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Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942 Author(s): Derek Watson Reviewed work(s): Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 51-85 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/826217 . Accessed: 06/03/2013 04:01
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EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES,

Carfax Publishing
Group Taylor&Francis

Vol. 54, No. 1, 2002, 51-85

Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942
DEREK WATSON*

BETWEEN the USA and the USSR were better during the Great RELATIONS BRITAIN,

PatrioticWar than at any other time, and the agreementthat Molotov negotiatedwith Britain during his visit in 1942 was the foundation for cooperation during the war years. It was clearly in the interests of both sides to work together to strengthenthe coalition to defeat Hitler, althoughthere was a ratherunfortunate prehistory.Molotov had been the chief Soviet negotiator in the failed Triple Alliance negotiations of 1939,' and in the infamous Nazi-Soviet pact. On the Soviet side policy was founded on ideology; there was suspicion of the great capitalist powers, and the legacy of appeasement.Diplomatic and political developments between September 1939 and May 1942, which formed the background to the talks, also greatly complicated Molotov's task in the negotiations, as did changes in Soviet priorities received in instructionsfrom Stalin. The Grand Alliance negotiations, which provide a comment on the diplomatic methods of Churchill, Eden, and Roosevelt and his advisers, as well as those of Molotov, are significant, not only because they were the foundation of the wartime alliance but also because the main problems which were to dog relations during the the way in which war were evident duringthe talks: the question of a Second Front;2 and the nature of the the alliance should be strengthened developed; peace treatiesto of the of be negotiated at the end the war, including recognition Soviet frontiers the their territorial 1939-41 period;and the organisationof gains during incorporating to maintain at the end of the war. These questions internationalcooperation peace the two sides and one may question whether demonstratedthe different prioritiesof the Grand Alliance was the real focal point of the negotiations. New archive evidence, now available, highlights these issues, providing additional of the negotiations.This insights and detail that allows a more nuancedunderstanding of the British the materialincludes Foreign secretary,unpubpapers Anthony Eden, lished documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archive, and recently published correspondence between Stalin and Molotov during the negotiations, from the PresidentialArchive. These documentsmake it possible to write a revised account of the negotiations using both Western and Soviet archive material, and highlight questions about the formulationof Soviet foreign policy, the extent to which it was made by Stalin alone, and Molotov's role in foreign policy making. Khrushchev recalled that Molotov
ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/02/010051-35 ? 2002 University of Glasgow DOI: 10.1080/09668130120098241

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was the only person in the Politburowho opposed Stalin on this or thatquestionfor a second
time ... There was not a conflict, but ... comments and a certain manifestation of

stubbornness.3 Gromyko and Zhukov were more specific: Gromyko recalled that Stalin 'left Molotov responsible for dealing with a number of issues involving other countries', and that 'Molotov exercised a considerable degree of influence on Stalin'.4 Zhukov claimed that at times it reached the point, that Stalin raised his voice and lost his temper, but Molotov, smiling, arose from his seat and defendedhis point of view ... Molotov was not only a very determinedand stubbornman, who was difficultto move from a stance if he really occupied any kind of position ... At that time he exercised a serious influence on Stalin, in particular on questions of foreign policy, in which Stalin always, up to the war considered him competent.5

Anglo-Soviet relations September1939-May 1942 Before the Germanattack on the USSR With the failure of the Triple Alliance negotiationsin August 1939, the signatureof the Nazi-Soviet pact, and the confrontationbetween Sir William Seeds, the British and Molotov which followed,6 Anglo-Soviet relationshad become rather ambassador, This continued with the expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations in frigid. December 1939 following the attackon Finland,when pressurein Britainfor severing diplomatic relations grew, Seeds leaving Moscow on 2 January 1940. In his final interview with Molotov, Seeds, who perhaps unwisely carped about Molotov's treatmentof Britain in the Triple Alliance negotiations, stated that he regrettedthe
hostile attitude of the USSR as displayed in speeches and the Soviet press. He asked for a message to the British Foreign Secretary to help reduce tension. In reply, Molotov declared that the Soviet government bore no enmity to Great Britain 'but was convinced by acts all over the world that His Majesty's government was unfriendly to Russia'.7 On Seeds's return to Britain he was said to be on holiday, but

