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Military Review




Major General John J. Hennessey


Brigadier General James M. Gibson

Editor in Chief COL O. W. Martin. Jr. Associate Editor COL Paul Goodman, Armg War CoUerre Assistant Editor LT.?-? IL Gknn McCue Features Editor MAJ Robert W. Ifornadau

Production Editor Helen M. HaU Spanish-American Editor LTC Ne8tor L. Berrio8

Brazilian Editor LTC Aluaro Galuio Publication Officer MAJ Steven E. ltarte18

Art and Design charle8 A. Moore

Military Review
Professional Journal of the US Army
ARTICLES The Army and Society Civil-Military Relations . . . . . . . . . . . LTC Frederic J. Brown, USA COL Richard F. Rosser, USAF . . CPT Mark D. Mariska, USA LTC James B. Agnew, USA 3 18 32 40


The Single Integrated Operational Plan Toward More Credible Force Planning

LTC Thomas E. Courant, USA and COL Reed E. Davis, Jr., USA East Is No Longer Least PSYOP: What Is It? . . . . . . . . . LTC William V. Kennedy, USAR . . , Raymond J. Barrett 52 57 73 82 90

From Leadership to Partnership Urban Guerrilla Warfare Military Academies . . . . . .

. . .

Marc E, Geneste Peterson, USMCR

COL Harries-Clidry

LTG Lam Quang Thi, ARVN

DEPARTMENTS Reader Forum Military Notes Military Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 94 105

Braddocks Victofy?
If only those illiterate savages had lined up in the open he would have had them: Anon. lieutenant Colooel Zeb B. Bradfords article [February 19721 was a pleasure to read. The author not only thinks clearly but arficrdatea hia thoughts well. MNNary Review has a depressingly large number of articlea which lack intellectual and literary vibrance. US Tactica in Vietnam was not one of these. While favorably impressed with the article, I fear there are some gaping boles in the authors thinking-holes which appear to have developed from overexposure to that sort of inafitutionalized thinking wherein we begin to halieve that which it is convenient to believe, the in thing, that which requirea the least change and that which will perpetuate our varioua totems. Bradfords totem, and he is not alone in its worship, is the use of technological and logistical legerdemain to compensate for potifical and military ineptitude. Bradford claims that in Vietnam during large unit combat we employed tacfica in a way which was generally appropriate to the situation and suited to our own charaqterisfics and assests. . . . I agree most sincerely. Given tbe existing circumstances, our forces did well. I submit, however, that the salvation of the patient is the goal and not the performance of an exemplary surgical operation. . . I can recall listening, in the 1957-61 period, to the conventional pundita of that age complimarrting the Army of the Republic of Vietnam fARVN) and its US advisors because Wet Cong terror attacks were not perpetrated against military units, Few of these obseNera noted that the Viet Cong were eviscerathrg the nationa embryonic administration while ARVN units, equipped fnr battle as in Korea, prepared to repel an invasion which never came. The US public has a right to expect a bit better return for its investment than an army wbfch must wait for a political struggle to escalate 2 to the near-convarrfional level before it can fight. It would appear to my inexpert eye that the oolificallv i3CCeDtable anawer would be to develop tha ability to win--cm at least significantly influence such struggles-in the early stagea and not wait until the monster grows to the convenient level for heroic slaughter in the threat traditions of St. George. . . . GiWm the social forces at work in our society today, I cannot accept the hypothasia that the public will tolerate massive Iaat-ditch stands in preference to the low~nst, Iow.personnel involvement, albeit long-term presence implicit in an insurgent atrraggle just becausa it ia inconvenient for the mulfibillion dollar army Iasser intensity environment. to fight in the

What happens if the opponent chooses to operate below what we unilaterally consider a participation threshold? We would then be helpless. Are we so addicted to outproducing nur opponents that evan our future mititary Ieadarahip disclaims the possibility of oofwitfirrg or outfighting them? Examination of Lieutenant Cnlonel Bradforts work reveals an assumption-stated as fact which I fear may underlie much of his rationale. He states that Seizure nf potifical powar ties beyond the grasp of a movement which cannot prosecute conventional battle as a prelude to seizure of the raina of government. This is inaccurate. If the wordd.be leadership involvad in a violent political power play can seize that power without the risk and cost of a converrfional military display, are we to believe that they will reject such an opportunity because it doas not maet Bradfnrds concept of how decent revohrfionaries perform? . . . For many contemporary strategic thinkars, . . the entire proceaa of strategic thinkhrg ia an elaborate escape machanism. . . . This atdelds the participants from the inhospitable world of reality by endless intellectualizing. rethinking when conventional The patiicipants pretand to be in fact they ara rehashing tired


(continued on page 111)

Military Raview

READER FORUM (continued from pege 2)
fear that if we follow Lieutenant Colonal Bradfords approach we will all be abla to eettle back into our institutionalized for great and glorious cdmbat niches and prepare which will in all but it would ba a foolhardy enamy that would attack a strong dafanse, and in doing so cons. mit hia major force, while ~s opponent poaaaeaes, in addition, deliver the the offensive blow. Jr., USA ability to ultimately daciaiva

probability never occur. The G3s and aspiring G3s will sharpen grease pencils. Resaarchara and developers will acquire exotic waaporwy, But any midget who chooses to do so will tweak the f;om ex. US giant because the giant,

MAf Jaho W. 6ahnaidar

himself B. Vought,

War Studies
It was disappointing to learn (in !War Studies, Military Raviaw, Saptamber 1971, reprinted from 7ha Army Oartarfy) that study of pact military experience haa been randarad inappropriate since 1943,, and that if is doubtful if tha miliiary professional today can really Iaarn much from Marlborough, Wellington, Jackson or Grant. Many of those who seek hiatoriosl perapaativa on the profession of arms can easily agree with tha author that war must be undarafood as an aspect of human behavior, a phenomenon of intergroup social psychology, a spacies of con. flict, and a spaaies of violence. It ia also agread that military affairs are-and always have been intertwined w.th the political, economic, social and technical factora, as wall as all other condi. tiona in effect at the time and place being atrrdied. It is difficult to accept the idaa, howaver, that studies of Conflict. Stratem. Peace and Defanae do not or should not ha~~ a sturdy framework and solid foundation tary history, of history, including mili-

trame myopia, has conditioned only other giants. LTC Donald

to fight


Antitank Oafense
Tha artiola in tha December 1971 kfimary Re. viaw, entitled Effective Antitank Defense by Ferdinand Otto Mikscha, was very thorough in its analysis of tha problams facing tha Fedaral Republic of Germany, Aa a veteran of three tense years (1960.33) on tha Czach corder in Garmany, I can attest to tha problems in praparing an adequate defense against a potential enemy that poaaeasea a preponderance of armorad forces in both numbers and equipment. Mr. Miksche has done an excellent ysis and has preaanted job of anal. but this

a fins proposal,

reader feals that ha has put tha greatest emphasis on only ona portion of the military probIam-dafenae. Doctrina still maintains enemy, and history has shown necesthat a determined poe-sesaing the

sary rasources, can braach or bypass the stoutest defanse. Examplas in our lifetime are tha Maginot Line of France and the Gustav Line of Germany. It is a moot point aa to whether Gamranys potardial enemias will utiliza nuclaar weaponry if their armored forces are thwarted in an attack. The real bone of contention ia to what extant they will go to breach a well-planned antitank defense in depth aa advocated by Mr. Miksche. In addition, this raader qoestions the political advantages of such a strategy. If massive attacks by either side taka place, tha Politisal spectrum has raachad the ultimate or final extension of its controlwar. This is theorized and clearly discussed by Von Clausewik in On War, and tha political military since that Defensive dabate has nevar ceaaed must be counterfima. forces and doctrine

Tha last stroke of the articla was particularly troublasom~ that the Wast attempted to win in Southeast Asia by military means alone and that those who suppartad the Repubfic of Vietnam failed to sogsider the political, aconomic, social and cultural environment. In my opinion, the West has not dona badly in the economic, social and cultural fialds. A significant and gerrerally successful effort has been put forth on these arasa. These efforta more successful to send aoores on their one-way nf course would have baan even if tha enemy had not continued of thousands of men each year tripa down tha Ho Chi-minh trail.

It ia true that thara is much yat to ba Iaarnad from our historic axperienca in tha economic, social, poJitiaal and culturat fialda. If we oarsnot overcome military tually nated the enemy in these, with as wall s tha fields, in Southaaaf may well be fesed third world. Asia, tha Wes f even. an anemydomi.

balanced by offensiva forcas and attendant theory. The antitank forces are a good partial solution,




Meanwhile, let us consider what military hi$ tory teaohes that might hare been useful in Southeast Asia. For example, one history-supported military concept that seems to have been forgotten is the Principle of the Offensive. To choose at random one of the leaders whose hard-earned and successful experience is said to be no longer applicable, and whose lessons regarding the Principfe of the Offensive certainly were not applied in Southeast Asia, consider Marlborough. As a leader of British and ellied forces on tha continent on 1707, Marlborough hoped to force the French oot of Spain. His economic, social, political-and military+fforts had produced unsatisfactory rasults within the Nation from which ha hoped to drive the enamy. N appeared likely, in fact, that the French would win in Spain. Instaad of atandhrg on tha defeneive, howevar, Marlbornugh decided to encourage the enemy to leave the Spanish alone by employing British sea power and allied land powar in offensive operations. Ha instigated a Iarga scale land and sea operation against Tmrlon, one of the major Franch basas in the area of strategic interast. With a critical point in their homeland thraatenad, the French ragimants and battalions hurried north, out of Spain, along their equivalent of the Ho Chi-minh treil. Vary shortly, Spain was







and history had reaffirmed some of its old teachingz+ notably that thare is no substitute for causing lots of troubla for the enemy. Perhapa this little lesson could have bean ap. plied more ambitiously in the vicinity of Vinh or Hanoi, and possibly other places where the Iesders hava shown an urge toward cutting the throats of their paaceably disposed naighbors. This is not to suggest, of course, that the cultural, political, aconomic or social ramificafiqns within the strategic area of concern should ba ignored, but only that military history does provide some perspective on how to win aod lose wars. All in all, the lessons of military history are too important to be neglected today, and it is much too early to throw away tha history books. N is even possible that theorists have become too inmeshad with new cmrcapts, and have forgotten, at high cost to the Nation, that only tha countries that win their wars have any influence at all on the further davalopmant of history. ClfR 0. P. Klrchnar. USN ConSrSbutt.m so Wn Shads? FOtIIm,bmCd be addmwed to: WdSCOr Im Cbhf, MifIfmrJ and SMIOnl StmimV, US Arms Co-d
stir COfcese, Pars a6027.
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ASNlfsrf Review

LOOKING AHEAD gvod winter as far This has been en exceptionally as receiving good manuscripts



As a mesult we can promise ers varied end interesting only make good reading but discussion.

Military Review readfare which will not will fuel nsmy a lively

We violently disagree with some articles. Others we espouse completely. But no one will know which be is which and all deserve publication sndwill printed.

Some articles to l-k forward to are a series by Army research fellows Bradford and Brown on where they think the Army should be headed in the near future. Then there is a provocatiw, critical article by a German officer on Soviet night operations doctrine. ~n snother the Chief of Staffof the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces discusses strategy for Southmakes an indeeast Asia. And, a graduate student analysis of our retirement pendent and penetrating sys tern. To more articles These are but a few highlights. should be added some interesting digests which see notes to Military ourselves as others see us. keep abreast of new developments and book reviews pointing to further in-depth professional raeding. lb be sure that you do not miss for a personal subscription.illt any of this, send

The Army and Society

LieutenantColonel Frederic J. Brown UmtsdStates Armu HESE are diilicrdt days for the Military Establishment and particularly the Army. Faced with the need to readjust after a long enervating commitment to a complex, confusing and frustrating war in Vietnam, the Army is eeemingly aseailed from all sides. Public animosity exceeds that in the previous experience of any of those soldiera preeently serving. The fiber of units is stretched by racial strese, drug excess and an environment of hyperactive inquiry if not hostile disssnt. In the view of critical observers, the ArmY not only servae an increasingly questionable social purpose-the use of force in defending the Nationbut also is dysMaffib 1972

functional in that it constitutes a nonproductive, inefficient drain of resourcee which could be better used to meet preeeing social problems. Critical public sentiment often strikes a responsive chord in the Army. The aesertion has been made, within the professional ranks, that the Army muet become meaningful if it is to continue to exiet. The proposition ie most oftkmstated to buttrees arguments favoring the development of noncombat-related socially productive roles w$ich will not only keep the Army active and committed to the mainstream of American life, but also, because of their utility to the Nation, will serve as added justifice3

TNE ARMY AND SOCIETY tion for the continued existence of the Army. This proposition is wrong. The greeteet current dsnger to the Army is the stimulus to overinvolvement in efforts to maintain eocial relevance rather than sny isolation stimulated by underinvolvement. The evolving nsture of the Americsn eociety constitutes a reasonable guarantee that the problem for the military profession is not lack of social integration; the character of our postindustrial society will insure that the necessary ties continue to be maintained, even in an all-volunteer force. The Army is already deeply committed to a broad range of social welfare programs. Further, there hss been a trend of continually increasing involvement. Isolation is not the problem. The real challenge to the Army today ie to conduct responsible and neceseary social welfare programe, while preserving those core values of the military which combhe to produce units and men who willingly serve the national defense with unlimited liabilityto and includlng the ultimate price. The danger is overcommitment to social welfare programs which can erede the core valuee snd capabilities of unit readinese. The concern is not that the Army exerci$ee social responsibilities. Many are absolutely necessary for management of the Armed Forces or to perform an essential public eervice such as disaster assistance or civil defense planning. The problem ie to subordinate in a responsible manner the aggregate of such efforts to the maintenance of adequate defenee readiness. Historical Precedent The Army is engaged today in a broad eeries of social programs developed over the. years in response to general acceptance of an increasing governmental role in providing for the social welfare of individuals and in taking direct responsibility for many other important areas of public life. Current social programe in which the Army is involved have historical precedent in a general tradition of civic aseietance provided over the years by the Army. However, in the past, the Army neither saw itself, nor was it seen by others, as possessing enduring responsibllitiee to conduct programs to improve the lot of any particular individuals in society or to correct social ille which plagued the Nation. Since World War II, there has been increasing preesure to commit the MMsryReview

Lieutenant Colonel Frederic J. Brown ia a student at the National War CoUege. He was com?niseioned in 1956 from the US Military Academy, wcw an Olrnsted Scholar at the Graduate Inetitute of International Studtes, Geneva, Switzerland, in 1968, and holds a Ph. D. in International Relat{orw. His assignments include command of the 1st Sqnadron, .$th Cavalry, let Infantry Div$sion in Vietnam; duty with the Joint Chief8 of Staff; and with the O@ce, Coordinator of Armg Studies, Ofie of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff. 4

TSE ARMY AND SOCIETY Army to social programs involving improvement of the individual. Some programs were necessary for better management of the Armed Forces; others were intended to improve community relations by providing ueeful public services. Current Efforts The rhetoric of leadership has led to the development of a broad set of social welfare programs, meet of which are desirable for improvement of personnel management. Yet some programs directly atfeet the environment and life style of the individual citizen both in and out of military service. Major current efforts are: Domestic Action, Equal Opportunity (minority relations), General Education Development (education), Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, Project Ons Hundred Thousand and Project Transition. . Domestic Action: This is a recent Department of Defenee (DOD) carrier program for most externally oriented eocial welfare activities conducted by the military services under the guidance of a DOD Domestic Action Council. The program includes manpower efforts such as. Project Referral, intended to aesist in securing jobs for retireee; Project Value, designed to provide jobs in DOD for over 1000 hardcore unemployed per year; and the Youth Employment Program, an effort to provide summer jobs for over 40,000 youthe per year. aleo procurement is Military channeled to minority emall business enterprises. Phyeical resources (equipment, facilities, services, and property) are made available on a reimbursable basis where possible. Over 275,000 disadvantaged youth were provided r&creational, cultural, educational, and training activities during March 1972 the summer of 1969 in the community relations effort. Lastly, technical knowledge such as low-cost modular housing, aeromedical evacuation, and environmental improvement is provided to civilian communities. The sixth element of the program is equal rights which continu~ longstanding efforts in minority rel@ions. Equal C@.oortunitg: Beginning with desegregation in 1948, the services have led the national effo minority relatione. Secretary Ro 2n ert S. McNamara saw the services as . . . a powerful fulcrum in removing the barriers to racial justice not merely in the military, but in the country at large. Consistent with this philosophy, the DOD open housing policy predated the comparable provisions of the Civil Righte Act of 1968. In further extension of this activist social role, placee of local entertainment practicing segregation have been placed off Iimite by the Secretary of the Army. Formal education in minority relations is being expanded for all service personnel. The level of involvement hae increeeed each year. Education Develop. General ment: The military ie the largest vocational training institution in the United Statee. The rate of turnover of personnelan estimated 24 million veterane since 1940-and the physical plant required have resulted in a majbr and expanding national educational syetem within the services. Prior to Vietnam, approximately 500,000 individual left the military cervices annually for civilian life with an eWlmated 50 percent having received posthigh school occupational and professional education and training. Such Army programa continue to increaee dramatically. A $22.6 million program in 1968 to increaee high school, college and postgraduate qual5


ifications of all enlisted and officer grades may expand to over $40 million for 1973. More recently, the Modern Volunteer Army Program envisages . . . an educational system which provides each eoldier the opportunity to acquire, on duty time, civifian-recognized skille or education so that the soldlers will see the Army . . . as an avenue and not as an alternative, to their personal and educational devel~Pment.~~ 1 A policy of providing veteran benefits te insure that an individual did not suffer as a result of Government service has become a program of providing personal benefit through Government aid and assistance while eerving and during duty hoursa new horizon of social re. sponsib]lity for the Army. 6

. Alcohol and Drng Abuse Prevention and Control: Although too early to gauge the resource implications of this new program, the principle ie clear: The military services are expected to provide professional rehabilitation for individuals discovered to be suffering from addiction during their period of national service. As is the case with educational programs, national service will, through rehabilitation, benefit the individual whether he acquired the disorder before or dnring service. In its embryonic stages, the drug abuse program will require over 2900 specialized pereonnel and over $32 million of direct costs for Fiscal Yezr 1972 according to DOD Fiscal Year 1973 budget hearings in October 1971. Unsupported estimates of true cost to Military Review

cl TNE ARMY AND SOCIETY include salaries of addicts, guards for facilities, and so forth range up to $100 million per year for the Army. All that seems certain at this point is that the military has entered into a new and uncharted ares of social responsibility. Project One Hundred Thousand: This project was developed by Secretary McNamara to broaden the manpower base and to make the marginally productive civilian into a successful, competitive citizen. He saw the challenge as: a ghetto of the .@mt. Chronic fa&es in school throughout their childhood, they were destined to a setwe of defeat and decag in a skiUomented nation tkat requires from ite manpower pool an increasing indez of compsterwe, discipline and eelf<onfiderwe. Many of these men, we decided, could be caved. ~ From 1 October 1966 to 30 September 1971, the Army has accepted over 200,000 of these individuals at an estimated annual coet for Fiscal Year 1970 of under $3, million. . Project Transition: The objective of Project Transition is to aseist the soldier to eecure a job upon completion of service. Begun in 1968, the program consists of job counseling, vocational training, and job placement assistance. By 1970, 240,000 men had been couneeled, and 69,000 trained at 56 installations in the United States. Due to the high veteran unemployment problem, a major expaneion of Project Transition is now underway. The program is being enlarged in the United Statee and extended overseas to include Vietnam. Specific job training installations are now being established to provide 60 days of training for combat soldiers without civilian skille. Thus expanded, the program could cost come $200 million per year.
Mamh 1972

Broad guidance is evident in the varying objectives, techniques and beneficiaries of these six programs. The range of variation is eo broad as to preclude establishment of unequivocal general criteria for evaluation of the suitability of programs. Of these programs, two-Minority Relations and Drug Abus+addrees problems which directly affect the military readiness of units, as well ae being programs which demonstrate acceptance of Federal responaibllity to state and 10CSI government. Two other programsGeneral Education Development and Project Otw Hundred Thousandimprove individual ekills for both service and postservice activity. A thirdProject Tra?wition-addresses only veteran activity. Several of the Domestic Action and technical knowledge programs would cost very little and could make useful and necessary contributions to the improvement of life in the United Statee. Examples would be uee of military posts to develop new techniques of low-cost housing construction, mass transit syetems, or pollution abatement. Other programs merely eerve to open military resources to ghetto or rural poor much as service children have been accommodated in the past for example, scouting and club activities. Some programe euch as disqster relief are purely humanitarifm. In the face of such diversity, program objective seems an inadequate criterion. The case for Army acceptance of increaeed eocial responsibilities reets upon five arguments: (1) There are major national social welfare taeke to be accomplished. (2) The Army is capable of aseiating in their accomplishment through amelioration of social ills.

TNE ARMY AND SOCIETY (3) Acceptance of social res.ponsibllities by the military will aeeiet in aesuring the availability of resources with which to maintain operational readiness te fulfill conventional defenee responsibilities. (4) Social involvement will eerve to diearm traditional critics of military programs. (5) Social involvement will help to attract and retain quality personnel. Social Walfare Tasks The first premise appears self-evident. There are major social welfare taske to be undertaken. Ae income levele rise, education and communication create greater awarenees of the need for action. Thie has been the pattern of the last decade. The premise that the Army can undertake major, new social responsibilities is more controversial. The Secretary of the Army hae strongly supported current Army domeetic action projects. In fact, after stating that the Army must maintain miesion readiness, he called for major expansion: We muet do more, much wore. . . . As long aa we limit it to sonwthing that will help the soldier in hie training mie8i0n; a8 long 0s we can accomplish our other goals without adding more men or d01far8, I see no limitr4tion . . . domeetic action has to become more and more impertant. = The activiet case appears to rest on two premises: availability of efficient quality personnel to carry out the programs within the service, and presumed ability to inetitutionalize successful social action programs. The Army does possess extraordinarily capable and dedicated managera. Attracted to public service by the professional nature of military service, the officer and eenior noncommissioned ofa ficer corps are precieely tbe actionoriented managera called for by John W. Gardner as he bemoans tbe 4, . . . chasm between the worlds of reflection and action and calls for . . . leaders who can move beyond their special fields to deal with problems of the total community. 4 Quality alone will not solve the problem. First-rate management talent is fimited. There may not be sufficient topfllght managerial capability within the Army to maintain ready combat capability while supporting complex social programs. With normal distr@tion, most of the Armys social welfare projects would be administered by average officers and noncommissioned officers. Complex Programs If a program is too complex or too innovative to be understood and honestly accepted by average men and women, it may fail despite the most optimistic prognostications of central authority. Racial attitude conditioning and establishment of the environment of discipline based upon mutual trust called for by the Modern Volunteer Army Program are current attempts to institutionalize sophisticated social programs. It is not certain that these programs can be implemented by average Army managers. Requirements for quality personnel, sheer size, and the bureaucratic nature of the Army combine ta make social action programs difficult to rnn properly. The Army, as a bureaucracy, may be a blunt instrument incapable of inetitutionalizing the finesse required to deal with complex social problems at the Federal level. This inability is not unique to the Army; it is a characteristic of large organizations. The third argument supporting inMilitav


THE ARMY AND SOCIETY creased social responsibilities is more conjectural. Increased social action may or may not justify the allocation of additional resources to the Army. It is conceivable that there could be major increases in program reaponeibility without a parallel increase in funds or personnel. For example, the real burden of expanded Project !lmnsition,-training is borne by the unit which must support the project while continuing other mieeions. Additionally, even if added resources were provided, they may not be suitable for improved defense readiness. Potential miesions in the inner city would provide ill-suited justification for additional maneuver battalions configured and trained for combat operations. Disarm tie Critics The fourth premise is that increaeed social responsibilitiee would help in disarming the most voluble critics of the militarythat ie, the liberal establishment representing the latest in a tradition of Siberal hostility toward, and suspicion of, military affairs. Presumably, by ite efforts at social improvement, the Army would convince its arch critics that it performs a useful and neceesary social function. Thha seems a problematical non seqctitur at best. Gardner, John Kenneth Galbraith, Goldberg and othere would appear more likely to insiet that the reeources be administered by another federal department. In any event, Army activity in such areae would be subjected to intense critical review by a skeptical audience. There isscant prospector changinga basic philosophical view of the nature of force in a democratic society by volunteering to accept, or willingly accepting, peacetime eocial reeponsiMarch le72

bilities. By blurring the Iimitz of its functional responsibilities as the poeeeseor of legitimate force, the Army could well exacerbate the conventional criticiem. Attract Ilrrality Personnel The fifth premiee ie that extensive eocial involvement will attract and retain quality personnel who might not otherwiee eerve in the Army. Underlying this premise is a belief that, to attract and retain, the Army should have an image as a compassionate, understanding organization accepting and developing the individual as a meane of contributing to the resolution of pressing domestic probleme. Inferentially, the social value of securing the Nation provides inefficient attraction. This view is evident in the Modern Volunteer Army master program which infers that the citizens contribution to society comes after hie period of military service: . . . to fcdfiU his needs and thoee of the nation, the Army todny mcwt be an institution in which men grow . . . and from which theg emerge, having eerved as prond competent sotdiers better prepared to contribute to our eOmetU. S For the eoldier, the basic contribution to society is his period of military eervice-a socially acceptable end in itself. Thie latter attitude appeare to be shared by many young Americane. Current national sample opinion polls show the eesential traditionalism of most young Americans. Performance of eocially relevant responsibilities does not appear to motivate young Americans to eervice in the enlieted ranks ae much as baeic acceptance of patriotic eervice-the notion that somebody must defend the Nation. They expect reasonable income, personal improvement, and job satisfac9

lflE &RMY AND StlCIEIY tion derived from being a serving partkipant in military preparedness. Tbe young college graduate officer may welI expect a more active social role based upon the activist environment on todays campus. The opportunity to contribute to the resolution of ecological or inner city probleme may be necessary to retain qurdity officers, but euch activism need not involve military units. One to two-year sabbaticals permitting a limited number of officers to assiet state or local governments would permit individual activist roles without committing unit resources. The myth of the necessity of involvement meaningful social throughout the Army may be more real to some of the educated leadership of the Army who are influenced daily by the values of the elite establishmentrepresented by The New York Timee and The Washington Post than it is to the Army as an organization compoeed of average people, with traditional motivations, who stem from middle America. Reasons for Concern Conversely, there are substantial reasons for Army concern about acceptance of extensive social action reeponsibllities. The case rests on four arguments: The Army exists to provide military security to the Nation, hence resources should be focused to this purpose. . Challenged by external criticism and internal review, the Army today is ill-suited to address nonmilitary problems. Ongoing social welfare programs are difficult to manage, hence expansion of these programs would compound the problem. Domestic social action may atim10

ulate overinvolvement by well-meaning nationbuildhsg experts. The Arrng eziete to provide militaru eecrtrity to the Nation+esozwcee ehould be devoted eolelg to this pat= pose. It is a basic proposition that the Army exists to defend the Nation. The Army must be skilled, tough, and ready to perform its mission in defending the country, and it must be seen ae sach by the American people who have a right to expect that several biI1ion dollars per year will produce the necessary unite with fully capable fighting troops. If such resour~ea also produce some form of social benefit, so much the better, but the funds are appropriated to provide the basic military preparedness expected by Congress and the public. U@il recently, the Army has been assigned increased social welfare responsibilities during a period of increasing defense budgets. Today, tbe situation has changed; budgets, are eteadily declining in real and absolute terms. Congressional Acceptance The major etimulus for allocation of national resources to the Army is, and must remain, basic congressional acceptance of the need for a reasonable level of general defense readiness roughly divided to meet the land, sea and air threats. It appears unlikely that social welfare projects could become a convincing rationale for allocation of additional military resources. More fundamentally, increased social welfare responsibilities could serve to dilute rather than create baeic military readiness. The problem is more basic than just diversion of resources. There is a poesibllity that assignment of social responsibilities to combat units may blur their role. Diminution or maskMiIitsry Review

similarity to watilme missions, could truly enhance combat readinese. Challenged by external criticism and internal review, the Army tohy is W-suited to address nonmilitary problems. The Army is under eerious attack-partially due to Vietnam and partially due to its role as a competitor for resources which might otherwise be available to civilian agenciee for social welfare. Seen as lax and fat hy some responsible national spokesman such as Gardner, E the
Match 1972

events moderate the current dieillueionment caueed by Vietnam. Far more serioue is the widespread questioning by responsible decision makere. Capable and dedicated Americans are in profound disagreement about the nature of the threat to the United Statee and the size and composition its Defenee Establishment ehould have. The external debate has stimulated searching internal review of policies and practicee. The Army is undergo11

