Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

185749 December 16, 2009

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. HERMINIGILDO L. ANDAL, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) seeking to set aside the Decision dated 22 September 20081 and the Resolution dated 2 December 20082 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100452. The Court of Appeals set aside the CSC Decision dated 25 May 2005, Resolution No. 062255 dated 20 December 2006 and Resolution No. 071493 dated 1 August 2007 in Administrative Case No. 00-12-027. The motion for reconsideration filed thereafter was denied. The Facts Herminigildo L. Andal (respondent) holds the position of Security Guard II in the Sandiganbayan. On 24 January 2000, he filed an application to take the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT) and was admitted to take the examination. The examination results showed that respondent passed the examination with a rating of 81.03%. On 25 January 2000, Arlene S. Vito (Vito), claiming to have been authorized by respondent to secure the results of the examination, presented a handwritten authorization allegedly signed by respondent. Upon verification and comparison of the pictures attached to the Picture Seat Plan and the identification card of respondent which Vito presented, there appeared a dissimilarity in the facial features. Bella A. Mitra, then Officer-in-Charge of the Examination, Placement and Services Division (EPSD) of the Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region (CSC-NCR), issued a Memorandum on the alleged "impersonation" of respondent and the matter was referred to the Legal Affairs Division to conduct a fact-finding investigation. On 29 November 2000, the CSC-NCR formally charged respondent with dishonesty. A formal investigation of the case was scheduled on 4 June 2001, 21 November 2001, 5 February 2002, and 10 July 2002. Notices were sent to respondents last known address as indicated in his Application Form but respondent failed to appear on the sche duled hearings. Respondent was deemed to have waived his right to appear at the formal investigation and the case proceeded ex parte. On 5 August 2005, the CSC-NCR rendered judgment finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CSC which issued Resolution No. 062255 dated 20 December 2006, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the appeal of Herminigildo L. Andal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 25, 2005 of the Civil Service Commission National Capital Region (CSC-NCR), Quezon City, finding him guilty of Dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service with accessory penalties of disqualification from re-entering government service, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and bar from taking any civil service examination, pursuant to Section 57 of the Uniformed Rules, is AFFIRMED.4 Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the CSC judgment but the motion was denied in the CSC Resolution No. 071493 dated 1 August 2007. Respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review under Rule 43. On 22 September 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 25 May 2005, Resolution No. 062255 dated 20 December 2006, and Resolution No. 071493 dated 01 August 2007 in Admin. Case No. 00-12-027 are SET ASIDEand respondent Civil Service Commission is enjoined from implementing the same. Respondent Civil Service Commission is hereby ORDERED to immediately refer said administrative case for Dishonesty against petitioner Herminigildo L. Andal to the Office of the Court Administrator, Supreme Court, for appropriate action.5 The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 2 December 2008. Hence, the present petition. The Issue The issue in this case is whether or not the Civil Service Commission has disciplinary jurisdiction to try and decide administrative cases against court personnel.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals ruled that the CSC encroached upon the Supreme Courts power of administrative supervision over court personnel. In reversing the CSC resolutions, the Court of Appeals cited Section 6, Article VIII 6 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. The Court of Appeals further stated that what the CSC should have done was to refer the administrative case for dishonesty against respondent to the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate action instead of resolving the case. The Courts Ruling In taking cognizance of the administrative case for dishonesty against respondent, the CSC invoked Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations which provides that the CSC "shall have original disciplinary jurisdiction over all its officials and employees and over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies or irregularities." The CSC further contends that administrative cases of dishonesty in connection with duties and responsibilities under Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code are different from cases of dishonesty in connection with cheating incidents in Civil Service examinations administered by the CSC. In the latter case, the CSC assumes jurisdiction as an integral part of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect its integrity, citing the case of Civil Service Commission v. Albao.7 The CSC argues that one of the powers of the CSC is the administration of the civil service examinations. The CSC made a careful study and comparison of the facial features of the person appearing on the photographs attached to the Application Form and the Personal Data Sheet (PDS), and the photograph attached to the Picture Seat Plan. Resemblance of the pictures purporting to be respondents was clearly wanting. The signatures appearing on the face of the documents also revealed discrepancies in the structure, strokes, form and general appearance. We agree with the Court of Appeals and accordingly, deny the present petition. The Court recognizes the CSCs administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. Section 3, Article IX-B of the Constitution declares the CSC as the central personnel agency of the Government, thus: Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs. Section 12, Title 1 (A), Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292) likewise enumerates the powers and functions of the CSC, one of which is its quasi-judicial function under paragraph 11, which states: Section 12. Powers and Functions The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: xxx (11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it x x x. And, Section 47, Title 1 (A), Book V of EO 292 provides for the CSCs disciplinary jurisdiction, as follows: SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demo tion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken. x x x (Emphasis supplied) The CSCs authority and power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases are not in dispute. The question is whether the CSCs disciplinary jurisdiction extends to court personnel in view of Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The Albao case cited by the CSC is not in point as Albao was not a court employee but a contractual employee of the Office of the Vice President. The Albao case merely affirmed the authority of the CSC to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the civil service examinations. One case in point is Bartolata v. Julaton8 wherein a letter-complaint was sent to the CSC Regional Office in Davao City denouncing the acts of Felicia Julaton (Julaton), Clerk of Court, and Juanita Tapic (Tapic), Court Interpreter II, both of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City, Branch 3. The CSC Regional Office in Davao City discovered that a certain Julaton submitted her application to take the Civil Service Professional Examination in 1989 but the picture on the application form and on the Picture Seat Plan did not resemble the picture appearing on the appointment of Julaton. The signature of Julaton affixed to the examination documents did not match the signature on her PDS. The case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator which recommended that Julaton and Tapic be held liable as charged. This Court dismissed Julaton from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits while Tapic, who had resigned, was fined P25,000 and his retirement benefits were ordered forfeited.1avvphi1 Likewise, in Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana,9 the CSC formally charged Zenaida Sta. Ana (Sta. Ana), Court Stenographer I of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Quezon-Licab, Nueva Ecija with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for misrepresenting that she took and passed the CSPE-CAT when in truth and in fact, someone else took the examinations for her. The CSC found that the picture and signature in Sta. Anas PDS were different from those appea ring in her application form and in the Picture Seat Plan. Upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, this Court found Sta. Ana guilty of dishonesty and dismissed her from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits.

In the Julaton and Sta. Ana cases, the CSC recognized the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over court personnel. This is consonant with Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof, thus: Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels administrative compl iance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. This we have ruled in Maceda v. Vasquez10and have reiterated in the case of Ampong v. Civil Service Commission.11 In Ampong, we also emphasized that in case of violation of the Civil Service Law by a court personnel, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court. The CSC contends that respondent is now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CSC when he voluntarily submitted himself to the CSC-NCR and was accorded due process, citing the Ampong case. We disagree. In Ampong, petitioner in that case admitted her guilt. She voluntarily went to the CSC regional office, admitted to the charges leveled against her and waived her right to the assistance of counsel. She was given ample opportunity to present her side and adduce evidence in her defense before the CSC. She filed her answer to the charges against her and even moved for a reconsideration of the adverse ruling of the CSC. In short, Ampong did not question the authority of the CSC and, in fact, actively participated in the proceedings before it. In the present case, while respondent may have filed his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty after having been directed to do so, he denied having taken the civil service examination and did not even appear at the formal investigation conducted by the CSCNCR.12 He appealed to the CSC after the adverse decision of the CSC-NCR was rendered but raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. He argued that as an employee in the Judiciary, "the jurisdiction to hear disciplinary action against him vests with the Sandiganbayan or the Supreme Court."13 It cannot therefore be said that he was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CSC. This notwithstanding, we reiterate that we will not and cannot tolerate dishonesty for the judiciary expects the highest standard of integrity from all its employees. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden or responsibility. The Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 22 September 2008 and the Resolution dated 2 December 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100452. Accordingly, we DENY the instant petition. Nonetheless, weORDER the Civil Service Commission to refer the case of respondent Herminigildo L. Andal to the Office of the Court Administrator, for the filing of the appropriate administrative case against him. SO ORDERED.

Maceda vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 dayshave been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months. Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsmanconstitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act. In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial courtclerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-54288 December 15, 1982 ARTURO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. Augusto S. Jimenez for petitioner. Solicitor General for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: An appeal by certiorari from the Decision of respondent Sandiganbayan 1 in Criminal Case No. 190 convicting petitioner, Arturo de Guzman, of Malversation of Public Funds. We resolved to "(a) give due course to the petition and (b) require the parties to file their respective Memoranda on the constitutional questions raised." 1. Petitioner assails the rule-making power of the Sandiganbayan as violative of Article X, section 5(5) of the Constitution, which vests on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all Courts. It is true that Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, the law creating the Sandiganbayan vests it with rule-making power, thus: Sec. 9. Rule-making Power. The Sandiganbayan shall have the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure and, pending such promulgation, the Rules of Court shall govern its proceedings. However, since the Sandiganbayan is a Court, its rule-making power must be construed, out of "constitutional necessity" as being subject to the approval of the Rules by the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo had expressed this view in his Concurring Opinion in "Nuez vs. Sandiganbayan 111 SCRA 433, 455 (January 30, 1982), when he said: ... the rule-making power granted to it (the Sandiganbayan) by P.D. 1606 must of constitutional necessity be understood as signifying that any rule it may promulgate cannot have force and effect unless approved by the Supreme Court, as if they have originated therefrom. The "Rules of the Sandiganbayan" were promulgated on January 10, 1979, and Rule XVIII thereof expressly provides that they "shall take effect upon approval." The approval referred to can only refer to approval by the Supreme Court. The Sandiganbayan has submitted its Rules to this Court. In the absence of any action of approval or disapprobation from this Court the Sandiganbayan has to be guided by the Rules of Court. 2 We have reviewed the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and we have not found any indication therein of contravention of the Rules of Court. 2. Petitioner also impugns the authority of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide his case contending that inasmuch as it was the only division which had been constituted, it could not legally function as a judicial body and, consequently, he was placed in a "precarious predicament". This argument must also fail. Although the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice and eight Associate Justices 3, it does not mean that it cannot validly function without all of the Divisions constituted. Section 3 of PD 1606 provides that "the Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three Justices each". While Section 5 thereof provides that "the unanimous vote of the three justices in a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment." Thus, the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three Justices each and each Division functions independently of the other. As long as a Division has been duly constituted it is a judicial body whose pronouncements are binding as judgments of the Sandiganbayan. The judgment convicting petitioner was a unanimous Decision of the First Division duly constituted. It thus met the requirement for the pronouncement of a judgment as required by Section 5 of PD 1606 supra. We find no substance to the argument that no member could be expected to dissent because no special Division of five Justices could then be formed, considering that the Decision was a unanimous one and there was no indication that any one of the three Justices had intended to dissent. 3. Petitioner's contention that there is a dilution of his right to appeal inasmuch as Decisions of the Sandiganbayan are subject to review by this Court only by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court 4 and, consequently, he is deprived of his right to appeal on questions of fact, is neither meritorious. On this point, this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, stressed in the Nuez case:

Even from the standpoint then of the American decisions relied upon, it cannot be successfully argued that there is a dilution of the right to appeal. Admittedly, under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review coming from this Court. ... Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the negative. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a division of respondent Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which 'the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment. Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps excessively so as to the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of the facts. What cannot be sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to give due course to the petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome. In that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied. The standard as to when there is proof of such weight to justify a conviction is set forth in People vs. Dramayo. 5 Justice Barredo, in his Concurring Opinion also observed: ... I believe that the accused has a better guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence and the determination of the facts where there are three judges actually seeing and observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. It is Our constant jurisprudence that the cases where pivotal points are shown to have been overlooked by them. With more reason should this rule apply to the review of the decision of a collegiate trial court. Moreover, when the Court of Appeals passes on an appeal in a criminal case, it has only the records to rely on, and yet the Supreme Court has no power to reverse its findings of fact, with only the usual exceptions already known to all lawyers and judges. I strongly believe that the review of the decisions of the Sandiganbayan whose three justices have actually seen and observed the witnesses as provided for in P.D. 1606 is a more iron-clad guarantee that no person accused before such special court will ever be finally convicted without his guilt appearing beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by the Constitution. 6 4. Petitioner's argument that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation as the same was conductedex parte has much less to recommend it. Petitioner failed to appear at said investigation despite notice thereof received by a member of his family, in the same way that the formal administrative investigation against him for dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and for violation of civil service rules and regulations was similarly conducted ex parte because of petitioner's failure to appear despite due notice served upon and received by his wife, where he was found guilty as charged and dismissed from the service effect following his last day of service, with pay (Exhibit "C"). Besides, an ex parte preliminary investigation is authorized under section 11 of PD 911, reading: ... If respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed he does not appear before the investigating fiscal or state prosecutor, the preliminary investigation shall proceed without him. ... It should also be recalled that the statutory right to a preliminary investigation may be waived expressly or impliedly. Petitioner waived it when he failed to appear for such investigation despite notice. The denial of his petition for reinvestigation by the Tanodbayan was a matter of discretion with the latter. 5. Finally, petitioner's contention that his conviction is not in accord with the law and jurisprudence is unmeritorious. The judgment against petitioner sentenced him as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Arturo de Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, as defined and penalized in Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code; and in default of any modifying circumstance in attendance, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from Twelve (12) Years and one (1) Day, as minimum, to Eighteen (18) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day, as maximum, both of reclusion temporaral, with the accessories provided by law and with credit for preventive imprisonment undergone, if any, in accordance with the provision of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 6127; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; to pay a fine in the amount of Seventy Six Thousand Five Hundred Twenty One and 37/100 Pesos P 76,521.37); to indemnify the City of Manila, Republic of the Philippines, in the same amount of Seventy Six Thousand Five Hundred Twenty One and 37/100 Pesos (P76,521.37) representing the amount malversed and, to pay the costs. We find that the Sandiganbayan has not committed any error of law in convicting petitioner. For the period from May 22, 1978 to June 7, 1978, petitioner, as Travelling Collector and an accountable officer, collected the total amounhat his conviction is not in accord with law and jurisprudence is unmeritorious. The judgmt of P 204,319.32 from various agencies (Veterinary Inspection Board, Public Health Laboratory, North Cemetery, among others) but remitted to the General Teller (Mr. Gerardo Verder now retired), Cash Division Department of Finance, City of Manila, only P 127,797.95, thus resulting in a shortage of P 76,521.37. Said shortgage pertained to collections of petitioner from the Veterinary Inspection Board (Exhibits "H-1-i" to "H-1-n"). Petitioner's contention that his accountability was not proven considering that the audit examination was conducted in his absence and after he had signed the Report of Examination (Exhibit "H") in blank presented to him by Auditing Examiner Maximo Pielago, thus making said procedure irregular, is neither persuasive. If he was not present during the audit examination, petitioner himself was to blame for he should have known that when he received a demand letter from Pielago to produce his accountabilities (Exhibit "G") on June 5, 1978 an examination would be forthcoming. Upon petitioner's assurance that he had no more existing accountabilities as he had ceased to make collections due to his expected promotion, and his promise to produce his accountabilities on June 7 or 8, 1978, Pielago presented said Report of Examination to petitioner for signature. On this point, we are in full agreement with the findings of respondent Court: Neither is there any merit in the accused's asseverations that his accountability has not been proved. It is true that as candidly admitted by Auditing Examiner Pielago himself, he made the accused sign the Report of Examination (Exhibit H) in blank even before any examination could be conducted. But, this rather irregular procedure is not altogether without any reasonable explanation. As uncontradictedly explained by Pielago, he

