Digests Pesigan vs.

Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 (1984) FACTS: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with Batangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates: 1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian, 2) permit to transfer/transport from the provincial commander; and 3) three certificates of inspections. In spite of the papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the towns police station commander while passing through Camarines Norte. The confiscation was based on EO No. 626-A which prohibits the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another. ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982 RULING: No. The said order is not enforceable against the Pesigans on April 2. 1982 because it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the OG. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code and Sec-11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word laws in article 2 includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a violation of EO No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of

the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos. Judgment: Order of dismissal and confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos, reversed and set aside. Respondents to restore carabaos, with the requisite documents, to petitioners for their own disposal in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur People v Veridiano Digest G.R. L-62243, October 12, 1984 Effectivity of laws At issue in this case is the applicability of BP 22 which was circulated a month after private respondent issued the dishonored check. Facts: 1. On or about the 2nd week of May 1979, private respondent Benito Go Bio Jr. issued a check amounting to P200, 000 to one Filipinas Tan. Said check was subsequently dishonored and despite repeated demands, the respondent failed to make the necessary payment. Hence, the filing of charges against him for violation of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Check law. 2. Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the information did not charge an offence on ground that BP 22 has not yet taken effect when the offense was committed on May 1979. Said law took into effect on June 29, 1979. The prosecution opposed the motion and contended that the date of the dishonor of the check -- September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense, hence BP 22 is applicable. 3. The respondent judge granted Go Bio's motion and dismissed the criminal action hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that BP 22 was published in the Official Gazette on April 4, 1979, and hence became effective 15 days thereafter or on April 24, 1979. PR contends however that said publication was only released on June 14, 1979 but since the questioned check was issued about the second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated BP 22 because it was not yet released for circulation at the time.

Issue: W/N BP 22 was already in effect when the offense was committed NO. The penal statute in question was circulated only on June 14, 1979 and not on its printed date of April 9, 1979. Publication of the law is necessary so that the public can be apprised of the contents of a penal statute before it can be bound by it. If a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to be violated. Hence, the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. In effect, when the alleged offense was committed there was still no law penalizing it. If BP 22 intended to make the printed date of issue of the Official Gazette as the point of reference in the determination of its the effectivity, it could have provided a special effectivity provision. Finally, the term "publication" in BP 22 must be given the ordinary accepted meaning, to make known to the people in general. Taada vs. Tuvera FACTS: Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its enforcement. RULING: Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it

goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

MRCA, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Judge, Regional Trial court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 168, Pasig, M.M., SPOUSES DOMINGO SEBASTIAN, JR. & LILIA TIOSECO SEBASTIAN, and EXPECTACION P. TIOSECO, respondents. GRIO-AQUINO, J.: FACTS: A complaint was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on the ground of non-payment of the proper filing fees, as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it from the defendants, but left them "to the discretion of this Honorable Court" or "to be proven during the trial." The trial courts decision was based on the Supreme Court ruling in Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals. However, petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had not yet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed, the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be given retroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its non-observance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and, that it should not apply to the present case

because the petitioner herein (plaintiff in the trial court) had no fraudulent intent to deprive the government of the proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester case where enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the body of the complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, to mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid. ISSUE: Whether or not decisions of the Supreme Court require publication in the Official Gazette before they may be applied to other cases. RULING: No. The rule is, publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule of procedure, for "it is a doctrine well established that the procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become effective at once, so long as it does not affect or change vested rights." However, in accordance with our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., the petitioner may be allowed to amend its complaint for the purpose of specifying, in terms of pesos, how much it claims as damages, and to pay the requisite filing fees therefor, provided its right of action has not yet prescribed. This the petitioner is ready to do. Yaokasin v Commissioner Digest GR No. 84111, December 22, 1989 Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by petitioner Yaokasin, which were then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo to the petitioner but this order was subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue of Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan under P.D. 1, which provides that in protest and seizure cases where the decision is adverse to the government, the Commissioner of Customs has the power of automatic review. Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12