there was considerable speculation in the British press that this was a formal
severance of diplomatic relations. In Moscow, Soviet leaders were aware that Britain was sending military supplies to Finland, and had plans to intervene in the Finnish war.8 In early February 1940 Sir Stafford Cripps, who was on a fact-finding tour of India

and China, following a conversationwith the Soviet ambassador to China, offered to


visit Moscow if 'one of those in authority' wished to discuss Anglo-Soviet relations

with him. Cripps,who believed that the Soviet pact with Germanywas under strain,
and had already tried to initiate a trade agreement and represent the views of the USSR to the British government, found his offer accepted.9 He met Molotov, who

maintainedthat the attackon Finlandwas the result of the location of Leningradand the naval position in the Baltic. Cripps felt that Molotov was 'anxious to cultivate better relations with Great Britain', but found him non-committal.Although he said that the USSR was preparedto make a trade or political agreementwith Britain, he 'indicated very clearly that any long delay might lead Russia to commit herself

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elsewhere'. When M. Tikhomirnov, one of Molotov's subordinates,became aware that Cripps was not due back in London until April, he had stated that this was 'too long to wait'.'0 Discounting the usefulness of Cripps as an intermediarywith the British government,Molotov now attemptedto thwartBritishplans to intervenein the Finnish war by having I. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassadorto Britain,propose to R.A. for Foreign Affairs, that Britain should act as a mediator Butler, the Under-Secretary between the USSR and Finland, an offer which was declined." Molotov's speech to the Supreme Soviet in late March was very hostile to Britain.12 The next major contact between the two powers occurred immediately after Churchill's appointmentas Prime Minister in May 1940, when Cripps was sent to Moscow 'to create better relations', basically on a trade mission, but with authority for his talks to 'flow over' into political matters. On Soviet insistence, Cripps was given ambassadorialstatus (less likely to antagonise the Germans than sending a special envoy), Molotov arguingthat, in the light of the 1939 talks, it was not worth sending somebody only empowered to carry out exploratory negotiations. As achievement Gorodetskyhas commented, 'the Russianshad gained the unprecedented of ... forcing the British to returnan ambassadorto Moscow'. In the light of Soviet suspicions of English socialists, however, it is less likely that they secured 'the appointmentof their own candidate'.'3 At two meetings, on 14 and 27 June, Crippstried to concentrateon political matters andjudged that Molotov, with the grave situationin Europe,was receptive to the idea of more cooperation.14 Following the fall of France, an event which caused great as well as in Britain,Churchillpersonallysigned gloom among the Soviet leadership15 a letter to Stalin on 26 June, seeking an improvementin Anglo-Soviet relations;the letter, despite Churchill's claims that he was the author,was drafted in the Foreign Office.16 Crippshandedthe letterto Stalin with Molotov present,on 1 July, and a long but inconclusive discussion ensued. Stalin stated that before 1939 the USSR, like Germany,wanted to change the old equilibrium,whereas Britain and France wished to restore it. If Churchillstill wished to do that, he could not agree with him and did not think it possible.17 The 1 July meeting was followed by a period when Molotov refused to see Cripps, referringhim to A. Mikoyan, at first because his approachwas on trade matters,and later because Mikoyan was a deputy chairmanof Sovnarkom,as well as Commissar for Foreign Trade.18Molotov eventually saw Cripps on 7 August, at an interview described by Cripps as 'a rathernegative one', Molotov explaining that the USSR 'had failed to obtain in Britain the political, economic, and strategic benefits which she gained from Germany'.19 meetings followed on 24 August and 4 Supplementary now to but was referred October, deputy commissarA. Ya. Vyshinsky20-perCripps as the Soviet not leadershipwould not have wished to do anythingto surprising haps disturb relations with Germany at the time of Molotov's visit to Berlin. This was being planned from 17 October, with Molotov leaving for Berlin on 11 November. Cripps was clearly rattledwhen he found out about the visit,21 writing to the Foreign Office:
Vyshinsky's previous assuranceto me that Molotov's refusal to receive me had no political significance was now disproved conclusively by his Berlin visit. Molotov's treatmentof

