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ilitary

eVlew
. u. S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
In This Issue
+ Communist China
+ The Persian Gulf
+ The International Soldier
June 70


UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL
STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
COMMANDANT
Major General John H. Hay, Jr.
DEPUTY COMMANDANT
Brigadier General Frank B. Clay
The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and General
Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides a
forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, national
security affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.
MilitaryReview
JournaloftheUS Army
The Threat of Communist China
British Withdrawal From the Persian Gulf
Why the Ussuri?
Politics and Culture in Southeast Asia
Europe, the United States, and NATO
The Military Advisor and the Commander
Frunze Military Academy
The Soviet Threat Since Czechoslovakia
Military Aid to Turkey: 194750
The International Soldier
Beyond SALT
Military Notes
Military Books
Reader Forum
Roger Hitsman 3
Alvin 1. Cottrell 14
Peter Mayer 22
MAJ Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA 33
Stanley LHarriso'n 43
LTC Raymond J. McClean, USA 55
and MAJ Melvin P. Williams, USA
LTG P. Bashurin, Soviet Army 60
I
Eugene Hinterhoff 68
Rocco M. Paone 74
Ahmed Sheikh 80
Dennis MenDs 91
98
106
110
Library of Congress Catalog Card No 34-33760 Rev
The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of the
US Army or the Command and General Staff College.
Editor In Chief
COL Donald J. Delaney
Associate Editor
COL Keith L. Monroe
Anny War CoUege
Assistant Editor
LTC A. Leroy Covey
Features Editor
LTC Robert G. Main
Preduction Editor
Helen M. Hall
Spanlsh-Amerfcan Editor
LTC Nestor L. Berrios
Brazilian Editors
LTG AlVaro Galvio
LTC Juarez A. Gomes
P ... llcatloll Oflleet
MAl Donald t Tuman
Art bll besitll
Charles A. Moore
!lilitnryieultw-
Awnrb Article
The Military Review announces the selection of the following article
from the April issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD ARTICLE:
"Soviet European Policy in the 1970's"
Walter C. Clemlm8, Jr.
Dr. Clemens discusses four main options which will be open to the Soviets
in the future: preserving the 8tatus quo; a strategy of interdependence;
a forward strategy; and isolationism. He concludes that Soviet European
policy is an important factor shaping the outcome of the Uriited States-
Soviet arms control talks, as well as the prospects of arms control meas-
ures in Europe. He suggests that there can be agreement of benefit to
both- sides even though an adversary relationship remains.
"* "* "*
COMING:
Colonel William E. LeGro, United States Army, in "The Why and How of
Limited War," describes two concepts of limited war. One is that rigid rules
must be imposed to govern the means utilized in order to prevent escalation
into a general holocaust. The other concept, which has less support, is that
limited war is limited because of limited objectives. He discusses how the
United States can best employ its military capabilities successfully in limited
war and suggests that we remain ftexible in order to take advantage of chang-
ing situations and new opportunities.
Will F. Thompson, in "Airmobile Warfare in Mountains," suggests that mili-
tary planners should become much more concerned with potential operations
in the high mountains of Eurasia. Rugged mountain zones long have served as
barriers to the spread of wars, but advances in vertical takeoff and landing
(VTOL) and short takeoff and landing (STOL) technology are threatening
these barriers. He feels special training should be provided to certain troops
in a wide variety of mountain environments and that we rapidly should increase
our understanding of the mountains in the Eurasian area.
I
The Threat 01 Communist China
BQger Hilsman
C
OMMUNIST China easta a long
and ominous shadow over all of
Asia. It is a nation of at least 750
miDion people. One out of every four
human beings is Chinese. By the Yolar
2000, every third human being will
be Chinese. They are able, hard-work-
ing, self-disciplined, and ambitious.
They occupy territory of continental
size within whose borders are con-
tained an the natural resources, if
_1978
and when they are developed, neces-
sary to make China the rival of any
power in the world.
China occupies a strategic position
of interior lines. From ita central posi-
tion in Asia, it can thresten Japan and
Korea in the east, the peninsula of
Southeast Asia, the subcontiuent of
India and Pakistan over ita Himalayan
borders in the south, and Soviet Asia
in the north. And ita history is peeu-
3
COMMUNIST CHINA
)
liar. Never has China had the histori-
cal experience of an international po-
litical system of equals. Relations with
its neighbors have been either those
of master to vassals, or those of the
sick man of Asia over whose prostrate
body the Western Nations, and even
Japan, have trampled almost at will.
China's Power
There is no question that China's
neighbors inl Asia are impressed by
the facts of its power-even that they
are fearful of its power. Neither is
there any question that this fear can
be manipulated by China into tangible
and significant political leverage.
There also is no question that the
superpowers-the Soviet Union and
the United States-are respectful of
China's power. It may be, in fact, that
both are overly impressed with at least
the potential threat that China poses.
F011Der Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
in an address that seemed so alarming
Roger Hilsmo,n is Professor of Gov-
ernment, Institute of War and Peace
Studies, Columbia University. A 1943
grailuate of the US MiliM'I'Y Academy"
he holds M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in
International Relations from Yale Un{,.
versity. During World War II, he
served with Merrill's Marauders in
Burma, with the Ofjice of Strategic
Services, and, at the. time of the Ko-
rean War, served in North Atlantic
Treaty Organization planning in Lon-
don and Germany. His career includes
teaching and research at Princeton's
Center of International Studies and at
the School of Adw1lCed International
Sttiilies of Johns Hopkins -University.
A former Assistant Secreta'I'Y of State
for Far Eastern Affairs, Dr. Hilsman
has written numerQUB articles on for-
eign affairs and national defense and
is the author of "The Problem of Ok{"
nawa."which appeared in the luly 1969
issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.
to the press that they labeled it the
"Yellow Peril" speech, warned that, in
a few decades, there would be "a bil-
lion Chinese armed with nuclear weap-
ons." The Soviets, for their part, have
issued a steady stream of propaganda
that, if anything, is even more alarm-
ist about China's intentions.
In both the Soviet Union and the
United States, a cool and realistic as-
sessment of the nature of the Chinese
threat needs to be made.
Major Determinants
Beyond the bare facts of size, re-
sources, and population, there are two
series of events that are of overwhelm-
ing influence in their impact on
China's position. One is the Sino-
Soviet dispute, and the other is the
so-called "Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution." '
The et dispute is funda-
mental in all the rich connotations
of the word. F st, it concerned with
ideology, with e "true" meaning of
the sacred texts of the Communist
world, and with the Communist vision
of the future. It also is concerned with
power, with who should have power
within the Communist world, and with
who should lead and who should follow.
In a real sense, communism is a doc-
trine for gaining and holding power,
and, in their bid for leadership in the
Communist world, the Chinese were
really just behaving like Communists.
The dispute also has been concerned
with the organization of decision
making within the Communist world
and the nature of the relationship
among the different parties. The key
words in this aspect of the debate were
"centrism" and "polycentrism"-the
tags for whether Soviet national in-
terests should be synonymous with the
interests of the entire Communist
world or whether the national inter-
MilitalJ .Ivle. 4
COMMUNIST CHINA
By the start of the 21st century, every thhd being will be Cbmese
ests of the other members should also
be considered "in determining policy
for the Communist world.
The differences were also concerned
with policy toward the in-between
world, whether the friendship of the
Communist world should be extended
to "national-bourgeois" regimes in
places like India, for example, or only
to the radical nationalists and "na-
tionalliberation movements." The So:-
viets chose friendship with such states
as India and eneouraged them in a
policy of neutralism while China advo-
cated a policy of support only for the
militant. Indeed, in 1962, China went
so far as to respond to India's some-
what bellicose rhetoric and rather
provocative action on the ground with
a military attack which, undoubtedly,
was designed, in part, as a deliberate
affront to the Soviet Union.
JUDe 1970
The dispute also has been eoncerned
with grand strategy, with the question
of how aggressive the Communist
world should be in its dealings with
the West, and how much risk could
be run of nuclear war. This difference
was symbolized by the exchange be-
tween Mao Tse-tung and Nikita S.
Khrushchev at the time of the Cuban
missile crisis-with Mao saying that
the West was only a "paper tiger" and
Khrushchev replying that this par-
ticular paper tiger had nuclear teeth.
All these different aspects and
themes appeared and reappeared as the
dispute unfolded. It apparently had
begun in 1956 with Khrushchev's pol-
icy of de-Stalinization, with which the
Chinese disagreed. It was exacerbated
by the Polish and Hungarian crises,
and by almost every major policy
problem from agriculture to relations
6
COMMUNIST CHINA
1
With Albania. But the issue that seems
to have caused the most difficulty con-
cerned the new technology for national
defense-nuclear weapons. It is now
known that some time in 1957, the
Soviets signed an agreement to assist
the Chinese in the nuclear weapons
field, in exchange for. which the Chi-
nese msde a number of concessions,
including "a public ac\mowledgment
that "the socialist camp must have a
head; and this head is the U.S.S.R."
Unreasonable Demuds
But hi the next two years, disagree-
ment and misunderstanding reportedly
developed over just how much th..
Soviets had promised to do in helping
China develop nuclear weapons. In
their later statements, the Chinese
suggest that it was no misunderstand-
ing, but a Soviet decision to renege on
what had been a commitment to help
them build a nuclear capability. But
what really may have happened was
that the Chinese asked for the weapons
themselves, or samples of them, and
Khrushchev countered with conditions
that the Chinese found unacceptable.
They alleged that the Soviets put foro.
ward unreasonable demands designed
to bring China under Soviet military
control. In any event, it was immedi-
ately after this episode that the Chi-
nese publicly reasserted that the nu-
clear bomb was a paper tiger.
In June 1959, according to the
Chinese, the Soviet Union finally re-
jected Peking's request for a sample
nuclear bomb. Moscow, furthermore,
apparently dabbled in subversion by
encouraging Marshal Penll' Teh-huai,
the Chinese Defense Minister,.in op-
posing the rest of the Chinese Party
-but unsuccessfully, for he was
promptly purged.
The Khrushchev visit to the United
States in September 1959 and the
8
"Camp David spirit" that came out
of it seemingly brought all these de-
velopmenta into crisis, for Khrushchev
found it necessary to make a sudden
trip to Peking immediately following
his visit to the United States. It seems
only to have made matters worse. Not
only did the ebullient Khrushchev use
the occasion to warn the Chinese in a
public speech against "testing by force
the stability of the capitalist system,"
but he used the oceasion to push a
two-Chinas' policy about Taiwan
which is an anathema to the Chinese.
Propaguda Increases
Throughout 1960, the propaganda
from both Moscow and Peking became
even more virulent. The symbolic is-
sue was Albania, and, in 1961, Khrush-
chev forced it to a crisis, breaking
diplomatic relations between the So-
viet Union and Albania, and -ending
Soviet aid. The Chinese stepped in
and replaced it.
Then, there began a fierce competi-
tion for the allegiance of the Commu-
nist Parties of every country in the
world. The debate grew hotter still,
and each side published more and more
of the formerly secret correspond-
ence in an effort to bolster its own
case. By early 1963, Peking was de-
nouncing the Soviet Communist Party
leaders as betrayers of the revolution,
arguing that the underdeveloped areas
of the world were the real focus of the
struggle against imperialisin and that
the real leader of the struggle was the
Chinese Party.
Moscow, in tum, attempted to show
that the Chinese were indifferent to
the risks of nuclear war and bent on
dividing the Communist world along
racist lines. In the summer of 1963,
the Chinese distributed, first in Mos-
cow and then throughout the world, a
letter dated 14 June 1963, declaring
MIlItIIy .IIln
COMMUNIST CHINA
that they intended to split every Com-
munist Party whose leaders sided with
the Soviet Union.
The next stage brought armed
clashes between Soviet and Chinese
troops along the border at the Ussuri
River 1 and talk in Moscow of extend-
ing the doctrine of Leonid I. Brezhnev
to China. If the Soviets were justified
in invading Czechoslovakia to remove
an anti-Soviet Politburo, why not
China?
Tension Lessens
Perhaps because both sides realized
that the paths they were following
carried a high risk of full-scale war,
talks on the border troubles were be-
gun recently, and there are some signs
of at least a slight lessening of ten-
sion. But even though these talks may
avert actual warfare, it is now clear
that the Sino-Soviet dispute itself is
one of the most portentous interna-
tional political facts of our time.
It will not be easily healed, even fol-
lowing the death of Mao or even if
the entire Maoist faction is over-
thrown. In the meantime, it will be the
single most dominant infiuence on
every act of foreign policy taken by
Peking. The Chinese response to any
initiative taken by the United States,
for example, will be based on what
they believe are the necessities of the
Sino-Soviet dispute above all else.
'The Great Proletarian Cultural Rev-
olution-the other major determinant
of the future course of Communist
China-is equally portentous. Unlike
most revolutions, the sources of the
cultural revolution were not from be-
low, but from the top. It had its ori-
gins in Mao Tse-tung's deep and pss-
sionate commitment to the concept of
"permanent revolution." Mao correctly
Border DlBpule:' MlljlGrI/
.Review. Janual7 1970, pp '1'1-88.
JI 1870
saw that the great enemy of revolu-
tions, in historical terms, was routini-
zation and bureaucratization. It is
essentially this settling down into the
comfortable stett18 quo to which he
refers in his charge that the Soviet
Union Is revisionist.
But Mao's idea of
Mao Tae-tuai is and nath-
less, but bis doetriue of permaneut revo-
lution is not likely to 8lIrVive him
rooted in his personal psyche. Perhaps
the greatest revolutionary of his time,
Mao is puritanical, determined, and.
ruthlsss, yet sensitive and Idealistic-
a "poet without pity." To find a histor-
ical parallel, it is necessary to go hack
to Martin Luther who was also a great
revolutionary. There are, in fact, sev-
eral instructive similarities. Like Lu-
ther, Mao was an avid reader when
young. Mao has said of himself that
7
COMMUNIST CHINA
)
he read"greedily, like anox thathas
rushed into a vegetable garden ."
Also, like Luther, Mao's writing has
an earthiness that appeals to simple
men.
Lutherhatedhisfather, and so did
Mao. Luther's father-hate took the
formofdoubtingdivi,ne righteousness
-to question the goodness of the
HeavenlyFather,ashedidtheearthly
one. The thought was unbearable. So
Lutherturnedagainsttheearthlyand
human institution, and he was led to
use his gifts oflanguage and leader-
shipto bringabouta massive revolu-
tionagainsttheoldesthuman institu-
tionoftheWest,theChurchofRome.
Mao's father-hate was no less far-
reaching. Itseems tohavearmedhim
in an even more monumental task
against an even older human institu-
tion,forhesetouttodestroytheChi-
nesefamilysystemwhosecentralethic
is theConfucian ideal offilial loyalty.
Struggle Among Factions
It requires some such analysis of
Mao, the man, to understand the ori-
gins of the cultural revolution. Even
thoughtheconceptofpermanentrevo-
lution is historically based in that it
seea theenemy ofrevolutions asrou-
tinizationand bureaucratization, itis
alsoapersonal,visionarydreamofen-
tirely remaking human nature by re-
peatedly destroying human institu-
tions until mankind achieves a final
re-creation.
Thus, the cultural revolution is in
no sense an uprising of the mass of,
Chinese, nordoes ithave.anyconnec-
tionwithMao'sold rival, ChiangKai-
shek, oranyimplications forChiang's
possible return to the mainland. The
GreatProletarianCulturalRevolution
isneither a revolt from below nor-
asyet.atleast--acivil war.
WhattheGreatProletarianCultural
Revolutionhasbeen'so farisa strug-
gle among dUferent factions of the
Communist Party. At least three of
thesecan be distinguished-Mao, Lin
Piao, and the other true Maoists in
the center; the Communist military
leaderson theright; and, on theleft,
Liu Shao-ch'i, Peng Chen, the ex-
mayorofPeking, and, ingeneral. the
party hierarchs. what the Soviets
would call theapparotckikil.
Polley and Power
The struggle is over policy as well
aspower. Eachoftheseprincipalfac-
tions is identified with a particular
policy line.
2
The Maoist faction is
first and foremost committed to per-
manent revolution. Beyond that.'itis
anti-Soviet. viewing Soviet revision-
ism as more dangerous than US im-
perialism, at least in. some respects.
The Maoistfactionhasopposed inter-
vening in Vietnam. unless theUnited
States first attacks China.
Itfollows theline laiddown byLin
PiaoinhisSeptember1965statement,
emphasizing that wars of "national
liberation" aredo-it-yourselfwars, in
whichthenativeCommunistsmustnot
countonsubstantialhelpfromoutside
sources: Atthesametime, theMaoist
lilieopposes theParisnegotiations. It
rejects any compromise in Vietnam
and urges Hanoi to gird itself for a
protracted struggle ending in total
victory.
Themilitaryfaction has, naturally,
littleinterestinpermanentrevolution.
As torelationswiththeSovietUnion,
itisdoubtfulthatthemilitaryfaction
is any less hostile in a fundamental
sense. But tactically, the military
leaders clearly favor closer relations,
principally in order to obtain aid in
Donald s. ZaaorIa. ''The S
Debate In
PeJdu:' in CAifta. in CriN: Polieiu in
AoIG ...... AtII6ri<G'. A_U....
n.Edited
b)r TaqTIou, The Vol .....I\>' Cbleeao P.....
ChI....... m. 1968.
MIlIWy Review 8
COMMUNIST CHINA .
modem arms. These leaders also favor
a harder line on Vietnam in terms of
Chinese participation, even though
this action increases the risk of war
with the United States.
The a'/YlKtratchiks also favor closer
relations with the Soviet Union, but
for different reasons. Basically, this
faction wants to tum inward, to con-
centrate on modernizing and industri-
alizing China first, and let the task of
spreading the revolution wait. They
not only agree with the Maoist faction
that China should refrain from direct
involvement in Vietnam, but also
would favor a negotiated settlement.
Cultural Revolution Waning
We are now seeing at least the be-
ginning of the end of the cultural
revolution. Although it is too early
for a definitive assessment, certain
points seem clear.
The first is that Mao seems to have
come out ahead-not in the sense of
having achieved a victory, but in the
sense of emerging stronger than any
rival even though weaker in absolute
terms. The map of China today looks
like a case of measles. Some areas are
controlled by the Maoists, others by
local military commanders, and some
by a coalition of the military and the
party hierarchs.
The second implication is paradoxi-
cal-that, although Mao seems to have
come out ahead, Maoism, the doctrine
of permanent revolution, is not likely
to survive. The idea of permanent
revolution failed at the time of the
Great Leap Forward and the Commune
Program, and now it has failed again
in the cultural revolution. It seems
unlikely that the concept could long
survive Mao.
Mao's aJlies in the cultural revolu-
tion suggest the weakness. The central
core of the army was not interested in
permanent revolution. Stability, hier-
archy, and preparedness were more
to their taste than perpetual chaos.
Similarly, this was true with the party
a'/YlKtratchiks. The entire idea of Mao's
assault on revisionism, in fact, was
that institutions must be repeatedly
tom down and the insti-
tution in Communist China is the
party itself. The peasants could not be
aroused to such a slogan. Their in-
terest, to use Mao's own expression of
contempt, is "economism," a higher
standard of living and a better life.
Red Guards
So, Mao turned to the one segment
of society which had not acquired
either a career or families, and hence
no interest as yet in stability, the one
element of society most easily IIPpealed
to by the idealism of an attempt to ra-:
make mankind entirely-the teenagers
who became the Red Guards. The
weakness, of course, is that this is it-
self an unstable segment of society to
use as a power base. Even in a Red
Guard parade, boy meets girl with
certain inevitable personal, social, and
political consequences.
It seems unlikely that events in
mainland China will change so radi-
cally as to bring about either a revolu-
tion from below, or a civil war in
which anti-Communist or non-Com-
munist elements become serious rivals.
Maoism, too, seems to be nearing the
end of its course. What seems most
probable is that, sooner or later, power
in China will return to the hands of a.
reunited Communist Party of the
more traditional type.
By this stage in the history of com-
munism, to say that it seems most
likely that power will return to a re-
united Communist Party of the more
traditionsl type is not to say much.
The Sino-Soviet dispute is one exam-
lune 1870 8
COlMMUNIST CHINA
pIe of the end to the monolithicity of
the Communist world. Others abound.
Will a reunited Communist Party in
China be like the party of Josip Tito?
Or Joseph Stalin? Or Nikita S.
Khrushchev? Or Nicolae Ceausescu?
Or Wladyslaw Gomulka? Or Antonin
Novotny? Or Alexander Dubcek?
The dominant faction of a reunited
party in China could range from the
doctrinal rigidity of a Stalin to the
pragmatism of a Tito, and most likely
wiIl at times adopt the policies of the
one and iLt other times the policies of
the other, whichever seems expedient.
Obviously, it is important to the rest
of the world whether the dominant
faction is doctrinaire or pragmatic-
the point is only that, with the evi-
dence at hand, it is impossible to pre-
dict.
What does seem to be within the
realm of the predictable is that, which-
ever faction or coalition of factions
come to dominate the party, it is
likely to be both ambitious, in terms
of the achievement of national goals,
and hostile to the outside world, in
terms not of tactics, but of funda-.
mental attitude toward both the Soviet
Union and the West.
Direct and "Indirect Action
But the question is precisely what
kind of threat this combination of am-
bition and hostility is likely to pose.
For convenience, the analysis of this
threat can be divided into two parts-
first, China's capability for direct mili-
tary action, and second, its capacity
to instigate indirect action through
subversion and internal guerriIla war-
fare in the classic pattern of so-called
wars of "national liberation."
There can be no doubt that Com-
munist China, with its vast population,
can mount formidable power in de-
fense. In spite of the turmoil of the
cultural revolution, there is no evi-
dence to suggest that the Chinese peo-
ple would fail to unite in the face of
an outside threat. The Vietnam strug-
gle has shown what determined men"
can do Oll their own home grounds,
using guerrilla tactics and essentially
individual weapons, even against the
most sophistic;ated of nonnuclear mod-
ern weapons. Only madmen would
seriously contemplate attempting to
invade and occupy China today.
China can project this type of power
into the local arenas immediately ad-
jacent to its borders, as it demon-
strated quite amply in its intervention
in the Korean War and in the Sino-
Indian war of 1962.
Local Power
Beyond this, however, China's mili-
tary capability is small. It does not
have the naval and air forces, or the
sea and airlift to project its power
beyond the contiguous arena. Its nu-
clear capability, although impressive
in local terms, is neither"large enough
nor sophisticated enough, especially in
terms of delivery systems, to give
China any more than local power.
It will be many years before China
can seriously threaten the sources of
either United States or Soviet power
while the sources of Chinese power
wiIl remain highly vulnerable to the
power of both the Soviet Union and
the United States. Even when China
does develop power of intercontinental
reach in sufficient numbers and sophis-
tication, both Soviet and United States
power will remain vastly superior for
as far ahead as it is useful for the
mind to reach.
In the realm of intentions, as op-
posed to capability, even though the
Chinese leadership is, undoubtedly,
both ambitious and hostile to the
outside world, the evidence is over-
Military Review 10
COMMUNIST CHINA
whelming that it also is realistic and
cautious.. In the Sino-Indian conflict
of 1962, for example, the Chinese
virtually destroyed the Indian Army
as an effective fighting force--yet
they stopped short of a line to which
they had some vague historical claim,
and they then drew back unilaterally.
Clearly, they assessed the power
situation realistically and cautiously,
recognizing the formidable power of
an aroused India resisting in the same
guerrilla fashion used in Vietnam,
and China's weakness relative to both
the Soviet Union and the United
States. As a result, the Chinese ex-
ercised elaborate care to avoid push-
ing their success so far as to provoke
a dangerous confrontation.
The evidence indicates that it is
unlikely that Communist China will
embark on grand adventures of simple
territorial expansion. More likely, it
will maneuver politically, using mili-
tary force only in political circum-
stances that are favorable and that
entail only manageable risk, and then
only in severely limited ways designed
to accomplish specific political ioals.
The example is the way the Chinese
took advantage of the opportunity
India gave them in 1962. The only
circumstances in which it seems likely
that they will attempt to invade and
occupy a neighbor is if they become
convinced that an enemy power, prin-
cipally the Soviet Union or the United
States, seems to be taking steps to
make that neighbor an anti-Chinese
bastion and a military base directed
against China itself.
On the question of China's capacity
to instigate subversion and so-called
wars of "national liberation," the first
point to be made is that China's
leaders, Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao,
can certainly claim credit for having
developed and propagated the basic
doctrine of revolutionary warfare.
They have analyzed and thought
through both the political and mili-
tary elements of the doctrine, devel-
China's factories and people provide a formidable power for defense, but its eapaeity
to project its militsry strength beyond its borders is limited
Jan. 1870 11
CHINA
oped it into essentially sound pro-
grams, and proceeded to spread the
doctrine by every available means.
In addition, China has estsblished
training bases for the nationals of
certain countries, and has successfully
placed agents with many of the mi-
nority mountsin peoples in most of
the Southeast Asian countries. As
the Soviets recently admitted, China
has succeeded in in-
fluence in the Communis Parties of
Albania, New Zealand, urma, Mali,
and Thailand, and in one faction of
the underground Communist Party
of Indonesia.
New Nationalism
But seems doubtful if these ef-
forts will enjoy any significant suc-
cess. In Communist terms, there is
little revolutionary potential to work
on, and the reason is the rise of the
new nationalisms. For the first time
in two or three millennia, the teem-
ing millions of Asia and Africa are
awakening, breaking out of the essen-
tially village culture which turned
them inward on themselves, isolating
them economically, politically, and'
psychologically.
The millions of Asia are seeking a
broader identity than the village, and
that identity is nationalism. The mo-
tive forces and aspirations are deep
and powerful-a search for identity,
a deep demand for national independ-
ence and expression, a yearning for
modernization, and a determination
not only to control their own destinies,
but to have a voice in the affairs of
the world. Anything foreign is the
enemy of this nationalism, whether
it is a foreign invader or local ideo-
logues who seem to be dominated by
foreigners.
The implications of the rise of the
new nationalism are portentous. It
seems clear that, once this nationalism
is thoroughly aroused, no power, how-
ever mighty, can hope to subjugate
another people, with few exceptions.
The new nationalism is indigestible.
One concrete implication is the fact
that there are today few, if any, domi-
noes in Asia. Vietnam, in fact, seems
to be turning out to be unique-unique
in the sense that it probably will be
the last Asian nation in which com-
munism captures the leadership of
nationalism.
Future Prospects Dim
In Japan, the Communist Party is
weak and divided. In Korea, repeated
infiltrators from the North have been
quickly rolled up with the help of the
peasants. In the Philippines, the Com-
munist Hukbalahaps I!.ave been re-
duced to the ststus of local bandits.
In Cambodia, the Communist Party
is virtually nonexistent. In Laos, the
Patket Lao has made little headway
since 1962 although Laos does remain
vulnerable to direct attsck from North
Vietnam. Even the recent Communist
successes in the Plain of Jars, in
which the Communists retook terri-
tory they held at the time of the 1962
agreements, but lost in 1964 and 1965,
was done not by the Patket Lao, but
by the-North Vietnamese.
In Indonesia, following the aborted
coup of 1965; over 300,000 Commu-
nists were slaughtered by local peas-
ants, and, although the Communist
Party has apparently been able to
maintsin an underground organiza-
tion, its prospects for the immediate
future are dim. In India, the ColP-
munists have been able to estsblish
themselves in some local governments,
but the influence of the Chinese fac-
tion has lessened. In Pakistsn, there
is no Communist Party of any conse-
quence.
MIlItaJy Review
12
COMMUNIST CHINA
In Burma, 'with all of its troubles,
the traditional fear of China and the
fact that the local party is under
Chinese influence have reduced the
prospects for the Communists immeas-
urably. It is only in Thailand that
there is any immediate danger, and
this is, in fact, instructive. The danger
in Thailand is principally in the north-
east, and what is instructive is that
the people of northeast Thailand are
more Lao than Thai and, consequently,
do not identify with Thai nationalism.
China is thus a formidable military
power in defense, but its capacity to
project that power beyond its borders
is limited, both in material terms. and
in terms of its realistic caution and
desire to avoid provoking a great
power intervention. Its doctrine of
wars of "national liberation" is a
weapon of great potential, but due to
the rising nationalisms, the opportu-
nities for its use are limited. Yet
China remains ambitious, and, in
consequence, is likely to continue to
pursue those ambitions with the in-
struments at hand that avoid creating
high risk-which means not military
measure, but political.
To have better relations with the Soviet Union and with Communist
China. we believe. would be in our national interest, and our poliey is to seek
sensible ways to accomplish this. The fact that a Sino-Soviet conDict exists
is strictly their affair. but it should not be a restraint on our efforts to improve
relations with both.
Secretary of State William P. Rogers
Juna 1970
13
British Withdrawal
From the Persian Gulf
Alvin J. Cottrell
T
HE Britishdecisiontowithdrawitsmilitaryforces eastofSuez, particu-
larlyfromthePersianGulf, by1971 isa significantturningpointinthat
~ oftheworld.Theimplicationsofthishavenotbeenfullyappreciatedinthe
WestandespeciallyintheUnitedStates.Indeed,itcouldbearguedthatrelatively
few people intheUnited States-withtheexception ofa handful of diplomats,
militaryofficers,andoilmen-knowmuchaboutthePersianGulfarea.
Forapproximately 150 years, Britishforces have made an important con-
tributiontothestabilityoftbeIndianOceanarea.PrimeMinisterHaroldWilson
reportedly suggested in 1964 that one British soldier east of Suez was more
valuablethan1,000BritishsoldiersontheRhine. Hemaywell havebeencorrect.
Military Review 14
However, in,1968, Wilson apparently
changed his earlier judgment for he
.reversed himself and announced that
Britainwouldwithdrawallforceseast
ofSuez by1971.
WItMrawal Schedule
In reversing British policy, Wilson
also reversed theprevious LaborGov-
ernment's flexible withdrawal sched-
ule-namely, 1973-77-a date which
atleasthadtheadvantageofmaintain-
ing enough ambiguity to provide the
timenecessarytoseemoreclearlythe
evolution of political developments in
the gulf before setting a firm date.
Evenhighlyeminentscholarswho be-
lieve it is impossible and inadvisable
fortheBritishtoreverseortomodify
their policy now agree that the de-
cision was hasty and unfortunate.
Whatprompted such an abrupt re-
versal of policy by the British Labor
Government,andwhatareitsimplica-
tions?