of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending that these were not published in the Official Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1 was however published in the Official Gazette. Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the OG to take effect NO. Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the custom collectors. Said issuance requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors), hence no general applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned. Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public nature of Congress, executive, administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no general applicability. DISSENTING: MEDIALDEA There is no question that P. D. No. 1/ the Plan is still a valid law. However, I do not agree that this is legal authority to uphold the Commissioner's right to automatically review decisions of the Collector of Customs in seizure cases, and, in the process, allow a reversal of a decision favorable to the importer. When the Plan became law pursuant to P.D. No. 1, Section 2313 of RA 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines) already governed the review powers of the Commissioner of Customs. Thus, while both Section 12 of the Plan and 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code deal with the review powers of the Commissioner of Customs, the Plan is a general law, as it concerns itself with the reorganization of the executive branch of the government in a martial law regime, whereas the Code is a special law, i.e., specifically on tariff and customs duties. Consequently, the Plan is subservient to the Code and the automatic review power granted therein can not be upheld. Kasalag v Rodriguez FACTS:

In 1932, Marcial Kalasag and Emiliana Ambrosio executed a document which stated that: the party of the first part (Emiliana) hereby encumbers and hypothecates, by way of mortgage, only the improvements described in Articles II and III hereof, of which improvements the party of the first part is the absolute owner. 1933, Emiliana was not able to pay the interest and tax. She and Marcial entered into another verbal contract, where she conveyed to Marcial the possession of the land on the condition that no interest will be collected. So Marcial now, entered the land, gathered the produce and did not collect interest Court of Appeals came to the conclusion and so held that the contract entered into by and between the parties, set out in the said public deed, was one of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its improvements. It held the contract VOID but Emilianas heirs must pay the loan. SC: The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention of the contracting parties should always prevail because their will has the force of law between them. Article 1281 of the Civil Code consecrates this rule and provides, that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and if the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail. Contract clearly show that they intended to enter into the principal contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum, and into the accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, the parties having moreover, agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In other words, the parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated interest thereon. Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those indicated, is to the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be separated from the valid and legal contract and when such separation can be made

because they are independent of the valid contract which expresses the will of the contracting parties According to Manresa: a criterion based upon the stability of juridical relations should tend to consider the nullity as confined to the clause or pact suffering therefrom, except in case where the latter, by an established connection or by manifest intention of the parties, is inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a condition, juridically speaking, of that the nullity of which it would also occasion The petitioner is not a lawyer and therefore not conversant with the laws. When he accepted the mortgage of the improvements, it is based on his well-grounded belief that he is was not violating the prohibition on the alienation of land. Thus is possessing, and consenting the receipt of its fruits, he has no knowledge that this is already in the nature of a contract of antichresis, which as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. Therefore, petitioner's ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith. (1) that the contract of mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid and binding; (2) that the contract of antichresis agreed upon verbally by the parties is a real incumbrance which burdens the land and, as such, is a null and without effect; (3) that the petitioner is a possessor in good faith; (4) that the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be filed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties; (5) that the respondents have a right to the possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged improvements; and (6) that the respondents may redeem the mortgage of the improvements by paying to the petitioner within three months the amount of P1,000, without interest, as that stipulated is set off by the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements which petitioner received, and in default thereof the petitioner may ask for the public sale of said improvements for the purpose of applying the proceeds thereof to the payment of his said credit Puzon v Abellera Digest G.R. No. 75082 July 31, 1989

