Seeking Symmetry on the Information Front: Confronting Global Jihad on the Internet

K. A. Taipale * 16 NATL STRATEGY F. REV. (Summer 2007)

"War is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means." CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, VOM KRIEGE (1832) Prolegomenon. Warfare is the use of extraordinary powerthat is, power that seemingly violates the ordinary normative rules governing civil activityto compel an adversary to submit to ones political will; and, asymmetric warfare seeks to do so by avoiding an adversarys strengths while applying ones own advantage against the others weaknesses. In the face of overwhelming U.S. military and economic power, Americas adversaries including non-state actors such as al Qaidaare increasingly turning to asymmetric strategies to oppose U.S. interests. According to the former Secretary of Defense: Compelled by a militant ideology that celebrates murder and suicide, with no territory to defend, with little to lose, they will either succeed in changing our way of life or we will succeed in changing theirs. Because they cannot defeat our forces on the battlefield, they challenge us through nontraditional, asymmetric or irregular means. This essay provides a brief overview of the information battlefront in the confrontation with militant Islamic extremism. In particular, this essay outlines how terror networks are increasingly using advanced information technology and the global communications network to expand their capacity and capability to wage a global insurgency against U.S. interests and surveys what counter-strategies might be employed in response.

Kim Taipale is the founder and executive director of the Center for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology Policy, a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute, a member of the Markle Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, and an adjunct professor of law at New York Law School.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=987040

DRAFT 051507 1. Introduction.

It is clich, of course, to note that the Internet is having a profound and widespread affect on global political, economic, and social organization and opportunities. Advanced information, communication and media technologies interconnected through a global network have transformed the existing world orderempowering individuals, groups, corporations, and governments to pursue myriad new opportunities and potentialities. These same technological forces, however, enable terror networks to expand their influence and operational reach beyond national borders by distributing their seductive message of victimization and radicalization to the disaffected and enabling social connectivity with new audiences. Thomas Friedman notes in The World is Flat that 21st Century terrorism is simply the globalization of 20th Century terrorism. The Internet provides terrorists with an inexpensive, ubiquitous, and secure communications infrastructure to support both their strategic activities (such as propaganda, radicalization, and the development of transnational support and community) and their operational or instrumental activities (such as command and control, planning and coordination, surveillance and reconnaissance, and recruitment and training, among others). The militant global insurgency inspired by al Qaida has recognized and availed itself of these technology-enabled opportunities to further its ambitions, but counter-forces have yet to develop fully a comprehensive (or effective) strategic response. 2. Insurgency is political warfare.

Insurgency is political warfare in which perceived legitimacy and just effect of actions can increase power and perceived illegitimacy or unjust effect can constrain the exercise of power (by undermining leadership or eroding popular support). Thus, counterinsurgencies can only be successful where counter-force strategies are perceived to have political legitimacy and where they succeed in isolating insurgents, separating them from the general population, and eliminating any external or popular support. In the end, insurgencies can only be defeated politically. 1 It is beyond the scope of this essay to address the broader political or policy issues relating more generally to the global war on terrorism, or to address the legal or ethical implications of employing the counter-strategies discussed below in any specific context.2 Rather, this essay focuses simply on surveying some of the information operations strategies that might be used to counter certain online activities of insurgents.
1 2

See generally BARD E. ONEILL, INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM (2d. ed., revd, 2005).

For an overview of the legal and ethical implications of offensive information warfare generally, see K. A. Taipale, Deconstructing Information Warfare, Presentation to the Committee on Policy Consequences and Legal/Ethical Implications of Offensive Information Warfare, The National Academies, Washington, DC (Oct. 30, 2006).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=987040

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3.

Information operations: an overview.

