Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Barbara Grewe

Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 3:05 PM
To: Front Office; Mike Hurley; Warren Bass; John Raidt; Susan Ginsburg
Subject: Ongoing saga of July 5 meeting.

To date we have confirmed that Cofer Black attended the meeting. He would
appear to have been the most senior attendee. We are working on the remaining
possible names. The one item that Clarke claims came out of the meeting — a
meeting of the federal building security committee — may have happened.
There was a meeting of the committee on July 9. We will be receiving from the
FBI tomorrow documents regarding the July 9 bldg sec. meeting, including the
sign in sheet. Do not yet have confirmation that this meeting was explicitly a
result of the July 5 Clarke meeting. It may have been a regularly scheduled
meeting.

Barbara

5/10/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Saturday, May 08, 2004 3:09 PM
To: Team 3
Cc: Philip Zelikow
Subject: Status Report on FR Chapter III

Team 3:

I just spoke with Philip in C-Ville.

He confirmed that he has received Sections 3.1 - 3.5 and the additional
piece that Warren drafted on Friday.

Philip asked me to tell you that he is very happy with the high quality of
your work which, he said, lifts his spirits. He asked me to pass along his
appreciation.

Well done to all of you and thanks for your hard work.

Mike

5/8/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Sunday, May 02, 2004 4:35 PM
To: Dan Marcus
Cc: Mike Hurley
Subject: Mike Hurley's Sections

Dan:

Please take the following text and paste it (or some Marcusian version of it) into an email from you to
Philip, so that he'll know what's going on with my sections. When you send your note forward, please cc
Stephanie and me on it.

Thanks, Mike

Philip:

Mike Hurley is working on the draft of section 9.2: Initial war planning and
the invasion of Afghanistan. He'll have it to Stephanie by Monday and
she'll cue it up for your review.

His other section is 5.4: Change and continuity. As that concerns

primarily the transition between the Clinton and Bush administrations, I'll
take lead editing responsibility for it. I'll also ensure that Chris is involved
in the editing process.

Dan

5/2/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Dan Marcus

Sent: Sunday, May 02, 2004 4:24 PM
To: Stephanie Kaplan
Cc: Chris Kojm; Steve Dunne; Mike Hurley
Subject: chapter 5.4

Draft of this chapter - on the transition -- should go to Chris, Steve and me, but not to Philip, pending my review.
I'll talk to Philip and Ernest about this.

5/2/2004
 Page 1 of2

Mike Hurley

From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 10:05 AM
To: Stephanie Kaplan
Cc: Chris Kojm; Dan Marcus; Mike Hurley
Subject: BE: Guidelines on deadlines

Stephanie:

I have two sections: 9.2 and 5.4.

I've focused on 9.2 this week. I had hoped to have it done by close of business today,
but the trip to Tampa cost me a day. I'll work on it on Saturday and Sunday and have it
sent to you by Sunday afternoon.

5.4 is on the transition—"Change and continuity". I'll pivot to that on Monday, and will
have a decent draft by Friday (May 7). Given that it covers the transition, my
understanding is that Chris or Dan will have the lead on editing it.

Mike
Original Message
From: Stephanie Kaplan
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 9:43 AM
To: Chris Kojm; staff
Subject: RE: Guidelines on deadlines

Colleagues:

When you are ready to submit a chapter section, please send it to me via unclassified email or, if you are
at K Street, via classified email. If you are not located at K Street and have a classified draft to submit,
please consult with Tony as soon as possible to make arrangements for transfer to the K Street classified
drive.

As Chris mentioned in an earlier email, we will begin the editing process this weekend, and so we look
forward to receiving your first drafts. If, for whatever reason, you cannot submit a draft today, send me a
quick email just letting me know the status of your section so that I can keep track of where we
collectively stand.

Feel free to contact me if you have any questions. Thanks and have a good weekend.

Stephanie

STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN
9-11 COMMISSION
7(202)331-1125
F (202) 296-5545
www.9-11commission.gov

Original Message
From: Chris Kojm

4/30/2004
 Page 2 of2

Sent: Monday, April 26, 2004 11:51 AM

To: staff
Subject: Guidelines on deadlines
Importance: High

Final Report.

To those drafting portions of the Final Report:

The two week-target date set by the Front Office for chapter submissions is Friday, April
30th. The more material the Front Office receives early, the more we can work with you in
shaping that material, and the less painful the process will be later in the month. In all cases
send material to Stephanie Kaplan; she will take care of further distribution.

We understand that not everyone will be complete with drafts by that date, but if you can
push hard this week to get the first draft done, please do so. We will start the editing process
this weekend. The deadline for a first draft final report submission to Commissioners is Monday,
May 31st.

Monographs.

To Team Leaders:

We want to clarify priorities on written products. For Team 8, the top priority is staff
statements, which will fold directly into the final report. For all other teams the top priority is the
final report. The next priority is the monographs. Monographs can take forms that suit the work
of your Team; they are of no set length or format, but we believe it is important for every team to
complete a monograph. The purpose of the monograph is to memorialize each Team's body of
work, and provide the investigative and intellectual underpinning for your contribution to the final
report.

The outside deadline for monographs is July 1st. What this means is that all work should
be complete by that date, subject to final edits by the Front Office and copy editing. Teams will
have the month of June to complete monographs while the Front Office is engaged with the
Commissioners turning the draft report into the final report by July 1st. Any monographs
completed before July 1st would be welcome.

The target date for issuing the Final Report, not later than July 26th, is also the target date
for issuing monographs.

4/30/2004
 WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3, 9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

BOX: 00003 FOLDER: 0002 TAB: 1 DOC ID: 31205825

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 1

_ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Hurley's Monograph File

DOCUMENT DATE: 04/27/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/(Profs Notes)

FROM: Marcus

TO: Team 3

SUBJECT: E-Folder for Our .. Sections

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
4/26 PZ guidance:

Feel free to copy as much of Number 5 as needed (leaving the four rendition examples
for another area)

Put the Sudan expulsion issue in Yoel's 2.1

With 3.3, use a page for pre Aug 1998 policy towards Afghanistan, Pakistan and AQ.
Take the Afghan story to Feb 2001; Take the Pak story to Dec 31,1999.

