Qualitative Research and Its Relation to Lacanian Psychoanalysis

Stijn Vanheule

INTRODUCTION

any contemporary psychoanalytic authors discuss the scientific status of their discipline. The general tenor of these discussions is that psychoanalysts should concentrate on the scientific foundations of psychoanalysis. This work is necessary in order to assure the position of psychoanalysis within its classical domain of application (clinical work) and within an academic context. In both domains psychoanalysis is often criticized on not being scientific. A remarkable trend in these discussions is the tendency to reduce science to statistically based research. Another remarkable trend is that especially non-Anglo-Saxon European psychoanalysts criticize this tendency (cf. Dreher, Perron, Green, qtd. in Sandler et al.). According to them the field of science is broader than statistically based research. Several theories in the philosophy of science support this point of view (Dreher). Specific alternative research strategies within the domain of psychoanalysis nevertheless are to be developed. In this paper I reflect on one alternative approach: qualitative interview research. First of all, I consider qualitative research, and secondly I relate it to psychoanalysis in general and especially to Lacanian psychoanalysis. As you will see, on the one hand I agree with the idea that psychoanalysis should question and study its scientific status by means of research. On the other hand, I think that the kind of research we engage in should be in accordance with a broader theory of the relation between science and psychoanalysis. I think the considerations I propose can help us in developing a research methodology that fits psychoanalysis in its application to psychological, social, cultural studies.

QUALITATIVE RESEARCH . . .
Outside of the evolutions within psychoanalysis, methodologists have developed a number of research

strategies for the social and the human sciences known as qualitative research. Within this field, different methodological and theoretical approaches co-exist. In qualitative interview research, one starts from interviews with one or more participants and aims at developing a theory about the topics discussed. The interviews are typed out verbatim, and labels or codes are given to chunks of raw interview material. These codes are grouped into several umbrella codes (Strauss and Corbin) or into coordinating codes in networks or matrixes (Miles and Huberman). Qualitative research is a very labor-intensive and painstaking job that is bound to strict rules concerning validity and reliability. Following these rules assures that the research meets the academic criteria for good science. Qualitative research starting from a psychoanalytic point of view implies co-operation with a neighboring field, namely methodologies from the social and human sciences. We therefore start from a methodology that is not psychoanalytic as such. In relation to psychoanalysis the information obtained by this kind of research is extra-clinical data, data that does not come from the analytic situation (Dreher). A main advantage of following this approach is that we meet conventional academic criteria concerning good science. If we want to elaborate on the scientific status of psychoanalysis, this is of course crucial. From a psychoanalytic point of view, qualitative research has many advantages over quantitative research. A first advantage is that just as in the clinical psychoanalytic research approachbased on psychoanalytic sessions and case studiesthe complexity of the social reality studied is maintained in the data. A second advantage is that qualitative research explicitly aims at the development of a theory, and it can be used to expand the reach of existing theories, such as psychoanalysis. Miles & Huberman state that qualitative re-

JPCS: Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture & Society, Volume 7, Number 2, Fall 2002 copyright 2002 by The Ohio State University

Qualitative Research and Its Relation to Lacanian Psychoanalysis search explicitly starts from theory-driven decisions(29). Consequently, ideas valued from a psychoanalytic point of view can be taken into account. Another advantage is that specific psychoanalytic issues can be taken into account while collecting the data (e.g., applying even-hovering attention, psychoanalytic questioning, and attention to hesitations) and when interpreting the data (e.g., taking into account parapraxes). It may sound nice to say that psychoanalysis and qualitative research fit together so well. Two theoretical issues nevertheless remain unanswered. First, how does this research fit with the Lacanian view of science? And second, what place can we give to this kind of research in relation to the broad field of psychoanalysis? Lets start with the first question. In order to define a possible relation between qualitative research and Lacans view of science, we have to make an intermediate stop at Lvi-Strausss work. The way in which qualitative data-analysis progresses resembles the logic Lvi-Strauss describes in his scientific study of myths. While studying myths Lvi-Strauss on the one hand found that anything could happen in a myth. It seemed that there were no logical ordering rules in it. On the other hand he observed that myths have a permanent structure, and that at the level of the story, similar characteristics and details often recur. He called these recurring themes gross constitutive units, or (in line with the phonemes, morphemes, and sememes discerned by structural linguistics), mythemes. What are these mythemes? At the sentence level of a myth we can observe a succession of events. The nature of these events can be represented by means of short sentences expressing a crucial relation between a subject and a predicate. Mythemes1 are bundles of such relations expressing a common feature. So, while at the level of the story line a myth has a diachronic ordering (a specific relation between time and event), at the synchronic level similar (my-)themes can be found (a specific relation between logic and event). diachronic