The Labor Government decided to
devalue the pound in November 1967
Alvin J. CottreU is Director of Re-
search at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Georgetown
University, Washington, D. C. A
World War 11 Army veteran, he re-
ceived a B.S. from Temple University,
Philadelphia, an M.A. and Ph. D. from
the University of Pennsylvania, and is
a graduate of the National War Col-
lege. He has served as an instructor
and Research Associate at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania; with the Weap-
ons Systems Evaluation Group, De-
partment of Defense; with the Strate-
gic Studies Center, Stanford Research
Institute; and as Professor of Foreign
Affair8 at the National War CoUege.
He is the author of numerous books
and magazine articles, including "So-
viet-Egyptian Relations" which ap-
peared in the December 1969 issue of
the MILITARY REVIEW.
JURe 1970
TilE PERSIAN GULF
sotherecanbelittledoubtthata key
considerationinWilson'sdecisionwas
economic.It costBritainabout85mil-
lion dollars to maintain a combined
force of approximately 8,400 men in
the
Saudi Arabia, led by King Falsal ibn
Abdul-Aziz, plays a principal role in
Peraian Gulf polities
225 million dollars to maintainforces
of48,000 intheareaeastofthegulf.
The rundown of forces is proceed-
ing, and the number of forces in the
FarEastalreadyhasbeen reduced to
below 30,000 and in the PersianGulf
to about 7,500. A British defense
statement,publishedinearly1969,has
indicated that the return of forces
fromthegulfmaybe slowed awaiting
a clearerpictureofthepoliticalsitua-
tion. There can be little doubt that
Britainwas unable to afford the cost
15
THE PERSIAN GULF
)
of maintaining its current level of
military commitment east of the Per-
sian Gulf in Singapore, but it is
equally clear that Britain could afford
the cost of maintaining its presence
in the Persian Gulf.
Many believe that the British pres-
ence in the Persian Gulf could have
been reduced substantially and still
have been adequate to provide con-
tinued stability. The British Conserv-
ative Party pamphlet, "East of Suez,"
states that less than 25 million dollars
might have been sufficient. Britain's
oil investment alone in the gulf nets
over 450 million dollars per year in
favorable exchange balances. Thus,
Britain has been paying a low cost for
the return it receives from its invest-
ments in the area.
It is not at all clear what savings,
if any, are likely to result from the
complete withdrawal of British mili-
tary forces in the gulf because Britain
probably will continue military train-
ing and other assistance after pulling
out.
Strong Opposition
Some Labor Party members have'
favored a continued British military
presence in the gulf, but the Labor
Left was' strongly opposed to. a con-
tinued presence in the area on the
grounds that it was merely a policy of
propping up feudal sheikhdoms. How-
ever, the Labor Left is opposed to a
British military presence anywhere.
Even some Laborites, who' contended
that Britain could afford the initiat
outlay of 35 million dollars, argued
that Britain could not afford the
"open-ended" economic commitment
involved.
In effect, it was argued that the
commitment in the gulf, while small,
could escalate in a crisis as did the
United Kingdom commitment in Cy-
prus. It also was argued that, if the
British stayed any longer, they would
never leave.
Furthermore, with the projected
British cutback and eventual elimina-
tion of aircraft carriers, it was as-
sumed that any British commitment
in the gulf could not be supported.
Also, it appeared that the United
States was too involved to undertake
a greater presence in the Indian Ocean,
in general, even if small British forces
remained in the gulf. Then, too, there
was a general psychological mood in
England born of a desire to liquidate
all of its foreign military commit-
ments.
Changed Situation
The decision, although it is not to
be implemented until 1971, has
brought about a changed situation in
the Persian Gulf. Many of the states
and territories in the area already
have begun to behave as though the
British have withdraWn. The British
presence in the gulf has, for many
years, constituted a successful, major
peace-keeping operation.
The British forces in the Persian
Gulf have insulated the area from in-
ternal conflict for over a century and
a half. Their presence has provided
the states of the area with an excuse
for not asserting historic and conflict-
ing claims in. the region while, at the
same time, not forfeiting them and
thus making themselves winerable to
internal domestic pressures to assert
such claims.
In this sense, the small British mili-
tary presence in the Persian Gulf has
been more political than military. The
situation which the British presence
has held in check for so long is de-
scribed by a group of British and
United States specialists in a report of
the Georgetown University Center for
MIlItaJy Ravlew
16
THE PERSIAN GULF
t
Strategic and International Studies:
1
Some of the states of the Gulf re-
gion have experienced a dmmatic in-
creMeintheliterateandsemi-litemte,
professional and artisan elements M
there81dt ofbothanincrea,se ined1h-
cational opportunities for citizens of
the Gulf, and the injluz of educa,ted
men from other area,s of the Amb
world. This growth in the size of a
politically conscious group that could
help to extend unrest in the region
threatens the continued existence of
someofthestatesintheirpresentter-
ritorialandpolitical forms.
Conjlicting territorial claims and
other traditional rivalries inhibit the
currentattemptto setupafederation
ofGulf sheikhdoms. The political OT-
1 TM Gulf: l ... pliM...... of Bnew. WitlldmlDa!,
Specfal .Report Series, Number 8. Georgetown Uni-
verstb' Center for StrateBle and International
Studies, WashingtoD, D. Co, p 16.
JURe 1970
As part of their withdrawal from the Middle EBlIt, these British troops msreh past Arab
soldiers waiting to take over their post'! in Aden
derintheGulfduring thelMtcentury
hM been maintained by British in-
terestandcontrol. Intheverydelicate
ba,la,nceofGulfpoliticstherearemany
claims that have beeninabeyance for
along time withoutactually being re-
solved. . . The principal territorial
claims in the Persian Gulf are those
ofIran to Bahrain and certain other
islands, Iraq to Kuwait and Saudi
Arabiato the BumimiOMis which is
portly in Abu Dhabi and partly in
Muscat and Oman. Disputes have not
been pursued because the porties con-
cernedrecognize that, while the Brit-
ish were present, tempomry silence
over aclaim did notimplyits forfeit-
ure. British withdrawal could lead to
a renewal of old interstate conjlicts
and the development ofnew disputes
arising from changed economic cir-
cumstances.
17
THf PERSIAN GULF
To emphasize the dangers inherent
in the unresolved claims, it might be
well to bear in mind that the Iraqi
claim to Kuwait was asserted in 1961
and was only forestalled by the landing
of a British brigade group.
To this list of potential conflicts
and disputes might alSb be added the
sharp clash. of interests between Iran
and Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab-a
body of water at the confluence of the
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers at the
head of the gulf. Iraq was given sov-
ereigntyover the waterway by a treaty
promulgated in 1937. Under the terms
of the treaty, all ships entering the
Shatt-al-Arab were to fly the Iraqi
flag.
Treaty Denounced
Iran has denounced the treaty and
has been sending vessels up the Shatt-
ai-Arab flying the Iranilln flag and
sometimes escorted by naval vessels
and military aircraft. The dispute,
which has already created serious ten-
sions between Iraq and Iran, could
evolve into serious conflict if Iran
seeks-as it apparently intends to da-
to fill the "vacuum" left by the British.
withdrawal from the gulf.
It has been the consistently ststed
position of the Conservative. Party
leadership, as it envisages a return to
power no later than 1971, that it will
discuss with the governments of the
Persian Gulf the possibility of main-
taining a British military presence in
the area. Since it is unlikely that all
British forces will have been with-
drawn from the area by 1971, the op-
tion, at least theoretically, should still
remain open to them.
The Conservative Party leader, Ed-
ward Heath, repeatedly has stated
that, when returned to power, the To-
ries will maintain a military presence
east of Suez. Referring specifically to
the Persian Gulf, he has said that
Britain will, under a Conservative gov-
ernment, maintain a presence in the
Persian Gulf "if our friends in the
area want us to stay."
Still, any change in policy would
have to be brought about quickly be-
cause of the changes in the gulf al-
ready brought about by Labor's an-
nounced intention to withdraw. For
example, the Shah of Iran now argues
that he will replace the British in the
gulf even though, when the decision
was first announced, he appeared to be
quite concerned over the prospect of
Britain's withdrawal. He has now
said that the British troops are not
wanted in the gulf by any of the gulf
states.
Federation Proposed
Steps have been taken to form a
Federation of Gulf Emirates seeking
to establish responsibility for its own
defense. The rulers of the nine states
met in Abu Dhabi in March 1968, but
failed to agree on such questions as lo-
cation of a capital or a constitution.
Thus, the prospects for success do not
look favorable. Should they fail, the
area would be a perfect target for
revolutionary forces which have al-
ready been established for the stated
purpose of overthrowing the tradi-
tional rulers and bringing Socialist
revolutionary. governments to power
in the area. One such organization
which opened an office in Aden in De-
cember 1968 is known as the National
Liberation Front for the Liberation of
the Arabian (Persian) Gulf.
Still, the Federation does repre-
sent another change in the situation
which would require the renegotia-
tion of new defense arrangements in
the area if the British were to stay.
The Conservative Part)', if it returns
to power by 1971, will, at best, be
MilltaJy Revie.
18
THE PERSIAN GULF .
able to modify, but not completely
reverse, the Labor Government's de-
cision. The Labor Government could
keep the option of maintaining a
Britishpresence inthegulfopen ifit
were to go slow on the rundown of
the present level ofmilitary commit-
ments in the area. There are hints
Nation politically acceptable in the
area.
TheUnited Statespresentlyhas no
intention ofreplacingthe British. As
one high-ranking State Department
official put it:
Local leadership must-and will-
carry on after the end of Britain's
BU1Dkef' Bnia10
Commando carriers such as the 8MB BulUlark shown in Aden Harbor are important
elementsin British presence
that some thinking is in this direc-
tion.
The British have been in the Per-
sian Gulf for sO long that they are
truly part of the landscape-not
really "foreign" to the area atall. If
the Labor Government's precipitate
decision to withdraw has, indeed,
made it impossible, as some contend,
for the British to modify their posi-
tion in the gulf and still maintain
some kind ofmilitary presence there,
one element is certain-no other
Western Nation could possibly re-
place them-certainly not the United
States. Britain is the only Western
JUDe 1970
historic role. The United States wiU
continue to do what it can to help,
but there can be no question of any
"special role" in Gulf affairs."
Great hope is being placed on the
success ofregional elements to bring
stability to the gulf following the
Britishwithdrawal. Much ofthehope
forthefuturecooperationofthegulf's
twoprincipalstates,SaudiArabiaand
Iran, relates to the cordial meeting
betweentheShahandKingFaisalibn
Abdul-AzizinNovember1968andthe
19
THE PERSIAN GULF
)
agreement reached on a median line
in the gulf and a plan for sharing of
oil in the disputed area. While this is
a hopeful sign, it is a long way from
assuming that the two gulf rulers will
be able to maintain stability in the re-
gion. Certainly, an understanding be-
tween the two nations is a fundamental
element looking toward peace and sta-
bility in the gulf.
US Naval Force
The present US naval presence in
the Persian Gulf, under the Com-
mander, Eastern Mediterranean Area,
is small. It consists of a seaplane ten-
der based at Bahrein and two destroy-
ers which make visits into the gulf.
This is not an impressive force. This
fact has been remarked on by some of
the local rulers. It is even less impres-
sive than the Soviet vessels which
showed their flag in the gulf in 1968.
Some have suggested strengthening
the US force, but this might not be the
most prudent policy course as it could
conceivably make the United States the
target for revolutionary elements al-
ready active. It might appear that the
United States were attempting to re- .
place the British, and this would be
unacceptable to some gulf states.
Still, this does not mean, as now
appears, that the United States should
have no military policy for the area.
One of the most dangerous steps the
United States could take is to indicate
a disinterest in the area by not doing
anything. The United States did this
in Korea when former Secretary of
State Dean Acheson made his much-
quoted statement which suggested that
Korea was not within the defense pe-
rimeter of the United States in the
Pacific. Some believe that the state-
ment was an open invitation to the
Soviets and their North Korean allies
to attack South Korea in June 1950.
The policy answer in the Persian
Gulf would appear not to be one of
maintaining a permanent large naval
presence in the area, but, rather, a
strategy of making frequent visits into
the gulf with modern US naval vessels
operating from a task force in the
Indian Ocean.
There can be no doubt that many in
the area-particularly the Shah-are
concerned with the possibility that the
United States will do nothing to coun-
ter the Soviets in this region. The
Shah, with the largest navy in the
area, while stating his belief that there
will be no vacuum following the Brit-
ish withdrawal because. he has the
power to fin it, cannot help but be con-
cerned lest the Suez Canal be reopened
and Soviet naval forces now deployed
in the eastern Mediterranean flow
through the canal into the gulf and
Indian Ocean.
Shah's Policy
The Shah's more neutral policy vis-
a-vis the United States, while moti-
vated, to a large extent, by his objec-
tion to US policy toward Pakistan
over Kashmir, is also, in some meas-
ure, caused by his concern over the
growing Soviet presence in the Middle
East. In this respect, his policy is sim-
ilar to. that of the Turks who have
adopted a more conciliatory policy
toward the St;lviets because of irrita-
tion over US policy toward Cyprus and
the growing evidence of Soviet naval
power in the eastern Mediterranean.
The Soviets, in the likely event the
Suez Canal is eventually reopened,
would then be in a position to block
Iran's sea route from its great oil re-
fineries and shipping ports at the head
of the gulf. It is one of the Shah's
principal concerns to keep this route
open. The Shah now has doubts that
the United States has the will to con-
Military Review
20
ceive and carry out any policy to coun-
ter the Soviets or their potential Arab
allies in the area. From the point of
view of Iran-and, indeed, the other
traditional gulf states-it must look as
though the only policy of the United
States is to hope for the best.
Many in the area believe that the
Soviet interest in the gulf is greater
than that of the United States. and,
symbolized by their growing naval
presence, the &oviets will eventually
become the dominant power in the
area. In view of public opposition to
military commitments by the United
States as a result of the war in Viet-
nam, few military poliCies are likely
to find any public or congressional ac-
ceptability, but it is clear that a mini-
mum naval policy probably would be
the most acceptable politically. Even
this type of policy would not be feas-
ible until the war in Vietnam is ended
or drastically phased down.
There can be little doubt that the
prospect of Britain's withdrawal has
stimUlated Soviet interest in the Medi-
terranean. For example, in 1968, a So-
viet naval force consisting of a cruiser,
a missile-carrying frigate, and an anti-
submarine vessel of the Pacific Fleet
cruised for about four months in the
Indian Ocean. The ships made calls at
THE PERSUlN GULF.
Madras, Bombay, Karachi, Colombo,
Basra, and Umm Qasr in Iraq, the
Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, Aden,
and Mogadishu in Somalia. The sO-:
viets have suggested that they intend
to make frequent visits into the Per-
sian Gulf.
The creation of a Soviet Indian
Ocean Fleet is a possibility that should
be taken into account. This would in-
crease the threat of direct USSR polit-
ical and military action within the
gulf itself, and pose the danger of in-
terference with the seaborne transport
of oil through the Indian Ocean, thus
presenting further reason for continu-
ing a matching Western capability in
this area. .
The Arab-Israeli dispute, as poten-
tially explosive and important as it is,
has served to obscure an area of the
Middle East which, because of its
great wealth and unresolved local
claims, could become a serious source
of local conflict which might eventually
drag in the great powers. The West
should not wait until conflict ensues
before endeavoring to show its interest
in stability in the region by means
other than mere pronouncements to
the states in the area that we wish
them all well.
June 1970
21

From Westinghouse Advam:ed Studies Group Monograph
Series
WHY THE
A
RE Moscow and Peking, whose
relations have deteriorated in
stages since 1958, now stopping at
the brink? While there have been
pauses and even reverses in deterio-
rating relations between the two sides,
the long-term trend has been to
greater and deeper antagonism.
What distinguished the recent phase
from those that preceded it was that
both protagonists were willing to en-
gage in actions designed to embarrass
the other, make him appear weak and
irresolute, and thus lessen his credi-
bility and standing in the interna-
tional Communist movement, as well
as in the field of foreign relations.
Strong terms of opprobrium have
been flung back and forth between
Peking and Moscow. The Soviets
Peter Mayer
were deemed to have become "fascist
renegades" and "revisionist fascist
bandits.". Their armed forces were
termed "Soviet hoodlum troops," and
the regime was dubbed a "revisionist
renegade clique." The Soviets recipro-
cated in somewhat milder language;
they merely <;laimed that "the Mao
clique" had lost its Marxist-Leninist
prerogative. Both charged . that the
other was allied with the "imperialist
warmongers"-the United States-
against the ''peoples of the world."
Both claimed the other had hood-
winked its population, but that it
. would return to the "true path" of
Marxist orthodoxy once the ''people''
had unmasked the pretenders in power.
This last left the path to eventual
rapprochement to the future, without
MUItalJ Rey/ew
22
the least inhibition to their quarrel.
The depth and intensity which that
quarrel reached might best be gleaned
in an examination of the various ac-
tions each side engaged in vis-a-vis
the other, and a discussion of possible
motives for such actions.
Since the border clashes constituted
the most important single series of
events within Sino-Soviet relations
in recent years, these can be taken as
a point of departure. From a careful
reading of all the evidence that has
been assembled so far it appears vir-
tually indisputable that the Chinese
People's Republic troops attacked the
USSR's territory on Damansky Island
on 2 March and subsequently, as well
as other Soviet frontiers at subsequent
times. However, it is the Chinese who
charged the Soviets with aggression,
and did so in a manner hardly calcu-
lated to soothe the strong feelings en-
This article was condll1l8ed
from the original, published in
the WESTINGHOUSE ADVANCED
STUDIES GROUP MONOGRAPH SE-
RIES Waltham, MassaehJusetts,
Dec;mber 1969, under the title,
"Why the Ussuri?: Reflections
on the Latest Sino-Soviet Fra-
cas!'
Dr. Mayer, formerly with
We8tinghouse Electric Corpora-
tion, Advanced Studie8 Group,
received his Ph. D. from the Uni-
ver8ity of California" Berkeley,
where he specialized in Commu-
nist affairs. From 1961. to 1968.
he was an Assistant Professor of
Political Science at Wichita State
University. He is the author of
Sino-Soviet Relations Since the
Death of Stalin and Cohesion and
Conflict in International Com-
munism, A Study of Marxist-
Leninist Concepts and Their
Application.
June 1970
WHY THE USSURI?
gendered on both sides of the dispute.
China claimed that:
The fact that the Soviet revisionist
renegade clique has repeatedly car-
ried out armed intrusions into China's
territory to create border incidents
has once again enabled the people
throughout the world to see clearly
that this handful of renegades are
out-aruJ,.out social imperialists and
new tsars pure and simple ..,
Czech Invasion
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia was cited to "prove" the aggres-
sive nature of the Soviet state. In-
stead of an unbiased analysis of Mos-
cow's intentions, the Chinese media
resorted to vituperation:
Fascist white terror reigns in So-
viet 80ciety today. At the end of its
rope, the Soviet revisionist renegade
clique is feverishly '/Wacticing social-
fascism at home and crueUy BUPfWes-
sing the broad masses of the Soviet
working people in order to maintain
its tottering reactionary rule and
'/Wess ahead Vigorously with socia/'-
imperialism abroad. These counter-
revolutionary tyrannical acts are
arousing the stiff resistance of the
Soviet people.'
The Soviets, on the other hand, were
blunt and most specific. Among all the
verbiage about the original activities
of Mao Tse-tung's "gangsters," two
lines stand out in sharp relief. First,
the Soviets contended that Peking
initiated the action on the Ussuri
against Damsnsky Island in order to
deftect attention from internal diffi-
culties that continually plagued the
mainland. They further claimed it
was done to divert the Chinese people's
attention from the "illegal maneu-
vers," employed before and during
&wletD, 7 March 1969, p 6.
S Peking llfn:MtD. " April 1969.
23
WHY THE USSURI?
)
theconvocation ofthe Ninth Chinese
Communist Party Congress, to break
with established ''legality'' and to se-
cure Mao's personal rule. The follow-
ing official statement sets both tone
and content of the Soviet charge:
These criminal actions by Mao
anti-Soviet hysteria, it will be easier
to impose on the Congress a platform
hostile to the Soviet Union and the
CPSU and to legitimize anti-Soviet-
ism as a state policy.'
The second Soviet contention was
that the actions against Damansky
Boldal "lid r.ch......
TheSovietsusedheW:opters aud armored reeounaissaneevehie\es to patrolthe Ussuri
River...1969
Tse-tung's group have far-reaching
obiectiv68. The ilf:
n
,." are trying to
create an atmosphere in their coun-
try that would enable tT: ,m to distract
the Chin68e peOPle's atterttion from
the huge economic and political fa11-
ures inside the country and to consoli-
date Mao Tse-tung's great-yower ad-
venturiat course aimed at further
worsening relations with the socialist
and other peace-loving countries.
And it is not mere chance, of
course, that the provocation on the
Soviet-Chinese border was'staged dur-
ing the period of preparations for the
Ninth CCP Congress. It is 61Iidently
ezpected that in an atmosphere of
Island were instituted specifically to
emIiarrass the Soviet Union abroad:
The new dangerous provocations by
the Maoists are also indicative of
their striving to step up their unprin-
cipled politicai flirting with the im-
perialist states, in particular with the
United States and the FRG. It is note-
worthy that the villainous armed raid
on the Soviet-Chinese border was
timed by the Maoists to coincide with
Bonn's provocative presidential elec-
tions in West Berlin .
An oft.stressed theme: see espeefaIbr Leonid M..
Zamntin, chief of the press section of the USSR
Forelp Ministry, as reported In Prut'do, 8 Mareb
1969, from which the excerpted section Is quoted.
'Prtlvoo. 8 Mareh 1969. Editorial, "Provocative
SaIb' of Peking Authoritl....
MilItary RevIew 24
The barely veiled charge contained
in the last statement bears closer
analysis. The evidence, obviously, is
circumstantial. However, since 1962,
the two major Communist powers bad
been engaged in a deadly serious
struggle aimed at undermining the
opponent's credibility within the
international Communist movement
and thus at a diminution of its power.
Propaganda Purposes
A recent (1968) manifestation of
this policy was the Peking claim that
anti-Soviet (Marxist-Leninist) Com-
munist Parties based in several of the
East European party-states and in
the USSR itself had been founded. The
prime purpose of these "parties" was
for propaganda purposes, and the
propaganda was geared against the
indigenous regime, with the claimed
support of the "people" of the nation.
These parties published, through
the Chinese press, manifestos and
news, both
o
of which echoed Peking's
line, and both of which stressed ex-
treme hostility to the USSR. The
Communist movement bad become a
battleground for influence between
Moscow and Peking, in which not
even the territorial integrity of the
party-states was respected.
The Ussuri incident of 2 March
1969 represented a new stage in that
struggle, not because of what hap-
pened-border clashes were endemic-
but, rather, because of the timing and
execution of the action itself.
The long Sino-Soviet border was
disputed practieally in its entirety.
Among the claims and counterclaims,
even the rivers, usually obvious de-
marcation lines, had come under chal-
lenge. Peking claimed the frontier to
lie in midatream; the Soviets declared
the unequal treaties to have granted
June 1970
WHY THE USSURI?
them the entire stream, leaving only
the left bank to the Chinese.
There ean be no question that,. as
far as suzerainty was concerned, dis-
puted, uninhabited Damansky Island
had been under Soviet jurisdiction
since 1917, and Russian since the
"unequal" treaties. The Chinese Peo-
ple's Republic informed the USSR as
early as 1968 that the territories ac-
quired by the czars under the unequal
treaties had not been forgotten by
the irredentist indigenous regime.
This should have served as a clear
warning that the Sino-Soviet fron-
tiers of czarist days were unacceptable
to the Peking regime, and that revi-
sion thereof would gain priority as
strained mutual relations turned ever
more hostile.
Action Surmised
Nor was Chinese action against
Damansky Island entirely unexpected.
Frontier guards had, for the past
several months, pushed onto Soviet
territory, only to be expelled by bor-
der guards. But on 2 March, Peking
altered the script. The Soviet charge
that their opponents opened fire seems
credible; most accounts agree that the
Soviets lost some 80 men killed in
that first engagement. It seems rea-
sonable to suppose that, were this
limited action to have been instigated
by the USSR, casualty figures would
have been much lower.
The next question is, What possible
benefit might the Chinese have de-
rived from the attack? The answer
seems to be twofold. The first was at-
taining maximum internal cohesion
at the Ninth Congress, and even so
there developed concerted opposition,
judging from the unprecedented num-
ber of ballots required to elect the
Central Committee. This is usually a
function that takes place under a
25
WHY THE _RI?
show frontier guards in tile DamausIIy Island
area maintaining while studying the words of Mao Tse-tung
facade of ''monolithic unity" among
the "fraternal" delegates. The second
benefit was derived from specifically,
embarrassingtheSovietsintheinter-
national arena.
The year 1968 had seen a further
deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations.
Evidence for that statement can be
found on both the verbal and practi-
cal levels. On the first, the presses of
both Communist states disparaged
the integrity and intentions of the
rivalinincreasinglyharshterms;few,
ifany, subjects remained-taboo; and
thenumberandfrequency'Of v t u ~
ative articles increased markedly,
especially in the Soviet press (the
Chinese barrage had begun earlier,
and was continued).
The Chinese were intent to oppose
Soviet hegemony wherever possible-
intheinternationalCommunistmove-
ment, among the party-states, and in
the world at large. Examples range
from support of the Czech "people"
against the Soviet aggressors, to
bottlenecks in Soviet supplies for
Vietnam and renunciation ofmost, if
not all, direct and indirect participa-
tion inthatwar.
Duringanearlierphaseofthe dis-
pute, before the open polemics came
to beinitiatedandjustafterthe1962
Cubanmissilecrisis, Pekingremained
contenttodirectitscriticismaagainst
bona tide Kremlin policy errors. Sub-
sequently, however, the Chinese were
. notthattolerant. IntheUssuricrisis,
they demonstrated that they were
quite prepared to intervene in Soviet
affairswhentheopportunitypresented
itself,providedthattherisksinvolved
MIlItIIy-.evll.
28
remained at a rather low and manage-
able order of magnitude.
One question which needed to be
asked about that specific crisis is.
Why did it occur at that particular
time and place? After all. no major
territory or principles were involved.
Yet. on the face of the evidence. a
small. insignificant event carried con-
notations and resulted in repercus-
sions which far transcended its ori-
ginal importance. The attacks were
repeated later that m()nth; border
fighting broke out elsewhere; and
Soviet citizens demonstrated outside
the Chinese Embassy in Moscow with-
out. for once, drawing a counterre-
sponse in Peking.
West German Election
In this instance, whether intention-
ally or unintentionally. the Chinese
had scored a major triumph in their
quarrel with the Soviets. But the real
battlefield was not the SinO-Soviet
frontier, but faraway Berlin. where
the West Germans had announced
they would hold the election on 5
March for the Presidency of the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
Both the Soviet Union and the Ger-
man Democratic Republic (GDR) had
denounced that intention as utterly
illegal. The Soviet position was ex-
plicitly stated in a text handed by
Semyon K. Tsarapkin. USSR Ambas-
sador to the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, to Chancellor Kurt G. Kiesinger
on 15 February.
The text termed the procedure "a
gross violation of the four-power
agreement" and predicted "the most
undesirable consequences" unless the
election was relocated.
No state in this world elects its
presidents on someone ekle's terri-
tory . The whole lIenture was nee-
eSS4f'11 only to re4fjilrm 4btmrd 4nd
JUl. 1870
WHY THE USSURI?
bankropt cmi1ll8 to the city, which has
not belonged, doB8 not belcmg, 4ntJ,-
for obvious rea8onB-Catmot belong
to the FRG
The illegal intriguB8 of the FRG
in West Berlin halle been and will be
resolutely rebuffed by the S01liet
Union.. !
Opposition Mounts
Both Communist powers. the USSR
and the GDR, announced that the
election would be opposed by all con-
ceivable means. Shortly after the note
was delivered, both Soviets and East
Germans declined to accept any re-
sponsibility whatsoever for the safety
of the presidential electors on their
flight into West Berlin. The Soviet
press was replete with veiled threats
of dire. but unspecified, consequence.
To that end, the East Germans,
quite obviously backed by the USSR,
began to interfere seriously with
traffic in and out of West Berlin in
late Februari. causing delays of sev-
eral hours. At the same time, it was
announced that illegal war materiel
and related items were manufactured
in West Berlin. East German author-
ities pledged themselves to end the
traffic, thus providing a ''legal'' excuse
for traffic delays caused by searches
for "illegal" merchandise.
At the same time, the Soviets an-
nounced that joint Soviet-East Ger-
man "maneuvers" would take place
within the confines of the GDR. more
specifically within the vicinity of Ber-
lin. Statements expressing these var-
ious policies were often explicitly
linked to the "nefarious" activities
of the Bonn "warmongers" and "re-
vanchists'" "illegal attempts" to hold
their presidential elections within the
confines of West Berlin.
,..,,""'" 18 Feb.....,. 1989. See aIoo ,..,,""'" 88
Feb.....,. 1969.
27
,.,THE USSURI?
The crescendo of such articles and
statements, both in the East German
and Soviet news media, and their im-
placably hostile tone, left no doubt
that both Communist Parties had
deeply committed their prestige and
resources to m x i m ~ l pressures on
both West Berlin and the FRG in
ordertoforce theGerman authorities
of threatened intervention in the
West German election was fortuitous.
Only the specter of a serious threat
could possibly have induced the Com-
munist High Command to cancel its
carefully prepared plans.
It may thus be safely postulated
thattheSovietsperceivedtheChinese
action onthe Ussuri, which coincided
East German guardsblock an autobahn route to Berliu protesting the West German
UBe of Berlin asthe siteof their presidential elections in Mareh 1969
to convene their election in another with the West Berlin election, as a
location. The two Germanies even primechallenge. The major thrustof
entered into semiofficial negotiations, Soviet policy-military,economic, but
an unheard of procedure, on this especially propagandistic-wheeled
issue. and faced its adv!i'rsary in the East.
Yet, on 2 March. the threats. 'the And the Soviet military buildup on
tanks, and the frenzied preparations the Chinese frontier, already impres-
to prevent the "illegal" election sive, was rapidly expanded.
6
abruptly ceased. The news media, The reason for such a complete
whilestillcoveringthenews,nolonger about-face is readily apparent. The
persistedin a threateningattitude. It entire Soviet strategic position is
issurelytoomuchofa coincidence to
G The N...:ron. Ti...... May 1969: Pekl"o B ..
suppose thatsuch a complete reversal
11ie1D. 18 J4ay 1969, p I.
Military Review
28
built on 1;he teachings of Karl von
Clausewitz; the Kremlin has an ab-
solute horror of multifrontal engage-
ments. The question then turns on
whether or not Peking's action was
intentionally designed to foil Mos-
I!I}W'\\ Eutl}\\eIl.u\\latw..
