Itwasacynicalreferencetothe

expansionofstatepowerbyawardingprimegovernmentcontractstoindividuals beholdentotheregimeonthebasisoftheirpersonalorritualtiestotheMarcos circle.Thecountrysleadingindustrieswerevirtuallysweptunderthecorrupt maneuversofthecronies,whotookonbusinessesforwhichtheyneverhadthe trainingnornecessaryfinancing.(BelindaAquino,ThePoliticsofPlunder.The nd PhilippinesunderMarcos.2 ed.GreatTradeBookandUPNCPAG,1999)

BeforethedeclarationofMartialLaw,PrimitivoMijaresinthebook The ConjugalDictatorshiprecalledthetransferofPhP69millionbyMarcosfromthe MalacanangPalacecontingencyfundstotheHouseofRepresentativestogiveallied congressmenwhobelongedtothesamerulingparty,thecampaignfundsforthere electionin1969(PorkandotherPerks,Coronel(ed.),1998).Atthattime,PhP69million wasabigamount.ThescandaldidnotsurfaceuntilthedeclarationofMartiallawin 1972whenafterremovingthelegislatureandotherchecksandbalancesontheexecutive, Marcoscouldforgetarguingaboutthecase.Afterall,underMartiallaw,whateverhe saidwasthefinalword. Grandkleptocracy,plunder,wholesalecorruption,statecaptureaptly describetheserialactsofcorruptioninvolvingthehighestofficial,family,andcronies, allofwhichhadsubstantialmeaningandaffinitytotheMarcoscrime.Marcoswas unparalleledgrosscorruption.TheMarcosgrandkleptocracyvirtuallyheldthestate capturetothebusinessinterestsoffamily,relativesandlimitedcronies,defyingany existinglawsonaccountabilityanditselfservingastheruleoftheday.Therewereno grandrulesoncorruptionatthattimetheruleswereonlygreedandwhims.Discretion andwhimsofdespotsbringthelessonforward,i.e.,thatthegreaterandmoreabsolutethe powerofrulers,themorecoercivepowersbecome(throughMartiallaw),andthemore consolidatedthepowerofauthorityandbusinessare,corruptionislikelytotakeplace.In theabsenceofstructures(ofcongressandtheJudiciary)thatwouldcheckthePresident, thelatterprovedabsoluteandcorruptiontendstobecomeitsnaturalconsequence. Marcoswasfinallyunseatedthroughabloodlesspeoplepowerin1986.The MarcosplunderofthenationisanodalpointinPhilippinecorruptionifonlybecauseit pavedthewaytoaPhilippinelexicographyofcorruptionandthereaftergavewaytoanti corruptionlaws,policies,andprograms. AntiCorruptionMeasuresAftertheNightmare Since1986whendemocraticinstitutionswerereinstalledundertheAquino administration,lawsandpolicieswerepurposivelyintroducedandprogramsweresetin placewithtwoprongedgoals,namely,therecoveryoftheMarcosillgottenwealth,and thepreventionandcurtailmentofcorruptioninthebureaucracy.Iftherewasanything goodthatcameoutoftheMarcosplunder,itwasthatthePhilippineslearnedtoinstitute anticorruptionmeasures.AfteranightmareundertheMarcosRegime,theAquino administrationtooktoheartthecleansingofthebureaucracyhowever,itcarried cleansingtotheextremebyoverdoingthepurginginthebureaucracy.Aquinovigorously

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eliminatedanyoneassociatedwiththeMarcosregimeincludingthosewhoperformed well(Carino,1986). AsummaryofanticorruptionandregulatorymeasuresisshownbelowinTable Ibelow. Table1.Summaryofbasiclawsandpoliciesrelatedtocorruption&corruption prevention

Law/Policy RepublicAct(RA)1379 Passedin1959

Intent/Goal Callsforforfeitureof propertyunlawfully acquiredbyanypublic employeeinfavorofthe statecoversproperty unlawfullyacquiredduring incumbency&outof proportiontolawfulincome Enumerateswhatmaybe consideredascorruptacts requiresthesubmissionof publicemployeesassets& liabilitiesevery2years

RA3019 AnActDeclaringForfeiture infavoroftheStateany propertyfoundtohavebeen unlawfullyacquiredbyany publicofficeroremployee andprovidingforthe proceduretherefor Passedin1960 RA6028 Passedin1969

Status/Remarks TheOmbudsmanrecently conductslifestylecheck amongpublicemployees especiallyinagencies involvedinhighrevenue generation&revenue spendingpenaltyisupto5 yearsimprisonmentorfine ofuptoPhP10,000.orboth Penaltiesinclude: imprisonmentbetween6 yearsto1month&15 years,disqualificationfrom publicoffice,forfeitureof unexplainedwealth

PresidentialDecree(PD)46 Passedin1972

PD677 Passedin1975 PD749

Providedforthecreationof anindependentagencyto attendtocomplaintswhen citizensareprejudicedby decisions/actionsofpublic officials Makesgiftgivingunlawful forgovt.personnel, includingChristmas (whetherforpastorfuture favors)prohibits entertainingpublicofficials &relatives Requiressubmissionof assets&liabilitiesevery year Grantsimmunityfrom