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themes across the different existing variants of a myth. Applying this method, one arrives at a complex of tables expressing the structure of a myth. This result very much resembles the results one arrives at by means of qualitative research starting from interviews. Lvi-Strauss adds another aspect to this: namely, the attempt to express the complex interrelations one arrives at by means of a logical framework and a mathematical based symbolism2 (Lvi-Strauss 242, my translation). In this manner he ends up with a formal logical formula expressing the genetic law of interrelations. This formal notation is the end product of a thorough examination and classification of the original discursive material.

. . . AND LACANIAN FORMALIZATION

Lacan appreciated this trend toward mathematical formulation in the work of Lvi-Strauss. In 1953 he writes: It is up to us to make use of these advances to discover their effects in the domain of psychoanalysis (Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection 73). In line with this appreciation he starts quite early with his own attempt to formalize psychoanalysis. At the end of his fourth seminar (1957) he announces that he is starting with a new logic of formalization. (cf. cette sorte de logique est nouvelle (Lacan, Seminaire IV 386); cest un commencement de . . . formalisation (Lacan, Seminaire IV 411)). Lacan maintained this effort to express psychoanalytic theory by means of formal language until the end of his works. Nowadays, formalized Lacanian theory is most known from Lacans concept of the matheme. The word matheme is a contraction of LeviStrauss mytheme and the Greek word mathema (knowledge). Its a generic term that refers to Lacans different algebraic formulas (Roudinesco & Plon). By means of mathemes he wanted to give a contemporary interpretation to the scientistic ideals Freud always adhered to in his study of the human psyche (cf. Lacan, Ecrits 857). Lacan elaborated mathematical formulas3 for the most crucial aspects of his theory. Like Lvi-Strauss, he wanted to express essential insights by means of these formulas. They were meant to clarify and reflect his understandings of the unconscious and the dimension of the real in psychic functioning (Lacan, Confrences; Charraud). By means of the formulas Lacan

synchronic This method maps out the crucial but implicit

338 wanted to give an explanation of the divided subject and the object a, which are normally excluded by science. Lacan also created formulas for the vicissitudes of the relation between subject and Other during the Oedipus complex (Lacan, Seminaire IV 379408; Seminaire V 175176). By means of formalization Lacan aimed4 at expressing his theoretical insights and conclusions drawn from clinical practice as clearly as possible. By means of the formulas he wanted to reflect complex interrelations between elements that never could be expressed in such a well-organized way by normal language (Lacan, Seminaire IV 411). He aimed at displaying essential connections (Lacan, Seminaire VI). In this way, formalized knowledge gives a straight and rigorous indication of the structure of a phenomenon or process (La structure, cest le rel qui se fait jour dans le langage (Lacan, Autre Ecrits 476)). For example, Lacan says that the formulas designate what invisibly holds (retient) bodies (Lacan, Seminar XX 93) and that structure can be grasped on the basis of the formulas (la structure sattrape de l (Lacan, Autre Ecrits 408)). The formal elements of the formulas were meant to be fixed (des points de rpres fixes, sur lesquels on puisse navoir pas revenir dans la discussion (Lacan, Seminaire IV 411)). The advantage of this kind of notation is that the formula can be maintained while different interpretations at the level of content take place. Consider Lacans remark about the formula for fantasy: it is created to allow a hundred and one different readings (Ecrits: A Selection 313). A more ambitious aim (and advantage) is that the mathemes enable us to communicate about the essence of psychoanalytic insights. They enable us to shift our discussions from the imaginary level of content to the essential dynamics and the structural framework. Following Lacan, mathematical logic re-introduces structure into knowledge, whereby structure is to be understood as the real that appears in language and that is reflected by means of language (Lacan, Autre Ecrits 408, 437, 476). It undoes knowledge from its imaginary dimension. From a Lacanian point of view, the discourse of science extinguishes the imaginary signification attributed to events. Miller puts it aptly by stating that scientific theory has demanded an adherence to the signifier in so far as this is separated from all imaginary signification (33).