Such a concept is by no means in-
Cl''Ildibl'll. Th'll Chines'll wet'e certainly
awarethatinterventionon theUssuri
would spell finish to whatever ambi-
tionstheSovietsmightentertainover
Berlin. Those ambitions had been
widelyandloudlyproclaimedthrough-
out the Soviet media.
A New .Dimension
The end ofthe maneuvers, andthe
bitter, utter silence which befell the
entire operation, must have brought
both satisfaction and acclaim to the
Chinese People's Republic. The satis-
faction would come from having
managedonceagaintobringanenter-
prise-towhichtheKremlinhadpub-
licly committed its prestige-to an
ignominious andprecipitatehalt. The
acclaim would lie inthe fact thatthe
meaning of their action was not lost
onthepartiesoftheCommunistmove-
ment. Such fulminations against Pe-
king's "adventurism" served only to
underscore Soviet impotence to deal
successfully against Chinese acts de-
signed to limit the USSR's influence
with friend and foe alike.
Viewed inthisperspective,Peking's
action on the Ussuri assumes a new
dimension. Both sides put out feelers
aimed toward negotiations.
7
The So-
viets had no concrete advantages to
be gained on the barren wastes of
the Ussuri; the objective ofthe Chi-
nese was strictly delimited. Once
underway, negotiations, even iffruit-
less, would provide a face-saving de-
vice to end a confrontation which, if
7 P ..... tl4. 80 :March 1969.
June 1970
WHY TIlE USSURI?
carried beyond its original intention,
mightprovoketheUSSRtooverreact
strongly. The Soviets proposed three
agendas for negotiation: .
To convene the already estab-
lished and previously functioning
-civet ('.1}mm.i\\siI}U to adjudiell.te uavi-
gational disputes.
'l'nlmld a bt'OOIiet' based, higMt'
level commission to adjudicate the
border disputes.
To calla conferencebetween the
Chinese and Soviet Parties in order
todiscusstheentirespectrumofSino-
Soviet differences.
As a result of these Soviet initia-
tives, a meeting on riparian rights
was held inJune 1969, andanagree-
ment was reached on navigation of
the Amur and Ussuri Rivers along
the Soviet-Chinese borders.
Soviet Betrayal
The actions of the Communist
Party of China are readily compre-
hensible when their single most cru-
cial charge, often repeated against
Moscow, is remembered: the Soviets
had betrayed the revolution, had re-
stored capitalism, and thus had lost
the right to speak for international
communism. But that is confined to
the ideological realm as it was
preached from Peking. In practice,
the Soviets, not the Chinese, held'
first priority on the allegiance of in-
ternational states
as well astheparties.
Such a situation was intolerable to
the fervently proselytizingChinese to
whom theory and practice formed an
intrinsicwhole inthedialecticalspec-
trum. Yet, Soviet, not Chinese, power
held down the party-states in East
Europe, and the Kremlin's money
filled the coffers of the international
Communist movement. Thus, Com-
muniststheworld over, from individ-
29
uals to groups, from parties to party-
states, were forced to accede, to a
greater or lesser extent, to the bid-
ding of the Soviet "revisionists" and
"renegades."
That Peking was willing to redress
that balance in any manner which
came to hand was proved by Chinese
support of the Czech "people" in their
struggle against the Soviet invaders
and occupiers8.-.even though it must
have been obvious to the Communist
Chinese leaders that the people of
Czechoslovakia were farther advanced
on the scale of revisionism than their
"revisionist" suppressors, and thus
even more hostile to the Chinese than
to the Soviet brand of communism.
Circumstantial Evldenco
The evidence which can be adduced
for the thesis that the Chinese at-
tacked on the Ussuri in order to force
a Soviet retreat in Europe must re-
main circumstantial. It does, however,
point in the direction of an attempt
to undermine the Soviet leadership
of the Communist bloc. Certainly, the
attack was well planned, and Chinese
ruling circles were absolutely pre!
pared to take full and immediate ad-
vantage of all favorable opportunities
which the new situation, created by
the attsck, offered.
Nor has anyone claimed that Pe-
king was seriously concerned to re-
capture territory which the regime
considered legitimately its own. Had
that been the case, the att8cks should
have been mounted along more dis-
parate, wider sections of the Sino-
Soviet border. The rather narrow
limits of the Chinese action indicated
that, as far as foreign policy was con-
eerned, their aims were met in the
action of 2 March. The later fighting
Psf<ing _. , and 18 April 1969. 5 May
1969.
was Soviet instigated and designed
to impress upon Peking that Soviet
borders could not be violated with im-
punity. Yet, from its own vantage
point, Peking's original premise that
such an attack promised great gain,
at little risk, proved correct; the
Kremlin would on no account risk the
possibility, however remote, of simul-
taneous confrontation on two widely
separated fronts.
What of the future? Both sides
backed off from the brink of possible
war when they agreed, in the wake of
Aleksei N. Kosygin's visit to Peking,
Soviet miBSile .:rew at training exercise.
Similar Soviet units were rushed to the
Chinese border region after the Ussun
elashes.
to initiate general negotiations on
their boundary disputes. There ap-
pears to be concern by both Soviet
and Chinese leaders to reach an agree-
ment on border questions. For China,
this is seen as a major conciliatory
step.
Before the feelers for a mP1'oche-
moot were put out, both the Soviets
and the Communist Chinese were
WHY THE USSURlf
showing concern about the implica-
tions of. other tendencies within
the Communist movement for their
respective interests. The general pic-
ture was not reassuring. The organi-
zational structure of the Communist
. movement lacked the bureaucratic
framework that could enable the
whole to subsist in adversity, even in
conditions of disintegration of its
parts.
9
Limited Success
The Council for Economic Mutual
Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty
Organization were limited and paro-
chial in that they encompassed only
the European party-states, the USSR,
and Mongolia. Yet, within these limits,
the two organizations had been suc-
cessful in enforcing minimal unity
among the diverse factions of the
membership. Even Romania had been
forced to acknowledge the principle
of solidarity among the Communist
states while, at the same time, put'-
ting every conceivable obstacle in the
path of the Kremlin's proposed "so-
cialist commonwealth"-the latest
version of which is expressed in the
Brezhnev doctrine.
Even though the Chinese had not
had a direct role in this struggle for
some time, -it concerned them inti-
mately. Again, a great deal can be
learned from past institutional be-
havior.
The meeting of the ruling Commu-
nist Parties in 1957, and the general
conference of the Communist move-
ment in 1960, produced two docu-
ments (Declaratilm, 1957;10 State-
~ 1la7er. CoAuiott. 4ftd ConJliet in ItlCet'..
..........., C...",,,..;.,,,,A SWdw 01MGr.riof-Lonln1ot
COfICfJPt. and TMlir ApplkGtion. The Bane.
Netherlands. JrlartfnUB Nfjho1r* 1968. It 228.
10 "Declaratlon of Communist and Workers'
Parties of SociaUst Countries,If New Century
Publish.... N. Y.. 1957: _rlnted from PoI'I"'"
AIltJirll. December 1957.
Junl 1870
mtIfIt, 1960
11
) which set forth the
terms of Sino-Soviet cooperation in
the realms of ideology, strategy and
tactics, and interparty organization.
Less than three years later. in June
1968, delegates from the Communist
Parties of the Soviet Union and China
met in Moscow in an unsuccessful
attempt to resolve the widening rift.llI
Since that time, both parties have
repeatedly called for "consultations."
Yet neither side saw fit to accommo-
date itself to the other: each opposed
any meeting proposed by the other.
Soviet Plot
Thus, the Chinese viewed Soviet
proposals for a meeting of the o m ~
munist movement, or a conference of
selected Communist Parties, sa "hatch-
ing a big plot for openly splitting the
socialist camp," as part of a Soviet
"plot to accelerate an open split," and
as a first step to the ''final open split"
that will destroy the movement.
18
The
very innocuous "consultative meeting"
among a limited number of the Com-
munist Parties, which finally con-
vened in March 1965, was denounced
in the strongest terms as though it
threatened to reimpose the Kremlin's
hegemony over a "monolithic" party-
state communism which would, of
course, include China.
Similarly, Peking had refused to
cooperate in the preparations for the
international meeting of the parties,
continually postponed, which finally
met in June 1969.
The Soviets promptly broke their
promise, made to the Albanians, to
31
WHY THE USSURI?
)
criticize neither Tirana nor Peking
at the conference. Thus, the congress,
supposedly called to discuss Commu-
nist "unity," became another stepping-
stone in the direction of polycentrism.
Tbe Kremlin seemed intent to carry
its version of Communist orthodoxy
within the Communist movement to
the point of disaffection of one or more
of the "independent" Communist Par-
ties, and where even the organization
adherence of the Romanian Commu-
nist Party became a matter of con-
jecture.
Nevertheless, Moscow was still
ready to pursue a course of minimal
hostility toward its major ideological
protagonist. The June negotiations on
Soviet-Chinese riparian rights are
proof of t h t ~ the Soviets faced more
immediate problems, and threats,
than those presented by. the border
issue. Nor was the move toward nego-
tiation a meaningful step leading to-
ward an understanding with the Chi-
nese; rather, it fell into the category
of "nuisance abatement"-that is, of
an attempt to settle differences at the
marginal, thus less sensitive, level.
All that the June meeting achieved,
as already noted, was a minimal ri-
parian agreement.
The fact remains that the Sino-
Soviet dispute is not just a struggle
between two nation-states. It is not
even an ideological struggle. Rather,
its primary. importance, at least to
the protagonists, lies in the competi-
tion for the minds and allegiance of
the components that comprise the in-
ternational Communist movement.
In that struggle, ideological and
power motives merge. The merger is
effected, in part, because of the belief
system which postulates communism
as the "wave of the future," eventu-
ally and "inevitably" to swallow up
all of mankind. And from that belief,
it is but a small, logical extension to
insist that one's own s1de controls the
forces in command of the ''historic
process." Tbus, power and ideology
combine to form the ultimate command
to the struggling Communist elites:
He who controls the movement con-
trols history.
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Military Review
32
POLITICS AND CULTURE
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Major Harry G. Summers, Jr., UnUed States Army
A
T THE root of many of our difficulties in making an ac-
curate assessment of political realities in mainland South-
east Asia (Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Laos, Cambodia, Thai-
land, and Vietnam) is our difficulty in understanding the peculiar
political culture or the distinctive national style of these coun-
tries. Lacking this knowledge, we confuse form for substance,
and accept meanings for labels that have no basis in reality.
Eighteen years ago, Professor Filme1: S. C. Northrop, of
Yale University, wrote that the success of the Communists in
Asia was due, in large part, to their great initial effort at under-
standing any culture they hoped to take over, including inner
beliefs, basic tenets, and mentality, as well as outer forma and
Cop_t @ 1970 by 1IIajor liarlY G. Summ.... Jr United States Army. AU
Rishts Reserved.
June 1970 33
J'ouncs AND CULTURE
needs. He saw the turmoil in Asia
as essentially an attempt by the
Asian nations to work toward a re-
surgence of their ancient submerged
civilizations and felt that the prime
motivation was culturalism rather
than nationalism in h Western sense.
Outer Needs
While the Communists worked to
capture men's minds, the West was
preoccupied with economic and mili-
tary aid-with outer needs. The West
attempted to redesign the structure
of society while ignoring the func-
tional bases underlying the structure.
The l'tl&8on for this indifference is
that, to understand political culture,
it is neceas&l'Y to understand the phil-
osophical foundation of the country,
and the thought of studying philos-
ophy, especially< Oriental philosophy,
strikes the average American as un-
necessary drudgery.
But philosophy is. not an esoteric
science. Basically, it is the science
of living. Philosophy investigates the
facts-the principles of reality, of
human nature, and of personal con-
duct. Philosophies are principles so
ingrained in a people's nature that
they are taken completely for granted.
They are immutable; they are not
open to question or discussion; and
they are 8CCellted as a matter of
Major Harry G. Summers, lr., iB
a member of the faculty at the US
Army Command and GffUlral Staff
College. He received a B.s. degree
from the University of Maryland and
iB <a 1968 graduate of t4e US Army
Command and General staff College
where he completed tke requirements
for the degree of Master of Militaf"/l
Art and Science. HiB service includes
duty with the 7th Infantf"/l Division
in KorN, and with tke 1st Infantf"/l
Division and Id Field Force in Viet-
nam.
course. They form the picture of <life
that we carry in our minds. They
form the concepts of right and wrong,
of morality, of the meaning of l i f ~
and of the consequences of death.
Philosophy is not the only ingredi-
ent of political culture. The historical
experience of a nation plays an im-
portant part in forming the concepts
of reality. Natural environment,
forming as it does the framework of
existence, also inftuences thought pat-
terns. The same is true for the world
environment. All of these factors
taken together form the concepts of
society and serve as the foundations
of human thought prOcesses.
US Political Culture
Before attempting an analysis of
the political culture of mainland
Southeast Asia, a brief analysis
should be made of our own political
culture, for it is in the con1lict be-
tween national cultures that our
troubles begin and our communica-
tions fail.
Language is an obvious barrier to
communication. Language schools
teach the art of verbal communica-
tion. However, this is concentration
on form rather than on substance.
Words have different meanings in dif-
ferent cultural spheres. The Western
concepts of "good," "evil," and ''mo-
rality" have quite different meanings
in the East. Although we can talk
across language barriers, the true
meanings of our words often are lost
because of cultural barriers.
The Judeo-Christian ethic is the
basic philosophy of the United States.
This ethic underlies our concepts of
reslity. We believe that we live only
one life, and that any impact which
we might have on the world must be
accomplished during this lifespan. We
believe that good and evil exist as opo
34
The war haa weakened the authority of the father and threatens traditional family
loyalties
posing poles of human behavior. From
this concept, we tend to see the world
in terms of absolutes.
We believe that we prove our worth
in the world through practical achieve-
ments-through work. As the Ger-
man sociologist Max Weber pointed
out, a man's existence is justified by
the work he accomplishes in life.* We
believe in men of action, and in the
efficacy of work as a cure for social
ills. We distrust the purely intellec-
tual scholar and take little stock in
his interference with the business of
life. We esteem the individual and
prize individualism as a virtue. We
consider "following the herd" the
mark of an inferior man.
T"" Pn>_nt and the
Allen " Unwin. London.
We see ourselves as open, practical
people who look forward to change
as an important and necessary part
of modern life. We esteem deeds over
words. We value materialism, and the
average American is so rich in ma-
terial wealth that his life is unbe-
lievable to the majority of the world.
Immensely more irritating tI! the
world is the fact that we are largely
unaware of our good fortune and tend
to accept it as a of course and.
a natural right.
The US historical experience has
had a profound effect on our national
attitudes. Our original Anglo-Saxon
origins. our revolutionary heritage,
our belief in the primacy of the com-
mon man, and our pioneer spirit dis-
played in the conquest of the West
Junl 1870 35
POLITICS AND CULTURE
)
have reinforced our picture of the su-
perior man as a man of action. This
historical experience also has provided
the foundation of our political beliefs.
From the beginning of the Ameri-
can Nation, the military services were
the tool-the action arm of the civil-
ian Government. Even in the face of
Indian threats, the Military Estab-
lishment was subordinate to the civil-
ian Government. The concept of civil-
ian supremacy over the military
forces is so deeply ingrained in our
national character that it is accepted
as a basic truth.
Military Protector
This is not so in many countries of
the world where the country began
its existence under military tutelage,
and civilian government was the crea-
tion of the military overseer. In these
countries, the military eIement looks
upon itself as the protector and guard-
ian of the nation, and deems it its duty
to step in when, in its opinion, the
civilian government is no longer ca-
pable of ruling. This phenomenon has
occurred in recent years in Korea,
Indonesia, Greece, several of thll
Latin-American countries, and the
Republic of Vietnam. Military coups
are not, necessarily viewed in the
same light in these countries as they
are in the United States.
Another aspect of our Anglo-Saxon
'heritage is that of the ''loyal opposi-
tion." It is possible, although not al-
ways popular, to be in
opposition to every facet of American
political life and still be considered
loyal to the country. While we take
this as a matter of course, such oppo-
sition is equated with treason in the
majority of the world. The ferment,
the dynamic change created in our
life by opposition, has kept
our political process alive and vibrant.
StiJI another concept is that of
noblesse oblige-the obligation of
those in authority to behave honor-
ably and generously toward their
subordinates. This concept, reinforced
by our Judeo-Christian ethic, and
strengthened by our Anglo-Saxon
heritage, has broadened into the idea
that government exists for the benefit
of the governed. Neither government
nor politicians are sacred in American
life.
The net effect of these various, and
by no means all-inclusive, facets of
our political culture is to produce a
dynamic, modern society oriented to-
ward the future. Science and tech-
nology are valued, and innovation is
looked upon as a natural and almost
essential part of our national life.
Utopia, if it exists at all in our na-
tional conscience, exists in the future,
This is the bare framework of our
political culture. It is through the lens
formed by this culture that we view
Southeast Asia. This lens tends to
give a distorted picture of reality.
Common Denominators
The most striking common denom-
inator of mainland Southeast Asia is
povertY. Although one-third the geo-
graphical size of the United States,
and over one-half as large as the
Unibid States in population, mainland
Southeast Asia is only one-fiftieth as
wealthy as the United States in gross
national product-the total goods and
services produced. On an individual
basis, the average American is 28
times as rich as the average South-
east Asian. The average per capita
gross national product of the United
States in 1968 was $4,240 while the
average per capita gross national pro-
duct in mainland Southeast Asia was
$149.
The presence in some countries of
MflltaJy Review 38
large numbers of American troops,
and the advent of mass communication
media-radio, television, and movies
-have brought this disparity home
to more and more Southeast Asians.
The resentment and envy caused by
our prosperity should not be di1licult
to understand. We daily demonstrate
the impotency and inadequacy of the
Southeast Asian economic system,
then wonder why we are not loved.
College graduates often are em-
ployed as houseboys for US troops.
Too often, they are looked upon as
just ignorant natives. Another unfor-
tunate fact is that the Asian intellec-
tual elite cannot even identify with the
prosperous Westerner. The prosper-
ous Westerner is not the intellectual,
but, rather, the worker, the man of
action. The cultural and economic dif-
ferences create a gap too great to
bridge, and resentment is a common
fact of life.
Manual Work
Manual work in Southeast Asia is
the stigma of the common man. No
man with pretentions of being supe-
rior would stoop to dirtying his hands.
The Vietnamese intellectual's custom
of cultivating a long fingernail on the
little finger is an outward manifesta-
tion of this feeling toward manual
work.
The American does not understand
or appreciate the Asian attitudes to-
ward work. Conversely, the Asian in-
tellectual-who believes that intellect,
not labor, is the sign of the superior
man-is unable to identify with the
American. This lack of identification,
reinforced by the obvious material
successes of the American man of ac-
tion, further alienates the two cul-
tures.
Climate, too, plays a part in this
alienation. Manual labor in the fields
Juna 1970
pounes AND CULTURE
in the sun darkens the skin, and,
throughout east Asia, dark skins are
considered a mark of inferiority. In
addition, the high temperatures, 'the
high humidity, and the heavy rainfall
all combine to have a debilitating effect
on the people. Climate encourages
jungle growth-over 60 percent of
mainland Southeast Asia is covered
with jungle forest and woodland. Con-
stant struggle is necessary to prevent
the jungle from overgrowing the small
amount of arable land.
The traditional agricultural society
reinforces the strength of the family.
The father had to be a strong central
figure and an absolute ruler in the
family circle in order to insure the
obedience of his sons whose labor was
necessary for family survival. These
economic realities influenced the phil-
osophy, the religion, and the way of
life of the entire area. The family, not
the individual, was the paramount
element in society. Individualism im-
plied selfish self-interest and was a
sin, not a vil'tue as in the West.
Minority Groups
Large diverse minority groups are
found in every mainland Southesst
Asian society. Every country has a
minority group in excess of 15 percent
of the population. With only 11 per-
cent nonwhite minorities in the United
States, we have seen the problems
created within our own society to
guarantee social justice for minority
groups. Our minority groups share,
in the main, the language, the culture,
and the underlying philosophies of
the majority. Our problems are more
economic than cultural.
The minority groups in mainland
Southeast Asia, on ,the other hand,
are not only of a different race, they
speak a different language, are from
a different culture, and share little or
37
POLmcs AND CULTURE
Db values with the majority group.
Large ethnic Chinese minorities exist
in all Southeast Asian countries.
Large tribal minorities exist in most
of the countries. Not so apparent is
the effect these groups have on the ma-
jority. When a person can acbieve sta-
tus solely on the basis of race or tribe
or by being bom into a majority
group, then the strength of the ma-
jority group is weakened.
In the United States, a man can no
longer achieve status solely by being
bom white, and no longer can a man
be denied status solely by being bom
black. In general, status must be
earned through work. A Vietnamese
can achieve status by_deprecating the
hill tribes or looking down on the
Cambodians. A Burman builds his ego
by vilifying a Karen or Shan tribes-
man. The Chinese minorities look
down upon all Southeast Asians as
semicivilized barbarians. The cross-
currents arising from the existence of
minority groups wesken the cultural
fabric of the various nations. How did
these minority groups come about?
Crossroads of Civilization
At the beginning of recorded his-'
tory, Southeast Asia was populated
by tribes of Khmer, Indonesian, and
Australoid stock. The first known civ-
ilization on the mainland was the
Kingdom of Funan, located in what is
now southeastem Cambodia and the
Mekong Delta region of Vietnam. In-
vaders from Java conquered the area
for a time until the Khmers, in 802,
threw out their Javanese overlords
and began their climb to empire. 'l,'he
vast temples at Aug-kor Wat were
built, and the Khmer Empire con-
trolled most of mainland Southeast
Asia.
Under pressure from the expanding
Chinese Empire to the north, tribes
of Mongoloid stock -began migrations
south into the peninsula. The first
group to move south were the Nam-
Viets from South China, beginning
in the third century B.C. Moving
from river delta to river delta, they
pushed the native tribea before them.
By the beginning of the 19th century,
the Viet people had reached their pres-
ent borders in the Mekong Delta.
Thai Migration
The next major invasion was the
Thai peoples. Under pressure from
the Mongol conquerors of China, the
Thai migration reached its height in
the 13th century. Thai peoples, espe-
cially Shan tribesmen, moved into
Burma and ruled that country for
several hundred years. The Thai also
moved south, pushing the Khmer in-
habitants before them, and estab-
lished the Kingdoms of Lanna (Laos)
and Siam (Thailand). In the 15th
century, Angkor Wat was sacked by
Thai armies, and the priests were car-
ried away into captivity. By the 19th
century, the Khmer people had been
forced back into wbat is today Cam-
bodia.
In the meantime, the Burmans de-
scended-from the heights of Tibet in-
to present-day Burma. By the 18th
century, they had subdued the Thai
invaders and had set up their rule
over the original Mon inhabitants.
Wars followed upon wars as the
invaders battled for the spoils. The
Thai capital was destroyed by the Bur-
mans in 1767, and the Burman in-
vaders were not expelled from Thai-
land until 1780. The Cambodians were
dominated by a Thai-Vietnamese co-
alition, and only the intervention of
the French in the 19th century pre-
vented the complete dissolution of the
Cambodian nation. Nationalism, mu-
tual distrust, and ancient feuds are
MllitaIJ RIY/III
38
part of the'historical heritage of main-
land Southeast Asia.
Cultural invasions also have swept
across mainland Southeast Asia. The
first was Hinduism. Indian princes
were instrumental in setting up the
POLmCS AND CULTURE
Mahayana (the Greater Vehicle)
Buddhism swept China. In1Iuenced, by
Chinese Taoist teachings, Mahayana
Buddhism is more Byzantine In its be-
liefs, with much pomp, pageantry,
and ceremony. This form of Bud-
Kingdom of Funan in about the first
century in the Mekong Delta area.
The Khmer people were converted to
Hinduism, and the religion spread.
By the sixth century, however, Hindu-
ism was replaced by Buddhism.
After Buddha's death, two princi-
pal schools of Buddhism arose. Hina-
yana (the Lesser Vehicle) was closer
to the original Hindu roots and to
the original teachings of Buddha.
This form of Buddhism is the religion
of all mainland Southeast Asia ex-
cept Malaysia and Vietnam.
Jan. 1870
dhism is practiced In China, Korea,
Japan, and Vietnam.
From the eighth century onward,
the Islamic Moguls raided and con-
quered India and parts of Southeast
Asia. Malaya, Indonesia, and the
southern Philippines were brought
under the Islamic faith.
The diverse cultural forces at
work In this area are shown in the
cultural Invasions diagrsm. Religion
was not the only legacy of these in-
vasions. Hinayana Buddhist texts,
written in Pali, a form of Sanskrit, '
39
POUTICS AND CULTURE
formed the basis of the written lan-
guages of Burma, Laos, Thailand, and
Cambodia. Malaysia and Indonesia,
on the other hand, use a form of Jawi,
the Arabic script of the Koran. In
Vietnam, the ancient Chinese Maha-
yana texts introduced Chinese writ-
ing into the country. Jfhe Vietnamese
language was written in Chinese
characters until Romanization was in-
troduced in the 17th century. Litera-
ture and art forms were other heri-
tages of these cultural invasions.
"Imperial" Confucianism"
In addition to the religious heritage
received from China, the Confucian
philosophical heritage also was passed
to Vietnam. Confucius built his philos-
ophy around" the family which was
the basic economic unit of society. He
formulated the Golden Rule, and
preached the Golden Mean-the
avoidance of extremes in all matters.
Individualism was a sin; the family
was all important. His teachings that
the ruler governed through the power
of his moral authority made the
Anglo-Saxon concept of loyal opposi-
tiolJ impossible since to oppose the.
Emperor was to question his morality.
Out of "Imperial Confucianism,"
which was a mixture of . several
Chinese political philosophies cloaked
in Confucian terms, the Mandarin
system evolved. Bureaucrats. or Man-
darins, were appointed to government
positions solely on the basis of their
knowledge of the Imperial orthodoxy.
Examinations were held periodically
at sllveral levels, and successful can-
didates were brought into the govern-
ment. The Imperial Government, down
to district level, was run by the Man-
darinate.
Below district level, the people--
through village elders, local gentry,
and appointed leaders-managed their
own affairs. This "civil service" sys-
tem was introduced into Vietnam in
A.D. 43 after the defeat of the Trung
sisters' revolt, and lasted until it was
destroyed by the French in the 19th
century. The attitudes toward govern-
ment in Vietnam stilI are influenced
by this ancient system.
Western Colonialism
The last culture to invade South-
east Asia was the West. The British
took Burma and Malaya. In 1856, the
French moved into the southern part
of Villtnam, captured Saigon in 1861,
and established the colony of Cochin
China in 1862. In 1874, the French
occupied Tonkin, and, iii 1884, moved
into Anuam. At the Second Treaty of
Tsientsin in June 1885, the Protec-
torates of Tonkin and Annam were
transferred from China to France.
Cambodia had been declared a French
Protectorate in 1863, and Laos in
1893. Only Thailand remained inde-
pendent in Southeast" Asia.
The ancient civilizations crumbled
in the face of Western colonialism.
Ancient values were discredited; new
ideas, new values, and new philoso-
phies were introduced. Resction fo-
cused into a deep anticolonial hatred
for the invaders mixed with admira-
tion and envy of modem technology
and modern ways of life.
The end of. the colonial era followed
closely the end of World War II. The
strength of first-generation national-
ism, oriented toward gaining freedom
from colonialism, gradually began to
wane. Asian nationalism moved into
its second stage. No longer concerned
with independence from colonialism,
the drive was now for a return to
traditional values, the use of ancient
submerged civilizations as a base up-
on which to build a separate viable
nation-state.
MUltaJy Review 40
the
It is these traditional values that
must be understood if we are to un-
derstand mainland Southeast Asia.
The values of mainland Southeast
Asia are most difficult to assess. The
"pure" 'Southeast Asian culture was
destroyed in the impact between the
traditional societies and Western
colonialism. Both Eastern and Western
cultural concepts now exist, and both
often exist side-by-side within the
same person. Which attitude, which
behavior pattern, which value is para-
mount may well depend on the circum-
stances of the moment.
Traditional Values
The traditionalist sees the world
in esthetic terms rather than the ra-
tional terms of the West. Intuition,
empirical knowledge, and perception
through feeling are more important
than theory. He does not believe in
absolutes, in good or evil per se, but
believes that good and evil are rela-
tive terms of value only to specific
situations and dependent on specific
circumstances. He does not believe in
one God, or in one life, but believes
in a synthesis of religious values, ac-
cepting those which at the moment
answer his needs.
The Confucian Golden Mean and
the Buddhist Middle Way represent
the path of the superior man, and all
extremes are avoided. Patience, self-
control, and forbearance are virtues,
and he tends to be pragmatic, practi-
cal, and ready to accept fate as it
comes. He believes in the cycle of re-
birth: he believes that his position in
life has been preordained by his ac-
tions in a past life. He is devoted to
the principles of compromise, and be-
lieves that only a fool would stay with
a policy in the name of loyalty once
the circumstances that created the
policy have changed.
lune 1910
POLInCS AND CULTURE
Education is esteemed, especially
an education in philosophy and the
classics. The scholar is looked upon
as one of the elite. The scholar, as so-'
ciety's superior man, strives to retain
his position in the face of Western
political culture which bypasses him
v...._, of 8"''''
Through the centuries, the Chinese pro-
vided models of government and organiza-
tion to mainland Southeast Asia
he turns to radical views and revolu-
tionary panaceas in order to regain
his lost prestige.
He believes in and emulates his-
torical models, and looks for a return
to the golden days of the past as a
solution to his problems. He sees
leadership as a rightful reward for
his devotion to scholarship.1Iis ,role
is leader, the masses' role is follower,
and the follower has no busineas med-
41
POLmcs AND CULTURE
)-------
d1ing in the affairs of the leader. The
leader rulea through his moral power,
built up through education. Criticism
of his leadership is criticism of his
morality and cannot be tolerated.
His primary loyalty is to his family.
He is not an individualist, feeling
that individualism is the sign of an
inferior, selfish man. He gains his
status and his sense .of well-being as
a member of the family group, or, in
the case of the Communists, as a
member of the larger family, the
state. c r i f i c e to the group is expected
and taken for granted. Since the fam-
ily supports him, and may well have
financed his education, he is obliged
to take care of his family when he
reaches a position of power and in-
fluence. '
Only an immoral and inferior man
would hire a stranger, even though
qualifled, over a deaerving second
cousin. His family may extend for
seven generations and include over
100 separate-named relationships. The
family is his social security and
provides him with a stable, secure
place in society. Elders are respected,
and ancestors are venerated, just as
he, too, will be venerated by genera-
tions yet unborn.