Theagency,Citizens Counselor,wasnever created

Probablyoneofthemost controversial,least understoodbymanypeople giftgivingisoftentreated asaculturalpractice&is difficulttodoawaywith

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Passedin1975

prosecutiontogiftandbribe giverswhentheyagreeto testifyinbriberycharges againstpublicofficials guiltyofoffense RA6713 Promoteshighstandardsof Formscoreethical CodeofConductand ethicsamongpublic standardssetbycivil EthicalStandardsforPublic employeesemulatespublic servicealsoenshrinedin officialsandemployees officetohighestesteem the1987Constitution Passedin1989(also enshrinedinthe1987 AdministrativeCode) OmbudsmanActof1989or CreatestheOfficeofthe RA6770 Ombudsman RA7055,AnAct Createdtwocourtsfor ThePresidentmaydecideto StrengtheningCivilian tryingerringAFPmembers directthetrialtobeincivil Supremacyoverthe subjecttomilitarylaws courtsthePresidenthasthe Military crimesinthepenalcode& discretiontodecideon Passedin1991 localgovernment wheretotrythecase ordinancesaretriedincivil courts RA7080,AnActDefining andPenalizingtheCrimeof Plunder RA8249,AnActDefining PlacesSandiganbayanasa Jurisdictionof specialcourtatparwith Sandiganbayan courtofappeals ExecutiveOrderNo.12, AssiststhePresidentinthe Thefocusedapproachon CreatingthePresidential campaignagainstgraftand thedoables,priority AntiGraftCommission corruption&conductthe agencies,andthestage CreatedNovember2004 taskofinvestigatingand basedprevention, hearingadministrativecases education,deterrence, &complaintsagainst andstrategicpartnership presidentialappointees iscommendable.Infactthis and/orgovernment shouldbeOmbudsman personnelwhohave approach.However,the conspiredwithPresidential mandateseemstobe appointees redundantandoverlapswith Ombudsman OmnibusElectionCode Defineselectionrules Accountabilityaspectof includinglimitsto reportexpendituresare campaignexpenditures weakandhardlyenforced allowspoliticalparty switching&doesnot encouragepartydiscipline penaltyandsanctionsare

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weak RepublicAct9184orthe GovernmentProcurement ReformAct Standardizesgovernment procurementundertakings frompurchaseofgoods& suppliestocivilworks RepublicAct8792ortheE Mandatesgovernment CommerceAct agenciesincluding governmentcorporationsto useelectronicdata& documentsintransaction RepublicAct8799orthe Makescapitalmarket SecuritiesRegulationCode operationstransparent& lesssusceptibleto irregularities RepublicAct9160as Definesandcriminalizes amendedbyRA9194orthe moneylaunderingoractsof AntimoneyLaunderingAct makingcriminallyobtained proceedsappearlegitimate RepublicAct8791orthe Containsregulatory GeneralBankingLawof measuresoftheCentral 2000 Bank(BSP)toensure viability andintegrity Compiledfromvarioussources.(CoandJuan,2005)

TheAntiCorruptionBodies The1987Constitutionestablishedtwospecial,independentbodieswhosegoals aretocarryouttheprinciplesofintegrityandaccountabilityofthepublicoffice.The passageoftwoRepublicActscreatedtheOmbudsmanandSandiganbayantoensure responsiblegovernmentemployeesandofficeholders.Thesebodiesarethefollowing: 1) 2) 3) 4) OfficeoftheOmbudsman(createdunderRepublicAct6770) Sandiganbayan(createdunderRepublicAct7975) CivilServiceCommission(CSC) CommissiononAudit(COA)

Toachieveeffectiveoperation,thesebodiesweregivenfiscaland politicalautonomyasstatedinSection2,ArticleVIII,Section14,ArticleXIandin SectionB1,ArticleIX,andSectionD1,alsoArticleIX,andSection11,ArticleXIofthe constitution.TheactionsanddecisionsofthesebodiescouldbeappealedtotheSupreme Court. Variousadministrativeorderswereissuedtoenforcethemotherlawsonanti corruptionbodiesandprograms.Amongthesearethefollowing:

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a) AdministrativeOrderNo.07(DefiningtherulesofprocedureoftheOfficeof theOmbudsman) b) AdministrativeOrderNo.08(Clarifyingandmodifyingcertainrulesof procedures) c) AdministrativeOrderNo.09(AmendingsectionsofAdministrativeOrderNo. 07) d) AdministrativeOrderNo.10(SupersedingAdministrativeOrderNo.6) SupremeCourtAdministrativeCircularNo.1894,designatingclerksofcourtof RegionalTrialCourtsasExofficioclerksof courtoftheSandiganbayanwas issuedtostrengthentheSandiganbayan.