Stijn Vanheule With his formalizations, Lacan wanted to lay the foundation for a scientific status suitable to psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis will provide scientific bases for its theory or for its technique only by formalizing in an adequate fashion the essential dimensions of its experience (Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection 77). Its a fact that Lacan on the one hand never considered psychoanalysis to be a classical science.5 Despite this, he clearly questioned psychoanalysis scientific status (if I am here . . . it is to ask myself whether psychoanalysis is as science, and to examine the question with you [Four 7]) and even wanted to link psychoanalysis to the domain of science (Kaufmann). As such he gave his own elaboration to Freuds scientific ideals. For example, he considered his formulas to be an attempt to imitate science, since science can only start from such formulas (une tentative pour imiter la science. . . . La science peut seulement commencer ainsi [Lacan, Confrences 26]). Recalcitrant and creative as he was, he considered psychoanalysis to be a special science, namely a science of the real, where the concept real must be understood in its Lacanian sense (Lacan, Autre Ecrits 449). In this move toward the field of science he had a clear idea about what he didnt want. Lacan was not an adherent of a strictly positivistic and experimental science, and even considered these useless for psychoanalysis. It is in the abstract objectification of our experience on fictitious, or even simulated, principles of the experimental method, that we find the effect of prejudices that must first be swept from our field if we wish to cultivate it according to its authentic structure (Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection 72). Lacan questioned their validity (Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection 74) and stated that empiricism cannot constitute the foundations for a science (Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection 293). In his continual emphasis on the importance of logical formulas, Lacan relies upon a specific theory of science. In line with Koyr, Lacan held that the natural sciences only started to be scientific the moment they attempted to grasp phenomena by means of mathematical, symbolic formulas (Lacan, Seminaire IV 429). According to him, formalization constitutes the essence of science. Lacan says: To extract a natural law is to extract a meaningless formula (Seminar III 184) These formulas guide the scientists experience. It was

Qualitative Research and Its Relation to Lacanian Psychoanalysis only with the formula for gravitation that specific and correct observations about gravitation were able to be made (Lacan, Seminaire IV 429). In other words, the symbolic system that constitutes science is not primarily given by means of empirical observation (Lacan, Seminar III 185). It is rather by means of the construction of a symbolic system (such as a formula) that things become visible. The value of a science lies in the value of its symbolic frame. This view might seem more radical than it is, since Lacan specifically stresses the logical origins of scientific thinking. These origins are in symbolic inventions. Such inventions only receive a scientific status if they prove to be useful. Lets consider Lacans graph of desire from this point of view. The graph is a complex of interrelations among several elements. It is more than an impressive construction. Lacan draws it up in order to give an account of the logic of desire at the level of the unconscious and the relation between subject and signifier at two levels of speech. Read Lacans fifth and sixth seminars and you will see that he develops this complex model by continually testing it against Freuds writings and clinical practice. It is by means of a meticulous deciphering of the raw material at hand that he draws his conclusions about structure. The formulas and the diagram in the graph are the reflections of these conclusions. At this point, Lacans formulas are valuable because they enhance our understanding; they are guidelines for a (Lacanian) psychoanalytic understanding. The Lacanian mathemes are not just nice formulas. They are based upon experience and clinical observation. Formulas that did not refer to empirical facts would be worthless. (cf. Quoi mautorise dans mon cas me rfrer ce pur mathme? . . . Il faut dabord avoir lide laquelle se prend de mon exprience, que nimporte quoi ne peut tre dit. [Lacan, Autre Ecrits 472] and Lobservation soit seulement satisfaisante quand elle aboutit une formule qui ne peut tre appele mathmatique [Lacan, Confrences 28]). In my opinion qualitative research that starts from Lacanian psychoanalysis and that aims at contributing something new should aim at elaborating (and falsifying) mathemes. A major problem we meet up with if we want to use mathemes in our research is that the formal characteristics of the parameters and operators used in the formulae are often inadequately defined.