These were the principal traditional
values of mainland Southeast Asia.
These values made for a secure, well-
ordered society, governed by a stra-
tified hierarchy based on education
and morality. Some aspects of this
traditional society, depending upon
the circumstances of the moment, are
as strong today as they' were a thou-
sand years ago.
The failure to understand the ef-
fect of this clash between traditional
and Western cultures results in a lack
of communication-the failure to un-
derstand that words and labels have
completely different meanings in dif-
ferent cultures. <.".
When we say to a province chief,
who has worked for years to attain
his position of power, that he is cor-
rupt because he levies taxes on the
people, we are not communicating
with him. He believes, as did his pred-
ecessors for thousands of years, that
his selection as province chief was a
just reward for his time, his study,
and his faithful service. It is to his
mentor who appointed him, and to his
family who supported him and sacri-
ficed for him on his rise to power,
that his loyalties lie.
When we say to an intellectual that
he should accept Western values and
Western cultural patterns, we are
failing to communicate with him. He
sees no models amQng the Western
elite. The Western elite are men of
action, not intellectuals. To follow
Western models would require the dis-
avowal of his entire cultural heritage.
When we ask or' expect unswerv-
ing allegiance to a particular stand
or position, we are asking the impos-
sible since devotion to any absolute
position is the sign of a fool.
When we expect gratitude for aid
and assistance, we ignore the fact
that, by accepting aid and assistance,
the receiver tacitly acknowledges his
own inferiority and impotence.
But understanding is possible.
When the surface label\! are pene-
trated and the underlying realities
exposed, then we can communicate.
The political culture of mainland
Southeast Asia is in a state of flux.
The cultures are attempting to find
their own level. We must understand
that cultural misunderstandings do
exist. We bridge these misunderstand-
ings by truly understanding what we
believe and why we believe as we do.
MilllIIJ Revll. 42
Europe, the United States, and
O O ~ f
Stanley L. Harrison
T
HE North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization alliance passed its
21st birthday in April of this year. It
continues as a vital entity, even if
promise over the past two decades
often exceeded performance. But the
frailty of NATO's structure was too
often given unwarranted gloss in the
face of hard problems ignored or ad-
versities only narrowly averted. Fun-
damental assumptions with respect to
NATO's role need rethinking; "con-
sultation" and ''burdens shared" have
been observed more in the breach than
in practice.
In order to remain relevant, the
United States-as the primary partner
in NATO-must be responsive to the
new European environment. Practical
politics and the range of alternatives
available dictate that a number of re-
lated aspects be considered in the
process of accommodation to change.
After more than 20 years of less-
than-equal partnership, Europe is
emerging as an active participant of
Juna 187D 43
NATO PARTNERS
)
independent bent. US hegemony is at
an end. Europe has a new momentum.
In the past decade-lmd longer-the
United States has led the alliance
with diffident assurance. Now, how-
ever, it is clearly evident that US
leadership of the alliance is being
challenged.
From the outset of NATO, the
raison Ifetre for the European allies
differed, to a degree, from US motives.
These early goals and ambitions are
related directly to the present course
of developments in NATO.
Puqioses for Alliance
Initially, differing interpretations
of the alliance prevailed within the
major European members of NATO
-the United Kingdom, France, and
later, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. Indeed, NATO's organizational
entity in the international environ-
ment has yet to produce precise defini-
tion on which all members could agree.
Moreover, the ambiguities of purpose
that originally prevailed exist still.
US arguments for joining in alli-
ance with Europe were divided. Never-
theless, it is clear that the United
States felt the North Atlantic Treaty
wae needed by the Europeans. Some
in the United States felt that Western
Stanley L. Harrison is an Opera,.
tiona Analyst with the Research Anal-
ysis Corporation, McLean, Virginia.
He has served on active duty with the
US Air Force; was a member of the
Weapona Systems Evaluation Group
of the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense; received his, Master's degree
in International Relationa and His-
tory from the University of Mary-
land; and obtained his Doctorate from
the American University, Washington,
D. C. A frequent contnbutor to the
MILITARY REVIEW, his latest article,
"NATO's Role After CzechoslOvakia,"
a'P'Peared in the July 1969 isSUE!,
Europe's military defense and political
stability needed aid to meet the clear
danger of Soviet military aggression.
Other advocates in the United States
held that NATO was needed to provide
the Europeans with the strategic
climate to impart needed self-confi-
dence for economic and political re-
covery. The divisions and emphasis
in Europe were neither similar nor
that simplistic.
Political aspects were not empha-
sized, but the major European nations
apparently were eager for a central al-
liance role. In general, the military
reasons for NATO were more pro-
nounced in Europe than in the United
States.
French Interpretations
In France, representative initial
interpretations of NATO held that, in
the beginning, the alliance would pro-
vide a needed response to the anxieties
created by fears of potential Soviet
penetration, militarily as well as po-
litically, and from without, as well as
within. French General Pierre M.
Gallois observed that'NATO was con-
ceived as a means of protection for a
clearly, defined threat. More directly,
specific Soviet threats-the coup in
Prague and the blockade of Berlin in
1948-provided the needed impetus
for France to carry forward the
tenets of the Treaty of Brussels.
According to General Andre Beau-
fre, NATO augmented an existing
defense structure by adding nuclear
arms. His interpretation wae that
military "commands" for Europe had
already been created. For example,
Beaufre has interpreted the guarantee
under NAT().,-to assist parties at-
tacked by such action as deemed nec-
essary-to have been "clearly a step
back," compared to the firm commit-
ment of "aid and assistance by all
MIlItaIJ .nl.. 44
means, military and other" under the
earlier Brussels Treaty that linked
France, the. United Kingdom, and the
Benelux group.
r ~ c e employed a pragmatic ra-
tionale for implementation of the
North Atlantic alliance. Foremost was
the need for military protection by
nuclear weapons from the United
States for the defense of Europe. Of
less importance was the need to as-
sure stability in order to complete the
economic rehabilitation of Europe.
More importantly, the dual purpose
of French desires to contain future
German aggression and to slow down
the movement to Europe prompted
France to join NATO. Essentially,
therefore, military needs prevailed to
- create a viable defense community
that included US nuclear arms.
The United KIngdom
In Britain, a decline of confidence
in the United Nations and aggressive
moves by the Soviets led the United
Kingdom to renew old prewar alli-
ances. Historian Hugh Seton-Watson
points out that the first military al-
liance, the Anglo-French Pact of Dun-
kirk of 4 March 1947, was originally
erected against a revival of the Ger-
man danger rather than against So-
viet Russia. The later Brussels Treaty
was the first manifestation of multi-
lateral protection against a renewal
of a policy of German aggression.
The Brussels Treaty, however, pro-
vided a pattern for NATO and was
successfully transformed by the inclu-
sion of the United States-a develop-
ment hoped and planned for by Ernest
Bevin, then British Foreign Secretary.
Bevin had earlier indicated his strong
desire for some form of union in
Western Europe, backed by the Ameri-
cans and the Dominions.
Fundamentally, it was the failure
lune 1970
NATO PARTIBS
The NAtO pilrpole of preventing war is
supported by a deterrent fone of nuclear
and conventional weapons
of the United Nations to work as a
body for peace enforcement and the
cold war actions of the Soviet Govern-
ment that constituted a combination
of factors virtually to force on the
British their decision to organize into
a broad alliance.
Britsh expectations for the imple-
mentation of -NATO may be sum-
marized briefty as desires to carry
out the task envisioned by the United
Nations to renovate and develop the
social and political structure of Eu-
~ PARTNERS
rope; assqre joint participation in
this t&!lk by the nations of the West,
particularly the United States; pre-
vent' llggression by any nation; and
provide the needed protection for
economic development in Europe.
airman Membalp
The Federal Republic of Germany
entered NATO in 1954. The US Senate
hearings for ratification of the North
Atlantic Treaty reported, in part,
that "so many imponderables affect
the current position of Germany .
that .. extensive consideration was
not given to the inclusion of Western
Germany." Then Secretary of State
Dean Acheson, during his testimony
before the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on 2:T April 1949, asserted that
there was "no thought of bringing
Western Germany into the Alliance."
Defense was the hard core of the
Brussels Pact, forerunner of the
NATO Treaty. The five European sig-
natory powers pledged to fortify and
preserve the prinCiples of democracy,
personal freedom, and political liberty,
and to create a firm basis for Euro-
pean economic recovery. Eventually,'
the fact became obvious that to keep
Europe ullited and strong, an alliance
was necessary to rehabilitate 'and de-
fend Germany and to enlist German
aid to that end.
An early as October 1950, France
proposed that German forces form an
element in a unified continental West
European defense force-the Euro-
pean Defense Community. But the
French National AssemblY crushed
this hope with a veto in August 1954.
Subsequently, the Brussels Treaty was
amended, transforming it from an al-
liance directed against Germany to
an agency promoting NATO and the
unification of Europe. It also exercises
arms control functions in Germany
and the continental European member
countries within the general frame-
work of NATO.
A number of military and political
motivations prompted German mem-
bership in NATO. First, the acces-
sion of the Federal Republic to the
Western defense alliance contributed
to German policy aimed at containing
the Soviet Union. Second, NATO had
the objective of binding Germany
closely to the Western Powers. Third,
the Federal Government interpreted
German membership in NATO as
representing the best method of at-
taining eventual reunification. Despite
the political issues raised within Ger-
many with regard to NATO mem-
bership, the government was faced
with a doubtful choice between ad-
herence to a militarY alliance and
questionable alternatives that might
arise under neutrality and Soviet
hegemony.
Unifying Elements .
Thus, it is apparent that NATO
was not interpreted in the same way
by the primary partners. Indeed, such
a phenomenon could hardly be ex-
pected, 'given the differences of na-
tional interest and geography of the
Atlantic community. There were sev-
eral significant areas of common
agreement that aided in the forma-
tion and development of NATO. With-
out these unifying elements, the al-
liance would have foundered during
the formative period. However, subtle
differences of emphasis account, in
part, for the broad divisions apparent
today.
There is a general agreement that
military need was paramount for
protection of Europe. Differences oc-
cur, however, in the types and level
of participation desired. For example,
the United Kingdom enjoyed a special
Military .", 48
relationship with the United States.
In fact, the British felt closer to the
United States than to their European
neighbors.
Forothat reason, with the emergence
of NATO, Britain's military contribu-
NATOPARTIIERS
rial way at least, apparently was not
altogether ignored. But this vital
point was not lost on its European
partners. Toward Europe, Britain em-
phasized the containment of Germany
to a marked degree as evidenced by
tion to the United States its adherence to the Brussels Pact and
British contributions to NATO defense included oval elem.eats and this base on Malta
--aircraft and naval elements rather
than conventional ground forces. Even
though Britain was a member of the
Brussels Pact and other bilateral de-
fense agreements with the nations of
Western Europe, it was the British
who urged joint efforts with the
United States. Development of nuclear
weapons was undertaken by the Brit-
ish Government, prompted, in part,
by the close relationship with the
United States.
Thus, it is not surprising that the
British interpreted their role in
NATO much like that of the United
States. The fact that Britain was not
equal to the United States, in a mate-
Junl 1970
the Dunkirk Pact. This was a view-
point shared with France and the
smaller countries as well.
France, like Britain, sought NATO
membership as a necessary means to
secure US assurances for the future
protection of Europe. France, how-
ever, was not at all sure that it would
be happy with the role that the United
States would play. This uneasiness
was evident from the initiation of the
alliance that succeeded the Brussels
Pact. Furthermore, the French were
quite sensitive to the fact that the
real deterrent and the manifestation
of the US commitment were nuclesr
weapons which France lacked.
47
NATO PARTNERS
)
Need for military protection was
recognized for the threat both domes-
tically and externally to France, but
the limitations of that promise were
equally as disquieting to the French
as was the threat of overwhelming
US dominance in NATO. Despite the
apparent, reservations, France felt
that the drift toward unification in
Europe would be checked by NATO.
France, like Britain, interpreted the
alliance as a means of containing Ger-
many.
Germany, the last of the major
European members to join NATO,
made the choice to align itself with
the nations of Western Europe rather
than accept a status of neutrality
offered by the Soviet Union. Despite
the concessions that had to be made
in order to join NATO under the Paris
agreements, Germany reCognized the
underlying distrust that persisted
within Europe. Rejection of the Eu-
ropean Defense Community confirmed
this feeling. Basically, however, Ger-
many's decision to join NATO was
linked to military defense and re-
. unification.
Political Perspectives
It is clear that the Europe of the
1970's will not be a continuation of
the 1950's and the 1960's. Within Eu-
rope, the setting is ripe for move-
ment and change. Practical considera-
tions compel US decision makers to
recognize that innovative dynamics
do not promise change for .the better.
The mood in Europe holds no a priori
assurances for' greater . unity, and
NATO can be a victim of the wave of
change that is underway.
A number of examples are present
that portend the new environment
present in Europe. First, the United
States and the USSR opened bilateral
discussions to limit nuclear weaponry.
Superpower Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks began in Helsinki, Finland,
in November 1969, were resumed in
Vienna in April, and are later to re-
turn to Helsinki. So far, these talks
have not been the center stage at-
traction expected.
A second major impetus centers on
the proposed European security con-
ference. The proposal, made by the
Finnish Government on 5 May 1969, is
finding increasing support by the na-
tions of Europe. OfI;lcially, over 20 na-
tions of the 82 invited had sent favor-
able replies by the autumn of 1969.
Others have expressEid interest. Sig-
nificantly, the Assembly of the West-
ern European Union recomDiended
consideration of such a conference,
and the Declaration of the North
Atlantic Council of 5 December 1969
made circumspect, but explicit, refer-
ence to examine the prospects.
National InHlatives
A third trend that emphasizes new
movement in Europe centers on na-
tional initiatives. In the West, the
Federal Republic of Germany has led
the way in unilateral initiatives to-
ward detente. Several European na-
tions have responded-Poland, Hun-
gary, Romania, and East Germany-
but the chief development was the
Bonn-Moscow bilateral discussions on
mutual renunciation of force.
Attitude,changes of this magnitude
are intimately related to the mood of
relaxation that prevails in Europe.
Evidently, the hard military lesson
of the massive force ministered
against Czechoslovakia in August 1968
has been forgotten, or it is conven-
iently overlooked in the eagerness to
pursue detente at any price. Whatever
the reasons, the fact emerges that, in
all Europe, there is a momentum to-
ward change.
MIlItaIJ Review
FUndamentaIly, three tendencies in
Europe contribute to centripetal move-
ment toward change. First, the gen-
eral military attitude toward NATO
and the urgent need for a heavy in-
vestment of forces have relaxed. This
outlook, in turn, prompts a feeling
that NATO needs revision and re-
thinking of aims and purpose. In
some respects, the need for a formsl
alliance is questioned.
Second, West Europeans anticipate
a waning military role for the United
States. Increasingly, doubts are re-
placing confidence in a continued US
involvement in Western Europe. Eu-
ropeans anticipate withdrawal of US
forces. This aspect springs, in part,
from the independence that is shap-
ing a new outlook for Europeans.
Basically, the third factor of influ-
ence relates to growing confidence and
stature of European countries. Prag-
matic realities have prompted a turn-
ing inward within the nations of Eu-
rope. Government changes, elections,
and domestic concern generally are
responsible. In France, Germany, and
Italy, new national governments came
to power in 1969.
0
In Turkey and Nor-
way, the existing governments were
returned to power partly on platforms
that promised domestic issue reform
and foreign policy readjustment that
affects NATO. Even in the United
Kingdom where the Labor Government
is preSSing for a greater European
unity by entering the Common
Market, the emphasis is toward Eu-
rope as a whole and away from nar-
row issues of alliance.
Caution and prudence in domestic
areas have replaced idealistic schemes.
For the immediate future, domestic
concerns and the natural slowdown
that accompanies administrative tran-
JunB 1970
NAmpAIITIIERS
sition ~ I act to retard the trend
toward flrm plans for NATO unity or
expansive military enterprises. .
This new environment in Europe
can be evaluated from the viewpoint
of the significant NATO partners who
contribute to the prevailing political
climate.
Closer RelationshIps
With regard to the United Kingdom,
it is evident that more than a vestige
of the special relationship exists and
persists through many levels of the
government. It is possible to detect a
longiIig for even closer relationships
with the United States. President
Richard M. Nixon's London visit in
February 1969, and his reaffirmation
of the special relationship, served to
heighten the domiant interest that
had been shown in this dubious heri-
tage of the past. It is evident that the
British still seek the role of the honest
broker and play the game <if 'POwer
politics. Today, however, the present
British Government has failed to pro-
vide the initiatives needed to make it
a leader in the political structure of
Europe.
Britain's perception of its present
role in the world and its relation to
the continent seem to waver from
isolationism to total participation, and
the mix is not a healthy one at this
point. It is evident that .the British
are unprepared to come forth with
any firm plan for their place in Eu-
rope and in the world.
The continued caIls by Defense
Minister Denis W. Healey for the
NATO nations to strengthen their
conventional forces in Western Eu-
rope have not been heeded by other
European nations. Increased integra-
tion of alliance forces has not come
about. Moreover, his words do not ap-
pear to be a domestic political mes-
49
NATO PARntERS
. 0'''''
ChaneeUor Willy Brandt advoeates a
ftmble foreign polley
sage for the British electorate to be
prePared to supply additional forces
of their own. They appear satisfied
that their recent efrorte spelled out
in the 1969 defense white paper are
sufficient for their contribution to
NATO. conventional forces. The feel-
ing prevails that it is up to the other
NATO nations to contribute more ef-
ficient forces.
There are indications, however, that
British Prime Minister Harold Wil-
son is committed to a circumspect
course of action toward mesningful
steps for political unity. These steps
are, perhaps, so circumspect that no
one knows quite what he will do. None-
theless, there is a feeling that Bri-
tain should do something toward a
common Europesn policy. But no one
is quite .sure just what this should
be and how it will come about. Pri-
marily, the British focus of attention
centers on their efforte to join the
Common Market.
Economic Role
Britain's future economic role in
Western Europe hinges on the accom-
modations accorded to the French.
This is a sticking point beyond which
the British are unlikely to progress.
There is no way to separate political,
military, 'and economic issues. Mutual
agreements must be reached, however.
The difficulties of the British role in
the Common Market and its military
role in NATO, along with its political
role, are interrelated to such an extent
that it is virtually impossible to sepa-
rate this dilemma.
The French, politically, have been
emharked on a program of para-
mountcy within Europe. Traditional
French differences with any contender
in this respect are rooted in this pos-
ture.
Accordingly, French foreign policy
continues to be geared toward restora-
tion of French hegemony and contain-
ment of Germany. Today, as in the past,
France believes that the ultimate de-
fense of the nation rests with the na-
tions. Whatever tactics, whatever
arms-including nuclear arms-are
needed to accomplish these goals are
MilitaIJ lIevlaw
justified. The force de frappe is cal-
culated to' enhance France's security
within Europe, as well as beyond, and,
at the sarne time, promote French
status as a member of the Atlantic
alliance. Hence, French security is
based on qualitative assessments of
nuclear weapons. The oratory and
promises of election fervor are past.
Cballenzes Remain
Georges Pompidou was elected Pres-
ident in June 1969. The era of Charles
A. de Gaulle closed, but his shadow
colors virtually every aspect of policy.
Changes will occur inevitably, but if
US decision makers harbor any no-
tions that say the force de frappe is
to be dismantled and abandoned, that
kind of wishful thinking is sheer folly.
The departure of De Gaulle has had
some liberating effect to be sure. But
the problems will endure. Europeans
will discover the painful fact that the
future of Europe has not been "by the
will of one man." The political chal-
lenges remain.
In Germany, the new coalition of
the Bundestag that made Willy Brandt
Chancellor promises to give a new
look to politica and policies of the
Federal Republic of Germany. The
former West Berlin mayor advocates
an increasingly flexible foreign policy
toward the Eastern European bloc
and independent detente toward the
USSR. However unilateral the move-
ments toward flexibility may be, Bonn
will continue membership in, and sup-
port for, NATO.
Under Brandt's leadership, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany has under-
taken active pursuit of detente. For
example, the NATO Ministers ap-
proved the German efforts to East-
West cooperation after they took the
lead in calling for bilateral talks be-
tween Bonn and Moscow. The NATO
June 11170
NATO PARTIWIS
agreements came only after Bonn had
proposed the talks with the Soviets.
Based on pre88 reports, it was evident
that US ofliciala were consulted after
the fact. Officials reportedly com-
plained that Bonn made "tactical er-
rors." Thus, the United States is
faced with the prospect of a NATO
partner bent on bilateral dealings with
the USSR and consultation after the
fact.
There can be no ignoring that Ger-
many, in the future, will exhibit con-
siderably more independence than
heretofore. Germany, psychologically
and by every measurable norm, is in
a position to act more directly for
itself. German power, based on a
sound, well-managed economy, com-
bined with the will to use it, may well
hold the key to the political future of
Europe.
The symbols of dependence on the
allies in Europe and the United States
are dropping away, snd the Germans
will continu_e to emphasize unilateral
efforts.
Present Viewpoints
Europeans agree that NATO needs
revision. There is a tacit admission
that the US nuclear umbrella is re-
quired. No one nation has any certain
ideas about what must be done to
revitalize NATO as a political and
military alliance. If the alliance is to
continue to be a valid entity, adjust-
ments must be made in both areas of
activity.
Within Europe, there is almost
wholehearted lack of support for
NATO's atrategy of flexible response.
Few in Europe believe it will work.
Nowhere is there evidence that the
requisite conventional forces will be
forthcoming.
It is taken for granted by the Eu-
ropeans that the West would have to
51
NATO PARTNERS
)
resort tofirst use of nuclear weapons
intheface ofany type of Sovietag-
gression that seems to be serious.
Sinceany Sovietaggressionisserious
totheEUropeans,theywishimmediate
and certain use of nuclear weapons.
Europeans believe thatthe disinte-
grationofNATO hasnotyetreached
Dopat1i_ of S_
President Richard M. Nixon at Brussels
in February 1969
thelowestpoint. Moreover, itappears
thatthe US emphasis on NATO will
never be shared by the Europeans.
Similarly,thedangerofpotential Eu-
ropean expansionbytheSovietUnion
isdismissedbyWestEuropeansinthe
faceoftheUSemphasisonthispoint.
With respect to US hegemony, vir-
tually every West European country
shares a feeling thatthereshould be
agenqineeffortandaconcerteddegree
ofmovementtowardgreaterindepend-
ence from the United States. Euro-
peans, fromScandinaviatothesouth-
ern regions, affirm that future de-
pendence on the United States is to
be avoided.
Stemming, in part, from this feel-
ing, proposals that there should be a
European defense force provided by
a Franco-English nuclear core are
being met with increasing favor.
The point is being made with suc-
cess that Europeans themselves must
dealwiththisproblemofnuclearweap-
ons.WestGermanslo()kmoreandmore
toward the possession oftactical nu-
clear weapons. However, they have a
clearand realisticappraisaloftheef-
fectthatthisdevelopment mighthave
on their European neighbors, not to
mentiontheUSSR.Thisisnota popu-
larview, they realize, butthe exigen-
cies of defense will, in time, compel
realistic Europeans to accept a more
softened role toward the possession
of nuclear weapons by West German
military forces on a unilateral basis.
Prospects in Europe
The triangle of the United King-
dom, the'Federal Republic of Ger-
many, and France includes those na-
tions contending for the leadership
of Europe. There will be no predomi-
nantnationinEuropesolongasthere
is a US military force present that
has diplomatic and politjcal punch to
it to acras a balance wheel more or
less: None of the three is willing to
seeanyotheremergeasthetopnation
on the continent and, for that reason
alone, welcome continued US presence
inEurope. .
Central trends in the environment
ofthecurrentpoliticalareain Europe
emergewithclarity. First,theBritish
are anxious and eager to pursue and
develop, if possible, a continuing
special relationship with the United
.States.TheBritishrecognizethatthis
will be anathema to their desires to
join the European continent in the
CommonMarket.Thisassociationmay
lead toward closer political cohesion.
MIliIatJ Review
Whether a' closer association of the
British and the French is possible re-
mains unclear. It appears that the
British would like to have it both
ways.They really have not made up
their minds in a positive manner as
how best to accomplish whatever it
is they would like to do.
Second, the French will remain
adamant in excluding the British from
any kind of political participation
within Europe unless, and until, the
British agree to come over on terms
acceptable to France. At this point,
the French see little need for com-
promise or accommodation with the
British.
Third, both the British and the
French are wooing the Germans. Each
nation recognizes the need to retain
the cooperation and active participa-
tion of the Germans in whatever
partnership emerges in the political
sphere. The Germans are the recip-
. ients of a dual pressure. Many in
Europe recognize the need for cooper-
ation with the Germans, but latent
hostility is evident.
Await Action
Within Europe generally, a feeling
of waiting and wondering what the
United States will do prevails. Pres-
ident Nixon's trip to Europe served
to reassert some old and familiar
themes to the Europeans and was
initially successful in his personal
diplomatic assurance that the United
States would stand fast in Berlin and
that the restitution of Germany was
a continuing goal. Nixon said the
right words to everyone. Europeans
were genuinely pleased with his per-
formance, but they await action.
From the beginning of NATO, Eu-
ropeans have seen the military estab-
lishment on the continent in largely
symbolic terms. This interpretation,
lune t970
MATO. PAR1IWlS
based on the past experience. of Euro-
peans with formal commitments un-
fuI1i11ed, has led to ambiguous and
ambivalent interpretations of alliance
pledges and responsibilities. Hence, it
is not difficult to comprehend the rea-
sons behind basic differences of in-
terpretation of the Atlantic alliance
that have contributed to discord. After
20 years, however, Europeans are tak-
ing the initiatives in unilateral enter-
prises.
Conflicting Concepts
Since NATO's inception, two con-
fiicting concepts have prevailed. The
first limits actions of the alliance to
a geographical area clearly defined-
namely, Western Europe-and to one
realm-military defense against the
Soviet threat. The second interpreta-
tion is based on the assumption that
the threat is global and embraces
economic, political, and psychological
aspects, as well as military .
It is clear - that there were basic
conflicts in the interests and expec-
tations of the NATO partners from
its beginnings to the present. These
differences of emphasis continue to
vex alliance solidarity. It is plain that
the trends of movement in Europe
do not portend improvement for
NATO. A fortiori, with a reduced
NATO, the role of the United States,
in the defense of Europe, will be more
onerous.
In the current European environ-
ment, there are basic differences and
variations in the focus of interest that
must be weighed carefully by Presi-
dent Nixon as he goes forward with his
policymakiug machinery. He told the
NATO Council in February 1969:
As NATO enters its third decade,
I see for it an opportunity to be more
than it has been before: a bulwark of
peace, the architect of new means of
53
NATO PARTNERS
)
partnership, and! an invigorated forum
for fleW id!eus and new technologies
to invigorate the lives of our peuple.
This is the heart of the formula
through which the United States seeks
to restructure and rebuild the falling
alliance. The task has been well-ar-
ticulated. The United States and Eu-
rope must attempt to approach their
mutual prohlems, with renewed vigor.
The old, familiar rhetoric will no
longer do. The United States bears the
burden of dynamic leadership in order
to formulate a meaningful approach
to accommodation and to propose pro-
grams.
In order to be responsive to partic-
ular problems, the United States
must recognize that its traditional out-
look must alter.
The greatest danger NATO faees is the possibility of a 'declining spiral'
of eonfidenee among the nations of the Allianc:e. This eould only result in a
deereasing military capability, whieh, if carried further, eould destroy the
very eredibility of our defensive posture-the key element in our deterrenee.
These changes came about, this expanding spiral of defense grew, because
all the nations 'lYere willing to work and saerifiee together for the common
defense. Contribution grew on eontribution, eonfidence came from eonfidence.
Now over the years we have seen many ebanges in our defense posture,
but regardless of the evolutionary steps that have alfected our strengths-in-
being or wbieb have changed the strategic guidance nnder whiCh we operate,
the deterrellt objective of the AlUanee has been aebieved. That deterrence,
of courac, has been based on the visible and eredible defensive posture whieh
the.AUianee has presented to the forces of the Warsaw Paet. Today, however,
we must aak ourselves whether the spiral of defense has not reaehed a kind of
point of equilibrium-and if so, what will be its state tomorrow?
General Andrew J. Goodpaster
Mlllliry Review
54
TheMilitaryAdvisor
and theCommander
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond J.McClean, Vnltetl States Armg, and
Major Melvin P. Williams, Vnitetl States Armg
T
HE usArmyhas, overthepast
20 years,builtup aconsiderable
body of experience in the techniques
of advising foreign military forces.
Schools have been set up to pass on
this knowledge to new advisors so
their paths will be smoother than
theirpredecessors'. Much literatureis
available on the methods and tech-
niques to use.
Buthaveweappliedallthatwehave
learned?Havewe actuallydetermined
how many it takes to advise and at
whatlevel? Have we learned when to
phaseoutadvisors? Arewedoingthe
bestandmoatefficientjobofadvising
JUl. 1910
thatwe arecapable of doing in Viet-
nam today? These are questions that
advisors ask each other. We need to
take a critical look atthe effort, par-
ticularly atthe effort inVietnam.
The advisory system inVietnam is
working.It hssbeengenerallyrespon-
sive; ithas helped theVietnamese to
build better field units; and it hss
improved such diverse areas as the
Army Republic of Vietnam logistic
system and the recruiting and i n u ~
tion centers. Many experienced and
dedicated people involved in the ad-
visory effort have Jll8de tremendous
improvements during the time this
55
ADVISORS AND COMMANDERS
~ r o g r m has been in effect. But no
one maintains that the advisory effort
is perfect.
Basically, it is too large. Although
Army Republic of Vietnam units are
becoming more efficient and self-con-
fident, there is seldom a parallel
effort to reduce the size of the ad-
visory teams. There 'have been some
reductions, but, because more Regional
Force and, Popular Force units have
been brought within the scope of the
advisory effort, the total effort con-
tinues to grow.
Size of Team
Advisory teams, like most organiza-
tions, . follow Parkinson's Law. The
team tends to grow in size, with little
correlation to increases or decreases
in the adviSOry need. But a larger
advisory team does not mean that
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond J.
McClean is with the Ranger Depart-
ment, US Army Infantry School, Fort
Benning, Georgia. He holds a B.S. in
Commerce from the State University
of Iowa and i8 a graduate of the US
Army Command and General Staff
College. From 1961 to 1964, he served
with the Defense Communications
Agency and with Special Forces from
1964 to 1966. During 1967 and 1968,
he was assigned to the Military As-
sistance Advisory Command, Vietnam,
as Senior Advisor to the Vietnamese
Ranger Command and to the 6th Viet-
namese Ranger Group.