1. TheOfficeoftheOmbudsman TheOmbudsmanistheinstitutionmainlytaskedtodealwiththepreventionof graftandcorruption.Itismeanttoactaswatchdog,ensuringthattheperformance ofofficialfunctionsareadministeredaccordingtothelaws.Itstandsasthe officialcriticofexistingproceduresandpracticeswiththeobjectiveofrefining thesepublicprocedures.TheOmbudsmanistheagencytoresorttointhe dispensationofjusticeandintheimpositionofadministrativesanctionsonerring publicofficialsandemployees. Toallowforeffectiveadministrationandexecutionofitsfunctions,the OmbudsmanisassignedbytheconstitutionaDeputyOmbudsmaninthemilitary, andadeputyeachforthemajorislandsofLuzon,Visayas,andMindanao. 2. TheSandiganbayan UnliketheOmbudsmanwhichisaregularcourt,theSandiganbayanisaspecial court.TheSandiganbayandealswithcasesandoffensescommittedbyhigher levelofficials,particularlythoseinSalaryGrade27orhigher,electiveor appointiveofficials.IthasjurisdictionofcasesrelatedtoRA3019,RA1379, ChapterIIoftheRevisedPenalCode,andRA7055overmilitaryofficials.Like theOmbudsman,thedecisionsoftheSandiganbayanareappealableonlytothe SupremeCourt. 3. CivilServiceCommission Asthepublicpersonnelcentralagency,theCSCpromotesthevaluesandethics pertainingtopublicservice,meritprinciple,codeofconduct,highperformance, andpublicaccountability.Toenforcetheseprinciples,theCSCpromotesanti corruptionfunctionssuchasvalueorientationamongemployees,including grantingrecognitionandrewardstooutstandingperformanceinthepublic service.

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4. CommissiononAudit TheCommissiononAuditnotonlyexaminesthefiscalperformanceof governmentunitsandagencies,butalsolooksintotheeffectiveness,economy, andregularityoftheirfunctions. Regularagenciesofgovernmentwhichweretaskedtosupportanticorruption measuresserveasmechanismsofaccountabilitythroughspecificallydefinedfunctions. TheseagenciesaretheDepartmentofJustice(DOJ)andthePresidentialCommissionon GoodGovernment(PCGG).TheDOJinvestigatesandprosecutespublicemployeesof ranklowerthanSG27,andmayinvestigateonofficialsofDOJitselfforany administrativecomplaintsleveledagainstthem.Ontheotherhand,thePCGGwhichwas createdduringtheAquinoadministration,istaskedtorecoverwealthfromMarcos familyandhiscronies. Differentadministrationsinstitutedanticorruptionbodies.Takethefollowingas examples: UnderAquino,thePresidentsCommitteeonPublicEthicsandAccountability (PCEA)wascreatedtoensureemployeesaccountability,atasksimilartowhatthe Ombudsmandoespresently. In1994PresidentRamoscreatedthePresidentialCommissionagainstGraftand Corruption(PCGAC)throughanexecutiveorderwhichwouldinvestigatechargesof graftandcorruptionallegedagainstappointiveofficialsandwhichwouldmonitorthe MoralRecoveryProgramalsoinstitutedduringRamosterm. WhenEstradacametopower,heintendedtousetheinteragencybodycomposed ofseveralagencies,namely,thePCAGC,theOmbudsman,DOJ,andtheCivilService Commissiontomonitorcasesandtodealwithcorruption. UndertheArroyoadministration,thelawsandpoliciesoncorruptionweregiven apushbyissuingExecutiveOrder12,creatingthePresidentialAntiGraftCommission (PAGC)withthespecificfunctionsofinvestigatingcomplaintsoncommissionofgrafts inpublicinstitutionsandonconspiringwithPresidentialappointeesinthecourseof committinggraft.However,dotheselawseffectivelycurbcorruption? TheSocialWeatherStations(SWS),apollbodyidentifiesmostcorruptionprone businessgovernmenttransactionstobeintheareaofpermittingandlicensing(localand national), payment and collection of taxes, customs regulation, and procurement and government contracting, including supplying government with goods and services. Tax audit and investigationis alsoanarea ofoperation thatis vulnerable andsusceptibleto corrupt dealings and practices. The modus operandi is for the tax examiner and the subjecttaxpayertocometoaninformalagreement.Thelatterstaxduewillbereducedin exchangeforanillicitpaymentthatgototheprivatecoffersofthetaxauditor.Anadage goes that more goes to PR (public relations) or to the tax examiners pocket than to