Retroactivity Facts: The oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera (substituted upon her death by Domondon) was the owner of the subject 2-hectare parcel of land situated in Baguio City, a land which was previously part of the public domain but was titled pursuant to RA 931. In another case Republic v Pio Marcos, the Supreme Court declared that all titles issued under RA 931 are null and void since the said Act was applicable only to places covered by cadastral proceedings, and not to the City of Baguio which was covered by a townsite reservation. This same ruling was subsequently incorporated into a law, P.D. 1271 with the title "An act nullifying decrees of registration and certificates of title covering lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation pursuant to RA 931 which took effect on December 22, 1977. PD 1271 considered as valid certain titles of lands that are alienable and disposable under certain conditions and for other purposes. Hence, the lot in question was reverted to the public domain. The subject lots were sold in an auction sale due to the non-payment of taxes.\Petitioner took interest and subsequently won the bid. A year after, a certificate of sale was issued. In this connection, the petitioner filed a case to consolidate his ownership of the lots. Meanwhile, Domondon found out about the auction sale and filed an opposition to the petition for consolidation filed by petitioner. The trial court ruled that said auction sale is null and void and that the assessments were illegally made. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition with petitioner contending that the tax assessments were valid and that PD 1271 has a curative effect. Issue: Whether or not PD 1271 can be applied retroactively YES. Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive application of laws unless expressly provided therein, such rule allows some exceptions and PD 1271 falls under one of the exceptions. The intent of PD 1271 is necessarily to make such titles valid from the time they were issued. This implies that the intent of the law is to recognize the effects of certain acts of ownership done in good faith by persons with Torrens titles issued in their favor before the cut-off date stated, honestly believing that they had validly acquired

the lands. And such would be possible only by validating all the said titles issued before 31 July 1973, effective on their respective dates of issue. However, the validity of these titles would not become operative unless and after the conditions stated in PD 1271 are met. While it may be argued that Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive application of laws unless expressly provided therein, such rule allows some exceptions. As We have held in the case of Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, "a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implications." Considering, however, that during the years 19711977 the land in question was still part of the public domain, the oppositor-appellee could not, in those years, obviously be held liable for real property taxes over the land in question. Since the validity of her title would take effect retroactively only after having complied with the conditions set in PD 1271, only then could she be held liable for taxes for the period starting 1971 to 1977. The land should really be considered owned by the respondent and her title thereto must not be disturbed BUT she must pay the real property taxes thereon for the years 1971-1977. Acosta v Plan Facts: Petitioners filed an accion publiciana1 against private respondent Magday at the CFI of Isabela. Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to submit a record on appeal, they waited for the trial court to elevate the entire records of the case to CA (as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court). On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to file a record on appeal, hence this petition. Under the Rules of Court then in force, a record on appeal was indeed required to be filed by a pauper appellant although it did not have to be printed. Issue: Whether or not a timely submission of a record on appeal is required for the
1

An action for recovery of possession of property filed one year of the dispossession. It is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.

perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant NO. Under B.P. Blg. 129, which has overtaken this case before it could be decided, a record on appeal is no longer required for the perfection of an appeal. This law was given retroactive effect. As held in People v Sumilang, being procedural in nature, those provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.' Sec. 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, provides: Sec. 16. Appeal by pauper. Where a party desiring to appeal shall establish to the satisfaction of the trial court that he is a pauper and unable to pay the expenses of prosecuting the appeal, and that the case is of such importance, by reason of the amount involved, or the nature of the questions raised, that it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court, the trial judge may enter an order entitling the party to appeal as pauper. The clerk shall transmit to the appellate court the entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial and the record on appeal, and the case shall be heard in the appellate court upon the original record so transmitted without printing the same.' The trial court is hereby ordered to forward the entire records of Civil Case No. 1201 to the Court of Appeals for the determination and disposition of the petitioners' appeal on the merits. BPI v IAC Facts: Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings account and a peso current account. An application for a dollar draft was accomplished by Virgillo Garcia branch manager of COMTRUST payable to a certain Leovigilda Dizon. In the APPLICation, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to the dollar savings account of the Zshornacks. There was no indication of the name of the purchaser of the dollar draft. Comtrust issued a check payable to the order of Dizon. When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal from his account, he demanded an explainaton from the bank. In its answer, Comtrust claimed that the