THE ARMY ANII SOCIETY ing a serious questioning of confidence precipitated by V]etrmm. There is a Iurking sentiment within the Army that the Nation could have heen better served. It is a simple yet fundamental truth that the mission of the Army is to control the land and people who inhabit it. The Army, as an institution, concerns and derivea its strength from people-the challenge of the diversity of manas compared with the attradkms of machines, sea or air, which are the lifeblood of the other military services. Due to its intimate relationship with people, the Army must believe that it is accepted as a necessary, if not always, popular profession. This atmosphere of acceptance is lacking in many quarters. Traditional Capabilities Today, as in the past, the key to external acceptance and internal satisfaction is proud, capable, confident units prepared to perform traditional missions. The reestablishment of tra- ditional capabilities must take precedence over initiation of beneficial and useful career-attracting programs such as onduty educational opportunities for the soldier serving in opera. tional units. Until there are fully manned, truly trained and maintained unite, hours devoted to onduty education must detract from the development of honest mission readiness. Particularly at a time of concerned introspection, those tasks which divert reeources from unit readiness and job satisfaction within the small unit should be avoided. Current social welfare pr0gram8 are di~lt to manag8. E%pa%8i0n cauld compound the problem. Current social welfare programs have been dittbxdt for the military to manage. The normal diversity of situations 12 and requirements faced by the Army, combhed withthe temporary hut vexing probleme of Vietnamench as personnel instabitity-have required that 10CSI commanders manage many social programs. In many cases, however, local authorities have neither the knowledge nor the resources to deal with complex social phenomena. Conditioning racial attitudes, applying techniques of oub patient drug rehabllitetion, and eklll training of the marginally preduetive are examples of challenging problems which strain the limits of current social knowledge, but which essentially are -problems that local military commanders have been forced to solve. Espanded Activities In many cases, local commanders have had to address these expanded responsiblliiles with neither a lessening of existing responsibSitie8 nor an increase in resources. Most commanders are understandably cautious about releasing men from military training to attend civilian skill training or expanded educational programs unless there is. an explicit change in directed miesions or priorities. Yet acceptance of such responsibilities has seldom provided a persuasive raClonale for a reduced level of unit readiness. The time and effort is often out of the hide of already-taxed commanders and units. Under these conditions, expanded personnel activities can become a disturbing stimulant for a hypocrisy of statistical performance. Lastly, the local commander is the cutting edge, innovating at ths local level eocial change which was proposed at the theoretical level. To the average American, the innovator is not Secretary McNamara or Secretary Melvin R. Laird. It is the Army. Milikwv Review

TNE ARMY AND SOCIETY Adam Yarmolinsky has observed: The establishment has aesumsd a csrtain rssfwrraibility for stimulating social change and km ceased to bs coutented solely with maintaining the status gr60 of the somety it servee. 8 He is correct-but the burden is not borne by the establishment which comes and goes from public eervice. It is borne by the average captain and sergeant in tbe Army year after year. Dome8t$c? social action m@ stimu.. late overinvolvement by weU-meaning rmtionbuilding experts. Another effect of Vietnam has been to make many within the military profession chary of civic action reeponsibilitiee. One of the real iesues of involvement in Vietnam was the procese of overcoming institutional reluctance to commit the Army to the resolution of problems that were primarily social, economic and political. The jump from Special Forces to Regular Army participation in civic action, nationbuilding, and counterinsurgency was signitlcant. It symbolised the acceptance of social and economic action aa a conventional primary Army responsibility. For myriad reasons, the transition was done poorly. Dismayed by the Vietnam experience in social endeavore, many officers do not want to permit a similar experience in tbe United States. The Army hae thoueands of capable advocetee who have invested a decade of service in counterinsurgency. Doctrines of nationbuilding forged in Vietnam are often aeeumed to be transferable and applicable to improvement of domeetic poverty conditions. To some, domestic social action projects will at last permit the Nation to gain full value from the epeMamh 1972

cial capabilities developed for Vietnam. These advocates see increaeed social involvement in the United States as a way to maintain the capability and thus the readiness for come future contingency, while simultaneously eerving to alleviate the conditions of the ghetto or rural poor. This rationale was evident in a recent study of Army personnel policies for tbe mid-1970s: A deeper Armg involvement will improve our urr.derstamding of the causes of irrsnrgencp and the means ?weded for countering them. 9 A more indirect and disturbing assumption of domestic education and security responsibilities is aleo inferred in the same document: The Army social action role is thoroughly anchored in doctrine which dictatee that rear areae muet be kept secure so ae not to divert or weaken the eflort at the front. 10 Allocation of Resources Another vexing but oft-forgotten aspect of domestic action is tbe problem of allocation of reeources at the local level. While Army motives may be humanitarian and ptire, the allocation of resources is a function of political power. Politics is the process of resolving conflicting values and wants. When the Army provides resources to ,any civilian community, it becomes enmeshed in political proceeses. It cannot escape a role of direct or indirect influence. For example, are resources to be distributed through Republicans or Democrats? The Army can be placed in a difficult, untenable position. Special Forcee are out today conducting imaginative civic action operations in the poverty-stricken communities of the mountilnous areas of North Carolina. The danger of un13

TSE ARMY Af4D SOCIEN fortunate involvement is real. The major and abiding determinant of the proper level and nature of social responsibilities of the Army ie the basic relationship of the military profession to the social and political system it exists to defend. Thi$ relaSionshlp is dynamichighly dependent upon the perceived needs of the eociety as a whole and defense requirements placed on the Army. American Society Changing one Of the more mundane truisms today is acknowledgment that American society is changing at a rapid, if not accelerathig, pace. Various descriptions of the change have been advanced, and the more adventurous of the theoreticians have attempted to chart the future-Daniel Bells postindustrial state, Herman Kahns sensate society, Zblgniew Brzezinskie technetronic age-the third revolution, Charles Reichs consciousness III, and the accelerating change of Alvin Tofflera future shock. Each attempts to chart the dimensions of major change underway in American society, including our eense of values. Each work overwhelms with statistics of change, but ia understandably vague about probable institutional responeibllities and relationship in the future. Perhaps the fraukest admission of uncertainty comes from Gardner: Were like a man driving eighty miles per hour in a fog that permits him to see only thrity feet ahead.1 The potential impact of such rapid change may be more pronounced for the military than it is for the rest of society. It jars the conservative bias of the mititary profession and erodeo the traditional isolation which has served to preserve the professional ethic. During euch a period of change, 14 the challenge to the Army is to modify ite policies and procedures to accommodate change, while retaining that essence of order and discipline which enables a unit to eucceed in battIe. The Army has often met this challenge; but, in the past, change was effected hehind the protective barrier of isolation. SamueI P. Huntington has noted that the military profession is: . . . probably unique among sig@fcant social irwtitutiorre in the United Statee in the eztent to which it was crea(ed independent of American societg. 1~ Effects of Change Change in the past was accomplished at a relatively leieurely pace. The Army had ample time to adjust to the new values stimulated by the Industrial Revolution se it dropped from public view in the late l%h and early 20th centuries. Today, the military appears to he no longer permitted the luxury of such self-paced, isolated change. One effect of the tcchnetronic age has been to place the Army squarely in the center of the arena of rapid change. The effects of these changee upon the Armys relationship with American society are manifested in numerous ways: . National concern for the welfare of the individual has focused critical attention on the military juetice sYstem. Military justice has become a subject of critierd public attention to the extant of severely restricting the authority of the commander. . The maes comrrmnisationsmedia have maintained an unblinking eye on military activities. Griping and groueing by disgruntled servicemen consequently have become nationally advertised diesent. Nilitsrt Review

THE ARMY AND SOCiEIY . National concern for equal opportunity for minorities has encouraged creation of racial organizations within and existing apart from the military chain of command. The scourge of drug abuse has tied the military unit inexorably closer to the local community. Drug abuse can be met only through the closest coordination of policy and activity between adjacent military and civilian communities. Sivilian Isolation The problem of the moment does not appear to be military isolation from the civilian community. It is precisely the reveree, Given the apparent tendency of man in the postindustrial state toward increased social involvement and concern, the danger to national security and the military profession ia that the unique characterietice and capabilities of the profession may become eroded beyond repair by overimmeraion in such a rapidly changing value syetem. The Army must seek ways to promote the gradual adjustment to ncw American postinduetrial valuea which will retiln good order and dlecipline. The path and rate of institutional change wilt be difficult to determine. There are numerous detours along the way. Two pitfalla are: a search for national acceptance by redirecting readiness resources to eoeial welfare purposes; and presenting the false image of an institution actively suppofilng natural eocial welfare activities in order to gain the transitory support of the liberal establishment. Othere may suggest such pathe in the honest belief that the only way to maintain an Army in the future will be to deliberately blur its functional role in an array of increased general March 1972 social welfare responeibiiitiee, Such eentiment reflects the implicit fear that an army which retaina its tradL tional image and structure is not supportable in the postinduatrial America. Fiexible Posture Yarmolinsky argues that, if the Army ia to survive, it must assume a lower and more flexible posture. To Yarmolinsky, such a posture would cauee a desirable and neeeseary eroeion of miiitary values: As the mdita~ character of the mlita?y eetabliehnwnt be80me8 le88 distinctive, absolutist psrceptimw may be replaced bg mere reuJietic ones. The military may come to be regarded ae any other part of government. 18 The military character of the Military Establishment is precisely what has been found to be essential to develop the order and discipline neeessary to successful performance in war. The Army must view with caution the understandable pressures for acceptance of greeter general social welfare responsib]iities. The current Department of Defense and Aaction policy ie exceiient. It ia basically conservative of Army resources today due to the unknowns of Vietnam withdrawal and the reduced defense budget. Unfortunately, the policy may be fragile after Vietnam is resolved. For example, it is subject to substantial erosion if the Army aspires to increased social welfare reaponsibllitiee in an attempt to be liked and thereby attract volunteers, Further, the guidance may be sufficiently broad to permit well-intentioned erosion by those within and above the Army who believe it necessary to stimulate additional convergence between the Amny and eoeiety at large. ts


Project franeitlomcrirrenttybeing expandeddue to high veteran unemploy&enbpr~ vides civifianskill trainingfor combatsoldiers and thus addressesonly vetemn activity 18
Militery Review

TNE ARMY AND SOCIETY ministration after the individual is no longer expected to be militarily readyand Project One Huudred Thousand-which could be replaced with nonmilitary pretraining before an individual ie expected to be prepared to accept national defense responeibilities. Decisions on pereonnel programs with uncertain impact upon unit readinees should be decentralized to the local commander with decision guidance to plan, budget and conduct projects which he believes will contribute to improved unit readiness. Projects impacting on civilian communities would be encouraged after detailed coordination and approval by the local political, businees and labor kedership. Examples of projeete for decentralised leadership could be Special Forces operations, social actionoriented adventure training, or community relations projects such as summer camps. Other, more exteneive programs could be undertaken by the Reeerve establishment. Thie guidance would permit continuation, if not expaneion, of a wide range of current projects-which are ehown to be demonstrably neutral politically, ueeful socially and not detrimental to unit readiness. The ArmY policy theme must be willing acceptance of socially useful tasks insofar ae they contribute to the building of proud, capable units-se perceived by the local commander responsible for unit readinees. Complex major programs centrally administered and publicized such ae race training and drug rehabilitation must be aggressively supported; they genuinely increase unit reediness. Decentralization of other projecte to the local commander who ie directly and immediately responsible will continue the eeeential preeminence of traditional rolee and responsibilities of the Army. At that level, maintenance of the capability to fight ie an instinctive response. Policies such as these would reflect necessary poeitive acceptance of responeibllity to meet and solve challenging social iesuee yet preserve the unique nature of the profession. These policies and programs would be strictly subordinated to maintenance of combat readiness. However unpopular or reactionary theee policies might he, the Army must pereevere: Upon the soldiers, the defendere of OTdeTreete a heaqt rezponsibi~it!l. The greateet eewce they can rewd.w is to remain trns to themselves, to eerve with eilence and courage in the military way. If they abjure the militarg eprit, theg deetrog themselves fiT8t and their nation ultimately. 14

I Ua Department of tbe ArmY. 2%8 A~vE mow ProDmm for Uw Mo&I% Vok.tier Amw D N. eemernber 1971, ~aobeti Z. mcl@maaa, Tb Emma of SaUin 0z7Lc6, Harper & Rowfibl&hnt#: Re@dimI

mmt: Ifd

zow Pblisbee+ Inc.,zcranbm, Pa, 1071, D 406. 8IbiA, D 868. *Ua Immanent of fbe Atmw, neputr Chief of
st.wi for Personnel, DPSZ, AWW 75: Pe,-wm.l comas:, Volume 11 (Draft), 166S,u 1-26. *OIbid., P 1-22. ,1 G~jIw. OP. tit., D 84. ,9 s~jJd p. xmnti~n, Ths and the Sfnte: The 1%.owand $Witiw of Civi4 Milibmu lhive~ R6Wimw. The Zelkmp $mas of Harvard sity Pm% Cambridse. Mws.. 1967,P 288. ,s y-oIin&., op. cit., p 406. 400. ,6 nuntin~=, 0=,

Inw.t on Ammi.xI. Societu,Harper


ela,Inc.,Scranton, Pa..196s, p 181. . ,ci~c A&on: Army% Nw,.Baffl.fleld,s- Thc



I@ ZeLIt8mher 1971, P A14.

Job. W. Grmher, Tf16 Eecovwof Cowl.ia!ce. W. W. Norton & CO.. lIIC.S N.y.. 19?e, PP98fi. en., P


. wdem
~ Adam

Vohmteer Arrow Mad=



20. Yanm iirisk,

. mmdmr, OP. e!:., P

TfM Milituw E&zfdish-

tit., p




From Seaford House Papers: 1970 (Great Britain)

Civil-Military Relations inthe 19.80s


ColonelRichardF. Rosser, UnitedStates Air Force

COMMON concern in the United States is the supposed drift . of American society toward militarism. Observers claim to see persuasive evidence of a foreign policy dominated by military considerations; of the Armed Forces of the United States essentially beyond the control of the people, Congrese, and even the executive branch; and of a major segment of US industry dependent upon the war machine. The result of this military industrial complex is a complete distortion of US priorities at a time when the United States internal problems cry out for immediate attention. My theme is that such a view of civil-military relations in the United States is wrong. The drift, I will maintain, is away from militarism. It will be argued that the United States is experiencing a trend already common in other advanced nations of the West. The factors which probably witl affset US civil-military relations in the 1980s can be arbitrarily grouped under three headings: a restricted role for the military; the primacy of domestic politice; and amilitarism among the young. These factors obviously are interrelated




I CML-MILITARV RELATIONS and interdependent. For purpoees of analysis, I will examine them separately. 1. A Restricted Rele fer the Militery The American soldier before World War II served mainly in the continental United States. American society considered the Armed Forces a haven for misfits, and frowned on interchange between civilian and military eoeiety. Isolated on posts in the southern and western United States, the military turned inward, Life for the US military changed dramatically after World War II. The United States helped occupy the defeated Axis Powera, and attempted to preserve the etability of Europe and Aeia to contain communism. This fundamental revolution in peacetime US defenee policy brought a fundamental change in the mission of the US Armed Forces. Most postwar soldiers could expect to serve half or more of their careers abroad. Moreover, American society respected the American serviceman. It believed that the militav performed a vital function in protecting the Free World from communism. The Nixon doctrine indicates that the mission of the US military again may change. Vietnam surely has been a major factor in forcing a basic reThis article was reprtnted from the original, published in SEAFOSP HOUSE PAPESS: 1970, under the title, American Civi&Military Relatione in the 1980s. SEAFOSUHOUSE PAPESS are pubtiehed by the RWal College of Defence Studiee, 97 Belgrave Square, London, S.W. 1. Colonel Roaeer is Pernnznent Profeeeor and Head, Department of Political Science, US Air Force Academg, Colorado. Mamh 1972 examination of the limits of the US ability to influence the course of events in a foreign nation, and of the nature and extent of the defense commitment which the United States should give an ally. But a reduced role for the US Armed Forcee prob. ably would have come about, in any case, becauae of certain long-range trends. The threat is different. There is no apparent danger today from monolithic communism. The Soviets and the Chinese can agree on little, certainly not on any coordinated thrust against the West. The Soviets, moreover, are changing their tactics. They finally appear to have learned the folly of attempting to engineer revolution from afar. The Kremlin contifiuee to aid some revolutionary groups because it competes with the Chinese Peoples Republic. But the USSR obviously prefers to help anti-Western legitimate governments. Indeed, potentially the most exploeive conflicts today are not between the West and the Communist statea, but between the two major Communist powers, the SSR and China, and T and the Arab world. between Israe The least likely conflict of all, provided each eide respects the vital interests of the other, is a general war between the West and the Communist world. The danger is in aseuming that there is no threat whatsoever from the Soviet Union or China, and this assumption could become an article of faith among Western political elites and the electorate by the next decade. Most influential and informed West Europeans already are aaid to believe that the Soviets are not interested in military aggression. A sudden thrust from the USSR against the United States seems even more remote. 19

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS We must 1ook to military planners, who have to assumq the worst possible case, to find any serious concern over a surprise attack from the Warsaw Pact powers. Western specialists on China also claim to see little danger from the Chinese Peoples Republic, noting its generally restrained and defensive approsch to international politics in the past several decades. What the layman tends to forget is the cause-and-effect reIationsbip between military preparedness and national security. Europe, for example, must be at least partly secure because of the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Yet such an elementary fact appears to be poorly understood. A polling organization in West Germany recently found that only seven percent of a sample group of young people could explain that NATO is an alliance which links the United States and Western Europe in defense against tbe Soviet Union. Twenty-four percent knew that NATO had something to do with defense; 52 percent had no idea what NATO was; and 17 percent indulged in bizarre guesses ae to its meaning.1 Not only the threat has changed. US allies no longer seem to need US military aid to the degree once required. Western Europe may be several decades from political unity, but already appears to be an economic superpower. Japan, with the third largest gross national product in the world and one of the smallest defense expenditures in relation to gross national product (0.8 percent in 1969), clearly could carry a greater share. As US allies grow stronger, an understandable dislike can arise for reliance on the US nuclear umbrella. General de Gaulle was the first to carry this to its logical extreme-the development of a truly independent 20 nuclear deterrent. It is too soon to determine whether a more closely integrated Europe or a more independent Japan will follow the same path. Barring some dramatic reversal of Soviet or Chkese policy, US public opinion may dictate a greatly reduced US presence in Europe and Asia by the 1980s, and inadvertently spur the development of independent n@ear deterrents. A Louis Harris poll commissioned by !l%ne magazine in 1969 could not find a majority of Americans who would use nuclear weapons to defend any other country, The high runner-was Canada, but only 17 percent would risk the use of US nuclear armory to defend that intimate neighbor. In the case of Italy, a staunch NATO ally, 27 percent would opt for the use of US military (not nuclear) force, and 15 percent would offer help short of force. Thirty-seven percent would refuse to aid Italy at all while 21 percent were not sure.z The utility of conventional forces inevitably is being questioned. Perhaps the sharpest test will come if the US ground troop contribution to NATO is reduced in the next few years. Conventional forces in NATO already are officially declared to be at a minimum. Western European NATO Defense Ministers reportedly have agreed in principle on strengthening the European pillar within NATO to try to etave off or reduce the prospective US troop withdrawal. The implementation of this agreement, however, will not be easy. The West Germans have refused for Political reasons even to consider increasing their NATO forces, preferring to raise their financial contribuKlon. Britain, according to official sources in Laidon, conld supply one or two extra battalions at the most to its army on the Rhine.s Military Review

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS If it is difficult to find enthusiasm in Europe for maintaining conventional forces in 1970, it may be even more difficult in the United States in 1980. The utility of ground forces for the protection of North America will seem even less relevant than their utility in Western Europe. NATO forces in that area at least have faced Communist armies along a tangible Iron Curtain. One factor may mitigate against the trend to reduce the conventional ground forces in the advanced countries of the Westthe appearance of domestic violence on a large scale and the use of armies for internal security. Most armies have done similar duty sometime in their history. But the necessity today is still a shock to the advanced societies; they supposedly had progressed to a state of internal harmony where even the police function might eventually be reduced. * * * The Western military, in short, will still exist in the 1980s. The question will be their size and effectiveness. There does not seem to be any particular minimum force level for national defense in an era of declining missions. Il. The Primacy of Domestic Politics A second major factor affecting civil-military relations in the United States in the 1980s probably will be the primacy of internal political, economic, and eocial issues in the minds of the public, and the relative lack of interest in international problems. One could argue that such ie the natural tendency in the political process of a democracy. The individual understandably feels strongest about those things which directly affect him: the cost of living, wages, taxes, social services, and law and order. This nafi
March 1972

ural tendency in politics is interrupted by war which focuses attention on the external threat to the Nation. It also is interrupted by international crises such as the Cuban missile confrontation in 1962. With the end of the dramatic encounters characteristic of the cold war years, it probably was inevitable that people in the West again should think primarily about their personal well being. And this factor, in turn, made the .Vietnam conflict seem such an anachronism to many in the United States and Europe. They could not eee a grave danger to the West of a coalition or even a Communist government in the Republic of Vietnam. The domino effect of an all-Communist Vietnam seemed an even more remote threat. But more than the end of the cold war is responsible for the primacy of internal questions and, particularly in the case of the United States, their urgency. The relatively prosperous Weetern Nations now have the economic means to eliminate poverty in their societies. The contradiction between the economically possible and the political and social reality is increasingly obvious. Affluent democratic societies also are especially vulnerable targets for minority groyp grievances. In the absence of threats to national security or of internal economic criees, such groups see no reason to hold back claims on the majority for equality of political, economic, and social rights and benefite. Elections in the Western Natione are a pa~lcularly significant indicator of public concentration on domestic issues. In the British election of June 1970, the question of continuing the pullback East of Suez was hardly mentioned. Even the Common Mar21

CML.MILITARY RELATIONS ket issue was ignored. This was partly because all major party leaders had agreed that Britain should join the European Economic Community (EEC). But if debate had broken out, it probably would have centered on the kind of impact Britilns entry into the EEC would have on local food prices. The longer range political im~lications of joining the EEC, clearly seen by political leaders, would have received little attention. A foreign policy issue did play a major role in the US presidential and congressional elections of 196S-Vietnam. But here the question was how to pull outimmediately or with varying degrees of honor. No presidential aspirant suggested that thk was the kind of war Americans might have to fight again in some other, dMant country. In contrast, the question of the adequacy of the defense budget the supposed missile gaphad played an important part in the 1960 presidential election. The most suggestive evidence of the increasing primacy of domestic concerns in the Western democracies is found in the relative share of their national resources allocated to defense, and in the manner by which they allocate that share. Because the budget and the budgetary process are so significant, I will discuss them in some detail. I also will need to distinguish among the countries of Europe and North America in this respect because the various Western democracies are at different stages in shifting priorities from international issues to domestic issues. Defense budgete in Western Europe appear to be determined primarily by domestic political considerations. The critical criterion ie what the legislature and public will etand, not strategic need. f2

Naturally, political leadere play an important role in forming the publics image of the threat. But any Western politician who attempts to increase defense expenditures today, let alone merely maintah them at their present level, faces major roadblocks. He has great difficulty in convincing the public of a possible frontal attack by the Wareaw Pact powers on NATO. The real dangers are more subtle and thus more difficult to explain: the complexities of escalator politics or nebulous future confrontations in the third world. lhe Western politician has a further problem. NATO has come to rely increasingly on the US nuclear deterrent for Europes defense. Even the credibility of the French Force de Frappe depende in the last analysis on the US deterrent, How will a Western political leader in the coming decade justify even a reasonable figure of his countrys gross national product for d$fense needs, particularly if these funds are to pay for conventional forces which seem to the public to be increasingly irrelevant for the defense of Europ%r the North American Continent. A given percentage of a gross national product for defense expenditure ie hardly sacrosanct. Indeed, France is not the only NATO country which is gradually decreasing the percentage of its gross national product spent on defense. The ratio between defense expenditure and grose national product, of course, is hardly an exact guide. The actual amount spent on defense can increase although the percentage of gross national product declines where an economy is experiencing h]gh economic growth. Western Germany, in 196S, spent almost $5 billion on defense, 6.7 percent of its gross national


CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS product; in 1969, defense expenditures rose to almost $7.3 bWion, 4.7 percent of the gross national product.i Nevertheless, there would seem to he a danger in the increasing tendency to think of defense expenditure primarily in terms of a percentage of a natione groee national product. An appropriate defenee effort can be eoundly constructed only if it ie baeed on a fairly realietic aesesement of the percent and future threats to national eecurity. The defenee budget in the United Statee ie not yet subordinated to domeetic political or economic coneideratione, but there are eigne that this may come about long before 1980. Such a development has heen retarded by a number of factors: the great economic wealth of the United States and the relatively light strain on the US economy of defense expenditure during the poetwar years; the leeding role of the United States in the non-communiet world and the dependence of thie eector on the US deterrent; the preoccupation of leading US political figuree in the executive branch and Congreee with the Communiet threat or international politice; and, finally, the involvement in Vietnam in the latter part of the 1960e. The military, on the other hand, hardly were given a blank check. The growing coeta of weapon eysteme in the 1960e, especially syeteme for nuclear deterrence, meant that come limit had to be placed on defense epending. Thie need wae buttressed by the philosophical political principles of the new Republican administration in 1952--pledged to reduce expendL turea, lower taxee, and balance the budget. Secretary of Defense McNamara introduced the major revolution in w:rcb 1972 defense budgeting in the early 1960s. For the firet time, the services had to relate their force structures to epecific foreign policy objeethwa. The cepabilitiee ~of Pobzria submarines were compared directly with land-based intercontinental ballietic mieeilee and bomber aircraft. The Secretary of Defense then selected those systems which were politically relevant and economically feasible. Yet the new budgetary approach dld not lead to lower defense expenditures. President Kennedy found that the Eieenhower administration bed continued to place all of ite egge in the nuclear baeket: The basic defense plans rested on the aeeumption of total nuclear war. Conventional weepons and ground forces were at a dangerously low level. Kenuedy wae told a few weeke after h]e inauguration that 10,000 men dispatched to South: east Asia would deplete the strategic reeerve. K]e atilnietration went to Congrees in March 1961 with a requeet to raise the defense budget. Flexible response was to replace maesive retaliation. The defense budget and the Armed Forcee expanded greatly after 1965 to meet the eoetc of the Vietnam war (from eight percent of the gross national product in 1965 to 9.2 percent in 1968). And this expansion to pay for probably the meet unpopular war in American h]etory triggered the first eerioue debate in the United States since World War II about foreign and domestic priorities. Fuel wae thrown on the tire with the eigne of a new and extremely costly eeeelation of the etrategic arms race, specifically the propoeal to install an antiballistic missile system. The United States internal probleme with its cities, its black minority, poverty, crime, and education also ap23