In 5.2 present the new Pak policy (i.e. high level diplomatic efforts) and carry through to
Feb 2001

In 5.5 discuss Afghan policy and Pak approach, Feb 2001 through Sept. 2001
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Thursday, April 22, 2004 7:56 AM
To: Dan Leopold
Cc: Team 3
Subject: Readership of Team 3 Monograph

Dan,

It's still unclear what shape Team 3's monograph will take, but assuming there is time to produce one after all the
work on the Final Report, then:

Classification is likely to be Top Secret/Codeword.

Given that, its readership will be restricted to a limited number of people in the compartment at CIA, State, NSC,
Office of Secretary of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senior officials in the
combatant commands (such as CENTCOM and SOCOM), DoJ, Treasury Department, Senior levels of the FBI,
and congressional leadership. Most of the people in the compartment are at CIA, the number of people in the
compartment at other agencies is limited.

If we can get our work through pre-publication review, then the readership would be broader, and would include
interested officials in the major foreign policy and national security departments and agencies, the think-tank
community, former government officials, reporters writing on national security, academics, and the families of the
victims of 9/11.

Mike

4/22/2004
To: Barbara Grewe
From: Team 5 (JKR)
Re: inserts for chapters 6 and 4: The entry of the hijackers.
Date: April 22, 2004

The summer of threat: border lookouts placed on Hazmi and Mihdhar.

Primary records of lookouts placed on Hazmi and Mihdhar show that border
lookouts were not received by INS and Customs until after Mihdhar had returned
July 4, 2001. (It appears that the INS acted quickly to upload the information
once the information was received.)
• On August 23, 2001, the CIA sent a classified electronic message to the State
Department, FBI, INS and other government agencies, recommending that
Mihdhar and al Hazmi be added to TIPOFF and the Treasury Enforcement
Communications System (TECS) which contained a database accessible to the
INS and Customs.
• On August 24, the State Department's TIPOFF office created a dual record for
each terrorist, a classified side with intelligence reporting, and an unclassified
record with their name, passport number, and place and date of birth. The
unclassified information was entered into the Consular Lookout Support
System (CLASS) for use by consular officers running checks on visa
applications. The TIPOFF office also transmitted the information to INS.
• August 24, 2001. Both al Hazmi and Mihdhar are entered into TECS as
lookouts, automatically scanned at ports of entry. The lookouts are identical,
and warn of "possible travel to the U.S." and instruct inspectors to refer the
terrorists to secondary inspection, where both investigations and intelligence
divisions at headquarters were to be notified. In addition, passport numbers
and travel itinerary were to be recorded in secondary results.
• August 31, 2001. Mihdhar is listed in TECS as "armed and dangerous", and
inspectors are instructed to transport him to secondary inspection.
• September 4,2001. The State Department revoked Mihdhar's visa under
section 212(A)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for his
participation in terrorist activities.
• September 5,2001. The INS entered Mihdhar's notice of revokation into the
INS lookout system, NAILS.
• September 5,2001. Mihdhar is listed in TECS as a potential witness in an
FBI investigation, and now inspectors are told not to detain him.
 WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

BOX: 00003 FOLDER: 0002 TAB: 2 DOC ID: 31205826

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 11

ACCESS RESTRICTEDj_|
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Hurley's Monograph File

DOCUMENT DATE: 02/06/2001 DOCUMENT TYPE: Telegram

FROM: SECSTATE

TO:

SUBJECT: Options for Dealing with the Afghan Terrorism Problem

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Dan Marcus

Sent: Wednesday, April 21, 2004 4:19 PM
To: staff
Subject: Classification issues in drafting report chapters

Attached is a memorandum from Philip and me setting forth guidelines and procedures to be followed in drafting
chapters of the report (which drafts we hope to see from you soon!) to assure that we keep on the right side of the
line on treatment of classified or possibly classified material pending executive branch review and clearance of
the report as unclassified. The rules are pretty much the same as the ones set forth in my March 22 e-mail re
staff statements. Our successful experience in navigating the classification shoals (or rapids?) with staff
statements underlines the importance of following the attached guidelines for the report chapters. So please read
the attached memorandum carefully.

4/22/2004
April 21,2004

MEMORANDUM

To: Staff

From: Philip Zelikow and Dan Marcus

Re: Classification Issues in Drafts of Report Sections

While we plan for the Commission's final report to be a public, unclassified document,
the report—or at least most portions of it—will have to undergo a pre-publication review
by the executive branch to assure that result. In addition, many if not most of you will be
using information—albeit information we believe should be declassified or regarded as
unclassified—that is derived from classified documents or interviews. It is therefore
important to adhere to the following guidelines and procedures, similar to those we have
followed in preparing draft staff statements, in working on drafts of chapters of the
report:

1. Drafts of chapters that rely on any information derived from classified sources
must be handled as classified documents based on the highest classification of
source documents or interviews. In particular:

a) such chapters must be drafted and edited only on classified computers;

b) draft chapters derived from material up to the Secret level may be worked
on in any Commission office; draft chapters derived from TS/SCI material
must be worked on at the K Street office or another SCIF;

c) such draft chapters must be transmitted by secure means—e.g., classified

fax or lock bag;

d) such draft chapters must be stored and transported securely.

2. Drafts of chapters that rely on any information derived from classified sources
(documents or interviews) should be marked on each page as "Subject to
Classification Review."

3. Draft chapters should include endnotes that set forth both the proposed citation for
the actual public report, along with the classification (if any) of the source and
additional information (such as Bates numbers) that would facilitate the retrieval
of the source. Stephanie Kaplan will circulate citation guidelines for both the
final report and monographs later today.
 4. Such draft chapters should be treated as classified until you are notified by the
front office that the pre-publication review process for that chapter has been
completed.

We recognize that it may be clear from the outset that some draft chapters contain no
material derived from currently classified sources (e.g., the chapters on the immediate
response in New York or chapters based solely on material in staff statements that have
already been cleared by the executive branch). Such draft chapters may be treated as
unclassified from the outset with the consent of the front office.

If you have any questions, please talk to Chris, Steve, Stephanie, Graham, or one of us.
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Philip Zelikow

Sent: Wednesday, April 21 , 2004 1 0:30 AM
To: Mike Hurley
Subject: RE: FR Section 9.2 Initial War Planning and the Invasion of Afghanistan

Come visit

— Original Message —
From: Mike Hurley
Sent: Wednesday, April 21, 2004 10:23 AM
To: Philip Zelikow; Chris Kojm
Cc: Stephanie Kaplan; Mike Hurley; Dan Marcus; Steve Dunne
Subject: FR Section 9.2 Initial War Planning and the Invasion of Afghanistan

Philip and Chris:

I'm drafting this section. I think it should be fairly straightforward. But I'd like to
spend a couple of minutes with both of you to get your thoughts.