resorted to that course of action because, upon his first demand to the accused for the production of his cash and cash items, the latter already told him that he had nothing to account for anymore because he had since ceased making collection in anticipation of his then supposed pending promotion. Evidently, because of this assurance from the accused, Pielago may have thought that the projected examination would be merely proforma and could not possibly result in anything but a zero-zero balance as far as the accounts of the accused were concerned. 7 It must be emphasized that petitioner did not report - for work anymore beginning June 9, 1978, despite a demand from Pielago for the production of his accountabilities (Exhibit "M"), a reminder of his criminal liability, and the fact that administrative charges had been filed against him for violation of civil service rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service (Exhibit "F"). Pielago thus proceeded with the audit examination of petitioner's accountability from the official records available namely: ... Official Receipts issued by him to collection agents from whom he received public funds (Exhibits H-1-a to H1-n); Daily Statements of Collections Exhibits I, I-1 to I-7) and Official Receipts (Exhibits L, L-1 to L-8) covering remittances made by him of his collection to the General Teller, the Ledger reflecting entries of collections made by him from the Veterinary Inspection Board (Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-1-a to Q-1-f, Q-2, Q-2-a to Q-2-e); and the Cashbooks also recording his remittances of his collections to the General Teller (Exhibits J, J-1, J-1-a, J-2, J-2a, K, K-1, K-I-a K-2-a, and K-2-b) 8 As against the above documentary evidence, petitioner's posture that he had turned over his collections everyday to Mr. Gerardo Verder the General Teller then, who had assured him that he would do the explaining, is lame, indeed. Besides, he could not but admit his accountability for receipts, with serial nos. 155901 to 155990, issued by him, but under the accountability of Gregorio Sano a travelling collector, because of petitioner's own pending request for transfer of accountability. 9 In the face of the evidence presented, petitioner failed to overcome the presumption under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any public officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal use. In Malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession public funds, that he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the same. An accountable public officer may be convicted of Malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily. 10 Neither do we find tenable petitioner's contention that his accountability was not established as the Report of Examination was denominated by Pielago as "preliminary". As held by respondent Court: True, the report of the audit aforesaid was denominated as 'preliminary'. But, this does not imply that the same may not be taken as basis for determining the extent of the accountability of the accused as of the date of said audit. If there was anything tentative about the finding made, it was only because collections of the accused under official receipts known to be still in his possession and the stubs of which had not yet been submitted, were not yet accounted for. Hence, the only meaning that the term 'preliminary' had in the premises was that the amount of shortage could still be increased if all said receipts are eventually found and taken into account. But, on the basis of the records available to the auditor, the amount of shortage established could not but be considered final. All told, we are convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence in petitioner's favor has been overcome and his guilt established beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, convicting petitioner of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner, Arturo de Guzman. SO ORDERED.

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012 By LLBe:LawLifeBuzzEtcetera Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current co mposition. The respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the petition. Issues: (1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this case; and (2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. Held: (1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue. The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official n ominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders. (2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particul ar allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

NITAFAN vs COMMISSIONER Constitutional Law Income Tax Payment By The Judiciary Nitafan and some others seek to prohibit the CIR from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. On June 7 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice. ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax. HELD: What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-2348 February 27, 1950

GREGORIO PERFECTO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BIBIANO MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant. First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Francisco Carreon for oppositor and appellant. Gregorio Perfecto in his own behalf. BENGZON, J.: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. The Manila judge upheld his contention, and required the refund of the amount collected. The defendant appealed. The death of Mr. Justice Perfecto has freed us from the embarrassment of passing upon the claim of a colleague. Still, as the outcome indirectly affects all the members of the Court, consideration of the matter is not without its vexing feature. Yet adjudication may not be declined, because (a) we are not legally disqualified; (b) jurisdiction may not be renounced, ad it is the defendant who appeals to this Court, and there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred; (c) supreme courts in the United States have decided similar disputes relating to themselves; (d) the question touches all the members of the judiciary from top to bottom; and (e) the issue involves the right of other constitutional officers whose compensation is equally protected by the Constitution, for instance, the President, the Auditor-General and the members of the Commission on Elections. Anyway the subject has been thoroughly discussed in many American lawsuits and opinions, and we shall hardly do nothing more than to borrow therefrom and to compare their conclusions to local conditions. There shall be little occasion to formulate new propositions, for the situation is not unprecedented. Our Constitution provides in its Article VIII, section 9, that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts "shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." It also provides that "until Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos". When in 1945 Mr. Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not "provided otherwise", by fixing a different salary for associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year. Now, does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution thereof?. A note found at page 534 of volume 11 of the American Law Reports answers the question in the affirmative. It says: Where the Constitution of a state provides that the salaries of its judicial officers shall not be dismissed during their continuance in office, it had been held that the state legislature cannot impose a tax upon the compensation paid to the judges of its court. New Orleans v. Lea (1859) 14 La. Ann. 194; Opinion of Attorney-General if N. C. (1856) 48 N. C. (3 Jones, L.) Appx. 1; Re Taxation of Salaries of Judges (1902) 131 N. C. 692, 42 S. E. 970; Com. ex. rel. Hepburn v. Mann (1843) 5 Watts & S,. (Pa.) 403 [but see to the contrary the earlier and much criticized case of Northumberland county v. Chapman (1829) 2 Rawle (Pa.) 73]* A different rule prevails in Wisconsin, according to the same annotation. Another state holding the contrary view is Missouri. The Constitution of the United States, likes ours, forbids the diminution of the compensation of Judges of the Supreme Court and of inferior courts. The Federal Governments has an income tax law. Does it embrace the salaries of federal judges? In answering this question, we should consider four periods: First period. No attempts was made to tax the compensation of Federal judges up to 1862 1. Second period. 1862-1918. In July, 1862, a statute was passed subjecting the salaries of "civil officers of the United States" to an income tax of three per cent. Revenue officers, construed it as including the compensation of all judges; but Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the judiciary, wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury a letter of protest saying, among other things: The act in question, as you interpret it, diminishes the compensation of every judge 3 per cent, and if it can be diminished to that extent by the name of a tax, it may, in the same way, be reduced from time to time, at the pleasure of the legislature. The judiciary is one of the three great departments of the government, created and established by the Constitution. Its duties and powers are specifically set forth, and are of a character that requires it to be perfectly independent of the two other departments, and in order to place it beyond the reach and above even the suspicion of any such influence, the power to reduce their compensation is expressly withheld from Congress, and excepted from their powers of legislation. Language could not be more plain than that used in the Constitution. It is, moreover, one of its most important and essential provisions. For the articles which limits the powers of the legislative and executive branches of the government, and those which provide safeguards for the protection of the citizen in his person and property, would be of little value without a judiciary to uphold and maintain them, which was free from every influence, direct and indirect, that might by possibility in times of political excitement warp their judgments. Upon these grounds I regard an act of Congress retaining in the Treasury a portion of the Compensation of the judges, as unconstitutional and void2. The protest was unheeded, although it apparently bore the approval of the whole Supreme Court, that ordered it printed among its records. But in 1869 Attorney-General Hoar upon the request of the Secretary of the Treasury rendered an opinion agreeing with the

Chief Justice. The collection of the tax was consequently discontinued and the amounts theretofore received were all refunded. For half a century thereafter judges' salaries were not taxed as income. 3 Third period. 1919-1938. The Federal Income Tax Act of February 24, 1919 expressly provided that taxable income shall include "the compensation of the judges of the Supreme Court and inferior courts of the United States". Under such Act, Walter Evans, United States judge since 1899, paid income tax on his salary; and maintaining that the impost reduced his compensation, he sued to recover the money he had delivered under protest. He was upheld in 1920 by the Supreme Court in an epoch-making decision.*, explaining the purpose, history and meaning of the Constitutional provision forbidding impairment of judicial salaries and the effect of an income tax upon the salary of a judge. With what purpose does the Constitution provide that the compensation of the judges "shall not be diminished during their continuance in office"? Is it primarily to benefit the judges, or rather to promote the public weal by giving them that independence which makes for an impartial and courageous discharge of the judicial function? Does the provision merely forbid direct diminution, such as expressly reducing the compensation from a greater to a less sum per year, and thereby leave the way open for indirect, yet effective, diminution, such as withholding or calling back a part as tax on the whole? Or does it mean that the judge shall have a sure and continuing right to the compensation, whereon he confidently may rely for his support during his continuance in office, so that he need have no apprehension lest his situation in this regard may be changed to his disadvantage? The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory that a larger measure of liberty and justice would be assured by vesting the three powers the legislative, the executive, and the judicial in separate departments, each relatively independent of the others and it was recognized that without this independence if it was not made both real and enduring the separation would fail of its purpose. all agreed that restraints and checks must be imposed to secure the requisite measure of independence; for otherwise the legislative department, inherently the strongest, might encroach on or even come to dominate the others, and the judicial, naturally the weakest, might be dwarf or swayed by the other two, especially by the legislative. The particular need for making the judiciary independent was elaborately pointed our by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist, No. 78, from which we excerpt the following: xxx xxx xxx

At a later period John Marshall, whose rich experience as lawyer, legislator, and chief justice enable him to speak as no one else could, tersely said (debates Va. Gonv. 1829-1831, pp. 616, 619): . . . Our courts are the balance wheel of our whole constitutional system; and our is the only constitutional system so balanced and controlled. Other constitutional systems lacks complete poise and certainly of operation because they lack the support and interpretation of authoritative, undisputable courts of law. It is clear beyond all need of exposition that for the definite maintenance of constitutional understandings it is indispensable, alike for the preservation of the liberty of the individual and for the preservation of the integrity of the powers of the government, that there should be some nonpolitical forum in which those understandings can be impartially debated and determined. That forum our courts supply. There the individual may assert his rights; there the government must accept definition of its authority. There the individual may challenge the legality of governmental action and have it adjudged by the test of fundamental principles, and that test the government must abide; there the government can check the too aggressive self-assertion of the individual and establish its power upon lines which all can comprehend and heed. The constitutional powers of the courts constitute the ultimate safeguard alike of individual privilege and of governmental prerogative. It is in this sense that our judiciary is the balance wheel of our entire system; it is meant to maintain that nice adjustment between individual rights and governmental powers which constitutes political liberty. Constitutional government in the United States, pp. 17, 142. Conscious in the nature and scope of the power being vested in the national courts, recognizing that they would be charge with responsibilities more delicate and important than any ever before confide to judicial tribunals, and appreciating that they were to be, in the words of George Washington, "the keystone of our political fabric", the convention with unusual accord incorporated in the Constitution the provision that the judges "shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." Can there be any doubt that the two things thus coupled in place the clause in respect of tenure during good behaviour and that in respect of an undiminishable compensation-were equally coupled in purpose? And is it not plain that their purposes was to invest the judges with an independence in keeping with the delicacy and importance of their task, and with the imperative need for its impartial and fearless performance? Mr. Hamilton said in explanation and support of the provision (Federalist No. 79): "Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. . . . In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will. xxx xxx xxx

These considerations make it very plain, as we think, that the primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench, and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations, and pervading principles of the constitution, and to the admiration of justice without respect to persons, and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. xxx xxx xxx