CIYIL.MIUTARY RELATIONS peered to be reaching a crieis stage. Theee preasuree coincided with President Nixons election in 1968. The Nixon administration seems to have abandoned McNamaras search for a rational calculation of the proper level of defense spending. The defense budget ceiling is now determined by calculating the expected revenue and subtracting the money needed for necaeeary domestic programs. This resulted in a planned $6 billion reduction in defense expenditures for 1971, primarily by cutting manpower and weapons for the conventional forces. Contingency planning in the Pentagon will be based on mainbdning a Cepabllity to fight one and one-half wars at any given moment rather than two and one-half wars (McNamaras famous pbmning figure). The goal for the deterrent forces will be nuclear sufficiency rather than parity or superiority. But defense planning runs UP againet stubborn domestic probleme such as inflation and the pressure to end the draft. The Presidente target for 1972 appeared to be a $70 billion defense budget-7 billion less than the estimate for 1970, and 10 billion less than the Vietnam high. When the budget actually went to Congress, it was around 75 billion. Eight hundred million was added to the seven billion research and development budget for new weapons. But most of the increaee went for eoaring manpower costs while the general decline continued in the number of shlpe, planee and men in the Armed Forces. the military industrial complex. This group ie a new phenomenon in poehvar US politics, and probably will play a highly significant role in US defenee policy in the next decade. It is important to investigate its origine. The exeeutive branch initiated budgetary cute for the Armed Forcee in the first two decades after World War II. There was no eignitlcant ,congressional preseure for lowering the military budget and no critical scrutiny of weapons programs. Legislator considered euch queetions highly technical, and national security eeemed clearly at stake. The.rise of serious congressional criticism in tbe later 1960s of the defense budget reeulted from a number of factors, some mentioned earlier: the attempt to redefine the US role in the world as a result of the frustration of Vietnam; certain longrange trende-the economic growth of Weetern Europe and Japan, the increasing eeverity of the US internal problems and an awarenees of the~ existence. There were additional factors which have not been noted. The Vietnam war, for example, severely tarnished the preetige of the US military. They were charged with inefficiency, indecisiveness, body count psychology, brutality, and heavy-handedmethode in dealing with conscientious objectors and dissenters within the services.fi The military were even challenged on questions of tactica-a eubject on which they should be the recognized experts. Some observers, basically sympathetic to the military, claimed that the Armed Forces did not understand the eeeential nature of the Vietnam war itself. Other recent events have not helped the military image: A congressional report eaw the North Korean capture of the Pueblo as an Mllitw R@viBW

The 1971 and 1972 reductions n defense spending, however, ma~ not satiefy the growing group of congressional critics of the military and of 24

example of a bureaucratic structure that had grown so vast and complex that it was unable to respond swiftly to a major crisis. Criticism of the military extended to the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense. Former Secretary of Defense McNamaras overly optimistic judgments in the middle 1960s on the probable course of the Vietnam war were ridiculed. But his managerial streamlining of the Department of Defense also was criticized. Forty-five Congressmen published a report in 1969 demanding that Congress reassert control over the military bureaucracy: and blaming McNamaras rationalization of the defense structure, in part, for what they consider the undue influence of the military in American society. The former Secretary declared that he had lost only two percent of his battles with the military industrial complex, but antimilitarists saw only that the Armed Forces were far stronger and better financed than they had been in 1960. Equally damaging to the image of all military and civilian members of the Department of Defense and of the defense industries have been investigations into contracting and procurement practices. Senator PrOxmires subcommittee on Economy in Government charged that the C5A was costing some $2 billion more than originally estimated. Proxmire claimed that it was a normal practice for most major weapons systems to cost at least twice their original estimate.e It is hard to escape tbe conclusion that US defense expenditures increasingly will be determined by general economic considerations, and will come into competition with what are
March 1972

thought to be equally compelling, if not overriding, domestic needs. The US military is entering an era experienced by the military of other Western Nations for a decade or more. There ie a final development which underlies all that I have been saying about the primacy of domestic.politics, and which may have profound implications for the future conduct ~f foreign and defense policy by tbe Western democracies. For the first time in recorded history, the essential monopoly of the elites on the formulation of foreign and defense policy is being seriously challenged. The mature industrial states were democratized, in theory, during the 19th and early 20th centuries; today, they are being democratized in fact. Populations are becoming mobilized politically as a result of mass education, universal and rapid communication, leisure to consider political questions, and, most of all, a feeling of competence to handle such questions. The elites of the past, largely tbrougb their control of the socialization process, were able to indoctrinate young and old with the desired foreign and defense policy goals. The careful attention now given by the US presidency and Congress to public rumblings regarding Vietnam shows dramatically that the attempts of the policymeMng elites to form public opinion face increasing difficulty. We are not yet at the point where every voter has an intelligent and informed opinion about all issues. There are also exceedingly difficult mechanical problems in translating public opinion into any kind of useful and accurate guide for policymakers. Nevertheless, the impact of a potentially concerned and mobilized public on policy implementation should be carefully considered by a Western 25

CWIL-MILITARY RELATIONS etatesman before he commits his nation in the future to a foreign venture which might prove unpopular. He almost certainly will be more selective about the uee of military powerat home, as well as abroad. He will be particularly ry of expensive weapons systems h h tend to multiply in ethnological generacost with eve b tion. The danger is that mobilized public opinion may frustrate foreign and defense policy decisions which, although unpopular, are important to national eecurity. Increased interest by an informed public may not always be in the public interest. Ill. Amilitarism Among the Young The third major factor which will affect civil-military relations in the United States in the 1980s is the attitude of contemporary youth toward the military, in general, the military as a profession, the concept of military service, and the use of force in international relationsin effect, toward those concepts summarized in the West Point code of behavior: Duty, honor, country. I will crudely characterize the predominant attitude of American youth toward the military in the next decade as militarism. I define amilitarism ae apathy toward the military ,and all thinge connected with it. Amilitariem is not the normal description of the current attitude of many American youth toward the military. We generally see the phraee antimilitarism, and there is no doubt that this attitude exists. The young men who make the headlines by burning draft cards, etorming the Pentagon, and distributing underground newspapers on Army posts are not indifferent to the military. Because antimilitariem has occnrred earlier in this century, the older gen26 eration in the United States temde to brush it off as transitory. Thla is largely true. Antimilitarism is never static. It seems to be greater in a given Western eociety: (1) the higher the rate of technological advance and sociological upheaval; (2) the more unpopular the functions the Armed Forces perform, externally and internally; and (3) the larger, more obvious, and more expensive the Military Establishment. Starting from these assumptions, the United States qualifies as the society experiencing the greatest degree of antimilitarism today-. .* */* Here, we turn to the central problem of this section: What will be the impact of the attitude of youth toward the military on Armed Forcee recruiting in the 1980e? I will examine this question with the assumption that the present eystem of selective military service (the draft ) will be phased out sometime in the 1970s. The Armed Forces, then, will rely completely on volunteers. Establishment college youth may provide a sufficient reeervoir of officer manpower. Military recruiters eeem to think so, balancing the loss of Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) units at prestigious IvY League universities with the other schools on the waiting Iiet for units, and drawing hope from the increasing number of ROTC graduates. The critical imponderable ie what happens to this major source of officer recruitment if, a Volunteer Army becomes a reality. Young men appear to join ROTC primarily so that they may avoid the draft and finish college, and later serve as officers rather than as enlisted men. This motivation is graphically demonMilitary Ilaview

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS strated by the small percentage of ROTC graduates who continue in the service after their initial Only H percent of Army ROTCsource officers extended beyond their minimum obligation in 1970; 27 percent of regular Navy ROTC-eource officers; and 38 percent of Air Force ROTC-eource officers. Tbe retention rate for each service appears to be steadily declining. In 1961, the Army retained 32 percent of a comparable group; in 1965, 21 percent.? A somewhat higher percentage of officers from the various Officer Candidate Schools, the second most important commissioning source, remain in the eervice. A majority of academy graduates remain, but even that percentage may be declining. Moreover, the academies provided Ieee than five percent of the new officere entering the services in 1970 (2,300 out of 58,000) . There is a further queetion, rarely asked, about officer recruiting in the absence of the draft: What kind of young men will volnnteer for the officer ranks ? There would not be the broad spectrum now in the service at this level. We just have noted the lose of ROTC units at Ivy League schools and the disaffection of the liberal arts students from the establiehment. In short, there is the prospect of an officer corps increasingly unrepresentative of society ae a whole. I am not concerned, however, with the supposed danger of an isolated military caste backed by an outof-control military industrial complex. The problem is that a modern armed force neede highly intelligent officers with training in all the disciplines. Moreover, the military would seem to have much more empathetic eupport for ite needs if it is broadly representative of society. March 1972 The recruiting eituation where enlisted men are concerned ie even less encouraging. Draftees comprise only 20 to 25 percent of the Armys etrength, but Pentagon studies show that 38 percent of the enlisteee in all the services would not have volunteered without the preseure of the draft. The Air Force, for example, admits that it hae had young men with high IQs waiting in line to volunteer in order to avoid the Army. How, then, do we man the Armed Forces, and procure the right kind of personnel? The Presidents Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, the Gates Commission, believes the primary answer to be better pay, especially for first-term officers and enlisted men. However, there is considerable doubt as to whether a mere pay raise is sufficient inducement to procure the required numbers of men, with the proper skills, and to keep them in the eervice after their initial commitment. For in the coming decade, the United States will see the further development of trends which will make even the young man who is essentially promilitary think twice before joining the Armed Forces, regardless of pay. I described one of these trende in the first section of this paperthe declining world role for the US military. The US Armed Forces have yet to enter the era of a drastically altered mieeion. Yet we can gain some idea of the impact of the change in the nature and scope of an Armed Forces mission or recruiting by noting the British experience. Young British gentlemen, in former yeare, joined the army or its colonial offehoots for travel, excitement, leisure, sport, and congenial companionship. Many thought that this was the only way of life, coming from families 27


CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS where military service was hereditary. The lure of advel]ture in distant lands was a powerful motivation for enlistment-not service in Britain. Even the enlisted ranks, largely composed of Irish peasants and urban poor, must have been attempting to escape a confining environment at homes Life for a British soldier today is quite different. He probably will spend most of his career in Europe, primarily in his home country. Unfortunately, the densely populated areas of Europe are not conducive to active soldiering. Moreover, in Britain, the standard of living of the offker corps, in particular, is considerably below that which had been typical of imperial postings. The British soldier is part of a deterrent force which we all hope will never be used. But what happens to armies when they never fight ? The populace begins to question whether they are really necessary, and a young man inevitably asks whether eervice in the armed forces is worthwhile. He may see combatp but only in performing internal security duty, and there is no more distasteful and frustrating assignment for a military man in Western society. This is not the enemy he expected. are a case in point. They are handpicked, highly trained, and motivated seamen. Yet such men are leaving the service in increasing numbers. They spend 60 days underwater, then 90 daye in port-60 of these 90 daya involve intensive training. Many of. ficers have been assigned to submarine sea duty for up to 17 years. If they leave the Navy and join private industry, they earn more money, spend every night with their familiea, and still are doing a task which is considered a eervice to the community. The contract between other jobs in the qivilian and military communities may not be as great, but it is there. There are relatively few jobs left in a modern military organization which are completely unekllled or lack a civilian equivalent. The services need computer programmers,missile repairmen, electronic technician, jet engine mechanics, and pilotsthe liet of skilled occupation is almost endless. Advanced societies have an equal need for such valuable skills, and aeon will probably offer 35-hour working weeks with considerably higher pay for almost exactly the came kind of work. The former enfisted man is particularly relieved to be through with the Mickey Mouse annoyance of KP, reveille, barracks life, and inspections.e A third trend militating against recruiting for the erdieted ranks is hard to quantify, but definitely exists. Societal values are ehifting in the United States toward increaeed individualism, equality, and cultural and educational uniformity. The average young recruit entering the service today is likely to be at least a high school gradnate, expecting to earn $600 to $800 a month and have his own car in civilian life; a decade ago, he rarely would have graduated from Militcvy ROVISW

There is a second trend which will make the services less attractive. I refer to the increasing contrast between life in the military and life ae a civilian in the mature industrial state. A man can be patriotic, satietied with the pay, and etill not enlist or extend because of the relative hardship of life in the military compared with a similar job in the civilian economy. Pokvris nuclear submarine officers 28

high school, and his earning expectations were much more modest, Yet this young man still goes through the traditional derogatory and harsh recruit indoctrination procedures.10 The significance of the egalitarian ethic for the enlisted man does not necessarily diminish after basic training. Indeed, it may grow as he comee into closer contact with the officer ranks. Based on personal experience, I can testify that a considerable number of enlisted men no longer accept the Armed Forces definition of an 05cer. They do not believe a college education is a sufficient distinction eince many enlisted men have or gain a college education while in service. (Enlisted men who enter eervice with college degreee are primarily drafteee). Air Force enlisted men, moreover, do not believe that a pilot is automatically qnalified to be an officer. It may be that, in many service specialties, the traditional distinction between officer and enlisted man ie no longer relevant and, indeed, ie a needless irritant. Discipline and rank certainly muet be maintained, but there could he equal opportunity for all to advance through the ranks. Police forces have operated on this principle for decades. The officer strncture itself is no longer free from the egalitarian trend in American society. The Concerned Officers Movement7 consisting of come 250 active duty junior officers mainly educated in northeastern schools, has made national headlines by speaking out against the war in Vietnam. But even more extraordinary is the fact that the Ieadere of thle movement initially were considered to be excellent young naval officers with impeccable academic and military records in ROTC or 05cer Candidate School. One of these men commented, MaWI 1972

The Navy has no questioning, and Id just spent four years questioning things. Establishment youth cannot totally eecape wondering about the system while at a university. What is more natural than to question the first organization they jointhe military. A fourth trend in the advanced eocieties also affects both the officer and enlisted ranks: the nature of the commitment to the organization. In mature Weetern eocieties, an individual with a skill ie highly mobile. He does not feel the same degree of loyalty as did hie father to a given company, industrial concern, or educational institution. The professional man supposedly ie loyal to at least his profession. But even this may be breaking down. Medical doetore, for example, are charged with having forgotten their Hippocratic oath; professor, their studente. This trend finds its inevitable reflection in the service. Older officers cannot understand why younger officere are not philosophically and psychologically committed to a 30-year career when they receive their commission. In part, military professionalism, like profeeeionalism in other areas, is weakening. Why ehotdd an officer make sacrifices for an ideal, a young captain asks, when few others in society are prepared te forego the good life ? Perhaps the biggest challenge to the concept of military professionaliem is the need for specialization in all ranks. Young men in the service increasingly think of themselves as meteorologieta,. eeonomiets, electrical engineere, political scientists, and nuclear physicists. If they have a commitment, it is primarily! to their patilcular profession or dmcipline, and secondarily to the military profeeeion. 29

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS The Mlicer today with a professional skUl may be moat conmrned shout his opportunitiee to practice his particular specialty and to advance in that specialty. He wiU stay in the service if he considers that hle opportunities in thla regard are equal or better than in the civilian community. To put it bluntly, hls basic question is what can the organization offer himnot what can he offer the organisation. Recent surveys indicate this trend. A motivation survey of 400 junior oslicers in the US Air Force t.bk year indicated that job dissatisfaction, the promotion system, and family separation were listed as the prime deterrents to an Air Force career. Pay and living condltiona were the last of their concerns.11 The American soldier is much better off today in regard to pay, training, and living conditions than hk predecessor. But the attractiveness of his job alwaye is relative. And the Armed Forces demand a degree of commitment, of professionalism, of sacrifice, and of hardship which increasingly divergee from that demanded hy other sectors of an advanced, democratic society. Above all, he will be aeked in the coming decades to accomplish tasks which probably will be both more difficult and less popular. Conclusion The dangers of prediction are well known, especiaUy when forecasting political and social aspects of society. Alfred Vagta wrote some years ago that we all would soon live in mihtarist societies; Harold LaasweU,that we would move toward the garrison state. I am attempting to demonstrate that this has not happene?, and will he even less probable in the advanced, democratic societies of the West, spe30

cifically the United States, by the next decade. Instead of militarism, these statca maybe entering an era of civilianism.lz 1 may be wrong. Certain of the trends I describe could be reversed or modified. For example, changes in leadership in the Soviet Union or China could lead to much more beUicose policies against the West. If the threat was clear, the worst days of the cold war might be repeated. There also could he changes in the internal political climate in the United States. The so-called silent majorit# might find its voice. On the other hand, I ati not sure exactly what it would say. An emphasis on law and order internally would not necessarily lead to more money for the armed forces. If civilianism does come to prevail, I will not quarrel with such a state provided the timing is right. Like most professional soldiers, I hope that the military eventually will be an anachronism. My concern is that Weetern societies may downgrade the necessity of having to rely on force before such action is warranted. For there is no indication yet that national security in the last analysis can depend on other than national defense forces and solidly constructed alliances. Once a society begins to downgrade its armed forces, a deacendlng spiral seems to take hold. The less valued the military function by the public, the fewer good men who join the military. The fewer good men in the military, the more derogatory the opinion of the public about the armed forces -and the less money appropriated, At some point, the spiral will stop. Few in the Weat are ready for unilateral disarmament. The unanswerable question is whether the resulting armed force will be aufflcient to supMllltay Review

port a sosietys foreign and defense polisy. For it is doubtful whether any general war in the future between the majore powere will permit leieurely mobilisation. Even minor crises be-

tween major powers require. forces in being. And an armed force onse torn asunder is not easily or quickly rebuilt in the lest deeades of the 20th century.

* The Ba4thor6

SW, 80 August1970. 92Vnw, 2 MUY 1969. 8T& Dai4y Tthraph, 2 OCtaber 1970.

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10 See the Critique bq C40nelSamuel Ii. bra, What b Wrong With Indmtton Proceh?m?, PDS-7.It should & AfJitasu RWi9W, Mq 1S70, noted O@ tbe US Army is now caref@r review. Imr its badie tnirdlw lxvgram in respect ta mob WOA.ismm

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SIOP fare, and they have introduced a magnitude of destructive power and a compression of time and distance that profoundly affect the traditional mission and functions of the armed services. This has had a tremendous impact on strategic operations plans and has complicated their potential execution. Thus, our existing nuclear weapons inventory must be programed for optimum results in the event deterrence fails. This plan is the Single Integrated operational Plan (SIOP) whkh, within the framework of national policy, is the responsibility of the Joint Stategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) at Offutt A& Force Base, Nebraska. In his 1970 foreign policy repor~ President Richard M. Nixon stated the adminietratione reasons for maintaining three separate strategic weapona systeme-intercontinental ballistic missiles, eubmarine launched miseiles and strategic aircraft. Such a triad, in the Presidents words: . . . providee inwrance against eurprise e?wmy technological breakthrough or unforeseen operational failure8 and complicate the task of pbwning attacks on us. As the general war plan of the United States, the SIOP pro~des for the coordination and possible employment for this energetic trihd of offensive nuclear forcee in major strategic attacks against potential enemies. Scope of Plan In visualizing the scope of the plan, imagine one single operation that brings together and coordinate more destructive power than that used by all belligerents in all theaters during World War II-and all of the other wars in hhtory. Imagine also that the duration of this retaliatory operationthe time period for the application of vast destructive poweris relatively short, its intensity is high, and that readinesa for execution is wqrldwide, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, year round. This is a general id= of the JSTPSS planning job. And through it all runs the salient goal of deter. rence, greatly enhanced by simplicity of execution. For no matter how, dif ficult the job of integrating and coordinating forces, their timing and their match with the targeta, execution must be Straightforward and reliable. 22

Ca@tiin Mark D. Marleka b with the Joint Strategic Target Ptmming Staff (Joimt Chiefs of Staff), Offutt Air Force Baae, Nebrashw. He halo% a B.S. from St. Benedtcts College, Atchieon, Kansas; and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Nebroalm. He he completed the 12month Russian conree at the Defense Langnagr. Inetitnte and was Chief of the Language Dimeion, US Anay Secarity Agcncg Training Center and School, and commander of Company G, US Amw Security Agemxt Trab ing Regivwnt. He served in Vietnam with the 9d Marine Diviaioa (Rei+ forced) aa intelligence liaieon ofier. March 1972

SIOP In 1946, when the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was formed, it alone in the world wae armed with nuclear weapons and there was no need for a JSTPS. SAC Headquarter had sole responsibility for targeting and mission assignment, eseuring tbe best application of nuclear resources and preventing conflicts and duplication in strategic air operations. Hforts l)uplicatad Technical miniaturization, the advent of electronic computers, sophisticated management techniques, and dynamic research and development programs have greatly expanded and diversified our national nuclear attack capability over the past two decades. A variety of manned and unmanned nuclear weapon delivery systems have been developed by the four military services and assigned to the unified and specified commands. This naturally led to a duplication of effort as each commander prepared target lists and attack plans which emphasized the threat in his area of responsibility. Without an existing unilateral nuclear command or even a coordinating staff, synchronization of various attack scenarios became subordinate to the needs of the individual commander. Several approaches were euggested as a solution to this problem, ranging from plane for revising the existing worldwide nuclear coordinating conferences to establishment of an all-encompassing US Strategic Command. By 1959, the then Secretary of Defense, Thomas S. Gates, Jr., realized that the mounting coordination question called for decisive steps, and he thus decided to effect a compromise between the various proposals advanced by the three military services. 34 The JSTPS wae established in August 1960 out of this compromise es a eeperate agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Gates has since referred to thie decision as the most important he had participated in while Secretary of Defense. Mr. Gates further directed that the JSTPS be located at SAC Headquarters to take advantzge of ite extensive targeting and intelligence facilities, computer support, and expertise gained from years of experience as the Nations primary nuclear force. He appointed the Commander in Chi~f, S t r a t e g i c Air Command (CINCSAC), as the Director, Strategic Target Planning (DSTP). General Bruce K. Holloway has been CINCSAC and DSTP since 1968. His Deputy Director, JSTPS, is Navy Vice Admiral Kent L. Lee. The staff is now comprised of more then 300 men and women-66 percent are from the Alr Force, 26 percent are Navy and Marine Corps representatives, and about 10 percent are Army personnel. Operations Planning The first National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and SIOP was completed and approved by the Secretary of Defense in December 1960-less than four months after the JSTPS was established. The responsibility of the JSTPS has since been concentrated primarily in the ares of operations planning selecting strategic targets, ranking them in priority, and then designating the appropriate attack weapona from those made available for SIOP planning. Major nuclear planning goals have been spelled out in the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addiMilitafy Rewiaw



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estimates, conducts defense and penetration analyses, and makee recommendation for the suppression of defensive targets, The Targets Branch develops the actual target and desired ground zero (DGZ) systems, estabIiehes force weight of effort by developing preplanned damage expectancy, performs damage analysis, and pubIiehes the NSTL. Analytical studies of, current and future SIOP revisions are conducted by the Integral AnaEysis Branch which also determines the consequence of SIOP execution. The Computer Programs Branch provides direct automated intelligence and document preparation support. Target planning by the NSTL Division centers on the preparation and maintenance of National Strategic Target Data Baee (NSTDB). The NSTDB ia a refinement of the Target Data Inventory which is published by 35

tion to preparing and revising this guidance, review and approve the development of the target systems and the proposed employment of strategic forces planned by JSTPS. To accomplish these functions, the JSTPS is organized into two working divisions composed of selected operations and intelligence specialists. The namee of the two divisions coincide with the two most important products-the National Strategic Target List and the Single Integrated Operational Plan. The National Strategic Target Lk.t Division prepares a succinct list of significant targete upon a continuing analysis of all-source intelligence data. The NSTL Divieion consists of the estimates, targets, integral analysis, and compnter programs branches. Generally speaking, the Estimates Branch gathers and processes intelligence information, develops threat
MIsch t972

SIOP the Defense Intelligence Agency as an outgrowth of the World War II Air Force Bombing Encyclopedia. This inventory is studied in detail. Priority targets which fall under the guidance of the Joint Chiefs of Stetf are established, and the inventory ie distilled into a comprehensive strategic target data base. Desired ground zeros to cover the targets in the data base are selected with the aid of computers and are individually checked by NSTL personnel to insure that each target in the data base has at least one associated DGZ and that the required target coverage or level of damage is achieved. These are combinsd in the National Strategic DGZ List, or NSDL. The primary inpute, then, of the NSTL Division to the SIOP include the National Strategic Target Data Base, Target List and DGZ List. In addition, the NSTL Division aleo uses Defense Intelligence Agency inputs to produce eetimatee of the SinoSoviet offensive and defensive threat. These estimates are obviouely of great importance. For instance, JSTPS is vitally interested in what attrition rate-or, conversely, what probability of arrivalshould be used in planning missile and aircraft strikes. Hostile Environment The hostile environment that must be taken into account includes sophisticated fighter-interceptors, surfaceto-air missiles, and antiaircraft guns of many calibers supported and aseisted by both ground and airborne radar. In addition, antiballistic miesile defenee is analyzed for its impact upon the Minuteman, Titan, Polaris and Poseidon miesile force. With regard to Soviet force etructure, NSTL estimates Soviet doctrine and concepts used in employing their 36 land based mieeiles, their strategic aircraft, and their eea launched balIietic miseiles under varying conditions of conflict initiation. These estimates are used in a timely analysis termed the Consequences of Executionwhich predicts how well the United States would do with the SIOP if it were to be executed. The Single Integrated Operational Plan Divieion is comprised of the combat plans, tactics, reconnaissance and SIOP analyeis branches. It prepares and maintains tbe integrated strategic war plan and conducts war gay analyees under various scenarios. Force Application Conceptual planning conducted by the SIOP Division is followed by force application which entda developing force planning factors, selecting optimum weapon systems for specific objectives, and mating the SIOP force with the precision essential to penetrate enemy defensee and assure target destruction. To complicate such planning, none of the modern nuclear weapons in the world today have ever been exposed to or tested in nuclear combat. The SIOP Division must examine such things as the type of weapon that should be allocated against a particular target, how to ronte the aircraft, and bow to prevent interferences between weapons. With the aid of the SAC computer framework, information is readily available on virtually every nuclear delivery vehicle and weapon in the United States inventory. Ability to eurvive an attack, system reliability and accuracy, as well as projected abllity to penetrate defenses, are all combined by the JSTPS in terms of statistical probability at a point in time. Mimsry Review

SIOP The SIOP Division develops the plan, covering the strategic target list with the forces available. In doing so, the SIOP Division must consider some oth,er important factore, including the most Sikely conditions of plan initiation, forces and weapons available and their characteristics, and capability estimates of possible enemies. Significantly, the SIOP Division considers attack timing, tactics, and force postures as well as producing the Coordinated Reconnaissance Plan which is destined for use in the trana and post-SIOP time frames. SIOP Kept Current The SIOP is constantly updated to reflect those changes in targets and forces which require prompt adjustment to the ope~ational plan. Should a new priority target appear or a target priority be altered to reflect new conditions, moditlcations ,are introduced into the current plan. The SIOP is also changed to distribute the targets of a weapons carrier which has undergone a change in operational status because of maintenance or modification-an example of which would he the addition of a short range attack missile capability to the bomber force. To compensate for new strategic developments, every six months the SIOP undergoes a major revision which incorporates all daily changes, future force projections, and the innumerable variables which require refinement to align military forces, assign targeta and assess the outcome of periodic war games activity. Two distinct study groups support the JSTPSthe Strategy Panel and the Scientific Advisory Group. The Strategy Panel, an in-house organization, concerns itself primarily with preplanning SIOP tactics and stratMarch le72

egy one to two years in advance of ite effective date. Through its subordinate working committees, the panel investigates future targets, the impact of new weapons systems and their optimum employment. The nature of some problems are such, however, that it is necessary to refer them to the Scientific Advisory Group which is comprised of noted military and civilian scientists. This group has examined such wide-ranging topics as nuclear burst phenomenology, weapon effects and certain foreign weapon anomalies. Full.Time Representation The JSTPS also has full-time representation from those commanders in chief who have forces ,involved in the SIOP. They furnish timely information on forces committed to the SIOP (JSTPS has neither forces nor weapons), and, together with pereonnel from both NSTL and SIOP Divisions, participate in the force application process for their areas of special geographical interest. In addition, each military service has an assigned senior member workhg directly for the deputy director. SIOP planning actually spans a considerable period of time both in preplanning force application and actual weapon laydown. During a particular and hypothetical planning phase, SIOP Revision Y-SIOP Revisions are identified alphabetically-ia first the eubject of Strategy Panel discussions. Concurrently, Revision W, the previous SIOP Revision, undergoes a penetrating analysis of its effectiveness ae measured under various war game options. The Revision Y Preplanned Damage Expectancy process involves the initial, intricate alignment of SIOP weapons against projected strategic 37

targets from six months to sometimes a year and a half in advance of the effective revisioix date. Force application is closely coordinated with the unified and specified commands to include force locations by units and delivery vehicles by type, weapons, generation rates and reaction times. Factors affecting weapon delivery, such as refueled or unrefueled aircraft flight limitations and weather-darkness factors which were established in the preplanning phase, are monitored during force application. Using this information, a positive control line or penetration point for each aircraft sortie is determined. The location and range capabilities of both missile and aircraft systems are concurrently analyzed to identify the optimum DGZS that can be considered for assignment. Aircraft sorties are analyzed in terms of tactics and poststrike routing to determine if the range require. ment can be tailored to correct a possible sortie deficiency. When it has been determined that the tentative

routing, penetration and delivery tactics are within a particular aircrafts or missiles capability, the sortie is committed. Final force application is followed by SIOP document production and distribution. The Joint Chiefs of Staff personally review and aPProve each SIOP Revision and the postulated Consequences of SIOP Execution. The SIOP is carefully analyzed and war gamed to assure that, under various conditions of plan initiation, the guidance furnished by the National Command Authority (NCA) through tbe Joint Chiefs of Staff is met. There mus% be no gaps for effective target coverage. The SIOP is a flexible plan-emphasizing unified force management, designed to produce positive results, and reinforced by a h]ghly redundant command control system. All possible contingencies are taken into account when the manifold alternatives are deliberated during SIOP preparation. The resulting SIOP is really a contingency plansomething to be exercised only if deterrence fails and


Rnlwnn w

6 MONIS$ -iT



mwsmn x

Wmwli Y



Military Rwlsw

the United States is forced to retaliate to a nuclear attack. Once the President has made the decision on what action to take in the event of enemy attack, near-simnltaneona execution of the vital counterstrike force occurs againat whatever geographical area or targeta the NCA has designated. The SIOP applies, of course, only to preplanned optiona in a general nuclear war environment. It is virtually impossible to predict the circumstances accurately enough after an initial nnclear exchange which would permit preparation of an effective operations plan for pOst-SIOP operations. In addition, the SIOP does not atTect the other operations and responsibilities of the unified commands which are authorized to condnct their assigned geographic missions both during and after an initial exchang+provided no SIOP weapona or targets are involved, Since the formulation of the JSTPS, the very existence of an integrated nuclear team haa lent more credibility to onr strategic deterrent. The JSTPS planning task, however, has grown increasingly complex over the last 10 years as both the enemys ability to wage war has been greatly enhanced and we have made significant improvements to our weapon syatema in the form of the Minuteman

SIOP 111 and Poseidon Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) systems, and the Safeguard antiballistic missile system. Significantly, though, there are no longer a number of conflicting war plans and target lists prepared by the individual services or commands, but only one list of all strategic targets and a single operational plan in which all nuclear components are included to enhance mutual support and economy of force. The Single Integrated Operational Plan is flexible. It gives the United States a rapid reaction capability, but the SIOP has the elements necessary to provide for graduated actions by the Preeident. In come ways, it is surgically precise. Necessarily complex, complicated and tedious in preparation, the SIOP is straightforward and simple in execution, and it provides the President with many options regardless of the circumstances surrounding plan initiation. These options, along with the threepronged thrust of the US nuclear triad, are designed to deter potential enemies from launching a nuclear attack on the United States, resorting to some form of nuclear blackmail or from the use of force below the nuclear threshold in such a manner that nuclear war might resuIt.