Major Melvin P. Williams is attend-
ing the Infantry Officers' Advanced
Course at Fort "Benning, Georgia. His
assignments include duty with the
Fort Leonard Wood Training Center
in Misst>Uri, with the 1st Special
Forces Group in Okinawa, and with
#d Corps in Vietnam. During 1967 and
1968, he was with the Military As-
sistance Advisory Command in Viet-
nam as Staff Advisor for the Vietnam-
eBe Ranger Command.
better or more advice will be given
by that team. In fact, the very size
of the advisory team is one of the
basic causes of its inefficiency. Build-
ing up the team, to cover every subject
on which advice might be offered,
often impairs the team's capability to
provide really good advice on essential
problems.
The natural tendency of most in-
dividuals to associate with others of
like cultural background is reinforced
the larger the advisory detachment
becomes. The advisors' compound,
with its own movie, swimming pool,
post exchange, mess, and living quar-
ters, effectively insulates the advisor
from informal social contacts with the
people he is advising.
It is not only easier to mix socially
with other advisors-it is also easier
to conduct business using the advisory
chain of command. Often, the advisor
at the higher level pressures the sub-
ordinate advisor to accomplish some-
thing which he was' not able to get
his counterpart to do. He wants the
lower level advisor to get it done
through his counterpart.
"Duplicate staff" System
This 'procedure becomes even more
attractive with the introduction of
the "duplicate staff" system, particu-
larly prevalent at higher echelons of
advising. The advisors set up a par-
allel division' or corps level staff and a
parallel tactical operations center. The
duplicate staff usually is large enough
to accomplish the mission of the divi-
sion or corps, even if the Vietnamese
staff were to disappear completely.
The duplicate staff arrangement
generally leads to all-American brief-
ings and meetings. It is possible to go
away from one of these effiCiently con-
ducted meetings feeling that every-
thing discussed and agreed upon ae-
Militaly Inl..
56
ADVISORS AIID COMMANDERS
Advice shouldbegiven directlytotbeeommander
tuallywill takeplace. This is notnec-
essarily so since much of what has
been talked about will happen only if
Vietnamese counterparts are con-
vinced itwill work and will issue the
orders through their channels.
Supportandadministrationfor the
large advisory detachments take a
considerablepercentageofeffortaway
from advising. The larger the team,
the more personnel, and the greater
the number of conveniences, the
greaterthepercentageofeffortwhich
mustbespentinmaintenanceofthese
/ areas. Certain officers and enlisted
men will be employed full time on
these activities. Others, nominally
clsasified as advisors, will spend a
greaterpercentageoftheirtimedoing
administrative or support work for
theteamthanthey do inadvising.
This is particularly noticeable in
the Gl advisory sections. Because of
the large number of advisors on the
teamand on subordinateteams, much
timemustbespentonpersonnelman-
agement and its related responsibiIi-
ties. In most higher level advisory
teams, part of this problem is solved
by adding personnel to the advisory
staff solely for handling administra-
tion. This increases the size of the
advisory teameven more.
If theincreasedsize ofanadvisory
teamencourages inefficiency, thelogi-
cal move is toreduce its size. To say
that, ifittakes only one tocommand,
it should require only one to advise,
undoubtedly overstates the problem,
but it does furnish the foundation
for useful thought on reducing ad-
visory teams.
June 1970 57
ADVISORS AND CDMMAIIDERS
)Almost all advisors agree that, when
advice is given, it-Deeds to be given
to only one man-the commander. If
he agrees, the order is put out, and
it will get done although it may not
be precisely what the advisor had in
mind. It generally is a waste of effort
to spend time convincing counterpart
staff officers or subordinate command-
ers in the hope that they will push
the ideas uphill. Neither their system
nor, ours works that way. The key to
successful advice is to convince the
commander. The advisor has then
made his'most significant contribution.
Lower Echelons
If we accept the general proposition
that the size of the teams must be
reduced to improve efficiency, the next
question is, Where and how much?
Advisors are most needed with the
lower echelons-the battalions and the
districts. They already have small,
four and five-man, teams so no change
is envisaged, nor do regiment or simi-
lar-sized units normally have a team
larger than three or four people.
The higher the staff and command
levels, the more efficient, capable, and
experienced are the officers of the'
Vietnamese Army. Yet it is here that
there are the greatest number of ad-
visors. Here is where the duplicate
staff has been instituted.
The major argument: to justify the
size of these detachments, especially
the G3 section, is that US assets must
be controlled by US personnel. That
is true at present, but not' so many
people are needed to do it, Not every
section and subsection at division and
corps level requires in-depth' advisory
assistance, and the elimination of the
duplicate staff would permit reduc-
tion of nearly 75 percent of the ad-
visors, including all enlisted advisors,
at corps and division levels.
A reduction of perhaps 50 percent
could similarly be made in the sector
advisory teams. These cuts would be
in advisory personnel only, and they
would eliminate the need for most of
the administrative personnel attached
to the teams. The size of the team
would be so reduced that advice would
be given only to key people. This is
precisely where the effort should be
focused.
Parallel with the reduction in size
of the teams, there should be a reduc-
tion in the flow of reports and ad-
visory-generated paperwork so the
advisors remaining would be free to
spend more time with their counter-
parts. The team would 'be forced to
give up its parallel staff function and
would no longer be able to operate a
duplicate tactical operations center.
The necessary coordination and con-
trol would take place in the Viet-
namese tactical operations center.
Support Functions
Although the size of the advisory
teams would be drastically reduced,
they would still need, administrative
and logistic support. If the advisory
teams are to be truly streamlined and
directed'solely toward their primary
effort, no one on the advisory teams
should be charged with a support
function. To provide administrative
and logistic services, advisory sup-
port detachments would be formed.
These detachments would act as a
one-stop service center for all advisors
in the area. They would provide typ-
ing services, personnel actions, uni-
forms and equipment, messes, tem-
porary billets, post exchanges, and dis-
, pensaries.
They also could act as signsl relay
stations and as a place for the ad
visor to store equipment he does not
need to take to the field. The detach-
MilitarJ Rniew 58
ments would be loeated in population
centers, near airports, or in places
near which a number of advisory
teams were loeated.
The detachments would provide
helicopter support for advisory teams
and would take care of logistic and
administrative matters when the ad-
visor could not easily leave the field.
The size of the support detachments
would depend upon the number and
size of teams served, but, in any event,
the total number of men involved in
support activities would be fewer than
under the present system.
The primary purpose in reducing
the size of the advisory teams is to
increase their efficiency, encourage
them to get closer to their counter-
parts, and eliminate duplication. It
could have other effects-with greater
ADVISORS AND COMIIA!IDERS
and clear-cut responsibility should
come greater accomplishment and job
satisfaction. The proposal also would
save money, both in pay of advisory
personnel and in the cost of maintain-
ing the advisor compounds.
Finally, with a smaller require-
ment for advisors, it should be pos-
sible to 1i1l a greater percentage of the
jobs with specially seleced officers
quali1ied in the Vietnamese language.
For certain key positions, tours longer
than one year might be possible.
As the missions of US units are
transferrsd to Army Republic of Viet-
nam formations, the relative impor-
tance of our advisory eft'ort will in-
crease. No measures to increase its
effectiveness should be overlooked. One
way which holds promise is to reduce
the size of the teams.
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JaIl 1870

Trom Vogenngg Vgestnik (USSR)
Frunze Military Academy
Lieutenant Geueral P. Bashuriu. Sordet Army
T
HEGeneral StaffAcademy. now knownas theFrunzeMilitaryAcademy.
wasformally opened on 8 December 1918. Thefirst Sovietmilitary acad-
emy. itwascreated on theorders ofV. I. Lenin to provide a uniform program
fortraininga commandgroup for thenewly formed Red Army. It has become
theprincipal trainingschool for command andstaffofficers capable ofscientifi-
cally organizing and successfully conducting modern military activiti!ls. and a
scientificcenterfortheelaborationoftactiealtheoryand operationsskills.
Inthefirstclass. 183 studentawerechosen from 435 candidates to receive
thegeneralstaffofficerinstruction. Theshortenedcurriculumcalledforaseven-
monthcourse. with 280 hours of thl! total 940 devoted to practical instruction.
Military specialists of the old Im-
perial Russian academies who had
crossed over to the Soviet side .were
used extensively during the early
years for teaching in the academy.
Among their numbers were well-
known generals and officers of the gen-
eral staff: K. I. Velichko, C. G. Lu-
kirskiy, A. K. Kolenkovskiy, N. G.
Korsun, A. M. Zayonchkovskiy, M. M.
Zagyu, V. F. Novitskiy, F. E. Ogord-
nikov, A. A. Svechin, and Ye A. Shi-
lovsky, as well as Colonel Boris M.
Shaposhnikov, later Marshal of the
Soviet Union, and one of the most
prominent military theoreticians of
the Red Army. Among the first stu-
dents at the academy were Vasili I.
Chapaev, Kirill A. Meretskov, Vasili
D. Sokolovsky, and Ivan V. Tyulenev.
During the first two years, studies
at the academy were often interrupted
by missions to the fronts of the Rus-
sian Civil War. For its active partic-
ipation on the civil war battlefields,
the academy was awarded the Order
of the Red Banner on 9 January 1922.
Reorganization
After the termination of the civil
war, reorganization was begun of all
training, party-political, and scientific
research work. The training period
was increased to three years.
Experienced combat officers from
the civil war were attracted to teach
the students. Typical of a small group
of what might be called "the young
professionals" was Mikhail N. TUkha-
chevsky who was named academy di-
rector in 1922.
The experience of World War I and
the civil war was generalized in the
This article was translated and
condensed from the origi1l4l,
published in VOYENNYY VYEST-
NIK (USSR) December 1968.
June 1970
FRUJIZE MILITARY ACAIIEII1'
academy during this period, and theo-
retical works were published on prob-
lems of tactical and minor strategy.
The works Summa1"1/ of General Tac-
tics (mobile warfare), Defense in
Mobile Warfare, and Infant1"1/ Tactics
were published in 1928, as .well as a
number of works on cavalry ~
lery tactics and engineeriJIlr matters.
In April 1924, the Central Commit-
tee named Mikhail V. Frunze lis acad-
emy director. :Under his direction, the
military academy underwent a com-
plete reorganization. He established a
Chair of Military Industry and a Fac-
ulty of Supply. Into the curriculum
came studies of the organization of
the rear and a fuller range of instruc-
tion in the science of strategy.
Elements of Instruction
By the time of Frunze's premature
death in October 1925, the course had
developed into three main elements.
The first involved the three basic
courses covering instruction at the
regimental, diVision, and corps level;
the second was built around the new
Faculty of Supply; and the third cen-
tered on the Eastern Faculty, a mili-
tary-political and linguistic course
for officers destined for duty in the
Far and Near East and central Asia.
The curriculum was designed to
furnish the requirements for combat
commanders and staff personnel of the
higher command levels, to train sup-
ply specialists, and to provide the
Eastern specialists needed for special
operations in the Far East. The Red
Army at that time was sending mili-
tary missions to China where they
played an active part in directing the
military aspects of the Chinese na-
tional revolution.
In recognition of his services, the
military academy took on the name of
Frunze on 5 November 1925.
81
FRom MILITARY ACADEMY
Student officers tour the museum of the
Franze Military Acaclemy
During the period 1926-29, more
than 100 scientific works were pub-
lished in the academy on problems of
general tactics and the military utili-
zation of various typcs of troops, tak-
ing into account the application df
new means of armed combat.
During that time, the academy be-
came a center of military theory. It
was necessary to investigate ways of
developing military techniques and
troop organization for the employment
of infantry and cavalry forces in close
cooperation with tanks, artiIIery, and
aviation. The theoretical 'research in
the academy, along with other work
carried out in the Red' Army, were
basic to the organization of the Field
Staff in 1929.
In connection with the massive in-
troduction of new military technology,
the first mechanized corps in the
world was formed in 1931. The emer-
gence of such powerful mobile units
posed a new problem to military
science-the development of the ap-
propriate theory for deep combat op-
erations.
Large contributions to the solution
of this problem were made by the So-
viet military officers and theoreti-
cians Tukhachevsky, V. K. Triandafi-
lov, K. B. Kalinovskiy, G. S. Isserson,
and N. E. Varfolomeyev.
Specialization has been widely prac-
ticed from 1931 up to the present
courses. The academy began to train
not only general military commanders
with an advanced military education,
but also artillerymen, tankmen, avia-
tors, and officers of other specialities.
World war II Problems
New complex problems moved to the
forefront on the eve of World War II.
The imminent danger of war with
Germany demanded that educational
training work be done in conditions
as close as possible to combat reality.
Chief attention was paid to tactical
operations and staff training, taking
account of experience gained in the
wars in Spain, on Khasan Lake, on the
Khalkhin-Gol River, and in the Finn-
ish Campaign. Time for field work
and study of the organization, weap-
ons, and tactics of the probable enemy
was greatly increased. The student
contingent was increased, and in-
structors mainly from the troops, the
most experienced commanders and
combat officers, were invited to join
the faculty.
Works on general tactics and the
tactics of branches of arms, the meth-
odology of combat training, and serv-
ice in combined-arms staft's were
published.
From the beginning of World War
II, special attention was paid to the
study and generalization of Red Army
MIlItIJJ Revle. 62
FRum MILITARY ACADEMY
M
IKHAIL V. Frunze was born on 2 February 1885 in
the town of Pishpek (now Frunze) into the family
of a medical assistant
He conducted clandestine activities against the czar
ist government in Petersburg, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, and
other cities. His revolutionary work included the or
ganization of strikes in the textile industry and the
formation of workers' combat detachments for street
fighting in Moscow. The czarist government sentenced
Frunze to death on two. occasions. He spent over seven
years in prisons and Siberian exile.
During World War I, Frunze escaped from his exile
in Siberia and, under an assumed name, saw action on
the German front where he had a party assignment to
set up an underground Bolshevik organization among
the soldiers. With the overthrow of the czar in February
1917, Frunze organized the Red Guard detachments in Belorussia;-in December 1918,
he was placed in command of the 4th Army on the Eastern Front fighting against the
White Army under Admiral Aleksandr V. Kolchak.
In the spring of 1919, he assumed command of the Southern Group of the Eastern
Front where the White Army offensive had breached the lines and was prepared to
sweep forward to the Volga. The forces under Frunze's command checked Kolchak's
troops, and a counteroffensive was mounted. In the heaviest fighting of the Russian Civil
War, Kolchak's army was defeated and pushed back to the Urals.
In the summer of 1919, Frunze was appointed Commander in Chief of the Eastern
Front forces. He led the marc& toward the Pamir Mountains and defeated the White
forces despite considerable Allied assistance. After this victory, Frunze was recalled to
Moscow and placed in command of the troops on the Southern Front operating against
General Petr N. Wrangel whose forces were threatening the Donets Basin.
It was important to prevent the linking of Wrangel's forces with the Polish Army
which was attacking from the west. Wrangel's drive was halted, and a powerful counter
offensive launched in November 1920 successfully cleared the Crimea of White forces.
When the Russian Civil War was over, Frunze held a number of key military, gov
ernment, and party posts. He is the author of some outstanding works on war doctrine,
the fundamentals of military art, and on military training.
In April 1924, he was named to command the General Staff Academy which now
bears his name. In the summer of 1925, Frunze fell ill. His death on 31 October was of
ficially announced as a heart attack. Later, Leon Trotsky charged he had been the victim
of medical murder contrived by Joseph Stalin. As politically welcoll1e as Frunze's death
might have been for Stalin, no conclusive evidence has been presented to support his
complicity in the death.-Editor.
Mikhail V. Frunze
Junl 1910 83
fRUNZE MILITARY ACADEMY
S
combat experience in the battles at
Moscow and Stalingrad. In these op-
erations, the tendencies were clearly
noted of the massing of forces and
equipment in the main effort, transi-
tion from artiUery support to artillerY
attack, and, n ~ e n t commitment
OfBeer-stlldents take 8 programed exami-
natioD OD aD eledroJlic testing machille
at the Fnutze Military Aeademy in
Moscow
of tank brigades 4nd battalions in
close coordination with infantrY, artil-
lery, and aviation.
Combat training conferences con-
ducted at the academy had great sig-
nificance for the further development
of tactics. At a conference in July
1942, instructors went out into the
field, and group talks and informa-
tional sessions and speeches by com-
bat participants were held i.n order to
aid the study and analysis of the war.
During the concluding part of the
war, the teaching staff and scientists
of the academy paid particular atten-
tion to the attack, forced crossings of
water obstacles, meeting engsge-
ments, engagements of mobile forma-
tions in breakthroughs, successful
development of depth strategy, and the
surrounding and annihilation of the
enemy.
During the war years, the academy
trained about 11,000 officers. Many of
its stUdents occupied responsible posi-
tions in the active army and skillfully
led large operations. Almost all the
commanders at the fronts, more than
75 percent of the army commanders,
and the great majority of the com-
manders and chiefs of staff of the in-
fantry corps and divisions were edu-
cated at the academy.
Combat Experience
After the termination of the war,
the chief task lay in investigating and
analyzing the huge amount of com-
bat experience and disseminating it
among the forces. It was necessary to
transform the educational training,
scientific research, and party political
work in order to guarantee the train-
ing of highly qualified manpower un-
der conditions of the further develop-
ment of military theory bssed on
World War II experience and the
future development of equipment,
weapons, and means of carrying out
combat action.
In perfecting the training of the
students, time for field maneuvers
was incressjld, as well as that for
staff-command and troop exercises.
In 1945, the academy began prepar-
ing II six-volume work entitled Gen-
eral Tactics. Works and training aids
on attack, breakthroughs of fortified
aress, and defense were published.
During the seven years following the
war, problems of general tactics and
minor strategy were dealt with in
more than 150 scientific works pub-
lished by the academy.
The professorial teaching staff,
MllitaJJ Rul,.
64
FRUNZE MILITARY ACADEMY
Organization of tIte Frunze MilltarJ Academy
T
HE Frunze Military Academy is second only to the Military Academy of the Generat
Staff as the highest level military school for training Soviet officers for higher level
command and staff positions. It is commanded by a colonel general who is assisted
by four lieutenant general deputy commanders, one each for political affairs, academic
training, command of troops, and logistic support.
The three-year course is roughly equivalent to a combination of the US Army's In-
fantry Advanced Course and the Command and General Staff College curriculums. About
40 percent of the instruction is devoted to infantry tactics and staff procedures. Studies
the first year concentrate on battalion level while division and corps level are covered
the second and third years. Field exercises are held during the summer months for
the student.
Political affairs and military history are prominent in the curriculum. Other subjects
are military administration, military geography, and familiarization courses in signal,
engineer, and ordnance equipment. Basic or refresher courses are offered on a voluntary
basis in English, French, and German. The foreignlanguage course was mandatory prior
to 1960.
Examinations, both written and oral, are frequent, and an examining commission
from the Ministry of Defense conducts a final interrogation.
Research projects are conducted during the second and third year with two theses
required from each student. All projects are cataloged and added to the library. A post-
graduate program is offered for selected students to do additional research for one
year. This often prepares officers for instructor assignment.
The academy maintains an enrollment of approximately 400 students divided among
the three staggered classes. The classes are divided into study groups of 10 to 12
officers each. A peak enrollment of 2,000 students yearly was attained for the shortened
oneyear mobilization courses during World War II.
Students at the academy are predominantly infantry branch and range from captain
to lieutenant colonel in rank. Entrance requirements are that an officer be under 36
years of age, have four years' command experience, and be proficient in one foreign
language. The officer's service record is also considered for initial selection. Candidates
who meet the requirements and pass a physical examination are then strictly selected
on the basis of written and oral competitive entrance examinations.-Editor.
working in close cooperation with and regulations. This enabled the
members of the central administra- swift introduction of the latest
tion of the Ministry of Defense and achievements of military theory into
representatives of the troops, partic- combat training practice.
ipated in working out new manuals Relations with the troops were
JUDe 1970 6S
FRom MILITARY ACADEMY
)
strengthened by regular presentations
to the teachers and students by well-
known military leaders, officers, and
commanders of large and small units.
The revolution in military affairs
complicated the character of internal
communications in armed con1lict.
Taking the new tenets of Soviet mili-
tary doctrine as the point of departure,
it was necessary to disclose and
substantiate the characteristics of the
next war, its combat and operation, to
clarify the laws and basic principles
of the "organization and conduct of
combat actions, to work out the theo-
retical bases for the application of
forces and materiel, and to give scien-
tifically based recommendations for
raising the eomhat readiness of the
armed forces.
In practice, this meant creating a
new theory of combat" by general
forces. In the short term, it also meant
establishing new programs, educa-
tional aids, and lectures and problems,
and reequipping the classrooms and
laboratories.
Nuclear Warfare Conditions
Mastering the principles of combat
and operations connected with the use
of nuclear weapons and with the ne-
cessity af defense against the enemy's
nuclear strikes was introduced into
the educational process. In the solution
of tactical problems, more attention
was paid to the mobile forms of com-
bat, considerations of strategy and
tactics, and research on the capabili-
ties of new combat weapons.
It would be unthinkable to try to
work out a new theory of general com-
bat without analyzing the experience
of the troops. With this aim, instruc-
tors from the academy regularly
visited tactical exercises in the field.
The results of these excursions were
discussed at departmental meetings.
&8
The collected materials were
for the information of a wide circle
of officers of all military training in-
stitutions, agencies, and troops.
During this period, problems were
investigated in the academy such as
the swift attack with troops advanc-
ing from the rear without occupying
an initial position, and attack in di-
rections which would later be assimi-
lated by large and small units of the
Soviet Army.
Textbooks and Training Aids
In 1956, the necessity became ur-
gent of analyzing the accumulated
material on the theory of combat un-
der nuclear warfare conditions. All
academic and scientific research de-
partments were drawn into this work.
In 1957, it was discussed at a military
scientific conference of more than 500
generals and officers.
Members of the scientific depart-
ments do a large amount of work in
compiling textbooks and training aids.
Although planned in correlation with
the academy program, many of the
texts are also in demand in the troop
units. In the last three years, the acad-
emy has published and sent out to the
troops more than 70 works of educa-
tional literature.
An invaluable contribution to the
development of the theory of general
combat bas been made by doctoral and
master's dissertations. Their defenses
are essentially creative discussions on
actual problems of modern and
operations. Here, special attention is
paid to the main lines of the further
improvement of tactics, taking into
consideration the future development
of the methods of armed combat. In
the last two years, six doctoral dis-
sertations have been defended in the
academy, three of them on problems
of general tactics.
MIlItaIJ Revi.w
FRUHlE MIlITARY ACADEMY
The academy, performing an inter-
national duty, maintains connections
with higher military institutions of
many other Communist countries.
From ita modest beginning in 1918,
the Frunze Military Academy has be-
come aprimary instrument in provid-
ing the trained leaders and staff offi-
cers necessary for modem combat
operations. In almost every unit in the
Soviet Army, one can 1ind several
graduates. A considerable number can
also be found in the 'other services as
well: in the navy, the strategic rocket
forces, the air force, and the air de-
fense forces. There are also a large
number of officers and generals of
friendly Socialist countries who have
received their professional training
in military science at the academy.
Most of the present students eam
their right to attend the academy
by being commanders of excellent
units. Others have made outstanding
achievement in combat training and
political education or in mastering
complex equipment, as well as weap-
ons.
Z'e 4Wre t6 Send in your CHANGE OF ADDRESS
To assure uninterrupted delivery of your Military Review, be sure to
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lege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.
JURI 1970 87
W
HEN Field Marshal BemaI'd
L. Montgomery, fOl'JDer ~
uty, Supreme Allied CODIJD8lIder,
Europe, gave a lecture at the Royal
United Service Institution of Great
Britain in 1958, he produced two
maps. One of these showed the situ-
ation in 1945 following the end of
World War II. The second showed
Europe in 1958 and showed Soviet
expansion and encroachments in 13
years.
If that same lecture were to be. re-
peated today, contrasting the 1958
situation with the present, the effect
would be depressing indeed. The
changes in the strategic and military
balance of power between the Soviet
bloc and the West would be cause for
serious misgivings. A rather fright-
ening aspect of this . slow process of
the shifting balance of power is that
it is tsking place against the hack-
ground of the so-called detente in re-
lations between the West and the
Soviet bloc.
This illusion of a Soviet change of
heart has become one of the favorite
topics of flowery oratory of some
politiCians on both sides of the At-
lantic. This resulted, in part, from
the signature of the Soviets, in July
1963, of a test ban treaty. The treaty
denied to Amerieans the opportunity
for conducting further tests in high
altitudes, whereas the Soviets had al-
ready obtained vital information from
their own tests which they used for
their antiballistic missile system.
The Soviet signature was hailed by
Militaly Revl 88
some in the West as the best proof
of Soviet .peaceful intentions. These
people began pressing for uni-
lateral reductions of troops in West-
ern Europfl. Even the Soviet invasion
of did not shatter
their illusions.
Nuclear Potential Buildup
During the nearly two years since
the invasion, the Soviets have made
marked progress in the relentless
buildup of their versatile nuclear p0-
tential. This fact was confirmed by
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird.
in March 1969, when he reported that
the Soviets had a total of 1.140 inter-
continental ballistic missiles (IC-
BM's), as compared with 1,054 for
the United States.
Of special concern to Secretary
Laird was the deployment of heavy
ICBM's-namely, the SS-9. carrying
warheads of 20 to 25 megatons. This
is far larger than anything existing
in the US inventory. It is reported
that the Soviets have 200 S8-9 mis-
siles, and the Pentagon expects that
they may have 500 of them by 1975.
An article, "The Soviet Strategic
Build Up," in The Washington Reprrrt.
published by the National Security
Council, points out the dangerous im-
plications of the development by the
USSR of a powerful booster, larger
than the 7.5-million-pound-thrust Sat-
urn V rocket. This would mean that
the Soviets will be able to deploy. in
space. warheads with a colossal mega-
Eugene HinterhofJ, a former Polish
Army officer a7ld member of the
Polish Supreme Military Council, re-
Bides in Loftdon. Fou7lder a7ld Secre-
tary oj the Military Comment41;ors'
Circle. Loftdon, Mr. HinterhofJ is the
author of "The Delicate Balance"
which appeared in the December 1968
issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.
Junl 1970
THE SOVIET TllllEAT
tonnage far exceeding their present
capability for lifting warheads of 100
megatons.
The main danger of these powerful
Soviet warheads is that they will not
only be able to knock "Out the Minute-
man, but, much worea, could com-
pletely black out the US electronic
system. This would paralyze the US
"second-etrike" capability which, for
many yeare. has been the main pillar
of North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion strategy.
It is becoming obvious that the
USSR aims at creating a situation by
which it could destroy, with its first
strike. the States and Europe
without risking unacceptable damage.
Or. after having assured such a capa-
bility for itself, it could try to use the
threat for political blackmail and
avoid a shooting war.
Naval Power
At the same time, the Soviets have.
been developing their naval power.
This could !dicate that they do not
regard nuclear war as inevitable and
they are planning for a conventional
war of some duration without resort-
ing to the use of nuclear weapons. A
war at sea need not lead necessarily
to the use of nuclear weapons. Their
use could be limited, not leading to
escalation into a general thermonu-
clear war as would be the ease in
Europe.
The rapid buildup of naval power
is giving to the USSR both strategic
and political advantage . Concerning
strategic advantages. it fits the pat-
tern of a Soviet classical "Cannae"
strategic concept-the envelopment of
both NATO flanks.
The activities of the Soviet Navy,
both surface and underwater vessels.
as well as of the merchant fleet along
the northwestern coast 'of Norway
0
THE SOVIET THREAT
)
and near the islands of Spitsbergen
and Svalbard, are causing growing
concern in Norway.
The Soviet threat to NATO's
southern IIank in the Mediterranean
has becoml! even more serious, both
from strategic and political points of
view. The Soviet Eskadra has become
a permanent part of the seascape
since the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 0
and is a growing challenge to the US
6th Fleet. Also, as a result of deep p0-
litical penetration into several pro-
Soviet Arab States, the Soviets have
acquired several naval and airbases.
Air Support
The most important event has
been the growing penetration into Al-
geria where the Soviets seek facilities
in the former French naval and air-
base at Mers-el-Kebir. Of even greater
implication is the loss ~ o the US
Wheelus Airbase in Libya. The US
Air Force is now evacuating these
facilities, and, in due course, they
could be put at the disposal of the
Soviet Union.
If the Soviets acquire the use of
airbases in Algiers and Libya, it,
could affect dramatica\1y the existing
naval balance of power in the Med-
iterranean. It could mean that, in ease
of a direct confrontation, the Soviet
Fleet could have air support provided
by any number of shore-based air-
craft. These numbers could vastly ex-
ceed the numbers of US planes opera-
ting from the attack aircraft carriers
of the 6th Fleet.
Furthermore, Soviet aircraft would
then be only 15 to 20 minutes' flying
time from US airbases in Spain. This
gives concern both to the United
States and its Spanish hosts and
causes Spain increasingly to feel in-
volved in all of NATO's risks without
formally being a member.
The Soviets derive political advan-
tage from the fact that their naval
presence in various oceans projects
the image of Soviet power more effi-
ciently than any other propaganda
medium. Moreover, this naval force
influences the political environment
of the entire Mediterranean area, en-
couraging, by ita mere presence, dis-
sident elements in Greece, Cyprus,
and Malta.
The best example of the political
implications of the presence of the
Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean
concerns the recent crisis which de-
veloped in Lebanon over the guerril-
las. A warning was given by the So-
viet Union to the United States not
to get involved. At the same time, the
Soviet Ambassador in Beirut was
most active in mediatil1g between the
government of Lebanon and the Arab
guerrillas. Such developments were
impossible in the 1958 Lebanese crisis
when US troops were landed and the
Soviets had no fleet in the Mediter-
ranean.
Czech Invasion
A review of Soviet achievements is
not complete without examining the
implications of the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia. Although there
has been no spectacular buildup of
Sovief conventional forces in Europe,
the invasion has resulted in a serious
disruption of the balance of power.
This balance existed in favor of the
West for many years, but now, cer-
tainly, must favor the Warsaw Pact
forces.
