CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No.

14355; 31 Oct 1919]

Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed

for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

Held:

The courts have the power of restricting the exercise ofeminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation toexercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditionsimposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.

Moday vs Court of Appeals

Municipal Corporation Eminent Domain Disapproval by SP of SB Resolution
Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays

land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domainmay be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by thegovernment to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011

26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation)

FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them. ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation. HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

Brgy. San Roque, Talisay, Cebu vs Heirs of Franco Pastor

Municipal Corporation Eminent Domain Expropriation BP 129
In 1997, Brgy. San Roque filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of Talisay. The MTC denied the suit because apparently under BP 129, MTCs do not have jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with the power to try such cases. So Brgy. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but then Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should

have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case. HELD: Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . . The present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

What are the two phases of expropriation cases?

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of thecomplaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking) FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present. ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse. HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease.

City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino

Police Power Not Validly Exercised
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensationof a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit

paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries

People vs Fajardo Case Digest

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
104 Phil 443 G.R. August 29, 1958 No. L-12172

FACTS: It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows: SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued. SEC. 3. PENALTY Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3) Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written

request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza." From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question. ISSUE: Whether or not ordinance no. 7, series of 1950 is a valid exercise of police power? HELD: the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs.

Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. YUNITA TUAZON, ROSAURO TUAZON AND MARIA TERESA TUAZON (G.R. NO. 193023, 22 JUNE 2011, BRION, J.) SUBJECT: DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION. (BRIEF TITLE: NAPOCOR VS. TUAZON) ============================ SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST DIGEST:

NAPOCORS TRANSMISSION LINE TRAVERSED ON RESPONDENTS PROPERTY. RESPONDENTS DEMANDS THAT THEY BE PAID FULL VALUE OF THEIR LAND AS JUST COMPENSATION. NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT IT SHALL ONLY PAY EASEMENT FEE PURSUANT TO SECTION 3-A(B) ITS CHARTER, R.A. 6395, WHICH PRESCRIBES A FORMULA FOR EASEMENT FEE. IS NAPOCOR CORRECT?

NO. THE DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. THE FORMULA PROVIDED IN NAPOCORS CHARTER IS NOT BINDING ON THE COURT. IT IS ONLY A GUIDE. NAPOCORs protest against the relevancy of Gutierrez,
heavily relying as it does on the supposed conclusiveness of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 on just compensation due for properties traversed by transmission lines, has no merit. We have held in numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive upon the courts.[1][33] In National Power Corporation v.

Maria Bagui, et al.,[2][34] we categorically held:

Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial

function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. (Citations omitted.) The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.[3][35] This judicial function has constitutional raison dtre; Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. In National Power Corporation v.

Santa Loro Vda. de Capin, et al.,[4][36] we noted with

approval the disquisition of the CA in this matter: The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A (b) of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. To uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a judicial function but would also render as useless the

protection guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9, Article III of our Constitution that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. SUBJECT: NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT RESPONDENTS MAY BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO SUCH VALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BECAUSE THEY DID NOT OPPOSE THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSMISSION LINE ON THEIR PROPERTY. IS NAPOCORS CONTENTION CORRECT?

NO. HIS PRESUMED WAIVER IS A BAR TO HIS ACTION TO DISPOSSESS THE COMPANY, HE IS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR THE VALUE OF THE LAND, OR FOR INJURIES DONE HIM.
That the respondents predecessor-in-interest did not oppose the installation of transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. In the present petition, NAPOCOR insinuates that Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose the instillation now estops the respondents from their present claim.[5][38] This insinuation has no legal basis. Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose cannot have the effect of thwarting the respondents right to just

compensation. In Rafael C. de Ynchausti v. Manila

Electric Railroad & Light Co., et al.,[6][39] we ruled:

The owner of land, who stands by, without objection, and sees a public railroad constructed over it, can not, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company. In such case there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation. (Goodin v. Cin. And Whitewater Canal Co.,18 Ohio St., 169.) One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct its road thereon without remonstrance or complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it. His acquiescence in the companys taking possession and constructing its works under circumstances which made imperative his resistance, if he ever intended to set up illegality, will be considered a waiver. But while this presumed waiver is a bar to his action to dispossess the company, he is not deprived of his action for damages for the value of the land, or for injuries done him by the construction or operation of the road. (St. Julien v. Morgan etc., Railroad Co., 35La.Ann., 924.)