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and showed unmistakably his myself and my non-Axiscolleagueswas unprecedented un-neutral attitude.22 completely Fear of antagonisingGermanyprobablylay behind Molotov's continuedrefusalto see Cripps until 1 February 1940. Then, after complaints by Eden, the British Foreign Secretary,to Maisky, aboutSoviet behaviour,Molotov tried to excuse his unavailability by telling Cripps that, as Sovnarkomchairman,he had to spend much time on domestic as well as foreign affairs. When Cripps challenged Vyshinsky's authority, Molotov assured him that the Deputy Commissar had a full mandate to pursue negotiations.23 In April 1941 Cripps handed Vyshinsky a long memorandum, addressed to Molotov, analysing the situationfacing the USSR and setting out the advantagesof joining the allied powers. Churchill's famous warning to Stalin, that the Germans, following the defeat of Yugoslavia, were moving two divisions from Romania to Poland, was sent a few days later.24 If, as Gorodetskyargues, these initiatives only convinced the Soviet leaders that the British were desperateto involve the USSR in the war, the flight of Hess to Britain, on 12 May, also greatly alarmed the Soviet leadershipthat a separatepeace was aboutto be negotiated;or even that Britainmight be enteringinto an alliance with Nazi Germanyagainstthe USSR. This situationwas exacerbatedas Cripps, to put pressureon the Soviet leadership,in his memorandum to Molotov, had hinted about the possibility of Britain making a separatepeace.2 There was thus little change in Anglo-Soviet relationsfrom 1939 until the time Hitler launched Barbarossa.

Thefirst months of war As is well known, Molotov, not Stalin, announcedthe Germanattack,on Sunday 22 June 1941. Recent accounts and Stalin's office diary, however, belie the traditional for the first few weeks story that this was because the Soviet leader was incapacitated of the war.26 At 9 p.m. Churchillmade his first response to the invasion of the USSR in a broadcastin which he said: will haveouraid ... It followstherefore Nazidom Any manor statewho fightson against we shallgive whatever help we can to Russiaandthe Russian people, although,as he went on to point out, he had always been an inveterateenemy of the USSR, and the broadcastincludedno welcome to an ally.27On the same day, Molotov telegraphedMaisky that the Soviet government could not receive assistance from Britain without recompense, and was preparedto render aid to Britain.28 Crippshad been recalled to London at the time of the Germanattack.He returned to the USSR on 26 June with a British military mission, but with no well-defined At these meetings he found that Molotov brief, and saw Molotov twice on 27 June.29 was already insistent on the need for 'a political agreement to define the basis of cooperation',the statementbeing linked to questions about Hess's landing in Britain in May.30Molotov began the first interview by raising the Hess issue, and would not have been reassuredwhen Cripps replied