For purposes of this essay, I use the term information operations broadly to include the full spectrum of activities on the information battlefront. To be effective, these counterterrorism information operations must be global, comprehensive, and consistent at the strategic, tactical, and operational level. At the strategic level, public diplomacy and perception management can reduce the appeal of extremists, encourage alternative views and values, and discourage terrorism as an acceptable tactic (that is, can provide a political counter-narrative). Ultimately, it is at this level that the counter-insurgency must be most effective to be successful. At the theater level (generally where military forces are deployed or proxies are available), civil affairs and psychological operations (psyops) can be used to separate terrorists in the field from support structures and to stabilize moderate or allied forces. At the tactical level, offensive information operations can be used against specific targets to destroy group cohesion and convergence. For example, to discredit al Qaida or other terrorist leadership elements, to create discord, to provoke distrust among operatives, to demoralize volunteers, and to discourage recruits. These methods can be combined with intelligence activities at the operational level to preempt specific terrorist actions or impose operational constraint on their activities. The objective of information operations is to eliminate the terrorists motivations and capabilities to act by attacking, denying, or altering their organizational, operational, or external information flows. These operations can be targeted against the information (or data) itself, against the channel or medium, or against the actors or audience. Information can be denied, corrupted, or discredited; channels can be blocked, delayed, or diverted; and actors can be turned, discredited, or denied freedom of action. Information operations can target information or systems physically (by destroying data or infrastructure), syntactically (that is, by disabling function), or semantically (that is, by interfering with meaning to disrupt decision-making or outcomes). Information systems can be targeted as information appliances (to achieve primary effects) or as control mechanisms (to achieve secondary effects). Finally, information operations can be accomplished through legal or technical means, and can be conducted overtly or through covert action, depending on the circumstances. 4. Strategic uses of the Internet: propaganda and radicalization.

The Internet has emerged as a powerful tool for social networking and mobilization. A recent New York Times article highlighted the fact that the Internet has transformed domestic U.S. political campaigns by allowing candidates to get their message out and reach supporters without having to rely on traditional mechanisms such as mainstream 3

DRAFT 051507 media or political parties. Likewise, the Internet enables radical extremist messages to reach new audience by bypassing traditional institutional media controls. Websites are used to disseminate ideological messages calling for violent global Jihad as well as to publicize operational successes by disseminating, for example, videos of terrorist attacks and beheadings. Al Qaida has its own media production unit, As-Sahab, which produces relatively sophisticated and multidimensional videos and other content. A formal propaganda organization of the global Jihad movement, the Global Islamic Media Front, serves as a distribution mechanism for these and other materials. And, individual sympathizers throughout the world, such as the prolific Irahbi 007 [Terrorist 007] recently apprehended in the U.K., use widely available tools and sophisticated knowledge of the Internet to further distribute materials to a wider audience. Of more concern perhaps, is the use and powerful effects of interactive means for communication and outreach. Online chat rooms serve as virtual meeting places in which aberrant attitudes and beliefs are exchanged, reinforced, strengthened and validated. These interactions engender a sense of community and belonging, particularly among otherwise disaffected youth throughout the worldwide Muslim diaspora. A Saudi Interior Ministry spokesman explains: 3 [T]he internet is responsible for 80 percent of the recruitment of youths for the jihad. First, a youth interested in Islamist or jihadi ideology is attracted to radical websites for information. Second, the youth develops a bond with the operators of the jihadi websites. Third, the youth is motivated to individual action to prove his allegiance to the organization. Once the youth has proven his loyalty, the jihadi operators investigate the willing recruit's background before accepting him into the group. After being properly vetted, the group exposes the new recruit to propaganda materialssuch as incendiary pictures, films, among other mediato radicalize the recruit completely. The powerful amplifying effects of these interactive technologies is confirmed by studies of racial violence and hate crimes that show that anonymity and the culture of online forums leads to increased levels of group endorsement for violence and deviant activity beyond that actually felt by any individual participant. These developments mirror those taking place across society more broadly as new technologies facilitate new forms of social networking and organization. The Internet is egalitarianavailable to alland creates a certain symmetry not previously available to insurgents for the use of propaganda as an instrument of power. Insurgencies have always used available media technologies to get their message out, whether through smuggled videotapes and audiocassettes in recent struggles, or printed or mimeographed pamphlets of an earlier time. For the first time, however, widely available technologies allow extremist groups with few physical resources to create professional
3

Asharq al-Awsat (May 2, 2007), as reported in Terrorism Focus, Vol. IV, No. 13 (May 8, 2007).