Mike

4/21/2004
 Page 1 of2

Mike Hurley

From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Friday, April 16, 2004 4:25 PM
To: Daniel Byman
Cc: Alexis Albion; Warren Bass; Mike Hurley
Subject: A Few Bullets

Dan,

Per your request. This is a start, I'll send more as I think of them. I suggest you
speak to John Roth about changes at Treasury that relate to the emerging shape of a
war on terror (FR, Section 9.3):

• TTIC-established in spring 2003 to consolidate threat reporting and ensure that all relevant info from cia, fbi
and other collectors resides in one place and is easily accessible. Unclear, at this point whether individual
agencies will cough up their most sensitive info. Tenet is banking that this answers the mail for a new
capability.

CIA's management of the war on terrorism is conducted in its daily 5:00 meetings, which bring together
reps of all elements within CIA, the 1C, State, DoD, Treasury, etc. to coordinate their efforts. Tenet touts
this as a highly effective management mechanism.

The al Qaeda Senior Leadership Group: This is a highly sensitive group of deputies, sometimes including
principals, that manages the USG's hunt for bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other a Q high value targets.
Chairman Myers runs it.

Task Force 121 now has a new name. But it is the special operations forces group, now under Combatant
Commander for CENTCOM, that hunts down UBL and his henchment in the field.

Rumsfeld/Tenet lash-ups: Both Tenet and Rumsfeld say they meet frequently and converse constantly.
As DoD and CIA have the leading roles, this close bilateral relationship ensures, they say, that there is no
daylight between them on important issues. The question is whether this will be institutionalized, or
whether it's personality dependent, i.e., it works because Tenet and Rumsfeld get along.

NSC Office of Combating Terrorism: Stood up in fall of 2001. Has coordinated an overall CT strategy.
How much power and authority does it have. In less than three years it has had three different Deputy
National Security Advisers for Combating Terrorism: Wayne Downing, John Gordon, now Fran
Townsend. Can it really prevail over Rumsfeld and DoD? Tenet and CIA? Powell and State?

• NSC also stood up in summer of 2003 a new directorate for Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. It's now headed by
Bob Blackwill who has the title of Deputy National Security Council. What is its role vis-a-vis Townsend's
shop? Just a coordinator? Or does it have real authority?

4/16/2004
 Page 2 of2

FBI: Mueller says that it is moving in the right direction: emphasis now not just on developing criminal
cases, but on collecting domestic intelligence. Problem is that his requires a huge cultural change.
Mueller does not want congress, or our commission, to force change on the bureau, so he is doing his best
to address concerns and demonstrate he is our in front of the wave. Bureau needs to establish a whole
new career track for analysts. These people won't be cops; but they need to know they can rise in the
Bureau. Lots of skepticism about whether the Bureau is really capable of making such a dramatic change
from how it has done business in the past.

FBI Director briefs President Bush every day. In press interviews, Andy Card makes clear that the
Director's access to the president is unprecedented. These daily briefings began on September 14, 2001.
According to Card, this channel alone is a huge step forward toward enhancing the country's security. The
background is that the FBI for years had stayed away from the White House as a result of the dysfunctional
Clinton-Freeh relationship, and concerns that the White House would misuse the FBI in some way (see
TravelGate).

4/16/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Friday, April 16, 2004 7:22 AM
To: 'bonniejenkins@harvard.edu'
Cc: Team 3
Subject: Bonnie

Bonnie,

While the FO has the responsibility for Chapter XV, Section 15.3 "Homeland defense," I
think you can be very helpful to them on that section, given the research you've done,
knowledge you've acquired on steps the military has taken to protect the homeland.

You're certainly our expert on this important topic.

Mike

4/16/2004
Mike Hurley
From: Daniel Byman
Sent: Friday, April 16, 2004 7:06 AM
To: Kevin Scheid
Co: Mike Hurley
Subject: Re: Help

Kevin,

I should also add that I would appreciate your help on how the CIA/1C is
contributing to the GWOT today (a minor subject, I know).

Are you free to talk this afternoon (Friday)?

Dan

Daniel Byman wrote:

> Kevin,
>
> I'd like to ask you or a member of your team for help on my section of
> the final report. In a rather dubious move, I've been asked to draft
> on sections on Bringing Foreign Policy Back In.
> I'd appreciate your thoughts on how multilateral institutions abroad
> might be used (or should not be) with regard to intelligence. Are
> there better ways to cooperate with allies? Can we set up new
> structures? Does this approach work at all for intelligence?
> Please let me know if you or another teammate can do this and, if so,
> how you'd like to structure it. I'd particularly appreciate written
> submissions that I can directly incorporate, but I'll take what I can
> get. I'd also appreciate thoughts on MFRs/documents/testimony that
> might be relevant.
>
> Best,
> Dan
Mike Hurley
From: Daniel Byman
Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:18 AM
To: Team 3
Subject: help...

I would like to ask all of you for help on section 9.3 -- "The emerging
shape of the war on terror." Because I am the person who as looked at
this the least, I am naturally the one tasked to draft it.

I would like to have each of you provide me with about four paragraphs
on how your "instrument" has fought the war on terror since September
20, 2001. Can I ask:

1. Scott -- how is diplomacy helping out?

2. Len -- how is criminal justice working?
3. Bonnie: what is the military/OSD up to?
4. Alexis: whassup at the Agency?
5. Warren: What is the White House plan/strategy now?

Suggestions on MFRs, testimony, and documents are also welcome.

If possible, I'd like this soon (say COB Wednesday), so I can go back to
you for more (okay, not the best incentive).

Dan
Mike Hurley
From: Daniel Byman
Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:35 AM
To: Kevin Scrieid
Cc: Mike Hurley; Daniel Byman
Subject: Help

Kevin,

I'd like to ask you or a member of your team for help on my section of
the final report. In a rather dubious move, I've been asked to draft on
sections on Bringing Foreign Policy Back In.

I'd appreciate your thoughts on how multilateral institutions abroad

might be used (or should not be) with regard to intelligence. Are there
better ways to cooperate with allies? Can we set up new structures?
Does this approach work at all for intelligence?
Please let me know if you or another teammate can do this and, if so,
how you'd like to structure it. I'd particularly appreciate written
submissions that I can directly incorporate, but I'll take what I can
get. I'd also appreciate thoughts on MFRs/documents/testimony that
might be relevant.