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thatin the pastHesshadbeenlinkedwitha circleof youngEnglishwithpro-Nazi opinions andconclude andbelievedthathe couldnegotiate peacewith thatgroup... In the second meeting Molotov questionedCrippsin detail on the scale of help Britain was likely to be able to offer the USSR, and ended by pressing the ambassadoron the political basis of cooperation.In the light of heightenedSoviet fears about Britain making a separatepeace, or an alliance with Nazi Germanyas a result of the Hess affair, this was hardly surprising.Molotov found Crippsevasive: he said that military and economic cooperation was essential, political collaborationcould come later.31 Cripps saw Molotov again on 29 June, when he raised the question of military cooperationin the Murmanskarea (to secure the only route available for supplies). Molotov, during this meeting, described the situation on the fronts as 'fluid'.32 Molotov now began to see Cripps and members of the British militarymission on an almost daily basis, but the Soviet leaders had alreadyrealised that the USA would Molotov telegraphedK. Umansky, have to be the chief supplier of war materials.33 the Soviet Ambassadorin Washington,on 29 June, asking him to approachRoosevelt about the possibility of assisting with 6000 aeroplanesand large quantitiesof other Regardingthe USA as the main source of war supplies not only put the equipment.34 emphasis in negotiations with the British on political mattersand military assistance but also made the British more cautious about cooperating, because vital war materialsfrom the USA were now being divertedto the USSR.35Molotov continued to press Crippsabout a political agreement,saying that his previous attitudehad been determined by an attempt to postpone war, and that negotiations could now be conducted without reservations.36When Stalin saw Cripps on 8 July he again demonstrated that Soviet fears had been heightened by the Hess episode. He reinforcedthe need for a political understanding, saying he wanted an agreement 'of nature' on two a purely general points: as to quantity or quality, (1) mutual help withoutany precision to conclude a separate (2) neither country peace.37 Following a further meeting between Stalin, Molotov and Cripps on 10 July, these two points were the centralclauses of the joint principallyto discuss wording,38 on 12 agreement signed July by Molotov and Cripps, which marked the peak of influence in Moscow. On Stalin's insistence the war was describedas being Cripps's This meant that if Hitler was overthrowninternallyand 'Hitlerite Germany'. against communist a replaced by regime, the USSR could reconsider the question of a separatepeace.39 In the Soviet Union the need to make Germanyfight on two or more fronts was assumed to be a priorityfrom the very early days of the war, and Maisky had raised this with Beaverbrookas early as 27 June 1941.40Molotov broachedthe topic of the Second Front in an interview with Cripps on 18 July.41On the same day Stalin sent his first personal message to Churchill in which he too raised the question of the opening of a Second Front. Not yet separatedfrom requests for military equipment, the issue was stressed in furtherletters to Churchillwritten on 3 and 13 September, It was a hint of friction that was to come, as the situationon the front deteriorated.42 and from the beginning the outlook was not good, because the British political and

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militaryleadershipwere only lukewarmin supportof the agreementsigned by Cripps and Molotov.43 The preliminaryjoint agreement was followed by a trade and credit agreement signed on 16 August, and by the 'three-power conference' in Moscow, held 29 September-1 October.This had been proposedby Roosevelt and Churchillwhen they formulatedthe Atlantic Charterin August.44Molotov took the chair at this conference, Beaverbrookleading the British delegation and Averell Harrimanthe American.45Harrimanfound Molotov overbearing,lacking in humour and inflexible. He insisted that there must be a signed formal protocol, probably thinking this would commit the 'capitalist powers'. The protocol extended the Lend-Lease scheme and promised large quantities of supplies to the USSR.46 On 30 September Stalin proposed a formal Anglo-Soviet alliance, 'not only for the war, but for the post-war as well'. The final negotiations for this treaty, conducted by Molotov in London in May 1942, caused differencesbetween the two Westernpowers, which Molotov later tried to exploit to Soviet advantage,both to gain recognitionof Soviet frontierclaims and a high priorityfor the Second Front. With the deterioratingmilitary situation in the USSR, Stalin's and Molotov's emphasis in negotiations with Britain moved from a political agreementto military assistance, for which they were desperate. The initial British response made by Cripps,on 14 October,was to offer British troops to control the growing disorderin Persia, thus freeing Soviet troops for service on the eastern front. Molotov disliked this proposal. He pointed out that no British troops were assisting the USSR, and argued that Persia and the eastern front were two different questions. He suggested that British troops might help defend the Caucasusfrom the Germans.When Cripps enquiredhow British troops would be supplied if sent to the USSR, Molotov replied that 'until that time comes the question has a platonic, abstractcharacter'.4 At a furthermeeting, on 22 October,when the British had offered troops for service in the Caucasus,Molotov respondedthat there was not a front there, and asked if the British As recently governmentreally wanted to send their forces to fight the Germans.48 published documents make clear, in a conversation with Sikorski, in June 1942, Molotov let slip that the lack of enthusiasmof the Soviet governmentto have English troops in the Caucasus arose from its fear of the effect on the local population of withdrawingSoviet troops from the area.49 Cripps was becoming steadily more frustratedwith his position, Beaverbrook having deliberately excluded him from the 'three-powerconference' and deprived him of information.50 His relationswith Molotov were not improvedwhen he forced the latterto appointM. Litvinov, Molotov's enemy and predecessoras NarkomIndel, as interpreter to the 'three-powerconference,' instead of Umansky, who was unacto the Americans.5 With the evacuationof Moscow, Molotov too was under ceptable considerable strain, Cripps writing of him on 15 October that he had never before looked so tiredandill ... he was deadly paleandhis collarall awrywherehe is generally veryneat andtidy.52 S. Kot, the ambassadorfor the Polish government-in-exile,who saw Molotov in Kuibyshev on 22 October, described him as 'obsessed with the seriousness of the