LieutenantColonel James B. Agnew, UmtedStete8 Armu LieutenantColonel Thomas E. Courant, United Stote8 Armu ColonelRead E. DavisjJr. UmtedStote.s Armu

N AN era of declining military budgets requiring more difficult force level decieions, intelligently developed and useful analytical methods take on a new meaning. Following a decade of, relatively abundant resourcee, the projectad austerity now prompts the search for methods to achieve more effective combat force mixes at less cost. From the standpoint of the AranY, the proper combat arms battalion combination for nonnuclear land combat in Europe represents a unique problem since general purpose forces are our etock in trade. The perennial quest for better maneuver-firepower amalgams euggeste that improved analfilcal methods should be applied to studying potential combat in Western Europe. Validation of essentially predictive models would provide such an improvad method. Model experts suggest two phases: Validate the model cO~cept+he& the reasonable representation of the real world in the model. Validute the wwo?d %Aementatio=heck the computer representation of the validated conceptual model. 40
Military Review

Such approach baa scientific appeal, but its potential for convincing the user is dukdous. There remain the problems of preci ion and of answering tbe right qu tione. These uncertainties have led the obvious tech\ Lieutenant Col&d James B. Agrww is an instructor in the Department of Hi8tor# at the US MiWaW Academy. He holds an A.B. degree from The Citadel, Chdeeton, South Carolina, and a Ma8teV of Pwblic Administration from Prinoeton University, New Jeree~. A 1964 gradwnte of the US Army Command and General Staff College, he hae eerved two tours in Vietnam; has been on the General Staff; wa8 with the O&e of the Secreta?y of Deferwe, Washington, D. C.; and ie a 1971 graduate of the US Army War College. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Courant is with Hemtqaarters, 7th Corp8 Artillew in Gernwny. A gruduate of the US MilitaW Academy, he holds an M.S. from Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana; ie a 1965 graduate of the US Army Commnnd and Genmd Stafl College; and a 1971 gmduate of the US ArmII War College. He hae 8eTved on the faenltg of the US Military Academg; on the General Staff; in Vietnam; and an an Opcrationa Anaktat in J$, O%iee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C. Colonel Reed E. DaVia, Jr., in DiviChief, T88t and Evaluation DG rectorate, Headqmzvter8, US Army Combat Development Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. A 1950 gradnate of the US Militarg Academy, he holds an M.S. from Georgia In8titite of Technology; in a 1965 gradaate of the US Army Command and General Sta# College; and is a 19T1 graduate of the US Arnau War College. He ha$ 8erved in Vietaam; on the Generat Staff; and in the O&e of the Asmstant SecretaW of Defena8 for inte??Z@iOW31SeOUtitV A#air8, Wa8hingten, D. C.

nique of using hletorical data in attempting to validate models. Thie aPProach ignoree the fact that we actually are attempting to evaluate a model of a nonexistent eystem. The validation of any model of future armed conflict cannot really be expected. Nonetheless, eeveral useful steps can be taken, Analysts and decision makers must have a like understanding of any modele concept and internal structure, and eecept the logic of both structure and concept. This demands good and continuous communication between builder and ueer throughout a models development. Proper attention must be paid to military judgment and experience in specifying the modele paramekrs. Theater Combat Model One of the moat recent innovative techniques to assist in tactical force structure development and analysis is the Theater Combat Model (TCM), developed by the Reeearch Analysis Corporation (RAC) of McLean, Virginia, and refined by a small group of officer students at the US Army War College. The TCM is a replacement for ATLAS, a component of FOREWON, the computerized force planning sYstem used by Department of the Army agenciee. TCMS utility is to serve as a model of theater combat, aggregating brigade and division-level forces into theater array requirements. RAC analysts recognized that tbe model, if built upon parameters such as weapons counts, firepower scores, or other simplified tallies, would be Subjat to the criticism freWentlY. leveled at other models-that professional experience and military judgment were oapitted. Therefore, the product would have limited applicability to the co-called real world. To forestall tbie possible criticism, TCM 41

Harab 1972

FORCE PiANNIN& was referred to the commandant of the US Army ,War College for further development, critique, and, if possible, amendment through the inclusion of qualified military experience factors. In effect, a blend of quantification and judgment was sought. The commandant elected ta place the task before a group of interested etudente. In mid-November 1970, a work]ng group of nine colonels and lieutenant colonels was appointed to undertake the projeet. Represented withh the group were infantry, armor, field aWllIery, engineer, and ordnance offitere. They set shout acquainting themselves with the model and its objective, and devising methods to attack the problem. The model, as developed by RAC, pite a Blue mechanized infantry or armored brigade against a counterpart Red force in a nonnuclear war in Western Europe over a sequence of 12-hour engagements for a campaign of 180 daye. There are several inpute in each atage. These include: A force for each atde-s number and mix of maneuver and artillery battalion (or regiments, aa in the caae of Red forces) Plus close air-support elements. A mkwion for such forcethere are eeven mission scenarios for each side. These are two attack two defense, advance against delay and vice versa, and meeting engagement. !lerrain-four types are included, varying from open rolling country through wooded mountahs to major obstacles. Resource statethe resource status of a force commencing at the beginning of each 12-hour engagement period ia baeed upon personnel and materiel resources available. Location of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). 42 Three outputs derive from play of the model in any engagement: Engagement outcome-win, lose, or draw. . Resource state after the battle. FEBA moveme@. With two adversaries, seven miseion postures for each, four types of terrain, and innumerable possibilities of maneuver force mixes, the output possibilities numbered in the tens of thousands. It quickly became obvious that, while exercise of judgment was necessary, case-by-case analysis was precluded. Some rules were required. -Over a period of weeke, several engagement outcome rules were tried. There was considerable profeeeional disagreement attendant to the relative merits of infantry, artillery, and armor units in different roles on different typea of terrain. When agreement dld exist, the mathematical solution did not hold up across a wide range of trial engagements. Subjectivity invalidated the equations. Initially, attempts were made to quantify morale, leadership, mobility, and terrain. Thk resulted in algebraic nightmare and considerable teem frustration. Next, the group tried to rely on previous work in this realm which waa essentially comparison of firepower scores. Proved data was sought on firepower and whatever other elements of combat had previously been quantified and approved by Army agenciea. Exteneive resezrch disclosed that little date exists. Aside from firepower, the Army has quantified few of the factors of combat such as mobility, morale, training, and leadership. Tids inconclusive search for date forced the group back to its own devices. There were several more weeks of trial-and-error approaches. The result was evolution of the Relative InMilitaW Ilwiaw




{ Fm (Ni*CPi*TFi+Nj* CPfiTFj)

+ FaCPk*TFk}

F?n = nonlinearity factor for intermix of maneuver battalion.

Ni,j = number of unite armor (i) and infantry (j).

CPi,j,k = combat power; armor (i), infantry (j), artillery (k). TF~,j,k = terrain feetor; armor, infantry, artillery. Fa = nonlinearity factor for number of artillery battalions with force.
dex of Combat Effectiveness (RICE) method for determining brigade-level engagement outcomes. The RICE ie a formula which uees the product of judgmentally weighted factore of relative combat power by mieeion for each sides armor, infantry, and artillery unite. It also incorporates a terrain mobility factor for each unit ove,r the four different types of terrain. The formula accommodates all seven of the models tactical mieeione and includes provisions for nonlinearity such as poor mixes of infantry and armor in task forces, and too much or too little atilllery or close air support for a force. A RICE is computed for both Red and Blue forces and then compared. Depending on the ratio of comparison, the outcome is adjudged a win or lose for either force or a draw. A draw occurs when forces are near parity, the contest is prolonged, and heavy losses occur on both sides; there is neither a clear-cut victory nor defeat for either adversary. In arriving at the values used in the RICE formula, the group went through its meet intensive seeeione. There was continuous disagreement among the value judgments held by the members; arguments were acrimonious and prolonged, with proponents of one tactical thesis or another yielding only after the most persuasive of arguments. The numerical tables were arrived at by the process of successive refinement, Thie wae es1972 McrclI

eentially a type of pseudo-Delphic decision-making procese. As a starting point in computing the firet RICE element-combat power -a base element is determined. Armor is considered the meet desirable arm before its utility is degraded by terrain, mission, or nature of opposing forces. This leade to the data in F]gure 1. Combat power, considering all czpabilitiee and limitations of a unit, is its relative effectiveness in accomplishing a mission as part of a combined-arme team. For an arbitrary starting point, a base value of 30 is awarded to a Blue armor battalion in a prepared defenee. Many other starting pointe or baee values could have been chosen. Values of other units are scaled to compare combat powers of the three unita to each other in a single miesion and combat powers of similar units in the seven different missions. Considerable detailed rationale justifies the valuee, but space does not permit ite reproduction here. One or two examples are suggestive:
In an organized defense againet an attackj armor is considered to be the dominant capability. Mechanized infantrys capability is slightly less than two-thirds of armors. In the same situation, artWery contributes about two-thirds of mechanized infantrys combat power due to afilllery minimum ranges, lack


FORCE PLANNIN6 of high velocity weapons, and relative ineffectiveness in indirect attack of moving targets. Following development of combat power tables for Blue forces, the team attacked the problem of Red forces using available reference material and the opinions of experts in residence. Proceeding from the assumption that Blue infantry battalion (18) plus the value for the organic tank battaSion (17). Artillery combat power scores should be set near parity since both forces artillery have offsetting advantage and disadvantages. Both the Blue self-propelled medium howitzer battalion and the Red medi,um gunand Red Ferces

Relative Cembat Pewer-Okre Defend Prepared Position

Blue Red Battalion Regiment Battolion Regiment BattnWon Regiment +

Armor Infantry Artillery - RedBw81ion Figure 1. Red forces fight in regimental formations, a comparison was made between the combat power of Red infantry and tank regiments and opposing Blue battalions. For example, there are 95 heavy tanks in a Red tank regiment compared to 54 in the Blue tank battalion although other similarities and divergencies exist. All evidence considered, the combat power of a Red armor regiment is abont one and three-fourths times that of a Blue tank battalion. For infantry units, near combat parity exists (1,010 Blue personnel versus 1,038 Red; 66 armored personnel carriers vereus 67 Red armored carriers). However, organic to cc+chRed infantry regiment ia a battalion of tanks. Thue, the combat power value for a Red infantry regiment is that of a 44 howitzer battalion are armed with 18 tubes. The Red forces dominate in range, lethality of ammunition, and rate of fire. However, Blue artillery is superior in accuracy achieved by use of fire direction computers, mobility, and crew protection. For these reasons, the artillery combat power of both sides is adjudged to be equal battalion to battalion. After the initial set of combat power variables had been determined, the group turned to the question of the effects of terrain upon moblSity, or the ability to apply combat power. The team established a judgmental multiplier scale of values from one to 10 to be applied to combat power scores. Proceeding from least difficult to most difficult terrain, all units are awarded a maximum factor of 10 in Military Srwiaw

18 12

69.0 86.0

24 12

42.0 25.6


16 6

28.1 17.2

FORCE PLANNING A terrain (open and rolling) since it does not restrict the projection of combat power for any arm. In type B terrain (hills and woods, marginal for vehicles and tanks), armor is degraded by 30 percent, but infantry by only 10 percent since it can project power afoot. Artillery is not degraded. Armor is drastically degraded in type C terrain (steep slopes, dense forest or swampe; tanks and vehicles roadbound). Infantry and artiUery were aSao cut, but to a leseer degree. Type D terrain ( a major obstacle euch as a wide river) presente a perplexing case. An obstacle usually favors a defender; therefore, the attackers maneuver force values are cut due to obstacle effects, but the defenders battalions are upgraded, presumably because he would exploit the advantage offered by the obstacle.

support. If the mix of infantry and tank battelione is appropriate to mission and terrain, no degradation is made for composition (linearity) in determining force combat power. If, however, a force is tailored otherwise, combat power is reduced by ae much ae 20 percent. The same rationale is applied to atilllery-if too little or too much is assigned to the task force, artillery power per unit ie reduced. Ratio Limits The final toek in developing the outcome table coneisted of eetablishlng the RICE ratio limits to adjudge whether any given engagement resulted in a win, 10SS, or draw for either eide. Again, judgment, rather than quantification, weighed heavily. After playing dozene of engagements involving different force mixes over all four terrain types, the group decided that the following ratios should prevail: To win, the attackers RICE muet exceed the defendere hy at leaet 25 percent. Conversely, a loss for the attacker occurs if his RICE ie less than 95 percent of the defenders. Thus, between .95 and 1.25 a draw outcome occurs. If the combat effectiveness ratio is within this range, there ie no clear-cut victory or defeat; both eides are considered to have become heavily engaged, taken extensive casualties, and been unable to achieve a dscieive edge. In a conventional war environment where the seizing and holding of critical terrain is important to an outcome, the location of lines of contact between opposing forces becomes significant. Therefore, a necessary output of TCM ie the periodic trace for the FEBA across the entire theater. The group relied upon its own collective 4s

Nonlinearity of Forces One final element compriees the RICEthe adjustment for nonlinearity of forcee within a command. This manipulation proceeds from the assumption that, for any given mission on any type terrain, there are preferred mixes of maneuver units (infantry and armor) and firepower (artillery and close air support). For example, for an aesault against infantry-heavy forces in type C terrain, an armor-heavy assault force will not fare ae well as an infantryheavy force. Similarly, if there are five maneuver battalions in a brigade, one battalion of artillery with the force is insufficient. On the other hand, there can be eo much artillery available that its utilization is inefficient. In such cases, some battalions might better be employed elsewhere. Thus, the group developed nonlinearity tables for maneuver and fire Mamh 1972

FORCE PLANNINS judgment, considering engagementtype terrain and outcome. The Delphi technique was employed to ascertain and refine the groups collective military judgment. The developed table provides the average number (and a normal range) of kilometers the FEBA is expected undertake the miseions of attack, defend, or delay. The scale of meeaurement is zero to 100. Following each 12-hour activity period, resource state dedines as a result of that periods evente. Manpower and materiel resource losses depend mainly upon unit missions and engagement out-

Advance vereus Delay

Forward Edge ef Sre Battle Area Movement (Kilometers)






Attack Hasty Position Attack Prepared Position 1 Meeting









120-2110 Figure 2.



to move

as a result of the various eombhmtions of parameters considered. For example, in B terrain, a Blue attack against a Red hasty defensive position results in the FEBA moving forward four kilometers if Blue wins. If the outcome is a draw or a loss for the Blue force, there is no appreciable change in the position of the FEBA. Since the delay constitutes a lesser form of resistance than the hasty defense, there is a corresponding difference in the FEBA movement between these two types of engagements (Fignre 2). Resource etate is a numerical expression of a battalions capability to

comes. Therefore, reduction in state is largely a function of the nature of the engagement and its outcome. A battalion can possess only one of three categories of mission eapabittty. In the lowest category, a battalion can undertake only the delay mission. The next category permits defense as well. In the highest category, the battalion can attack, defend, or delay. State degradation bridges consecutive 12-hour periods in the model cycle, It derives from engagement outcome in a previous interval. The new battalion state then constrains the battalion mission in the following interval.
Milirafy Review



StateDegr3d3tien versusIniil State

Figure 3. Thresholds are at 65 and 50. A battalion can undertake any of tbe miesions when ita state is in the 65 to 100 range. Below 65, the attack eepahility is lost, Without resource replenishment, the capability to defend deteriorates at state level 50. Below this point, a nnit is capable only of the delay mission. In computing state degradation, lower initial states must suffer greater propofilonate degradation. The question is whether the actual point reduction should grow as inverse functions of initial resource state. After lengthy consideration of engaged units rates of resource expenditure, the study group concluded that a single table of constant point degradations sufficiently retlecta the accelerating deterioration of battalion state. For the same mission and outcome, the point lose is identical for battalions at initial level of 100 and March 1972 of 50, Thk results in accelerated proportionate degradation. The function is actually hyperbolic. If d is the amount of point degradation, tbe proportionate loss is p=100d/8 where a is the initial state. Holding the parameter d fixed, the relationship of p to s is shown in Figure S. Thus, the proportionate degradation is twice as great for a unit at state 50 than for one at state 100. It is three times as great for a unit at state 33. The first step in formulating the . state degradation table itself was to consult casualty rates in Field Manual 101-10 series, Staff O@ers Fisld Manunl: Organizational, Tschnical, and Logistical Data. These daily percentages were then modified significantly by the Delphi technique in ascertaining and refining the groupe military judgment regarding state degradation. For the three offensive missions, 47

FORCE PLANNING degradation is most severe for attack of a prepared position and Ieaet severe for advance against a delaying action. For the three defensive miesions, assigning values ie not as simple, The least severe degradation is in delaying action, but degradation in hasty defense and prepared defense depends upon engagement outcome. For win and draw outcomes, haety defense incurs elightly higher degradation since defending forces do not enjoy the improved protection of a prepared poeition. For the loss OUL come, prepared defense euffers higher degradation. This is because the full impact of more intense battle affects forces that must either withdraw from their prepared positions or become casualties in place (Figure 4). The inteneity of meeting engagements is more severe than the advance and delay missions because neither side is purposely attempting to avoid serioue contact. It is less eevere than an attack upon a hasty position because intelligence and targeting capabilities are clearly insufficient on both sides. Productive use of firepower and maneuver capabilities is somewhat restricted. Except for the advance-delay situation, the attacker generally suffers greater loeses than the defender. The attacker must expose himeelf to the planned fires of the defender, while the latter enjoye some protection. Therefore, a losing attacker ie degraded more than a losing defender. The same is also true for tbe win and draw outcomes. The margin narrowe when comparing a winning defender and a losing attacker. The advantage of defense exhibits itself most markedly in the prepared position situaticb. The spread between attacker and defender in a hasty defense is less because the advantages of time for prep. aration and protection are reduced. Degradation in the win column is the lowest in each mission. When comparing the draw and lose column, there are two missions in which these degradations are equal. This is not so much an assertion of strict equality as one of uncertainty. Unsuccessfu]

Midwa Advance Attack Hasty

Resource State Degradation, d Win 2 8 12 4 5 6 2 > <

Draw Lo8e

3 10 15 6 7 8 3

4 10 15 5 10 T 4

Attack Prepared Meeting Defend Prepared Defend Hasty Delay If Ra/Rd If Ra/Rd

%, multiply d by 2/9 for attecker and 9/2 for defender. .J, multiply d by 2 for attacker and 1/2 for defender. Figure 4.

40 kL-

Military Review

FORCE PLANNING attacks of both prepared and hasty positions are costly. It is possible to envision more serious degradations in the draw outcome on some occasions, but in the loee outcome on others, There seems to be no rational ordering of the severity of these outcomes. A draw ie more severe than a loss in the cases of defense of a hasty position and a meeting engagerrient. This is because the proximity of contending forces may be close for a long time, while the outcome remains in doubt. Oppoeing commanders, each anticipating victory, tend to apply more resources and greater resolve. In time, the forces degrade more than if the outcome were clearly defined. The loss degradation exceede the draw cost in the remaining three missions. The advance and delay missions are similar in that the nature of contact is at a distance and intelligence is relatively accurate. Here, a draw outcome does not possess the indeterminable property described earlier. Prspared Position Defense Defense of a prepared position ie meet costly in defeat because the advantegee of protection, enjoyed to that point, are suddenly stripped away. A draw is not as likely to involve close combat situations. The essence of the defense is the prepared position, and, therefore, the defender etrives to influence the battle outside tbe poeition. The question of the relationship between resource state and combat effectiveness is considered in two aspecte. How effective is a battalion in undertaking a particular mission at the minimum threshold of capability for that type mission ? How does effectiveness, vis-a-vis resource state, vary between these miniMareh 1972

mum thresholds and the maximum resource state of 100? The firet aepect of this question was anewered on the basis of historical research and modified by the groups military judgment for the models European environment, again employing the Delphi technique, The questio~s second aspect was answered by eimilarly determining the maximum thresholdsthat is, how much resource degradation can be sustained below a state of 100 before a perceptible decrease in combat effectiveness is observed? This type of intuitive and judgmental analysis resulted in the following statement regarding state vis-a-vis combat effectiveness. Attack Effectiveness As state decreases below 100, combat effectiveness for the attack mission and for artillery immediately starts to decrease. The effectiveness loss is small at first. At about state level 80, attack effectiveness begins falling sharply to the point where state 65 corresponds to effectiveness 40. We judge that the attack mieeion is no longer poseible at this point. Artillery reaches a comparable point at etate level 40 (effectiveness 20). The nature of artillery combat constrains effectiveness less severely and permits mission pursuit to a lower resource level. For example, an artillery battery of six howitzers at state 40 can keep one howitzer firing. Defend and delay missions lose no effectiveness as the resource state falle from 100 to 90. As state drops further, however, effectiveness then tails off rather sharply. The lowest admissible defend point is state 50 (effectiveness 40). At similar resource levels, defeneive effectiveness is eaeier to maintain than attack effectiveness. Delay is 4e

even easier. The unique property attributed to delay is that effectiveness decreases continuously to zero without a break point. Except for tlds property, delay differs only slightly from defense. These relationships are reflected in Figure 5. Mathematical expression for each of these effectiveness state curves were written as inputs to TCM. These equations allow the combat effectiveness modification of the RICE for each combat element within the model, based upon current resource states. Therefore, as resource levels decline from combat attrition, or rise from 50

logistics replenishment and personnel replacement, corresponding adjush ments in each RICE are easily computed when required. The use of ATLAS as a theater combat simulator in FOREWON was initially neceseary to give force plannere a much-ne&ded method to look rapidly at the characteristics of alternative force packagee. ATLAS did ita job with the reeult that FOREWON became en operative tool ueed by force analysts and decieion makers to gain added ineighte into structure and relative capabilities of general purpose forces. Nonetheless, the critMiliklIy


FORCE PLANNING icism leveled at ATLAS was inevitable. The apparent exclusion of military judgment and experience in the preparation of those inpute which drive the model has caused serioue doubts in the minde of military ueers. Firepower ratioe ignore the force-mix problem described by Harl von Clausewitz: Artillerg fire is mnch more effective than that of infantrg. A batterg of eight aix-paunders takee up less than one-third of the front taken up by an infantry battalion; it has less than one-eighth the men of a battalion, pet its fire is two to three times ae e#ective. On the other hand, artillery Ims the disadvantage of being lees, mobile than infantr~. Thie is trne, on the whole, even of the lightest horse-artitletyi, for it cannot, like infantrg, be used in any kind of terrain. Modern technology has given ue weapon and target acquisition systeme, and means of mobility and communications which have greatly complicated this baeic force-mix problem. Nonlinearity of effectiveness among combinations of the amns is an accepted phenomenon of modern war. No useful model dealing with force structure can neglect this important aspect of force analysis. It is, in fact, tbe root of the pkoblem. Among existing tactical simulators, there are only a few which attempt to deal with force-mix interactions. This recent work on TCM ie an at. tempt to deal with those two iesuee: modeling with inputs baeed on military judgment, and force-mix interactions. Initial runs of the RICE outcome generator have provided results which are judgmentally and intuitively eatiefying to review by military professionals. In the world of predictive modele of armed conflict, it is apparent that model credibility is the beet we can hope for. Hopefully, this work done by etudente of the US Army War College ie a poeitive step toward dealing with the force-mix problem. Having provided sound military judgment to TCMS input parameter, it has increased the validity of its outputa.


