Explaining the Effect of State Accommodation on Islamist Movement Strategies: The Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan and Jamaat-i-Islam of Pakistan.

Neha Sahgal University of Maryland, College Park States have followed various strategies to manage the tide of Islamist activism in opposition to their power. Some have chosen to repress, while others have strategically used accommodative tactics. This paper explores the effect of government accommodation on Islamist movement strategies. I argue that states have followed two kinds of accommodative policies towards Islamist movements Islamization and liberalization. Using a social movement theory lens, I hypothesize that these policies have different effects on the targeted movements. Counter intuitively, Islamization leads to an increase in regime opposition while liberalization decreases opposition among Islamist movements. The argument is found to hold true in the two cases explored: Pakistan under General Zia (1977-1989), where Islamization policies were followed creating greater opposition from Jamaat-i-Islam and Jordan (1989-1999), where liberalization policies were followed creating lower levels of regime opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood.

International Studies Association, Annual Convention March 2005 Honolulu, Hawaii

Introduction The study of Islamist activism is new to social movement theory. Social movement scholarship has ignored Islamist movements because of their unique faithbased nature. More recently scholars have recognized that the processes of contention conceptualized by social movement theory can be applied to Islamist activism to seek theoretical refinements in both areas of study. In this paper, I examine variations in the strategies followed by Islamist movements in response to government policies. States have followed various policies in managing the tide of Islamist opposition to their power. Some states have chosen to use repressive means (Egypt, Jordan before 1989), while others, at different times in their history have used accommodative policies (Jordan after 1989, Pakistan, Malaysia). I examine the effects of government accommodation on Islamist movement strategies. I argue that accommodation can have varying effects on Islamist movement strategies depending on the nature of accommodative policies followed. Governments have employed two different types of accommodative policies in their tenuous relationship with Islamist opposition Islamization and liberalization. Islamization attempts to co-opt the movements through greater religiosity in state and society. Liberalization allows the movements to conduct their activities at both the state and the societal level without necessarily increasing the religiosity of the state1. Islamization disempowers Islamists while liberalization empowers them by providing a sphere of influence. Disempowered movements are likely to increase their oppositional stance, while empowered Islamist movements work in cooperation with the government to
A similar distinction has been made by Nasr (1994) who argues that states can either expand their power through Islamization, as in the case of Malaysia under Mahatir and Pakistan under General Zia or form tactical alliances with Islamists in order to counter a common enemy as in the case of Turkey where the state felt threatened by leftist forces.
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preserve their privileged position. I explain my point with two case studies Pakistan, where Islamization policies were followed under General Zia from 1977 1989 and Jordan (1989-1999), where liberalization policies were followed. I explain the effects of these policies by examining the strategies followed by major Islamist movements that became the direct targets of accommodative policies Jamaat-i-Islam in Pakistan and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. While both movements show remarkable similarities in their philosophical roots and pre accommodation strategies, their post accommodation strategies diverged. Jamaat-iIslam became a pro democracy, political opposition movement, while the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) became a loyal opposition party to the Jordanian government, never directly challenging the monarchy, and primarily a social Islamist movement2. The literature addressing the effects of state policy on social movements has primarily theorized and tested the effects of varying levels of government repression. These studies have found that repression leads to increased radicalism and violence (Lichbach 1987; Koopmans 1993; Khawaja 1994; Krain 2000; Rashid 2002). One scholar has also disaggregated the concept of repression into discriminate versus indiscriminate repression and reactive versus preemptive repression, arguing that indiscriminate and reactive repression lead to increased violence and radicalism (Hafez 2002). The effects of accommodation however, remain under-theorized. We need to understand accommodation by similarly disaggregating the concept qualitatively according to the nature of accommodative policies followed.

The distinction between social Islamist and political Islamist movements is drawn by Robinson (1988). She argues that social Islamists are primarily interested in social reform through support from the state while political Islamists are more concerned with larger political issues such as Western Zionist links, regime corruption etc. These movements are more likely to be critical of the regime under which they operate.

I begin this paper with the argument that there are many benefits of studying Islamist movements using the social movement lens. I believe that using social movement theory in understanding Islamist activism takes scholars away from treating these movements as in some way unique in their faith-based nature to an understanding of the dynamics of contention that surround their strategies and framing processes (Wiktorowicz 2004). I then go on to examine the literature on repression/ accommodation and dissent and argue that this literature needs to pay particular attention to the varying effects of accommodation. This discussion is followed by an explanation of the hypothesized effects of Islamization and liberalization. The case studies of Pakistan and Jordan follow, showing the differing effects of these policies on Jamaat-i-Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood. Islamist Activism and Social Movement Theory The study of Islamist activism has traditionally been lumped under comparative fundamentalisms, the idea being that such movements are an expression of radicalized faith that is exceptional to their particular world view (Lawrence 1989; Marty and Appleby 1995; Lawrence 1998). Islamic activism is treated as a product of distinctive cultural mentalities3. Such orientalist understandings of Islamism miss several key components of these movements. Focusing on the exceptionalism of Islamist activism as an expression of fundamentalist thought misses the social and political nature of the grievances

Ideas presented in this section are adapted from Wiktorowicz 2004, whose insights on collaboration between the Islamist activism and social movement theory are one of the first. See also, Snow, D. and S. Marshall (1984). Cultural Imperialism, Social Movements and Islamic Revival. Research in Social Movement Conflict, and Change. L. Kriesberg. Greenwich, JAI Press. 7: 131-152.