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RP (the Republic of the Philippines). There is also the usual sharing scheme that happenswithintheBureauofInternalRevenue(BIR).Theexaminerretains30percent oftheloot whiletheremaining70per cent are sharedbythe regionaldirector,revenue districtofficer(headoftheBIRdistrictoffice),andthechiefoftheassessmentdivision. In the recent years, the banking and stock market sectors have also been rigged by unsavvy transactions, mostly with consent of high officials. Customs administration corruptionfallsinto2categories,namelythosethatoccurtofacilitateandmakepossible illegitimate and illegal transactions and virtual smuggling where there is collusion between smugglers and Customs people. Technical smuggling assumes the forms of undervaluationofgoods,misclassificationofgoods,andmisdeclarationofgoods.Inall cases,thenationalcoffersaretheultimatelosersandbenefitsnarrowlyaccruetoboththe clients (smugglers) and the bureaucrats. Based on these cases, corruption is a transactional thing it involves both the bureaucrat and the client, government and business, or government and the citizen. It spills over the bureaucracy and onto the society.Corruptionisnotthemonopolyofthebureaucratsbecausetheactiscommitted byaprocessofosmosiswithinandwithoutthebureaucracy. Asaresponsetothesenegativebehaviorinthegovernmentagenciestransacting withbusiness,numerouslawswerefurtherenactedbycongress.Theseincludethe following: RepublicAct9184ortheGovernmentProcurementReformAct RepublicAct8792ortheECommerceAct Republic8799ortheSecuritiesRegulationCode RepublicActNo.9160asamendedbyRA9194orTheAntiMoneyLaundering Act RepublicActNo.8791orTheGeneralBankingLawof2000 Anticorruptionandregulatorymeasures,whetherlaws,presidentialdecrees,and bodiesmandatedbytheconstitutionarenotwanting.Infact,thereweretoomany,and someofthesetendtooverlapwitheachother.Therangeoftheirresponsibilitiesand functionsarewideandtheirprovisionscomprehensiveenoughtodiscouragethe commissionofcorruptactsandforpublicemployeesandofficialstobetruly accountable.Theanticorruptionbodiesnearlyoverlapeachotherintermsoffunctions andscopeofresponsibilitiesbutthesedidnotwarranteffectivepreventionofcorruption. Acrossdifferentadministrations,therewereflagshipprogramsandprojects,asthougha sealofadministrationssendingthemessagethateachadministrationdidsomething againstgraftandcorruption.However,thecreationofsuchcommissionsandbodiesmay havebeenredundantandbythemselvescostlyforthegovernment.Althoughthismaynot betooefficientawayofdoing,thecreationitselfofthesebodiesshouldbeexaminedto ascertainwhetherthesestructuresdonotcontributetofurthercorruptionofthepublic administrativesystem.Thenumerouslawsandprogramsdidnotinsulatethehighest officialsandbureaucratsfromcorruptacts,theachievementofwhichusuallyemployed authority,yieldingevenmorepoweranddiscretionoverthepublicoffice.Anattendant questiontoraiseiswhyindeedanewprogramwouldhavetobecreatedeachtimeanew administrationsetsin,ratherthanforanincomingadministrationtoexaminethe

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performanceoftheexistinganticorruptionbodyandtobuildupontheeffortsofthe presentanticorruptionbloc. ThequerythenbringsustoadiscourseonCultureandindeedsomescholarshave givencultureasanexplanationtothepersistentcorruption.

TheCulturethatBreedsCorruption,theCorruptionthatisEmbeddedinthe Culture ThecultureofcorruptionissustainedbyasubculturethatpersistsinPhilippine politicaladministrativesystem,namely:giftgiving,reciprocity,clientelism,theso calleddarksideofsocialcapitalorthenetwork,fixing,andfacilitationusedina negativeway,thecultureofdualism,andtheexpansiveyetdiscretionaryuseof bureaucraticpower.Thecorruptioncultureisdiscussedbelow. Giftgiving,reciprocity,andclientelism: ThestereotypedFilipinocharacterissynonymoustokindheartednessandgift giving.Thelatteriscommonplaceespeciallywhenoneshowsappreciation,gratitudefor afavordone,ortobridgeandreachouttoastrangerorsomeonedistant.Thepractice ofgiftgivingiscarriedthroughthepoliticalandadministrativeinstitutions,hence,when ajobisdonebyabureaucrat,theclientsendsgiftsasawayofthankingtheemployeefor theservicerendered.Asgiftgivingisconstantlypracticed,certainexpectationsof regularityintheactgrowsonthebureaucratuntilthehabitisembeddedintheoffice,in thetransactions,andeventuallyintheinstitutionsofgovernance. DespitethepassageofaPresidentialDecree46in1972whichforbidsgiftgiving inbureaucratictransaction,bureaucratandclientcontinuetoignoretheregulation.Gift givingisembeddedinthesocialnormswhichexplainswhythehabitiseffectively institutionalizedbetterthanthelawitself. Similarly,reciprocitycreepsintothePhilippineelectoralsystemthrough clientelismwhereinapoliticalcandidatecuddlestheelectoratethroughvotebuyingand thepromiseoffavorsatafuturetimeinexchangeforthevote.Ratherthanserveasatool forchoosingleaders,electionisturnedintomarketpoliticswherevotesarewellsoldto thecandidateswhocouldofferthebestpriceeitherduringelectiontimeorthereafter, throughfavorsandjuicyposts.Giftgiving,reciprocity,andclientelismwhicharedeeply embeddedintheculturesustaincorruptionandpeoplethinkthatthesepracticesarethe naturalwaysofthepublicinstitutionsandthepoliticalsystem.Andasthehabitgrowson peopleandinstitutions,societydevelopsatoleranceforcorruption. Aspiringpoliticiansandcandidateshavethenotionthatpublicofficeisan employmentfromwhichanofficeholdercouldrakeinmoney,buycars,travelabroad, andgetwhateveronewants.Oneneedsonlytoenterpoliticsandholdpublicofficeto