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March 1972


East Is No Longer Least

Uleutenant Colonel William V. Kennedv United States Armg Re8erve AST is least and West is best is an old saw committed to memory by generations of Army recruits struggling with map and compass problems involving magnetic declination. The axiom is equally valid as a descriptor of US foreign policy thus far in this century. For better or for worse, politics and economics HO not respond to so reliable a reference point as the magnetic pole. After a half century of a predominately Western orientation, the needle of our most fundamental interests is being pulled to the East by a combination of Japans spectacular economic success, the Sine-Soviet rivalry, and such ancillary interests as the prospects of Alaskan oil. The term interests ia used here in its most basic sensa-that which


directly affaets the territorial integrity of the United States and the survival of its people and their insWutions. During the debates that preceded establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the late General Hoyt S. Vandenberg of the Air Force describsd Western Europe as the thsater of decision. This concept was based on the belief that the industrial power of Western Europe, coupled with its skilled manpower and its strategic location, would give to the Soviet Union a decisive advantage over the United States were Europe to euccumb to Soviet conquest or Communist subversion. United States policy in regard to Europe continues to be based on that belief. To say that our interests in hlilitwy Roview


THE EAST East Asia are becoming as fundamental as our interesta in Europe is not to challenge in any respect the continuing importance of Europe. It is to say, rather, that in neither Europe nor East Asia can we accept control of the mainland by a single power, or combination of powers, that does not operate as part of an international peacekeeping eyetem effectively controlled by the peoples it governs. The central strategic fact in Eaet Asia is the attainment by Japan of a gross national product exceeded only by those of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is, furthermore, a national product that can be converted rapidly into military power due to its principal elemente of shipbuilding, steel, automotive, and electronics. Japan hae prospered as an industrial giant that had ite sworde beaten into plowshares by the B-.29 and as a trading nation by virtue of the freedom of the seas won and kept by the Western Allies of World War II. The economic power thue attained ie greatly in excess of the empire that dealt a smashing blow at Hawaii in 1941 and which landed troops in what is now the state of Alaeka in 1942. Japan is also the most vulnerable of all the worlde great industrial powere. Its population and ite induetry are jammed into narrow coastal plains. It ie dependent upon ocean commerce. It is more vulnerable to the combination of air, naval, and amphibloue forces that defeated it in World War II than it wae in 1945. For the Japanese, there ie an unpleasant paradox in the fact that they could become a first-rate military power tomorrow, but would remain as vulnerable to destruction as they are today. As Japans economy continues to grow, its requirements for raw materials and markets also continue to grow. It is almost completely dependent, at the moment, upon oil shipped from the Persian Gulf through the constricted waterwaya of Malaysia

The central strategic fact in Eeet Asia is the attainmentby Japanof a gross national product exceededonly by those of the United States end the soviet Uniomand rapidly convertible into military power
Mamh 1972 53


,., -

TsEE/m and Indoneeis. Mainland Asia takes come 26 percent of Japans export trade today and will become even more important to Japan in the future, par. titularly if the US Congrees acte te reetriet Japanese markets in the United Statee. Smart, new Soviet men-of-war-in emall numbers up to the present time are eailing Japans extended sea routae acroes the Indian Ocean. Ashore, China looms behind the guer. rills armiee in Vietnam, Camhodla, Laos, Thailand and Burma; along the Himalayas; and in at least tacit eupport of North Koreas attempts at subversion of the Republic of Korea. The present and future health of Japans eeonomy is vitally concerned in all of these conflicte. Americans have been inclined to look upon the Soviet naval, economic, and political activity in the Indian Ocean and South Asia and theChinese activities on the mainland, in Ceylon, and in Africa as dirseted primarily at the United States. Being the primary target of Soviet and Chinese macldnatione for 26 yeare may have obscured to-us the possibility that, for the time baling, the Chinese and the Soviets are more concerned with each other than with us. Thle is the viewpoint of an increasing number of military and political writers in this country and abroad. The came point of view ie euggested in come recent statements by Henry A. Kk.singer and George W. Ball, the former Undersecretary of State. That the Soviet thruet through the Middle East and along the southern periphery of. Asia may, in fact, be aimed primarily at China seems logical enough. The Soviets understand full well the implications of continued instability and a threat of sorts in Asia. They eaw at first hand the consequence to Germany of attempting to fight on two fronts in World Wars I and II. The Soviet General Staff knows what would have happened bed they not been abIe to draw on their Siberian garrisons in 1941-42. Indeed, there eeems to be little doubt that it ie tbie Soviet uncertahty in regard to Aeia that hae forced the Soviets to seek some type of temporary accommodation in Europe. As concerne Soviet policy in Asia, the Soviet Communists need not conquer China in the claseieel sense of MilitaIY ROVkW

Lieutenant Colonel William V. Kcnned~, US ArmII Reeerve, is a civilian member of the US Army Combat Developments Command Stratsgic Stwdie8 Iwatitute, @r.%8k? Barndte, Penneylvunia. A graduate of Marquette lYniver8ity, and the US ArmII Comnmud awd General Staff CoUege, he hae served in the Armv, oe an intalligewce ofiev in ths Strategia Air Command, and m an ArmII f.mblie affaire ofier in the National Guard Bureau. A mobilization designee to the O@e of the Depm?V Chief of Sta17 for Opsrationa and Training, Headqwwtere, First US ArmP, Fort Meade, Mar@m.d, hie articlea on milb tary affairs huve been pnbliahed in the United States, Bmtain, Fravwe, and Eire. 54

With the fulf developmentof Aleeken 0i7Eel& we will no longer be able to get by with the token forces stationed there in the past

the term in order to achieve a satisfactory solution. A ring of Soviet influence, forged by seapower and political and economic penetration around the southern rim of Asia and joined by the Soviet Pacific Fleet to the fend forces already deployed along Chinas northern and western frontiers, could exert a considerable influence on China without a shot being fired. That influence would be used in the hope of bringing to power in Peking a government willing to reestablish a workhg etrategic and ideological partnership. Were China to eucceed in bloekiig, or at leeet balancing, this attempted Soviet encirclement, there still remaine the possibility that. China would seek reeetabliehment of a working reletilon with the Soviets in order to speed the modernicetion of its economy. Mardi1972

Japan could maintain the health of its economy, ita democratic institutions, and ite physical security in the face of such a development, provided the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Southeeet Asia remain under at least neutral control. Were those areee to come under Chhmee-+r a combination of Soviet and Chhesdomination, it would be evident to Japan and to the world either that US policy had been defeated on the mainland or that the Americane had chosen to abandon the mainland. In either case, even a powerfully armed Japan would be looklng down the nuclear gun barrel of the power, or combhation of powere, that had achieved a hegemony over mainland Asia. A remote US guarantee of Japans security eimply would not be as convincing as the visible power across the Tsushima Strait. The US guar. 55

THE EAST antee would be meaningless in terme of access to Asiatic markets. In such circumstances, Japan would have no choice but to accommodate itself to the mainland power. Whatever form such accommodation took, it would have the end result of placing the Japanese economy at the disposal of the power or powers in control of the mainlsnd. The economy of Japan harnessed with whatever degree of reluctance to the manpower of a militant mainland power would pose at least as signi6cant a threat to the territorial integrity of the United States as the extension of Soviet power @ the English Channel. There is a great emotional reluctance among many Americans to acknowledge the emergence of East Asia as an ares at least equal in importance to Western Europe. We think of East Asia as a strange and unsanitary place. The aspirations and the tribulations of the people who live there do not grip us as do the hopes and troubles of, say, the Irish or the Israelie. Yet, if the Wilsonian ideal of selfdetermination ever is a&ained, the balance of political power in the world will shift inevitably from Europe to East and South Asia by sheer force of numbers. For that reason alone, we must seek and maintah a working relationship with the peoples of Asia on a scale at least equal to our relationship with Europe. We could live with our stereotypes, prejudices and delusions so long as the locus of US power and cultare lay east of the Mississippi River. The @ft of population westward and the projection of the territorial boundaries of the United States, per se, to the Central Pacific and the Bering Strait changed all that. We are in56 volved in East Asia and we are likely to become more invo]ved with each advance in the potitical, economic, and military power of the East Asian peoples. The implications of this involvement are many, but overshadowing them all is the necessity of insuring that Japan remains free of domination by any outside power. That, in turn, involvee us irrevocably with the fate of the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and Indonesia, This involvement will be influenced and, to a degree, compounded during the.next decade by development of the Arctic Alaskan oil reserves, If a trans-Alaska pipeline materialises, and if present indications as to the size of the North Slope fielde prove to be valid, we ehall be able to reduce Japans vulnerability to Soviet pressure and to defuse, to a considerable extent, the recurring crises in the Middle East. In short, every barrel of oil that can be shipped out of the Gulf of Alaska will reduce the degree of Japans dependence on Middle Eaetern supplies and on the long, tenuous sea routes through the Indian Ocean. By the same token, however, full development of the Alaskan oilfields will increase the criticality of Arctic Alaska and the North Pacific trade routes. We will no longer be able to get by with the token land, sea, and air forcee we have stationed in Alaska in the past. what this combination of political and economic developments adds up to is that we no longer have the option of abandoning East Asia in favor of a Europe Firet, etrategy. We are committed in both areas. Defeat in either will place the survival of the United States and its most basic institutions in jeopardy. Militmy RoviOW

The viewe expre88ed in this article are the authors and do not neceesarilv reflect thoee of the State or Defen8e Dcpartment8.-Editor.

HAT is a psychological operation ? Is there a psychological aspect to our national seeurity policies and programs ? Is there another dimension to our efforts other than the direct impact of our diplomatic, military, and economic activities ? Clearly, the results we achieve do not depend eimply on what we do. They also depend on how othera perceive our actions. The views of others frequently determine whether they act in ways beneficial or detrimental
Mmeh 1972

to the US national security goals we seek through our diplomatic, military, and economic activities. Thus, there clearly is a psychological aspect to our national security policies and programe. Often, it ie the critical element in whether we are successful or not. Psychological operations (PSYOP) respond to this aspect of our national security efforts; they are designed to get others to respond in waya beneficial to achieving our goals. We need to clarify the concept of psychological operations. Reviewing the recent record will bring out the reality of psychological consideration and how they can operate against the best intereeta of the United States. 57

From this review, it will also be clearer what psychological operations is, and it will also point up the dllemma that psychological operations can pose, or seem to pose, for a democracy. Cold War The development of the cold war illustrates the reality and importance of psychological considerations. The confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union stemmed from many things. But clearly, a critical factor wee how each side viewed the others actions. The Sovieta, having suffered two devastating attacks in 25 years, were intent on absolute security in Eastern Europe. They perceived Western attitudes toward Eastern Europe as being incompatible with this overriding Soviet concern. The United States and Western Europe saw Soviet statements and actions as implacably hostile, aggressively expansionistic, and a direct threat to their very existence. These perceptions motivated the diplomatic, military, and economic actions of both the Soviets and the West. The pettern of action and reacRagmm-rdJ. Barrett is the Defmrtment of State A&iaor wtth the Armye John F. Kennedy Center for Military A.wistmwe, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. A US Foreign Service ofier, he hsa served at Anwmcan Embaeeies in Madrid, Mexico Citg, Managn@, Dublin, and Cairo. He aleo hoe held aaeignmente with the O&e of International Conference; the Office of Eaet and Southern African Affairs; and with US Air Force Hem& qunrtere (Direetomte of Plana) in the Pentagon under the State-De fcn8e exchange program. He is the author of The Role of the Military Attache which appeared in the May 1971 issue of the Mllmtlw ltnVIEW. 58

tion multiplied each sides perceptions of the other in ways that steadily deepened the confrontation. Another salient feature of the cold war has been the role of ideology. The Communists brought to poetwar prominence a way of thhddng attuned to The peychologieal considerations. Communist sees the world in an ideological framework. The way the thought of Mao Tse-tung has dominated Chinae conduct ie a salutary reminder of the absorbhg concern of the Communist mind with ideology. Communist China now distributes publications abroad in some 40 languag%s and broadcast about 1,500 hours a week in 38 different languags& In the Soviet Union, Taee sends out 75,000 words a day, and foreign broadcasts total over 1,000 hours a week in 40 languages. The volume of these efforte indicates graphically the attention devoted by the Communists to psychological considerations. A living Heritaga Soviet and Chinese ideological and psychological activities often eound like massive polemics of questionable sincerity. However, ideology has real meaning for Communietc. MarxistLeninist ideology ie a living heritage. It assures Communists they are right in trying to extend their sway over the rwt of the world, and it tells them they will win. The latter conviction also endows their efforts with a patience that contrasts with US impatience for remdta. The theoretical certainty of their ideological goale allows Communists to be flexible abont means. They can play on the contradictions that bother others without regard to their own complete consistency. An ideological approach aleo bighlighta concern for Milltary Raview

PSYOP ideas. This is obviously a frame of mind adapted to identifying and exploiting the psychological aspects of international developments. Americans, too, approach human bebavior and international eventa from their own conceptual point of view. But the central and explicit Communist concern for ideology has so broadened and deepened the psychological aspect of international relations as to give it a new dimension. The Communist approach to the world incorporates a parvzeive effort to foster scmial climates and public opinion that wiff affect domestic and international po~cies in the Communist intereata. Thdse Communist activities have often ha~ a direct impact on our diplomatic, military, and economic capabilities. Hostile psychological operations can drive out good deeds. US Reputation In thie connection, it is instructive to examine candidly the deterioration of the reputation of the United States. Why has the Soviet Union maintained a relatively favorable image? Why have the rapes of Hungary, Tibet, and Czechoslovakia made little lasting impression? How could a society that must build a wail to retain its members be attractive to the peoples of the world seeking freedom ? In contrast, why has worldwide obloquy attached to the US efforts in V]etnam ? It is no accident that words like eximperialism: intervention, ploitation and fallout have become common currency and loaded with unconnotations. Simiiarly, favorable peaceful coexistence and wars of national liberation have become acceptable concepte with desirable aspects. In contrast, the words capitalism and capitalist have been all but universally tainted as involving March 1972 eocial injustice and the exploitation of man by man. Socialism has become a good word, and the Communist countries label themselves the Soeialiat Camp and dedicate their efforts to Socialist fraternity. Simply labeling a reiationehip colonialist or neocolonialist creates a stigma and pute it on the defensive. Soldiers fighting for the government in the Congo became mercenarieefl a derogatory word. On the other hand, the revolutionaries in the Dominican Republic were labeled constitutionalistefl a good sounding word. The United States bad a highly favorable image at the end of World War II, and it has given others vast aid and made many sacrific~. Yet the United States is in disrepute in much of the world. In contrast, the Soviet Union has repressed dissent by force, proclaimed a dogmatic ideology, and given far leas aid than the United States and several other countries. Yet the Soviet Union hae a great deal of sympathy and support in many quarters of the world. How has this come ahout ? Image of Power Power-or, more exactly, the image of powerhas been an important element. Soviet nuclear power has obviously affected the views of others. The Soviets have adroitly projected an image of power. They have not hesitated, for instance, to dwell on the terrors of nuclear warfare. The Soviet threat is credible enough that they can utilize it to heighten fears of the USSR in many segments of world opinion. These fears lead to worry about provoking the Sovieta. You cannot expect the Sovieta to be reasonable if you keep provoking them runs the 5a

plaint. The reeult is mmemitthg pressure on the United States to make concessions. We are placed constantly on the defensive, and the United States incurs opprobrium if it does not make repeated, unilateral conces. sions. The Communists have shrewdly used their concepts to exploit the aspirations of the developing world. Those struggling to achieve or develop independence were not receptive to the idea of taking control of their destinies gradually. More important to them than advice and assistance are pride and a sense of self-reelization. In an atmosphere of both poverty and aspirations, the idea of pitting one person against another seems destructive. The concept of working together for the common good seems highly desirable-and translates reed60

ily to eympathy for things labeled Socialist. These attitudes obviously offered a fertile field for Communist psychological exploitation. Admittedly, the Communists could be more freewheeling because they had few direct interests that might. be damaged. But they were also aetute in playing up to the concerns of the newly independent countries. Delegations from these lands were freely brought to Moscow and Peking, and key Chinese officials, in particular, paid them flattering attention. China diligently portrayed iteelf as the model for, and friend of, revolution in the Afro-Asian world. Through ekillful activities and constant repetition, Commnnist tenets have heen given vague but wide acceptance by many peoples and governments throughout the world. Militrty REViOW

PSYOP The United Statee also had tremendous assets that would seem to have offered it far greater opportunities than the Communists enjoyed for achieving identification with those seeking independence. The United States was the modern model of national independence from a colonial empire. It articulated the ideals of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Unity and lfisnity American history, for all its faulte, centered around the pursuit of unity and dignity out of diversity. American eociety and economy, for all their serious defeete, offered a quality of life well beyond that achieved previously. The United States accepted the principle of national tradition in a pluralistic world while the Communists, as the Brezhnev doctrine made blatantly clear, had one doctrinal concept for all the world. Yet, despite these eeeming advantages, the climate of opinion hae clearly changed against the United States and hae imposed important practical constraints on what we can do in the world. In the current era of insurgency and potential or actual instability, psychological considerations are the central element. Public atWudes toward government and violence are crucial. Vietnam has made clear that governmental legitimacy and security stem from a state of mind as much ae a set of physical factors. Psychology is similarly crucial to the success of the Nixon doctrine. The framework of US security is our network of multilateral and bilateral defense treaties. Clearly, the viability of this arrangement depende on continued rapport and confidence. Successful partnership is, in many waye, a frame of mind. Mamh la72 Under the Nixon doctrine, we are essentially engaged in developing the self-confidence of our alliee. This effort involves our allies perceptions of their problems and capabilities and of their neighbors and of ue. The success of the Nixon doctrine also involves how our allies neighbors, particularly those who might threaten them, view our capabilities and resolve, as well as those of our allies. All of these elements are heavily psychological. Era of Negotiation The era of negotiation that the United States seeks has similarly important psychological aspects. The willingness to negotiate is also a frame of mind. President Richard M. Nixon hae referred to the n@edfor a spirit of negotiation in which each side defines its interest with concern for the legitimate interests of others. At the same time, a productive epirit of negotiation must stem from a poeition of confidence and not of weakness. Clearly, all of these actions are heavily underscored with psychological implications. Serious negotiation is more than atmospherics. It comes down to specific steps. A central factor in maintakring our troop levels in Europe was the destabilizing effect a cut might have on the Soviet evaluation of the American will and commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. An important element in proceeding with the Safeguard antiballistic mieeile system hae been the belief that it would motivate the Sovieta to negotiate more productively at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Deterrence itself is, in the main, baeed on psychology. Deterrence reliee on irffluencing the thoughts, perception, and actione of potential foes 61

in ways that will discourage or prevent them from acting in a manner inimical to our seeurity. We can also point to examples in which the United States used psychological considerations adroitly and realized clear benefite. One was the atoms for peace program in 1963. This program offered a practical way to provide nuclear fuels to third countries for peaceful purposes. It aleo created a favorable impression for tbe United States among those countries eager to gain access to nuclear power as a key step toward seIf-development. And, at the same time, it embarrassed the Soviet Union by highlighting ita reluctance to engage in a similar program. Open Sky Proposal Another example waa the open sky proposal that President Dwight D. Eisenhower made at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955. The concept was forthright and clear. Each country would allow the other complete freedom to inspect ite territory from the air. This approach offered a realistic way to put aside many of the worries and uncertainties that led to fear of a surprise nuclear attack. The move clear]y illuminated the Soviet reluctance to accept any form of verification which would be essential to meaningful strategic arms agreement. The proposal offered dramatic evidence that the United States was willing to cooperate toward arms control despite its strategic dominance. It completely changed the atmosphere of the summit conference and of world public opinion in ways favorable to the United States. A more recent example of psychological benefits for the United States arises from our landings on the moon. 62

Obviously, these explorations have caught the interest of most of the world. The worldwide anxiety during Apollo 198 near tragedy underscored the tremendous empathy for the astronauts and our space program. Thkz human concern and interest have comprised a singular asset for the United States that hae helped counterbalance the opprobrium that Vietnam has produced. Key Foreign Groups This review of the reality and importance of psychological considerations in international relationa pointe the way toward defining psychological operations. The key point, clearly, is how pertinent foreign groups perceive actions that are important to US national eecurity. What we want, therefore, are responses by key foreign groups that will further the achievement of important US interests. We must, in ehort, influence theee foreign groups. Psychological operations, therefore, are those efforts designed primarily to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of key foreign groups in ways that assist in maintaining the national security of the United States. This etatement sounds crass and self-centered, but our sur. vey of recent international developments makee clear that the question is not whether psychological considerations will play a key role, but how. A positive approach to psychological considerations generally is mutually beneficial to the foreign groups and the United Statee. What is involved is seldom a Machiavellian manipulation of the beliefs of others against their beet interests. Generally, what is needed is an honest effort to understand and reepond to the cnl. tural conditioning and aspiration of
MiliSaIY R0vi8w

PSYOP others tQ achieve a result beneficial, in some degree, to all concerned. The response that will moat often benefit the United States-peaceful change, international cooperation, eeonomic development, and improved communications-is also beneficial to the other country (or countries) concerned. Often, the US interest will be well served simply by the country avoiding coming heavily under the domination of the Soviet Union or China. Efforts to influence others cannot be always open and aboveboard, but the goal, as these considerations make clear, is not an invidioue one. Psychological operations are not something apart from the diplomatic, military, and economic elements of our national security policies and programe. Nor are they a substitute for these other sources of power. They draw on and reinforce these activities and make them more effective. Psychological operations are ineffective witbout these other activities. The psychological success of the United Statee in the Cuban missile confrontation of 1962 was possible because the United States psychologically utilized effective military capabilities while tbe Soviet Union did not. Psychological operations are essential if the United States is to serve its beet intereat+tbe skillful nonuse of its great power. One difficulty in defining more precisely the idea of psychological operation is that the concept bas a certain vagueness about it. It is hard to visualize. We can see a diplomat, or a military weapon, or an economic development project,. but it ia herd to

PSYOP point to anything equally concrete and say, that is a psychological operation. This difficulty etems from the intimate interdependence between psychological considerations and the other elements of our national security policies and programs. What is appropriate in psychological operations is closely interrelated with our other activities and to whom, where, and why we do them. We cannot eeparate and identify a single national PSYOP doctrine or strategy. By the came token, psychological operations involve more than simply information, communications, or even propaganda. Q Operations Defined Efforts have been made to develop adequate working definition of psychological operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have defined the operation, for military purpoees, as thoee that: cept of strategic psychological operations ae aimed at influencing and shaping decision-makers power to govern or control their followers. These definitions tend to suffer from overstatement, overinclusiveness, or vagueness. It ie hard to tell from these definitions what is, and what is not, a psychological operation. Greater precision seems neckssary if we are to have a workable concept. Wartime situation We can clarify better what ie involved hy looking at an extreme case ethesituation in wartime. Here, our goals are starker. It is easier to see whom we want to influence and the value to us of influencing them in certain ways. We want the enemy to stop fighting. The ability of our forcee to move toward this goal is greatly improved if we can persuade enemy troops to defector impair t~eir morale so ae to lower their abilities ae tlghting forces. Leaflet and other operations are carried out to achieve these ends. In this instance, psychological operations becomes something clear and concrete. The broader impact of psychological considerations is eimilarly clearer in wartime. It ie not juet our military forces, economic meaeuree, and diplomatic efforts that induce an enemy to stop fighting-although they are eaeential. We improve our chancee of geWlng an enemy to etop fighting if we increase his doubta and fears and the thought that he hae more to lose than to win by continuing. The German perception of the demand for unconditional surrender almost certainly lengthened the war in Europe, and strongly influenced the way it ended and the shape of. the poetwar world. Japaneee attitudes toward tbe Emperor and US awareness Milibey Review

. . . include Pegchological warfare and, in addition, encwnpaee thoss pelitical, military, economic and ideological actio?w pkznned and couducted to weate in neutral w friendly fweign groups the emotione, attitcufea, or behaviar to eupport the achievement of national objectives.
Psychological operations have also been defined elsewhere as:

. . . a euctained effort by a governw political group to emze, preeerve or extend power, againet a defiued ideological onemg, or even by y or eolidifgi?zg the poeitien of an % all winning over a neutral, throug acts ehort of a 8hOOting war bg regwlar militaW foree8, but not excluding the threat of 8uch a war. m ent

Another proposal develops the con&s

of thla concern had a greet deal to do with endinc the war in the Pacific and the more favorable postwar eventa in that area. We have trouble delimiting psychological operations because we live in an era that is neither peace nor war. Our goals are not as unambiguous as they are in wartime, and the usefulness of our effortz to influence others is correspondingly less clear-cut. We face a dilemma because we long for a world of pezce and freedom. Unfortunately, conflict, however we label it, existe in the world in which we ,must live. We must acknowledge it clearly, both to endure it and to move from it to an era of negotiation. For both purposes, attention to psychological considerations is essential. Influence Others The relationship of psychological operations and freedom calls attention to another important dilemma. The concept of psychological operations hae ominous overtones for a democracy. It smacks of brainwashing and thought control. What are the implications for democracy and individual dignity if people can be influenced to adopt attitudes and carry out activities beneficial to another party? If we can influence others to do what we want, can we rdso influence American public opinion ? A people qcutely conscious of the role and influence of adverting in its daily life is bound to be extremely wary on thie point. The requirements of psychological operation sound dangerous and alien to a society that conceives of itself as free and diverse. The Washington Post reportedly editorialized during the Korean War that: . . . no doubt these tactice of [psvchologieal operations] can be u-red in Marah 1972

wnuU dares dumngan enwrgency, as a doctor might prescribe drugs, but, takea too ofteu and in too large doses, they might create addicts. . . . We do know that the zeet with which manv of our uoung men are lemming to employ them might be unhealthy to the American future. Oirect Threat If domeetic public attitudes could be influenced, would not this be a direct threat to the ides of democratic government ? Theoretically, democracy is based on the concept of a knowledgeable citizenry, able to examine the facts, make ite own judgments, and, accordingly, instruct its governmental eervanta. What are the implication for the interplay between the Pcditical party in power and that seeking office? Could a governmental influence-generating apparatue eway public opinion to the benefit of the party in government ? Or, leaving aside a possible domeztic impact, ie the deliberate effort to influence others compatible with the broader interest of the United Statea in fostering human dignity and freedom ? Can efiorta to influence others fruetrate the development of the responsible democratic processes that we seek around the world ? The dilemma raised by these questions ie clear. It must be squarely met if we are to have a legitimate and viable concept for psychological operations in the United States. The difficulties presented by these questions result from, and are raflected in, the US approach to peychelogieal operation over the yaare. A brief review of these developments is instructive in working toward a viable concept of psychological operations. US experiences during and after as

PSYOP World War I had an important impact on attitudes toward psychological operations. The Committee on Public Information, tinder energetic George Creel, developed a high-pressure propaganda campaign; it operated domestically, ae well as overseaa, using simple, patriotic themes. Congress soon showed concern-it aboliehed the committee jn 1919, leaving it without even funds to print its final report. The attitude shown by Congrees abrupt action deepened greatly as the feeling spread that propaganda had tricked the United States into World War I. Propaganda, and psychological considerations generally, acquired the connotation and stigma of deceit and trickery. War Information Office US ambivalence toward psychological consideration continued to be reflected in the arrangements developed during World War II. After come confusion in setthg up varied orgenizatione, the Office of War Information wae establiebed in 1942. Its mainstay was straight news. The real power to release military newa was left to tbe military department. President Franklin D. Roosevelt wae aleo his own best propagandist. The Office of War Information wae plagued by the mistrust it inherited from the Creel Committee. When the office emphasized domestic news output in its first year, Congress promptly took exception and curtailed funde for those programs. The experience of World War II, perhaps because of tbe prominence of ideologicrd consideration, did euggest the peacetime need for a peychologiesl arm of the US Government. President Harry S Truman directed that an information program be eet up in the Department of State. The purpoee, he 66 Pi&.. ., said, would not be to outetrip the extensive and growing information programs of other natione~ but to see to it that other peoples receive a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States Government. Smith-MrmdtAct The growing cold war gave etrong impetus to the postwar @ogram. Senators Smith and Mundt toured Europe in 1947 and reported, in strong language, that tbe Communiete were conducting aggressive psychological warfare against us. To counte~ this campaign, they recommended that a strong and effective information and educational exchange program ie essential. The resultent Smith-Mundt Act was the legislative charter of tbe US postwar information program. The legislation wae heavily amended and debated in the course of paesage. The language and authorizations that it actually incorporated were considerably less extensive than might have been expected from the tone of the Sen@ors original report. The Smith-Mundt Acts epecitlc grant of authority wae thue relatively limited. Its purpose was to:

. . . promote better understanding of the United Statee abroad and to hwreaee mutcml undemanding between the people of the United Statee and the people of other eountmee.
Two principal mains were authorized: an information service to disseminate information abroad about the United States, and an educational exchange service. US efforts were placed firmly in a strictly informational framework by Preeident Truman. In a December Military Review

PSYOP 1950 speech, he dedicated the United Statee to a great campaign of truth. His premiee was that propaganda can be overcome by truthplain, simple, unvarnished truth. The creation of a Psychological Strategy Board in 1951 responded to the more complicated demande imposed by the Korean War. The board wae intended to coordinate military, thus into responsibilities of the other agencies-the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency-charged with carrying out theee activities. The board, in fact, was unable during ita existence to agree on its terms of reference. The US Information Agency (US1A) was eet up in 1953 as a sepa-

It is no accident that some words have acquired %d connotations while others sre considered good in many parts of the world political, economic, and psychological factors in the cold war. It did produce several ueeful psychological initiative and brought more awareness, at least temporarily, that psychological considerations extended well beyond just informational efforts. However, tbe board laeted only about two yeare. The board foundered on the practical difficulty that psychological operation cannot be eeparated from the other elements of national security programs. The efforte to develop specific programs of psychological operation inevitably involved indicating what activities should be conducted in theee other areae, and how they should be done. Thie tendency intruded into ongoing operations in these areas and Mamh 1S72 rate division in the executive branch. The purpose was to bring together the international information programs in one operational agency. The tranefer of functions accented informational activities with come policy guidance from the Department of State, but with little attention to psychological operations as such. The educational exchange program remained in the Department of State. The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 broadened come of the authorizations for exchange and informational activities. The most recent formal statement of the USIAs mieeion was by Preeident John F. Kennedy in 1963. He stated that the agencys mission is: 67

PSYOP . . . to help achieve US foreign policy objective by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various Departments and Agencies on the implications of foreign apinioa for pre8ent and contemplated US policies, programe, and official statements. informational Programs Actually, however, the USIA has largely conceived and operated its efforts ae an information program rather than one oriented to psychological considerations as suggested in President Kennedys directive. Indicative perhaps was a recent analysis of the agencys mission hy one of its officers; it concluded that the USIAs difficulties stemmed from trying to meet the conflicting needs of both fast and slow communications media. Significantly, improving the US image abroad and the agencys mieeion were considered solely in terms of a flow of communication and exchanges. The USIAs concentration on informational programs reflects the wariness of Congress and domestic public opinion regarding psychological operations that we have noted earlier. Congress has been constantly vigilant to debar the USIA from presenting its activities in the United States. The USIAs approach to its mission has also reflected its origins as an information program and ita staffing which came largely from the pubJic media and cultural and related areas. A 1954 survey indicated that 48 percent of USIA personnel had been employed in journalism, advertising, or public relations; 26 percent had been in teaching; and three percent in library work. Newsmen, teachers, and librarians place a strong professional 68 on impartiality and are likely to shy away from psychological operation, fearing they will impair their credibility. The USIAs organization also reflects this orientation. The agency is organized around geographic regions and media services. Its Office of Policy and Plans is a staff function. USIA research efforts have been limited almost entirely to opinion and attitude measurement. It has not elaborated principles or concepts for addressing the psychological aspects of national security policy.