With some knowledge and under-
standing of Soviet strategic thinking,
it is easy to construct a hypothetical
scheme of maneuver for their two
most probable plans for a major of-
fensive in Europe. These could be put
into action when the Soviets conclude
MIlItaiJ .evla. 70
The. plan could be con-
Thebuildupof 'Soviet navalPower northrepresentsa threattoNorway and the
NATO northern lank
thatthe disarray in NATO has gone
far enough, and when the US deter-
rent has lost its credibility in their
eyes. In such a case, the high com-
mandoftheWarsawPactcouldchoose
a replica of the Schlieffen plan of
1914,"with its accent on a strOng
ducted by a powerful mass of about
20 to80armoreddivisions, across the
north German plain, combined with
an offensive on a broadfront, aiming
at tying up the reserves of the Su-
preme Allied Commander, Europe.
A second alternative which has be-
come more feasible since the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia is a clas-
sical double pincer. The north pincer
would start from Eastern Germany,
thrusting across the Schleswig-Hol-
stein flatlands. The southern pincer
JulIe 1870
THE SOVIET THREAT
would go through Bavaria, and both
would meetwest of the Rhine, trap-
pingtheNATOforcesfightingarear-
guard battle.
Obviously,theSovietgeneralswould
be foolhardy touseCzechoslovak for-
mations for such operations. This
tilCzechmoralewas restored andthe
troops could be kept under control.
Until thesetroops could be relied up-
on, any such war operation would
havetobe conductedbytheRedArmy
units which have replsced the Czech-
oslovak units which were, for years,
deployed along the frontier with
Bavaria.
Consequently, the units of the US
7th Army deployed in southern Ger-
many would be facing crack Soviet
divisionsratherthantheCzechoslovak
71
THUOVIET THREAT
\
troops. whose combat value was
strongly criticized after the "October
Storm" maneuvers of the Warsaw
Pact in 1965.
Troop ReducUons
Anotber factor which also has con-
tributed to this undesirable change
of military balance in Europe has
been a series of unilateral reductions
in numbers of troops stationed in
W8!ltern Germany. The onlY exeeption
to tbese reductions has been Belgium
which not only has rescinded previous
plans to withdraw four mechanized
hattalions, but, on the contrary, has
reinforced its units in Germany with
a few antiaircraft batteries .
.}t is equally satisfactory to note
that the present Chief of Stall of the
French Armed Forces, General Michel
~ L. Fourquet, has abandoned his
predecessor's (General of the Army
Charles Ailleret) thesis of an "alI-
azimuth defense" by stating that there
is only one threat and that from the
East.
Unfortunately. these few positive
developments are outweighed by the
general trend in NATO. The disturbed.
military balance in Europe and the
possibility that defense cuts might
lead to a .reduction in US troops in
Germany create a situation in Europe
which does not encourage much op-
timism.
However. both in the Middle East
and Europe. there is still much room
for maneuver for Western 4iplomacy.
This could bring about a considerable
improvement in favor of the West. In
the Middle East, President Gamal Ab-
del Nasser's disenchantment with the
Soviets. as well as the hostility which
exists between the ErYIltian officer
corps.and Soviet military "advisors,"
opens a chance for Western, and espe-
cially for US, diplomacy.
In Europe, if conventional forces
are reduced, it willlesve the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe, no alter-
native but a planned early use of tac-
tical nuclear weapons. This, of course,
would mean the abandonment of the
strategy of "ftexible response."
One alternative would be to request
Turkey to station a few divisions in
NATO Lotio_
US aircraft in the Mediterranean area
have tbis as their "base"
Western Germany, with all mainte-
nance costs paid by NATO countries,
or to admit Spain to NATO. This
could result in stationing of a few
Spanish divisions east of the pyr-
enees. Unfortunately, the dispute
over Gibraltar, unless settled, will
rule out Spain's admission to NATO.
This is in spite of the fact that, as a
result of a bilateral United States-
MllitaJJ Review 72
THE SOVIET THREAT
Spanish defense agreement, Spain
for years 'has been indirectly con-
nected with NATO, incurring, in case
of war, the dangers of Soviet nuclear
strikes directed at US air and naval
. bases on its territory.
It is to be regretted that, because
of this dispute, NATO is deprived of
a Spanish contribution to its defense
capability and potential. The dismissal
by General Francisco Franco of his
Foreign Minister, Fernando M.
Castiella y Maiz, known for his mili-
tancy over Gibraltar, could justify an
assumption that Spain might be ready
now for some compromise. This situa-
tion gives further room for maneuver
for constructive diplomatic initiatives
which could overcome the implications
of unilateral troop withdrawals.
We do not assume that the intentions of the Warsaw Paet are eerta!nly
aggresaive. Bnt based on past experience, we cannot with certainty conclude
that they will always be peaeeful, either. Unil'steral}Y reducing the NATO
forces because an equilibrium now exists disregards the fact that those forces
are an essential component of that equilibrium.
We may be convinced that the Soviets have no present plans for military
aetion against the West. But could we be sure that the Soviets would not re-
spond to an opportunity to spread their influence by military means if the
occasion presented itself? Could we say with any assurance that Soviet policy
on the central front would remain unchanged if they saw an opportunity to
chip away at Western Europe, and do so with no challenge from our side,
short of all-out nuclear war?
Secretary of the Army Stanley R. ReBor
Juna 1970
73
1947-50
Roeeo M. Paone
I
N HIS "address before Congress on
12 March 1947, President Harry S
Truman, referring to US military aid
to Turkey, stated:
One of the primary objectiveB of
the foreign policy of the United StateB
ill the C1'84tion of conditiOfIll' in which
we and other nations will be able to
work out a way of life" free from
coercion.
This, he added, was "a fundamental
issue in the war with Germany and
Japan." The President felt that the
national integrity of Turkey was "es-
sential to the preservation of order
in the Middle East" and, therefore,
Turkey, like Greece, must have the
assistance it needs. This aid could
come only from the United States since
we are "the only country able to pro-
vide that help."
Thus, when President Truman
signed Public Law 75 and ordered the
Secretary of State to implement the
program, a new twist was given to the
policy of US foreign military aid.
Unlike Greece, Turkey was neither
impoverished nor war torn-neither
was it politically unstable. However,
since 1945, it had sought financial as-
sistance from both Great Britain and
the United States to modernize its
Mil Rnlew
economic, military, and political ma-
chinery so ,necessary for the mainte-
nance of its national integrity and se-
curity in the postwar world.
Soviet Threat
At .the same time, Turkey had
grown increasingly worried over the
growth of communism in the Mediter-
ranean area. Traditionally, it had
been wary of Soviet designs on its
lands. This distrust was sharpened
by the postwar territorial demands of
the USSR on Turkish borders. Turkey
rejected these demands, undertook
energetic military measures, and made
it clear to the world that it would re-
sist Soviet aggression by force, if
necessary.
Here was an ally who could not be
allowed to have its voice go unheard.
Therefore, when Great Britain an-
nounced that it could no longer send
military assistance to Turkey, the US
War Department quickly suggested
that support for Turkey, as well as
Greece, was not only militarily sound,
but that it should be considered as a
matter of priority. It also recom-
Rocco M. Paone is Professor of For-
eign Affair8 at the US Naval Acad-
emy, Annapolis, Marymnd. He recei'lled
a B.A. and an M.A. from Fordham
University, New York; an M.A. from
the Univer8ity of Cineinnati; and a
Ph. D. from Georgetown University,
Washington, D. C. He has 8erved as
consultant to the Depa.rt-ment of the
Ar-my on Foreign Military Aid and
is a 8enior me-mber of the Consulting
Fa.culty of the US Ar-my Command
and General Staff CoUege. He is co-
author of Geography and National
Power and the author of Political-
Military Relations in the Formulation
of U.S. Foreign Policy. His article
"The Last Volunteer Ar-my,
a'/flJ6tl,red in the Dece-mber 1969 issue
of the MILITARY REVIEW.
June 1870
MILITARY AID
mended"Qat the Department of State
apprise both Congress and the Ameri-
can people of the true situation in
Turkey. Armed with this advice, the
President and the 80th Congress co-
operated in setting aside 100 million
dollars for military aid to Turkey.
Why did this give a new twist to
the military policy of the United
States? It was the first time in its
history that the United States had
promised a significant amount of mil-
itary aid to a nation both at peace
with the world and with itself. The
aid program to Turkey was designed
to be both military and diplomatic in
purpose. It was hoped that Turkey
could enhance the ability to defend
itself and, at the same time, continue
as a stabilizing force against commu-
nism in the Middle East.
Survey Team Farmed
At the suggestion of the Department
of State, a military, naval, and ec0-
nomic survey team was formed and
sent to to determine the speci-
fic form which the aid should take.
Major Lunsford E. Oliver,
US Army, was named chairman of the
group which spent most of the spring
and esrly summer of 1947 in Turkey.
Oliver and part of his staff met fre-
quently with members of the Turklsh
General Staff and obtained firsthand
information of the Turkish military
situation. From Major General Naznii
Atac, Chief of Operations, Turkish
General Staff, General Oliver obtained
the present and proposed strength of
the Turkish military forces in the
event of a national emergency (see
chart).
General Atac explained that, in the
event of a Soviet attack from the east,
the Turks could dispatch 18 divisions
75.
MILITARY AID
to) that area. Also, there would be 30
divisions available to withstand a So-
viet attack from the north. The Turk-
ish operations chief emphasized that
the Turks badly needed heavy tanks
and greater mobility. He added that
the Turkish Navy could control the
Black"Sea near the Bosporus entrance,
but that 80 squadrons of aircraft,
With the aid of a small staff, Oliver
drew up a report which formed the
basis of Ambassador Edwin C. Wil-
son's report concerning assistance to
Turkey. As such, it also became the
basic structure upon which the initial
Turkish aid program was built. In
the report, Oliver reaffirmed the hope
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the
Strengtll of Turkish MilitarY Farces
Present M-Day Foree
Ground
Air
Navy
G61Idermerie
Warrant Officers
453,188
26,000
20,000
40,000
8,500
547,688
1,175,000
31,000
25,000
40,000
10,000
1,281,000
which the Turks lacked, would be re-
quired to protect that area.
At a number of those meetings,
Oliver explained his concept of the
role of tank armor in Turkey. He dis-
agreed with the idea of the Turkish
General Staff that heavy tanks should
be utilized in counterattacks in the
event of a breakthrough and explained
that antitank guns would be more
effective. Oliver agreed that the Turks
needed more tanks, but that they
should request light tanks rather than
heavy ones. Separate units of light
tanks would be more suitable for the
local counterattacks.
He felt that the principal role Ilf
armor under Turkish command would
be to destroy Soviet airborne troops.
Hence, he concluded that the most
effective tank against this attack was
the light and fast MIe.t.. To these ideas,
the Turkish General Staff agreed.
Turkish armed forces, if aided
promptly, could provide a deterrent
of such a nature to a potential aggres-
sor that an all-out costly war would
be necessary for the "aggressor "in
order to realize territorial or political
objectives in Turkey."
However, the equipment of all the
Turkish armed forces was inadequate
and outmoded so that the USSR could
easily overrun Turkey in a war against
each other. Oliver also added that,
although Turkey could plaCe 1.5 mil-
lion men, including reserves, in the
field within one month in the event of
war, reorganization of the Turkish
military establishment was essential
at both high and low levels.
The report contained a number of
other significant observations which
were rewritten later by US political
and diplomatic leaders into speeches
and policy. It was felt that the eco-
MilItary Review 76
nomic burden of maintaining the cur-
rent Turkisli Army of almost 600,000
would result in too great a curtail-
ment of essential government services,
reduction in economic productivity, as
well as' "diminished potential for cap-
ital development necessary to raise
the standard of living of the Turkish
MILITARY AID
basis of the Turkish aid program. He
suggested that equipment and supplies
be fumished the Turkish Army in the
amount of 48.5 million dollars; the
navy, 14.8 million dollars; and the air
force, 26.8 million dollars.
Of the remaining 10 million dollars
from the 100 million appropriated by
The Brill was one of four US submarines transferred to the Tnrkisb Navy
peasant and worker." This could have
serious adverse effects on Turkey's
capacity for resistance to armed ag-
gression or infiltration.
It also was felt that the funds made
available for the Turkish aid program
could be used most effectively for
provision of modern military eqUip-
ment, equipment for manufacture of
ammunition and small arms, a mili-
tary training program and equipment,
and technical assistance for construc-
tion and maintenance of strategic
highways.
General Oliver then made certain
recommendations which were accepted
by the Turkish and United States
Governments and which formed the
June 1870
the 80th Congress, five million was al-
lotted to road construction and main-
tenance equipment and five million for
the improvement of Turkish arsenals.
The report included a hope that the
British would continue to aid the
Turks in both equipment and training,
and that the British and United States
missions in Turkey would cooperate
closely with one another. It expressed
the desire that the various items of
equipment and supplies to be furnished
Turkey be made available "at the
earliest possible moment ...." Motor
equipment should arrive with, or
ahead of, the equipment with which
it is to be used.
However, the mission emphasized
77
MILITARY AID
~ supervision of the use of the
equipment to be fumisbed Turkey
sbould be exercised, but only to the
extent of assuring ourselves that the
Turks knew how to use it. This could
best be accomplished by the groups
to be .sent to give instruction on use
and maintenance of US equipment.
Both General Oliver and Ambas-
sador Wilson had no desire to have
the Turks feel that the United States
would keep control of the materiel or.
in any way. invite the thought that
the national sovereignty of Turkey
would be threatened as a result of this
military aid program. This was to be
a program to help Turkey if Turkey
would help itself. With these ideas
in mind. Oliver also recommended that
this assistance'to Turkey be extended
''by authorization of aid to the extent
of 100 million dollars annually for an
additional four years."
If these SUggestions were accepted,
both Oliver and Wilson expected the
defensive firepower of the Turkish
Army to be increased to such an ex-
tent that a reduction could be made in
the strength of the army without a
corresponding reduction in its de-
fensive ability. Increased manpower
could then be made available to the
domestic economy.
Naval Aid
The report also contained analyses
of the conditions of the Turkish Navy
and Air Force. The naval aid program
was designed to. increase the efficiency
and combat effectiveness of the Turk-
ish Navy:
; to BUCk an eztent that greater
economies wiU be effected r68'ldting in
a decreased burden on tke nation.al
budget, while at the Bame time bring-
ing the fleet to a greater state of
readineBB for war.
This would be accomplished by aug-
menting the stock of guns and under-
water ordnance and ammunition. in-
creasing the efficiency of shipboard
antiaircraft defenses, improving meth-
ods of training, and "replacement of
old. obsolete, and womout vessels
with more modem types."
Air Force Program
The air force program acknowledged
that the expenditure of 26.8 million
dollars would be insufficient to trans-
form the Turkish Air Foree into an
effective combat force. Nevertheless,
it was hoped to accomplish the follow-
ing:
Provide, from US surplus stocks,
the aircraft necessary to complete 10
air regiments and provide for a trans-
port grouP. an air-sea rescue unit,
and a small night-fighter unit.
Provide some motor transports-
tion equipment which was nonexistent
in the turkish Air Force.
Provide appro]!:imately the
amount of bombs and ammunition
necessary for the minimum standard
of training for one Yl\ar.
" Augment and improve supply
and training standards of the Turkish
Air Force.
With the five million dollars appor-
tioned for road construction and
maintenance. it was planned to or-
ganize 25 labor battalions from men
in the service and build 1,000 miles of
new highways. Also, it was -hoped to
accomplish a more efficient mainte-
nance of approximately 5.000 miles of
existing arterial roads which were of
strategic importsnce.
The report was incomplete regard-
ing the Turkish technical services.
Oliver recommended that three prop-
erly qualified omeers be dispatched to
Turkey to make the necessary surveys
in the fields of medical and signal
MIlItI/J Rnle.
78
MILITARY AID
equipment, as well as in motor mainte-
nance.
The main significance of the Oliver
report is the fact that it contained a
series, of suggestions which were
made by US military men who were
on the ground in Turkey. They were
in positions to perceive the Turkish
need for more modern military equip-
ment and were able to obtain the con-
currence of the Turkish military au-
thorities as to the training require-
menta of the Turkish land, sea, and
air force.
As a result, their report formed the
basis of the initial Turkish aid pro-
gram. It was admittedly an incomplete
report, and, therefore, it virtually
sponsored an incomplete program--
but it did initiate the military aid
program to Turkey at a time when
prompt action was essential if the
United States hoped to contain com-
munism in the Middle East.
COMMENTS INVITED
The Military Review welcomes your comments on any mate-
rial published. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought
may be published in our Reader Forum and stimulate the ex-
change of ideas. If you are an authority on asubject, why not
write an article for our consideration? If you have only an idea,
query us; perhaps we can assist you in developing an acceptable
article.
June 1870 78
The International Soldier
Ahmed Sheikh
A
NY international military force
established and operated by the
United Nations would require mobility
and technical proficiency of' a fairly
high order. It also, to a certain degree,
would have to be a fighting force ca-
pable of executing coercive power in
a wide variety of situations. In order
to achieve these qualities of sophisti-
cation and versatility, its personnel
would require, at various operating
levels, a universally appealing philo-
sophical doctrine and a high sense of
~ courtesy United Nallons.
corporate identity and morale within
its rank and file.
While the military and technical ex-
perts seem confident that problems
related to complicated logistics and
proficiency in military and technical
mobilization can be readily solved,
.they are not sure of more subtle hu-
man requirements for men who would
compose such a force. A crucial prob-
lem which increasingly will become
the subject of concern for the social
scientist is the question of loyalties
of the international soldiers ..
MilitaJy Review
80
The membership of an international
force. while bebig amenable to inter-
national control by a collective au-
thority, also must have wider ap-
preciation of the nature of its com-
mand .and its relationship with the
nature and character of the force being
commanded. There is a general lack of
literature on the subject of loyalties
of an international soldier. Some
scholars have attempted to deal with
this question, but, unfortunately, the
frequent outcome has been an expan-
sive and s o m w ~ t romantic imagina-
tion, coupled with a general ambiva-
lence toward the whole question of
human loyalties to an international
authority and its causes.
Moral Basis
There is a need to ascertain the
full dimensions of the problem of
loyalty and reliability of soldiers
serving in an international military
force and to develop a conceptual
framework for solving this problem
should the United Nations find itself
in a position to establish an interna-
tional military force in the future.
A basic aspect of a soldier's loyalty
and reliability concerns the moral
basis of command. Broadly speaking,
obedience and compliance to orders
Ahmed Sheikh is an Associate Pro-
f88sor in the Deportment of Political
Science at Marshall University, Hunt-
ington, West Virginia. Born in India,
he is now an American citizen and has
been a permanent resident of the
United States since 1956. He received
an M.A. in Political Science and
Economic Theory from Sacramento
State CoUege and an M.A. and a Ph. D.
in Political Science with concentration
in International Relations from the
University of Oregon. Before accept-
ing his pre8ent position, he was As-
sistant Profe88or at PennB1/lvania.
State University.
June 1970
INTERNADONAL SOLDIER
flow only after a framework of com-
mand has been established and has
created an authority. Command au-
thority is a grant from those who
follow it. Chester I. Barnard points
out that command regarded as a prod-
uct of obedience is' much closer to a
basic truth than obedience conceived
as a product of command.
1
Social and Cultural Base
Another aspect concerns the social
and cultural base of a military organi-
zation's responses. Hoffman Nicker-
son has written, "military institutions
are intimately bound up with the state
of culture which the nation has ob-
tained."2 This social and cultural base
has important bearings on the con-
cept of force loyalty and reliability.
To be loyal and reliable, a military
force must have a unified character-
reflecting a common doctrine and a
certain degree of consensus upon pri-
mary values. To a certain minimal ex-
tent, it also must share the conception
of law and justice of the political
authority responsible for its creation
and its missions.
It is admitted that, in the world
today, there may be numerous, valid
moral and cultural bases for estab-
lishing an effective military force.
However, it is an entirely different
matter to try and find a universally
acceptable ethic of authority and re-
sponsibility wide enough, and yet
specific enough, to accommodate an
international military force. Such an
ethic, if and when agreed upon, will
still have to be translated as a moti-
vating force of practical ideas which
formulate a major condition of estab-
81
1!1DIfATiONAL SOLDIER
lisbing a structure of command and
control.
Thequestionofspecificenvironment
in relation to the loyalties of an in-
ternational soldier is also quite im-
portant. Normally,a soldier should be
conceived of as spen,:ling the major
part of his service in a peaceful en-
vironment' rather than in a hostile
territory. Despite the fact that an
individual soldier may spend thema-
jorpartofhislifeinamilitaryforce,
it can be argued that the so-called
military culture is not enough to di-
vorce him entirely from the main
partsofhisculturewhich isnormally
relatedtoa nationalbase.
frencb foreJp Lellon
It will be possible to assimilate in-
dividuals from alien cultures in a
militaryforce alresdyassociatedwith
a certainculture, buta militaryforce
itself cannot be properly considered
without a strongcultural base and a
well-definedethic.TheFrenchForeign
Legion at times has been cited as a
modelforafutureinternationalforce,
disassociated from its civil French.
cultureandcenteredon itsown exist-
ence, and defined by its own inward
effectiveness, thus becoming a moral
equivalentofa homeland.
This example, however, becomes
invalid when examined closely. The
fact cannot be overemphasized that
the Foreign Legion, as it existed be-
fore the Algerian war. was a French
Foreign Legion. The members were
subject to French indoctrination, au-
thority, andlaw. Theirmissions were
defined by the French Government,
and they used French as their opera-
tional language. Most of the officers
also were French.
Perhaps it is possible to establish
aninternationalforcewithoutencoun-
teringseriousproblemsofloyaltyand
reliability by recruiting its members
from those people who have an un-
questionable zeal for universal pesce.
This is, of course, a faint hope, for
most military experts would argue
that a military force's capabilities
must depend on a fighting elan and
not on a zeal againstfighting.
At least theoretically, an interna-
tional force might be raised through
therecruitmentofmenwhoeitherare
free of any antecedent loyalties and
are moved primarily by an urge to
identify themselves with a "higher"
power such as a UN force or, being
convinced of the superiority of the
UN cause, are desirous of an oppor-
tunity tofight on the "right" side.
Alesserpossibility isthat,through
some rigorous method, of indoctrina-
tion, the men will have been able to
transform their personalities and
overcome their esrlier socialization
process to the point that they would
be willing to fight against their own
countries because the United Nations
has commanded them to do so in the
name of maintaining international
pesceandsecurity.
LOY,allY Conflicts
However, the belief that military
men can be recruited and indoctri-
natedtogive exclusive loyalties toan
international force and its command
is subject todebate. Apart from the
question of whether it is reslly de-
sirable, there is the question of
whether it is possible, especially in
the first few decades of the history
of the international force. The high
command and field command officers
.fortheUN forces arelikelytobeac-
ceptedfromthenationalarmedforces
ofvariousmember nations,and, quite
likely, theywould be representingthe
best of their own national forces.
A scholar whQ bas been concerned
Milltaly Revl.w
82
IIITERNAnONAL SOLDIER
The hlgh eommand and field eommand officers for UN forces represent the best of their
own national foues
with the question of potential con-
flicts of loyalty in the minds of the
soldiers of an international military
force is Henry V. Dicks.
s
He formu-
lates the conditions for high morale
and loyalty as follows:
Belief or faith in the csuse for
which the troops are asked to fight
and die.
o Conviction of personal and group
worth as shown in the esteem accorded
to their forces by the backing popula-
tion and by the high command.
o Confidence in the leadership,
especially at the face-to-face level.
o Good selection-that is, the fit-
ting of personal attitudes to the tech-
nicsl tasks and demands required by
the units' role in battle. This can be
_ J l ~ V. Dlcb, "The In_onal Soldlel'-
A I'B7<bI&trIat. View," In 1.._1ionGI MiIUG",
F...... EdIted by Bloomfield, pp 186-87.
JUDI 1870
held to include a conviction of one's
skill and mastery in the role.
o Confidence in the superiority and
plentiful supply of technicsl equip-
ment such as arms and vehicles.
o Good personal logistic support
-food, billets, welfare, medicine, fuel,
home links, and comforts.
Only when conditions for loyalty
and high morale are enumerated in
the manner Dicks suggests csn the full
meanings of terms such as ''the good
csuse" and "conviction of personal and
group worth" be seen. Many of these
terms until now have been defined to
mean either greater defense of, or for
the greater glory of, the fatherland.
Much of the personal "identity," in
the sense of finding one's worth
through recognition of one's govern-
ment and people, is also tied up with
t,NTERNAnONAL SOLDIER
loyalties to nation-states. If the UN
cause of "maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security" or "serv-
ices to mankind" is to be substituted
in place of national loyalties, this
cause must become a strong motivat-
ing sentiment in comparison with
national patriotism. Perhaps the most
importanf question in combat is how
the UN forces can successfully over-
come national loyalty problems in its
soldiers.
It is likely that an entirely different
picture may emerge "of the problem in
the context of "peacetime" armed
forces, dominated by well-trained and
indoctrinated full-time professional
soldiers who would be"expected to fill
a majority of positions in the inter-
national military force.
Military Profile
There seems to be some consensus
in the relevant literature that the
professional soldiers can be taken to
constitute a kind of transnational
professional group such as doctors and
artists. And as it becomes possible for
doctors and artists to discipline their.
attitudes and talents over a period of
time, so does the professional soldier
diSCipline. himself in the art of com-
bat and other related tendencies.
4
Some scattered research, based upon
various studies of the attitudes of
professional soldiers, indicates that
a fair amount of validity can be given
to the concept frequently u ~ e in the
armed forces-the "military profile."
These studies have revealed a number
of dominant features in the fields' of
self-perception, personality dynamics,
and general motivation which the pro-
fessional soldiers seem to have with a
high degree of constancy -across cul-
tural, racial, and national differences.
3
~ Janowitz. The PHI"""""" Soldl ....
Chapter 2. Free Press of Glencoe. Inc . N. Y. 1960.
"11>Id.. Chapter 2.
In view of this resesrch, it can be
tentatively agreed that, perhaps, most
professional soldiers, despite their
varied backgrounds, are much closer
to their fellow professionals than to
some other subgroups within their
own nations.
If the proposition that a profes-
sional soldier has certain universal
attitudes toward his role and certain
personal values around which his iden-
tity and self-image are built is true,
then, to this extent, the task of creat-
ing an international force becomes at
the human level that of merely en-
listing the loyalties of a sufflcient
number of such soldiers.
In view of the nature of the univer-
sal military code, the transplanting
of loyalties to a new authority might
be essier in the case of military per-
sonnel than with their civilian coun-
terparts in service with the United
Nations. An appropriate image of a
universally appesling cause will be
needed to which the international
soldier could be asked to devote his
faith.
Constabulary Role
Perhaps the only feasible role that
could be assigned to an international
soldier is that of a constabulary, for
it alone imparts to its military leader-
ship a feeling of guardianship of law
and order on behalf of all the peoples.
Thus, the only legitimate area in
which the international force would
be able to pride itself would be in
the successful maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.
It would be desirable for the United
Nations to give, at lesst in the early
years of the force, the top military
jobs to soldiers of smaller nations
which do not aspire to dominate the
world. This will help the soldier in
the rank and file, not only in his role
MIlIta/J RaYle.
perception, but also in close identi-
fication with it, for he too is expected
to be from the smaller nations. It also
would be desirable that all UN mili-
tary personnel be committed directly
to the United Nations and not simply
transferred by national forces for
international force duty for a specified
period of time.
Once the force is established and op-
erational, the major problem will be in
the area of continued conservation of
the loyalties of the international sol-
diers. This particular problem can be
examined from five different dimen-
sions which will be instrumental in
keeping an international soldier loyal
to the international force. These are:
a good cause, a need for sense of per-
sonal worth, face-to-face leadership,
international soldiers' welfare, and
UN symbolism and ceremony.
The Good Cause
It is always important in any armed
force that the officers and men con-
stantly be reminded of their noble mis-
sion and important role. This will
be even more important in an interna-
tional force where the goals of the
force may not always be understood
and acceptable to all of its members.
In a disarming world, the soldiers of
an international force are likely to be
personaIly on the defensive in justify-
ing their role as armed men and im-
parting the conviction that they are
respected as the upholders of inter-
national peace rather than accepted
as an archaic elite.
It also has been suggested that,
especially in peacetime, there exists
an inner conflict of identity among
most soldiers, and this conflict is
enhanced by certain poorly perceived
insight of the average man's revolt
from authority figures, and of his
own identification with, or submis-
June 1970
INTERNADONAL SOLDIER
sion to, the paternal superego. This
frequently results in a sense of guilt
for being on the side of the authority.
A SenBe of Perso1Ull Worth
The second important faetor, a sense
of personal worth, is crucial in per-
petuating a high morale among the
members of any international mili.
tary force in a largely civilian world.
It is generally agreed by all military
men that, in order to achieve military
cohesion, an armed force always needs
a feeling of forming a special corps
d'elite. This would mean that at least
a semisegregation of the international
military community would have to be
maintained anywhere in the world the
force happened to be stationed if the
boundaries of their ingroup mores and
loyalties are to be maintained intact.
A certain amount of feeling of am-
bivalence toward the international
force on the part of the world com-
munity is unavoidable. Therefore, if
the force is to be spread out in various
parts of the world, stationed in the
midst of civilian populations, extra-
ordinary efforts will be required to
cultivate good public relations between
the members of the force and the peo-
ple of the host states. The force will
have to strive for a balance in its
relationship with the natives between
being entirely exclusive and self-con-
tained on one hand and being exces-
sively friendly and paternalistic on
the other.
The following measures have been
suggested in order to achieve an ideal
balance between the two extremes of
relationship with the local popUlation:
The force should possess good
liaison officers, including experts in
the culture patterns of the area.
The force should be an economic
advantage to the area in which it is
located by purchasing supplies locally
85
INTERNATIONAL SOLDIER
I
when possible and utilizing local lei-
sure facilities.
The manpower and technical re-
sources of the force should be made
available for the benefit of the area.
Engineers could he employed for
draInage, and bridge and road con-
struction, while medical and educa-
tional staffs would be available to
treat, train, and educate underde-
veloped populations and upgrade their
local services.
8
If these recommendations were to
be followed, the image of a fotce that
emerges out of this would be a force,
not merely a symbol of benevolent
authority and a guardian of peace,
but also would represent a type of
UN technical aid corps in peacetime.
Conceivably; there can be some
liabilities to the force. Can this type
of relationship be cultivated without
either side becoming too dependent
upon the other, espll(lially at the ex-
pense of self-respect of one of the
parties? What would be the conse-
quences of a close identification be-
tween the UN soldiers and the sur-
rounding population if it became nec-
essary for the force to use ita energies'
against this population or the country
in a con1lict situation? It is likely that
the international soldier will be under
some degree of strain from a purely
economic point of view since he would
represent a higher standard of living
and thus be the target of envy and
jealousy.