Best,
Dan
Mike Hurley
From: Daniel Byman
Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:26 AM
To: Christine Healey; Mike Jacobson; Caroline Barnes
Cc: Daniel Byman; Mike Hurley
Subject: Request for help

Chris, Mike and Caroline,

I've naturally been asked to be a lead drafter on several sections of

the report for which I've done no research. Can you (or someone from
your team ... or someone else (I'm not sure who)) help out on two parts
of the report related to the FBI and justice issues? In particular, I'd
appreciate your thoughts on:

1. Chapter 9, section 3. How has the FBI changed its activities

overseas (and its cooperation overseas with others) to fight the war on
terrorism since September 20, 2001? What has it done? What problems
have emerged? What remains to be done?

2. Chapter 12, section 3. How has DOJ/the FBI tried to work with
multilateral institutions? Is there more that can be done? Is this a
bad idea?

I'd also appreciate your thoughts on relevant documents, MFRs, and

testimony. Ideally, I'd like some written thoughts that I can
incorporate directly, but I'll take what you have time to give.

Thanks .. and please redirect me if there are better people.

Best,
Dan
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Daniel Byman

Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:14 AM
To: Scott Allan
Cc: Dan Byman; Len Hawley; Tom Dowling; Mike Hurley
Subject: Re: chapter 12

You've anticipated me ... would tommorrow (Friday) afternoon work? If not, how "bout 9:00 am on
Tuesday?

Dan

Scott Allan wrote:

Gentlemen:

I saw that Dan Byman is listed as the "lead drafter" for Chapter 12 of the F/O's final report. Since
we all will have information and insights to add to his section we should try to schedule a
brainstorming session next week. Anytime Tues, Thurs, Friday works for me, as does Wed
afternoon. I can help with 12.2 (Central Asia and Arabia) and I'm sure Len would have a good
amount to say about reinventing multilateral institutions (covered in 12.3).

-SNA

4/15/2004
Mike Hurley
From: Daniel Byman
Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:12 AM
To: Tom Dowling
Cc: Daniel Byman; Mike Hurley
Subject: Byman request for help

Tom,

In a rather dubious move, I've been ask to take the lead on drafting
Chapter 12 of the final report: "Bringing Foreign Policy Back In." I
would appreciate your help with several sections of this chapter. In
particular, I'd like your thoughts on "America in the Muslim World" and
on "Reinventing Multilateral Institutions."

Can you give me your thoughts on these subjects? In particular, I'd

like your ideas on 1. what the problems are; 2. how they contributed to
9-11 or to problems in counterterrorism in general; 3. what is being
done, if anything; and 4. recommendations for improvement.

I would also appreciate yoru suggestions on any MFRs, testimony, or

documents to look at.

Of course, this is due in a hurry. Can you get some thoughts to me in

the next few days?

Thanks in advance -- and I'm open to any ideas that aren't above.

Dan
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:10 AM
To: 'bonniejenkins@harvard.edu'
Cc: Mike Hurley
Subject: Final Report Assignment

Hi Bonnie:

You've been assigned lead drafting responsibility for Section 3.4 "Military Options".
The overall title of Chapter III is "Responses to al Qaeda's Initial Assaults". Section 3.4
is one of 5 sections that come under that chapter.

You'll need to submit your draft section to the FO on or before April 30. PZ advised that
each section should be more or less 5,000 words, which is equivalent to 10 pages
single-spaced, using Times Roman, 12 point typeface.

As a lead drafter you should call on any materials (MFRs, documents, notes), held by
any staff member or team on the commission.

PZ wants very strong footnoting done for each section.

The sections must be concise, there can be no wasted sentences or even words.

Mike

4/15/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley

From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2004 11:15 AM
To: Len Hawley
Cc: Mike Hurley
Subject: Final Report Assignment

Hi Len:

PZ just gave us our Final Report lead drafting assignments:

You've been assigned lead drafting responsibility for Section 15.1 "Transforming
Institutions for Attacking Terrorists". The overall title of Chapter XV is "National
Defense". Section 15.1 is one of 3 sections that come under that chapter.

You'll need to submit your draft section to the FO on or before April 30. PZ advised that
each section should be more or less 5,000 words, which is equivalent to 10 pages
single-spaced, using Times Roman, 12 point typeface.

As a lead drafter you should call on any materials (MFRs, documents, notes), held by
any staff member or team on the commission.

PZ wants very strong footnoting done for each section.

The sections must be concise, there can be no wasted sentences or even words.

Just wanted to give you a heads up. I think this is a good topic for you. You'll have to
call on others to get input. But you'll have a good sense of how our institutions are
transforming, and what more needs to be done for attacking terrorists.

Mike

4/15/2004
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

CHAPTER LEA D DRAFTER |

\
1. The Foundation of an Islamic Army
1 . 1 The fatwa of February 1 998 May
1.2 Islamist extremism and its appeal in the Islamic world May
1 .3 The rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda MacEachin
1.4 Al Qaeda and the Muslim world Dowling
1 .5 Attacking the United States MacEachin

II. Counterterrorism Evolves

2.1 From the old terrorism to the new: The case of WTC I Tobin
2.2 Adaptation - or non-adaptation - in the law enforcement community FO
2.3 ...the intelligence community FO
2.4 ... the Departments and the Congress FO
2.5 ...the White House FO

III. Responses to al Qaeda's Initial Assaults

3.1 Before the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania Albion
3.2 Crisis Bass
3.3 Post-crisis diplomacy Allan
3.4 Military options Jenkins
3.5 Clandestine and covert action Albion

IV. Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland

4.1 Terrorist entrepreneurs Snell
4.2 Plans, targets, and requirements De
4.3 Choosing the attackers: recruitment, vetting, and training De
4.4 Seeing aircraft as weapons? May
4.5 A money trail? Roth

V. From Threat to Threat

5.1 The Millennium crisis Linden
5.2 Post-crisis reflection: an agenda for 2000 Albion
5.3 The attack on the U.S.S. Cole Grandrimo
5.4 Change and continuity Hurley
5.5 A new strategy? Bass

VI. The Attack Looms

6.1 Arriving, Waiting in California Snell
6.2 California and Florida Jacobson
6.3 Final strategies and tactics Kim
6.4 Assembling the teams Kim
6.5 The 'summer of threat' Grewe
6.6 Late leads? Al Mihdhar and Moussaoui Grewe