JUSPAO Established The closest approach to direction and coordination of US psychological operations resulted from the exigencies of Vietnam. The Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was set up in Vietnam in 1966 by President Lyndon B. Johneon; the US Information Service public affairs officer in Saigon was designated to head it. The establishment of JUSPAO, with responsibility for all US psychological activities in Vietnam, reflected the crucial importance of psychological considerations in furthering internal security, rural development, and pacification. JUSPAO became a major element in the US mission. A series of changes, by 1968, took it out of many operational roles. Apparently, these modifications reflected the USIAs continued feeling that ita role should be confined to policy rather than involvement in psychological operations. This brief eurvey shows that US efforts to deal with the psychological side of international relations have been rather grudging and wary. Appropriation for activities in this field have been hard to come hy and have frequently been cut by Congress. Military Review

PSYOP tations. Is a quart bottle with a pint of milk in it half empty already or still half full ? Faithful portrayal of the US scene often provoked envy, jealousy, and resentment in other lessfortunate areas of the world. Reliance on informational or exchange programs does not take adequate account of cultural differences. The meaning given to the facts presented depends on the cultnral concepts and aspirations of the recipients. The latters perceptions are also influenced by other information and ideological concepts being actively brought to bear on them from other sources such as those urgently seeking national unity, political eupport, or even insurgency in their country. Truthfl in the light of these considerations, lies in the mind of the beholder. Credibility Development These comments do not mean that there is not a role for information programs. These programs are a means for developing credibility. They help establish a groundw~rk of familiarity with the United Statea and its purposes that can serve as a foundation for psychological operations. Through their credibility, information programs help capture the attention of foreign audiences and divert it from sources and propaganda conflicting with the interests of the United Statss. Since tbe behavior of key foreign groups and decision makers can be beneficial or detrimental to important US national seeurity intereste, it is their concept of the truth that must hs the objeet of our efforts. This broader psychologies framework haa proved difficult to institutionalise. As the experience with the PqychoIogical Strategy Board indicated, a 69

US Air Force

Peychologieal operations become clear and eomxete in wartime By emphasizing truth: the United has sought to square democracy with psychology. Our premise has been that the facta would speak for themselves and that foreign groups would thus learn about and understand the United States and our motives and actions. A corollary has been that consistent presentation of the facts would establish our credibility so that what the United Statas said would be believed. Another corollary has been that natural communities of intereat exist between scholars, students, professionals, and similar groups. Exchange programs could thus build on this rapport to increase understanding of the United States and its actions in the world. This approach involves difficulties for the United States, as the unfavorable record of recent decades suggests. One problem ia simply ascertaining the facts themselves, particularly all of them pertkrent to a given subjeet. Beyond that difficulty is the one of communicating the information. The truth can be told in many ways with differing connoStatea

ManlI 1972

PSYOP separate agency is not feasible. The effort to develop and implement epecific psychological operations inevitably intrudes upon the functions of other agenciea. For similar reasons, allocating directing reaponebilities for psychological operation to an exieting agency is equally infeasible. The chosen agency, ae it eought to develop and carry out psychological operations, would aeon be impinging on the legal and operational responsibilitilea of other agenciee. , In addition, there is no agency particularly suited for the tack. The USIA, ae we have seen, has not been inclined to accept it, and there is probably considerable advantage, by this late date, in leaving its informational role uncluttered and uncompromised. The Department of State is not staffed, or operationally disposed, to take on the task, and it would not he desirable to compromise the departmente role as the vieible representative of the United Statee overseas. The concerns of other agencies the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense -are more limited than the broad reeponsibilities and approach that would be required for Governmentwide psychological operations. Sigh.level Ohector Equally unsatisfactory would be the appointment of a high-level director of psychological operation. This approach has never been tried, but it has occasionally been auggestad as a way to avoid the operational dMticulties caueed by attempta at a separate agency. Congress would almoat certainly object, viewing the individual as a potential scar. Placing thie kind of authority in one man, no matter what the theoretic safeguards, 7e would he considered excessive and dangerous. Furthermore, ae a practical matter, the director would coon run into the same problems of interference with other agency responsibilities met by a separate agency. We can now draw together the varioua pertinent consideratiloneregardhg psychological operations: We need a program of psychological operations as an integral part of our national security policies and programs. Onr review of recent decades makes clear that there is a psychological aspect to international re@@ons. Furthermore, psychological considerations operate to the detriment of the United States if we ignore them. Looking ahead, this record makes equally clear that psychological factors are essential elements in trying to develop a climate conducive to negotiationa in place of threata and confrontation. Psychological operations are designed to influencekey foreign groupe. It consietc of something more than informational and exchange programs. However, candidly noting that our goal is to influence othere does not mean that we muet lapee into trickery and deceit. The popular misconception that psychological operatilona are inherently a dirty business should be laid to rest. Psychological operations deal in truth. Recall, for instance, the atoms for peace or the open sky programe mentioned earlier. Psychological operation involve a judicious combination of our diplomatic, military, and economic activities in waye that strengthen understanding of our purpoeee and foeter actions by others likely to asaiat in achieving those goale. As we move toward an era of negotiation, our purposes, toward which we seek to influence othere, will be those mutually
Militery Review

II / I 1 I

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beneficial to the confidence and understanding of ali thoee engaged in the world arena. We need to be Klghly eeleetive in our psychological operations. We should select those instances in whkh a relatively limited and defined psychnlogical effort would provide substantial benefits to the United States. The eelective approach has a variety of advantages. It enables us to utilice recent research in opinion formation and influence. This research has indicated that elites play the crucial role in forming public opinion and exerting influence on poliCymakers. With a discriminating approach, we can pinpoint the elites that we need to reach and how to reach them. By defining our efforts with this kind of precision, we can also better allay the concerns of Congreee and domestic opinion that psychological operations not be, or become, a freewheeling bogeyman. We can also make it clearer that we are not engaged in trickery or deceit, but are, rather, using truth in ways likely to establish its validity in the minds of the beholders. With our objectives well-defined, we are able to draw on and orchestrate the appropriate talents of the existing operational agencies to provide the effects we seek. The selective approach thus gives us a manageable and promising task. An opportunity to provide this type of attention to psychological considerations seems to be offered by the National Security Council (NSC) system as it now operates. A knowledgeable individual might be added to the staff of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He would be asked to look at the various studies and activities being considered by the NSC and its subsidiary bodies
Mwrh 1972

to identify opportunities for substantial peycbologieal benefits or major psychological pitfalls. The individuals suggestions on how a patilcular program or activity might be adjusted to take account of these psychological considerations would be offered to the Assistant to the Preeident for National Security Affairs. The latter would, as he deemed deeirable, pass these observations and suggestions to the NSC or pertinent subsidiary body. Monitoring Role The decision regarding the psychological considerations would be made by the NSC or its subsidiary organs in which the pertinent operational agencies are represented. Psychological factors would be reviewed along with the rest of the study or proposal being considered. If they were found to have merit by the council or the President, they would be incorporated in the Presidents decision on the matter. His directive would include, hztsr aiia, instructions for tbe psychological aspects of the program, with specific implementing tasks allocated to the appropriate agencies with the requisite capabilities. Tbe advisor to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs would have no directive or operational authority. His role would be solely one of monitoring and offering, on a distinctly selective basis, suggestions for consideration where he felt the psychological aspect particularly important. As noted, the decisions regarding his suggestions would be made by NSC organs in which the operational agencies have voice and vote. The operational capabilities and activities would remain with these agencies. The decision regarding any 71

PSYOP psychological proposals would come from the President, and he would draw on and specifically direct the use of the appropriate capabilities by the agenciee concerned, Arrangements along these lines would seem to make unlikely the conflicts and confusions of earlier approaches to the problem. National guidance on key psychological aepecte of our national security policies and programs would be provided in a way that would enable each agency to use its psychological operations capabilities toward the achievement of national goals. These proposals constitute an effort to find a design that will adequately define and delimit psychological operations. We must meet the legitimate concerns that this coucept arouses if it is not clearly defined and carefully controlled. At the same time, we must identify and utilize those psychological opportunities in our policies and programs that will substantially benefit our national security. The psychological aspect of international relations is very real. It will not go away just because we do not like it or find it too vague to come to grips with. Peace and security, and ultimately a world of understanding and accommodation, spring from an attitude of mind. If we value our security and if we cherish our future, we must realistically-deliberately and judiciously=include the psychological aspect in our national security policies and programs.

The Military Review Award Program provides that:
Outstanding articles, without fimit as to number, are recognized ae Mifitery Review Award articles. All euthors of articles published originally in the Military Review are eligible to receive tbe award. The criteria by which articles ere judged are eccuracy, authoritativeness, completeness originality, readability and reader appeal, soundness, substence, and over-all mifitary velue of the article. Authors ef awerd articles receive a $.25bonue and an engraved certificate in addition to the usual honorarium. Award articles are announced after publication,in subsequent issues of the Mifitary Review.




Marc E. Geneete

HE last q&mter century has been dominated by US colossus who, unlike most of its AWles, won World War II without suffering damage at home. The immediate poetwar period vested in the American people the formidable task of helping the recovery of wounded friends and checking, almost alone, the threat of new foes. Tbe job has been done, and done well. The recovery of Western economies is illustrated by the following chart which was published recently in the French journal Le Figaro. These figures reflect the general trends which speak for themselves. March 1972

Thanks to the Marshall Plan, US technology and methode, and US military prot~t,ion, the recovery hae been SPSC- , tacular, especially in the Fsderal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Japan. The figures clearly demonstrate that the old nations are steadily catching up with the leader, as far as their standard of living is concerned, although the United States is etill growing. From the strategic viewpoint, this achievement is extremely important because the appeal of social revolution, which wae so great after World War II, bas considerably declined and ie now fading out in the Western countries. There, the favorite and 73


6roaa National Produot (BSliomJ of Dollars) 1960 United states Japan Federal Republic of Germany France United Kingdom 1000. 1970 1871

6roaa National Produot (Per Capita Dotlcrs) 18s6 laao Iwo 1971

286 12

511 49

976 205

1,050 250

1,890 170

2,090 460

4,750 1,980

6,100 2,400

23 29

71 61

180 15s

210 170

490 690

1,280 1,350

2,940 3,020

3,400 3,300









most insidious weapons of Soviet expansionism have becnneutralizad for good. This danger still remains in many parta of the world, and it ie obvious that the best way to checkmate it in underdeveloped countries would Marc E. Gene8te i8 with the French Atomic Energv Com9wi88ien and i8a memb8r of the French Institut dEtudes Strategie8 and of the British Ivwtitute for Strateaic Studiee. He --.- -. wm edueated at Francee Military College at Saint-Cgr and, while en active duty, served on the fac?dtiee of the Ecole Superieure de Guerre in Parie and the US ArmzI Cemvnund and General Staff College. He vetired from the Frtwwh Army w a lieutenant colonel. Hie article, A Common Weetsrn NW clear Doctrine ?, amwarcd in the September 1971 ieeue of the MrLrrnY REVIEW. 74

be the use of the came proved methods. Western wealth stockpiles necessary to promote development and fight poverty (and communiem) are increasing at an incredible pace. Provided monetary or other troubles withh the Western eapitaliet sociaties do not disturb the machine, the West will not lack ammunitions. In thie vital field where the competition actually exiete, Western strategy for the 1970e has to be offensive and better coordinated than it has been in the past. The meane to win are available, the will to win apparently does exist, but the skill to win, which might make the difference, requiree some division of labor among allies. In the nuclear age, military forms of offenee appear to be impossible ae instruments of policy. The atom has, at long lzst, revealed the intrinsic absurdity of war which was already apparent in the TNT age in World War I and World War H. Under the defensive shield established by military
Millta# @ViOW

LEADERSNIP TO PfdtlNERSHIP strategy, organization, and doctrinee, competition in the other fielde-eeonomic, sociological, and culturalbetween the two systems can proceed by other means. This is not peace, of course, but it ie better than war. Necessary Teamwork The mounting capabilities of the alliea allow them to become partners rather than sate17itee of the United States in the general competition between the two philosophies of life. It is up to the politician to organize the necessary teamwork to win thie global competition. In this general context of protracted condkt, the task of the strategiete is to build a shield against warfare to prevent the inevitable tensions of other forms of competition from degenerating into a final nuclear holocaust, The organisation of the necessary teamwork from leadership to partnership seems to be the crucial problem of the years ahead, especially for the United States, because it implies, in many respects, an agoniaing reappraisal of US strategic doctrine as it was in the past. Presidsnt John F. Kennedy coined the words From Leadership to Partnership to alleviats allied fears of permanent US hegemony. Kennedys dream was premature by at least one, or maybe two, generations. His contemporaries in political power were men of two World Ware. The nation-state eystem, although it had culminated in world holoceuete, was the cradle of their youth. No one can escape from his youth. The instinctive defiance of foreigners built into tide system was stronger than all the rationale, however right, of philosophers, scientist, end economists. Only now, the rising generations, who are not veterane of World March 1972 War 11, begin to question the basic beliefs of their fathers, and lthe general unrest of modem youth, ihore or lees consciously, probably stems from such feelings. At least, for the next decade, the new US strategy muet be beeed on the hard fact of national entities rather than built on sands of political integration. Western defense muet be gesrad to todays realities rather than prospective bopee, if only to win the necessary delays. A good, clear, strong common defense is the beet, and today perhaps the only cement of Weetern solidarity is torn apart by economic and monetary squabbles, This would provide the cornerstone of future political construction. Basic Discrepancy The Communists growing military power was, and still is, more than enough to force the old nation-etetea into solidarity in defense matters. The greet illusion of the 1960s has been to subordinate a common defense to the realisation of a premature political dream. The Weetera a17iance almost foundered on this basic discrepancy. Time wee not yet ripe for France, Britain, or the FRG to give up their national entities to dreamers fancies, whatever their logic or sentimental appeal. Things being what they are, we must build on realities. Rightly or wrongly, in the publics mind, the idea of strategic thermonuclear exchange is equated with sudden death for both the attacker and the defender. This is tbe comeretone of deterrence. Modern technology hae, in the recent past, tended to erode this basic belief of the early 1960s. With the development of satellites, Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles, antiballistic missilee, and the like, there was at one time a hint of 75


the technical feasibility of splendid counterforce strategies capable of dbaarming in one blow the nuclear arms of the opponent and killing in flight with antiballistic missiles the few retaliatory rockete which might have escaped the first strike. However, such technical developmente, which might have rendered to war its former value as an instrument of policy, met the sobering barrage of economic feasibility. The record of 250 or more billion dollars expended in 1970 by the civilized nations for their defense budgets would be considerably increased if any competitor wanted to reach total protection, and a formidable spiraling arms race with the progress of technology unceasingly fueling the blaze would necessarily follow. . 76

This truth has finally led the two superpowers to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) conference table in Helsinki and Vienna. The significance of these talks is naturally immense. Thki is a basic admission that neither one can or wants to try to reach a decisive strategic superiority and that both agree to remain hostages to each other. In the strategic field, defense is, and will remain, mainly retaliation. Whatever might be the final outcome of theee SALT negotiations, one cannot foresee any significant change in the balance of strategic power in the next decade. Now, the protection value of the US nuclear umbralla has to be examined once again in this light. The US-extended deterrence concept was questioned in European minds in the
Military Review

LEADERSHIP TO PARTNERSHIP beginning, at a time when the US etrategic superiority was unquee. tioned. Then, the Europeane remembered too well the preatotnic age when, in public opinion, the motto why dle for Danzig? greatly prevented the French and Britieh Governments from stopping Adolf Hit.Iers ambitions at the doore of Vienna or Prague. They remembered aleo that their American friends did not come into World War I and World War II at the start since the US mainland was not then threatened. Credibility Gap NrI wonder, then, if today, the US nuclear umbrella of extended deterrence, which was not even opened to protect the US soldiers in Korea or Vietnam for fear of nnclear escalation to the US mainland, can nolongerremain the one and only guarantee of strategic deterrence on the European Continent. Whatever might be the personal resolution of US policymakers, or even of the American people, to die for Danzig, Bonn, Rome, or Parie, the problem of convincing the allies andthepotential enemy of euch a heroic resolve would remain thecrucial matter. Here, only the small individual strategic umbrella of frontline European natione, or a larger European umhrelte, can close this credibilitygap and avoid possible Soviet miscalculation. They would lend considerable credibility to the US nuclear guarantee, while borrowing from the US stockpiles the maesive power they currently lack. The credibility of strategic defense through retaliation-can be fully restored if it is stated that one nuclear strategic attack against one ally will be met with nuclear etrategic response from all the allies, and mainly, Kamh 1972 if this resolution is guaranteed, when the chips are down, by the physical capability of at least the attacked nation to retaliate in kind, however small the counterstrike. Only the national willean be credited with enough resolutionto use strategic rockets in self defense. The certainty of national retaliation, however small, plus the perspectiveof allied solidarity involving vast US stockpiles, would have a deterrent effect much more impressive, as eeen from the other eide, than the gigantic integrated machine of 14 national wills in which all must agree to die for Danzig before any action can be taken. In other words, we have to open European umbrellas, triggered by Europeans themselves, to restore, as a minimum, the certitude of some nuclear retaliation and, at the same time, some credibility in the US umbrella. Tha Ksy Needless to say, the SALT bilateral negotiations between the two superpowers are the key to the entire affair. On one hand, SALT gives the extraordinary hope for humanity to stop the immemorial arms race between hostile groups. If it succeeds to the extent that world opinion and individual nations are convinced that the way to serious business in arms control and disarmament is open, then all theee schemes to save peace through terror will appear useless, costly, and absurd. We might, then, but only then, throw all these thoughts in the wastebasket. On the other hand, SALT appears to be, for the time being, a bilateral negotiation between superpowers specifically limited to that part of their arsenal which vitally threatens their own social fabricintercontinental 17

LEADERSHIP TO PARTNERSHIP ballistic missiles (ICBMS) and sealaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMS). This bilateralism, in itself, ie the tacit admission that serious business in strategic bombardment matters is only peesible in national person-toperson negotiations. If SALT succeeds in neutralizing the two intercontinental arsenals, but faile to extend tbe same neutralization to the lower forms of warfare, then Europe will remain alone under the threat of the Soviet midrange ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and mobilization potential. This would provide considerable incentive toward the national strategic deterrent system. It must be noted that the Soviete still proclaim in party gatherings their traditional goals of world conquest for their system aud continue to bar onsite inspection. Needless to say, these two attitudes do not help build that minimum confidence necessary for arms control. Moreover, on teehnical ground, any SALT agreement establishing quantitative parity of offensive reeketa should, of course, freeze the number of deliverable warheade. Here, the total payload of the SS-9 monsters would give the Soviets potential far superior to the United states! Another question mark in any such United States-USSR agreement in a multilateral world is the effect of a Chineee strategic buildup and the unavoidable chain reaction it would generate in the bilateral equation. Wldle the European allies applaud the United Statee-USSR initiative toward arms control and detente, they perceive the enormous difficulty of the SALT undertaking at the intercontinental strategic level end feel all the weight of the local etrategic threat shonld SALT fail. The two superpowers who signed 78 the nonproliferation treaty are now at the turning point: Either they will demonstrate that other natione do not need to go nuclear: or they will compel them to build modern defenses. If SALT appears either to be a failure, starting a new round of the arms race, or, even worse, if it looks like a strictly bilateral arrangement in which many observers will find come flavor of Nuclear YaltaY ihen the nonproliferation treaty will be as good as dead. New Doctrine To eum it up: If only to pressmw the Soviets into a satisfactory and comprehensive arms control agreement, an entirely new stratagic dectrine has to be devised for the Western alliance, taking into account the emergence of Western European nations as a new center of world power with Japan and China. There is a provision of the nonproliferation treaty which would allow Europe, as a political entity, to enjoy the special position of the Wo European nations already members of the nuclear club-Britain and France. United Europe ae a whole would become a member of the club. Unfortunately, as already pointed out, a political unity in Europe is not around the corner and will certahly not be aclieved in a timeframe which would permit consideration of Europe today as one monolithic building block of Western defense in the new strategy. To remain realistic, we have to build with what we have today. Here, the problem of West Germany becomes the crucial mattar. This nation is, at the same time, the cornerstone of both European and Western defense becauee of its geographical position, economic potential, technology, and military traditions. ConMilitmy RRViOW

LEADERSHIP TO PARTNERSNIP demned by many international treaties to build a strictly national defense on conventional weapons, it had no choice but to comply with the nonproliferation treaty. From a strictly national viewpoint, if SALT appears to close the US nuclear umbrella which wae, in the Germane minde, their only possible protection in the nuclear age, then the incentive toward appeasement might be greater than for an unsatiafectory defense. The dramatic choice between appeasement and defense is, finally, a choice between East and West. The rebuilding of Western strategic deetrine following the end of the US extended deterrence concept must primertly take care of this crucial preblem: how to assure the security of a nation deprived of modem weapans. Of course, West Germany must participate in the combhed deterrence equation with nuclear weapone. The FRG cannot build or possess nuclear warheads. However, the nonproliferation treaty does not preclude the FRG from building or possessing hmnchers. As a matter of fact, the .FRG Army has already in ita bands an arsenal of tactical weapons such se the Pershitzg, Sergeant, and the Nike Hercules which would be instantly nuclear tipped if need be. In other words, West Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization becomes instantly a nuclear nation as soon as the alliance so decides, and automatically if attacked with nuclear weapons, even under the present flexible response concept. The FRG might easily participate in the general array of national deterrents and form the missing building block of our combined national strategic deterrence system. Some national strategic

LEADERSHIP TO PARTNERSHIP umbrella has to be provided, one way or another, to the allied nations who doubt the allied resolve and feel that this move is necessary for their own security. Tids would not give any dreaded offensive capability to anyone, but only a defensive one. With a proper strategic doctrine which would assure defense through retaliation-however smaU, but absolutely guaranteed by its national character-one cannot eee any rationality in the first use of strategic arsenals or any chance for nuclear political blackmail. The object of war is control, not useless and blind destruction. The object of war implies invasion with land forces, and the use of iirepower-even nuclear firepower-must be limited and subordinated to the achievement of this task. Tactical Battlefield This is why the true problem of deterrence does not lie at the strategic level only, but, rather, on the tactical battlefield. There ie not the slightest chance for a nuclear war to start through a massive intercontinental and reciprocal bombardment, but, rather, to start from local skirmishes the most likely Mdng in the ehaky Soviet empir+then escalating progressively out of control. If war is ever to come, it will come on foot across the Iron Curtain, not riding an SS-9 across the stratosphere+ hence, the cardinal importance of the long-neglected deterrence problem at the tactical level in West Germany along the Iron (@t&n. The only chance of a Soviet offensive on the continent (short of nuclear war), the thrust of their superior manpower into some part of West Germany, would be blocked physically by the phenomenal firepower of US tactical warheads properly used on the 80 battlefield. Psychologically, the very certitude of meeting such a crushing barrage would be the best deterrent to conventional action. Thue, the only Soviet choice to breach our forward continental defense would be a Soviet nuclear first strike aimed at silencing the many nuclear batteries threatening their highly vulnerable columns on the ground. No Separation Thie is the point where tactical and strategic strikes meet and where tactical and strategic deterrence cannot be separated. Again, the FRG is the ke~. Assuming that the Soviets want to start the nuclear tactical game in despair for a lost cauee, they would have to strike in depth the widely dispersed array of airtlelds, rockets, and nuclear artillery. Thk clearly would be a strategic attack from the Iron Curtain at least to tbe Rhine, and a strategic aggression as far as the FRG is concerned. The Soviets should not be allowed to gamble that the nuclear battle would be confined tQ West Germany and that no nuclear punishment on their homeland would occur. The very -decoupling of the US deterrent might raise such a hope in their minds; they might ae well estimate that, regardless of peacetime promises, the European club members namely France and Britain-would hesitate to strike back on behalf of their new friend and former foe. To say the least, a West German retaMatory strike on behalf of the FRG equipped with a retaliatory trigger is much more credible than any other system. The West Germans have consistently stuck, quite rightly, to a forward strategy with the hope that the threat of US strategic strikes on the USSR was the answer to deterrence
Military Review