peso value of the withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy. When he encashed with COMTRUST a cashiers check for P8450 issued by the manila banking corporation payable to Ernesto. Issue: Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit? YES Held: No sworn answer denying the due execution of the document in question, or questioning the authority of Garcia to bind the bank, or denying the bank's capacity to enter into the contract, was ever filed. Hence, the bank is deemed to have admitted not only Garcia's authority, but also the bank's power, to enter into the contract in question. Garcia's act of entering into the contract binds the corporation, we now determine the correct nature of the contract, and its legal consequences, including its enforceability. The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later. The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads: Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract. the document and the subsequent acts of the parties show that they intended the bank to safekeep the foreign exchange, and return it later to Zshornack, who alleged in his complaint that he is a Philippine resident. The parties did not intended to sell the US dollars to the Central Bank within one business day from receipt. Otherwise, the contract of depositum would never have been entered into at all. Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank within one business day from receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, it must be considered as one which falls under the

general class of prohibited transactions. Hence, pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having been executed against the provisions of a mandatory/prohibitory law. Guingona v Carague Digest Facts: Petitioner senators question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget which was authorized by PD 81. Petitioners seek that (1) PD 81, PD 1177 (Sec 31), and PD 1967 be declared unconstitutional, and (2) restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. While respondents contend that the petition involves a political question (repeal/amendment of said laws) Issue: Whether or not subject laws has been impliedly repealed by the 1987 Constitution NO. (1). Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated. (2) The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country. Martinez v Van Buskirk Digest Facts: 1. On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in

Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used for the transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached), came from the opposite direction, while their carromata went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely passing by, the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the plaintiffs head. 3. The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendants employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground. 4. From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such decision. Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver. NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent. The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances. The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver

products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed. G.R. No. L-50654 November 6, 1989 RUDY GLEO ARMIGOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CRISTITO MATA, and JUDGE L. D. CARPIO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V, respondents. FACTS: Private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against Rudy Gleo Armigos with the Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur for the collection of damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Cristito Mata. A copy of the decision was received by Armigos on June 8, 1977, and the following day, June 9, 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court, and on June 24, 1977, he completed the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including the filing of an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee. But the presiding judge of Court of First Instance, Judge L.D. Carpio dismissed the appeal for it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Armigos filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals, claiming that from June 8, 1977, when he received a copy of the decision of the municipal court, to June 24, 1977, when he perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner contended that the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received copy of the decision, so that the first of the 1 5-day period comprising 24 hours is: from 4pm of June 9, 1977 to 4pm of June 10, 1977 and the last day, from 4pm of June 23, 1977 to 4pm of June 24, 1977. ISSUE/S:

a.) Whether or not the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour of the receipt of the decision. b.) Whether or not Armigos filed his appeal on time. HELD: a.) No. The Court of Appeals rejected Armigos interpretation for it would result in many confusing situations and many unreliable testimonies as to the time a copy of a decision, order or pleading. In the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Encarnacion, the Court held that when a law was to be effective upon approval by the President and the President signed the same on June 16, 1950, the law should be considered to have taken effect not on the exact hour when the President signed the same on June 16, 1950 but from the very first minute or hour of said day of June 16, 1950. b.) No. Because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. He should have filed it on June 23, 1977 for his appeal to be valid. Art. 13 of the NCC, provides that in computing period, the 1st day is excluded, the last day is included. The Petition is DENIED. NAMARCO V. TECSON [29 S 70 (1969)] F: On 10/14/55, the CFI-Mla. rendered judgment in a civil case, Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Tecson, et al. Copy of this decision was, on 10/21/55 served upon defendants in said case. On 12/21/65, NAMARCO, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses in action of Price, as pltff in that case and judgment creditor therein, filed w/ the same court, a complaint against defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered therein. Def. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of prescription of action, among others. The motion was granted by the court. Hence, the appeal to the CA w/c was certified to the SC, upon the ground that the only question raised therein is one of law, namely,

