30) DIGEST NOT AVAILABLE

31) Case Digest on NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)

FACTS: Plaintiff National Power Corporation (Napocor), for the construction of its 230KVM e x i c o L i m a y t r a n s m i s s i o n l i n e s , i t s l i n e s h a v e t o p a s s t h e l a n d s b e l o n g i n g t o respondents Matias Cruz, heirs of Natalie Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrezand Recardo Malit. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the rightof way easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. Trial courts ordered that the defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw thefixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00 deposited by the plaintiff to cover the provisional value of the land to proceed their construction and for thepurpose of determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants, thec o u r t a p p o i n t e d t h r e e c o m m i s s i o n e r s , c o m p r i s e d o f o n e r e presentative of theplaintiff, one for the defendants and t h e o t h e r f r o m t h e c o u r t , w h o t h e n w e r e empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the premises, andthereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to be paidto the owners of the lots. The lower court rendered judgement ordered Napocor top a y d e f e n d a n t s p o u s e s t h e s u m o f P 1 0 . 0 0 p e r s q u a r e m e t e r a s t h e f a i r a n d reasonable compensation for the right-ofway easement of the affected area andP800.00 as attorney's fees'. Napocor filed a motion for reconsideration contendingthat the Court of Appeals committed gross error by adjudging the petitioner liablefor the payment of the full market value of the land traversed by its transmissionlines, and that it overlooks the undeniable fact that a simple right-of-way easementransmits no rights, except that of the easement. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee orfull compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines.

RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the power of eminent domainr e s u l t s i n t h e t a k i n g o r a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f t h e t i t l e t o , a n d p o s s e s s i o n o f , t h e expropriated property, but no cogent reason appears why said power may not beavailed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property,w i t h o u t l o s s o f t i t l e o r p o s s e s s i o n . I t i s u n q u e s t i o n a b l e t h a t r e a l p r o p e r t y m a y , through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way." In this case,the easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Consideringthe nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, the limitationsimposed by the NPC against the use of the land (that no plant higher than 3 metersis allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of i t s o r d i n a r y u s e . F o r t h e s e r e a s o n s , t h e o w n e r o f t h e p r o p e r t y e x p r o p r i a t e d i s entitled to a just compensation which should neither be more nor less, whenever itis possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just equivalent has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalentof the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of theexpropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the time of takingby the Govt. are the criteria for determining just compensation.

32) Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990 Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution.

Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. .

33) DIGEST NOT AVAILABLE

34) NAPOCOR
FACTS:

vs CA

GR 103442-45 May 21, 1993

This is a consolidated case comprising of four separate complaints., filed against NPC and a particular Chavez. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against respondent for the lost of lives and destruction of properties due to the negligence of the latter in releasing water from Angat dam during the typhoon Kading Benjamin Chavez, being the supervisor at that time of a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan, failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam. NPCs allegations were as follows: 1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenanceof the hydroelectric plant; 2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees; 3) written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take the necessary precautions; 4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property; 5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or control the flood that resulted and; 6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. By way of special affirmative defense, the defendants averred that the NPC cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function. The trial court dismissed the complaints as against the NPC on the ground that the provision of its charter allowing it to sue and be sued does not contemplate actions based on tort. Its decision on 30 April 1990 dismissing the complaints "for lack of sufficient and credible evidence." Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision and awarded damages in favor of the private respondents. Based on the findings that From the mass of evidence extant in the record, We are convinced, and so hold that the flash flood on October 27, 1978, was caused not by rain waters (sic), but by stored waters (sic) suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by defendantsappellees, particularly from midnight of October 26, 1978 up to the morning hours of October 27, 1978. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is negligent? Whether or not the notices of warning were insufficient? Whether or not The damages suffered was not DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA?

HELD: We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein who were similarly situated as the private respondents herein was the negligence of the petitioners, and that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was insufficient.

The petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of defendants-appellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness." To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the Phil. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).

Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.