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situation,but endeavouringneverthelessto masterhis exhaustion'. Cripp'sinterview with Molotov on 23 October in Kuibyshev, when W. Citrine was visiting with a British trade union delegation, degenerated into little more than a squabble, with Molotov accusing the British of avoiding their military responsibilities and not replying to requests for military assistance. Crippsdenied this, saying that the USSR had not responded to questions as to where the troops should be deployed.54The sympatheticCitrine did not report the altercationwith Cripps in the account of his visit to the USSR. Impressedwith the grandeurof Molotov's office in Kuibyshev,he noted only that Molotov was pale, gesticulating with his hands as he spoke in short sharp sentences.55 Molotov continued to increase Cripps's unease. In early November, when Cripps claimed he was pressurisingthe British government,Molotov replied that he feared that Cripps 'had no power of persuadingthem'. Anxious to returnto Britain, Cripps wrote to Eden that he saw no point in remaining in Moscow to be used as an 'occasional post box'. He wished to resign, unless the British governmentwas going to negotiate a full treaty of alliance to replace the July agreement.56 Shortly after this interview Stalin sent Churchillhis angry letter of 8 November, declaring that there was neither a definite understandingbetween Britain and the USSR on war aims and plans for post-war organisation,nor an agreementon mutual military assistance against Hitler. He stated that he did not wish to meet Generals Wavell and Paget, whom Churchillproposed to send to inform him of the military situation, unless they had powers to conclude an agreement on assistance and war aims, and claimed that British war supplies were arrivingbadly packed and broken.57 On 21 November Churchill, after delaying a response, offered to send Eden and military advisers to visit Stalin. This was pleasing to Cripps, who found Eden On 6 December, in preparationfor the visit, the British government sympathetic.58 announcedthat a state of war existed between Britain, on the one hand, and Finland, Hungary and Romania on the other.59 The Eden visit Despite his efforts to ensure the success of the Moscow conference before he left Britain, Eden, who preferredan alliance with the USSR to one with the USA,60was sent to Moscow with no detailed brief, whereas, as his letter of 8 November showed, Stalin had very fixed ideas. This meant that a positive outcome was unlikely. Moreover, by the time Eden arrived, for both sides the greatest urgency for an agreement had passed. Japan had attacked Pearl Harbour, the United States had entered the war, and the British need for an alliance with the Soviet Union became a much lower priority. Not only did British politicians believe that the eventual outcome of the war was decided, but the Japanese attack on Malaya meant that the opening of a British front in Europeto aid the USSR was a secondaryconsideration. In addition, as Churchillhad decided to travel to the United States, the negotiations to be carriedon in Moscow were no longer centre stage. Eden, who had been looking for a diplomatic coup, knew this. In the USSR the initial German onslaught on Moscow had been repelled, which meant that the Soviet leaders were no longer quite so desperate for assistance.61From the Eden Papers and recently published Soviet