expressed in protests, rallies and other forms of contentious activity. In several countries, severe restrictions on opposition activity make Islamism a natural outlet for dissent. As Wiktorowicz (2004) explains, Rooted in established social sites of religious practice and widely accepted values, contention through Islam represents one of the few remaining effective options for confronting a sense of political exclusion (p.8). Islam therefore provides an opportunity structure for expressing grievances in opposition to the regime (Esposito and Voll 1996). Analyzing Islamism as an expression of dissent is therefore necessary for a better understanding of the grievances expressed and strategies used. Examining Islamism as simply an expression of fundamentalism also prevents the literature from exploring the possibility that these actors seek instrumental and/ or ideational goals through strategic means. Value-laden terms such as fundamentalism associate Islamism with a sense of irrationality that preempts understanding the strategic nature of their behavior (Juergensmeyer 1993). More recent literature has found that Islamists respond rationally to the changing nature of opportunities and constraints presented by their environment (Mufti 1999; Alexander 2000; Hafez 2002; Rashid 2002; Hafez 2004). Islamism is often excluded from social movement theory because religion is seen as an involuntary and unchanging identity. On the other hand, more secular forms of social movements such as environmentalism and womens rights are assumed to be based on voluntary association with a dynamic ideal where discourse within the community shapes the contentious strategies. However, this understanding of religion as static because of its by the book nature ignores the fact that religious identity, particularly in its contentious forms, shows dynamism according to the needs of the environment within which it operates. As I will show in this paper, Jamaat changed its strategy from a 5

reformist social movement to a pro-democracy movement under the Zia regime because of the limited political opportunities provided by the new Islamic state. Similar examples can be found when examining Church activism in Poland and Hindu activism in the United States where the movements have renegotiated their identities and changed their strategies according to the needs of their environment (Byrnes 2002; Mazumdar 2003). In order to gain a more complete understanding of Islamist activism it is also necessary to move away from treating these movements simply as terrorist networks. While terrorism is an aspect of Islamist activism, most Islamist movements are actually charity organizations, civic associations and even democracy movements (Esposito and Voll 1996). Far from being a monolithic phenomenon, Islamism represents the many ways in which community life can be politically organized and should be understood as such. Social movement theory also has much to gain from examining Islamist activism. Not only does Islamism provide a new testing ground for concepts such as political opportunity structures and framing, the particular ways in which governments have responded to Islamist activism can help scholars disaggregate repression and accommodation. In this paper I argue that government accommodation towards Islamist movements can be categorized into two forms Islamization and liberalization. The literature on repression and accommodation has inadequately theorized the varying effects of these policies because of its lack of rootedness in a particular social context. Large N studies of the effects of these policies prevent a more nuanced understanding of the various ways in which social movements can be accommodated. Studying the effects

of different accommodative or repressive policies on Islamist activism therefore adds theoretical nuance to social movement theory (see for example Hafez 2003). The fields of Islamism and social movement theory therefore have much to gain from each other. The increasingly more complex phenomenon of Islamist activism requires an understanding of these actors as strategic in their orientation, using political opportunities and battling against constraints, instead of dismissive notions of terrorist and fundamentalist organizations. Particular attention needs to be paid to the grievances expressed by these movements and their dynamic nature. Social movement theory, I have argued, can make theoretical advances by seeking greater disaggregation in understanding the effects of government policies of repression and accommodation. I now follow with a critical review of social movement literature that focuses on the effects of government policy and social movement mobilization. The Study of Repression/ Accommodation and Dissent A growing group of scholars have suggested that much like other forms of opposition movements, Islamist movement activity follows predictable patterns based on repression or accommodation by their respective governments (Parsa 1989; Hafez 2002; Rashid 2002). Such conjectures bring the study of Islamism closer to a well-known sub field in comparative government and contentious politics- the Repression / Opposition nexus. In this section I elucidate some of the major findings of the literature on repression/ accommodation and social movement activity. I find that while the literature on repression/ accommodation had made several important theoretical contributions, the study of accommodation is not given sufficient attention. Accommodation is studied as the counterpart to repression whereby low levels of repression are considered 7

accommodation. However, accommodation can entail more than just less repression. Regimes use accommodation strategically to prevent crises of governance (Adams 1996; Nasr 2001; Wiktorowicz 2001). Different types of accommodative policies can have varying effects on movement strategies. Further, I find that the literature aims to explain the level of dissent, but not the different strategies used by dissenters. There are four main theoretical divisions among the scholars examining social movement mobilization. Some theorists explain mobilization or the lack there of, through individual participation in protest based on resource mobilization and cost benefit analysis (Olson 1965; Lichbach 1987; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Khawaja 1994; Francisco 1995; Lichbach 1998). Others explain mobilization through structural factors (Skocpol 1979; Parsa 1989) or through psychological theories of deprivation (Gurr 1970; Davies 1974; Tilly, Tilly et al. 1975; Skocpol 1979) Another group of scholars explore culturalist perspectives of mobilization (Gurr 1970; Hibbs 1973; Snow, Zurcher et al. 1980; Snow 1986; White 1989; Hoover and Kowalewski 1992; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). These schools of thought are explained further:

Structuralists school of thought Structuralists explain mobilization through economic, institutional and classbased factors. In her explanation of contentious politics, Theda Skocpol (1979) argues that revolutions are accompanied and carried through by class-based revolts. She believes that a comparative historical analysis of class-based conflict is the key to understanding revolutions.

Misgah Parsa (1989) takes a similar approach in his work on the Iranian revolution. He explains the Iranian revolution as a class-based struggle consolidated under an overarching Islamic identity. However, he adds an institutional dimension to the argument. Revolution is a product of opposition consolidation as well as state intervention. His ideas on the interaction between the two variables can be explained by the following table: Levels of State Intervention High Segmented class conflict against the state Popular struggles to seize state power

Low Consolidation Low High

Segmented class conflict Popular Struggles for Social Reforms

State intervention is broadly defined as regulation of the private sphere. For example, a state that regulates dress codes is considered an interventionist state. Consolidation is defined as the level of inter-group organization, or social cohesion among affected groups. Under conditions of high inter-group consolidation, as well as high state intervention, there is an increased likelihood of revolution, or as he puts it, Popular struggles to seize state power (p.10). Class forms an important part of the argument. Revolution is seen as a form of inter-class cohesiveness against the state. This cohesiveness is the result of opposition consolidation and high levels of state intervention. When social cohesion is low, and state intervention is high, opposition movements show factional resistance. That is, while they do struggle against the state, the classes are not able to put up a united front due to internal class based differences.