DRAFT 051507 looking content and website and engage in sophisticated forms of propaganda that can compete effectively with traditional institutional messaging. These tools, together with the global reach of the Internet, have enabled the wide propagation of a falsebut seemingly seductivemessage: Islam is under attack by America and it is the duty of all Muslims to defend the ummah. That the terrorists themselves recognize the power of these technologies is clearaccording to a recent report on Internet-facilitated radicalization, some Jihadists have adopted the slogan keyboard equals Kalashnikov. 4 That the United Stateshome to the most advanced media and technology companies and possessing the most sophisticated marketing and political campaign knowledge in the worldhas been unable to compete effectively in this war of ideas is curious. It seems axiomatic that a compelling counter-narrative delivered consistently and with political legitimacy is required to counter this process of radicalization. Unfortunately, to date, it has not been forthcoming. 5. Operational or instrumental uses of the Internet.

In addition to its use for propaganda and outreach, global terrorist networks are using the Internet for specific instrumental purposes to facilitate operational activity. 5.1 Distributed command and control.

The availability of robust and secure communications capabilitiesemail, websites, cell phones, together with encryptionfor use from anywhere on the planet has facilitated command and control of insurgent activities. Further, its distributed nature has helped accelerate the devolution of al Qaida from a hierarchical organizational structure subject to containment to a metastasized movement providing general guidance to unaffiliated organizations and cells with fewer opportunities for discovery or preemption. 5.2 Surveillance and reconnaissance.

In many ways, a single terrorist today has more surveillance and reconnaissance technology available to them through the Internet than that possessed by the entire Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. Recovered computers often contain schematics of government buildings, critical infrastructure, and other potential targets downloaded from the Internet. Likewise, terrorists dont need their own reconnaissance satellites. For example, Iraqi insurgents have used detailed maps and coordinates from Google Earth to target British soldiers with increasingly accurate mortar fire. 5

Homeland Security Policy Institute and Critical Incident Analysis Group Task Force on Internetfacilitated Radicalization, NETworked Radicalization: A Counter-Strategy (2007).
5

Thomas Harding, Terrorists 'use Google maps to hit UK troops', Telegraph (UK) (Jan. 13, 2007).

DRAFT 051507 5.3 Training and Tradecraft Development.

The Internet is being used as a virtual training camp. 6 Jihadi training manuals (including many adopted from U.S. military sources) and training videos are widely available on the Internet. In addition, certain tradecraft websites specialize in providing detailed information about specific operational needsthe latest tactics for bomb-making or for evading authorities, for example. Iraqi insurgents have responded with online postings in almost real-time to U.S. efforts to counter IEDs with new tactics. Likewise, within days of the public disclosure of the NSAs Terrorist Surveillance Program, the tradecraft websites were suggesting counter-measures to avoid electronic surveillance. 6. 6.1 Counter-insurgency information operations. Countering Propaganda and Radicalization.

There is little that can be done about extremist information freely distributed over the Internet. A website shut down in one country can simply move to another. In any case, while there were once only a handful of such sites there are today thousands of mirror sites worldwide being fed by dozens of feeder sites. Even if organized efforts to distribute materials could be interdicted, individual sympathizers would simply repost the material to publicly available sites like YouTube or MySpace that could not be targeted by counter-insurgency forces. As discussed above, the most successful counter-strategy to terrorist propaganda is likely to be a compelling political counter-narrative, building on core common values, and delivered through authentic and legitimate sources. Coordinated public diplomacy, strategic influence, and perception management efforts employing sophisticated media and marketing techniques are needed. However, three additional counter-strategies might be employed as well: open-source intelligence gathering, infiltration, and honeypots. Valuable intelligence can be gained from monitoring and analyzing extremist websites and public forums. Indeed, developing an effective counter-narrative requires a better understanding of the insurgent narrative. In addition, analysis of terrorist tradecraft methods can provide intelligence agencies with identifiable behavior signatures to search for. Two hurdles to such intelligence gathering are language and volume; but they can, in part, be overcome through technology. Translation software can supplement the paucity of Arabic language skills in the intelligence community and automated monitoring and analysis tools, including data mining, can help manage the volume.