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documentswe have a much clearerpictureof the detail of the negotiationsand of the priorities of the Soviet leadershipat this point. Eden arrived at Murmanskon 12 December and was met by Molotov when he arrived in Moscow on 15 December.62At the first meeting with Eden, on 17 December, Stalin producedtwo drafts, on a military alliance during the war and on These were to replace the July agreement,but with a much post-war cooperation.63 more binding formula. In response, Eden produceda document which was basically similar, but about which Stalin made his famous comment that Eden's document resembled a declaration,that declarationswere algebra, whilst treaties were simple practical arithmetic,and he wanted arithmetic.64 Stalin also proposeda secret protocolto be attachedto the second document.It was to deal with two matters:firstly, the recognition of both the Soviet Union's western frontieron the basis of the 'Curzonline' amendedin favour of the USSR, and of the USSR's absorptionof the Baltic states and Bessarabia;and secondly, the future of Europe, including Germany,which the document indicated was to be dismembered. In the light of the Atlantic Charterand the lack of an agreed British policy, Eden could do no more than say that furtherconsultationswith Churchill, the USA and Dominions were necessaryon these matters;but he left Stalin with the impressionthat he accepted de facto the Soviet claims with regard to the Baltic states.65From this time Stalin and Molotov always behaved, in negotiations with the British, as if the future of the Baltic states was settled, although on a numberof occasions Churchill If they did not believe that it was the case, it was a useful made clear that it was not.66 It is also clear that, from the beginning, for Stalin and Molotov bargainingposition. the post-war settlement was as importantan issue for negotiation as a war-time alliance. On the next day, although an acceptable formula had been worked out on the treaties, Stalin, claiming that the Atlantic Charter ignored Soviet security needs, refused to sign them unless Russia's 1941 western frontierswere recognised at the same time.67 The position remainedthe same at a thirdmeeting, Eden recordingin his and memoirs 'Molotov was most unhelpful', adding in his memoirs 'and the diary close of our discussion frigid'.68The negotiationswere thus deadlocked:Britainwas preparedto make a treatyonly to win the war whilst Stalin was intenton guaranteeing secure Soviet borders in the post-war world. There was now a break in the conference to allow Eden to consult the cabinet. During this time, whilst the British Foreign Secretary was away from Moscow visiting the front, Cripps 'nobly volunteeredto stay behind to give Molotoff [sic] a He informedthe Commissarfor Foreign Affairs of the prior commitments lecture'.69 which the British cabinet had to honour, and stressed that the failure of the Eden mission would strengthenforces in Britain opposed to cooperationwith the USSR. Molotov's response was to emphasise Stalin's position on the frontierquestion, and to point out the previous Soviet approacheson the matter.He denied Eden's claim that a new issue was being raised duringthe talks, and arguedthat the alliance must be based on the new in the struggle relations whichhavebeen formed betweenthe USSR andBritain with the
common enemy...

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The warringcountries-Britain, the USSR and the USA-must know what each of them was fighting for. The elementaryinterestsof these countriesmust be recognised. The question of frontierswas the most elementaryquestion. Without settling this question there could be no real lasting alliance, and we would like to have one ... We could not sign an agreement after six months of the war leaving quite substantial questions open. ComradeStalin had statedoutrightthat neitherhe nor the Governmentcould appearbefore the people with such an answer. He had even said that the people might want such a Governmentto go to hell.70

The British cabinet supportedthe line Eden was taking, opposing the recognition of the 1941 Soviet frontiersand stressing the need to consult the USA and Dominions. At the final meeting Stalin made the Soviet position clear in a statementreflectingthe temporaryslight improvementin the Soviet military position:
He had proposed attachingprotocols to the treaties,but the British side had been against it, and he had discardedthe protocols. He had also droppedhis request for opening a Second Front.It was also unclearwhat the state of affairs was concerningthe question of a northern operationin the area of Petsamo. In view of these concessions, ComradeStalin thoughthe had the right to request some compensationin the form of recognition of our 1941 western frontier.71