Skocpol (1982) explicitly argues that the Iranian case does not fall within her model because it shows a possible role of ideas and culture in shaping political action. Therefore, the explanatory variables behind the Iranian revolution lie in the traditional centers of urban communal life and in networks of Islamic communication and leadership (Skocpol 1982). While Parsas (1989) argument addresses these unique community networks in his treatment of class-based mobilization, he aims to fit the Iranian case in the larger theoretical framework of revolution. Parsas recognition that Islamist movement activity in the Iranian revolution can be explained in the context of revolutions more generally is an important theoretical advancement. However, Parsas (1989) definition of state intervention seems vague. Each state intervenes in the private sphere in different levels. Even in the United States there is state intervention in areas such as marriage and divorce. In fact, states are formed with the very purpose of regulation. The line between an interventionist state and a noninterventionist state is hence thin. The link between state intervention in society and social movement activity is not clear. State intervention is hence not a useful concept in understanding dissent. It is more useful to examine social movement strategies in relation to state repression and/or accommodation. Psychological Theories These scholars explain dissent as a product of the psychological processes that are the result of economic factors such as income inequality, poverty and structural rearrangements (Gurr 1970; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly, Tilly et al. 1975). Social movement opposition activity is more likely in countries that are poor and have deprived or strained populations. These macro structural conditions have a deeply psychological effect that leads to greater dissent. 10

Tilly et.al. (1975) argue that large-scale structural rearrangement such as urbanization and industrialization dissolves existing social control mechanisms subjecting the populous to uncertainty and strain. Migration to cities further adds to these feeling of disassociation. The century from 1830 through 1930 in Europe consisted of several revolutions and instances of collective violence. It is no coincidence that during these years, Europe experienced a transformation from an agrarian to industrial society. They argue, [i]f the shift in the locus and character of collective violence occurred as European countries urbanized and industrialized, the two massive sets of changes must somehow have depended on each other (p.3). Scholars have argued that marginal populations in a society are more likely to engage in violent activities because these people feel disoriented from the core population. This has been offered as a common explanation for all forms of collective violence such as riots, rebellion and extremist killing (1965). In particular, Ted Gurrs (1970) influential theory, relative deprivation explains collective violence as the deeply psychological process of the frustrations that arise when there is a gap between what people think they can achieve and what they actually achieve. This psychological process is the result of the manner in which structural conditions are processed. The theory of relative deprivation has lost adherents because it has been empirically disproved (McPhail 1971; Muller 1972). The generally accepted version of the theory currently is that relative deprivation is not the primary cause of dissent, although it may contribute significantly under some circumstances. Relative deprivation, or the psychological processes of frustration and alienation are further filtered through the organizational mechanisms available for voicing the groups demands (Tilly, Tilly et al. 11

1975), individual cost-benefit analysis (Lichbach 1998) or the formation of community in the frustrated dissident group (Opp and Roehl 1990). Even though relative deprivation theory has been discredited in the literature, no analysis of Islamist movements can proceed without taking account of the fact that these movements emerge in countries that are poor and weak. Most of the Islamic world, is experiencing economic crisis because of high rates of unemployment, inflation and inability of the domestic economy to keep pace with globalization (Rashid 2002). It is therefore important to take economic factors into account when explaining mobilization and state responses. Rational choice theorists This theory is a more recent reevaluation of relative deprivation. Its proponents believe that anti-regime mobilization can be explained through struggles of political power between rational actors. Groups attempt to apply their resources towards acquiring collective goods-such as concessions from the government. Groups will only mobilize if individual benefits of mobilization are high (Snyder and Tilly 1972; Snyder 1978; Khawaja 1994; Lichbach 1998). It has been argued that individual interests aggregate differently to group interests since the attainment of the group goal is a collective good (Olson 1982; Lichbach 1998). Once the group goal is achieved, the members of the group share its benefits equally. Therefore, while the individual costs of participation in collective action are high, the benefits are distributed equally regardless of participation. Therefore, individual incentives for participation are low. It follows from this argument that dissent is a relatively rare phenomenon. In fact 95-percent of the people, 95-percent of the time, do

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not participate in collective action. This statistic is commonly referred to as the 5-percent rule (Lichbach 1998). While there is much evidence that the 5-percent rule holds, Lichbach (1998) argues that the current problem facing rational choice theorists is how collective action can be explained when it does occur. In other words, what explanations can be offered to explain the activities of the 5-percent who do participate in collective action? Lichbach (1998) says:
There are, [second], those who do rebel. While this is by far the smaller category, one cannot ignore the fact that some people at some time in some places are able to overcome the Rebels Dilemma and rebel. This is referred to as the paradox or puzzle of CA [collective action] (p.12).

Lichbach (1998) offers four solutions to the rebels dilemma. These are Contract, Hierarchy, Market, and Community. The market solution to the collective action problem assumes that individuals do not engage in social planning. Therefore, a state of nature exists among the rebels. Rebels participate in collective action when the immediate environmental conditions allow them to do so. These conditions may include, reduced supply of the collective good, increased probability of winning or lowered costs. The Contract solution proposes that rebels solve their collective action problems through the formation of association relationships, whereby there is a contractual agreement among the members as to the type of institutions they seek. Therefore, the rebels solve their collective action problem through a formal agreement. The Hierarchy solution proposes that the public goods problem is solved through the existence of formal organizations that have the ability to coerce members into contributing to collective action. These institutions are created specifically to manage society and plan social order. Regarding the community solution, Lichbach (1998) says: 13

Dissidents, however, are often members of a shared community. Communal groups, characterized by strong social institutions, hold common beliefs and eventually engage in common behavior. In short, communal relationships beget communal understandings, which beget communal action (p.111).