LEADERSHIP TO PARTNERSHIP of war in Europe, and that, if need be, such a blow on the USSR mainland would avoid a nuclear fight on Weet German soil. This view is now completely outdated with the reciprocal neutralization of the ICBM deterrents, whatever might be the outcome of SALT. A forward strategy, on the other hand, is not feasible with conventional means, even if some parity in manpower could be established on the central front. The only solution to achieve a tectimdly feasible forward strategy is the employment of nuclear tlrepdwer which inetantly shlfte considerable destruction from one point of the front to the other. Moiility of nuclear fires is a feature no less important than their crushing power. Only nuclear fires can offset the advantages of mechanization observed in World War II and revive World War I concepts of linear defense. A forward strategy for West Germany cannot be devised without immediate and massive use of tactical nuclear weapons, whlcb then might be limited to a narrow band of terrain on tbe border and reduce drastically collateral demage and civilian deaths, that our current tactical doctrine inherited from World War II cannot avoid. Unfortunately, the strategy of flexible response necessarily implies a delayed nuclear reaction on the tactical battlefield. During this delay, the Soviet conventional thrust would have occupied one-half of the FRG. The mixing up of unite probably would have hampered the use of the nuclear weapons, and, even if the decision had been made, the nuclea$ battle would have to take place on Wed German soil and deetroy the FRG for the sake of reconquering it. k!mch1972 No wonder the West Germane had no special taste for a t.act&l nuclear war of this kind. The choice ie in their hands. They do not have the key to nuclear weapons, but they have the key of Weetern defense. The FRGs alliea should not forget that. A stalemate hea already been achieved at the upper level of violence: Strategic nuclear etrikee are clearly unthinkable. If we pull the nuclear screen down to the lower level of the scale, we find that, on the battlefield, tbe. massive use of tactical nuclear weapons would vaporize all maneuver elements on the ground and render offense se outdated today as a cavalry charge against macbineguns. The only form of warfare which might barvest political dividends today are those in which nuclear firepower is not applicsbl-ubversion or economic warfare. The rising standards of living in Weetern nations have offeet, for good, the oncedrezded internal Communist chaUenge which, to succeed, would reqnire a linkup with the Red Army. As far ae economic warfare is concerned, ,the Seviet system is no match for ours, to such an dent that the Hremlin bosses might be tempted, in deepair, to play their growing asset, the military game. Dstente is working for the Weetern system: Czechoslovakia has alreedy demonstrated the threat to the peace in Europe inherent in desperate Soviet military reaction. Here probably lies one of the main dangers of peacekeeping in the for=eeable future. It is up to the Atlantic alliance to build the defensive waU which would deter escalation of such local troubles to military warfare. It has to be a nuclear wall, a nuclear partnership, and a new military doctrine. 81

Urban Guerrilla Waflare

Colonel Harries-CIichy Peterson, United States Marine Corps Reserve O WE really have urban guerrilla Warfare in the United States today ? The question is complex to anewer. I think that the United States has come cloee to a state of urban guerrilla warfare and, with carelessness, could regress into real danger. Left wing attacke have concentrated in the urban araas of New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Washington, D. C., and Chicago. They targeted on police, colleges, high schools, corporations, military facilities, Government offices, and homes. Acts of sabotage and terrorism apparently committed by the political left rbse from 16 in 1965 to well over 500 in 1970, ae reported in Scantans 82

Monthly in January 1971. These figures were obtained by analysis of 17 big city newspapers, the underground press, and information held at the Lemburg Center of the Study of Violence at Brandeis University. Although alarmist in tenor, Scanl.ans Mom%tg asserta it made every effort not!to give credit to the left for right- ist or purely criminal or demented acte of violence. Leftist bombings in 1970, as rapor@d by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, averagad 60 monthly, accounting for two deatha per month. Leftist damage to schools and colleges in 79 cities during 1970, according to insurance authorities, averagad some one million dollars
Milltary Review

URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE monthlysomewhat over half of all US damage from all kinds of riots and civil disorders. To put leftist incidence in perspective, a study prepared by Senator John L. McClellans Subcommittee on Investigations found nearly 4,000 bombings occurring annually in the United States from all causes. This suggests that leftist bombing is lees than 15 percent of the total. Base of Restlessness Wltbout comparing other countries or times, it can safely be said that there are many things wrong with the United States-there are also many things that are eminently right, but that is not the issue here. Wrongs include the decaying cities, increaeed crime, drugs, choked traffic, the position of minorities, pollution, gross misunderstanding of the capitalist system, wedlock, the family, religion, the role of authority of the state, elders, and personal responsibility. Perhaps, however, the crux can be summarized in remarks of Peter F. Drucker, intellectual, and John W. Gardner, political activiet. Drucker, addressing the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in March 1969, asked: How does an institution serve both the individual and eociety ? Gardner, in Ths Rscovery of Confidence, blames the paradox of poverty in the worlds richest nation, and other evils, on institutional rigidity: . . . supported by solid citizene who stnve to be virtuow+ but dislike change, . . . and never, never fail to protect that part of the system that guarde their own selfih interests. In recent years, students, free from drudgery to pay tuition, sense tbeae blemishes and want to correct them. When they run into the rigidity Gardner mentions, they become dieilluMsrsh 1972

sioned and then resentful. One neede only to reea21the hopeleee slums of New York, or the impersonality of a 25,000-student campus, or the frustration of correcting a computerised misbilling to see causes of irritation. That somebody wants to react is a blessing; that the voice may require violence to be heard is a curse. That is exacty the point where social redeeign is needed, or else where guerrillas are spawned. Resentment is magnified in the case of students by fear of being drafted for a seemingly purposeless Southeast Asian war. In the case of the blacks, accumulated dleadventagee and resulting discrimination inflame the irritations. When Marxist doctrine is introduced to provide a gen-

Colonel Hawiee-Clichy Peter80n, US Marine Carps Re8e-rve, @ a bcwine.rs eeneultant ba8ed in San Francisco. He hokla B.A. and M.B.A. d+ grees from Harvard University, and i8 a gradwate of the Awned Forces Staff Co2Jege and the National War ColJege. He mwved as an infunt$y commander with the 1st Marine Dim-eion and as an armared amphibian commander in Korea, and with the Matins CorP8 Equipment Board and Advanced Base Planning Unit. He ia the author of the book, Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. 83

LIRBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE eral indictment against our system and to glorify another, desire for mere redrese is supplanted with maesive disenchantment and the psychological need to destroy completely without regard for what may follow. At this point, guerrilla warfare can become real. The guerrilla warfare of Mao Tsetung and Ernesto (Che) Guevara focused on rural life. Both saw the peeeant es being conscioue of exploitation and eager to follow blindly any leadership that promised redreee of grievances and a better future. This worked in China and Cuba, but it failed for Guevara in Bolivia. The educational backwardness of highland Indians was too great; they could not fully picture what Guevara alluded to when he harangued them in Lighspeed, abstract rhetoric spoken in his urban Argentinean-Cuban Spanish. They lacked revolutionary preparation, and Guevara tried to drive it in far faster than they were ready. Debrays Theory Regie Debray, author of the book, Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America, who was with Guevara until the end in Bolivia, grasped this failure and, being a sophisticated French urbanist, could never feel comfortable with rural Andeane. With hie natural focus being toward urban movements, Debray dednced a new theory to fit and to extend the reality of urban guerrilla warfare as he saw it. He recognized the worldwide movement of students and the middle claes to free man from the rigid institutional controls of Western capitalism, as well as Eastern bureaucracy. From thie, Debray boldly rejected, as no longer realistic, Maos principle that politics directe the gun. He saw 84 the gun inurban guerrilla warfareae now making politics. Mao had observed an ineffective government in China, found increasing resentment against authority, and then formulated a theory to give would-be rebele a rationale for action and hope for a better life. He skHlfully combined resentment, hope, nnifying theory, demagoguery, qseudomorality and armed force into the attainment of absolute power in China. Create Resentment Guevara worked with Fidel Castro to exploit resentment against Fulgencio Y Zaldivar Batistns corruption and turn it into rebellion. He even boaeted that, if there were no natural resentment, it could be created. His famoue book, Guerrilla Warfare, formulated theory and then sought to conduct all subsequent actione in terms of rigid obedience to those theoretical principles. Debray takes a radlc k 1 departure. He feels that, today, resentment can fire its own erratic, uncoordinated, violence against authority. It needs no unifying theory although hatred of the alleged foreign imperialism and domestic tyranny of capitalism appear as cOnnnOn cause. According to Debray, youth and the middle class are at last beginning to realize that they are but serfs in a syetem that, while it is materially productive, is humanistically destructive. Tbie realization, he feels, is widespread from the most sophisticated aerospace engineer in the United States to the lowest clerk in a developing country. So far, this realization is enlightened by no unifying theory. It ia just blindly resentful. It reacts often in bizarre, seemingly irrational ways; it has no top leadership, seeme to he disMilitary Review

URBAN 6UERRILI.A WARFARE trustful of would-be leaders. ,-. and acta . close to anarchy. From thk, Debray theorizes that, as violence emerges and becomes more commonplace, it will tend to follow patterns of greatest effect and emotional satisfaction. Out of this, he feels, will come, in a form yet unpredictable, a pragmatic, common set of political principles, perhaps even a great new ideology. Debraye theory at least has one value: It gives us a type of explanation why the recent wave of violence in the United Statw lacks leadership, goale, and a concrete etatement of what is wanted to replace what is being torn down. His theory rejects the Communist Party and ite Maraists as the political vanguard, setting the correct line for the people to follow. The guerrillas themselves promulgate their own reasons for resentment by their sabotage and terroristic violence. If drematically done, if creating a feeling that the government is impotent and the guerrillas can act with impunity, and if guerrilla motives and logic are made public, then the exploited claesee can be expected to rally beldnd the guerrillas, Debray feels. During this time, there ie no role for Communist bureaucrats. However, by helping fan urban guerrilla warfare, closely following ite deatr tion 1 of an established government, an 5 being ready to till the political vacuum when that government collapses, the Communists can aspire eventually to take over control. In any event, they feel confident that any new government in these conditions would not be capitalistic and would have to be friendly and cooperative to communism which is good enough reason for them to aid urban guerrilla warfare. Debray cites the Irish Revolutionary Army, the Irgun in Israel, and


URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE of arms at this time, but the dissemination of the guerrilla point of view by emphatic violence. Many leftiets consider the United States, to have paesed through the first stage and to be well into the second. However, the third stage-larger, regular, centrally led forces carrying

the Algerians as examples of successful urban guerrilla warfare. He considers the recent violence in Quebec, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay as urban guerriUa warfare. The first step in urban guerrilla warfare is for many people to resent deeply an established government and

its operating systems and ideologies. This, then, emerges as emall cells of revolt venting resentment in ezattered, probably minor, violence. The second stage develops this violence into widespread action aimed at undermining government authority and inspiring a revolutionary state of mind. This increases the number of people who share the guerrillas resentment against the government. Debray de this armed propaganda sines the aim ie not control by force 88 out more conventional operations with many sectors of the country liberated and subjest to guerrilla control and tiation-is considered by most observers to be far away, perhaps a dezade. This could be hastened by government repression, publication of a unifying theory appealing ti most ndddle-class people, and broad Communist succemee elsewhere to create a get-on-thebandwagon psychology. It would be retarded by redesign of institutions and a firm leadership that
Millta& Review

is able publicly to inculcate moral disciplines supporting constructive approaches to problems and opportunities. For todaya urban guerrillas, violence is condoned as the ultimate, manly act to obtain social and eeonomic justice. Precedents of the American War of Independence and industrial strikes are cited as exemples where violence was gwd and paid off. Coupled to this view is the aseertion that it ie hypocritical to be against the use of force since we accept force by policemen to preserve civil order, or by the military to wage foreign ware when they eerve our goals, but resentin a moral inconsistencyforce when it conflicts with onr own personal values. There is no universally accepted code which distinguishes good from bad use of force. Hence, each pereon must be free to judge this for himself-so say urban guerrilIa theorists. Reform System Debray argues that the only way to bombproof society is to refoqm the system continuously. All urban guerrilla warfare is the direct result of the failure of the orderly process of progrese. Violence in the United States today reacts more to specific outrage than to ideology. Thus, white studenta target draft boards, miSitary recruiting offices, Reserve Officers Training Corps facilities, colleges, high schools, corporations, and banks. The blacks snipe and bomb the police and the courts since both are seen as the immediate harassment to their normal lives. When students and blacks get aroueed about mistreatment and tangential response of authorities, they want to do eomething, and, for many, Marsh Ielz

violence can vent this anger satisfyingly and even exMSarat.ingly. The risk of getting caught has heen minor, especially with popular indulgence and our lack of past need for a massive police force to preserve order. Also, the university encSave and the black ghetto can act as sanctuary since the police get scant cooperation from, and generally are quite unfamiliar with, those areas. Foreign Beeks The techniques and some of the theory of violence are easily obtained from foreign guerrilla books-such as Guevarae GuemUa Warfare, Alberto Bayos 150 Questions for a GuerriU.u, Maos Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, DebraYs Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America, and Carlos L. Marighellas Mintman!az5 of the Urban Guemlla-Black Panther Party pubSicetions, US Army training manuals, encyclopedias, and the spreading knowledge of Vietnam veterane and graduates of Cuban Venceremoe schoole. Supplies have been easy to buy, steal, or improvise. Recent laws requiring full reporting of purchaees of exploeivee will hinder, but not prevent, provisioning of urban guerrillas in the United States. Urban guerrillas, fearful of backlaeh euch as that created by the killing of a married graduate student in the bombing of the Wisconsin mathematical research building, are beeoming more careful to avoid kilSing noninvolved people and to accompany all incidents by wide dissemination of their own rationale. Wherever possible, incidents are designed to force people to take sides to discredit authority, and to present some shred of moral justification, imagined or reel. 87

URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE Our 1969-70 domestic violence-the first step of urban guerrilSa warfare -came in tilme to compound our difficulties in coping with rural guerrilla warfare in Southeast Asia. Together, the two succeeded in weakening our resolve to prosecute that war to a clear and early victory. In thie sense, it can he said that urban guerrilla warfare in the United States contributed importantly to worldwide Communist ambitilone. The Communists appear not to have dL rectly managed this US violence. Rather, their influence was intellectual and ideological; it depended critically on the special dbdike of students to being drafted for a seemingly purposeless, unsuccessful war, plus the black awakening. The lack of imaginative techniques and aims, strong and respectful leadership personalities, and a clear message caused this machine of violence to run out of gasolin+for the moment at least. Mass Resentment Today, the main questions are where can Communists find real causes of mass resentment? If they do not exist, how can Communists taSk up imaginary wrongs to trigger a revolution ? The burden of performance in the next few years may. well be on the Communists shoulder$, not our Governments. To have a job, the would-be revolutionist must first find customers who want things changed badly enough to take big risks. In the United States, with our democratic elections, could the mass of people ever become so angry with their Government to support corrective violence? It seems incredible, yet the violence of 1969-70 did, in itself, ati]n the incredible, the unprecedented. A threshold can be postulated above 88 which violence runs out of control. It repression, rivalry to outdo, desire for revenge, acceptance of imaginary wrongs: desire to acquiesce, and, finally, desire to get on the bandwagon. How close did we get to that threshold ? Is the present coohng off merely temporary ? Could a resurgence of violence take us into a full-scale, out-uf-control urban guerrilla war ? Regardless of tbe answers to those questione, leftists admit that urban guerrilla warfare did not rise into the critical threshold in the United States. Now, they are busy wondering why not, and how to breathe new life into the movement.

Centemperary Thktkera To assess this situation, let ua briefly examine the contributions of leading contemporary thinkera. Charlee A. Reich, Yale University law professor, in a 1970 book, The Greening of America: The Coming of a New Conseiouenees and ths Rebirth of a Future, voiced an underlying trend. He seems to recommend substituting free-form conscience in place of submission to the pragmatic, organizational disciplines that have been needed to advance ue materially. He offers a frame of mind for moral ease and freedom from harsh competition and laborious responsibWiee. He does not show how this will help meet daily family income needs. Still, Reichs book, remaine a pioneering effort to find a better harmony between personal and gronp life, and probably will appeal to students before they assume family responsibilities. It could weaken the reeponee of youth to any call for eacrifice to defend traditional US values and interests. At best, it wilt cause youth to question thoee assumption in our
Military R8Yiow

system width are false or obsolete. At wors~ it could lead minds to welcome a followup book advocating active raEistance to current authorities and destruction or nihilism as the first step to progress, Debray had interpreted views such as Reichs as creating wild violence that would shape its own destiny, quite apart from outaide ideology. John W. Gardner, former Secretary of the Department of Health, Educa. tion, and Welfare, urged continuous, early, responsive redesign of our institutions to meat new needs. His call was headed, consciously or unconsciously, by our Government. Saul D. Alinsky, former criminologist and now founder-director of Chicagos Industrial Araae Foundation, trains and urges people to react intelligently and forcefully, but not destructively, to injustice and, if legal means are too slow, to go out and agitate to bring about needed change. Bernadine R. Dobrn, Weatherman leader, sees a failure in DebraYs violence for ita own sake, and, instead, in her book, Nsw Morning4hanuing Weather, calls for courage to risk rallies, open argumenta, and to convince and organise mass forces against war and social and economic injustice. Herbert Marcuse seems to long fervently for fast, radical changes in the United Stataa, ahnost for their own sake. He is distressed at the failure of those who tried to engineer confrontation and violence. Thk failure is hwgely due to physical restraint, admission of error, and willingness on the part of the Government voluntarily to make many of the changes for which the leftists were

URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE . ready to bomb and terrorise. Never a quitter, Marouse calls these Government attitudes repressive tolerance. To overcome this new and unexpected stumbling block of Government flexibility with no harsh reprisals, Marcuse urges complete reexamination of the strategy of the leftist movement. Jaan-Francois Reve~ French intellectual, in a book Without Mara rwr J.wua: Ths New Amsriazn Revolution Haa Begun, sees the United States as the true vanguard of revolution, more responsive to dissent and willing to change then any other nation on earth. He sew us sure ta find suc@esful nonviolent means to bring about change with revolutionary speed. For much of this, he crecWa informative television reporting free of the government censorship common in most other countries, Weetern and Eastern. He even goes on to envision the Unitad States becoming the model for revolution despite all today% Ieftista views that the United States is imperialistic and racist. Thus, the two POIWof despair and hope for the United States future are shown in Marcuses repressive tolerance and Revels outlook that the US Government, in an important new revolutionary spirit, is co@ing for beneficial changes more or leas apace with need. In either case, our restrained, graduated response has succeeded in blunting a major threat. Now, we have temporary cabn. If the threat of urban guerrilla warfare should be renewed with dearer ideology, firmer leadership, and real causes, it could strike harder and with more danger. That is what understanding the movement will keep us alert to prevent.

March 1972

andthe Challenge of theSeventies

Lieutenant General Lam Quang Tld, Armg Republic of Vistnom PON completing a recent tour of military academiee in Australia, I sat down to prepare a routine report on the trip. One key impression left with me was the different-in some eaees, divergent-views held in Australia and the Republic of Vietnam on how to prepare a young man for a career as a professional officer. At first, 1 thought the differences simply sprang from the fact that Australian academies were generally influenced by British thought, while we had accepted an American pattarn. But upon deeper reflection, I realized that was not so. Like military services themselves, a nations military academies are bound to mirror the prevailing attitudes and mores of the parent society. With that idee in mind, I began to reminisce about all the other military academies I had visited over the years. Fate has been quite kind to me in thla regard, providing opportunities for me to observe extensively military academies in the United States, Europe, Asia, and Australiaall told some 17 different academies. Additionally, while serving for more than three years as Superintendent of 90
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MIUTARY ACADEMIES the Republic of Vietnam National Military Academy, I have reed broadly and deeply about similar institutions in other parta of the world. Altogether, I have been fortunate enough to have had about as wide an eaposure ta facts and theories concerning military acad. emiee ae anyone could hope for. From that experience, I have gleened come intriguing comparisons which seem to be of quite timely interest se we journey down the decade of tbe eeventiee, particularly from the standpoint of the challenge to military academies preeented by this tumultuous decade. Training Ingradianta Essentially, a military academy preparee a young man to be a professional soldier by attempting to ahape hlm in three dletinct waya: academic education, military training, and character building. All academiee agree on theee neceseary ingredient. There is wide dkagreement, bowever, on what constitutes the right mix of the three. Generally speaking, all nations are in accord on the extent, type, and goals of the military training cadets ehould receive, To begin with, they introduce the newly arrived young man to the peculiarities of the local military eyeLieutenant Genera! Lam Qnang Thi is Superintendent of the Republic of Vietnam NatiormZ Mil$targ AcademV. He holde a Bachelors degree in Philosophy which he received in Saigon; was graduated from the Dalati Combined Arms Military School; attended the Advanced Artill.srp Training Couree at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and i8 a 196S graduate of the US Army Command and General Stag CoUege. General Thie a-seignments also include duty a%commander of lat Corfla Artillerp; Deputy Commander, 7th Infantry Division; and Commander, 9th Infant~ Division. Mwrli 1972 tern-peculiarities which eet it apart from his civilian environment. He thus mekee the transition from civilian to soldier. N* he receives enougk rudimentary technical and leadership training to permit him to gain a commieeion and to perform adequately se a junior officer. There are elight differences, of coureq from country to country, but imparting thk baeic level of military eklll is what they all aim for. Moreover, and quite significantly, all acsdemiee of all nations aver openly that they are preparing officers wbo will ultimately lead their armed forces at the highest levels. They claim that generale are their products, not lieutenants. If that is eo, and if there are not distinctive differences in the outlook on military training, then one might expect to see widely varying societal concepts expressed in se wide a varie~ of approaches to academic preparation and character development. That is the ease. Take character development first. Thie includes euch intangible factors as disciplinary techniques, cedes of honor, degreea of challenge and preesure, religious and moral preparation, and the inculeatioh of pride, spirit,

MILITARY ACADEMIES and confidence. It has to do with the toughness and quality of obstacles the cadet muet meet and overcome, with questions of Spartan versus plush surroundings, and with permissive versus uncompromising standards. Across the boerd, the older, developed states are less demanding of their eedets than are the newer or emerging nations. A Canadian oiltcer, a graduate of Canadas Royal Military College, was astounded to observe harshness. Cadets there begin being treated as officers and gentlemen immediately. Handled with silk gloves, they are expected to be tempered through osmosie rather than by fire. It is otherwise in the new nations. There, cadeta are pushed herder, physically and emotionally. They are subjected to more severe and more prolonged pressures. Everywhere, of course, military academies are more demanding than civilian colleges in

the strict regimen of cedeta in Vie& nam. He remarked that: Our cadets in Canada are far too soft. In the United States, service academy standards have recently changed to accommodate the general relaxation of rules across the board in the MRitary Establishment and to adhere more cIose2y to the permiasivenesa now permeating American society itself. Australian otliciala have opted to do away ahnost completely with all semblance-or vestiges--of hazing or 92 L.

the same country. However, between countries, cadets from the established statea have a much easier time of it. Their contemporaries in the developing nations are quite noticeably leaner and harder. Sacrifice ia a word intimately involved in the precees of character development in academies of the new etatee. Privilege ie more often than not the corresponding operative word in the academies of established countries. In the realm of academic attainMilitary Rwbll


one sees the same general phenomenon. The emerging natione attach much status to education and place greet stress on producing a highly educated corps of professional officers. This is especially true in the Asian countries where Confucius long ago stressed the importance of karning, and where societies are strongly degree-oriented. They require eadete to remain at their academies at least four years and, in come cases, five. In the developing countries, academy graduates are destined to play a key role not only in the defenee of their countries, but they also might well become the leaders of these countries. So, it is self-evident that these young men ehould be given a good moral and academic education. Wealthy nationswith the notable exception of the United States-seem to consider that educating a soldier is a waste of money. They see little or no correlation between military prowess and intellectual attainment. For example, neither Sain&Cyr in France nor Sandhurst in England aspire to granting their graduates a baccalaureate degree. Presumably, a two-year brush with books provides a touch of polieh-and nothing about war really requires brains. Now, compare the results.. All governments expect the graduates df their academies one day to lead their respective armed forces. These are the men,

then, who will inspire or fail to inspire the defense of their nation. In the dark hour of peri~ w?dch comes sooner or later to every country, they must shoulder the lonely burden of high command. Will they be ready? A society, like a person, can expect to receive no more than it is willing to give. The cadet is malleable; the new graduate will largely reflect the attitudes and principles he developed wldle at his academy. Those countries whose cadets reeeive an inadequate education in an easy environment of luxury and privilege should not be dismayed to find tbemselvee saddled with profeasionaI soldlers both ignorant and lethargic. There is one other point of agreement among all military academiw: The decade of the seventies will be one of unparalleled challenge to those past preeepte upon which they have operated. With seciety in the midst of dynamic, even explosive, change, the academies will inevitably be caught up in the current. How they themselves should shift and to what degree, are pressing questions with no evident or easy anawers. Nor will we know for at least 20 or 90 years just what the best approach should have been. However, when that day comes, do not be surprieed if the consensus of hb3tory votes in favor of the hard and hungry cadet. iilr

Mamh 1972


UNITED STATES Bomb Guidancs 2ystsm YO-3A The Air Force has developad a minThe photo ehowe the two-place iature guidance system that will encamouflaged Y03A aircraft in flight able a bomb or missile tr) pinpoint a above a rubber plantation in Vietnam. specific target within a large complex. In the period the aircraft hae heen ~The Optical Aimpoint Guidance in the Republic of Vietnam, several (OPTAG) system uses a correlation improvement have been made. to compare previously made photoPowerad by a slow-turning, threegraphs with actual scenery. The tarbladed wooden propeller, the widaget does not have to be visible, thus enemy camouflage cannot fool the system. By turning photographic and optical scenes into electronic images, the OPTAG syetam cues control fins to keep a bomb or missile on couree d~ring its flight. Any deviation between the true scene and tbe photograph ie eliminated through movement of the fine. The guidance system can also home in on any target the pilot of the launching aircraft can see or locate. Simulated Sight tests earSier this year and captive Sight tests proved successful. Actual drop teata will be done at WMts Sands Missile Range in New Maaico. The guidance eystem will be fitted onto the standard 2000-pound general purpose Murk 84 bomb for the taeta. winged YO-.9A is a quiet-fl@rg airUS Air Force release. craft designed for aerial reeonnairisance. It wae adapted from an unpowered sailplane. The airplane has long, thin, high-Sift wings with a span of 57 feet although the aircraft fuselage is only 30 feet long.News release. 1 a.1 Mili~

MILITARY NOTES TOW Purchasas 4 Iran and the Netherlands have ansaid that the Royal Netherlands Army nounced that they will purchase the hae ordered TOW weapons syetems TOW antitank missile. The contracte, costing more than 15 million dollare made through the US Army, will to be introduced in the antitank mark the first purchase of the TOW unite at the brigade level of the Army by foreign natione. Corps. The missiles will be delivered Iran, while not revealing the dollar before the end of 1974. amount or the number of TOW sys. The TOW is a tube-launched, opterns to be purchased, said that it in: tically tracked, wire-guided missile. tends to equip its armored infantry, Fired from a recoilless launcher, it helicoptw, and infantry units with the has a range of several thousand TOW at the earliest possible date, metere. The miseile eyetem, wldch hae with initial equipment delivery comheen in production for three yeare, is mencing immediately. now being issued to US Army units. The Netherlands announcement Newe release. Sunship Cornpatitlon

All&? Ch&enne Produtilon of the Cheyenne attack helicopter haa been postponed pending Sight evaluation teats achedtded to begin in August 1972. Reporta indicate that the Chqwnne will be tested along with the Bkzekfwzokand KingCobra gunsbipa. In a strict eense, thie will not be a competitive flyoff beeauee the Chewc?me is more fully developed than the other two aircraft. The Cheuenne has completed 1570 hours of tlight testing at Yuma, Arisona. Reportedly, the aircraft is meeh ing or exceeding all fllght and weapons requirement& There are three US cloee air support systeme under consideration: the ArmYs attack helicopter, the Harrier vertical takeoff jet purchased for the Marines, and the AX attack aircraft proposed by the Air Force.Newe item.
Mmb 1872 aa

MILITARY NOTES ROTC Benefita for Reserve f)tiicere Training Corps (ROTC) students have been increased. Subsistence pay has been raised from $60 to $100 per month. The maximum number of scholarships that can be awarded has been increased to 6500 each for the Army and Ah Force and 6000 for the Navy. More than 280 colleges and universities offer Army ROTC programs. A graduate of the Army ROTC program incurs an obligation to serve two years on active duty and four years in a Reserve component as an officer. Graduates who accept Regular Army commieeions and those who are accepted aqfl complete Army aviation training serve three years on active duty. Scholarship students must serve four years on active duty. In any case, the total obligation is six years. Four-year scholarships are awarded annually on a national competitive basis. To qualify, a student must be at least 17 years of age and a citizen of the United States. He muet display a strong desire for a career as a Regular Army officer. In addition, he must pass a physical examination and be younger than 25 years of age on 30 June of the yeanhe is commissioned. Normally, a student may attend the echool of hie choice offering a four-year Army ROTC



I 1974
6;100 6,000 4,000 4,500 1,480 1,950


YPrediction Objective Production



12,600 5,200

6,200 6,4W 3,741 4,500 1,174 1,950

6,000 6,000 4,300 4,500 1,734 1,950

6,000 6,000



4,202 4,500

4,500 4,500 1,950 1,950

Air Force

Objective Production Navy Objective 2,058 1,330

1,177 1,950

Oe artment o ! Oefanse










program. The new legislation, however, places a 50-percent ceiling on the number of scholarships which can be granted to oubof-state studenta who ueually pay higher tuition. Thoee etudents not granted four-year scholarships are eligible to compete each year that they are enrolled in Army ROTC for scholershipe covering the remainder of their undergraduate career. At some schools, stodente in their laet year of ROTC may apply for flight instruction. This training is usually conducted by a local flying echool. The Army pays for all expensee. Flying students muet meet rigid phyaieal requirements and have an aptitude for flying. After eommiesioning, they must agree to participate in the Army aviation program. The Department of Defense ROTC Production Objective echedule eelle for fewer officers from ROTC as the eize of the active forces deeIinee.-DOD releeee. 36
/ Military Review


The Dragon tank killer, a shoulder tired weapon, has successfully under. gone research and development acceptance taste. The Dragon is the Armye first goided missile eyetem light enough to be carried by one man and yet have a warhead b]g enough b deetroy tanks. It is far euperior in range, accuracy and hit probability to the 90-millimeter recoillese rifle which it will replace. Capable of destroying any known enemy armor or field fofilfieetione, the Dragon ueee an automatic command-to-line-of-eight guidance eyetem. A gunner aims through a telescopic sight, launches the missile, and holde bia sight on the target until impact. The miseile ie automatically and continuously guided by a censor device which tracks the missiles course and transmits corrective signale through a wire link. During prototype fllght evaluation teeta, test gunners evaluated the weapone capabilities firing at stationary targets. The 30-pound antitank system will now undergo engineer tests and expanded service teets.-Armg News Featwree.
Marvb 1972 al

MILITARY NOTES Pacific Rebuiid In the Pacific theater, the Army maintairis major equipment rebuild facilities in Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan and Japan. Combat vehicles are overhauled at Sagami, Japan, and on Taiwan. Together, the two facilities repaired more than 1200 combat vehicles during Fkal Year 1971, resulting in substantial savings in timq cost and equipment shortages. Ninety-nine percent of the M1l.9 armored personnel carriers sent to the Sagami facility are repaired. Previously, over 40 percent of the M119E had been rejected due to battle damage to the hulle. By training employees to weld aluminum, fabricating a hull alignment rack, pro+mring X-ray inspeetioq equipment, and using replacement hull sections, the Sagami facility not only supplied a larger number of carriers to the users, but saved ahout $18 million over a three-year pericd.-ArncU Logi8tioian.