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makesureonegetswealthy.(FocusGroupDiscussionamongkeyinformantsinLuzon, Philippines,DemocracyAudit,July2005)Thewaytosocialmobilityisthepublicoffice. Publicofficeisthereforeseenasanopportunitytorewardonesselfratherthanasan apexofresponsibilityandpublicservice.Publicofficeandcorruptionareintimately related.Recallthatsuchnotionofpublicofficeasprivateinterestandselfrewarding mechanismratherthananobleduty,isbothlegacyandreinventionofthecolonial experienceofadistortedviewaboutthepublicoffice. ACultureofDualism: AlsoembeddedinthePhilippineadministrativesystemisthecultureofdualism (Varela,2003).Thereisonestandardfor therankandfileandanotherforthehigh official,astandardthatexactsstrictaccountabilityfromtherankandfileontheonehand andonethatallowsalatitudeofdiscretionarypowerwithnoclearaccountabilityamong highofficialsontheother. Thereisadifferentsetoftrafficruleswhenhighofficials traversethetrafficjam,asopposedtotherulesthatgoverntheordinarycitizens the trafficcomestoastandstillandyieldstoapolicecarwithsirenbecausethepoliceis escortingsomeVeryImportantPersons(VIP)andthereforeallothercarsshouldyield.

TheSocialBadinSocialCapital:Network,Fixing,andFacilitation Despitetheformalrules,policies,andprogramsagainstcorruption,theinformal networksandrulesaboundandoperatemoreeffectivelythantheformalones.Thereisso muchinformalitythattranspireswithinthebureaucracyandatitsgates.Anetworkof individualsorgroupstokeepthepublictransactionsmoothissuccinctlyobservedby Amorado(2005)inanunpublisheddissertationcalledFixingSociety.AnEthnographic StudyofFixersinthePhilippinesandthepurposeofwhichispreciselytofixthe complexwaysofthebureaucracy inexchangeforsomefees.Briberyisatransaction meanttofacilitatethetransactionswiththebureaucracy.TheFilipinosjustlikemost otherhumanbeings,havepredilectiontoinformalnetworksandconnectionsbridge, connector,facilitatorwhenthingsaredifficultandcomplextodealwithorto reach. Thebureaucracyisdifficultandcomplexforsomeordinarycitizens,andtobeable togetthroughthejungle,oneneedsafacilitator,afixer.Whenthebureaucracyfails toachievethegoalsofefficiency,effectiveness,andorderasWeberwouldhavethese, thebureaucracyconstrictsratherthancohereserviceandtransactions.Andunderthese sameconditionsorpreciselyduetotheseconditions,fixingandfacilitationabound inandoutofthebureaucracy.Moreoften,thereisaconnectionbetweenthosewholie insidethebureaucracyandthosewhofixoutsideofit(Amorado,unpublished dissertation,2005). Connections,networks,andlinksarepositivesocialbridges,accordingtoPutnam. Butthatisnotsoallthetime.Althoughfixersaresometimesrecognizedastrouble shooterswhohelpclientsintrouble,fixershavenowbecomepartofthesystemof dealingwiththebureaucracy.Consideredasdoctorswhofixthebureaucraticproblems fortheclients,fixersarealsoseenasbagmenwhoregularlydeliverthetariffstotheir

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connectionsinsidethegovernmentagencies(Amorado,2005).Andtherearefixerswho extortwhentheyfixonpurpose.Policemenfallinthiscategoryoffixers.Basedonapoll survey(SWS1999),44%ofFilipinosbelievethatpolicemenaskforbribes.Andfixing orbriberyoroutrightextortioniscommonplaceamonganumberofgovernmentagencies suchasinthedrivinglicenseapplication(LandTransportationOffice),revenuecollectors (BureauofInternalRevenue),environmentalinspectorsandbusinessassessors,land appraising,businesspermits,andtravelpackages,amongothers.Theclientsyieldto fixingwhenthebureaucraticproceduresarecumbersome,inefficient,andunfriendlyto clients.Thesocalleddarksideofsocialcapitaltheconnectionandnetworking emergeswhenthereisafailureofthebureaucracytodealwithefficiencyand effectiveness.Peoplegotofixerstoexpediteadifficultprocessandwhichthenleadsto falsificationofdocuments. Whenfixingbecomesdeliberate,persistent,andorganized,thecorruptactthen becomesinstitutionalizedandgraduatesintoasyndicate.Anothernegativesideofa syndicatefixingisthatitregularlybringsinthegoodsforthoseinsidethebureaucracy andthebureaucratsgraduallyrefuseanyattemptstoremedybureaucraticinefficiencies suchasthepromotionoftransparencyintheoperationorthesimplificationoftherules andproceduresoftransactions. Althoughwidespreadandembeddedintheagency,fixingandtheexistenceofa fixingnetworkwillnotbecontestedbytheemployeesintheagency,outoffear,laziness, oroutofcompulsiontoconform.Worse,fixingnetworkemboldensthesyndicateto resist,evendestroythosewhohavethewilltofightthem(Santiago,1991).Toleranceof fixingorbriberyisnurturedbythecultureof pakikisama(espritdecorps)orthehabitto conformandnotresistanysuchactofbribery. Changingthemindsetofboththebureaucratandtheclienttowardtheelimination ofgiftgivingandfixingtakessometimeandrequiressomestrategicmeasuresofculture change.Theintroductionoftechnologyandproceduresmightbeinterestingforastart andmayhelpachievetransparency,butthismaynotbeenoughtosustainanticorruption measures.Unlesshabits,mindset,andpracticesthatsitinthesocialnormsarechanged,a reinventionofgovernanceinstitutionswillcometonaught.AsFollettinsists, organizationsaremadeupofindividualsandtheirhabits.