Communal groups can hence overcome the collective action problem by establishing a common belief system and a set of common values. Communities are able to remedy the free rider problem by increasing the perception that other members of the community will join in the protest. Under these condition, rebels are less likely to act in self-interest and more likely to act in the interest of the community. Lichbach (1998) argues that there are four factors that act to increase the dissidents belief that others will participate in the collective action. These are, Mutually understood signals, Places and times, Causal mechanisms and Communications. Mutually understood signals preempt the need for overt leadership in the dissident group. The dissidents are able to act in unison through the use of community-specific symbols. The community is able to better communicate to its members regarding the places and times at which the dissident activity is to take place. The history of collective action has shown that there is much significance attached to the places where the dissent occurs. Lichbach (1998) uses several examples to illustrate this point. Student protesters often meet at a particular significant place on their campus for a demonstration or rioters may commune at a major intersection that they hold significant. Similarly, the community may pick certain significant times that are mutually understood and easily communicated, to engage in their dissident activity. Members of a community are well aware of the causal mechanisms that link them to the other members of the group. They understand that their actions will have consequences for other members and that another members actions will have

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consequences for them. These causal links contribute to solving the collective action problem by establishing causal interconnectedness among the community members. Finally, communication among the members of the group helps facilitate solidarity, clarify expectations of each member and reinforce each members connectedness in the community. Mutually understood communication therefore helps in solving the collective action problem. Skocpol (1982) has argued that Islamic groups operate under the influence of a unique political culture. This political culture lends itself to the formation of a community within the dissident groups. Therefore, using the rational choice perspective, Islamist dissident groups are able to solve their collective action problem through mutually understood symbols, causal mechanisms, places and times and communication. Indeed there is much evidence to show that Islamist groups use these factors to increase the perceptions of a community among the members. The invocation of symbols such as Allah, Jihad, the Shariah and the Quaran are powerful means of reinforcing the community. Further, the idea of Ummah, or the Islamic community around the world, is a powerful socialization practice that facilitates causal mechanisms and communications. Parsa (1989) argues that mosques were extensively used as meeting grounds for dissidents and the Islamic lunar calendar was used to establish times for dissident events. Therefore, Islamic communities around the world are able to make use of mutually significant times and places, symbols, communication and interconnectedness to increase the perception that the collective action problem among the dissidents will be solved. The community solution to the free rider problem implies that Islamist dissident groups should show high levels of mobilization. However, while Lichbachs solutions to the CA problem and subsequent mechanisms of contention explain why dissent occurs, 15

his theory does not explain variations across social movement activity. How can we explain variations in the strategies used by social movements? Why do some movements refrain from directly challenging the regime while others engage in political opposition, despite comparable levels of community cohesion? Kitschelts (Kitschelt 1986) research on the anti nuclear movement in four western democracies (United States, France, Sweden and West Germany) provides a possible solution to the puzzle. He finds that movements in more open and responsive political systems such as the United States and Sweden adopted more assimilative strategies such as lobbying, petitioning and political party activity. On the other hand, movements in more closed political systems such as France and W. Germany adopted more confrontational activities like public demonstrations and civil disobedience (della Porta, Kriesi et al. 1999). Kitschelt (1986) finds that state accommodation leads to social movements following more institutional strategies of dissent while state repressiveness leads to extra institutional strategies. It is clear that Islamist movements use the community solution to the free rider problem, but state responses of repression or accommodation predispose movements towards certain strategies as opposed to others. There is a need to understand how institutional strategies (as Kitschelt finds) can vary across movements based on the particularities of regime accommodation. Constructivist school of thought This group takes the cultural perspective in explaining opposition activity. An important concept introduced by these authors is that of micromobilization. The term refers to an escalation in opposition mobilization when the members of the opposition movement consider the repression illegitimate and are able to participate in informal 16

associations that support opposition to the regime (Opp and Roehl 1990). Therefore individual relationships with the group and the community that are formed as a result of the repression become important explanatory variables for group mobilization against the state, even though escalation in resistance may not appear rational from the cost-benefit stand point (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). Opp and Roelh (1998) argue that informal kinship based ties form under conditions of repression. Furthermore, for micromobilization processes to take effect, the repression must be judged as illegitimate by the community. In other words, the presence of an illegitimate other is necessary for reinforcement of community ties. While Opp and Roelh (1998) make a convincing argument with regard to the effects of repression, the effect of accommodation are not explored. How do micromobization strategies change when the illegitimate other is seen as accommodating? If repression leads to an increase in micromobilization, does accommodation necessarily lead to a decrease in these informal community-based networks? What is the subsequent effect of this decrease on movement activity? Exploration of the formation of identity through community ties is an important part of the constructivist endeavor. Scholars argue that social movements and dissenting groups frame issues in a particular manner that makes collective action possible (Snow 1986). Snow et.al. (1986) argue that resource mobilization and relative deprivation theorists have ignored the interpretive and framing function that is an important part of collective action. They say:
Too much attention is focused on grievances per se, and on their social psychological manifestations, to the neglect of the fact that grievances or discontents are subject to differential interpretation, and in fact that variations in their interpretation across individuals, social movement organizations, and time can affect whether and how they are acted upon (p.465).