ISSUE: W/n the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute of limitations. Pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action for judgement must be brought w/in 10 yrs from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final. This in turn, took place on 12/21/55 or 30 days from notice of the judgment-- w/c was received by defs. on 10/21/55-- no appeal having been taken therefrom. The issue is thus confined to the date on w/c the 10 yrs from 12/21/55 expired. Pltff alleges that it was 12/21/65, but appellee maintains otherwise, bec. :when the law speaks of years xxx it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each"-- and, in 1960 and 1964 being leap years, so that 10 yrs of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3650 days, from 12/21/55, expired on 12/19/65. Pltff.-appellant further insists that there is no question that when it is not a leap year, 12/21 to 12/21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, bec. it is the 366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls, and therefore, that the 366 days constitute one yr. HELD: The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 limiting the connotation of each "year"-- as the term is used in our laws-- to 365 days. [The action to enforce a judgment which became final on December 21, 1955 prescribes in 10 years. Since the Civil Code computes "years" in terms of 365 days each, the action has prescribed on December 19, 1955, since the two intervening leap years added two more days to the computation. It is not the calendar year that is considered.] Barreto Gonzales v Gonzales FACTS: The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together from January 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived together as man & wife, they had 4 minor children together. After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her childrens support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of

necessity & illness, and that the title of certain properties be put in her name. Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. On that same date he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3 children with her. When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony. Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barreto brought an action at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents died intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzales be ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed as intervenors in the case. After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff & intervenors, but reduced the attorneys fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action against the defendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their decision. ISSUE: WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. NO. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce, because: The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the divorce done in

Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce. Its clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda that the entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted praying the ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of the law regarding divorce & will be done under conditions not authorized by our laws. The matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines & the residence acquired by the husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in 1919. Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such to be done, the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out government believes is contrary to public order & good morals. TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO [15 SCRA 355] F: Pastor Tenchavez (PT), 32, married Vicenta Escano (VE), 27 on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On 6/24/50, VE left for the US. On 8/22/50, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein pltff. in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 10/21050, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On 9/13/54, VE married an American Russel Leo Moran IN Nevada. She now lives w/ him in California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8/8/58. On 7/30/55, PT filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu. HELD: At the time the divorce decree was issued, VE like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15, NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation.

For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils. Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction. VAN DORN V. ROMILLO [139 SCRA 139] F: Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Phils. while private resp. Richard Upton is a US citizen; they were married in HK in 1972; after the marriage, they established their residence in the Phils. and begot 2 children; the parties were divorced in Nevada, US, in 1982; and petitioner has remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. On 6/18/83, Upton filed a suit against petitioner in the RTC-Pasay, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Mla. (the Galleon Shop), is conjugal prop. and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Upton be declared as having the right to manage the conjugal prop. Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 13, NCC, only Phil. nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, w/c may be recognized in the Phils., provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private resps from the marriage from the stds of American law, under w/c divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. xxx.

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To maintain, as Upton does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to him and still subject to a wife's obligations under the NCC cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private resp. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs w/ possible rights to conjugal prop. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be observed. Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Balane: In Art. 16 par. 1 provides that the lex situs or lex rei sitae governs real or personal prop. This rule applies even to incorporeal property. In Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated, 26 S, the SC said that Phil. courts have jurisdiction over shares of stocks located in the Phils. Tolentino: The rule of mobilia sequuntur personam in personal property has yielded to the to the lex situs bec. of the great increase in modern times of the amount and variety of prop. not immediately connected w/ the person of the owner. Law on Succession.-- The law governing succession may be considered from the point of view of (a) the execution of wills, and (b) the distribution of property. The formalities of execution of will are generally governed by the law of the place of execution (Art. 17, par. 1.) But the distribution of the estate is governed by the law of the nation of the deceased. Applicability of Foreign Law.-- The second par. of this article can be invoked only when the deceased was vested w/ a descendible interest in prop. w/in the jurisdiction of the Phils. The intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will of a foreigner who dies in the Phils. is to be determined by the laws of his own state or country, and not by those of the Phils. Thus, a condition in a will of a foreigner that his legatee respect his order that his prop. be distributed according to the laws of the Phils. instead of the laws of his own country, was held illegal and