BureaucraticCulture:ArethereLimitsandAccountabilitytoPower? SincepostMarcosdictatorship,theAquinoadministrationinstitutednumerous measurestoaddresscorruptioninthebureaucracy.(Seelistoflawsandpolicieson corruptionmeasuresabove.)However,bureaucraticcorruptiondoesnotseemtogoaway. Corruptionpersistsbecausediscretionarypowerisembeddedintheinstitutionsandthe rulesarearbitrary,i.e.,theinterpretationofrulesdependonpersonsinofficeandthose thatwalkthecorridorsofpower.Thecasebelowshowshowpoweriscorruptedinthe corridorsofpower.

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ThestigmathathauntstheRamosadministrationwasthescamassociatedwith thePEAAmarideal,committedbetween19951997.Thisinvolvedthesaleofa propertyalongtheManilaBay.ThenSenatorErnestoMacedainvestigatedthis grandmotherofallscams,adealwhichinvolvedthepaymentbyAmariofoverPhP1.7 billionincashandrealestateascommissionstoacastofdealmakersandofficials(PCIJ, 1998:85).ThePCIJ1998documentclaimsthatafteraseriesofhearingsthePhilippine senatecommitteesconcludedthatthegovernmentwasdefraudedofbillionsofpesosin thedealandalthoughtherewerenosolidevidencesoftheinvolvementofhighofficials suchasHouseSpeakerJosedeVeneciaandPresidentFidelV.Ramos,theconclusionof thesenatecommitteespointtowardacollusionwithinthesystemindicatingthatthedeal couldnothavebeenclinchedwithouttheapprovalbythehighestofficials.Moreover,the Senatefeltthattherewerefranticattemptstoderailfullinvestigationonthedeal(PCIJ, 1998:85).BasedonthePCIJreport,theplayersinvolvedaretiredmilitaryofficeras architectandengineerandsponsorofthedeal(MacedaquotedinPCIJ,1998),the involvedpartyshowsalongandwindinglinktokinshiptieswithRamos.Itwastheusual bloodpoliticallinksi.e.,akinassociatewhodabbledinindependentventureswhether professionallyandbusinesswise,butfortunatelygotappointedintoajuicypostthanksto theconnectionupstairs,andmanagedtogetMalacanangapprovalfortheAmarijoint venture(PCIJ,1998:87),amongotherfavors.(Malacanangistheofficialresidenceof thePresident.)BasedonthePCIJvividaccountsanddocumentation,whatmadethe dealswasabunchofunknownpersonalitieswhohavetheskillsofbuildingrelationships overalongtime,whoarehangersoninthepartiesandsocialgatheringsthrownby Malacanang,andaresuccessfulatpeddlingdealsasopportunitiesforcommissions.PCIJ describedthesecharactersascoffeeshophustlers,withaninstinctforafastbuck.With theirunusualtalentandconnections,theycouldeasilyputupcorporations,suchasthe AmariCoastalBayDevelopmentCorporation,putupin1994inpartnershipwithanItal Thaidevelopmentcompany,thelatteritselfpossessingtrackrecordincorneringhuge constructionprojectsinAsia. Thus,whilethismayappeartobeacaseofsuspiciousdeal,itwasalsoabouta storyofAsianbusinessnetworkthatbuttressedtheAsianmiracle. Despitetheappropriatebodiesthatshouldlookintotheproposalssuchasthe PublicEstatesAuthority(PEA),ortheofficeoftheGovernmentCorporateCounsel (OGCC),andtheDepartmentofJustice(DOJ),thedealsandapprovalsaresealedmore quicklythanmanyothermattersthatrequireexecutivedecisions,andthrough personalitieswhomovebehindthescenesandworkthroughsomebackdoorchannels. PEAmanagementwasconvincedof theAmarisproposalbasedonthreeappraisals,but therewereindicationsthattheappraisalsweretailormadetofavorAmarisbid.Basedon theSenateblueribboncommitteeinvestigationandfindings,theappraisalprocesswas clearlyflawedanddesignedtojustifywhatisotherwiseaflawedtransaction(PCIJ 1998:95).PEAmanagementdecidednottobidoutthepropertybutjusttoenterintoa negotiationwithprospectivedevelopers,oneofthetwobeingAmari,andtheotherbeing aKoreancompanybutwhichlateronagreedtosettlecompetingclaimtothe property(MacedainPCIJ,1998:96)andcongressconfirmedthattherewaspayoff given.

