JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE vs. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y.

VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010 Facts: Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was, by Information, charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Petitioner was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center. After petitioner posted a bond which the trial court approved,he was released from detention, and his arraignment was set. The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. Issue: Whether or not in cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused. Held: No. The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation. All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case. Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal action, and is granted the authority to prosecute, the private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation. In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. If after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Once the trial court grants the prosecutions motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion wide and far reaching regarding the disposition thereof, subject to the trial courts approval of the resulting proposed course of action.

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES PEOPLE VS. NOEL TUDTUD AND DINDO BOLONG G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003 Facts: Solier informed the police that Tudtud would come back with new stocks of marijuana. Policemen saw two men alighted from the bus, helping each other carry a carton/ box, one of them fitted the description of Tudtud. They approached the two and Tudtud denied that he carried any drugs. The latter opened the box, beneath dried fish where two bundles, one wrapped in a plastic bag and another in newspapers. Policemen asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages and contained what seemed to the police as marijuana leaves. The two did not resist the arrest. Charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs, they pleaded not guilty and interposed the defense that they were framed up. The trial court convicted them with the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or not searches and seizures without warrant may be validly obtained. Held: The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes reasonable within the meaning of the constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Except with the following instances even in the absence of a warrant: 1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, 2) Search in evidence in plain view, 3) Search of a moving vehicle, 4) Consented warrantless search, 5) Customs search, 6) Stop and frisk and 7) Exigent and emergency circumstances. The long standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a degree of consistency, is that, a reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. Hence, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the accuseds constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Leviste vs CA GR No 189122

March 17, 2010

Facts: Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he field an application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for bail considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That when the penalty

imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal. Issue: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail of Leviste. Ruling: No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty impose is more than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other circumstances: 1. that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; 2. that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; 3. that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; 4. that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or 5. that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. VICENTE P. LADLAD vs. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172074-76 & 175013 June 1, 2007 FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin petitioners' prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and prosecution of petitioners' cases. Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency," police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City. An inquest was held and Beltran was later charged with rebellion before the RTC. Beltran moved for a judicial determination of probable cause. The trial court affirmed the existence of probable cause. ISSUE: Is there probable cause to charge Beltran with rebellion? HELD: No. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. The elements of the offense are:

1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and 2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws: (1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (a) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives. Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military and some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 February 2006, and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006, none of the affidavits mentions Beltran. In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran and other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that after the passengers alighted, they were met by another individual. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPP's "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent party-list groups affiliated with the CPP. The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran's alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion. In his Comment to Beltran's petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes' affidavit, dated 25 February 2006, as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in his statement regarding meetings with Beltran and the other petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly discussed, among others. However, what the allegations in Fuentes' affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged this, since the felony charged in the Information against Beltran in the criminal case is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not Rebellion. The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired to form a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before it.