considered as not written. Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Balane: The rule in par. 1 is known as the lex loci celebrationis. Tolentino: Validity and Effects of Obligations.-The code fails to mention the law w/c shall govern the validity and effects of obligations. (1) First, the law designated by the parties shall be applied; (2) if there is no stipulation on the matter, and the parties are of the same nationality, their national law shall be applied; (3) if this is not the case, the law of the place of perfection of the obligation shall govern its essence and nature, and the law of the place of the performance shall govern its fulfillment; (4) but if these places are not specified and they cannot be deduced from the nature and circumstances of the obligation, then the law of the domicile of the passive subject shall apply. (Manresa and Valverde.) Pilapil v Ibay-Somera FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child

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was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued. HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. PEOPLE vs RITTER G.R. No. 88582. March 5, 1991. GUTIERREZ, JR., J FACTS: Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide involving a young girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and who later died because a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal. When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits. The trial court rendered a decision convicting the appellant of such crime. ISSUE: Whether SC should affirm the conviction of the accused rendered by the lower court? RULING: Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable

doubt, it behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act. Before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit: xxx The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. xxx We cannot convict on anything less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they are for normal, decent, and law-abiding people. The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that the accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied. The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is possible that the appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra) The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). The appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. The Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of our society. We have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express the Court's concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against them. Something must be done about it.

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HELD: The appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt ROE v WADE Facts: January 22, 1973 - The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, affirms the legality of a woman's right to have an abortion under the Fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. 1971 - The case is filed by Norma McCorvey, known in court documents as Jane ROE against Henry WADE, the district attorney of Dallas County from 1951 to 1987, who enforced a Texas law that prohibited abortion, except to save a woman's life. The Case: The Constitutional Question: Does the Constitution embrace the right of a woman to obtain an abortion, nullifying the Texas prohibition? The ruling allows for legal abortions during the entire pregnancy, but set up conditions to allow states to regulate abortion during the second and third trimesters. Decision: The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gave a woman a right to abortion during the entirety of the pregnancy and defined different levels of state interest for regulating abortion in the second and third trimesters. Issues 1. Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions, except those required on medical advice to save the life of the mother, violate the Constitution of the United States? 2. Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect the right to privacy, including the right to obtain an abortion? 3. Are there any circumstances where a state may enact laws prohibiting abortion? 4. Did the fact that Roes pregnancy had already terminated naturally before this case was decided by the Supreme Court render her lawsuit moot? 5. Was the district court correct in denying injunctive relief? Holding and Rule (Blackmun)

1. Yes. State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only life-saving procedures on the mothers behalf, and that do not take into consideration the stage of pregnancy and other interests, are unconstitutional for violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2. Yes. The Due Process Clause protects the right to privacy, including a womans right to terminate her pregnancy, against state action. 3. Yes. Though a state cannot completely deny a woman the right to terminate her pregnancy, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant womans health and the potentiality of human life at various stages of pregnancy. 4. No. The natural termination of Roes pregnancy did not render her suit moot. 5. Yes. The district court was correct in denying injunctive relief. The Court held that, in regard to abortions during the first trimester, the decision must be left to the judgment of the pregnant womans doctor. In regard to second trimester pregnancies, states may promote their interests in the mothers health by regulating abortion procedures related to the health of the mother. Regarding third trimester pregnancies, states may promote their interests in the potentiality of human life by regulating or even prohibiting abortion, except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. The Supreme Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is capable of repetition, yet evading review, is an exception to the general rule that an actual controversy must exist at each stage of judicial review, and not merely when the action is initiated. The Court held that while 28 U.S.C. 1253 does not authorize a party seeking only declaratory relief to appeal directly to the Supreme Court, review is not foreclosed when the case is brought on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments on the issues of both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical. The Does complaint seeking injunctive relief was based on contingencies which might or might not occur and was therefore too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. It was unnecessary for the Court to decide Hallfords case for injunctive relief because once the Court found the laws unconstitutional, the Texas