VII. The Four Flights

7.1 The hijacking of AA 1 1 and UA 175 Johnstone
7.2 FAA and NORAD Farmer
7.3 Losing AA 77 Farmer
7.4 Improvising a homeland defense Farmer
7.5 The battle for UA 93 Raidt

VIII. Heroism and Horror

8.1 Emergency plans Caspersen
8.2 Agencies and firms implement the plans Caspersen
8.3 The World Trade Center Caspersen
8.4 Fateful choices in emergency response Caspersen

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

CHAPTER LEAD DRAFTER |

IX. Wartime
9.1 Crisis management and domestic responses Hyde
9.2 Initial war planning and the invasion of Afghanistan Hurley
9.3 The emerging shape of a war on terror Byman

X. Problems of Foresight - and Hindsight

10.1 The world of policymakers: appreciations and judgments FO
10.2 The blinding effects of hindsight FO
1 0.3 Finding fair verdicts FO

XI. National Leadership and National Strategy

11.1 A new world and a new kind of conflict FO
1 1 .2 Measuring success FO
1 1 .3 Coordinating a national strategy FO
1 1 .4 The role of the Congress FO
1 1 .5 From national strategy to coalition strategy FO

XII. Bringing Foreign Policy Back In

12.1 America and the Muslim world Byman
12.2 Central Asia and Arabia Byman
12.3 Reinventing multilateral institutions Byman

XIII. Intelligence for a Different World

13.1 America's intelligence community: A legacy of the Cold War Lederman
13.2 Bridging the f oreign-dom estic divide Healey
13.3 Assessment and warning Fenner
13.4 Reforming the Executive and the Congress Lederman

XIV. Protecting Security and Preserving Liberty

14.1 Balancing empowerment and restraint Rundlet
14.2 Harnessing and regulating the power of the information age FO
14.3 Terrorist finance Roth

XV. National Defense

1 5.1 Transforming institutions for attacking terrorists Hawley
1 5.2 Border security (move to Chap. 1 4?) Ginsburg
15.3 Homeland defense FO

XVI. Living in a World of Risk

16.1 Assessing vulnerabilities and judging risks FO
1 6.2 Aviation and transportation security Dillingham
16.3 Who is protecting us? Public and private partnerships Farmer
16.4 Mitigating and managing the consequences of catastrophic attack Team 8
1 6.5 Learning to live in a world of risk FO

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
\o

v
V
Thought Experiment:
1) What are the most important institutional criticisms the commission is finding
across the board? Weaknesses in the pre-9/11 posture of the United States.
2) Zelikow's 1998 article, and the Hart-Rudman article
3) To what extent were these weaknesses identified and recognized before 9/11?
4) To what extent were the weaknesses placed on the agenda for national action
before 9/11?
5) What is the purpose of national policy coordination? What is the White House
uniquely supposed to do? Help define the national agenda for action, draw the
entire government together in pursuit of that agenda.
6) How do we define the debate, using our independent analysis?
7) What are the big problems? Criminal investigation vs. intelligence collection;
lack of capacity for direct action in Afghanistan; lack of will to use direct action
in Afghanistan; diplomatic strategy to deal with Pakistan
McLaughlin on Summer of Threat:

But it was a reflection of the degree of frustration he was feeling at the time. Given the
fact that policy was proceeding so slowly while the threat warnings were at their height,
McLaughlin's feeling at this time was, "what more did you need to know?" (He added
that he understands that before 9-11 one could not expect the same consensus as was seen
after 9-11).

"We were going nuts at this point," McLaughlin explained, and yet it was at exactly this
time when CIA was asked whether the warnings it was receiving were, perhaps,
disinformation. These questions came mostly from the Pentagon, McLaughlin observed,
but they were "from all over." In response, a study was put together by CIA which
reported that the warnings were indeed for real. McLaughlin explained that his
comments on this matter were not meant to be critical, but "imagine the extra energy that
went into that."
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 Page 1 of2

Mike Hurley

From: Mike Hurley

Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2004 12:39 PM
To: Front Office
Cc: Stephanie Kaplan; Mike Hurley
Subject: Team 3 Revised Nominees for Our Portions of the Final Report

Philip/Chris/Dan/Steve:

Here are my suggestions for who from Team 3 should have the lead on the sections of
the Final Report that concern CTpolicy. Mike

Part II
2.4—The Departments and Congress. Team 3 has part of this. Lead: Hurley

2.5—The White House. Team 3 has part of this. Lead: Bass

Part III
3.1—Before the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Lead: Albion

3.2—Crisis. Lead: Bass

3.3—Post-crisis diplomacy. Lead: Allan (supported by Byman)

3.4—Military options. Lead: Jenkins (supported by Hawley)

3.5—Clandestine and covert action. Lead: Albion

PartV
5.1—The Millennium crisis. Leads: Bass

5.2—Post-crisis reflection: an agenda for 2000. Lead: Albion

5.3—The attack on the USS Cole. Leads: Bass

5.4—Change and continuity. Lead: Hurley

5.5—A new strategy? Lead: Bass

Part VI

4/13/2004
 Page 2 of2

6.5—The 'summer of threat'. Team 3 has part of this. Lead: Albion

Part IX
9.2—Initial war planning and the invasion of Afghanistan. Lead: Hurley

9.3—The emerging shape of a war on terror. Lead: Byman

Part XI
11.3—Coordinating a national strategy. Team 3 has part of this. Lead: Hurley

Part XII
12.1,12.2,12.3—Bringing foreign policy back in. Some Team 3 involvement. Lead:
Byman

Part XV
15.1—Transforming institutions for attacking terrorists. Lead: Hawley

4/13/2004
 Page 1 of2

Mike Hurley
From: Mike Hurley
Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2004 10:25 AM
To: Philip Zelikow; Chris Kojm
Cc: Mike Hurley
Subject: FW: Mike Hurley nominees for Team 3 portions of Final Report

Philip and Chris:

On Monday I sent you the attached email re Team 3 nominees for helping to write
sections of the Final Report.

On further reflection, I may have confused the issue, and been a bit "off" your guidance,
by in some cases designating more than one Team 3'er per section.

I'd like to re-submit this to you in a way that more accurately reflects what I think you're
looking for.

I'll try to get the resubmission to you quickly.