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Lacan spoke and wrote in an associative way, and as a consequence his formulas tend to lack operational precision. In my opinion its necessary to opt for a more stringent use and a clear definition of (the elements of ) formal notation if we want to use them in research. The mathemes we arrive at by means of research should moreover be based on the research data collected, should be in accordance with psychoanalytic practice, and should be logically coherent with psychoanalytic theory. The requirement that the mathemes should be coherent with the raw material and should be conclusions drawn logically from the data is a general scientific claim. Mathemes that would not reflect essential conclusions concerning the basic data studied have no scientific validity. In the process of arriving at decisive mathemes we can follow the logic Lvi-Strauss described when he started from the raw material of myths and ended up with his formulas. Its by means of a detailed study of the raw material and the gradual discernment of general trends that we can arrive at useful formal notations. The prerequisite that conclusions should be coherent with psychoanalytic practice and psychoanalytical theory is crucial in order for them to be psychoanalytically meaningful (cf. Lacan, Conferences 25): Nous navons pas de moyen de savoir si linconscient existe hors de la psychanalyse). In my opinion, psychoanalytic practice should be the ultimate touchstone for checking the value of new insights, and for seeing if new insights are valuable from a psychoanalytic point of view (cf. Dreher). Compared to the mass of material that is produced during psychoanalysis, qualitative research starts from a relatively limited amount of data, obtained by means of a non-psychoanalytic method. In order to be able to decide on its psychoanalytic validity and to check its psychoanalytic value, validation in psychoanalytic practice is necessary. This kind of skepticism should guard us against wild thinking, and should neutralize the side effects that psychoanalysis recognizes in science, but that science itself generally doesnt recognize (e.g., the influence of personal determinants causing the researchers interest in a topic, or the possibly distorting effect of the researchers desire to know). Classic science is based upon a negation of the truth that lies at its basis (cf. Lacan, Ecrits). As a re-

340 sult the hidden agenda of the researchers desire can find its expression in scientific results.

Stijn Vanheule started after Freud. Freud tried to enhance his understanding with extra-clinical data. After Freud, a Freudian understanding was used to explain how extra-clinical phenomena were organized. Freuds restless seeking often seemed to be replaced by confidence. On the one hand Lacan was skeptical about applied psychoanalysis. He considered it to be a confused domain (Lacan, Ecrits 747) that permitted all kinds of misuse and led to infamous results (Lacan, Seminaire XVI). On the other hand Lacan himself used extra-clinical data-sources to develop and clarify the concepts he was elaborating. He thus practiced applied psychoanalysis such as we have defined it. His study of courtly love refines his conceptualization of sublimation (Seminar VII), and his investigation of James Joyce leads to a new view of symptoms, reflected in his concept of the sinthome (Seminaire XXIII). In these examples Lacan indeed appeals to extra-clinical data in order to refine his insights. Applied psychoanalysis has much potential for psychoanalysis. It brings about a systematic questioning in order to elucidate a problem. This systematic questioning is not obvious in clinical psychoanalysis, since the analyst always follows the analysands free associations. Applied psychoanalysis moreover enables us to question issues that cannot directly be addressed by means of the cure. For example, applied psychoanalysis enables us to address subjects that did not ask for analysis. Concerning the extra-clinical use of psychoanalysis, Lacan emphasizes that it can only be considered psychoanalytic if it proceeds from the deciphering of signifiers, and if it knowingly negates any trend to draw conclusions concerning content or implied meaning (Lacan, Ecrits 747-748). Psychoanalysis should not seek the ever new and never exhausted signification (Lacan, Four 7-8). Reed seems to agree with this, and states that applied psychoanalysis should start from a clinical skepticism toward the manifest content of words. From a psychoanalytic point of view there is always a danger that the researchers desire to know or to find the truth will result in an imaginary interpretation of the data. In such a case, the conclusions reflect the researchers own prejudices. This impulse can be avoided if we derive meaning by staying close to the