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Similarly,theEstradaPresidencywasaccusedofabuseofpower.Hispresidential stintwasbriefandcutshortin2001byanotherpeoplepowerstyleofchanging presidents.Estradawasstrippedofthepresidencypreciselybecauseofallegationsof corruptiontheuseofgovernmentresourcestofundmistresses,mansionsandhighstyle living.ThecaseisstillbeingtriedintheSandiganbayanandthankstosuchbriefstintin Malacanang,Estradaissparedofmonstrousdealssuchasthoseassociatedwithhis predecessors.OnecaseleveledagainstEstradawastheviolationofRA6713,pertaining toethicalstandardsofpublicofficials. Corruptionpreventionisnotjustabouttheinstitutionofbodiesandsettingthe agendatostampoutcorruption,asthesemechanismscouldbecircumvented,bent,and flexed,andasshowninthiscasecorruptionpreventionisalsoaboutthepersonalities andcharactersthatsurroundandareatthehelmofdecisionmaking.Decisionswere sustainedbyofficialswhoenjoyedinformalapprovalsbythoseupstairs.Thereare shadowdecisionmakersaroundtheofficialdecisionmakers, andtherearepowerswithin thecorridorsofpowerwhoprovetobemoreinfluentialanddecisiveinsealingcontracts anddeliveringthebucksthanthosewhoofficiallydefinetherulesofbidsandcontracts. Thereisadichotomybetweentheformalpronouncementsoftheanticorruption campaignandthepracticesthatliebehindthecheerleadingefforts.Itisdifficulttolocate whererealaccountabilityliesasthereareshadowpowerholdersandunofficialdecision makers.Theofficialpowersatthetopusuallygrantconsentorapproval. Thelatitudeofdiscretionofauthorityisenormous,especiallythatwhichstems fromtheauthorityoftheOfficeofthePresident.ThePhilippinePresidencyisthecenter stageofenormouspowerandauthorityandyetitsaccountabilityisnotclearlydefined. Principalsofexecutiveagencieswhoarethecabinetmembersandadvisorsofthe PresidentserveatthepleasureoftheChiefExecutiveandarenotnecessarilygovernedby performanceindicatorsinpublicoffice.Thecabinetandadvisersconsistofacabalof presidentialbuddiesandfriendswhoarenotclearlyaccountabletothepublicoffice,but tothePresident.Inmorewaysthanone,theofficeisgroundedonpersonalloyaltyrather thanaccountability.Forexample,inthelast2004nationalelection,thesittingPresident whoraninthepresidentialrace,hadatitsdisposal,governmentresourcesandprograms usedinfavorofhercampaign.Therewereallegationspointingtowardtheuseofsocial securityfundstowinthesupportoftheelectorate,andtheuseofroadprogramsto employcontractualstreetcleanerswhoadvertisedhercampaigns.Worseyet,the PresidentinfluencedamemberoftheCommissiononElections,himselfapresidential appointee,tomanipulatetheoutcomeoftheelections.Bureaucraticpowerareundefined andunboundedandauthorityissupreme.Accountabilityofpublicofficeremainsa challengeparticularlyinapowerfulofficesuchasthePresidency. Thestructurefailstodefinethelimitsandboundariesofauthorityontheonehand whilstontheotherhand,thereisanextremelyliberalapplicationoftheruleoflawand theruledoesnotexistintheculturalnormsofsociety.Thus,theseamlessand unaccountablepower,thepoliticalrentseeking,andtheambiguousruleswhichare

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carriedoutbasedontheexpediencyofthosewhointerprettherules,complementto sustaingrandcorruption.Whereruleoflawisnotembeddedwithintheculturalnorms (KaufmannandWei,1998)andwhereateveryturnandopportunity,discretionary authorityisexercisedatdifferentlevelsofgovernment,corruptionislikelytoflourish. TheproblemofthePhilippineadministrativeandpoliticalsystemmayalsobeattributed toaleadershipthatispersonalitycenteredratherthanonethatisrulesdriven.Moreover, theruleoflawisnotseenasauniversalprinciplebutasaparticularisticguideto behavior.Theculturetendstowardspecialtreatmentandexceptionstotherulerather thansubmissiontotherule.Worseyet,somepractitionersviewtheruleoflawasafailed principleifandwhenitdoesnotrespondtoaparticularcontextandgivensuchcondition, theysuggestthatblindandirrelevantrulesbereformulated.Thispropositionmust bechallengedbecausetheprinciplebehindtheruleoflawispreciselyauniversal applicationoftherulesbeyondperson,stature,orspecificcircumstances.