But it is urged that what plaintiff was made to pay back was an income tax, and that a like tax was exacted of others engaged in private employment. If the tax in respect of his compensation be prohibited, it can find no justification in the taxation of other income as to which there is no prohibition, for, of course, doing what the Constitution permits gives no license to do what it prohibits. The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed against all diminution, whether for one purpose or another; and the reason for its adoption, as publicly assigned at the time and commonly accepted ever since,

make with impelling force for the conclusion that the fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that they regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. (American law Reports, annotated, Vol. 11, pp. 522-25; Evans vs. Gore, supra.) In September 1, 1919, Samuel J. Graham assumed office as judge of the Unites States court of claims. His salary was taxed by virtue of the same time income tax of February 24, 1919. At the time he qualified, a statute fixed his salary at P7,500. He filed action for reimbursement, submitting the same theory on which Evans v. Gore had been decided. The Supreme Court of the United States in 1925 reaffirmed that decision. It overruled the distinction offered by Solicitor-General Beck that Judge Graham took office after the income tax had been levied on judicial salaries, (Evans qualified before), and that Congress had power "to impose taxes which should apply to the salaries of Federal judges appointed after the enactment of the taxing statute." (The law had made no distinction as to judges appointed before or after its passage) Fourth period. 1939 Foiled in their previous attempts, the Revenue men persisted, and succeeded in inserting in the United States Revenue Act of June, 1932 the modified proviso that "gross income" on which taxes were payable included the compensation "of judges of courts of the United States taking office after June 6, 1932". Joseph W. Woodrough qualified as United States circuit judge on May 1, 1933. His salary as judge was taxed, and before the Supreme Court of the United States the issue of decrease of remuneration again came up. That court, however, ruled against him, declaring (in 1939) that Congress had the power to adopt the law. It said: The question immediately before us is whether Congress exceeded its constitutional power in providing that United States judges appointed after the Revenue Act of 1932 shall not enjoy immunity from the incidence of taxation to which everyone else within the defined classes of income is subjected. Thereby, of course, Congress has committed itself to the position that a non-discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is not, when applied to the income of federal judge, a diminution of his salary within the prohibition of Article 3, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. To suggest that it makes inroads upon the independence of judges who took office after the Congress has thus charged them with the common duties of citizenship, by making them bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great historic experience on which the framers based the safeguards of Article 3, Sec. 1. To subject them to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges also are citizens, and that their particular function in government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are charged with administering. (O'Malley vs. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, A. L. R. 1379.) Now, the case for the defendant-appellant Collector of Internal Revenue is premised mainly on this decision (Note A). He claims it holds "that federal judges are subject to the payment of income taxes without violating the constitutional prohibition against the reduction of their salaries during their continuance in office", and that it "is a complete repudiation of the ratio decidenci of Evans vs. Gore". To grasp the full import of the O'Malley precedent, we should bear in mind that: 1. It does not entirely overturn Miles vs. Graham. "To the extent that what the Court now says is inconsistent with what said in Miles vs. Graham, the latter can not survive", Justice Frankfurter announced. 2. It does not expressly touch nor amend the doctrine in Evans vs, Gore, although it indicates that the Congressional Act in dispute avoided in part the consequences of that case. Carefully analyzing the three cases (Evans, Miles and O'Malley) and piecing them together, the logical conclusion may be reached that although Congress may validly declare by law that salaries of judges appointed thereaftershall be taxed as income (O'Malley vs. Woodrough) it may not tax the salaries of those judges already in office at the time of such declaration because such taxation would diminish their salaries (Evans vs. Gore; Miles vs. Graham). In this manner the rationalizing principle that will harmonize the allegedly discordant decision may be condensed. By the way, Justice Frankfurter, writing the O'Malley decision, says the Evans precedent met with disfavor from legal scholarship opinion. Examining the issues of Harvard Law review at the time of Evans vs. Gore (Frankfurter is a Harvard graduate and professor), we found that such school publication criticized it. Believing this to be the "inarticulate consideration that may have influenced the grounds on which the case went off"4, we looked into the criticism, and discovered that it was predicated on the position that the 16th Amendment empowered Congress "to collect taxes on incomes from whatever source derived" admitting of no exception. Said the Harvard Law Journal: In the recent case of Evans vs. Gore the Supreme Court of the United States decided that by taxing the salary of a federal judge as a part of his income, Congress was in effect reducing his salary and thus violating Art. III, sec. 1, of the Constitution. Admitting for the present purpose that such a tax really is a reduction of salary, even so it would seem that the words of the amendment giving power to tax 'incomes, from whatever source derived', are sufficiently strong to overrule pro tanto the provisions of Art. III, sec. 1. But, two years ago, the court had already suggested that the amendment in no way extended the subjects open to federal taxation. The decision in Evans vs. Gore affirms that view, and virtually strikes from the amendment the words "from whatever source derived". (Harvard law Review, vol. 34, p. 70) The Unites States Court's shift of position5 might be attributed to the above detraction which, without appearing on the surface, led to Frankfurter's sweeping expression about judges being also citizens liable to income tax. But it must be remembered that undisclosed factor the 16th Amendment has no counterpart in the Philippine legal system. Our Constitution does not repeat it. Wherefore, as the underlying influence and the unuttered reason has no validity in this jurisdiction, the broad generality loses much of its force. Anyhow the O'Malley case declares no more than that Congress may validly enact a law taxing the salaries of judges appointed after its passage. Here in the Philippines no such law has been approved. Besides, it is markworthy that, as Judge Woodrough had qualified after the express legislative declaration taxing salaries, he could not very well complain. The United States Supreme Court probably had in mind what in other cases was maintained, namely, that the tax levied on the salary in effect decreased the emoluments of the office and therefore the judge qualified with such reduced emoluments.6 The O'Malley ruling does not cover the situation in which judges already in office are made to pay tax by executive interpretation, without express legislative declaration. That state of affairs is controlled by the administrative and judicial standards herein-before

described in the "second period" of the Federal Government, namely, the views of Chief Justice Taney and of Attorney-General Hoar and the constant practice from 1869 to 1938, i.e., when the Income Tax Law merely taxes "income" in general, it does not include salaries of judges protected from diminution. In this connection the respondent would make capital of the circumstance that the Act of 1932, upheld in the O'Malley case, has subsequently been amended by making it applicable even to judges who took office before1932. This shows, the appellant argues, that Congress interprets the O'Malley ruling to permit legislative taxation of the salary of judges whether appointed before the tax or after. The answer to this is that the Federal Supreme Court expressly withheld opinion on that amendment in the O'Malley case. Which is significant. Anyway, and again, there is here no congressional directive taxing judges' salaries. Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves an amendment to the Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter appointed", the O'Malley case is not relevant. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here; 7 and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham were then outstanding doctrines; and the inference is not illogical that in restraining the impairment of judicial compensation the Fathers of the Constitution intended to preclude taxation of the same.8 It seems that prior to the O'Malley decision the Philippine Government did not collect income tax on salaries of judges. This may be gleaned from General Circular No. 449 of the Department of Finance dated March 4, 1940, which says in part: xxx xxx xxx

The question of whether or not the salaries of judges should be taken into account in computing additional residence taxes is closely linked with the liability of judges to income tax on their salaries, in fact, whatever resolution is adopted with respect to either of said taxes be followed with respect to the other. The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, to which the attention of this department has been drawn, appears to have enunciated a new doctrine regarding the liability of judges to income tax upon their salaries. In view of the fact that the question is of great significance, the matter was taken up in the Council of State, and the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice was requested to give an opinion on whether or not, having in mind the said decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, there is justification in reversing our present ruling to the effect that judges are not liable to tax on their salaries. After going over the opinion of the court in the said case, the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, stated that although the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States is not binding in the Philippines, the doctrine therein enunciated has resolved the issue of the taxability of judges' salaries into a question of policy. Forthwith, His Excellency the President decided that the best policy to adopt would be to collect income and additional residence taxes from the President of the Philippines, the members of the Judiciary, and the Auditor General, and the undersigned was authorized to act accordingly. In view of the foregoing, income and additional residence taxes should be levied on the salaries received by the President of the Philippines, members of the Judiciary, and the Auditor General during the calendar year 1939 and thereafter. . . . . (Emphasis ours.) Of course, the Secretary of Justice correctly opined that the O'Malley decision "resolved the issue of taxability of judges' salaries into a question of policy." But that policy must be enunciated by Congressional enactment, as was done in the O'Malley case, not by Executive Fiat or interpretation. This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter. Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges personal and therefore waivable but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest. (Evans vs. Gore) Indeed the exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or privilege. Let the highest court of Maryland speak: The exemption of the judicial compensation from reduction is not in any true sense a gratuity, privilege or exemption. It is essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is the money salary. The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their connection with their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that they guaranty against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely a nominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the public purpose promoted is received in the place of the tax. Theory and Practice of Taxation (1900), D. A. Wells, p. 541. (Gordy vs. Dennis (Md.) 1939, 5 Atl. Rep. 2d Series, p. 80) It is hard to see, appellants asserts, how the imposition of the income tax may imperil the independence of the judicial department. The danger may be demonstrated. Suppose there is power to tax the salary of judges, and the judiciary incurs the displeasure of the Legislature and the Executive. In retaliation the income tax law is amended so as to levy a 30 per cent on all salaries of government officials on the level of judges. This naturally reduces the salary of the judges by 30 per cent, but they may not grumble because the

tax is general on all receiving the same amount of earning, and affects the Executive and the Legislative branches in equal measure. However, means are provided thereafter in other laws, for the increase of salaries of the Executive and the Legislative branches, or their perquisites such as allowances, per diems, quarters, etc. that actually compensate for the 30 per cent reduction on their salaries. Result: Judges compensation is thereby diminished during their incumbency thanks to the income tax law. Consequence: Judges must "toe the line" or else. Second consequence: Some few judges might falter; the great majority will not. But knowing the frailty of human nature, and this chink in the judicial armor, will the parties losing their cases against the Executive or the Congress believe that the judicature has not yielded to their pressure? Respondent asserts in argumentation that by executive order the President has subjected his salary to the income tax law. In our opinion this shows obviously that, without such voluntary act of the President, his salary would not be taxable, because of constitutional protection against diminution. To argue from this executive gesture that the judiciary could, and should act in like manner is to assume that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs. The judgment will be affirmed. So ordered.

ENDENCIA vs DAVID Separation of Powers Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional. HELD: By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertai nment of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pas s any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. ** The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials. The independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1925 June 26, 2006 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-989-RTJ) GRACE F. MUNSAYAC C. DE VILLA, LILY F. MUNSAYAC- SUNGA, and ROY PETER F. MUNSAYAC,Complainants, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO C. REYES, Respondent. x--------------------------------------x A. M. NO. RTJ-05-1926 June 26, 2006 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 01-1248-RTJ) RAMON K. ILUSORIO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO C. REYES, RTC, BRANCH 61, BAGUIO CITY, Respondent. x--------------------------------------x A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1927 June 26, 2006 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1435-RTJ) JUDGE RUBEN C. AYSON, Complainant, vs. RTC JUDGES OF BAGUIO CITY, Respondents. x--------------------------------------x A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1928 June 26, 2006 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1485-RTJ) JUDGE CLARENCE VILLANUEVA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE RUBEN C. AYSON, Respondent. x--------------------------------------x A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1929 June 26, 2006 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1552-RTJ) JUDGE RUBEN C. AYSON, Complainant, vs. JUDGE ABRAHAM BORRETA, Respondent. x--------------------------------------x A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1930 June 26, 2006 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1559-RTJ) ATTY. CRISTETA R. CALUZA-FLORES, Complainant, vs. JUDGE AMADO S. CAGUIOA, Respondent. x--------------------------------------x A.M. NO. P-05-2020 June 26, 2006 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1358-P) HON. AMADO S. CAGUIOA Complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISTETA R. CALUZA-FLORES, Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: Before the Court are these administrative matters most of which are offshoots of the disapproval by Hon. Antonio C. Reyes, as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, of the January 24, 2002 order of inhibition issued by RTC Judge

Ruben C. Ayson of the same city, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 5140-R entitled Sps. Espirita Malecdan, et al., Plaintiffs, versus Mabel Joan Tadoan, et al., Defendants, in which the latter inhibited himself from hearing the case. 1 Obviously resenting the aforementioned disapproval action, Judge Ayson issued, on the same date, another order 2 in which he not only delved on the issue of inhibition, but dwelt on matters alien therefrom and proceeded to ascribe on his colleagues in Baguio City what to him are acts constituting misconduct, corruption and immorality. Named as erring officials were RTC Judges Amado S. Caguioa, Antonio Esteves, Clarence J. Villanueva, Abraham B. Borreta, Edilberto T. Claravall and Antonio C. Reyes of Branch Nos. 4, 5, 7, 59, 60, and 61, respectively. Judge Aysons expos contained in his Order of January 24, 2002 found its way into the pages of The Daily Inquirer, am ong other dailies, and eventually reached the Court which, thru the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), then asked the judges mentioned in said order to comment thereon. Thereafter, Judge Ayson, as directed by the Court, formalized his complaint against his colleagues thru an Affidavit dated May 13, 2002.3 In it, Judge Ayson made specific reference to the separate administrative complaints for serious misconduct initiated by Ramon K. Ilusorio, on one hand, and Dr. Grace Munsayac-de Villa, et al., on the other, against Judge Antonio C. Reyes. In the ensuing formal investigation conducted, Judge Ayson would adopt his affidavit-complaint, marked as Exhibit "A", as part of his direct testimony in all the cases subject of A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1435-RTJ. Subsequent developments saw Atty. Cristeta Caluza-Flores, Clerk of Court of Branch 4, joining the fray by filing an administrative case against the presiding judge (Judge Caguioa) of that branch. And consequent to the filing by Atty. Flores of her complaint and by Judge Ayson of his affidavit-complaint aforestated and the bill of particulars thereto, countercharges were also instituted. Per an en banc Resolution of October 15, 2002, the Court directed Court of Appeals Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto to conduct a formal investigation on the aforementioned charges and counter-charges and to include in the probe the complaints of private parties against Judge Antonio C. Reyes and thereafter to submit his report and recommendation. Following a marathon joint hearings, the Investigating Justice submitted a 72-paged Consolidated Report4 dated May 27, 2003 on the sworn complaints which, upon the OCAs recommendation, were each redocketed as a regular administrative matter. I. A. M. NO. RTJ-05-1925 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-989-RTJ): Grace F. Munsayac-De Villa, et al. Complainants, vs. Judge Antonio C. Reyes, Respondent Albeit previously ordered dismissed via a Resolution dated April 22, 2002 (Exh. "5"-Reyes),5 the Court, in an en banc resolution of July 16, 2002, ordered the inclusion of this case in the formal investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1435-RTJ (Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs. RTC Judges of Baguio City), with a directive for the Investigating Justice to allow the introduction of evidence thereon. In their verified complaint filed on July 12, 2000 (Exh. "W"), Grace F. Munsayac-de Villa, et al., charged respondent Judge Reyes with Serious Misconduct and Inefficiency. The grounds for the Munsayac complaint arose from the proceedings in Special Proc. (SP) No. 704-R for the issuance of letters of administration where complainants, Grace M. De Villa, Lily M. Sunga and Roy Peter Munsayac, were petitioners. In sum, the complaint alleges that the respondent judge exhibited extreme hostility against complainants and manifest partiality towards the oppositors in SP No. 704-R, and took unusual interest in the case. Respondents unreasonable delay in resolving a motion for his inhibi tion and for gross ignorance of the law form the basis for the charge of serious inefficiency. Specifically, the complaint asks that respondent Judge Reyes, as the presiding judge in whose sala SP No. 704-R was pending, be adjudged administratively liable for (1) Issuing, without giving herein complainants, as petitioners in said proceedings an opportunity to be heard, unjust and oppressive orders which, among others, (a) directed them to release P3 Million to the oppositors, (b) declared, as part of the estate, properties that complainants claimed to be their own, and (c) directed them and certain third parties to produce documents of accounts; (2) Issuing, without hearing, arrest orders against Grace F. M. de Villa and Lily M. Sunga for alleged violation of his orders; (3) Refusing to act on complainants request for inhibition and insisting on hearing SP. No. 704 -R even after a Motion for Inhibition was filed; (4) Unjustifiably failing to act on a Motion filed by certain corporations which were not parties to the case, to make a limited appearance; and (5) Issuing orders against complainants without giving them time to hire another counsel. After identifying the complaint she and her co-complainants filed against the respondent judge and the perceived unjust and oppressive orders he issued in S.P. No. 704-R, complainant Grace Munsayac M. de Villa testified on the respondent judges refusal to act on their request for inhibition. In his Comment,6 Judge Reyes denied the various charges hurled against him by the Munsayacs, explaining, at the outset, that it was the courts duty to determine the extent and worth of the estate of the deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta F. Munsayac. The respondent judge also alleged that, consequent to his issuance, at the instance of the oppositors, of subpoena to different banks, the following material events transpired: 1. Jewelry items apparently placed by the decedents in a safety deposit box at the Allied Bank were uncovered. This led to the issuance by the court of a freeze order. 2. The Branch Manager of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) testified in court that complainants de Villa and Sunga were able to transfer their mothers P13,506,343.33 deposits -- contained in UCPB Investment