. . . AND APPLIED PSYCHOANALYSIS

Now we arrive at our second question: what place can we give to qualitative research in the broad field of psychoanalysis? Within the field of psychoanalysis there are three domains of practice: clinical, theoretical, and applied psychoanalysis. From a scientific point of view all of these domains are worthy of study, for many crucial questions remain (partially) unanswered: the relation between theoretical concepts is often vague; we do not have decision-rules for making inductions from clinical practice to theoretical formulations; our concepts are often criticized for their vague status, and so on. Applied psychoanalysis seems to be the domain in which to situate qualitative research. Applied psychoanalysis can be defined as an approach that applies psychoanalytic insight to extra-clinical data. From a Lacanian point of view we can qualify this data as a network of signifiers obtained from a source other than the psychoanalytic cure. Extra-clinical data-sources are multiple, and are classically defined as ego documents (e.g. Freuds study of Schrebers book), literary texts (e.g. Freuds study of Shakespeare), works of art (e.g. Freuds study of Michelangelos Moses), jokes (e.g. Freuds study of jokes), and clinical information obtained by others (e.g., Freuds study of little Hans). The descriptive information obtained by qualitative research is another contemporary source of extra-clinical data. In fact, the name applied psychoanalysis is deceiving. It suggests that psychoanalytic knowledge is used to make an exegesis of an external data-source. However, considering Freuds application of psychoanalysis, I conclude that he mainly used it to test and to refine his theory. His applied psychoanalysis was never only an exegetic demonstration of psychoanalytic truth in an external data-source, but an opportunity to question, validate, and elaborate on psychoanalytic theory (cf. Esman, Reed). The results were significant. Crucial concepts like the family romance and the Oedipus complex were only introduced into psychoanalytic theory by means of applied psychoanalysis. In line with this conclusion, Paul-Laurent Assoun states that applied psychoanalysis as such only

Qualitative Research and Its Relation to Lacanian Psychoanalysis signifiers obtained. The only significant meaning (scientific and psychoanalytic) we can give to data obtained from interviews is an interpretation that arises from the signifiers and the interconnections between signifiers. So, when we give a psychoanalytic reading of texts, we should beware of our own understanding. Meaning should arise from the data.

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CONCLUSION
In this paper I discussed qualitative research from a psychoanalytic point of view. I situated this research within the domain of applied psychoanalysis, linked it to the Lacanian theory on science, and pleaded for a link between research and clinical practice. Situating psychoanalytic qualitative research within the domain of applied psychoanalysis allows us to combine scientific research tools with the typical psychoanalytic interpretative approach that aims at deciphering signifiers. There are two advantages to this. On the one hand a scientifically agreed-upon method is used to gather the data. This assures that the research fits within the current scientific norms. On the other hand the typical psychoanalytic method of reflecting that brings into account the dimension of the unconscious can be used while interpreting the data. In this way, psychoanalytic theory is not reduced to a consciousness-psychology. From my point of view, psychoanalytic qualitative research that starts from a Lacanian orientation and that aims at having relevance for psychoanalytic theory should be in conformity with Lacans view of science. Consequently, it should concentrate on testing and formulating mathemes that reflect essential psychoanalytic insights. If, to conclude, the research findings are to be called psychoanalytic, they should be validated in clinical practice. This way, we can arrive at results that are useful from a scientific and a psychoanalytic point of view.

3 Lacan used different terms to refer to these formulas. Sometimes he called them equations (e.g. Lacan, Seminar IV 379), algorithms (e.g. Lacan, Ecrits 497; Ecrits selection 313), algebra (e.g., Lacan, Ecrits selection 313), or mathematization (e.g., Lacan, Ecrits 284). . Most of our conclusions about Lacans formalizations also hold for his use of topology (e.g., Lacan, Ecrits:A Selection 302303). 4 Another thing Lacan aimed at with his formulas and mathemes was a better transfer of knowledge (cf. Lacan, Seminar XX 119; Fink 144). 5 In his article La science et la vrit he discusses their difference (Lacan, Ecrits 855877).

NOTES also uses the terms mytheme and gross constituent units to refer to unbundled relations between subject and predicate. The bundled relations nevertheless are the true constituent units of a myth (Lvi-Strauss 211). 2 Since I think the existing English translation interprets the original text too much, I am citing from the original French text.
1 Lvi-Strauss

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