Eden thereforeleft Moscow without an agreement,Stalin reluctantlyagreeing to wait for three more weeks for further consultations in London.72The carefully worded communique which was issued at the end of the talks spoke only of a friendly atmosphere,agreementon the necessity for the 'utterdefeat of HitleriteGermany',an
exchange of views on post-war peace and security, and a step towards closer cooperation.73

Although he met Eden when he arrivedin Moscow, saw him off when he departed,
and received him in the Kremlin, 'dressed in a little buff uniform coat and Russian boots', when Eden arrived for a formal dinner,74 Molotov played only a minor role, stressing Soviet priorities. This was typical when Stalin was present at negotiations. When Stalin pressed for the recognition of the Soviet western frontier, Comrade Molotov expressed surprise at Eden's persistent defence of his position. We are talking of common military goals, common struggle, but in one of the most important military goals, our western frontier, we cannot derive support from Great Britain. Is this really normal? Later, when Eden insisted that it was necessary to consult the British government on this matter, he continued: I am of the opinion that this question of the western frontiersis the major question for us, and if no definite answer can be obtained upon it I think it is better to put off the signing of the agreements. At the next session on the same topic he added: We are going to sign a treaty of mutual assistance or alliance and we must know what we are fighting for and where we stand. His other main contribution was to support Stalin when the General Secretary raised

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the question of the Second Front,but this was a minor input that occurredquite near the end of the meetings.75 At the banquet at the end of the conference Stalin blamed Molotov for the Nazi-Soviet pact. He also narrated the story of Molotov's visit to Berlin in November which Churchill claimed Stalin told him when he visited Moscow in August 1940, 1942. According to this, when Molotov met Ribbentropin a dugout during a British air raid, and Ribbentropclaimed that Britainwas finished,Molotov asked: 'Why then are we in this dugout and whose bombs have put us here?' Eden claimed that, in response to Stalin's story, Molotov smiled and nodded.76 Outside the main conference meetings, Molotov behaved more typically in discussing subsidiarymatters,Eden writing to Cripps about one of these on 13 January 1942: WhenI was in Moscow,I hadspokento M. Molotovon the subject of the Kurds andhad a diplomatic document butwas a was not strictly givenhim a notewhich,I hadexplained, couchedin very suitable termsfor a foreign note prepared for me. It was not, therefore, We havenow receiveda replyfromM. Molotovwhichwas somewhat sharp government. in tone, and I fearedthat this might well have been my fault for giving the Soviet a document in this form.77 government From Eden in Moscow to Molotov in London Molotov had indicated to Cripps on 19 December his displeasure at the failure to secure an agreement on frontiers. On 26 December he tried to persuade the ambassadorthat the original belligerent powers, Britain and the USSR, should act independentlyof the USA against Germany,but Crippsdid not respondfavourably.78 This, a clear reflection of Molotov's commitment to an ideological framework, appearsto be his first attemptto create divisions between the 'imperialistpowers'. It is less certainthat he was proposingan Anglo-Soviet alliance which could eventually be directed against the USA. Molotov was clearly hostile at Cripps's last two interviews,79and the latter left Moscow on 9 January 1942 without any of the civilities normally shown to a His replacement,A. ClarkKerr,did not arriveuntil March,81 departingambassador.80 which left something of a hiatus. At their first meeting, on 28 March, Molotov took It had clearly come to the top of the Soviet up the question of the Second Front.82 an the indication of military situation at the time.83 agenda again, Eden had de in If, Moscow, given facto recognition of the USSR's claims to the Baltic States,84back in London, Churchill continued to oppose recognition of the Soviet Union's 1941 western frontiers.Moreover, the British cabinet and permanent staff of the foreign office were divided. This meant that the consultationsfor which Stalin had allowed three weeks took considerably longer. In Februarythe British cabinet agreed to approach Roosevelt about the frontier question, but found him In March,throughLitvinov, now serving strongly opposed to the Russian proposal.85 to the USA, Roosevelt appealedto Stalin to defer the frontierquestion as ambassador until the end of the war. Stalin's reply was a curt message from Molotov to Litvinov instructinghim to tell Roosevelt that the Soviet governmenttook note of his views. Molotov's relations with Litvinov continued to be strained. When the ambassador