Confirmation (IC) No. 0666 of Trust Account No. TA-2966 in the name of "Vicenta Munsayac or Grace M. de Villa or Lily M. Sunga" -- into their own personal accounts immediately after their mothers death and that at its maturity date on May 22, 1995, IC No. 0666 was "rolled-over under three (3) different Investment Confirmations," which appeared to be in the name of only "Grace M. de Villa or Lily Sunga;" 3. That upon being summoned by the court to shed light on what happened to the name of Vicenta Munsayac in the 3 ICs, the UCPB Bank Manager testified that Vicentas name in the 3 original certificates were erased by a bank manager in connivance with and upon order of de Villa and Sunga. In the light of what appeared to be attempts to deceive other heirs, Judge Reyes issued an order dated May 4, 2000 granting the Motion of the Special Administrator for complainants de Villa and Sunga to turn over the amount of P13,506,343.33, inclusive of accrued interest, in custodia legis for the benefit of the estate of Vicenta F. Munsayac, the heirs and the government. It was, according to the respondent judge, complainant de Villas and Sungas refusal to comply with said order, as reiterated in another order of May 24, 2000 with a contempt proviso, followed by de Villas open court manifestation on June 1, 2000, that she was not ready to comply with the order, that impelled him to order de Villas arrest. Continuing, the respondent judge related that de Villa was immediately released thereafter when she and her two (2) siblings made an undertaking to comply with the courts order; that when they still failed to comply, he issued another order dated June 22, 2000 for their arrest. Among other documents, Judge Reyes attached to his Comment machine copies of the Agency Safekeeping Certificate No. 006311 dated April 22, 1995 in the amount of P15,298,835.95 and Agency Safekeeping Certificate No. 006326 dated April 28, 1995 in the amounts of P2,894,705.31 and P116,116.71 of the Philippine Banking Corporation, Baguio City (Annexes "H" and "I" to Comment), which show that the said amounts belonged to the late Vicenta Munsayac and, therefore, formed part of her estate. In the same Comment, Judge Reyes cites Section 8, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court7 to justify the arrest order he issued against complainant de Villa who refused to comply with his previous orders, which was within her power to perform. According to the respondent judge, complainant de Villa herself forced his hand to issue the first arrest order when she failed to keep her undertaking to bring to the court certification of bank deposits that wer e previously in her late mothers name. With respect to his order dated August 17, 1999, granting the plea of Nora and Gelacio Munsayac, Jr. for a P1 Million cash advance each, the respondent judge offered the following explanations for the grant, viz: a) Nora, the daughter of the decedents, was a very sick woman needing immediate medical attention; b) Gelacio, Jr. manifested having no other means of livelihood, all the family corporations being under the full control of his co-heirs de Villa, Sunga and Roy; c) That his order provided that the amounts advanced will be credited to Nora and Gelacio, Jr.s shares in the estate of their deceased parents; and d) That there was enough money for all the children and the cash advances could have been very well provided for were if not for de Villa and Sungas surreptitious withdrawals of decedent Vicenta Munsayacs money in the bank. Anent the issue of his inhibition, the respondent judge submitted, as required, a Comment to the OCA therein stressing that the matter of inhibition and the legality of his orders have been raised by complainants de Villa, et al., before the Court of Appeals (CA) in a petition for certiorari, docketed thereat as CA G.R. SP. No. 55193, which was resolved against the petitioners therein in a decision promulgated on February 23, 2001 (Exhs. "22," "22-a"-Reyes). Judge Reyes thus claims that it was due to the said petition which involved, among others, the issue of inhibition which prompted him to refrain from acting on the corresponding motion for inhibition. Finally, the respondent judge denied issuing the disputed orders without notice to herein complainants, stating that the records of the case will attest to the fact of sending and the receipt of such notices by every counsel of record. From the evidence adduced, the Court is unable to make out a case for serious misconduct and inefficiency against respondent Judge Reyes. As it were, the basic Munsayac complaint links the respondent judges culpability to several orders he issued in SP. No. 704-R, which complainants claim to be unjust, to call for the issuance of warrants of arrest issued against two of them, and to the respondents refusal to act on a request for inhibition. As above discussed, however, the respondent judge has explained at length and with some measure of plausibility the circumstances under which the various orders complained of were issued by him and the reasons for their issuance. To begin with, not one of the various orders complained of can, on their face, be rightly tagged as unjust. It cannot be overemphasized that these orders were issued in a case over which Judge Reyes had jurisdiction. Accordingly, complainants appropriate recourse therefrom would have been to raise the issue of the validity of such orders to the CA or this Court in a certiorari proceedings and not in an administrative case. For, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every judicial act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is available. 8 Militating further against the complaint is the fact that there is no competent evidence to show that Judge Reyes issued the orders in question with malice or in bad faith or for some fraudulent, corrupt or dishonest motive. We can allow that some of such orders may have been unjustified or even erroneous, albeit the circumstances leading to their issuance tend to argue against such conclusion. At any event, the respondent judge, or any public officer for that matter, is not amenable to disciplinary action for his orders, even if erroneous, if that be the case, absent proof that malice or bad faith attended the issuance thereof. 9 This is so because, in the absence of a showing that the acts complained of were done with malice or an intention to violate the law or disregard the Rules of Court or for some corrupt motive, they would, at best, constitute errors of judgment which do not amount to serious misconduct. 10 With respect to the arrest orders issued by the respondent judge against complainant de Villa, the Court notes that some of such orders, inclusive of the warrants of arrest against her and the matter of the respondent judges inhibition, were challenged before the CA in a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 55193 (Grace F. Munsayac de

Villa, et al., Petitioners, vs. Judge Antonio C. Reyes, et al., Respondents). And as aptly pointed out by the respondent judge, the CA, in its Decision dated February 23, 2001, dismissed the petition for lack of merit. 11 In all, the Munsayac complaint against Judge Antonio C. Reyes in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1925, which the Court had previously dismissed in its Resolution dated April 22, 2002 (Exh. "5"-Reyes) appears to be really without merit, and should, therefore, be dismissed. II. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1926 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 01-1248-RTJ): Ramon K. Ilusorio vs. Judge Antonio C. Reyes, RTC Baguio City, Br. 61 Like the Munsayac complaint, the Court, in an en banc Resolution promulgated on July 16, 2002, ordered the inclusion of this administrative complaint of Ramon K. Ilusorio against Judge Antonio C. Reyes in the formal investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 021435-RTJ (Judge Ruben C. Ayson v. RTC Judges of Baguio City). In his verified Complaint dated September 20, 2001 (Exh. "F"), 12 which he later identified and adopted as his direct testimony, complainant Ramon K. Ilusorio alleged, in gist, the following: 1. That he has a case against the Baguio Country Club Corporation, Inc. (Club), docketed as Civil Case (CC) No. 4537-R of the RTC of Baguio, Branch 61, presided over by the respondent judge; 2. That his motion to have respondent inhibit himself, he (respondent) being a classmate of Atty. Federico Agcaoili, the Clubs president, was, together with complainants plea for injunction, denied; 3. That during the pendency of CC No. 4537-R, he received information about Judge Reyess account with the Club being charged to that of Atty. Agcaoili, who had requested the Clubs Accounts Receivables Manag er, Elizabeth Narciza, "to reverse against representation of the Club" the amount of P26,175.00 which represents "the unpaid chits" racked up with the Club by the respondent judge; 4. That pursuant to Atty. Agcaoilis request, Ms. Narciza sought, via a Memo dated December 16, 1999 to the Clubs General Manager, Anthony de Leon, and later secured approval of the desired reversal of account; and 5. That Judge Reyess acceptance of freebies constitutes bribery and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, or the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.. During the investigation, complainant Ilusorio presented Elizabeth Narciza who testified knowing Atty. Federico Agcaoili and having once held the position of Accounts Receivables Manager of the Club. She affirmed complainants allegations respecting the reversal of account and the memo she addressed to Mr. de Leon. On the witness box, Ms. Narcizas testified and/or identified certain documents, as indicated below: 1. A copy of the Statement of Account of "member #14 Account #14", and copy of GUEST CHECK NO. 107445 which bears the name Antonio Reyes (Exh. "G-3"), indicating that Judge Reyes, while not a Club member, was accorded special Club privileges. 2. Exhibit "G-4," a copy of the January 20, 1999 letter13 of Dr. Amado Dizon, Jr., a Club member with authority to sponsor a guest, addressed to the Club introducing "Judge Tony Reyes of the RTC Baguio who will be patronizing our Club sports facilities and restaurant" and requesting to the allow the latter as his guest who "may directly pay or charge xxx his chits to my account." In his Comment dated November 15, 2001,14 Judge Reyes alleged that, upon his denial of the writ of preliminary injunction applied for by complainant Ilusorio, followed by a denial of the latters motion for inhibition, the latter went to the CA on a petition for certiorari challenging his denial for the issuance of the injunctive writ, but the CA in its decision promulgated on January 12, 2001, and later this Court, upheld his order (Annexes "A" and "B" to Comment). In the same Comment, Judge Reyes denied knowledge of Atty. Agcaoilis purported request for reversal of account, noting in th is regard that the accounts allegedly reversed were for the months of August, September, and October 1999, while CC No. 4537-R was raffled off to him only on October 20, 1999. He also denied allegations that he used the Club facilities for free and cites Elizabeth Narcizas testimony, in which she identified the official receipt from the Club showing payment of his account with the Club in the amount of P29,069.92 made by him (TSN, Nov. 26, 2002; pp. 25-26). Pressing the point, Judge Reyes states that his use of the Clubs facilities was extended to him at the behest of Dr. Dizon whose Sponsorship Letter of January 2 2, 1999 came long before Ilusorios complaint in Civil Case No. 4537-R against the Club was assigned to him (Reyes) on October 20, 1999. Similarly, in his Affidavit which was also adopted as part of his direct testimony (Exh. "12"-Reyes), the respondent judge belied Ilusorios insinuation that his judgment favorable to the Club in CC No. 4537-R was a quid pro quo for his availment for free of the Clubs facilities. As the respondent judge alleged, CC No. 4537-R was resolved on the merits by this Court in its resolution promulgated on October 10, 2001 in G.R. No. 148985 (Ramon K. Ilusorio vs. Hon. Antonio C. Reyes and Baguio Country Club Corporation). The respondent judge further alleged in the same Affidavit that he had no dealings whatsoever with the Clubs management, except through Dr. Dizon. While complainant Ilusorios evidence cannot, in our appreciation, support a finding of guilt for bribery or violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is certainly not amiss to say that Judge Reyess c onduct under the premises fall short of the exacting standards for prudence expected of members of the bench. Trite as it may sound, a judges conduct must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum. But beyond proper decorum, such conduct must be above and beyond suspicion.15 Judge Reyess unyielding stance about having no knowledge of Atty. Agcaoilis request to reverse his (respondents) acc ount with the Club strains credulity. There can be no quibbling about such request having been made. Ms. Narciza testified about it and her Memo dated December 16, 1999 (Exh. "G-1") for the Clubs Acting General Manager has, for its subject, the reversal o f respondents account in question. As the Court notes, the said Memo clearly shows that the respondent judges accounts with t he Club for the months of August, September and October 1999 were charged to Atty. Agcaoilis account. While it may be true, as the