Ftu:e-to-Ftu:e Lemler.hi"
Some of the dynamic forces which
provide strong bonds among group
members are not mainly the common
task they share, but, rather, a sense
of identification with, and loyalty to,
the leader wbo, in tum, also creates
strong bonds among the members in
"". cit.. p 146.
88
general. This shared loyalty to the
leader and close identification with
his person are more frequently notice-
able in military groups where face-to-
face leadership assumes paramount
Uftieed Notiou
The morale and loyalty of an international
military foree soldier are enhanced by a
plentiful supply of superior military arms
importance, especially under combat
conditions.
Perhaps the most appropriate level
within a military organization for
the purpose Qf creating an image of
the trustworthy leader would be either
a platoon or a company commander.
This image could be instrumental in
various recruitmel)t drives in coun-
tries where the United Nations
chooses to accept volunteers. The
other figures who can effectively in-
lIuence the morale of the soldiers
would be unit senior noncommissioned
officers and medical 'officers who could
be recruited and promoted on a highly
selective basis.
MIlIfIIJ Review
Once the recruitment has taken
place, the UN high cOmJllll.nd could em-
bark on a highly sophisticated educa-
tional progrl1-m. It could give social
and political training in those uni-
versal values which the force exists to
uphold and defend, and could impart
those attitudes and beliefs which will
help the members get along with each
other and with the civilian population,
regardless of the fact that UN action
against them is being contemplated
or is in the process. The education
process can be facilitated by UN
seminars on various aspects of human
relationships.
WeUllre
The welfare aspect of morale build-
ing is highly significant for the pur-
poses of UN forces. It frequently was
neglected in past operations, largely
because of a general lack of organiza-
tion due to the nature of emergencies.
The general welfare of the soldiers
would include such things as housing
facilities, food arrangements, mail and
medical services, and provisions for
constructive leisure. Constructive lei-
sure would include educating and pre-
paring the soldier for reentry into
his own or any other culture and coun-
try after he has fulfilled his contract
with the UN force.
This aspect of morale building could
be the responsibility of well-organized
liaison officers set up by the UN high
command in various parts of the
world. These officers could integrate
and supplement their social services
with those offered by member states
to their own armed services.
SgmbDllsm mul Cerenumu
The United Nations needs to pro-
vide a sense of pride in, and a sense
of belonging to, the international force
among its soldiers. To that extent,
the importance of nonrational sym-
JUDI 1970
INlEIIllAlIONAL SOLDIER
bolism in creating a self-image of
worth and group illusion in the mind
of the international be
underestimated.
Such nonrational symbols would in-
clude the special design of uniforms.
fiags. and badges, and various -public
ceremonies and parades on special oc-
casions such as UN Day. and various
anniversaries of significant events
related to the United Nations and the
international community at lsrge. An
elaborate system of awards and merits
also could be instituted for various
types of distinctions which the force
may hold as valuable.
Blended Force
In determining the composition of
the force. an attempt must be made
to weigh the advantages which a UN
force may derive by recruitment of
soldiers on the basis of ethnic units
(the Gurkha model) or random indi-
vidual recruitment (the Foreign Le-
gion model) from the point of view of
loyalty to tlJ.e force. The most im-
portant level of concern would be the
basic unit of group affiliation at which
the soldiers can identify each other
at a face-to-face level such as an in-
fantry company of 200 men. a crew of
a small warship. or an air squadron.
Of course. larger formations in any
true international force will have to
be constructed of internationally com-
posed
There is no doubt that, in any inter-
national force, problems of language
and communication will exist in vary-
ing degrees at different levels. There
will be further problems caused by
differences in various ethnic and cul-
tural patterns as refiected in religious
and dietary customs and in the at-
titude toward authority.
The impact of technology. a general
trend toward mechanization. and sec-
87
INTERNATIONAL SOLDIER
utarlzatlon have tended to soften some
of these differences. However, prog-
ress has been slow, and any attempt
to alleviate the differences by too
restricted a selection of soldiers in
the hope of dodging "cultural clashes"
or other possible communication prob-
lems may result in a "Western,"
"Asian," or "African,r force and thus
impair its" chances of being accepted
as a truly international force.
HODlogeneous Units
Perhaps the greatest advantage of
constructing smaller military units
where a face-to-face relationship is
possible on an ethnic and national
basis is that men with the same back-
ground can communicate with each
other easily and will have the same
type of food, recreation, and other wel-
fare elements necessary for building
high morale. The information available
to prospective recruits that they shall
be put together with people of their
own baCkground will also facilitate
recruitment by encouraging quantita-
tively more people to join the force.
At these unit levels, many of the
logistics and other problems will be
more adequately handled. People from
different parts of the world are used
to different authority patterns. The
same patterns could be preserved. It
will be possible to cater to them ac-
cording to their diet preferences and
provide them time and facilities for
the observances of their religion and
other customs.
However, for the purposes of cohe-
siveness, communication,. and com-
mand, it will be necessary for their
unit commanders and other commis-
sioned officers to know at least one
of the two or three compulsory lan-
guages which the United Nations may
choose as the official language for the
force.
Under this model, the problems aris-
ing from a close national and cultural
identity might still be lessened
through a determined educational ef-
fort to provide these units a high
sense of the UN force's mission as a
whole and a faith in its "good" cause.
It also will be possible to channel the
national loyalties within these units
and the national rivalries among them
into constructive and meaningful in-
terunit competitions for merit and
recognition on a host of activities.
These could range from sports to mili-
tary efficiency and effectiveness in
combat situations, to various types of
help and services rendered to the
civilian populations of the host states
in peacetime.
"BuddyRelationship"
Since the composition of each unit
in this model will by and large repre-
sent a specific country, a unit can be
easily withdrawn from a particular
operation against the country of that
unit. Perhaps one of the major dis-
advantages of this model is that the
effective process of integration and
''buddy-relationship'' will be largely
curtailed beyond the unit level. Under
combat stress, there might develop
an' interunit hostility and lack of
reliance because of lack of communi-
cation.
At a higher level of UN command,
these ethnic units will present still
other problems. By the fact that the
units will be culturally and nationally
oriented, they will tend to consolidate
and project upward typically specific
and relatively solid political and ethnic
attitudes and beliefs which are bound
"to influence the individual officers and
commanders of the high command.
It should not be forgotten that the
UN high command is supposed to be
thoroughly integrat.ed and nonpoliti-
MUltaJy Review 88
INltRNAnONAL SOLDIER
cally motivated. As a result, the non-
political t r ~ t u r e and role of the force
and its other higher objectives may be
jeopardized.
The alternative to the formation
of units on an ethnic basis is to re-
cruit Ihlxed units on the Foreign Le-
gion model. Conceivably, with the
lected from various parts of the world
in mixed units would require a great
deal from the high command, as well
as from these soldiers. To put it more
explicitly, in order for any military
unit to maintain its effectiveness and
cohesiveness under combat stress, its
members must have certain minimal
It is good public relations for au international force to assist local civilisns through a
sharing of medical facilities
initial establishment and subsequent
development of the international force,
there will be a reduction in the number
of national armed forces. This may
well mean that many nationally re-
leased officers and men would offer
their services to the UN force and
thus provide a ready nucleus for the
force. Their motives for volunteering
their services on an individual basis
may range anywhere from good pay
and other tangible benefits to pros-
pects of travel and adventure, to a
strong feeling of international ideal-
ism.
The placement of these people se-
June 1970
cultural capability and homogeneity.
These attributes would require train-
ing in a common language and crea-
tion of a climate of some tradition-
shared attitudes and beliefs for the
purposes of identification.
By way of comparison between the
two models, it seems more appropriate
and reasonable to conclude that the
structure of a UN force at the unit
level, in its initial stages of develop-
ment, stands to gain more if the ethnic
model were to be used. This, of course,
does not mean that some units on the
mixed individual's model could not
be established on an experimental
89
INTERNAnONAL SOLDIER
Such experiments are extremely
important. Some day, a mixed-unit
UN force may be able to produce the
men of the future who wou-ld regard
the entire world as their home and
thus may prove to be the catalyst in
changing or modifying the parochial
views of their countrymen once they
return home. '
One of the most persistent and pain-
ful problems is that of conflicting
ideologies which the international sol-
diers will bring to the force and their
effects on a number of related matters
such as of force identity, its cohesive-
ness, and the general problem of
morale and military discipline. If the
force is to function effectively and im-
partially, and, if it is expected to gain
the support of all member states, it
will have to acquire a posture of being
nonpolitical, and largely technical and
professional.
It is reasonable to assume that unit
life within the forces-along with an
intensive, as well as extensive, pro-
gram of training and education-
would help create identity of purpose
and solidarity at the expense of some
parochial values among the soldiers.
However, the problem of deep-seated
nationalistic beliefs and attitudes,
reinforced by ideological predisposi-
tion will not simply disappear.
Professional soldiers and sincere
volunteers might join the force pre-
cisely because of their rejection of
narrow nationalism or the predisposi-
tion to international Even
among the best of these, however,
there is a possibility of resurgence
of deep nationalistic feelings should
they happen to clash with other sol-
diers who might denigrate their coun-
try.
Perhaps one way the force could
handle this problem would be to chan-
nel such conflicts into meaningful ar-
guments and debates. These debates
and discussions could be institution-
alized by making them a part of regu-
lar educational programs. But at the
same time, it should be recognized
that the political realities of the con-
temporary international politics sug-
gest that great power rivalries and
alignments, along with various con-
flicting ideological orientations, will
continue to play a significant role in
the ideological orientations of a UN
force soldier, even if he is recruited
entirely from smaller states.
In conjunction with this, it can be
further added that tne force, while
reserving the right to terminate any-
one's service, should take special pains
to see to it that an attitude of respect
and understanding of' conflicting ide-
ologies is inculcated among its sol-
diers. If there are occasions where
disciplinary action against an indi-
vidual is needed, it should be based
upon his behavior and not on his
vie:ws.
While the problems are formidable,
it is possible to argue that the United
Nations would be able to have an in-
ternational fo,,"ce organized and unified
around a well-trained professional
high command which is thoroughly
educated in the international norms
conducive to the philosophy of the
United Nations and the purposes of
its military force.
Military Review 90
Beyond
LT
P
ERHAPS the most important
diplomatic negotiations ever un-
dertaken by our Government since
the American Republics gained their
independence in 1783 commenced in
Helsinki, Finland, on 17 November
1969. Known under the acronym
SALT, for Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks, these negotiations, -continued
in Vienna, are designed to explore
ways for controlling the strategic
arms race between the United States
and the Soviet Union.
The possibility that a United States-
Soviet arms control agreement may
materialize as a result of the SALT
negotiations is heartening. Such an
June 1970
Dennis
agreement would fulfill sincere US
hopes for an early end to the nuclear
arms race. It also would respond to
the worldwide demand for more arms
control, as evidenced by the United
Nations General Assembly Resolution
of 1968 and Article VI of the Treaty
on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.
It is too early to predict the out-
come of the SALT negotiations. By
all indications, the United States and
the Soviet Union achieved a favorable
climate in Helsinki. Subsequent nego-
tiations may lead to agreement on a
number of arms control measures;
perhaps the termination of antibal-
91
SALT
llstic missile systems deployment in
the United States and the Soviet
Union; the suspension, of further
testing by both sides of interconti-
nental ballistic missile weapons in
Multiple Independently Targeted Re-
entry Vehicle (MIRV) configurations;
and the stabilization of the United
States and Soviet offensive strategic
systems at their present levels.
However, even if these agreements
should materialize, they would far
from solve all of the world's nuclear
ills. It is necessary to look beyond
SALT for other measures whose suc-
cessful negotiation and adoption
could bring about the lessening of
nuclear tensions.
Soviet Proposal
One possible measure would outlaw
the use of nuclear weapons without
actually eliminating the 'existing nu-
clear arsenals of the great powers.
This is not a novel idea, but one which
repeatedly has been proposed by the
Soviet Union. However, our Govern-
ment does not support the Soviet pro-
posal-and rightly so. In the US
view, nuclear war cannot be outlawed
by the simple expedient of an agree:
ment. Adoption, therefore, of the
Soviet proposal would provide the
world with a false sense of security
while actually increasing the danger
of nuclear war by banning the only
positive contribution of nuclear weap-
ons-their role as instruments of de-
terrence.
In terms of its potential value to
mankind, an Urban, Trllllty appears
Dennis M enos has been a Depart-
ment of Defense employee since 1947.
He holds an M.A. in International
Relations from the GeO'1'getown Uni-
versity Graduate School in Washing-
ton, D. C., and is a 1967 graduate of
the US Army War CoUege.
to hold the best promise for lowering
the nuclear tensions of the world.
Such a treaty would ease the uncer-
tainty concerning the fate of urban
areas in the event of nuclear war, and
would end the role of urban areas as
the hostages of the nuclear age.
Worldwide acceptance of the treaty
could save, at some future date, up to
200 million people from nuclear anni-
hilation.
Second.strike Missions
The urgency for an Urban Treaty
is obvious. Despite the arms control
measures agreed to, and the agree-
ments to be negotiated, the arsenals
of the world's nuclear. powers have
never been at higher levels. Worse
yet, there has been l. proliferation on
both sides of countercity weapons and
of other weapon systems especially
designed for second-strike missions.
The latter will most likely also strike
at urban areas.
In the last two l'ears alone, the
world has witnessed the development
and testing of the SoViet Fractional
Orbital Bombardment System; the
continued deployment 'of the S8-9 and
88-11 in alarming numbers; the
flight testing of multiple reentry ve-
hicle payloads; and the accelerated
production of Soviet missile-firing
submarines. On our side, during the
same period. we have decided on an
antiballistic missile system and have
flight-tested the Minute71U1,n III and
Poseidon missiles in Multiple Inde-
pendently Targeted Reentry Vehicle
configurations.
Granted that, at the present time,
a general war fought between the nu-
clear powers of the world as a rational
instrument of policy is highly un-
likely, the possibility still exists that
a general war could escalate from a
nuclear accident or be started in des-
MllitaJy Review 92
SALT
peration by a nation believing that
its national' survival is at stake. In
any such war, urban areas will be
principal targets. This belief is sup-
ported by three factors:
Urban areas are the centers of
government, industry, transportation,
arations, and warning time available
-their concensus is that tens of mil-
lions of Americans would die from
direct weapons effects and radioactive
fallout. A recent official estimate, for
example, predicts fatalities of 160
million Americans should the Soviets
and commerce, and as such represent undertake a massive nuclear
Vladimir S. Semyonov, left, headed the Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks in Helsinki while his US couuterpart was Gerard C. Smith
the backbone of a nation's strength.
They are easy targets to locate
and destroy.
Under present technology, and
barring spectacular breakthroughs in
defensive systems, urban areas cannot
be defended against a massive inter-
continental ballistic missile and
bomber attack.
Throughout the past years, many
studies have been prepared by our
Government on the anticipated de-
struction to US urban areas in the
event of nuclear war. Although the
conclusions of these studies differ
widely depending upon the assump-
tions made-such as the number of
warheads involved, civil defense prep-
June 1970
attack against our military and civil-
ian centers.
The proposed Urban Treaty would
provide that, "under no circumstances
and at no time will the Signatories to
the agreement use nuclear weapons
against the urban areas of another
Nation." As evidence of good faith,
the signatory powers would agree to
refrain from positioning, within a 60-
mile radius of their urban areas, of-
fensive and defensive strategic forces
with nuclear capabilities, as well as
industrial facilities engaged in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons and
their delivery vehicles.
Urban areas would be defined under
the agreement as any built-up area
SALT
Jith a population of over 50,000, and
suitable maps would be published by
the United Nations portraying the
world areas classified as "urban"
under this definition.
Critics of the proposed Urban
Treaty, undoubtedly, will argue that
the basic provisions of the treaty
simply would not hold, in an actual
situation, when one or more urban
areas of a nation have been violated
by.a nuclear power, either by design
strategic forces anywhere within a
50-mile radius of the urban area. Such
a strike would leave the attacked na-
tion with its offensive nuclear forces
intact to strike in retaliation. On the
other band, shOUld a nuclear strike
occur against an urban area by acci-
dent. the existence of the Urban
Treaty, and, hopefully. the ''hot-line''
agreement, could avert nuclear holo-
caust.
The proposed treaty does not re-
Jane'. AU the Wot'Zt:re A'"C?'a!t.
The Soviet 88-9, being deployed in increasing numbers, is also the launch vehicle for
the Fractional Orbital Bombardment Syatem
or by accident. It is true that the
treaty do!!s not distinguish between
a first strike against an urban area
or a retaliatory strike. Both are con-
sidered illegal. It is for this reason
that the treaty carries a credibility
clause requiring the signatory powers
to refrain from positioning. within a
50-mile radius of their urban areas.
offensive and defensive. strategic
forces with nuclear capabilities and
their associated nuclear warmaking
facilities.
A nuclear power simply would
have no incentive to strike intention-
ally at one or more urban areas of an
opponent if there were no offensive
quire any special verification proce-
dures. Existing intelligence systems
could easily offer the means for es-
tablishing credibility on the part of
the signatories. Thus. if a nuclear
power intends to comply with the
provisions of the treaty. it would
cease the deployment of all urban
area defense systems as concrete evi-
dence that it does not intend to strike
at an opponent's urban areas in the
event of war. and, therefore. is not
fearful of retaliation against its
cities.
In compliance with the credibility
clause of the agreement. a nation
would redeploy all its industrial plants
Milltal)' Review 94
with a nuclear warmaking potential
and strategic offel1llive forces away
from urban areas. This would remove
from its potential adversaries the in-
centive, and, indeed, the rationale,
for striking at its urban areas.
False Implication
By implication, the proposed Urban
Treaty would allow urban areas, with
populations of less than 50,000, to be-
come the victims of a nuclear war.
This is not the case. The reason for
excluding from the provisions of the
treaty all urban areas under 50,000
population is to strengthen the credi-
bility prOVisions of the treaty. It would
be difficult to police these provisions
in the case of small urban areas.
What may be a small urban area
in one country may be considered
rural in anotlier, and vice versa. Also,
the vast majority of urban areas of
the world, with populations of under
50,000, are not important enough to
be considered nuclear targets. A nu-
clear power would have no incentive
to strike at such small urban areas
with nuclear weapons except for the
purpose of destroying their civilian
populations. In this age, when both
the United States and the Soviet
Union possess actual and credible
second-strike capabilities, such strikes
would be sheer folly and, therefore,
are unlikely to occur.
Adoption of the Urban Treaty
would in no way degrade the over-all
military posture of the United States
although the treaty would affect the
US strategic concepts of deterrence,
assured destruction, and flexible re-
sponse.
With respect to deterrence, the
proposed Urban Treaty would weaken
somewhat the future US reliance on
nuclear weapons as instruments of
deterrence. If nuclear weapons can-
June 1970
SALT
not be used to threaten the destruc-
tion of an opponent's urban areas,
then, obviouslY, the usefulness of
these weapons for purposes of deter-
rence will have been lessened.
Some may argue that this would
have a destabilizing effect in the
world since a potential aggressor na-
tion need no longer be concerned with
US nuclear retaliation agail1llt its
urban areas. This view is only partially
right. So long as nuclear weapons
exist in the US arsenal, they will con-
tinue to serve as effective instruments
of deterrence. Each nation contains
numerous targets, other than urban
areas, such as naval bases, military
airfields, economic targets, and mili-
tary posts. The threat of the destruc-
tion of these targets will act as much
as a deterrent on a potential aggres-
sor as would the threat of the destruc-
tion of his urban areas.
"Assured Destruction"
Adoption of the Urban Treaty prob-
ably will nullify "assured destruc-
tion" as a US strategic concept.
Neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union could ever effect the
"assured destruction" of the other
without striking at each other's ur-
ban areas. Yet each still would be in
a position to punish the other severely
--could even cause millions in fatali-
ties through the skillful use of wind
patterns and associated fallout-but
never would cause the end of the other
as a viable society.
Since the purpose of the assured
destruction concept is for a nuclear
nation to deter another nuclear na-
tion, retention by both the United
Ststes and the Soviet Union of the
capability to punish each other se-
verely will continue to act as an effec-
tive deterrent as heretofore.
There could yet be another change
95
SALT
i ~ US strategic concepts as a result
of the adoption of the proposed Urban
Treaty. Under its present declared
strategy of flexible response. the
United States is retaining the option
of striking first with thermonuclear
weapons against an enemy-theoret-
ically even against his urban areas.
Adoption of the Urban Treaty will
remove the latter option.
It is extremely doubtful that the
United States would ever exercise
such an option, considering its ethi-
cal values and the fact that the other
side has the capability of mounting
3n equal. or even more severe retalia-
tory. attack against US urban centers.
Elimination of this option will not
weaken the US national defense pos-
ture. Apart from humanitarian con-
siderations, adoption of the treaty
would wisely recognize the fact that
urban areas themselves are not im-
portant to victory. once a general war
has been initiated. and that their de-
struction would serve no useful pur-
pose in terms of achieving victory.
Soviet Reaction
There are few hard facts available
upon which the Soviet reaction to the'
Urban Treaty can be estimated.
Historically. Soviet military authors
have mailltained the view that a nu-
clear war between the world's major
powers will be a total war with the
destruction of military and civilian
targets being a logical consequence.
In all of their writings. these authors
supported a countercity strategy and
refused to discriminate between urban
and nonurban nuclear targets.
Consistent with this position. the
Soviets have. in past years, repudiated
counterforce as a nuclear strategy.
This strategy conceives a general
thermonuclear war between opposing
nuclear forces striking at each other.
not at their urban areas. In their
writings. the Soviets have indicated
that counterforce is not consistent
with their national interests. The
strategy would preserve the US eco-
nomic lead and would allow the United
States to win any nuclear contlict on
> ~ ., \
", ~
De/6MB Induat", Bulletin
The POBeidon missile has I\een flight
tested in Multiple Independently Targeted
Reentry Vehicle configurations
the basis of its superior number of
strategic offensive weapons.
In 1962. the Soviets also rejected
. a suggestion in a speech by the US
Secretary of Defense that the par-
ticipants to a nuclear exchange make
every effort to spare urban areas
from the ravages of nuclear war. In
Militaly Review
98
SALT
their response, the Soviets adhered to
their countercity strategy, again re-
fusing to differentiate between urban
and nonurban targets in the event of
a nuclear war.
Forttlnately, these ominous Soviet
positions do not necessarily reflect
the present Soviet views. They were
representative of an era long since
gone during which the United States
maintained a vast nuclear superiority
over the Soviet Union. Soviet anxie-
ties were manifested in a number of
ways, including their uncompromising
reliance on "countercity" as a basic
nuclear doctrine.
It would be presumptuous to predict
an outright acceptance of an Urban
Treaty by the Soviet Union. A favor-
able response, however, should not be
ruled out, considering the newly
gained status of the Soviet Union as
a nuclear power and the recent acqui-
sition on the part of the Soviet Union
of an actual and credible second-strike
capability vis-a-vis the United States.
A positive Soviet response, further-
more, would provide evidence of Soviet
maturity as a nuclear power and
recognition that, in this day and age,
city destruction would be an act of
total absurdity.
We hope that the coming year will bring evidence that the Soviets have
decided to seek a durable peace rather than contiuue along the roads of the
past.
It will not be the sincerity or purpose of the Soviet leadership that will
be at issue. The tensions between us are not generated by personal misunder-
stsndings, and neither side does anyone a service by so suggesting. Peace does
not come simply with stotesmeu's smiles. At issue are basic questions of long
conflicting purposes in a world where no one's interests are furthered by
conflict. Only a straightforward recognition of that reality-and an equally
direet effort to deal with it-will bring us to the genuine cooperation which
we seek and which the peace of the world requires.
President Richard M. Nixon
JUDD 1970
97
MILITARY
NOTES
UNITED STATES
Flying Ambulances Planned
The Department of Defense has
joined with the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare and other
Federal agencies to form a commit-
tee to study means of providing heli-
copter ambulances for highway ac-
cident victims.
Approximately 56,000 people were
killed and two million injured on
highways last year. In remote and
rural areas, the death rate is four
times greater than in urban areas be-
cause of delay in administering emer-
gency medical treatment and trans-
Ann-II" New8 FeOCU'l"68
Medical evacuation helicopters for high.
way sccident victims are being studied
porting victims to medical facilities.
According to one authority, at least
25 percent of the 170,000 who suffered
permanent disability in highway ac-
cidents could have escaped disability
if they had had proper care shortly
after their accidents.-Army News
Features.
Floating Stretcher
A new floating stretcher capable of
ferrying supplies or injured troops
Annu News FeatureB
across swamp areas, delta country, or
inland waterways is being developed
by the
Light and compact, the inflatable
stretcher is designed to be strong
enough to resist puncture damage and
be suitable for airborne and uncon-
ventional operations in, mountain,
arctic, and jungle regions. 1
Three methods of inflatibn will be
possible: expendable gas Icartridge,
hand pump, or soldier lung power.-
Army News Features.
The MlLrrARY RBVIEW &lid the U. S.
Arm,. Command and Genenl SidCoUeee a-
lame no raponalhUlty for aeeuney of lIlfor-
....tI.n eontalned In the MILITARY NOTES

dorsement of the ne.... oplnlO11l, or f.etaal
statements Is intended_The Editor.
Military Revle.
98
MIUTARY NOTES
Heat Resistance for Bombs
The Naval Ordnance Laboratory
has developed a way to lengthen "cook-
off" time from 90 seconds to five min-
utes for bombs involved in fire-pro-
ducing "accidents.
It was 90 seconds after fire broke
out on the aircraft carrier USS For-
restal in 1967 .that a bomb exploded
killing many of the firefighters. Had
more firefighting time been available
before the bomb "cooked" enough to
go off, much of the damage and injury
could have undoubtedly heen avoided.
After more than a year of studies
and experiments, Navy engineers have
devised a combination of internal and
external coats of insulators that
should reduce chances of explosion
during a shipboard fire. Experiments
show that even the thinnest-walled
bombs could withstand heat from
burning jet fuel at least five minutes
before exploding.-NAVNEWS.
Coast Guard Tests Oil Slick Bladder
The US Coast Guard is testing an
airborne pollution control system tbJ!,t
can be flown quickly to the scene of a
potential oil pollution incident.
The system uses collapsible, inflat-
able, rubber-coated bladders, each ca-
pable of transporting 140,000 gallons
of oil from a distressed tanker. In a
collapsed state, the bladders are about
the size of small automobiles.
After the equipment loads have
been dropped by Coast Guard fixed-
wing aircraft close to a stricken
tanker, a Coast Guard helicopter
moves in to assist in on-board delivery
of the pump and prime mover. A
Coast Guard salvage team then as-
sembles the components necessary to
transfer oil into the bladders for
temporary storage. Finally, the oil-
filled bladders are towed by Coast
Guard cutters to safe anchorage for
later disposal.-DOD release.
Newest Sniper Weapon
The M14 national match rifle has been modified by the US Army Weapons
Command into a sniper rifle. Designated the XM21, it weighs 11 pounds with
a fully loaded magazine. A variable power (3X to 9X) telescope features
adjustable focus, power adjustment, and "zero" which adjusts as power
changes are made. Highly accurate, the weapon has average extreme spread
for three consecutive 10-shot groups of not more than six inches at 300
meters firing 7.62-millimeter NATO match grade ammunition.-News item.
June 1970
89
MILITARY NOltS
)
Portable PUrifier
A water purifieation plant, mounted
on the Army's :1;2-ton platform truck
(mule), is driven over rough terrain
during testing. The airmobile plant,
which weighs. less than 1,000 pounds,
can purify 420 galIons of water per
hour. It was designed to meet a need
for a purifier that could be trans-
ported in the cargo compartment of a
helicopter.-Army News Features.
War Games Facility
The Army has opened a new war
gaming facility at the Institute of
Land Combat in Alexandria, Virginia.
The facility will be used to wage,'
photograph, and analyze simulated
battle situations.
The facility has three game rooms,
one each for a friendly army, an ag-
gressor army, and a team of control-
lers. Dominating the rooms are five
large projector screens ("glass bat-
tlefields")
A battle situation can lie depicted
on any of the eight by lO-foot glass
panels. A monorail track supports each
panel which allows the battle scene to
be trolleyed from its gaming room to
a photographic station. Here, a record
is made of a particular moment of
battle for later analysis.-Army News
Features.
Logistics CSSC Course Studied
The Department of the Army is
studying proposals for separate com-
mand and general staff college (CGSC)
courses in such fields as quarter-
master, ordnance, and transportstion
for Reserve and National Guard offi
cers.
The proposals are included in are
view of officer military schooling
which would reinstate associate
courses at the CGSC and branch ad
vanced career courses.
Associate courses were dropped in
1966 following a review of Army offi-
cer schools by the Haines Board.-
The Officer, 1970.
New Patrol Gunboats
The USS Defiance (PG-95) is one
of 10 highspeed, 165-foot gunboats
recently completed for-the NavY. Con
structed almost entirely of aluminum
and fiberglass, the boats are manned
by a crew of four officers and 24 en
listed men.
The 250ton vessels have a propul
sion system consisting of two 750-
horsepower diesel engines for normal
cruising, and a 14,000horl!epower gas
turbine engine, with a maximum
speed of 40 knots. They are armed
with a single 3-inch, 50-caliber, rapid
fire gun, one 40millimeter gun, and
four .50-caliber machineguns in twin
mounts.-US Naval Institute Proceed-
ings, 1970.
MIlHarr Revle. 100
MILITARY NOTES
AHemate Army Gunsblp
Armed Foretsll Joumcl
Profile views of the AH-3 attack helicopter proposed as an alternate gunship for the
Army
The Army is evaluating an industry proposal for an off-the-shelf armed gun-
ship as a possible replacement for the Cheyenne Advanced Aerial Fire Support
System (AAFSS).
The proposal calls for using the dynamic components of the Navy's SH-9
with a new fuselage. Designated the AH-9, the aircraft would meet the Army's
basic AAFSS requirements except for certain speed and load factors. As outlined,
the AH-9 would be able to dive at 200 knots and cruise at 172 knots with arma-
ment.
It would be able to carry a varied payload, including the XM-#O SO-milli-
meter (2,OOO-round capability), the XM-fJ6 airborne TOW missile system (six
to 18 missiles), or the XM-159 2.75-inch rocket launcher (114 rockets).-Armed
Force8 Journal.
Missile Detector SateliHe
According to news reports, the De-
partment of Defense has requested
funds to complete development and
deployment within the next few years
of an infrared sensor satellite system.