See generally, G ABRIEL W EIMANN, TERROR ON THE INTERNET (2006).

DRAFT 051507 Additionally, covert undercover agents can be used to infiltrate terrorist forums to gather intelligence as well as to plant misinformation. In many cases, because of the language and cultural barriers, infiltration may best be accomplished through allies or proxies with a deeper understanding of terrorist behavior and culture. Misinformation can be introduced to attack cohesion and trust, undermine leadership, and engender suspicion. Finally, honeypotsthat is, websites that resemble extremist sites but are operated by counter-insurgency servicescan be used to lure in, discover, and expose sympathizers or to misdirect efforts. 6.2 Countering Operational or Instrumental Uses.

Tactics to counter specific operational uses are highly dependent on the particular circumstances, including the exact nature of the content of the information or communication, the channel or medium through which it is conveyed, and the actors or audiences involved. What follows is a very brief generalized view of how each of these can be targeted: 6.2.1 Targeting content. Content can be denied, discredited, or corrupted. Presenting a counter-narrative, as described above, is one method of denying or discrediting information by presenting a competing point of view. Another method is to attack the integrity of the information directly, either by destroying it or corrupting it using technical means. The intent with direct attack is to make the information unreliable for opposition decision-making. Technical methods for attacking content include manipulation of input or sensors (to alter environmental signals), destroying or altering the data itself within systems, or manipulating the systems logic to interfere with outcomes. Additionally, content can be filtered to shape the information environment in which behavior or decision-making is determined. The goal here is to constrain the potential physical world outcomes by limiting the online information environment in which decisions are made. 6.2.2 Targeting channels. Direct technical methods for attacking channels or systems include distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks to delay information or communications, router attacks to monitor or interrupt transmissions, domain name server (DNS) hacks to distort or redirect information or communications, and the introduction of malware (for example, viruses, trojans, or logic bombs) to disrupt systems. In addition, various social engineering techniques can be employed (e.g., Google bombing) to manipulate perceptions or direct behavior.

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6.2.3 Targeting actors or audience. Like any other information source, online participants can be attacked directlythey can be turned, discredited, or denied freedom of action. Goals in targeting actors include interfering with decision making, increasing dissension and friction, engendering internal competition, undermining trust, exploiting ideological breaks in leadership, subverting authority of leadership and senior commanders or confusing, humiliating, demoralizing, and embarrassing the rank-and-file, among others. Additionally, terrorists or potential terrorist can be presented with alternatives, exits, and incentives. 7. Counter-strategy authority.

As noted earlier, counter-insurgency operations require legitimacy for success. Thus, offensive information operations will require new legal authorities and procedures for democratic accountability. It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss these issues. 8. Conclusion

Counter-insurgency is political warfare that is information dependent. Therefore, it is imperative to develop a comprehensive and consistent information strategy to counter the terrorists use of the Internet. Ultimately, the presentation of a compelling political counter-narrative that can isolate insurgence and separate them from the general population, thereby dispelling or eroding outright or latent support for their actions, will be required to achieve success. In addition, however, there are opportunities in particular circumstances to use offensive information operations to achieve specific outcomes, including operations to undermine group cohesion and to interfere with decision-making or to constrain terrorist activities in order to preempt attacks. These methods should be considered, in appropriate circumstances, but only as part of a comprehensive information strategy.