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Snow et. al (1986) define framing as the process by which social movements establish congruence between individual interests, values, beliefs and the goals and activities of the social movement. Therefore, the manner in which the exigency is interpreted by the social movement is of most consequence in explaining collective action. Applying the concept of framing to opposition activity, some scholars argue that rebellion against authorities is contingent on the injustice frame, or an interpretation that defines the actions of the state as illegitimate, hence legitimizing opposition (Goffman 1974; Moore 1978; Gamson, Fireman et al. 1982). This direction of analysis is in congruence with Opp and Roehl (1990) who argue that the community must judge the repression as illegitimate for micromobilization processes to take effect. Several constructivist scholars examine the role of identity formation in the community. Scholars argue that participants in collective action are able to align their identities with the community through the processes of Identity Amplification, Identity Consolidation, Identity Extension and Identity Transformation (Snow and McAdam 2000). Identity amplification is defined as, [t]he embellishment and strengthening of an existing identity that is congruent with a movements collective identity but not sufficiently salient to ensure participation and activism (p.49). This argument implies that collective action is made possible by the invocation of an underlying individual identity and then matching this identity with that of the group. A previously lower-order identity is made salient enough to facilitate collective action. Identity consolidation refers to the formation of an association between two or more prior identities. New identities are not based on the amplification of an existing

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identity or the reemergence of a previous identity, but rather, on a blending process between two identities (Snow and McAdam 2000). Identity extension refers to the broadening of identity to allow for congruence with the group while identity transformation refers to a dramatic change in identity due to fracturing and obliterating of old identities. The result is a complete change in perspective towards the group, as well as towards oneself. This categorization points to the dynamic nature of self and group identity. While Snow and McAdam (2000) provide an interesting analysis of the changing nature of identity, they fail to identify the explanatory factors that would account for identity amplification, transformation or extension. Scholars such as Opp and Roehl (1990), Gamson et. al. (1982) and Goffman (1975) have stressed the importance of how the movement participants interact with authority as an important variable in explaining identity dynamism. It is hence important to take account of both the external influences that change identity and how identity changes as a result of these interactions. Unfortunately, a detailed examination of identity changes in Jamaat and Muslim Brotherhood are beyond the scope of this paper, as such research would necessarily require field work. Nonetheless, in this paper, I assess possible identity changes in the two movements using existing literature. I now explain my theoretical arguments on the effects of regime accommodation. Disaggregating the Effects of Accommodation In the previous section I have argued that examining state responses is an important variable in explaining the strategies of opposition movements. I have also argued that the literature on social movement activity and the repression dissent nexus 19

has treated accommodation as the counterpart to repression without adequately examining the varying effects of different types of accommodative strategies. Furthermore, the literature explains the conditions under which dissent occurs, but is less prolific in explaining variations in strategies of movements. In this section, I explain the theorized relationship between regime accommodation and Islamist movement strategies. The last several decades have seen the emergence of Islamist opposition with Islamist movements emerging as an important political force, questioning the activities of the state, demanding greater religiosity in society and state, or seeking greater openness at the institutional level (Juergensmeyer 1993; Nasr 1993; Esposito 1997; Wiktorowicz 2004). Some states have used repressive tactics to quell the tide of Islamist activism while others have strategically used accommodation of certain key groups to prevent a crisis of governance. In the Muslim world accommodative policies have been employed in two different ways Islamization, as in the case of Pakistan (under Zia) and Malaysia (under Mahatir); or liberalization as in the case of Jordan (after 1989) and Turkey (Nasr 2001). Islamization implies the transformation of the state institutions into a theocracy whereby the state governs according to the principles of Islam. Shariah law may be implemented and the courts may follow Islamic jurisprudence. Under state-led Islamization, the government becomes the authority on religious interpretation. In the case of Pakistan, Islamization policies were followed for the first time under General Zia. Zia implemented Islamic education, Islamic taxation and Islamic judiciary. Liberalization implies the opening up of the political system to allow civic and other groups to function. Restrictions on political freedoms and liberty are repealed. Liberalization is often accompanied by democratization, although not necessarily. In the 20

case of Jordan, liberalization was initiated in 1989 under King Hussein. Parliamentary elections were held in the same year and by 1993, several political parties had registered with the government. Scholars have argued that the nature of liberalization in Jordan is limited at best. The goal of liberalization in Jordan is not democratization but to preserve state power (Adams 1996; Robinson 1998; Wiktorowicz 2001). In the 1993 elections, the state undertook electoral reforms and instituted a one-man-one-vote rule that would prevent the Islamists from voting as a bloc, thus hurting their chances of electoral success. Even though the state used precautionary tactics to prevent the Islamists from gaining unmanageable influence in the state, elections were held and political freedoms were granted under the newly initiated reforms4. I argue that Islamization disempowers Islamist movements, making them critical of government policies. Since the state now has the monopoly over religious interpretation, the movement loses its major sphere of activity. It must now function merely as a body of implementation of state Islamic policies. This new position prevents the movement from establishing an identity separate from that of the state, which is hurtful to the movements grassroots and other activities (Nasr 2001). Liberalization on the other hand, empowers Islamist movements. Allowing movements to have representation at the level of the state and to influence government policy provides Islamist movements with an identifiable sphere of influence and cultivates cooperative relations with the government. While it is argued that inclusion in governmental processes limits that movements grassroots activity (Wiktorowicz 2001),
It should be noted that under the reign of King Abdullah (1999 onwards) several impediments to liberalization were initiated to manage Islamic activism, see Wiktorowicz, Q. (2001). The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and State Power in Jordan. New York, SUNY Press.
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often through control over key portfolios such as education and health, Islamist movements are able to better achieve their community-level goals. State accommodation can therefore have varying effects based on the extent to which the movement feels empowered by its new position. I argue that while Islamization disempowers Islamist movements and therefore leads to greater anti regime oppositional tendencies, liberalization empowers Islamist movements and encourages a cooperative relationship with the government. Movement strategies are therefore explained by the type of accommodative policies followed by the state. Case Selection Two cases of accommodation are examined in this paper Pakistan (1977-1989) and Jordan (1989-1999). During this period, both countries accommodated Islamist movements in response to a growing crisis of governance and rising tide of Islamist activism. Pakistan, under General Zia Islamized the state and society, making Jamaat its closest allay. Jordan liberalized the polity, allowing movements such as MB to contest elections. Crisis of Governance During the years that preceded accommodation, both Pakistan and Jordan were facing economic, political and social crises. In Jordan, the regime faced threat from growing Palestinian activism, particularly the activities of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as well as for Nasserites and Bathists. Also, the country was in financial turmoil owing to cuts in foreign aid from the United States, falling oil prices and declining remittances from expatriates. To mitigate the effects of the crisis, austerity measures were introduced in 1989 that increased the price of certain goods such as