Thanks,

Mike
Original Message
From: Mike Hurley
Sent: Monday, April 05, 2004 5:20 PM
To: Front Office
Cc: Warren Bass; Mike Hurley
Subject: Mike Hurley nominees for Team 3 portions of Final Report

/ spoke with Chris Kojm last Friday re my ideas for who on Team 3 should
have the lead on what I think are Team 3-related sections of the report.
Here's what I propose:

2.4—The Departments and Congress. Team 3 has part of this. Leads: Bass and Hurley

2.5—The White House. Team 3 has part of this. Leads: Bass and Hurley

3.1—Before the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Lead: Albion

3.2—Crisis. Lead: Bass

3.3—Post-crisis diplomacy. Leads: Byman and Allan

3.4—Military options. Lead: Jenkins and Hawley

4/7/2004
 Page 2 of2

3.5—Clandestine and covert action. Lead: Albion

5.1—The Millennium crisis. Leads: Bass and Hurley

5.2—Post-crisis reflection: an agenda for 2000. Leads: Bass and Albion

5.3—The attack on the USS Cole. Leads: Bass and Hurley

5.4—Change and continuity. Leads: Bass and Hurley

5.5—A new strategy. Leads: Bass and Albion

6.5—The 'summer of threat'. Team 3 has a part of this. Leads: Albion and Bass

9.2—Initial war planning and the invasion of Afghanistan. Lead: Hurley

9.3—The emerging shape of a war on terror. Lead: Hurley

11.3—Coordinating a national strategy. Leads: Zelikow, May, Bass, Hurley

XII—12.1,12.2,12.3--some Team 3 involvement

15.1—Transforming institutions for attacking terrorists. Leads: Albion and Hurley

4/7/2004
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One. The Foundation of an Islamic Army

Two. Counterterrorism Evolves

Three. Responses to al Qaeda's Initial Assaults

Four. Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland

Five. From Threat to Threat

Six. The Attack Looms

Seven. The Four Flights

Eight. Heroism and Horror

Nine. Wartime

Ten. Problems of Foresight - and Hindsight

Eleven. National Leadership and National Strategy

Twelve. Bringing Foreign Policy Back In

Thirteen. Intelligence for a Different World

Fourteen. Protecting Security and Preserving Liberty

Fifteen. National Defense

Sixteen. Living with a World of Risk

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

I. THE FOUNDATION OF AN ISLAMIC ARMY

1.1 Thefatwa of February 1998

1.2 Islamist extremism and its appeal in the Islamic world

1.3 The rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda

1.4 Al Qaeda and the Muslim world

1.5 Attacking the United States

II. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES

2.1 From the old terrorism to the new: The case of WTC I

2.2 Adaptation - or non-adaptation - in the law enforcement community

•2.3 ... the intelligence community

's*^ ' '2.4 ... the Departments and the Congress

•2.5 ...the White House

• III. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS

3.1 Before the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania

K)J 3.2 Crisis

>4. 3.3 Post-crisis diplomacy

bj 3.4 Military options

3.5 Clandestine and covert action

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

IV. ALQAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND

4.1 Terrorist entrepreneurs

4.2 Plans, targets, and requirements

4.3 Choosing the attackers: recruitment, vetting, and training

4.4 Seeing aircraft as weapons?

, 4.5 A money trail?

V. FROM THREAT TO THREAT

5.1 The Millennium crisis

2 Post-crisis reflection: an agenda for 2000

5.3 The attack on the U.S.S. Cole

5.4 Change and continuity

5.5 A new strategy?

VI. THE ATTACK LOOMS

6.1 Going to California

6.2 California and Florida

6.3 Final strategies and tactics

6.4 Assembling the teams

6.5 The ' summer of threat'

6.6 Late leads? Al Mihdhar and Moussaoui

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

VII. THE FOUR FLIGHTS

7.1 The hijacking of AA 11 and UA 175

7.2 FAAandNORAD

7.3 Losing AA 77

7.4 Improvising a homeland defense

7.5 The battle for UA 93

VIII. HEROISM AND HORROR

8.1 Emergency plans

8.2 Agencies and firms implement the plans

8.3 The World Trade Center

8.4 Fateful choices in emergency response

IX. WARTIME
9.1 Crisis management and domestic responses

9.2 Initial war planning and the invasion of Afghanistan

9.3 The emerging shape of a war on terror

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

x. PROBLEMS OF FORESIGHT-AND HINDSIGHT

10.1 The world of policymakers: appreciations and judgments

10.2 The blinding effects of hindsight

10.3 Finding fair verdicts

XI. NATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL STRATEGY

11.1 A new world and a new kind of conflict

11.2 Measuring success

~"?Z./£M AX* H '^ Coordinating a national strategy

11.4 The role of the Congress

• 11.5 From national strategy to coalition strategy

3flL BRINGING FOREIGN POLICY BACK IN

12.1 America and the Muslim world

12.2 Central Asia and Arabia

12.3 Reinventing multilateral institutions

XIII. INTELLIGENCE FOR A DIFFERENT WORLD

13.1 America's intelligence community: A legacy of the Cold War

13.2 Bridging the foreign-domestic divide

13.3 Assessment and warning

13.4 Reforming the Executive and the Congress: Unity of effort, joint missions

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

XIV. PROTECTING SECURITY AND PRESERVING LIBERTY

14.1 Balancing empowerment and restraint

14.2 Harnessing and regulating the power of the information age

14.3 Terrorist finance

XV. NATIONAL DEFENSE

15.1 Transforming institutions for attacking terrorists

15.2 Border security

15.3 Homeland defense

XVI. LIVING IN A WORLD OF RISK

16.1 Assessing vulnerabilities and judging risks

16.2 Aviation and transportation security

16.3 Who is protecting us? Public and private partnerships

16.4 Mitigating and managing the consequences of catastrophic attack

16.5 Learning to live in a world of risk

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One. The Foundation of an Islamic Army

Two. Counter-terrorism Evolves

Three. Responses to the Embassy Bombings

Four. Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland

Five. From Threat to Threat

Six. The Attack Looms

Seven. The Four Flights

Eight. Heroism and Horror

Nine. Wartime

Ten. Problems of Foresight - and Hindsight

Eleven. National Leadership and National Strategy

Twelve. Bringing Foreign Policy Back In

Thirteen. Intelligence for a Different World

Fourteen. Protecting Security and Preserving Liberty

Fifteen. National Defense

Sixteen. Living with a World of Risk

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
f

I. THE FOUNDATION OF AN ISLAMIC ARMY

1.1 Thefatwa of February 1998

1.2 Islamist extremism and its appeal in the Islamic world

1.3 The rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda

1.4 Al Qaeda and the Muslim world

1.5 Attacking the United States

II. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES

\N SENSITIVE
-2.1 From the old terrorism to the new: The case of WTC I
r~ ' J -
2.2 Adaptation — or non-adaptation - in the law enforcement c

2.3/ ... the intelligence community

... the Departments and the Congress

15 J ...the White House

III. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS

11 ' /
Before the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania

Crisis -7
v~i^
Post-crisis diplomacy.