The system would be capable of pro-
viding early detection of any inter-
continental ballistic missile launching,
including the low-trajectory Frac-
tional Orbital Bombardment System
weapons and submarine-launched mis-
siles.-News item.
Improved Aerial Gun System
The Air Force has requested pro-
posals for a follow-on development of
the GAU-7/A improved aerial gun
system.
The GAU-7/A is a high-rate-of-tire,
high-velocity, 25-miIlimeter cannon
using caseless ammunition. If ap-
proved for production, the new can-
non system will replace the M61 Vul-
can cannon in the projected F-15 air
superiority tighter.-US Air Force
release.
luna 1870 101
MILITARY NOYES
OilCarrying Submarine
Getleml Dun4mics
Artist's concept of submarine tanker
A US firm has offered to build six huge submarines capable of carrying
oil through the Northwest Passage. The proposal envisions nuclear-powered
submarine tankers to move Alaskan oil under the ice and into North Atlantic
ports for transfer to conventional tankers and delivery to east coast destinations.
Capable of carrying 170,000 tons of oil in a rectangularshaped hulI, the
submarines would be 900 feet long, with a beam of 140 feet, and a hulI depth
of 85 feet. Twin screws would give a speed of 18 Imots.-News release.
Base Closings for Economy
The Department of Defense has'
approved 371 actions to consolidate,
reduce, realign, or close instalIations
and activities in the United States,
Puerto Rico, and overseas.
When the 371 actions are completed,
the annual reduction of Department
of Defense expenditures will be more
than 914 million dollars. About 93,900
positions-35,300 military and 58,600
civilians-wm be affected.
Many of the 371 actionS are the ,re-
sult of congressionalIy approved re-
ductions of more than four billion
dolIars in the budget for Fiscal Year
1970. Others are necessary because of
further cuts in the Fiscal Year 1971
budgetary plan.-DOD rel\!8se.
Worldwide AUYOVON system
The last five of 17 overseas elec-
tronic switching centers for automatic
voice network (AUTOVON) have been
completed. The centers are at Coltano,
Italy; Athens, Greece; Fuchu, Japan;
Grass Mountain, Taiwan; and Fu-
tema, Okinawa. AlI are interconnected
with the worldwide netwoJ'k.
AUTOVON now provides the De-
partment of Defense the capability
for handling both voice and graphic
communications on an automaticalIy
switched basis. The global system
includes 17 overseas switching cen-
ters; 53 centers in the contiguous
United States; and nine centers in
Canada, linking 2,000 military faciIi-
ties.-DOD release.
Milill/Y Review 102
MILITARY NOTES
ANGOLA
Major Attack liy Guerrillas
The Portuguese military command
in Angola has reported a major at-
tack by guerrillas of the Popular
MovemE!nt for the Liberation of An-
gola inthesouthern a ~ o m b o district
near the frontier with Zambia.
The command reported "many"
Portuguese casualties in the attack
which occurred in late March. The
report said that the attack was
launched from across the border in
Zambia and that Zambian border
guards watched the incident. Itsaid
that the attackers used mortar and
automaticweapons fire in theassault.
Portugal has been fighting the na-
tionalist insurgents in Angola since
a revolt in northern Angola in 1961.
Although that revolt failed, guerrilla
activity spread to other areas of the
territory which has a population of
5.3million-90-percentblackAfricans
-scatteredover481,000 squaremiles.
.Itis estimated that Portugal now
has 50,000 soldiers in the territory
to fight the guerrillas which include
members of the Union of Angolan
Peoples, as well as the Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola.-
News item.
MALAYSIA
Border Agreement With Thailand
An antiguerrilla pact was sigued
in March by the Malaysian and Thai
Governments.
The border cooperation agreement
permits armed forces ofeither coun-
try to cross the common border for
operations against terrorists using
remote border areas as a hideout. In
. the first action under the new pact,
2,000 Malay troops joined the Thai
Armyina counterguerrillasearchop-
eration.-Armed Force8 Journal.
June 1870
PAKISTAN
Submarines From Red China
China has agreed to give Pakistan
two orthree W class submarines, ac-
cordingtoanIndiannewsreport. The
agreement was said to include a
training program for Pakistan Navy
crews. The W class is a conventional
patrol-type submarine with a sub-
mergedspeedof16knotsanda radius
ofaction of13,000 to 16,500 miles. It
hassix21-inchtorpedotubesandcar-
ries 18torpedoes. Itcan also be used
forminelaying.-Newsitem.
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
SovietsModify'MiG21's'
According to US intelligence re-
ports, the Soviet Union is altering
some of the more than 100 lIfiG-21
jetsithas furnished theUnited Arab
Republic to enable them to carry
bombs.
TheMiG-21 was designed primarily
as a high-speed, maneuverable inter-
ceptoraircraft. Itcarries cannon and
air-to-air missiles. However, the re-
ports indicate Soviettechnicians have
been strengthening the wings of
Egyptian MiG-21'8 to enable attach-
ment of underwing bomb racks. One
estimateisthattheaircraftarebeing
fitted to carry up to 2,000 pounds of
bombs-a relatively small bombload
fora fighter bomber.
Since the Arab-Israeli war ofJune
1967, the Soviets have concentrated
on defensive jetfighters inrebuilding
the Egyptian Air Force. At the same
time, theyhavebuiltuptheEgyptian
force ofSu,-7 fighter bombersto70to
90 planes. ButtheSu,-7, while itmay
carryupto4,000 pounds ofbombs, is
considerably slower than the MiG-21.
-News item.
103
MILITARY NOTES
FRANCE
A1rpower
The French Air Force now has over
2,200 aircraft, 650 of which are com-
bat planes. All but 100 of the aircraft
are French built. By 1976, the
French fighter plane with a variable
geometrical wing, the Mirage G, will
be in service with the air force.-
Wehr und Wirtschajt.
NATO
United StatesNorwegian Maneuvers
US Army units from the 8th Infan-
try Division and a unit of His Maj-
esty King's Guards from Oslo, Nor-
way, have completed a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization exercise, Nordic
PaB8, in southern Norway near Lists.
The purpose of the exercise was to
practice and evaluate the command
and staff procedures necessary to
plan and coordinate a joint United
States-Norwegian field training exer-
cise.
Nordic PaB8 involved a battalion-
size airborne task force requested
from NATO by the Norwegian Gov-
ernment to defend an air force base.
In response to the calI, US forces
were marshalIed in Mainz, West Ger-
many, and fiown over the battle area
where they parachuted onto the air-
base. Here, the US paratroopers linked
with Norwegian ground forces and
began defensive ground tactical opo
erations.-Army News Features.
DEMOGRATIC REPUBUC OF tHE CONGO
Jet Alljraft for Air Force .
The . Congolese Air Force has' re-
ceived three of the 17 M.B. 9126 jet
aircraft ordered from Italy. Ten
Congolese pilots have completed train-
ing in Italy to fiy the dual-purpose,
jet trainer-ground attack aircraft.-
Ri'/lism M ilimre.
NEW ZEALAND
'A-4K Skyhawlls' for AIr Force
The Royal New Zealand Air Force
(RNZAF) has received the first two
of 14 Skyhawk military jets purchased
from the US Navy.
The attack bomber and TA-
trainer version will become New
Zealand's primary combat aircraft
when they enter service later this
year. The is a new version of
the aircraft currently in service
with the US Navy and Marine Corps.
It is tailored to RNZAF specifications.
Dovl1lae N8U1.
An A-IK and TA-IK aircraft with Royal
New Zealand Air Foree markings during
a checkout.flight
The aircraft was selected after
extensive evaluation to fulfilI the
RNZAF requirement for a new plane
particularly suited for the close air-
support mission which is the service's
primary combat role. It can carry up
to 8,200 pounds of weapons, including
bombs, rockets, and machineguns.
Designed for aircraft carrier serv-
ice, Skyhawks are welI suited for op-
erations from rough expeditionary
airfields close to combat areas. The
New Zealand models are specialIy
equipped with drag chutes for short-
field landings.
In addition to the new models for
the RNZAF, versions of the air-
craft are operational in Australia,
Argentina, and Israel.-News item.
MUllalY Review 104
"CEHTO
Prllll'lss liD Rail and Road Nat
Encouraging progress bas been re-
POrted on the railway and road net-
work being constructed to link Tur-
key, Iran, and Pakistan.
Construction of the Qotur Bridge
along the Turkish-Iranian border, one
of the most difficult obstacles
CENTO N ...",.clor
Artist's drawing of the Qotur Bridge
near the Iranian-Turkish border
the rail path, is nearly complete. The
1,500-foot span, one of the longest in
Asia, has taken two years to build at
a cost of over seven million dollars.
When completed in late 1971, the
project will provide a modern rail
link between Asia and Europe.
Steady progress is also being made
in constructing the modern highway
connecting the three countries, with
completion expected in 1972.
A microwave telecommunications
system 'between the three countries
is in operation.-News release.
GREAT BRITAIN
Military Paracbute
A new low-altitude military para-
chute has been developed in Great
Britain. Named Trifoglio because of
having three panels, each 22 feet in
diameter, the new parachute permits
descent at 12 feet per second instead
of the normal 16 feet per second. The
actual altitude of the parachutist re-
lease will be reduced from 800 feet
to 800 feet.-Rivista Militare.
MILITARY NOlES
. AUSJRAI:1A
Services to Cat New _ ...Dt
The Australian Government bas
announced it would spend about '186
million dollars equipping the armed
forces with new ships and aircraft.
The biggest single item is 46.5 mil-
lion dollars for two new Oberon class
submarines.
Apart from the submarines, the
navy is to get another destroyer, more
aircraft, helicopters, and new receiv-
ing facilities for its communications
station at Darwin. The air force will
get 126 new helicopters, including 11
of the latest gunship type, and six
low-cover radars. The army will get
a logistic cargo ship to be operated
by the Australian National Line when
not needed for defense purposes. In
addition, the government will spend
about 67 million dollars on equipment
such as trucks and ammunition for
the armY.-Australian news release.
WARSAW PACT
Multipurpose Bay8lllt
Warsaw Pact forces have been is-
sued a new Soviet bayonet that bas
many practical applications. In addi-
tion to its use as a bayonet and knife,
it is also a can opener and wirecutter.
-News item.
Jane 1970 105
INTERVENTION. By Isaac. Don Levine. 152
Pages. David McKay Co., Inc., N. Y., 1969.
$4.95.
By COL LEROY STRONG, USA
Soon after Warsaw Pact troops en-
tered Prague, the author of this book,
a seasoned analyst of-Soviet and East-
ern European afi'airs, set out for the
Balkan capitals to probe for the causes
of the event and their likely conse-
quences for the Kremlin and the rest
of the world.' In the course of two
months, September and October 1968,
he interviewed the best sQurces avail-
able to him, including diplomatic of
ficials, Communist functionaries, mem-
bers of the press, and distinguished
students of Soviet afi'airs. This book is
the result of his inquiry and subse-
quent analysis.
His account provides a highly read-
able analysis of every aspect of the'
invasion, including a vivid account of
the Virtually unanimous hostility with
which the invaders were received. Le-
vine sees a definite cause and efi'ect
relationship between the invasion and
the Chinese attack on the Soviet Army
post at the Ussuri River on the eve of
the scheduled meeting in Budapest of
the Warsaw Pact.
According to this analysis. Mao Tse-
tung hoped that, by threatening the
Soviet Union in the East, China could
deter the Soviets from further aggres-
sion in the West where China also has
important political stakes. Whether or
not one wholly agrees with such a
direct causal relationship, the case pre-
BOOKS
sented is highly provocative and by no
means unpersuasive.
The author's over-all conclusions
are that the invasion was a massive
blunder. As he analyzes it, the Krem-
lin's multiple miscalculation involved
numerous faulty judgments. For ex-
ample, the resuscitation of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization certainly
was not expected or wanted. The dis-
covery that Czech industrial workers
have neither love for, nor loyalty to,
the Kremlin doubtless came as a shock,
particularly to the Soviet Ambassador
who apparently had informed his gov-
ernment otherwise. Also, the Kremlin
seems to have underestimated the
depth of the impact Of the invasion on
the other Communist countries. When
assessing the origins of these blun-
ders, the character and influence of
senior Soviet miUtary members is
given appropriate consideration.
As for longer range consequences,
MI'. Levine speculates that the inva-
sion may foreshadow the rise of a new
USSR guided' avowedly by national
self-interest in its international rela-
tions. While seeing no expectation of
any great populsr upheaval that would
transform the Soviet Union into a
constitutional and freedom-based gov-
ernment, at the same time, he points
to intensified ferment in Soviet intel-
lectual circles that has already found
limited expression. All signs, he he-
lieves, indicate that a Red Tory team
is already waiting in the wings to re-
place the hand that bungled the execu-
tion of the operation in Czechoslovakia.
MIlItarJ Review 108
TRAINING FOR LEADERSHIP. By John Adair.
158 Pales. MacDonald &Co., Ltd., London,
Eng., 19118. $4.25.
By COL PHILIP S. NEWTON,'
British Army
This"isa thoughtfulandwide-rang-
ing analysis of the abstract subject
ofleadershipbytheadvisoronleader-
ship training at the British Royal
Military Academy, Sandhurst. Itin-
cludes some interesting background
examples of good leadership, as well
as a practical method of leadership
training used at the Royal Military
Academy. The author stresses, how-
ever, that "one cannot teach leader-
ship-itcan only be learnt" and that
the title of the book is partly a mis-
nomer, unless it is taken to mean
"self-training."
Itshouldbea welcome additionnot
only to the military library, but also
to any institution concerned with the
productionofleadersfor anyfield.
AFRICAN ARMIES AND CIVIL ORDER: studies
in International Security: 13. By J. M. Lee.
198 Pages. Praeger Publishers, N. Y., 1969.
$6.00.
ByCOL GEORGE D. EGGERS, Ja., USA
In this book, the author, a senior
lecturer atthe University of London,
presents the results of his extensive
research intothepolitical behaviorof
certain African armies. He concen-
trates on the sociopolitical and eco-
nomic factors thatexplain why some
governments have been vulnerable to
military takeovers while others have
been abletoretainthereinsofpower
although beset by a myriad ofseem-
ingly insoluble problems.
This work is a significant addition
to the growing number of empirical
studiesontheroleofthemilitaryseg-
mentofthedeveloping societies. Itis
nota bookforthecasualreader.
JUDe 1970
MILITARY BOOKS
GREEK AND ROMAN ARTIWRY: Historical
Development ByE. W. MarsdeII. 218 Palls.
OlfordUniversityPress, N. Y..1919.$11.15.
ByLTC PAUL C. DILLON, USA
This is a scholarly history of the
development ofthe earlyengines and
equipments of war. Itcovers the in-
vention of the devices, traces their
evolution through various aspects of
GreekandRoman employment, and is
exceptionally well documented. Al-
though artillery designs and tech-
niques were developed more or less
simultaneouslybyboththeGreeksand
the Romans, along with appropriate
tactics to include their use, the text
deals with these elements inisolation
for academic purposes.
The author covers the detailed me-
chanical operation of the various ar-
tillery pieces. He has confirmed the
practicality of the basic design, ob-
tainedprincipallyfrom archaeological
evidence,ofmostoftheearlytypesof
artillery thrQugh the construction of
workingmodels.Thetextalsoincludes
a numberoffigures, clarified inmany
instances by the use of color, which
illustrate mechanical 'principles and
interrelationships.
Other developments related to the
use of artillery in early warfare are
integratedintothestudy.Someofthe
more interesting ofthese are theuse
ofartillery byanassaulting force in
staticwarortypical siegeoperations,
thedesignoffortresswallsandtowers
toaccommodatethenew weapons, the
use ofthenew artilleryinnavalwar-
fare,andsomeofthelogisticproblems
whichwerecreatedbytheintroduction
ofartillery into the inventory ofthe
early army.
This is an excellent reference vol-
ume for the serious military history
student or the artillery buff.
107
MILITARY BOOKS
Tb KEEP AND BEAR ARMS. By Bill R. DavId-
son. 302 Pag8S. Arlington House, New Ro-
chelle, N. Y.. 1969.$5.95.
In this book, which is a selection of
the Conservative Book Club, the
author presents the arguments against
gun control legislation in the United
States. He cites individual protection,
civilian marksmanship, and conserva-
tion support from hunting revenues
to support his position.
THE RIVER AND THE ROCK: TIle History of
FortressWest Point, 1775-1183. By Lleuten
ant Colonel Dave Richard Palmer, US Army.
395 Pages. Greenwood Publishing Corp.,
N. Y., 1969. $23.'50.
By MAJ JOHN G. FOWLER, JR., USA
This is a magnificent volume which
is lavishly augmented with illustra-
tions and maps. Ittraces the e v e ~ p
ment of the West Point Fortress on-
the-Hudson. Beginning with its selec-
tion in 1775 by Colonel James Clinton
as the site from which to block the
Hudson River, West Point achieved
strategic significance as the key to the
Hudson River forts throughout the
revolution.
The fal1 of 1777 saw the complete
destruction of the Hudson River forts
by British General Sir Henry Clinton.
The rebuilding provided for stronger
defenses by experts-French engi-
neers secured by Benjamin Franklin.
The important contribution of Thad-
deus Kosciuszko, Chief Engineer at
West Point for two critical years
(1777-79), is skillful1y described.
Benedict Arnold's attempt to hand
over West Point to the British in 1780
is also treated in considerable detail.
The epilogue of this excellent work
describes the transition of West Point
from a military fortress to the US
Military Academy.
toe
THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNADONAL
LAW: Sponsored by the American Societyof
International Law. Edited byRlcllard A. Fall!.
1,270 Pages. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, N. J., 1969. $25.00 clothbound,
$7.50 paperbound.
By MAJ JOHN F. VOTAW, USA
Professor Richard A. Falk and the
members of the Civil War Panel of the
American Society of International
Law have produced a second collection
of scholarly articles and supporting
documents that is impressive and pro-
vocative. Although some of the articles
advance controversial interpretations,
they are well documented and support
the theme of the book-"to encourage
a deeper appreciation of the relevance
of law to civil war."
The critics of US policy in Vietnam
are ably represented by Professor Falk
and Alastair Buchan, to name only
two. Those articles are, in turn, bal-
anced by thoughtful examinations sup-
porting US policy, such as Edwin
Brown Firmage's "International Law
and the Response of the United States
to 'Internal War.'''
The book is presented in eight sec-
tions which provide a comprehensive
review of US policy and the "legal
status" of American involvement in
Vietnam. Also included are specialized
articles dealing with the role of the
United Nations, the laws of war, and
the constitutional authority of the
President to prosecute a war abroad.
Section six addresses the problems of
settlement of the Vietnam conflict.
The Vietnam War and International
Law is both a useful primer and an
important source volume for the
student of international relations. It
demonstrates that there are many di-
mensions of protracted international
conflict that amplify the more com-
monplace force-counterforce analyses.
MllitarJ Revil.
MILITARY BOOKS
NEW BOOKS RECEIVED
ESSENTIAL 'WORKS OF CHINESE COMMU
NISM: Mao Tse-tung, Llu SbatH:hl, Un Piao,
P'eng Cbeng. A Comprehensive Study of
Chinese Communism From Its Bellnnlng
to tile"Present Edited by Winberg Chal. 464
Pages. Pica Press, N. Y., 1969. $7.00.
MACARTHUR'S AMPHIBIDUS NAVY: Seventll
Amphibious Force Operations, 1943-1945.
By Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, US Navy,
Retired. 375 Pages. US Naval Institute, An
napolls, Md., 1969. $12.50.
THE BAmE FOR NORTH AFRICA. By John
Strawson. 226 Pages. Charles Scribner's
Sons, N. Y., 1969. $7.95.
DISASTER AT MOSCOW: Von Bock's Cam
paigns, 19411942. By Alfred W. Tumey. 228
Pages. The University of New Mexico Press,
Albuquerque, N. M., 1970. $6.95.
THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID IN INDIA.
By P. J. Eldridge. 290 Pages. Schocken
Books, Inc., N. Y., 1970. $9.00.
IN THE SERVICE OF THEIR COUNTRY: War
Resisters in Prison. By Willard Gayllo. 344
Pages. The Viking Press, Inc., H. Y., 1970.
$6.95.
AMERICA AND THE WORLD: From tile Truman
Doctrine to Vietnam. By Robert E. Osgood,
Robert W. Tucker, Herbert S. Dinerstein,
Francis E. Rourke, Isaiah Frank, Laurence
W. Martin, and George Liska. 434 Pages. The
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1970.
$2.95.
THE PAPERS OF DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER:
The War Years. Edited by Alfred D. Chandler,
Jr., Associato Editor Stephen E. Ambrose.
Five Volume Set The Jobns Hopkins Press,
Baltimore, Md., 1970. $75.011. .
ARCHITECTS OF ILLUSION: Men and Ideas in
American Foreign Policy, 19411949. By Uoyd
C. Gardner. 365. Pages. Quadranlle Books,
Chicago, III., 1970. $8.95.
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: fte Next
Decade. d ~ by A. Deak BIII8tt' and
Edwin O. Relscbaaar. 250 Paps. Preap!'
Publishers, N ~ Y., "7D. $7.50.
REPORT FROM WASTELAND: America's Mlii-
tarylndustrlal Campier. By Senator William
Proxmire. Foreword by Senator Paul H. Doug
las. 248 Pages. Praller Publisbers, N. Y.,
1970. $6.95.
THE COURAGEOUS AND THE PROUD. By
Samuel Vance. 1&8 Pages. W. W. Norton &
Co., Inc., N. Y., 1970. $4.95.
BARBARISM IN GREECE. By James Beckel
Foreword by Senator Claiborne Pell 147
Pages. Walker " Co., N. Y., 1970. $5.95.
UTIN AMERICA: Underdevelopment or Rev
olutlon. By Andre Gunder Frank. 409 Pages.
Montllly Review Press, N. Y., 1969. $8.50.
THE AMERICAN MILITARY ARMORED CAR. By
A. J. Clemens. 70 Pages. Grenadier Books,
Canoga Park, Calif., 1969. $4.95.
AFRICA YESTERDAY AND TODAY. Edited by
Clark D. Moore and Ann Dunbar. 394 Pages.
Praeger Publishers, N. Y., 1968. $7.95.
MILITARY THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE
AGE OF XENOPHON. By J. It Anderson. 419
Pages. University of California Press, Berke-
ley, Calif., 1970. $12.50.
RURAL DMLOPMENT PLANNING: Systems
Analysis and Working MetllDd. By Earl M.
Kulp. 664 Pages. Praeger Publishers, N. Y.,
1970. $18.50.
ARTILLERY AND AMMUNITION OF THE CMl
WAR. BJ Warren Ripley. 384 Pages. Van
Nostrand Reinhold Co., N. Y., 197D. $22.$0.
THE AIR FORCE PLANS FOR PEACE, 1942
1943. By PInY McCoy Smltll. 132 Pages.
lbe Johns HOpkins Press, Baltimore, Md
1970. $5.95.
June 1970
109
Strategic Arms Umltatlon
In .the article "Strategic Arms Limitation" by
Mark B. Schneider, which appeared in the March
issue of lIilltaJy Review, the Soviet's laOin sys
tem was described as an ~ M .
This would appear to be an error. It is gen-
erally agreed in the intelligence community that
the laUln system is an antiaircraft system (what
ever its potential for upgrading into an ABMl.
From the context, one might surmise that
Mr. Schneider is reterring to the Soviet III/osh
ADM system, about which there Is no doubt, but
which he fails to mention at all.
It is unusual to find an error of that magnitude
in the Military Review. The .article itself, however,
is an oversimplified and somewhat uninstructed
approach to the subject
John H. SulUvan
Alexandria. V"lfIlnfa
Error In Blograpby
There is an error in the name of the firm
"Orion" which appears in my biography for my
article "Mao and the Battle for Communist
Power" on page 44 of the March Issue. That was
the name we had selected, but, unfortunately,
when trying to register it, we found the name
had already been !elen, so we are now calling
our orpnizatilm "Otren Research, Incorporated"
instead.
Mlnnad, MasucImsIItts
FORUM
ASilver Unlng
Admittedly, 1969 was not one of the Army's bet
ter years, with its image smeared by the welter
of mud thrown up during the investigations of
wrongdoing In service-operated clubs, coverups
by senior officers, and the more recent atrocity
charges growing from the Vietnam war.
And it is not over yet, I am afraid. More of the
same mud-slinging will be In evidence. The Army
has been tossed again into the ring of political
warfare at has been there beforen, and it will not
be permitted to retire in peace to its reserva-
tions until the politicians anil the public have
done with it.
Despite the dark days that loom ahead, today's
regular soldier-if he is willing to be objective
about the whole thing-might well thank his
lucky star for what has happened. For he and
his fellow professionals should be able to look
back and see what was wrong with the Army and
to take this opportunity to bring forth a new and
far stronger Army, stronger morally as well as
physically; an Army that will not be afraid to dis-
card' the old and obsolete; an Army that will
develop its own beliefs and traditions withaut
restriction from the past; an Army that will take
advantage of the latest techniques in the fields
of management, administration, and leadership;
an Army thai will develop specialists as well as
generalists; and an Army with vitality whose
sh8fPest edges are nat dulled by ignorance and
unwillingness to change.
118
Over the years, and particularly since 1945,
there had crept'lnto the Army several dissolute
schools of behavior and certain phony ideas,
Some of those ideas dated back 100 years or
more, but-were brought back under the guise
of being .different; others were of more recent
vintage, Each attracted a set of followers, and
these developed the schools of thought; each
was tolerated by the Army's more senior leaders;
and each soon began to eat away at the Army's
moral fibers to cause such damage that the man
in uniform spent most of his time playing the
role of an apologist.
Among the host of changes, a few stand out,
not only because they became the most prevalent,
but because they had the greatest longterm ef
fects on the Army:
TIll Alrllome Syndrome, No sooner had the
Korean War ended than the "young Turks," who
replaced the retiring senior commanders of World
War II, started a drive to make everyone and
everything in the Army airborne. Building up
thair actions during World War II far out of pro-
portion to their actual accomplishments, air
borne troop commanders fought their way into
positions of responsibility and changed the Army
completely in organization and direction.
On the one hand, the "new" Army had the bat
tie group, an organizatkln with little to recom
mend it other than looking good on an aircraft
manifest, and a new uniform, the third different
one In 10 years. On the other hand, the Army's
members were now told that they hed to believe
that a man's physical prowess counted far more
than his mental ability, that a man's muscles
were of greater Importance than his gray mat
ter, and that a man who would not jump out
of an airplane was not fit to command any of the
Army's units.
From this Idea, of course, came the Special
Forces coricept and the rebirth of the Rangers-
close-lnlt groups, Jealous of their prerogatives.
1IIe hIItw II. FIntIoa. let me quickly
explain that I moe no referante to the famous
statoes at Fort Benning, Georgia, or to the patch
of The Infanby CeRter and The Infanby School.
I refer to the docIrIne of blind obedience to
orders that carne is a natoral oulInMth of the
lirboma syndrome. Alrboma units have akqys
beea noted for their Iron discipllne. But, to 8
RUDER FORUM
large degree, their commanders damanded-and
received-blind and unquestioning obedience, an
,Idea that Is dangerous to foster in any group of
uniformed, armed men, and one that Is utterly
allen to this country's military tradition.
Unfortunately, this same demand for blind
loyalty soon permeated the rest of the Army,
end, before long, the guiding light of all became
the famous phrases, "Oon't ruck the boat" and
"Don't fight the system." No matter where one
served, he met the same inflexible approach to
duty. Conformity became the watChword; follow
the Old Man; anticipate his desires; give him
what he wants; insulate him from reality; but,
above all, keep him happyl That was the way to
get aheadl
'ilia Sergeant Mljar Fillacy. Ever since
1942, the Army had searched diligently for ways
to improve the lot of its noncommissioned offi
cers. Not content with mere ralses of pay, the
simple solutkln, the Army began to change the
enlisted grade structure, a process stili going
on. Reaching back 40 years, the ''young Turks"
resurrected a rank that most officers with any
experience had been happy to see deleted from
tables of organization: the Sergeant Major.
As had happenad before, the Sergeant Major
assumed unwarranted power, so much so, in fact,
that he effectively blocked communications be-
tween the Officers of a unit or sactkln and the
enlisted men of that unit or section. No one,
other than the Old Man, could allord to bypass
the Sergeant Major, and his actions soon became
more and more dictatorial, particularly wilen the
confrontation came between himself end relatively
junior officers.
The revival of this rank did as much to hinder
the Army's prograss as any other single happen-
Ing. Once again, the lower ranking enlisted man
was divorced from close contact with his officers,
and his life again bepn to rasemIIIe more closely
that of the enlisted man of 50 or 60 years ego
who seldom saw an otlicer end wIIose fate was
decided, oftentimes. by senior sergeants or the
Setieant Major. To man matters worse. the Army
created two types of Sereeant 1IaJor, thus sprad-
Inll the Insidious inIIuenca of that rank to a far
greafer range than eve!' dreamed possible 111 the
old Army.
At probably 110 other time In its history has
111
READER fORUM
\
the Army faced such criticism and ridicule as it
faces today. Certainly, the clouds are dark. But,
on the other hand, never before hes the Army
had a better opportunity to get rid of the old
and put an the new, to use the talent that is in
its ranks to the best advantage, to modernize
Its thinking, and brighten its image. Reservations
no longer have walls or fences; they are open
to the p u b l i ~ and the Army must respond.
Well-educated and welltrained officers and
enlisted men are aprime requirement, and ways
of bridging the gap between the two must be
found. Authoritarian leadership must go, prlv
ileges must bring responsibilities, specialists
have to be created and recognized in promotion
schemes, and some backbone has to be put back
Into subordinates. If necessary, branches should
be done away with if that Is the only way the
Army can modernize.
For the Army, this may well be the last time
it will have an opportunityto bring about changes
on Its own. Tbe next time, changes may come
because an outside agency brought them about.
None of us wants the Army put Into that position.
'LTC Albert N. Garland, USA, Retired
Military Notes Defended
In the February issue of Military Review,
Colanel Glenn E. Fant took exception to the
"secondhand notes." If It were not for these,
many of us would not be aware of mlny signlfl
cant and important developments-especially
those taking place in other countries.
It seems to me that the leadtlme required to
edit and publish the Military Review makes it
virtually impossible for you to scoop any except
a quarterly publication.
Iam one distant armchair editor who appre-
ciates the Military Notes and likes to know the
source from which they were taken.
lTC Ann B. Smith, USA
Congratulations Offered
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vard, I have been fortunate in receiving the
Military Review.
You are to be congratulated on an excellent
publication that is both interesting and very in
formative. . . .
Keith P. Gould
Boston, Massachusetts
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