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cigarettes and gasoline. In response, riots broke out throughout the country leading to further chaos. Similarly, in Pakistan rising unemployment and inflation had led to severe social unrest. Ethnic factionalism had emerged with Sindis and Baluchis threatening the Bhutto regime. An Islamist movement under the banner Nizam-i-Mustapha (consisting of nine separate movements) threatened to topple the government. In 1977, Pakistan went to the polls with the main opposition to the Bhutto government coming from Islamists. Despite their widespread popularity, the Islamists did not do well in the elections leading to popular beliefs that the election had been rigged. Activists took to the street and social turmoil ensued. In this state of unrest, General Zia staged a coup in July 1977. Both countries followed accommodative policies in response to crises of governance (Adams 1996; Robinson 1998; Nasr 2001; Wiktorowicz 2001). In order to quell social unrest and consolidate their power, the governments formed tactical alliances with Islamists that held the greatest political and social influence at the time Jamaat-iIslam in Pakistan and Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Jamaat-i-Islam and Muslim Brotherhood Jamaat and the Muslim Brotherhood became the major targets of regime accommodation due to their wide support base. The two movements represent the dynamic nature of Islamist activism. They have functioned as opposition parties, regime allies and charity organizations as well as social movements. The Muslim Brotherhood was formed in 1929 by Hassan Al- Banna. Its Jordanian Branch was set up in 1945. The Brotherhood never espoused the overthrow of the government or violent rebellion. The main motto of the movement, in its philosophical roots, has been evolution, not revolution (Wiktorowicz 2001). Even though 23

traditionally the MB had never directly threatened the regime, it would be a misnomer to believe that the MB has no history of regime opposition. In the mid 1980s, MB had become forthright in its demands for democratization and Islamist reforms. Under the Hussein regime (before 1989), the MB was active in opposition to the regime on the Palestinian question, advocating, No to Camp David and no to Reagan, and No solution to the Palestinian question except through Islam. (Day 1986; Boulby 1999). MB also attacked the government on human rights issues, activities of the security services, public sector corruption and the continuance of martial law (Day 1986; Robbins 1986; Boulby 1999; Wiktorowicz 2001). State reactions to the MB before 1989 had been a combination of repression and accommodation. While the MB was never subject to harsh repression, as several other groups in Jordan were, under Hussein, security services often harassed MB members by taking away passports of senior members and forcing members to resign from their jobs at universities and other areas. Jamaat-i-Islam was formed in 1941 under the leadership of Mawdudi. Mawdudi saw Islam as the solution for the problems of South Asian Muslims and believed that change could be achieved through reform. In its philosophical roots, Jamaat had little interest in politics and was conceptualized primarily as an elitist movement seeking greater religiosity in the state. Mawdudi explicitly rejected democracy in his writings, arguing that illiterate people can not be in charge of their own government. Even though the movement had apolitical roots, Jamaats leadership was a key pillar for the opposition movement to Bhuttos regime. Jamaat was one of the nine members of the Nizam-i-Mustapha Movement that contested elections against Bhutto. Jamaat was also active in anti-regime protest in response to the 1977 elections. 24

Both Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat have reformist philosophical roots that translated to moderate political action in their respective polities. In the years immediately prior to regime accommodation, both movements had shown increased antiregime activism. However, their post accommodation strategies diverged. Jamaat, while initially cooperative with the Zia regime, soon transformed into a pro democracy activist movement, while MB became a loyal opposition to the Jordanian regime, never directly challenging regime policies. I now present the case studies in detail. Pakistani Islamization and the Jamaat-i-Islam The state of Pakistan was formed primarily to protect the interests of the South Asian Muslim minority once the Indian subcontinent received independence from British rule. Ironically, Islam had been a limited part of government until Zias regime was instituted in 1977. Previous military leaders such as Yaha Khan and Ayub Khan had been ardent secularists. The Bhutto regime paid lip service to Islamists, by terming Pakistans nuclear program, the Islamic Bomb, seeking greater cooperation with Gulf states and including Arabic in the school curriculum. However, Bhuttos appeal to the Islamists was not credible owing to his reputation as a secularist in the early years of his political career (Nasr 1993). The 1970s saw a rise in Islamism around the world. In Pakistan, the 1970s were the apogee of anti state Islamist activism, particularly after the loss of East Pakistan in a war with its neighbor India. The loss of territory became a central grievance for the Islamists, who blamed the loss on the lack of religiosity in state and society (Khan 1985). Zia came to power amidst social, economic and political turmoil. His immediate goal was to restore order in the country. The means to achieve this end were the 25