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authorities were prohibited from enforcing them. Geluz v CA Facts: The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Lazos cause of action was the third and last abortion of his wife to the said doctor. The wife aborted the first baby before they were legally married. She had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant and was aborted when the husband was campaigning in the province. He did not give his consent. The trial court granted the petition and order the doctor to pay Php 3,000. The CA sustained. The doctor appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: WON the husband can recover damages from the death of a fetus Held: No. Petition granted. Ratio: Fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality. Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". (Read Art 41 of the Civil Code) In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb. As to the reward of moral damages to Lazo: The court ruled that evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant, clearly indicates that

he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. He appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated. Quimiging v Icao Facts: Icao, a married man, impregnated Quimiging, a minor. As a result, she had to pay for hospitalization and stopped studying. The latter claimed damages Php 120 a month. Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born. The trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. The plaintiff appealed directly to this Court. Issue: Is a conceived child entitled to support? Held: Yes. Petition granted. Ratio: A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors. It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all

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purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). Auxiliary reason: A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code: ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts Hence, the girl has a cause of action. TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia CITATION: 58 Phil 866 FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonia and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila. After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy,

defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time. It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned. ISSUES: 1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity. 2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco. HELD: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status. Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension. Limjuco v Estate of Fragante FACTS: On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the

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Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that Fragantes intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Fragante for the latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a contravention of the law. ISSUE: Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality. HELD: The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has not changed except for his death, and the economic ability of his estate to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the judicial administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his estate which survived after his death.

The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death like his pending application at the commission. TITLE: Dumlao v Quality Plastics CITATION: GR No. L27956, April 30, 1976 FACTS: Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as security under the bond. Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Orias death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants. Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of Orias testate estate. ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity. HELD: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T873 just learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Orias death and that they acted in

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good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant. However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death. The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorneys fees against the corporation. WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. Eugenio vs Velez 185 SCRA 45 FACTS: Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence. The court ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased. HELD: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:

Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased. Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where a man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions. In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. Smith, Bell & Company (Ltd.), pet vs. Joaquin Natividad, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, resp. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the petitioner to compel Natividad to issue a certificate of Philippine registry in favor of the former for its motor vessel Bato. Facts: Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant action is the result. Counsel argues that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its property without due process of law because by

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the passage of the law company was automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not use. Issue: Whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders Ruling: Yes. Act No. 2761 provides: Investigation into character of vessel No application for a certificate of Philippine register shall be approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic ownership as such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code. Certificate of Philippine register Upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner. While Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision Barlin V. RAMIREZ [7 P 41] F: The def., Ramirez, having been appointed by the pltff parish priest, took possession of the church on 7/5/01. He administered if as such under the orders of his superiors until 11/14/02. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other prop. of the church. The def., by a written

document of that date, refused to make such delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction w/ the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and to join the Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Mla. In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against def., alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church bldg, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other prop. belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the def. render an account of the prop. w/c he had received and w/c was retained by him, and for other relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the pltff. HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe, and w/c existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshipped in the temple of Mecca," does not require serious consideration. Standard Oil v Arenas Facts: The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment, including the appellant Vicente Villanueva who acted as surety to the loan. The CFI of Manila ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs SOCNY. While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared and alleged that her husband was declared insane on July 24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was authorized by the court as guardian to institute the proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity. Issues: (1)Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that the person does not have capacity to act. (2) Whether or not the appellant, was incapable of entering into contract at the time the bond was executed on December 15, 1908. Held: The court affirmed the trial court decision that Villanueva possessed the capacity to act. The SC held that there is no evidence to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a person suffering from monomania of wealth is really insane and therefore is deranged and incapable of