respondent judge claimed, that the accounts in question were incurred before October 20, 1999, the request for reversal of account was made by Atty. Agcaoili on December 16, 1999, at which date, the case against the Club was already assigned to the respondents court. It is extremely difficult to believe that Judge Reyes did not know of Atty. Agcaoilis request anytime before or after it was made. To be sure, the respondent judges evidence of payment of his accounts with the Club, under OR No. 80720 dated February 14, 2000 (Exh. "21-A"-Reyes) in the amount of P29,069.92, does not coincide with his account mentioned in Ms. Narcizas Memo (Exh. "G"), which summed up to only P21,115.00 and therefore obviously refers to a different account. To be sure, Judge Reyess acceptance of a favor from Atty. Agcaoili during the pendency of complainant Ilusorios civil case against the Club is highly censurable; it certainly does not speak well of Judge Reyess sense of delicadeza. The same may be said of the respondent judges act of allowing Club member Dr. Dizon to charge to him (Dizon) any account that he (respondent) may incur with the Club. The likelihood that any favor from a club member may somehow influence or affect the respondent judges judicial functions with respect to the Clubs pending case in his court or any case which the said sponsor may later have in the RTC of Baguio is not far-fetched. It may be that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to a party is not enough to sustain a charge of misconduct. It behooves the Court to once again remind the respondent judge, however, and all members of the bench for that matter, that they are expected to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion; 16 to endeavor to keep at all times the high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice, 17and, last but not least, to avoid situations likely to erode the faith of the people in the judiciary and bring it to disrepute.18 Judge Reyes cannot plausibly feign ignorance of this basic but wise counsel which had doubtless guided men in robes throughout the years and in the process evade any form of sanction. To be sure, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct contains a caveat against allowing the prestige of the judicial office to be used or lent to advance the private interests of others or to convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence a judge. Judge Reyess acts of impropriety and patent lack of delicadeza verily run counter to the injunction prescribed by the aforecited rule of the Code. Accordingly, as recommended by the Investigating Justice, the imposition of a fine against the respondent judge in the amount of P30,000.00, with a stern warning is deemed very much appropriate in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1926. III. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1927 (A.M. OCA IPI NO. 02-1435-RTJ): Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs. RTC Judges of Baguio City A. Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs. Judge Clarence J. Villanueva for immorality. On the charge of immorality against Judge Clarence J. Villanueva, complainant Judge Ruben C. Ayson alleged in his underlying affidavit-complaint that Judge Villanueva 1. Has with his mistress, Emy Tumaneng, a daughter named Shaira Marjorie Tumaneng, born on March 31, 1996, baptized on October 20, 1996 at the Don Bosco Parish Church, with Pauline Badul, his (Judge Villanuevas) clerk of court, and Abraham de Castro, as godmother and godfather, respectively; and 2. Has with the same woman a son named Richard Clarence Tumaneng born March 9, 1999 and acknowledged by Judge Villanueva as his child. The acknowledgment appears in the birth certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar, Baguio City. To support his charge, Judge Ayson presented documentary evidence consisting, among others, of the Certificate of Baptism (Exh. "A-1") of one Shaira Marjorie Tumaneng (Shaira, hereinafter) in which the names "Clarence Villanueva" and "Emy Tumaneng" ( Exh. "A-1-b") appear as her parents; a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Baguio City on certain entries in its Register of Births bearing on the child Shaira (Exh. "A-2"); certified xerox copies of the Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "A-3") of one Richard Clarence Parangan Tumaneng (Richard, hereinafter) in which the names "EMY PARANGAN TUMANENG" and "CLARENCE JAPSON VILLANUEVA" appear as mother and father, respectively, and at the back of which is an entry that reads "AFFIDAVIT OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/ ADMISSION OF PATERNITY" (Exh. "A-3-h"), which bears a signature on top of the typewritten name CLARENCE VILLANUEVA (Exh. "A-3-j"); and the Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "A-4") of Shaira (Exh. "A-4-c"). Judge Aysons witness, Sylvia R. Laudencia, OIC of the Baguio City Registrars Office, produced the original ce rtificates of live birth of both Richard and Shaira, confirming in effect that the certified photo-copies thus presented of the certificates of live birth of both Richard and Shaira are faithful reproduction of the originals thereof in the custody of her office. The witness also testified as to the authenticity of her signature appearing on the certified xerox copies of both documents. In his Sworn Statement dated December 9, 2002 (Exh. "1"-Villanueva), which he also adopted as his direct testimony, Judge Villanueva denied knowing Emy, Shaira and Richard Tumaneng or signing the certificates of live birth of Shaira and Richard Tumaneng both of whom he disclaimed as his children with Emy Tumaneng. Juxtaposed with the duly identified documents presented by Judge Ayson, Judge Villanuevas Sworn Statement embodying his defense has little to commend itself. As may be noted, written on the Certificate of Live Birth of Richard vis--vis the name and occupation of the childs father are: name - "Clarence Japson Villanueva" (Exh. "A-3-e"); occupation - "lawyer" (Exh. "A-3-f"). Further, at the back of such certificate, the name of the father appears to be Clarence J. Villanueva (Exh. "A-3-h"), which bears the signature of the said father (Exh. "A-3-j"). On the other hand, the name of the putative father does not appear in Shairas Birth Certificate. However, written on Shairas Certificate of Baptism issued by the Parish Priest of Don Bosco Parish (Exh. "A-1") are the following entries: "Shaira Marjorie Villanueva child of Clarence Villanueva and Emy Tumaneng" (Exhs. "A-1-a" and "A-1-b"). Exhibit "A-3," supra, being a public document, is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. 19 This document was, as earlier indicated, identified by the Civil Registrar of Baguio as a faithful reproduction of Richards Certificate of Live Birth in the registrys file and which she produced during her testimony. And while in the nature of a private document, the baptismal certificate of Shaira (Exh. "A-1"), may, for purposes of this administrative complaint, be accorded the same evidentiary weight as a public document, especially when the date of birth of the child indicated therein, i.e., March 31, 1996, coincides with the date of birth appearing in Shairas Certificate of Live Birth (Exhs. "A-4" and "A-4-b"). In net effect, the onus of refuting or disproving both documents and their contents falls on the respondent judge. Sad to state, however, Judge Villanueva has failed to discharge the burden. As it were, he relied on his uncorroborated denial respecting the filiation of both children and his relationship to Emy Tumaneng who is mentioned in Exhibits "A-1", "A-3" and "A-4" as the mother. Needless to state, Judge Vllanuevas evidence leaves much to be desired. To begin with, the Certificate of Baptism (Exh. "A-1") mentions the name of the officiating priest and the persons who stood as godfather and

godmother of Shaira. Judge Villanueva could and should have requested the priest or either of the baptismal sponsors to testify and perhaps clarify that the "Clarence Villanueva" mentioned in the baptismal certificate as father of Shaira refers to a different person. Also, the Certificate of Live Birth of Richard (Exh. "A-3") appears to have been prepared by staff nurse, Maria Theresa B. Fulgencio. Again, Judge Villanueva should have had asked Ms. Fulgencio to testify as to the real identity of the "Clarence Japson Villanueva" entered therein as the childs father. And more importantly, he should have called on the mother, Emy Tumaneng, to at least confirm his protestation over his imputed paternity of both children. Judge Villanueva has offered no explanation why he failed in that regard and, for this reason, thus failed to destroy the probative value of the said documents. Certainly not on lost on the Court is Judge Villanuevas failure, after having been apprised of Judge Aysons allegation that he had affixed his signature at the dorsal side of the childs Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "A -3"), to engage the services of a handwriting expert to shed light on the said signature and perchance confirm his theory of his purported signature being forged. In all, Judge Villanueva failed to substantiate his defense of not being the father of Shaira and Richard. And lest it be overlooked, Judge Villanueva, a married man, sired Shaira, who was born in March 1996, and Richard, who was born in March 1999, while he was occupying the position of RTC Judge of Baguio. This reality necessarily means that his intimate although illicit relationship with their mother, Emmy Tumaneng, started or at least continued during his incumbency as such judge. As it were, Judge Villanueva s service record on file with the Court yields the information that he was appointed RTC judge of Baguio on March 22, 1991, took his oath of office on April 1, 1991 and assumed office on April 8, 1991. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his discharge of judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. As we articulated in Castillo vs. Calanog,20 there is no dichotomy of morality: a public official, particularly a member of the judiciary, is also judged by his private morals. A judges official life cannot simply be detached from his personal existence. His publi c as well as his private life must be above suspicion. The charge of immorality proven against Judge Villanueva demonstrates his unfitness to remain in office and continue to discharge the functions of a judge.21 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies immorality as a serious offense. It is punishable by dismissal from the service with accessory penalties. With the view we take of the case, there is no reason for not meting out the severest form of disciplinary sanction, specially since the offense was committed in the very city where the respondent judge holds office. What is more, there seems to be little attempt on the part of Judge Villanueva to be discreet about his liaison with a women not his wife. The fact that Judge Ayson knew about Emy Tumaneng and the birth and baptism of Shaira and Richard would suggest as much. B. Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs. Judges Abraham B. Borreta, Amado S. Caguioa, Antonio M. Esteves & Clarence J. Villanueva for Gambling and Drinking in the Court Premises During Office Hours. On the charge of gambling and drinking against Judges Borreta, Caguioa, Esteves and Villanueva, complainant Judge Ayson alleged seeing respondents Judge Borreta et al., playing "pusoy" (a card game) with money bets and drinking liquor "three times in the Court premises during office hours", the first, in Judge Villanuevas sala lasting the whole afternoon of Sept ember 26, 2001 or just before the program of the Baguio IBP started; the second, in the morning until 12 noon of September 27, 2001 in Judge Caguioas sala, and the third, at about 1:30 p.m. of the same date, September 27, in the chambers of Judge Borreta. In his Comment22 to this particular charge, respondent Judge Borreta admitted playing, during a despedida party tendered for him on September 27, 2001 in connection with his transfer to Pasig City, what he described as a friendly game of "pusoy" with fellow Judges Caguioa, Villanueva and Esteves when only wine was served. He, however, denied allegations that he and the other respondent judges engaged in drinking and gambling on the other occasions mentioned in the complaint. For his part, respondent Judge Esteves, in his Comment,23 practically repeated what Judge Borreta said respecting what transpired during the despedida party adverted to, adding, however, that he recalled the judges agreeing "to use the winnings in the purchase of additional foodstuff for the party." Judge Esteves, therefore, denied Judge A ysons insinuation that RTC judges in Baguio regularly gambled in public. As to the drinking aspect, Judge Esteves asserts being "under strict medical instructions not to take any form of alcoholic drink." To prove his delicate health condition, Judge Esteves attached to his Comment medical certificates issued by Drs. Tiong and William Occidental (Annexes "A" and "B"), and the medical records from the Capitol Medical Center (Annexes "C" and "C-1"). For his part, respondent Judge Caguioa admitted in his separate Comment24 that card games were indeed played during the sendoff parties for Judge Borreta separately tendered by the IBP and Judge Borretas staff. He stressed, however, that the games were played for fun, without bets and after office hours. And he dismissed, as without basis, the charge of drinking liquor, claiming that he has been taking medicines daily to control his blood pressure and has been under strict medical orders to avoid alcohol. Respondent Judge Villanueva, in his Comment25 dated February 20, 2002, similarly denied Judge Aysons allegations about gambling and drinking during office hours. As it were, the parties have chosen not to introduce any further evidence on this particular charge and agreed to submit the same for resolution on the bases of Judge Aysons affidavit and the respondents respective comments. It is noteworthy that Judge Borretas aforesaid Comment, supra, dated February 2, 2002, contained the following statements: xxx The only time that I can remember that I had the occasion to drink and play cards with my fellow Judges was during my despedida on September 27, 2001 in my office. I remember that while I and my fellow Judges, namely Amado Caguioa, Clarence Villanueva and Antonio Esteves were waiting for the food to be served, we decided to while the time away by playing a friendly game of pusoy. Contrary to the claim of Judge Ayson who came in late, our betting was very mild considering that we are all friends. Our bets ranged only from P20.00 to P100.00. Some of the guests brought bottles of liquor and offered to open one for me and the other Judges. But I demurred and told them that I would only take wine knowing very well that hard liquor was bad for my heal th . It was while we were drinking wine and playing a friendly game of pusoy that Judge Ayson came into my office. xxx" (Exh. 1-Ayson [Perjury]) Similarly, respondent Judges Caguioa, Esteves and Borreta stated in their Joint Affidavit (Exh. "4"-Villanueva) as follows:

That we played pusoy for fun on the occasion of the despedida of Judge Abraham Borreta on September 27, 2001 at 10:00 A.M. up to 12:00 noon at the courtroom of Judge Amado Caguioa; That since the game was for fun only to while away the time before the despedida lunch for Judge Abraham Borreta, our betting was minimal and a purely friendly game; (p. 41, Rollo, Vol. V). The statements made in the Comments and Joint Affidavit immediately referred to above veritably partake of the nature of binding admissions on the part of the declarants or affiants, as the case may be, that they played "pusoy" on the date/s and places mentioned in both documents. Thus, the charge of gambling stands substantiated, except with respect to respondent Judge Villanueva, who has denied participating in the "pusoy" game as well as in the drinking sessions. In effect, respondent Judge Villanuevas alleged participation in said sessions is at least doubtful, more so since respondents Caguioa, Esteves, and Borret a, in their Joint Affidavit, categorically declared that Judge Villanueva declined their invitation to join them in their friendly card game. We can allow that what the three (3) respondent judges played was no more than just a friendly game of "pusoy" to while away their time. They, however, used the court premises for this past time, thus adding an inappropriate dimension to what would have otherwise been an insignificant isolated event. To borrow from Alumbres vs. Caoibes, 26 misbehavior within the court premises diminishes its sanctity and dignity. Respondents Caguioa, Esteves and Borreta should, therefore, be fined and warned against a repetition of such improper conduct. This particular complaint should, however, be dismissed as against respondent Judge Villanueva for insufficiency of evidence. The Court need not delve further on the charge of drinking hard liquor in the court premises during office hours. Suffice it to state in regard to this charge that Judge Ayson has not discharged his burden, like any complainant in administrative disciplinary proceedings, of proving by substantial evidence the allegations of his complaint. 27 C. Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs. Judge Amado S. Caguioa for gross misconduct, incompetence and for allowing collection of commissioners fees in ex-parte hearings and allowing ex-parte reception of evidence by non-lawyers/employees of his court. According to complainant Judge Ayson, respondent "Judge Caguioa allowed ex-parte hearings of his cases to be presided by a clerk or stenographer who is not a lawyer and not his clerk of court contrary to Section 9 of Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, [and that] commissioners fees were also collected in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 50-2001 dated August 17, 2001." Judge Ayson presented as witnesses the following individuals whose affidavits served as their respective direct testimonies: 1. Vida Ramos inter alia stated in her Affidavit (Exh. "D") that she had a petition for correction of birth certificate entry, docketed as Special Proc. No. 1030-R of the RTC of Baguio City, Br. 4, presided over by respondent; that Court Stenographer Carmen Diaz, instead of respondent, presided over an ex-parte hearing of the petition, as shown in the TSNs of the proceedings (Exh. "E"); that before the hearing commenced, Mrs. Diaz reminded her and her lawyer about the "commissioners fee"; that when asked how much is such fee and for what it is for, Mrs. Diaz responded "Tig -fifive hundred kami" and that it is intended as a measure of compensation "listening to your case." 2. Atty. Joy Angelica P. Santos-Doctor, in her affidavit/direct testimony (Exh. "H"), declared appearing as counsel in Special Proc. No. 990-R for change of name and correction of entries. Like Ms. Ramos, Atty. Doctor testified about Ms. Carmen Diaz presiding over the ex-parte hearing and about her client being also asked to pay commissioners fees. 3. Atty. Tomas B. Gorospe, in his affidavit/direct testimony (Exh. "K"), declared that, in at least two (2) cases assigned to Judge Caguioa, the ex-parte hearings were presided over by a court personnel other than the branch clerk of court. In the ex-parte hearing in Spec. Proc. No. 1051-R (Exh. "L") for guardianship, Atty. Gorospe adds, Court Interpreter Teodora Paquito presided and in connection with which his client was charged P1,500 as commissioners fee. 4. Atty. Cristeta C. Flores, the clerk of Court of Judge Caguioa, in her Affidavits of February 27, 2002 (Exh. "N") and March 1, 2002 (Exh. "O"), disclosed, among other things, that their court conducts ex-parte hearings over a menu of cases three times a week, with the Tuesday and Wednesday hearings being presided over either by Stenographer Carmen Diaz or Court Interpreter Teodora Paquito, while she presides over hearings on Thursdays. According to Atty. Flores, the practice of Judge Caguioa is to direct reception of ex-parte evidence "before any officer of the Court authorized by the Presiding Judge" or before the Clerk of Court or any officer delegated to receive the same". Atty. Flores cited two (2) adoption cases where Ms. Paquito presided over the ex-parte hearings (Exhs. "N-17," "N-19" and "N-20"), the same practice that was followed with respect to Civil Case No. 227-FC, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Pressing the point, Atty Flores accused Judge Caguioa of having some TSNs falsified to reflect his being present in the ex-parte hearings. In refutation of the aforementioned evidence, Judge Caguioa presented the affidavits of Melita Salinas, and several others, all of which were adopted as their direct testimonies. A summary of the relevant portions of their respective testimonies follows: 1. Melita Salinas, Docket Clerk 3, Br.4, RTC, Baguio City, in her affidavit, (Exh. "10-A" & "10-A-1") declared being the custodian of all records of some 169 special proceedings cases being heard ex-parte since April 2000; that of that number, 138 cases were heard by Atty. Cristeta Flores, while Judge Caguioa, assisted by Carmen Diaz and Teodora Paquito, heard the remaining 31. Owing to complaints of some lawyers and party litigants about the slow progress of their cases, Judge Caguioa, per Ms. Salinas, was constrained to help Atty. Flores in disposing her assigned cases. 2. Carmen Diaz, now retired, in her affidavit (Exh. "23") and joint affidavit with Mercedes Onato ("Exh. "24"), declared donating part of what she and co-employees received for copies of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs) to defray certain office expenses (Exh. "N-24"). She denies ever presiding over any ex-parte hearing, albeit she admits assisting Judge Caguioa in those hearings. Ms. Diaz also denied having asked for commissioners fees from Ms. Flor -Ramos, noting that it was the latters lawyer who voluntarily handed her two P500 bills, one of which she gave to Mercedes Onato to cover payment for the TSNs. Particularly referring to the Fuentes case handled by one Atty. Gorospe, Ms. Diaz asserts that it was Judge Caguioa who presided over the hearings.

3. Teodora Paquito, court interpreter, declared that she never acted as commissioner to receive evidence in ex-parte hearings, her role in such hearings being limited to attending to simple court matters like preparing the minutes of the proceedings and summarizing testimonies of witnesses. He denied having received any fee in such ex-parte hearings. 4. Prosecutor Romeo Carbonell, in his Affidavit (Exh. "26"), stated that as trial prosecutor once assigned to the sala of Judge Caguioa, he always attended, when the governments interest is involved, all such ex-parte hearings which respondent Judge Caguioa or his Clerk of Court, when so authorized, conducts. Setting his sight on the ex-parte hearings in the Vida Ramos case and the cases cited by Attys. Gorospe and Doctor, Prosecutor Carbonell belies allegations that Judge Caguioa was not present in those hearings, noting that the respondent judge always controlled the proceedings even when he leaves the courtroom from time to time to go to his chambers. 5. Attys. Lisa P. Calvi, Jaime Pablito and Alan Mazo separately declared in essence that they appeared several times before the sala of Judge Caguioa, who presided over all ex-parte hearings of cases raffled to his court. Judge Caguioa, in his Comment dated February 26, 2002 (Exh. "29"), denied all the inculpatory allegations against him. More specifically, the respondent judge stated that he had always assigned his Clerk of Court, Atty. Flores, to conduct the tri-weekly exparte hearings until he had to preside over them himself, or at least the Tuesday and Wednesday sessions, in response to lawyers and litigants complaints about the slow progress of the ex-parte proceedings before his clerk of court. According to him, he always asked either his stenographer, Carmen Diaz, or interpreter, Teodora Paquito, to assist him whenever he presided over an ex-parte hearing, allowing them to make such harmless remarks as "Present your witness," "Proceed," "Anymore witness, sir," and the like, a practice he does not find irregular since he was always present during the proceedings. He admitted that there were instances when he left the hearing to attend to some other matters in his chambers, which is 2 to 3 meters away from the lawyers table, but he made it a point to return thereto. He denied authorizing non-lawyers to preside over ex-parte hearings and that he also never authorized the collection of commissioners fees after learning of a Supreme Court circular prohibiting such collection. With respect to the cases in which Attys. Doctor and Gorospe appeared, Jude Caguioa maintained that he was always present when the said cases were heard ex-parte. Pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 12 dated October 2, 1986, all RTC Judges are to personally hear all adoption cases and not to delegate to the clerk of court the reception of evidence therein. Notwithstanding Judge Caguioas denial, ample ev idence obtain to show that he had indeed delegated the reception of evidence in at least two (2) adoption cases to his court interpreter. We refer to the certified true copies of (a) the TSNs taken on January 31, 2002 in Spec. Proc. No. 28-A, (Re: Petition for adoption, etc., Sps. Danelia Javier & Julio Javier III [Exh. "N-17"]), (b) Order issued in Spec. Proc. No. 63-A (In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of Eunice C. Balangi, Sps. Francis Aguinaldo & Esther Bahatan-Aguinaldo (Exh. "N-18"), and the TSNs taken on September 12, 2001 in the aforementioned case (Exhs. "N-19-a" to "N-19-b"). To be sure, these pieces of evidence strongly argue against, if not contradict, Judge Caguioas posture that it was he who personally heard the adoption cases previously mention ed. Like the Investigating Justice, the Court is inclined to give more credence to the TSNs (Exhs. "N-17," "N-19," "N-19-a" to "N-19-b") and the certified true Copy of the Order dated June 21, 2001 (Exh. "N-18") as proof of Judge Caguioas failure to strictly adhere to SC Circular No. 12, supra. Unlike, however, with respect to the non-compliance with SC Circular 12, Judge Aysons evidence, vis--vis his charge on alleged collection of commissioners fees in ex-parte proceedings in violation of another Supreme Court issuance, i.e., SC Circular No. 502001,28 is far from persuasive. As explained by Ms. Diaz, in her Affidavit (Exh. "23"-Caguioa) and in another Affidavit she executed jointly with Mercedes Onato (Exh. "24"-Caguioa), no fees were collected from the parties, although most lawyers voluntarily gave money for the TSNs and for their snacks. Ms. Diaz declaration find substantial corroboration from Judge Caguioas other witn esses. But the more important consideration with respect to this particular charge is that there is absolutely no showing whatsoever that any portion of the amounts lawyers voluntarily gave ended up in the respondent judges own pocket. Similarly, there is no evi dence tending to prove that Judge Caguioa acted with malice or with similar base motivation in allowing some court personnel to participate or assist him in the ex-parte hearings. If at all, Judge Aysons evidence only exposed Judge Caguioas lack of circumspection in the performance of some of his judicial mandate. While admonition with warning may be in order for Judge Caguioas act of allowing his court stenographer and/or interpreter to participate in ex-parte hearings, absent any showing to vitiate the bona fides of such act, a heavier penalty should be meted him for his failure to strictly adhere to the prescription of Circular No. 12, series of 1986, of this Court. As recommended by the Investigating Justice, a fine of P10,000.00 should be imposed on the respondent judge. D. Judge Ruben C. Ayson versus Judge Antonio C. Reyes for assigning to himself a case without benefit of raffle. The particular suit upon which the charge against respondent Judge Antonio C. Reyes for allegedly assigning to himself a case without the benefit of raffle refers to Civil Case No. 4892-R (Edgar Avila, et al., vs. Jadewell Corporation). Presented to substantiate the charge were the petitioners in that civil case themselves, namely, Attys. Edgar M. Avila, Ma. Nenita Opiana and Ruth P. Bernabe who affirmed the truth of the allegations they made in their April 1, 2002 joint letter to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide (Exh. Q),29 wherein they stated that "No raffle was ever conducted in this particular case, as we never signed the minutes of the raffle before or after the afternoon proceedings". The afternoon proceedings adverted refer to the 2:00 p.m. February 26, 20 01 setting of Civil Case No. 4892-R on the matter of extension of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by Judge Abraham Borreta, as then vice-executive judge, when they (Atty. Avila et al.) were informed by court personnel that the case was assigned to Judge Antonio Reyes. Attys. Opiana and Bernabe uniformly declared that in the morning of February 26, 2001, they were already informed by a personnel from the Office of the Clerk of Court that the Jadewell case was assigned to respondent Judge Antonio Reyes. On the other hand, Atty. Avila affirmed the truth and veracity of another letter he sent to then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. in reply to the letter of Atty. Emiliano Gayo, Jadewell Corporations counsel, who earlier wrote the then Chief Justice, through Deput y Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, on the matter of raffle of the Jadewell case. On cross-examination, however, Atty. Avila testified not having seen the Certification issued by Clerk of Court Delilah Muoz, to the effect that the Jadewell case was the subject of a special raffle conducted on February 26, 2001 (Exh. "S") or the Minutes of the Special Raffle held on February 26, 2001 (Exhs. "U" and "R"-Reyes). Judge Reyes, in his Comment (Exh. "13"-Reyes), which he adopted as part of his direct testimony, denied allegations that he acted on the Jadewell case without the benefit of a raffle, stating that the case was raffled off to him on February 26, 2001 at 2:30 pm in open court. In the same comment, the respondent judge made reference to the February 11, 2002 letter, infra, of Jadewells

counsel, Atty. Emiliano Gayo (Exh. "2"-Reyes), who, in response to respondents query, explained the circumstances surrounding the controversial raffle. Respondent Judge Reyes further declared that, in his capacity as Executive Judge, he conducts raffles himself in the presence of the parties lawyers, with some media people in attendance. Continuing, he said that he conducted a hearing on the Jadewell case in the afternoon of February 26, 2001 to determine the propriety of extending the TRO which then Acting Executive Judge Borreta previously issued and where Attys. Avila and Alim appeared for the petitioners, while Attys. Gayo and Fangayen appeared for respondents Jadewell Corporation and the City of Baguio, respectively. Respondent Judge Reyes identified the TSNs taken during the said hearing of February 26, 2001. In the same Comment, Judge Reyes further stated that in a letter dated February 14, 2002 addressed to Atty. Delilah Muoz, complainant Judge Ayson requested a certification concerning the raffle of, among others, the Jadewell case (Annex "M", Comment, Exh. "13"-Reyes); that in answer to Judge Aysons letter, Atty. Muoz issued a Certification dated February 14, 2002 stating in paragraph 3 thereof that "Civil Case No. 4892-R, a Petition for Prohibition, etc. filed by Edgar M. Avila, et al. against the City Government of Baguio and Jadewell Corporation on February 23, 2001 was raffled to Br. 61 under Judge Antonio C. Reyes on Special Raffle conducted on February 26, 2001 xxx before him as the Executive Judge." Testifying for the respondent judge, Atty. Emiliano Gayo confirmed writing the letter (Exh. "1"-Reyes) dated April 27, 2002 to then Chief Justice Davide, in which he stated the fact that Atty. Johnico Alim was one of the lawyers of the petitioners in the Jadewell case and that during the hearing of February 26, 2001, Civil Case No. 4892-R, was set for raffle and preliminary conference at 2:30 p.m. of that day. He further stated that after the raffle, which was done in the presence of the parties and counsels, Judge Reyes returned to his chambers after advising the parties that he would study the records and call the case at 3:00 p.m. The Court notes that on the charge under consideration, complainant Judge Ayson lined up three (3) witnesses, uniformly stating that no raffle was conducted in the Jadewell case in the afternoon of February 26, 2001. Arrayed against this account of the three (3) individuals was the testimony of the respondent judge who categorically stated that the Jadewell case was raffled off to him on February 26, 2001 at 2:30 p.m. in open court. The respondent judge further stated that, as Executive Judge, he was the one who conducted the said raffle in the presence of the lawyers, which was even attended by some media people. The respondent judge s aforesaid statement found corroboration from Atty. Emiliano Gayo, who stated in his letter dated April 27, 2002 to then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. (Exh. "1"-Reyes), that the raffle of said case was conducted in the presence of the parties and their counsels. Mention may also be made of Atty. Gayos February 11, 2002 letter in response to respondents query about the raffle of said c ase which, insofar as pertinent, reads: The case was raffled on February 26, 2001 at 2:30 p.m., a Monday, in open court in your sala and presided by you as the Executive Judge in the presence of some of the petitioners who are themselves Attorneys, namely: Edgar M. Avila, Ma. Nenita A. Opiana, Ruth P. Bernanbe (sic), Justinian O. Licnachan and Johnico Alim on the one hand, and City government of Baguio and the undersigned and his associate Atty. Maylene D. Gayo as counsel for Jadewell, on the other hand. Several people from the local media where (sic) also present. Representatives from other branches of the Regional trial Court of Baguio where (sic) there. The case was raffled to RTC 61, the branch you preside. After the raffle and the announcement of the result, you asked the parties to wait until 3:00 p.m. because you were going to study the case in your chamber. We immediately filed our COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION [Re Application for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order] with MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION which was included in the records that where (sic) brought into your chamber. The case was called at 3:00 p.m. and the counsels of the parties took turns in arguing for there (sic) respective clients and answering questions which you asked of them in the process. We adjourned about 5:00 p.m. (Exh. "2-A"-Reyes [p. 115, Record, Vol. V]). Additionally, the respondent judge submitted in evidence a certified xerox copy of the Minutes of the Special Raffle held on February 26, 2001 which states that Civil Case No. 4892-R was raffled off to Br. 61 (Exh. "4"-Reyes). As shown in said Minutes, a Special Raffle was attended by, among others, Baguio RTC Clerk of Court Remedios B. Reyes, who conducted the raffle in the presence of representatives of the various branches of the RTC of Baguio. The said Minutes appears to have been signed by the members of the Raffle Committee, namely, respondent Judge Reyes as Executive Judge, and Vice-Executive Judge Abraham Borreta and Judge Villanueva, who certified to its correctness. The existence and authenticity of said Minutes of the Special Raffle have not been successfully controverted and since the Certified Xerox Copy presented by the respondent judge bears the signature of the Clerk of Court, Remedios Reyes, who certified that the same is a Xerox copy of the Minutes, the said document must be given credence.30 At bottom then, what is before the Court are conflicting evidence presented by complainant Judge Ayson and respondent Judge Reyes on the raffle (or absence thereof) of the Jadewell case, Civil Case No. 4892-R. Given this perspective, and considering the submission of the Minutes of Special Raffle, supra, it is not amiss to say, as did the Investigating Justice, that this particular charge against Judge Antonio C. Reyes has not been satisfactorily established. Accordingly, its dismissal for insufficiency of evidence is clearly indicated. E. Judge Ruben C. Ayson versus Judge Edilberto Claravall for conduct unbecoming a judge. On Judge Aysons complaint against Judge Edilberto T. Claravall for misconduct, it is noted that the parties agreed to submit the same for resolution on the basis of Judge Aysons Affidavit -Complaint and Judge Claravalls February 18, 2002 letter-comment31 to the OCA and his December 2, 2002 Counter-Affidavit,32 without need of formally presenting evidence thereon. This charge against Judge Edilberto T. Claravall stemmed from an incident which occurred during the judges convention held on June 10, 1999 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila, where Judge Claravalls van hit another vehicle. In his affidavit of complaint, Judge Ayson alleged in esse the following: 1. Judge Claravall and those inside his van named him (Judge Ayson) as the driver of the offending van, albeit he was not on board the vehicle; 2. The next day, Domingo Rodenas, the hotels chief of security, had him paged at the convention floor and was asked to pay the damage caused to the car allegedly hit by his van the night before;