Islamization of state and society. While Islamization was part a tactical strategy to co opt the Islamists and unite the country, Zia had been an ardent admirer of Mawdudis work and had encouraged soldiers under his command to read his work and practice Islamic teachings (Khan 1985; Nasr 2001). Therefore, Zia had religious credibility that his predecessor Bhutto lacked. Zia made several changes in governance to institute Islamism. Islamic code was strictly enforced through Shariah law and Islamic jurisprudence. Along with Islamism came the curtailment of civil liberties. All opposition to the regime wad considered anti Islamic and elections were postponed on two occasions. Zia declared himself as having the right to interpret and enforce Islamic law. Jamaat was given special status under Zias regime. Islamization was carried out under the road map of Mawdudis writings. Many members of Jamaat were included in Zias inner circle of advisors to provide guidelines on seeking greater Islamization. Jamaat leaders were also given important portfolios such as petroleum, water and power. Jamaat and Zia were tactical allies in seeking the suppression of remaining factions of support for the Bhutto regime (Peoples Party of Pakistan or PPP). Jamaat had opposed the PPP in 1977 and saw Zia as a partner against a common enemy (Nasr 2001). Further, Zia used Jamaat to quell more radical anti regime Islamist movements such as Islami Jamiat-i Taluba, a student organization. Zia initiated the large scale Islamization of state and society with Jamaat as an ally. Initially Jamaat cooperated with the regime, as this was the first time any government had made an effort to co opt the movement and implement its demands. Jamaat held pro- regime rallies and formed religious police squads to enforce

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Islamization. In the early years of Zias administration, Jamaat followed the strategy of cooperation with the regime. Zia postponed elections soon after coming to power on the pretext that if elections were held and PPP was allowed to contest, the debacle of the 1971 loss of East Pakistan would be repeated. Jamaat supported Zia in this decision owing to its anti PPP stance and Mawdudis general sentiment against democracy. However, the alliance between the regime and Jamaat was short lived. Jamaats strategies changed drastically when it realized that it had been disempowered through its association with the regime. Two factors proved to be particularly important Jamaats grassroots activities had been hampered through its close association with the regime. Zia had banned both student and labor organizations. Association with such regime tactics had made several sections of the population critical of Jamaat. Second, Zia had the monopoly over the interpretation of Islam. Therefore, even though Jamaat members had been given important positions within the administration, their influence was limited (Nasr 1993). As Nasr (1993) explains, Islamization, [however], proved to be a bone of contention. While it created concord between Zia and the Jamaat in principle, in practice it also promoted conflict between the two over what the content of the Islamization program should be (p.266). Amidst the growing tension between Zia and Jamaat, the elections planned for 1979 were suspended. In 1980, Jamaat members issued strong statements to Zia warning him of the consequences of his policy. They asked Zia to restore civilian rule, cut censorship and restore rule of law. Jamaat was becoming increasingly divided among two groups. One group led by Mian Tufayal worked closely with Zia and felt that Jamaat should not oppose Zia 27

because its greatest enemy was the PPP. The other, known as the Karachi group argued that Jamaat could only ensure its survival by moving away from the regimes ideological agenda and cultivating support from a new social stratum. The Karachi group started demanding socioeconomic justice and democracy. As Nasr (1993) explains:
This initiative [Karachi initiative] was a manifestation of disenchantment with the Zia regime, but more importantly, it was a recognition of the limits the emotive appeal of Islam had in the face of secular political issues socioeconomic justice and ethnic concerns and democratic demands. Islamization, in the eyes of the younger and more politically inclined of at leaders could no longer sustain a successful political campaign (p.272).

Meanwhile, a pro-democracy movement, Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), had emerged with an alliance formed between the students movement and the PPP. In 1985 elections were held, but Jamaats showing was poor. These elections confirmed that Jamaat had lost its support base. It was Zia and not Jamaat that had profited from Islamization in Pakistan. The results of the election strengthened the Karachi group, under the leadership of Gafur Ahmad. They advocated that Jamaat form an alliance with the MRD. This was a significant reorientation for Jamaat. The party started distancing itself from Zia. In 1987, Jamaat voted Qazi Husain Ahmed as its leader who was from the Karachi group. He had also been an advocate of Jamaat joining the MRD. He was openly critical of Zia, arguing that neither Islamization, nor the Afghan Jihad justified the abrogation of democracy in Pakistan. By 1988 Jamaat had formally cut connections with the Zia regime and formed an alliance with the MRD. Although Islamist revivalism is thought to be solely committed to the Islamization of society, the record of Jamaat shows that often political and organizational interests can trump commitment to Islamization. In the case of Pakistan, Jamaats political

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interests led it to become critical of Zias regime and favor the democratic process. Such actions are not usually associated with Islamist movements. The case of Jamaat shows us the dynamics of continuity and change in Islamist movements and how Islamization can actually disempower Islamists, making them critical of the regime and leading to a significant change in strategies. Jordanian Liberalization and the Muslim Brotherhood Prior to 1989, Jordan had followed policies of harsh repression towards Islamists. Most Islamists were detained, questioned and tortured for anti regime activities. Even though the repressive apparatus of the state prevented Islamists from participating directly in politics, many groups used associational networks to carry on charity work. The Muslim Brotherhood was one such group (Wiktorowicz 2001). In 1984, King Hussein decided to hold elections, mostly as a means to gauge public opinion. Political parties were not legal at the time and candidates ran as individuals. Further, the press was severely restricted. The Muslim Brotherhood participated in these elections, and to the alarm of the regime, commanded a high volume of the vote. The excellent showing of the MB was a cause for alarm for the regime as it was an indication of the popularity of the Islamists. The MB used its electoral showing to increase leverage on the government and increase its opposition activities (Boulby 1999). The rising Islamist opposition combined with political and economic crises led King Hussein to initiate a series of liberalization reforms in 1989. Parliamentary elections were held in the same year in which the MB won 34 of the 80 seats contested. Political parties were still illegal during the 1989 elections. However, since the MB had already been active as an associational network, it was able 29