M48A3 tank


Ovelbeul V5 Acqilidtion Ac%ke $209,241 30,s66 30,566 Ualt 0mA2111 colt


I Pncme

M113A1 armored paracmrrel carrier, high mileage Ml 13A1 armored peramrnel carrier, battte damage MS51 armored reconnaissance air. borne acaault vehicle, high
mileage M551 armored reurrmaiaaarrce air-

12,130 1S,162





16.2 19.5

borne aaaault vehicle, battta damage




MiliteIY Review

MILITARY NOIES laser Ran@rder

The Army has developed a laser rangetinder weighing 4% pounds. It has a range of 6 miles and provides a distance to target readout in less than one second after the trigger button is depressed. The laaer is currently undergoing tests at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.Armv News Features. Medical Evacuation Nelicoptera as well as wounded enemy soldiers. An experiment in Vietnam apThe trial program was based on the parently shows that enemy soldiers assumption that medical evacuation will not shoot at med]cal evacuation helicopters painted olive drab and helicopters if they can identify them. marked with small red crosses could Six UH-I helicopters were painted not be distinguished from troop transwhite and marked with three-foot red ports and gunships. Pilots report that crosses on the sides, front, and botcrews flying white helicopters have tom. only been ehot at once, and there have The white helicopters were put in been no losses of men or equipment. service on 1 October 1971 operating The olive drab helicopter ambulances from Chu Lei into Quang Ngai and are fired upon at least once a day while Quang Tin Provinces, both hotbeds flying miesions. In the past five years, of Viet Cong activity. Around-tbe141 medkel evacuation helicopter cloek radio broadcasts in Vietnamese have been shot down killing 114 crew and leaflet drops have explained to members and 20 patients.-Newa rethe populace that the wldte helicopter lease. are unarmed andcarry wounded allied
Mamh 1972






Army Deployment The Soviet military buildup in the Far East is continuing. There are now 49 Soviet Army tank and motorized divisions located near the Chinese ,border. Sixteen of these divisions were transferred from western Russia during 1971. This ground force of about 800,000 men is supported by 75,000 border guards and 5000 aircraft of the Soviet Air Force. The Central Asian MNitary DMrict baa been created to control the Soviet Republics of Kazakh, Hirgiz, and Tadzhik. With headquarters at AbnaAtz, the command has a 1000-mile-border with Sinkiang Province in China.

The Soviet Army has a current strength of 160 divisiona, including 102 motorized rifle divisions, 51 tank divisions, and 7 airborne divieions. This reflecte the deactivation of 3 airborne divisions. A sizable percentage of these units are understrength, but can be brought to full strength on short notice. In addition to the 49 divisiona on tbe Chinese border, there are 80 Soviet Army dNisions etetioned witbin the Soviet Union, 2 Soviet divisions stationed in Poland, 20 in Eeet Germany, 4 in HungaW, and 5 in CzeehoslovaMa.News item.

BOLMA Air Force Modernization

a J

! <

! i g
Bolivia will buy 18 Bracilian built jet aircraft valued at more then $10 million in a move to modernize ite air force. The purchaee will involve 18 Xzvante jets built by the Brazilian state
March 1972

aircraft company in Sao Paulo. The Xatnwte ie a subsonic, two-eeat, twin-jet aircraft designed for training and close air eupport and is built in Brazil under license from the Italian manufacturer.-News item.


Australia has agreed to proeeed with the purchaee of 24 FIIICS and hae approved an extensive modification program to meet the standarde required by the Royal Australian Air Force. Australian FIIIC aircraft will be fitted with a new design, low stress wing carry through box which has been successfully fatigue tested to 24,000 hours. These boxes are being fitted also to the US Air Force FIIIFs, the most recent and technically advanced of the Fill series aircraft, Work on the aircraft will etart in April 1972. Each aircraft will be in the modification line for 10 to 12 months. On completion and before delivery, each aircraft will be put through a comprehensive test program to prove structural integrity. The 24 F11 ICe are expected to be ferried to Australia over the period May to November 1973. The estimated project cost wee $244 million. News release. I SWEDEN Arms Esperts Arms exporte from Sweden will be be excepted from tbe ban: the neighboring Scandinavian countries and the sfibject to f urtber reetrictione under neutral etates of Europe. the terme of new guidelines. Sales of arms will be forbidden to countries Such exports as are permitted will engaged in or threatened by internbe conditional in the buyer-governmental anthority or authorized imationalconflict, civil war, or armed inporter-guaranteeing not to resell surrection. They will likewise be prowitbin five years. This will prevent hibited to countries likely to use them dwoy$) tr~s~tiOnS from Oecur?ing. for the suppression of human righta The new guidelines replsse regulaas defined by the United Nations tions introduced in 1956. Charter. Sales of weaponry to liberaSwecUeh arms exports batween tion movements will also be banned 1965-69 averaged $22 million annually since this would constitute an interwldch wee equivalent to 0.7 pereent ference in the internal affairs of a of total Swedish eaports.-Newa item. sovereign state. Certah countriee will 102 MlliteIY I?eshw

MILITARY NOTES Royal United Sarvices Irrstituta for Oafance Studies The Royal United Service Institution (RUSI), ae it ueed to be known, was founded in 1831, Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington being ita first Vice-Patron. It ie situated in Widtehall, Under ita original Royal Charter it wcs charged with . , . the promotion and advancement of Naval and Military ecience and literature. Over the years, the RUSI has become famous in military circles all over the world for ita quarterly journal and for a library of books on every aepect of the conduct of war, ranging from the latest publications to rare old editions. Until 1968, membership of the RUSI was reserved for officers of the three services (serving and retired) plus a small number of civilians with special connection with the armed forces. Then, on 1 April of that year, a reorganization came into effect. Membership was made available to many more people in industry, the universities, and the profession. In thie way, the RUSI became Britains first national forum for tbe independent study of matters pertaining to British defenee and overeeas policy. The name was changed to the Royal United Services Institnte for Defence Studies so as to eignify this assumption of a broader and more central role. A Defence Studies Wing has been set up witbin the institute to monitor the program of research. Topics previously dealt with have included the etrategic signitieence of South Africa, the central organization of defense, and British defenee policy in the 1970s. Two more reporb3 are currently being prepared. One is on European Security: 1972-80 by Neville Brown, a etaff member of the University of Birmingham and a contributor to the Milita?yr Review. The other, which is concerned with The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: is by David Hawkins, a lecturer at the University of Southampton. The Director General of the Inetitute is Air Vlca-Marehal S. W. B. Menaul.News release. ~~ YUGOSLAVIA Oafansa Oudgat The continuing emphasis placed by Yugoslavia on national defense ie reflagted in the 1972 Federal budget of $1.42 billion or 11.2 percent of the national income. The defense budget ie allocated $616.4 miRion46 percent of the total budget. This represent a 23.5-percent increase over 1970. Yugoslav officials say tbe incrczze is caused by both inflation and the real defense needs of the country.-News item. INTERNATIONAL Itafanse Spending About $212 billion is expected to be spent throughout the world on military forcee and programs during 1972. This representa a 76-percent increase above 1962 spending when the United Nations estimated world military outlays at $120 billion. Military spending in the late 1960s and early 1970s exceeds that of any prior period except the peak years of World War II. Global military expenditures consume between six and seven pereent of the world groee product. About three-fiftbe of the increase in defenee spending rettacta price inflation. Experte detect no evidence of a widespread shift from military to civilian use of resources.-Government Bueincas Worldwide.



INDIAN-F16NTIN6 MMY. By Fairfaa Downey. Shrstrated From Drawings by Frederic Rem. ingtorr, Charlea Sahreyvogal, and Others. 32S Pages. 7bIJ Old Army Press, Fort Collins, Colo., Copyright 1841. Reprint Edition 1971. TNE 3ECSE7 ASMY: 7he IU 191&1870. Sy J. Bowyar Bail. 404 Pagss. 71re John Oay Co., inc., N. Y., 1971. $C.S3. BY COL DONALO J. DELANEY, USA The near civil war in Northern Ireland between Catholics end Protestants makes tide book about the Irish RepubJieen Army particularly timely. The author, a research associate at the Center for International Affaire at Harvard, has compiled the history from hundreds of interviews with members and former members of the IRA and from the meager records of tbe army stitl remaining. It is the etory of the long, tragic, seldom successful, and largely incomprehensible struggle of the IRA to establish by force an Irish Republic embracing all 32 counties of Ireland. National heroes in the 1916 Easter RebelJJonagainst England, the members of the IRA became outlewe in their own country after the formation of the Free State. Even after the proclamation of the Republic in 1948, the IRA continued ite opposition, refueing to pa~lcipate in constitutional government while partition remained. The author maintaine that until at least 1970, when the writing was completed, the IRA was little involved in the Ulster violence. The army was divided and ineffective, but still alive. The IRA hae not directed the courie of Irish hietory during the past half century, but it has had a profound influence on it. This book will help the reader to understand the events now taking place. 105


BY LTC DAVIDP. PERRINE, USA Originally published in 1941, 2Ndion-Fighting ArmII has risen to high esteem with those interested in Indian campaigns. The author has succeeded in placing all the significant Indian battles into a single volume. Each of the 16 chapters deals with a particular campaign. The writing ie story fashioned with all the euspense and drama required to make a best eeller. The eketches of Frederic Remington and other noted illustrators add greatly to the value of this work. Downeys purpose wae simply to tell the Old ArmYs story. At the time it was written, the country had World War II on its mind. Indian war veterans were rapidly fading away their deeds disregarded in their time and are half forgotten now. The soldiers endurance and devotion to duty in face of congreeeional neglect are told in convincing fashion. The arduoue -campaigns conducted in the heat and the cold with impossible logietic support somehow usually eueceeded. Men and horses broke down, but, in spite of setbacks, the job got done. Fortunately, for the public, the Old Army Press has put beck inta circulation an invaluable book long out of print. NerclI 1972

MILITARY BOOKS LIEUTENANT CALLEY: His Own Story. As Told to John Saqk. 181 Pages. The Viking Press, Inc., N. Y., 1971.$4.95. BY COL PHILIPL. BOLTE,USA For weeks, ae the court-martial of Lieutenant Calley became the longest in Army history, and for months before, the public wae expoeed to every viewpoint concerning what happened at My Lai. Every viewpoint except a most important one: that of Lieutenant Calley himeelf. Now, this gap is closed. The book is written in the first pereon, the author having conducted 100 daye of interviews with Lieutenant Calley during the investigation and trial period. It relatea Lieutenant Calleye experiences throughout hls tour of duty in Vietnam, concentrating particularly on the eventa leading to the tragedy at My Lai on 16 March 1968, and continues through the testimony taken at hle court-martial. The advantages of first person presentation are readily apparent as the reader is exposed to Lieutenant Calleys emotions and thoughte coincident with his experiences. As presented, the material provides an explanation, if not an excuse, for the behavior of Lieutenant Calley on that fateful day. The reader ehould consider LieNtemwtt Galley: His Own Storg in proper context. It is the account of an accused murderer who was obviously confused not only by being charged with murder but was equally confused earlier in Vietnam concerning hie own miesion and the manner in which it should be accomplished. The accuracy of his presentation of earlier thoughts and emotione rightly can be questioned. That the presentation does reflect to some degree the thoughts of a not-too-intelligent, not-too-well-informed, and quite confused young ofIoa ficer becomesobvious, though, as the reader progresses through the book. Ex-infantry platoon leaders who served in Vietnam will recognize a Idnshlp with Lieutenant Calley and cannot help but sympathize with hlm to some degree. Generally, that degree of eympathy will terminate where the more typical such of6cer would have found himself exercising bett& judgment at My Lai. This work makes a contribution to overall understanding of the My Lai affair. Further, it provides insight into the moral problems faced daily by ~ombat leaders in the Vietnam war. It should not, however, be read alone as an explanation of either the My Lai massacre or the problems of junior combat leadership in Vietnam. THE REO OEVILS: The Story of the British Airborne Forcas.By 6.6. Norton. 260 Pages. The Stzckpole Co., Narrisbwg, Pa., 1971. $7.50. BY COL PHILIP S. NEWTON, Britkh Army This addition to the
MENTS SESIES gives FAMOUS REGIa stirring account

of all that has happened to the British airborne forces during their short but eventful exietence, from their formation in 1940 to the evacuation of Ad$n in 1967 which wae the last year in which a British soldier was killed in action overseas. The fact that Major Norton has produced such a comprehensive account, as well as including 92 photographs and 16 maps in this short book, is a tribute to his succinct style and is worthy of attention on this score alone. Nor has he fallen into the trap of emphasizing euch heroic actions ae Arnhem; all the events have been mentioned, including the less publicized such as Kuwait and the abrogation of the Suez Canal Treaty.
Militsty ROViOW

MILITARY BOOKS SUPERSTATE: Readings in the Militaiy-ktduatrial Complex. Edited by Herbert L Schil. Ier and Joseph D. Phillips. 353 Pages. Uni. versity of Illinois Press, Urbana, Ill., 1970. $8.50. By LTC DAVIOE. WATTS, USA In the decade of the 1960s, Americans rediscovered poverty in their land. Our frustrations grew and festered because of Vietnam, the draft, the riots, pollution, waste, and the tragic assassinations of the Kennedys and King. A demand emerged for a new set of national goals and national priorities. A large share of our domestic discontent must be attributed, it is said by many, to the existence and operation of an insidious tilitary industrial complex so named by President Eisenhower in his 1961 farewell address to the Nation. Newspapermen now call it the (MIC. The editors have compiled this book of 25 selected readings on the subject. Several of the readings are factual discussions of the size and scope of military dependence on private industry and vice versa. But mo t of them are emotional or philosop t mal in tone. At one end of the spectrum there are articles by former Marine Commandant David M. Shoup and by Senators McGovern and Fulbright. They warn ue of The New American Militarism and blame much of it on the MIC. In the middle, we find such influential leaders as Senator William Proxmire whose writings are concerned not with portraying the MIC as good or bad, but with condemning it as in=edicientand wasteful. At the other end of the epectrum are the reasoned arguments of such eminent men as Dean Acheeon who deplore all the furor about the MIC and cons{der it to be simply a eide issue. The real issue, they say, is
Maroh le72

whether or not the United States wants to remain a first-rate world power. If we do, they emphasize, then the MIC-or something like itis the price we must pay. This book contains a good debate and attempts to show all sides of the issue. THE SEPOY ANO THE COSSACIL The Anglo. Russian Confrontation in British India. By Pierce 6. Fredericks. 274 Pages. World Publishing Co., N. Y., 1971.$7.50. BY COL STANLEY T. BALDRY, British ArmII The mutual suspicions of the British and the Russians in the days of the East India Company and the British raj in India resulted in military activity in and around Afghanistan. The neat title of the book does not, of course, indicate that, fortunately, there were cool enough heads about to prevent sepoys and cossacks fighting each other in the area. The etory is mainly concerned with the higher ranking political and military characters involved, and particularly those eccentric aspects of their activities which led to military disasters. The author ie also fascinated by the pretentious, but the book is amusing and well written. The reader is told that descriptions of punitive expeditions against the Afghans scarcely vary whether they are recorded by such people aa Lumsden of the Guides (circa 1842), Bill Slim after World War I, John Masters in the late 1930s and others in between. It ie also suggested that these stories probably shouldnt be snbjeeted to the moat etringent echolarly scrutiny. The same advice might apply to some of the material and innuendo Mr. Fredericks has chosen to use in The Sepoy and the Cossack. 107

MILITARY BOOKS U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE: Issues, Costa, and Chokes. By John Newhouse.With Melvin Croan, Edward R. Fried, and Timothy W. Stanley. 177 Pages. 7be Brookittgainstitution, Washington, D. C., 1971.$6.95 cleth. bound. $2.95 paperbound. BY LTC JAMESW. KEaa, llSA, Retired The stationing of over a quarter miUIon troops in Europe, 25 years after the end of World War II is either copping out from the baeic West European problem or is the most economical meane of meeting a national security requirement, depending on ones side in the argument. These troops were a factor, of course, in the negotiatilona on international monetary agreements and tbe devaluation of the United States dollar. The domestic US debates involve basic tenete of foreign poSicy, with great divergence of opinion. Four pressures for change are discussed in separate chapters by the membere (or associates) of the Brookings Institution Foreign Poficy Studies Staff. Croan discusees the Soviet poSicies reflected in the current European political environment. Negotiations are in progrme on arms, and state visite planned. Soviet reaction to a uniare lateral US withdrawal, Croan feele, would be imperceptible. Why should the Sovieta withdraw without negotiation ? In the long run, a Soviet economic or political move against an unprotected Weet Germany might prove irresistible, Stanley takes up military balancey or, zz the Sovieta cay, relation of forces, The balance, however close or one-sided it appears, has deterred aggression for a quarter-century, lending credence to the idea that it can continue to do so, if not upset uni10s laterally. The conventional role today is to deter conventional action by the Wareaw Pact long enough to allow for other optione. Tactical nuclear weapons appear to be the first etep in an irreversible move toward use of strategic forcee and arme. Some reduction in US forces would be eurely of no importance.#0,000 men have been cut in the hat five yeare. Perhaps another 5 to 10 percent would not be missed but 20 percent could be hazardous. Naval forces could be cut first, with balanced reductions in other areas later, with as lit.tfe degradation ae poseible on initial combat capability. Western Europe eeems fully absorbed in noneecurity matters. A reduetion in US forcee ie not Jikely to be offeet by North Atlantic Treaty Organization increases but by a similar reduction by the Europeen governments. US negotiations with the Soviets lead many European natione to feel that the superpowers hold a monopoly on security. Fried proposes two new measures to reduce the US coat of stationing NATO forces. Negotiations between the United States and its NATO associates are now greatly facilitated by recent US monetary decisions. Coet sharing muet be reworked, and new rules are needed to aim for a zeronet cash balance yearly. (Budgetary matters unite all US critics of our NATO involvement!) A change in US deployment seems probable, with the When ? and How ? demanding attention. The United States muet exerciee unaccustomed patience. A willingness to assure the presence of balanced forces on both eidee of the Elbe River is needed to encourage change and at the same time reduce the dangere attendant to bringing it about.
Militarj Raview

U.S. CHINA POLICY AND THE PROBLEM OF TAJWAN. By William M. Bueler. 143 Pages. Colorado AssocJatad Usli$imity hSS, Boulder, Colo., 1971.$5.95. REMAKING CNINA POLICY: U.s~hhra Relations and Governmental DecJaioniwakhrg. By Riabati Moorstaan and Morton AbramowJtz Wti Foraworda by John K. Fairtmnk and Niairolas deB. Katsenbach. 13S Pagas. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971.$5.95. A NEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD CNINA. By A. Doak Bamett, 132 Pages. Tbe Brookbrgs Institution, Washington, D. C., 1971.$5.95. BY MAJ DAVm D. DANTZSCHSS, USA Recent developments have focused attention on the immediate problems aeseciated with the status of Taiwan and a Two China poiicy. The possibility of moving toward more normal relatione with Communist China raises further questione concerning what the long-term approach of the US Government should be toward Communist China. Theee three books may provide come answers. Of the three, U.S. China PoliczI and the Problem of Taiwan ia the most limited in scope. Bueler, who spent five years on Taiwan, presents an excellent background on the evolution of US policy toward Taiwan from 1949 to the present. His examination of the relationships between the mainianders and native Taiwaneee, based on hk personal contacts with both groups, is particularly valuable on the subject of Taiwaneae political aspiratifms. His argument that self-determination for Taiwan would best serve both US and Taiwan@se interests wili appeal to some, but the question of how much a policy could be implemented is left MaralI 1S72

unanswered. The discussion of the myth of return to the meinkmd and the role it plays in the thbddng of the older mainlanders, younger mainlanders and the Taiwaneae majority is vital to an understanding of the present situation. Remaking China PolicII is directed primarily at those responsible for shaping our China poiicy. Rather than dealing in specific answers to policy questions, Mooreteen, a Rand consultant, and Abramowitz, a Foreign Service officer, suggest some tentative approaches to the problem of United States-China relations and propose changes in administrative procedures they believe are required to reach sound policy decisions. while the book gives soma valuable insights into the problems and pitfalle of shaping a policy toward China, its major value lies in the questions for supplemental etudies posed by tbe authors. A New U.S. Policp Toward China will probably be of the most interest to the military reader. Now a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, Barnett hae authored or edited numerous works on Communist Ch]na. This latest work is a compilation of hia material which has appeared in various journals and periodicals since 1970. Barnett proceeds logically from an examination of the past legacy of US relations with Communist China, reviews recent trends, examines our assumptions about China, and goes on to formulats his recommendations for a Chha poiicy for the 1970s. The discussion of nuclear weapons is both innovative and intriguing. While any book or article on China poiicy published at the preeent time is vulnerable to being overtaken by events, each of these books provides the reader with valuable material to aid his understanding. 10s

MILITARY BOOKS NEW BOOKS RECEWEO THE VANTAGE POiNT: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969. By Lyndon Baines Johnson. 036 Pages. Hoit, Rinehart & Winston, inc., N. Y., 1971.$15.00. THE Eisenhower Administration, 19531961: A Documentary History. Two Voiumes. By Robert L. Branyan and Lawrence N. Larsen< 1<414 Ewes, Rende!n ttswa 1sss2s ft. Y., {971. $55.00 per sat. FRENCH COLONIALISMiN TROPiCALAFRiCA, 1600.1645. By Jean Suret.Canaie. Transited From tho FreneiI by Tiii tiottheiner. 521 Pages. Pica Press, N. Y., 1971.$17.50. HOOOS TEKAS BRi6AOE: Lees 6renadier Guard. By Coionei Haroid B. Simpson. 512 Pages. Texian Press, Waco, Tex., 1970.

THE WINNING OF INDEPENDENCE: The lluadrangle Bicentennial Nistory of the American Revolution.By Marshall Smelser. 427 Pagea. ftuadrangle Books, Jnc., Chicago, 111.,1972.


VICTORS JUSTICE: Tho Tokyo War Crimes Trial. By Richard if. Mhrear. 22B Pages. Priwcetm LirJiveIeity PreEs< Prkmaten, N. L> IJ17?. $7.25. WHEN WAR COMES: The LteomaIiayBook of the Nuclear Age. By Martin Caidin. 159 Pages. WNiiam Morrow & Co,, [no,, N. Y., 1972.$4.95. THE JUNKS & SAMPANS OF THE YAN6TZE. By 6. R. 6. Woraester, River Inspector, Re. tired, Chinese Maritime Customs. B2B Pagea, United Statea Novai instNute, Annapoiis, Md., 1971.$45.00. THE BLACK SOLOiER: From tbe American Revolution to Vietnam. Edtid by Jay David and Eiaine Crane. 248 Pages. Wiiiiam Mor. row & Co., inc., N. Y,, 1971.$5.95. A BROKEN WORLO, 19164639: The Rise of Modarn Europe. By Raymond J. Sontsg. 415 Pages. Harper & Row Publishers, inc., Scran. ton, Pa., 1971. $B.95. THE Responsible: How Five American Leaders Coped With Crisi% Truman, Taft Eisenhower, JFK, and Johnson. By Wiiiiam S. White, Prriiier PriseWhrning Author and Noted Coiumnist. 275 Pages. Narper & Row Publishers, inc., Scranton, Pa., 1972.$7.95. TNE CHiLEAN REVOLUTION: Conversations With Aiiende. By Regis Oebray. WNh a Postscript by Saivador Aiiende. 201 Pages. Pantheon Books, inc., N. Y., 1971.$5.65.


KOREA: The Third Repubiic. By Kyung Cho Chung. 266 Pages. The Macmiiian Co., N. Y., 1971.$6.95. ARMS, YEN & POWER: The Japanese Diiemma. By John K. Emmerson. Foreword by Edwin O. Reischauer. 420 Pages. The Ounaiien Co., inc., N. Y., 1971.$15.00. A 6UiOE TO THE SOURCESOF BRiTiSH MiLiTARY HiSTORY. Edited by Robin Higfsam. S36 Pages. University of California Press, Berkeiey, Caiif., 1971.$22.50. iNTERGOVERNMENTAL MiLiTARY FORCES ANO WORLO PUBLiC OROER. By Waiter L. Wiiiiams, Jr. 703 Pages. Oceana Pubi[cations inc., Oobbs Fewy, N. Y., 1971.$19.40. THE GREAT AMERICAN BOMB MACHiNL By Roger Rapopork 160 Pages. E. P. Dutton & Co., inc., N. Y.r 1971.$5.95.