TheChallengestoCurbCorruption

TheremedialmeasuresagainstcorruptioninthePhilippinesareenormous,andif thenumberandarticulationofthelawsweretobecomethebenchmarkofananti corruptionbattle,thePhilippineswouldhaverankedfirstamongcorruptionfree countriesintheregion.Obviouslyhowever,theformulation,formalization,andthe articulationofthelawsarenotsufficientindicatorsofsolutiontocorruption. Firstly,thechallengetothePhilippineanticorruptioncampaignisthe substantiationandexecutionoftheselaws,andoneshouldhastentoadd,thattheselaws shouldbeclearsoastobeselfexecutory,andnotbesubjectedtoanarbitrary interpretationbythelegalmindsandthelawenforcers.Regardingthisargument,a discoursemaybeseparatelypursuedastowhetheranticorruptionmeasuresarealegal matteroranormativedissertation. Thispaperpositsthattheenforcementofanticorruptionmeasuresrequiresthe normativeprincipleofuniversalapplication,ratherthanaparticularisticandlimited interpretationoftherules.Whatrulesapplytotherankandfileshouldapplytothetop brass.Toenforcethisnorm,scholarsandpractitionersincludinggovernmentagencies, shoulddealwiththeminimizationifnottheeliminationofthecultureofdualismandof ambiguity.Rulesshouldnotbeambiguousandsanctionsonruleviolationshouldbe monitoredandappliedwithdecisivenesssothatpunitivemeasuresareseriouslyupheld ratherthanbreached.(ThePhilippineanticorruptioneffortisusuallygoodatdetection andinvestigationwhereinvestigationisusuallyhypedbymedia,however,itisnot knownwhethertheactendsinprosecutionandconviction,andifnecessarywith sanctions.) Secondly,acontinuedreengineeringofthebureaucracyisnecessary.Re engineeringapproachshouldnotonlyconsiderthesoundnessoforganizationalefficiency

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andeffectivenessthroughadoptionofnewtechnologiesoftransparencyorofdivesting thepublicsectorofitsserviceprovisionfunctionsinfavorofthebusinesssectorthrough subcontracting,butreengineeringshouldalsostrengthenthebureaucracyandinstill amongitsvariousinstrumentalities,thecultureofrules.Embracingthecultureofrulesis crucial. Thirdly,anticorruptioneffortsshouldzeroinonbureaucraticreforms,with bureaucracyasthenexusofthereformprocesswhileengagingbusinessandcivilsociety. Thusfar,thedonordrivencampaignagainstcorruptionwhichpoursmoneytodivestthe publicsectorofitsfunctionsdonotnecessarilycurecorruption.Theeffortsonlyrelocate thesphereofcorruptionfrompublictoprivateandcreatetheillusionthatbureaucratic corruptionisminimized.However,corruptionpersistseveninthegovernmentbusiness transaction.Evenasmoneyispouredoncivilsocietysbattleagainstcorruption, sustainabilityoftheanticorruptioneffortsremainsaproblembecausethecampaignis asgoodastheprojectaidlasts.Moreover,civilsocietyandtheprivatesectorhavetheir ownshareofaccountabilityproblems.Thus,corruptionrefusestogoawayandanti corruptionmeasuresstillfailsustainability.Thebureaucracyandstateledinstitutions remaintobethelegitimateleaderandinspiteofthecivilsocietygroupsandbusiness sectorsintegrationintothegovernancecontinuum,theFilipinopeoplecontinuetolook uptoaleadershipwhotheythemselveschooseandwhotheybelieveareaccountableto them. Fourthly,leadershipisvitaltoananticorruptioncampaign.Thegovernmentled campaignagainstcorruptionshouldhaveatitshelm,leaderswhohavethecredibilityto launchthecampaignandtoconvincefollowersthatcorruptionisaseriousbattlebyall. ThePhilippineshashadleaderseitherincompetentorcorruptwhofailedtoleadthebattle againstcorruption.Thepresenceofexemplaryleadersisthewillthatwouldgiveapush toanticorruptionrulesandpoliciesofwhichthePhilippineshasmany.However,the makingofsuchleadersisitselfatremendouschallenge.Choosingleaderswhoare worthyofthepublicofficeandthepublictrustisitselfaworkinprogressandatestto theFilipinoelectorate.Themakingofgoodleadersisalsopartofastrategicprocessof culturechange. Finally,acorruptioncontrolcampaignfocusedonculturechangeinvolves variousplayerscitizens,organizedgroups,privatesector,educationalinstitutions,and thestate.Towardaculturechangeandamindsetshift,thedifferentstakeholdersshould considerpopularandcreativemethodsofembracingtheruleoflawintothesocialfabric andtheinstitutionsofgovernance.Theshiftshouldengagestakeholderstowardasocial constructionofacultureoftheruleoflaw.

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