to command a high number of votes. MB had a wide support base among Palestinian and Transjordanian areas that valued democracy and sought greater liberalization in the government (Boulby 1999). The wide social base of the Brotherhood made it a prime candidate for government cooptation. In 1990, the government used the Brotherhood to pacify social unrest in the country by appealing for peace. State directed liberalization therefore proceeded with a key alliance with a traditionally moderate Islamist group. In 1991, members of the Muslim Brotherhood gained socially important portfolios such as education, health, justice and social development. Alcohol was banned from government and public buildings and the MB became in charge of Islamic programming on television. Furthermore, MB was allowed to contest municipal elections where it gained significant ground. The movement was also popular with professional associations. While the regimes support of the MB was based on its wide social base combined with the possibility that it may form alliances with anti regime forces such as Palestinians, Arab Nationalists and East Bankers, the MB was able to use its privileged position to gain an important sphere of influence in politics. In 1992, the Brotherhood formed the Islamic Action Front (IAF) which was necessitated by the provisions of the National Charter that legalized political parties but prohibited those that had links outside Jordan. The regime announced elections in 1993, but introduced a one-man-one-vote system that would prevent Islamists from voting as a bloc and therefore hampered their chances of electoral success. In response, the IAF threatened to boycott the elections. King Hussein appealed to the IAF to carry out its historical responsibilities and to proceed, with Gods help, toward genuine Islam

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(Adams 1996). Eventually, the IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood gave up their brief opposition to the regime and contested elections under the new electoral law. The IAF did not fare well in the 1993 elections, leading to speculation by some scholars that the MB had lost its support base. Boulby (1999) explains, The Muslim Brotherhood did not extend its parliamentary agenda much beyond the vaguely defined principles of its campaign program Islam is the solution (p.153). Therefore it lost support from other Islamists as well as from the populace. However other scholars have argued that given that they were contesting elections in a system that hurt them, the MB performed well. In particular, the MB received votes in the Palestinian areas where its support had been high in previous elections (Robinson 1998). Therefore, there is little evidence that MB had lost its support base. Robinson (1998) argues that the MB had been able to provide social services to the population that the regime had not. In addition, because it still had an identity separate from that of the regime, it had not become associated with the corruption among government officials. MB was still considered a pious religious party. Despite its wide support base, the Muslim Brotherhood has not chosen to oppose the regime, instead working within the political apparatus in seeking reform. There is a small radical wing operating within the Brotherhood, but even this wing has never advocated radical opposition to the regime, or seeking its overthrow (Wiktorowicz 2001). The MB had several opportunities for mobilization against the regime, but it has worked within the system as a loyal opposition, focusing primarily on social reform (Robinson 1998). The case of Jordanian liberalization and the Muslim Brotherhood shows that through empowerment of Islamists by giving them a sphere of influence can cause an 31

already moderate opposition group to become even more moderate. While traditionally reformist, the MB had shown resistance to the Hussein regime. After the 1989 reforms, the MB worked within the system as a key ally to the Hashemite rule. Conclusion Islamist movements have used various strategies in their interaction with domestic governments. They are not simply faith based organizations that are an expression of religious fundamentalism, nor are they mere terrorist cells. As I have shown in this paper, Islamist movements have functioned as charity organizations, social movements and even pro democracy forces. They are dynamic entities that strategically adapt to the needs of their environment in expressing their grievances and seeking their goals. Therefore, there are many benefits of examining Islamist movements using the social movement theory lens. How do we understand the varying strategies of Islamist movements? In this paper, I argue that state responses are a key explanatory variable when examining the dynamic nature of Islamist movement strategies. I examine the effect of state accommodation, arguing that the literature on repression/accommodation and dissent has focused all its energies on varying levels of repression, to the determent of a clear understanding of the effects of accommodation. I argue that in the context of Islamist movements, states have used two types of accommodative strategies Islamization and liberalization. Islamization disempowers Islamist movements by expanding state power and preventing the movements from having an identity of their own beyond that of the state. Therefore, Islamization leads to greater regime opposition among Islamist movements.

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Liberalization empowers Islamist movement by giving them a greater sphere of influence in politics and society. Islamist movements that are accommodated through liberalization show greater cooperation with the government and moderation in their strategies. I explain my argument by examining the cases of Pakistan (1977-1989) where Islamization policies were implemented under General Zia and Jordan (1989-1999) where liberalization policies were implemented under King Hussein. I examine the effect of these policies on the strategies of the major Islamist movements operating in these countries that became the targets of accommodative policies Jamaat-i-Islam in Pakistan and Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Both had been moderate, reformist movements before the accommodative policies were followed, but had exhibited an increase in anti regime activity in the years immediately preceding accommodation. I found that in the case of Pakistan, while Islamization initially created a relationship of cooperation between Zia and Jamaat, this partnership proved to be short lived. Jamaat soon realized that it had lost support from several sections of the population because of its association with the repressive tactics of the regime. An anti regime subgroup soon emerged within the Jamaat and by 1988, it had officially ended its relationship with the regime and formed an alliance with the pro democracy group, Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). Jamaat continually pressed the regime for elections and critiqued Zias policies on rule of law and media censorship. Jamaat therefore exhibited a change in strategy from a reformist, moderate Islamist movement, to a pro democracy, anti regime opposition movement. In the case of Jordan, liberalization provided a greater sphere of influence for the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement became loyal to the regime and never directly 33

challenged its power. Even with the introduction of unfair electoral laws in 1993, and the IAFs threats to boycott the elections, the movement ultimately gave in to the requests of the regime and did participated in the elections. MB has also cooperated with the government in preventing social turmoil in the country. In exchange, MB members were given important portfolios and many of their demands regarding education and television programming were met. Overall, a cooperative relationship emerged between King Husseins regime and MB that we did not see in the case of Pakistan. This paper points out that governments that Islamize plant the seeds for their own destruction. When Islamization is accompanied by an increase in state power, as it most often is, greater opposition emerges in the long run. On the other hand, the case of Jordan shows that liberalization provides Islamists with a separate sphere of influence and creates less dissent.

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