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binding himself in a contract. From the testimony of his wife, it seemed that Vicente has the liberty to go wherever he wished, that he had property of his own and was not deprived of its management, as well as the fact that he had never squandered any large sum of money. As for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof that showed that at the date of the giving of the bond, December 15, 1908, the appellant was incapable of acting because of insanity. The witnesses who as physicians, testified that they observed insane periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908, but none at the time of the execution of the said bond on December 15, 1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought to legally deprive her husband management over his estate knowing full well that he was insane. Mercado & Mercado vs. Espiritu; 37 Phil 215 Facts: The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares. The defendant (Luis Espiritu) was accused to have induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sell their land for a sum of P400 as opposed to its original value. The annulment of a deed of sale was sought by the plaintiffs. They asserted that two of the four parties were minors. These two minors (Domingo & Josefa Mercado) presented themselves to be of legal age upon signing it and they made a manifestation in front of the notary public. Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that they were of legal age. Held: The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled. BAMBALAN v MARAMBA FACTS: Bambalans parents Paula Prado and her first husband, Isidro Bambalan Y Calcotura received a loan from Genoveva Muerong and German

Maramba in 1915. Calcotura died leaving Bambalan as the sole heir of his estate. In 1922, Muerong and Maramba forced Bambalan, who was at that time, a minor, to sell their land as payment for the loan. Bambalan signed, but said that he was forced because they were threatening his mother with imprisonment. Muerong and Maramba bought Bambalans first cedula to acknowledge the document. ISSUE: Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and Muerong is valid. RATIO: The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of execution. The Doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu is not applicable to this case, because the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him as a minor. Important Statutes: Civil Code, Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil-interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. Civil code, Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract: (1) Unemancipated minors; (2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. (1263a) Civil code, Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties: (1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract; (2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao vs. Ramon Alcantara, March 4, 1950

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Facts: On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land to petitioner Sia Suan On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco Alfonso, attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing him that Ramon Alcantara was a minor and accordingly disavowing the contract. After Gaw Chiao responded to the letter, Ramon Alcantara went to the office of Gaw Chiaos counsel ratifying the sale. Ramon Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500 as payment for the sold parcels of land. On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of his minority at the time of sale. Action was d enied and Sia Suan, Gaw Chiao, Ramons father and brother, Nicolas and Antonio Azores were absolved Ramon brought the case to CA; CFI decision reversed. Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not Ramon Alcantaras execution of the deed of sale is valid despite being a minor at the time of its execution. Held: Ramon Alcantara in his minority may not be allowed to execute the deed of sale but his act of ratification, the contract was given a binding effect BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE FACTS: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have no paid, Abrille sued them in March 1949. The Manila court of first instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to pay

according to the contract they signed. The family petitioned to review the decision of the CA whereby they were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for consideration of the minority of the Braganza sons when they signed the contract. ISSUE: Whether the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are to be bound by the contract of loan they have signed. RATIO: The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in the contract because the minority of her sons does not release her from liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest. However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which found them similarly liable due to their failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained previous sources in Jurisprudence in order to hold the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to his age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of deceit. The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount they have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written contract is unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they may have profited by the money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine money is equivalent to P1,166.67. PEOPLE vs RAFANAN Jr Insanity FACTS: On February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused. The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same. Policarpio was then married and had two children. On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house. Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to

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help him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said that they should have intercourse, Ronaya refused. The accused held a bolo and pointed it to the throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. He then raped Ronaya in spite of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her. In the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what happened that night. The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. The trial court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978. On the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial." Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying that appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when he raped complainant. ISSUE : Whether or not the reason of insanity in this case is sufficient to relieve himself of criminal liability through exempting circumstance. HELD: NO RATIO: The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is ,that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that the acts without the least discernment; or

that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. F or this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved. Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions In the findings of the case, testimonies negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault. In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found. The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed. Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia.

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