3. His (Judge Aysons) protestation of innocence notwithstanding, Mr. Rodenas gave him his calling card therein indicating the plate number of the offending van, so that if he (Judge Ayson) changed his mind, he could call him to settle the damage; 4. It turned out that the offending van belonged to Judge Claravall, who, when confronted, promised to settle the matter with the hotel guest involved; and 5. Judge Claravalls act of falsely imputing to him (Judge Ayson) something constitutes conduct unbecoming of a judge. In his aforesaid letter-comment, respondent Judge Claravall alleged that: 1. In the evening of June 10, 1999, while driving his van out of the Harrison Plaza parking area, he "accidentally cracked [but hardly noticed] the tail light lens of a car that was parked very close to the van;" 2. When the parking attendant called his attention to what happened, two of the judges seated behind called out one after the other for the parking attendant not to worry because Justice Ayson would take care of any damage to the car; that the remarks were made in levity; 3. He identified himself and gave his name to the parking attendant and asked him to just take note of his vans plate number and to tell the owner of the car that he would be back; and 4. He was not aware that the Security Officer of Century Park paged Judge Ayson or that the incident was reported to the former until Judge Ayson so informed him in Baguio, where Judge Ayson asked him to call up the hotels security officer and settle the car damage; and, that, as promised, he immediately attended to and settled the matter. Respondent Judge Claravall further stated in his Counter-Affidavit dated December 2, 2002, that complainant Judge Ayson knew about his not being the one who gave out Judge Aysons name to the parking attendant. Attached to the counter -affidavit is another affidavit executed on April 27, 2002 by Antonio Aquino33 who confirmed Judge Claravalls account as to who among the occupants of the van told the parking attendant that "Justice Ayson" would take care of the damage. As may be noted, Judge Ayson has charged Judge Claravall with conduct unbecoming of a judge on the postulate that the latter implicated him to the minor car accident in question by calling out to the parking attendant that "Justice Ayson" would take care of the resulting damage. However, Judge Claravall, in his aforementioned Comment and Counter-Affidavit, distinctly recalled stating that it was "one of the judges seated behind" (who) called out to the parking attendant not to worry because "Jus tice Ayson" would take care of any damage to the car and that another judge gave a similar remark. Notably, Judge Aysons inculpatory allegations stand without corroborative support. On the other hand, Judge Claravalls denial that he implicated Judge Ayso n to the incident in question finds full corroboration from Antonio Aquino who, in his Affidavit of April 27, 2002, supra, confirmed Judge Claravalls statement that it was another judge sitting at the back of the van who gave the name of Judge Ayson to the parking attendant. On balance then, Judge Aysons evidence, failing as it does to conclusively establish that respondent Judge Claravall implica ted him to the incident in question, cannot support a case for conduct unbecoming of a judge. For this reason, the complaint for that offense against Judge Claravall must fail. IV. A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1928 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1485-RTJ): Judge Clarence J. Villanueva vs. Judge Ruben C. Ayson Judge Clarence J. Villanuevas complaint (Exh. "A" Villanueva) for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code and serious misconduct against Judge Ruben C. Ayson arose from the Bill of Particulars submitted by the latter in A.M. OCA IPI No. 021435-RTJ (Exh. "C" Villanueva). In it, Judge Ayson pertinently stated: The second time I saw the gambling was in the morning of September 27, 2001 in the sala of Judge Amado Caguioa. The card game they played was again "pusoy" and there was drinking likewise. The quorum was composed of Judge Abraham Borreta, Amado Caguioa, Clarence Villanueva and Antonio Esteves. . It was only 10:00 a.m. and there in the sala of Judge Amado Caguioa I saw Judges Abraham Borreta, Clarence Villanueva, Amado Caguioa and Antonio Esteves playing pusoy with money bets. .. They played until 12:00 noon. By noontime we all went to the sala of Judge Abraham Borreta to eat lunch; Complainant Judge Villanueva tags the reference to their having played "pusoy" from "10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon on September 27, 2001 [as] an absolute lie and amounts to a fabrication of facts" the truth, according to him, being that he (Judge Villanueva) had regular civil cases hearings from 8:30 a.m. up to 12:00 noon of September 27, 2001, as evidenced by the orders issued and minutes of proceedings in the said cases (Exhs. "H" to "T," Perjury). Complainant Villanueva, therefore, maintains that respondent Judge Aysons untruthful statements in his Bill of Particulars (Exh. "C," Perjury) amounted to perjury. Testifying for complainant Judge Villanueva, Judge Antonio Esteves declared that Judge Villanueva did not play "pusoy" in Judge Caguioas chambers at 10:00 a.m. of September 27, 2001; that at 10:00 a.m. of the said date, he went to fetch Judge Caguioa a t his office to attend a despedida party for Judge Borreta; that Judge Caguioa was then working and he waited for him (Caguioa) so that they could go together; that Judge Borreta then came also to fetch him about past 10:00 a.m.; that when they were informed that the food was still being prepared, they decided to have a friendly game of "pusoy"; and that Judge Villanueva was not with them because he was then conducting trial. Judges Antonio Esteves, Amado Caguioa and Abraham Borreta all testified to belie respondent Judge Aysons allegation that the y played "pusoy" with complainant Judge Villanueva on September 27, 2001. In their Joint Affidavit (Exh. "G," Perjury), they stated that, on September 27, 2001 at 10:00 a.m., while waiting for the despedida lunch tendered for Judge Borreta, the three of them invited Judge Villanueva to play but the latter did not join them as he was then hearing cases in his courtroom.

Attys. Galo Reyes and Juris Carl Dacaoi likewise testified to corroborate complainant Judge Villanuevas testimony respecting his being in his courtroom hearing cases in the morning of September 27, 2001. Testifying for respondent Judge Ayson, Atty. Cristeta Flores identified her Affidavit executed on February 12, 2003 (Exh. "5"-Ayson), wherein she stated seeing Judges Borreta, Villanueva, Caguioa and Esteves gambling in the Justice Hall on September 27, 2001 at about 10:30 a.m. in the courtroom of RTC, Branch 4. In resisting what basically is a countercharge against him for perjury, respondent Judge Ayson submitted in evidence his underlying affidavit-complaint (Exhs. "A" and "8" Ayson). He further offered in evidence the Joint Affidavit of Judges Borreta, Caguioa and Esteves (Exh. "11" Ayson, also Exh. "G," Perjury) to prove that affiants themselves had in fact admitted playing "pusoy" on September 27, 2001 from 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon in the courtroom of Judge Caguioa. The Court finds no merit in the complaint of Judge Villanueva which, at bottom, turns on the question of whether or not what Judge Ayson wrote under oath about the former playing the game of "pusoy" on the date in question is false. As may very well be noted, Judge Borreta, in his Comment dated February 20, 2002 (Exh. "1"- Ayson) submitted to Deputy Court Administrator Christopher Lock, categorically admitted in the 6th paragraph thereof that during the despedida party tendered for him on September 27, 2001, he and fellow Judges Caguioa, Villanueva and Esteves played a friendly game of "pusoy", while waiting for food to be served. However, in their Joint Affidavit (Exh. "4"-Villanueva ), Judges Caguioa, Esteves and Borreta stated that complainant Judge Villanueva, who was invited to join in their game, declined as he was then hearing cases in his courtroom. Also in his Comment dated February 26, 2002 (Exh. "2"- Ayson), Judge Caguioa admitted that on the date in question, they played "pusoy" first in the courtroom of Judge Villanueva and later in the courtroom of Judge Borreta. There is thus an apparent conflict in the aforesaid comments of Judges Borreta and Caguioa (Exhs. "1" and "2,"-Ayson) and the Joint Affidavit executed by Judges Caguioa, Esteves and Borreta (Exh. "4"-Villanueva) on complainant Villanuevas participation in the friendly game "pusoy". Given such discrepancy and considering further Atty. Cristeta Flores positive statement in her February 12, 2003 Affidavit (Exh. "5" -Ayson) and testimony that, at about 10:30 a.m. of September 27, 2001, she saw Judges Borreta, Caguioa, Villanueva and Esteves playing "pusoy" in Judge Caguioas chamber, it may be inappropriate to conclude that respondent Ayson had fabricated his allegation of gambling against complainant Judge Villanueva. Accordingly, Judge Villanuevas complaint against Judge Ayson is, as recommended by the Investigating Justice, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. V. A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1929 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1552-RTJ): Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs. Judge Abraham B. Borreta In his letter of August 21, 2002,34 (Exh. "B") with enclosures, to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Judge Ayson charged Judge Borreta with serious misconduct arising from the following set facts alleged in said letter: 1. In July 2000, respondent Borreta, while still a RTC judge of Baguio, entered into a contract of agency with one Purita Llorente, for the sale of a tract of land located in Longlong, La Trinidad, Benguet, part of which the Philippine National Bank (PNB) owned. Ms. Llorente has several pending cases in Baguio courts involving said property; 2. A week after, respondent (i.e., Judge Borreta) acquired an authorization from the PNB to work out and secure from the Department of Agrarian Reform and other government agencies the exemption of the property from agrarian reform coverage; 3. Respondent subsequently entered into a contract of Intent to Sell with several entities/groups, among them the Green Meadows Homeowners Association (HOA) I and employees of the city government of Baguio. 4. A case for damages has been filed by Benguet Green Meadows, Inc. against one Rose Ann Tabora. According to Judge Ayson, Judge Borretas act of entering into transactions/deals involvi ng the above-described may constitute engaging in the private practice of law and violate certain provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct. During the investigation, complainant Judge Ayson presented one Rose Ann Tabora, who adopted, as her direct testimony, her Affidavit dated November 22, 2002 (Exh. "C-13"). Among other things, she stated that, on July 18, 2002, complainant Judge Ayson showed her certain documents relating to respondent Judge Borretas land transactions; that she, in turn, also showed J udge Ayson some documents that were annexed to Civil Case No. 5136-R filed by Benguet Green Meadows, represented by its collector, Lovely Ladignon, against her, consisting, among others, of: 1) acknowledgment receipts of certain down payments; and 2) authorization given by Judge Borreta for Ms. Ladignon to collect payments from buyers. Ms. Tabora also declared in the same affidavit that, per Ms. Ladignon, Judge Borreta was the latters accomplice in the case filed against her (Ms. Tabora). In his verified Comment dated November 5, 2002 (Exh. "1" Borreta), which he adopted as part of his direct testimony, Judge Borreta admitted having entered into an agency agreement with Purita Llorente for the sale of her property located in Longlong, La Trinidad, Benguet through the Community Mortgage Program (CMP). He also admitted Judge Aysons allegation regarding arrangements taken to exempt the property from agrarian law coverage. He stated, however, that such exemption is one of the requirements of the CMP, a housing and payment scheme the mechanics of which the respondent judge explained in some detail in his comment. And addressing apprehension on cases involving the covered lands being filed in Baguio, Judge Borreta averred that the subject property is situated in La Trinidad, Benguet thus outside the territorial jurisdiction of Baguio courts. Anent the cases involving landowner Llorente, Judge Borreta belabored to explain that none of the cases was assigned to the branch (Branch 59) of which he was previously the presiding judge. The respondent judge hastens to add that the contract of agency he entered into relates only to a single, regular transaction, the CMP Housing Project in Longlong, La Trinidad, Benguet, which did not interfere in or conflict with the discharge of his judicial functions. Judge Borretas witness, Victoria Reyes-Ferrer, submitted her Affidavit which was adopted as part of her direct testimony (Exh. "2" Borreta). For the most part, the affidavit contained a denial of the statements or acts attributed to her by Ms. Rose Ann Tabora.