Military options

Clandestine and covert action v, LJi/vw-'U- cJwys-~

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

IV. AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND .

4.1 Terrorist entrepreneurs ^^ ^°

4.2 Plans, targets, and requirements ^r

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4.3 Choosing the attackers: recruitment, vetting, and training. « \^ruLv^

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4.4 Seeing aircraft as weapons?

4.5 A money trail?

V. FROM THREAT TO THREAT

5.1 ) The Millennium crisis

5.Z) Post-crisis reflection: an agenda for 2000

.3 J The attack on the U.S.S. Cole

-^ l-Sis
.4) Change and continuity

A new strategy? . i
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7
VI. THE ATTACK LOOMS
6.1 Going to California

6.2 California and Florida

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6.3 Final strategies and tactics
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6.4 Assembling the teams

4/vivJLc7'/-KWrtJ!/ - ••^"'•'*
The 'summer of threat'
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6.6 Late leads? Moussaoui and al Mihdhar

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

VII. THE FOUR FLIGHTS . K

h+> ^~
7.1 The hijacking of AA 11 and UA 175 / L

7.2 FAAandNORAD

7.3 Losing AA 77

7.4 Improvising a homeland defense

7.5 The battle for UA 93 -

VIII. HEROISM AND HORROR

8.1 Emergency plans

8.2 Agencies and firms implement the plans

8.3 The World Trade Center

8.4 Fateful choices in emergency response

IX. WARTIME •*- • -•

9.1 Crisis management and domestic responses / l>

&*'
9.21 Initial war planning and the invasion of Afghanistan — i/

L^
9.3^ The emerging shape of the war on terror \ ^ M ^ ' ^ * k ^ ^ ' i
)<\N SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

X. PROBLEMS OF FORESIGHT-AND HINDSIGHT <jW/

10.1 The world of policymakers: appreciations and judgments A"^" 1

<J . <^
10.2 The blinding effects of hindsight. _^^

10.3 Finding fair verdicts ' ' •^--^

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XI. NATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL STRATEGY
11.1 A new world and a new kind of conflict

11.2 Measuring success

11.3 Coordinating a national strategy ^l

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11.4 The role of the Congress

^TJ
^L^
From national strategy to coalition strategy

\(\ BRINGING FOREIGN POLICY BACK IN

jV /
12.1 America and the Muslim world

12.2 Central Asia and Arabia

12.3 Reinventing multilateral institutions

XIII. INTELLIGENCE FOR A DIFFERENT WORLD

13.1 America's intelligence community: A legacy of the Cold War

13.2 Bridging the foreign-domestic divide

13.3 Assessment and warning

13.4 Reforming the Executive and the Congress: Unity of effort, joint missions

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

XIV. PROTECTING SECURITY ANDPRESERVING LIBERTY

£ /\SL £
14.1 Balancing empowerment and restraint

14.2 Harnessing and regulating the power of the information age

14.3 Terrorist finance

•
n
u
XV. NATIONAL DEFENSE Ul"

15.1\ Transforming institutions for attacking terrorists

•—
15.2 Border security

15.3 Homeland defense

XVI. LIVING IN A WORLD OF RISK

16.1 Assessing vulnerabilities and judging risks

16.2 Aviation and transportation security

16.3 Who is protecting us? Public and private partnerships

16.4 Mitigating and managing the consequences of catastrophic attack

16.5 Learning to live in a world of risk

;Vi

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley
From: Stephanie Kaplan
Sent: Saturday, April 03, 2004 12:1 1 AM
To: Team Leaders
Cc: Front Office
Subject: Nominees for Final Report

Team Leaders:

We've received a few emails nominating staff to draft sections of the final report. If you haven't submitted your
nominees, please do so by COB Monday. We'd like to settle on these assignments as soon as possible so as to
give those drafting as much time as possible.

Also, a reminder to begin to thinking about illustrations (pictures, charts, graphs) and appendixes that you wish to
be included in the final report. We will have to be somewhat conservative, so the earlier you weigh in on this, the
better.

Many thanks,
Stephanie

*
STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN
9-11 COMMISSION
T (202) 331-1125
F (202) 296-5545 -X £
www.9-11commission.gov /

4/4/2004
FDD 63 Overview Page 1 of 1

FDD 63 Overview
On May 22,1998, the President ordered the strengthening of the nation's defenses against
emerging unconventional threats to the United States to include those involving terrorist acts,
weapons of mass destruction, assaults on our critical infrastructures, and cyber-based attacks.

Presidential Decision Directive 63

GSA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICE

Previous slide Next slide Back to first slide View graphic version

http://csrc.nist.gov/organizations/fissea/presentations/2001/gsa-coop/tsld012.htm 4/1/2004
 WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: Team 3, 9/11 Commission
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 52100 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

BOX: 00003 FOLDER: 0002 TAB: 4 DOC ID: 31205828

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 1

j^CESSRESTOCTEDj
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Hurley's Monograph File

DOCUMENT DATE: 02/10/2004 DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/fProfs Notes)

FROM: Kara

TO: Front Office..

SUBJECT: ITRAP

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
 Page 1 of3

Mike Hurley

From: Mike Jacobson

Sent: Monday, February 09, 2004 6:14 PM
To: Warren Bass
Cc: Mike Hurley; Len Hawley
Subject: RE: USS Cole Bombing

I agree that this is an important issue. I wonder whether or not there was some legal/policy distinction for the FBI,
in its ability to share information with the WH, based on whether the CT investigation was criminal or intelligence.
That might explain why the FBI couldn't share information on the progress of the USS Cole investigation (a
criminal investigation) versus the developments in its intelligence investigations in the lead up to the Millennium.
Not that this should have impacted on the summer of 2001, when the issues in question (Moussaoui, Phoenix EC,
and search for Midhar/Hazmi) were all intelligence-related matters.

Mike

Original Message
From: Warren Bass
Sent: Monday, February 09, 2004 5:49 PM
To: Mike Jacobson
Cc: Mike Hurley; Len Hawley
Subject: RE: USS Cole Bombing

Yep, that sounds like the FBI I've come to know.

One important piece of our puzzle (not just for the Cole): how did the FBI share what it knew with the rest
of the USG? The image I have is of the FBI sitting mute as Clarke goes around the table at CSG meetings,
albeit with Watson sharing info offline. But I'd love to have that picture right; it's quite important for the
overall policy story, especially since the FBI (a) seems to have shared a fair bit of info during the
Millennium, however unhappily; and (b) seems to have reverted back to clammed-up form during
summer 2001, when it might've made a difference.

Anyway, curious to hear what you guys are coming up with. There's more FBI stuff in the third Clarke
MFR, which should be ready by the end of the week, inshallah. (It's huge, as usual.)

Warren

Original Message
From: Mike Jacobson
Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2004 7:29 PM
To: Warren Bass
Cc: Mike Hurley; Len Hawley
Subject: RE: USS Cole Bombing

Warren,

Just one additional thought on this matter. It seems to me that even if the FBI had concluded that
the attack was perpetrated by AQ, that doesn't necessarily mean that the WH was briefed on this
development. I recently saw a 1999 DOJ document (produced by DAG Holder's office), which
discusses the difficulties that they've had in formulating policies for sharing FBI criminal
information with the NSC. In an interview, we were also told that the standing policy at the time
was that for the FBI to share this type of information with the NSC required AG approval. We
haven't really looked into this issue very closely, so I have no idea whether or not this is all
accurate. But it seems like an important issue to explore. Thoughts on how we should proceed

2/9/2004
 Page 2 of3

on this?

Mike

Original Message
From: Warren Bass
Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2004 9:55 AM
To: Mike Jacobson
Subject: RE: USS Cole Bombing

Thanks, man—grateful for any light you can shed on this.

FYT, we've had several Clinton people—including Berger—say that they couldn't respond
until they got a definitive ruling (as it were) on Cole culpability from FBI or CIA. So we're
pretty curious about what sort of messages were going up from the FBI—preliminary
conclusions with an investigation ongoing, or something pretty blunt.
For Watson, we're also curious about how FBI played in the CSG. Did he literally sit mute
when they went around the table asking for info on current threats? Did info-sharing
change over time—e.g., during the Millennium scare, or the summer of threat in 2001?
And why on earth didn't the NSC know about all the info the FBI had? Why didn't SACs
tell HQ about Phoenix, Moussaoui, and the two San Diego bastards? Why didn't the NSC
know about those data points?
I'm just saying.

Original Message
From: Mike Jacobson
Sent: Monday, January 26, 2004 8:08 PM
To: Warren Bass
Subject: RE: USS Cole Bombing

Hey,
We've been asking that question during our latest round of interviews.
Haven't gotten the most exact answers. I'll try and round up that document
again.

Mike
Original Message
From: Warren Bass
Sent: Mon 1/26/2004 7:56 PM
To: Mike Jacobson
Cc:
Subject: RE: USS Cole Bombing

We're still keenly interested in this, by the way, esp. Len Hawley.

—Original Message—
From: Mike Jacobson
Sent: Friday, December 26, 2003 2:53 PM
To: Warren Bass
Subject: USS Cole Bombing

Warren,

I know that your team has been interested in determining when the USG
came to the conclusion that AQ was behind the Cole attack. I've located

2/9/2004
 Page 3 of3

some possibly relevant FBI documents and would be happy to show those
to you (they are secret). Let me know if you're interested.

Mike

2/9/2004
 Page 1 of 1
9/11 P e r s o n a l
Privacy

Mike Hurley

From: Dan Leopold on behatf of Info

Sent: Monday, February 09, 2004 6:23 PM
To: Team Leaders
Subject: FW: Questions?

Original Message

Sent: Monday, January 26, ZO(W 5:10 PM

To: Info
Subject: Questions?

1. Where is the video footage off all these hijackers getting on these planes?
2. How do 2 huge buildings fall perfectly straight down? Almost like a demolition?
3. What is being done to investigate the obvious insider trading that took place regarding Airline options right
before 9/11?
4. Has the government ever figured out who was on the planes on 9/11? Its my understanding that a few of the
people mentioned as terrorist were later found to be alive and well in thier own countries?
5. What was the elevation of the planes at the time that cell phone calls were made to relatives or airline
management?
6. How is it that numerous government officials are aware of terrorist threats to airlines, airlines are aware of this
threat, are trained to react in case of said threat but for some reason on 9/11 they fail to notify NORAD? Why
wasn't the airforce dispatched by somebody so they could see why 4 planes were all way off course?
7. Why was all the debris of the World Trade Center Hauled away overseas without being properly investigated. I
think you would be able to determine why the towers fell the way they did.

I wonder if any of these questions will ever be properly investigated?

I wonder if I will get any type of reply?
I wonder sometimes why we all pay taxes?
Anyway any reply would be greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
Todd Hostad
Hinckly, MM.

2/9/2004
 Page 1 of 1
9/11 Closed by
Statute

Mike Hurley

From: Susan Qinsburg

Sent: Friday, January 02,2004 9:46 AM
To: Doug MacEachin; Team 1 A; Mike Jacobson; Yoel Tobin
Cc: Philip Zelikow; Team 2; Team 5; John Roth; Mike Hurley; Barbara Grewe; Team 6
Subject: question re: today's clips

Colleagues,
The paragraph below from an article in today's clips caught my eye, since April 21 2001 is within time to watchlist
an individual. Is someone looking into this report?
Even so, the 9/11 Commission will tip more to redden George W.'s prominent ears and disturb the topiary of
Condi's hair if it nails the administration. Including the CIA and the FBI, for some gross mistake, such as failing to
act on that April 21, 2001, warning from| [about a terrorist from a Hamburg cell who turned out to be
none other than 9/11 death pilot Mohammed Atta.

FYI, we have requested a briefing on Al Shehhi from the CIA and I will alert Team leaders when this is
scheduled. If someone is not looking into the above report, I would simply supplement my Al Shehhi briefing
request to add a discussion of this report.
Thanks.
Susan

1/2/2004