Another witness, Lovely Ladignon, in her Affidavit (Exh. "3" Borreta) which was adopted as her direct testimony, denied Ms. Taboras testimony that Judge Borreta had anything to do with the civil and criminal cases filed against her (Tabora). Going over the evidence presented, the Court can concede, as Judge Borreta urges, that there is nothing illegal or immoral per se about his having entered into an agreement with Purita Llorente for the sale of her property and the side transactions concluded to bring the same under the CMP scheme. We cannot, however, turn a blind eye on, first, SC Administrative Circular No. 5 issued on October 4, 1988, which enjoins all officials and employees of the Judiciary from being commissioned as agents or from engaging in any such related activities. The rationale for the injunction is that "the entire time of Judiciary officials and employees must be devoted to government service to ensure efficient and speedy administration of justice." It cannot be denied that securing the desired exemption from agrarian law coverage would mean that the respondent judge has to touch base with different government agencies. In the process, he cannot be devoting his entire time to government service, contrary to what is prescribed by the aforesaid Administrative Circular. And lest it be overlooked, Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct also prohibits judges from engaging in activities or entering into dealings, particularly financial, likely to interfere with the performance of their functions or present a conflict-of-interest situation. The provision thus provides: Rule 5.02.- A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the courts impartiality, interfere, with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interest as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualifications. The Court has to be sure taken stock of the fact that some of the CMP Project beneficiaries are employees of the Baguio City government. Thus, any personal action involving delinquent amortization payments for the lots shall have to be filed in the proper court of Baguio City. In net effect, Judge Borretas participation in the CMP Project in question would increase the possibil ity of his disqualifying or inhibiting himself from acting on or hearing any of such case. Else, he opens himself to doubt not only as to his fairness, but also as to his ability to render decisions free from any suspicion of partiality. This scenario certainly is not in accord with the aforequoted rule. Of course, the undesirable situation sought to be avoided may no longer come to pass, inasmuch as Judge Borreta had already been transferred to another judicial district, i.e., NCR-RTC of Pasig City, Br. 154. However, since the acts complained of occurred during his watch as Presiding Judge of Branch 59, RTC, Baguio, Judge Borretas transfer is really of little moment in this administrative proceedings. Like the judge in another disciplinary case charged with, and eventually adjudged guilty of, a similar offense, 35Judge Borreta ought to be penalized with a fine in the amount of P2,000.00 and warned to be more discreet in his private and business activities. VI. A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1930 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1559-RTJ): Atty. Cristeta R. Caluza-Flores vs. Judge Amado S. Caguioa In an Affidavit-Complaint executed on February 27, 2002, as supplemented by another Affidavit dated March 1, 2002, Atty. Cristeta R. Caluza-Flores, Branch 4 Clerk of Court of the RTC of Baguio City, charges Judge Amado S. Caguioa with incompetence and improper judicial conduct. In it, she attributes to Judge Caguioa certain acts and personal habits and enumerate incidents/events which she perceives to support her complaint. And in a virtual repeat of what she said when she testified as Judge Aysons witness in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1927 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1435-RTJ), Atty. Flores stated that Judge Caguioa allowed Stenographer Carmen Diaz and Interpreter Teodora Paquito to receive evidence in ex-parte proceedings and that the stenographers had falsify their TSNs to reflect Judge Caguioas presence in all such proceedings. In his Comment to Atty. Flores Affidavit-Complaint, Judge Caguioa virtually answered point-by-point the inculpatory allegations against him, particularly about his not being present during ex-parte hearings of cases assigned to him. He notes in this regard that the TSNs of the corresponding proceedings would show his presence thereat. And just like what he said with respect to Judge Aysons basic complaint, respondent Judge Caguioa inter alia alleged that there were instances that he had to leave the court room and stay in his chamber to answer telephone calls or the call of nature, but in all the proceedings, he was in control. Judge Caguioa attached to his Comment the affidavit of Branch 4 Clerk III, Melita Salinas executed on February 14, 2002, 36 which the respondent judge earlier submitted in his defense against the complaint of Judge Ayson in A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1435-RTJ. At the outset, it is to be stated that no separate reception of evidence in this particular case was held, the p arties evidence thereon having been offered in the formal hearing of the other cases previously discussed. In this case, Judge Caguioa is charged with incompetence and improper judicial conduct by his Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Flores. According to complainant Flores, Judge Caguioa is a slave driver who only sees her and her co-workers mistakes but not their good points; is a judge who, in dealing with his personnel, uses intemperate words; and one who does not dictate orders in open court but merely requires the stenographer on duty to prepare the orders based on what had been manifested by the parties. Atty. Flores also invites attention to the operation in Baguio City by Judge Caguioa of taxicabs where the words "Your Honor" are painted on the individual units. Respondent Judge Caguioa, so Atty. Flores alleges, is not familiar with the Indeterminate Sentence Law and with the duration and graduation of penalties. With the view we take of this particular case, what the evidence on record has adequately established is that Judge Caguioa had allowed his stenographer/s and interpreter to make, when called to assist during ex-parte proceeding, remarks that should have been properly made by the judge. This is quite clear from the TSNs of some ex-parte proceedings that were presented by complainant Ayson (Exh. "N-17," "N-19," "N-20," "N-21," and "N-22"). While this aberration is not actionable, Judge Caguioa is advised to revise his system to ensure that he alone presides over all proceedings in his court. His practice, as shown by the TSNs presented in evidence, can very well lead to the impression that the stenographer or interpreter also presided over the said proceedings. This certainly does not enhance the dignity of the court or improve its image. While the respondent judge may, during ex-parte hearings, momentarily leave the courtroom, it behooves him to make it a point that he promptly return to ensure that he alone directs the proceedings. At any rate, the same acts of impropriety have been treated in A.M. No. RTJ-05- 1927 (Judge Ayson v. RTC Judges of Baguio City), for which the corresponding sanction has been meted, as recommended by the Investigating Justice. As to the other acts complained of by Atty. Flores, like Judge Caguioa being a slave driver, who only sees her and her co-workers bad points, and about what the respondent judge painted on his taxicabs, the Court, like the Investigating Justice, finds them so

trivial to require belaboring. Suffice it to state that judges, like any human being, have their own idiosyncrasis and subject to human limitations.37 Certainly, perceived personality flaws and human frailties, of which everyone is an heir to, cannot, without more, plausibly be the subject of an administrative complaint. VII. A.M. NO. P-05-2020 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1358-P): Hon. Amado S. Caguioa vs. Atty. Cristeta R. Caluza- Flores In his Complaint dated March 26, 2002 (Exh. "34"), Judge Amado S. Caguioa would have his Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Cristeta Caluza-Flores, administratively liable for 1) the act of her husband, Manolo, buying a portion of a lot that was subject of an LRC case once pending before the RTC of Baguio (BR. 4) in which his wife is the Branch Clerk of Court, is in violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code; 38 2) bringing home an armalite rifle which, before complainants assumption to office, was submitted in evidence in Criminal Case No. 7872-R for illegal possession of firearms against accused Sixto Raymundo; 3) bringing home the records of two (2) cases, one of which she brought back, with her draft order, almost 9 months after the case was submitted for resolution, and, the other, 18 months after the case was submitted for resolution, together with her draft summary of the evidence; 4) that in answer to complainants memorandum on the LRC case, respondent Flores admitt ed that she forwarded the records to the office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) on March 29, 1995; that she retrieved the records on April 20, 1999 when an unnamed person went to her to check on the status of the case; that respondent Flores was negligent in forwarding to the OCC the records of the case which was still pending; and 5) failing to set, for an unreasonable length of time, the hearing of five cases. In her Comment dated December 1, 2002 (Exh. "0-29"-Ayson), respondent Flores stated, in gist, that that the LRC case referred to in Judge Caguioas complaint was dismissed by the Supreme Court in its decision promulgated on November 29, 1984, adding that her husband acquired a portion of the land in question long after the case had been terminated. With respect to the armalite rifle, respondent Flores claimed having been authorized by then Acting Presiding Judge Benito Dacanay to bring it home, as shown by Judge Dacanays verified certification stating that he "allowed Clerk of Court, Atty. Cristeta C. Fl ores to safekeep Exhibit "C," a baby armalite rifle in Criminal Case No. 7872-R" for the reason that there were no safekeeping facilities in the court (Exh. "0-28"). With respect to the records of two (2) pending cases, respondent Flores explained that she bought them home during weekends only to enable her to prepare the corresponding decisions. Anent her supposed failure to set cases for hearing for an unreasonable length of time, respondent explained that the fault respecting thereto lies with Judge Caguioa who "stripped" her of the duty to check the status of cases, which he assigned to another personnel. Complainant Judge Caguioa presented as witness retired Judge Benito Dacanay who, while admitting having signed the certification adverted to above, nonetheless denied so authorizing Atty. Flores to bring the armalite rifle to her house. In his report, the Investigating Justice recommended the dismissal of the case against respondent Atty. Flores on the strength of the following premised observations: 1. Atty. Flores explanation bearing on the latters act of bringing home, for safekeeping, an armalite rifle submitted in evidence in a pending criminal case is satisfactory. 2. She cannot be held accountable for the purchase of a piece of land once the subject of a pending case in her court (Br.4). As explained by respondent Flores, the case in question had, at the time her husband acquired a portion of the land in 1994, long been terminated. 3. The charge that respondent Flores had brought home records of two ( 2) cases and keeping the records of one case for almost 9 months after the case was submitted for resolution and that of another case which she returned, together with her draft summary of the evidence, 18 months later, forwarding to the OCC the records of a case that was still pending and failure to set 5 cases for hearing for an unreasonable length of time, would reflect more on Judge Caguioas court management. A more systematic management and control of the court by complainant judge could have avoided the very acts he has complained of. The recommendation and the premises holding it together commend themselves for concurrence. Indeed, respondent Flores has adequately addressed and very well acquitted herself against the allegations against her. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RULES, as follows: 1. In A. M. NO. RTJ-05-1925 - Grace F. Munsayac-De Villa, et al. vs. Judge Antonio C. Reyes: The complaint of Grace F. Munsayac C. De Villa, et al. against Judge Antonio C. Reyes is, for insufficiency of evidence, DISMISSED. 2. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1926 - Ramon K. Ilusorio vs. Judge Antonio C. Reyes, RTC Baguio City, Br. 61: Judge Antonio C. Reyes is FINED in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and WARNED that a repetition of similar acts complained of shall be dealt with more severely. 3. In A.M. No. RTJ 05-1927 - Judge Ruben C. Ayson v. RTC Judges of Baguio City:

a. Judge Clarence J. Villanueva is found GUILTY of immorality and is DISMISSED from the service, with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and forfeiture of retirement benefits, if any, except accrued leave credits. b. Judge Abraham B. Borreta, Judge Amado S. Caguioa and Judge Antonio M. Esteves are, for engaging in a friendly game of "pusoy" in court premises, each FINED in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) and WARNED against a repetition of such improper conduct. The complaint for gambling insofar as Judge Clarence Villanueva is concerned is DISMISSED. The complaint against all the respondent judges for drinking is DISMISSED. c. Judge Amado S. Caguioa is FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for not strictly adhering to the prescription of Supreme Court Circular No. 12 dated October 2, 1986 and ADMONISHED and WARNED to stop the practice of allowing court stenographers and/or interpreters to participate in ex-parte hearings. d. The complaint against Judge Antonio C. Reyes insofar as it charges him for assigning to himself a case without benefit of raffle is DISMISSED. e. The complaint insofar as it charges Judge Edilberto Claravall for conduct unbecoming a judge is DISMISSED. 4. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1928 - Judge Clarence J. Villanueva vs. Judge Ruben C. Ayson: The complaint of Judge Clarence Villanueva against Judge Ruben C. Ayson is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. 5. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1929 - Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs. Judge Abraham B. Borreta: Judge Abraham B. Borreta is, for violation of the injunction prescribed under Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, in relation to SC Administrative Circular No. 5, FINED in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) and WARNED to be more discreet in his private and business activities. 6. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1930 - Atty. Cristeta R. Caluza-Flores vs. Judge Amado S. Caguioa: The complaint of Atty. Cristeta R. Caluza-Flores against Judge Amado S. Caguioa is DISMISSED. 7. In A.M. No. P-05-2020 - Hon. Amado S. Caguioa vs. Atty. Cristeta R. Caluza-Florez: The complaint of Judge Caguioa against his clerk of court, Atty. Cristeta R. CaluzaFlores, is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

De Llana vs Alba Constitutional Law Political Question if there is no question of law involved BP 129 In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passe d. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129). HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

Garcia vs Macaraig Political Law Separation of Powers Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be properly established due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court. Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge. ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge. HELD: Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a judge without a sala, but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.

Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation Company Case Digest Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation Company, Inc., G.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932 Facts: The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric Company, requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No. 1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility operators. Issue: Validity of SEC. 11 of ACT No. 1446 Held: The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission to arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar rules which find support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code. We can also perceive a distinction between a private contract for submission to arbitration and agreements to arbitrate falling within the terms of a statute enacted for such purpose and affecting others than the parties to a particular franchise. Here, however, whatever else may be said in extenuation, it remains true that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if literally enforced would leave a public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts for a judicial determination of the question in dispute. We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. taThe present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at all.l The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.lawph aw Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.

Lopez vs Roxas Lopez and Roxas were the candidates for VP in the 1965 elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his lost before the PET. The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that There s hall be on independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines. In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body. HELD: Pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be established by law This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but the judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or all of said power, except, only, so much as the Constit ution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively. Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdictio n of the various courts, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law. The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the courts jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election contests is essentially judicial.

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano Posted on December 8, 2012 Facts: Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary. Issue: What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned? Ruling: The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency performing QuasiJudicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution). Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence. Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments executive machinery and its performance of governmen tal acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.

In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.