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suggested he should approachRoosevelt about the Second Front,Molotov forbadhim to raise the matter, saying that they had already had three refusals and did not want
a fourth.86

With continuingBritish militaryreverses in the Far East, Churchill,by 25 March, was preparedto consider opening negotiations with the USSR and making concessions on the frontierquestion. The British cabinet agreed on 8 April,87 when Molotov was invited to come to London to negotiate the proposed treaty.88 Roosevelt, who his not to the criticise registered dissatisfaction,agreed proposedtreatypublicly. But, to counterthe British initiative, he invited Molotov to Washingtonto discuss military matters,hinting at the possibility of a Second Front. He wrote to Stalin that he had in minda veryimportant of ourarmed forcesin military proposal involvingthe utilisation a manner front.Thisobjectcarries to relieveyourcritical Western greatweightwithme ... time is of the essenceif we are to help in an important way.89 On 13 April Maisky told Eden that although Molotov appreciatedthe invitation to come to London, he was unable to accept becausehe had been chargedby Stalinwith more important dutiesin connection with as well as his dutiesas Commissar for ForeignAffairsand could not absent production himselffromMoscowduring the next few criticalmonths.90 With regardto Roosevelt's invitation,Molotov first directedUmansky to obtain more details of what was to be discussed. Then, on 20 April, Stalin wrote to Roosevelt that it was essential to arrangea meeting between Molotov and Roosevelt to exchangeopinionson the organisation of a SecondFrontin Europein the shortest possibletime, and that he agreed to Molotov visiting London, as well as Washington.91 He wrote to Churchill on 22 April that the Soviet government, has decidedto send V. M Molotovto despiteall the difficulties, Londonto settleby personal conversations all the problems and obstaclesin the way of essentialbecausethe question of forming a Second signingthe treaty.This is particularly Frontin Europe, raisedin a recentmessageto me personally the President of the USA, by Mr Roosevelt,with an invitationto Washington to discuss this question,demandsa of opinions betweenrepresentatives of our governments.92 preparatory exchange The USA was holding out the possibility of a Second Front;Molotov was therefore to go to London first to test the less enthusiastic British opinion. Eden had demonstratedthat Britain might make concessions on Soviet territorialclaims. If he went to Washington first, Molotov might have to trade these for a promise of a Second Front.93In London he might get some firm agreement on frontiers before going on to Washington. Again, Stalin and Molotov were trying to divide the 'imperialistcamp'. Eden's draft treaty for the meetings, which recognised Soviet claims to the Baltic states, included provisions to allow emigrationfrom them, and he suggested that the USSR should make a declarationallowing the Baltic States to preservesome measure of autonomy.The Soviet draftssubmittedby Maisky on 1 May ignored this proposal. They proposed that the question of the Russian frontierwith Poland was to be dealt

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with in a separatenote: the outcome of direct negotiations between the USSR and Poland in which the British were not to be involved. A secret protocol was also proposedallowing the USSR to give guaranteesto Romaniaand Finlandand establish As a result, Eden had Sir Alexander Cadogan, the bases in those two countries.94 PermanentUnder-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, who had accompaniedhim to Moscow, prepare a modified draft document which dropped the proposals for emigration from the Baltic states, together with a second document to be held in reserve in case negotiations on the main treaty broke down. This was essentially a wartimealliance and agreementon post-warcooperationwith no mention of post-war frontiers,the advantageof which, Eden claimed, was that it was no longer necessary for Great Britain to safeguardthe Polish position.95Eden had two main purposes in his drafts:to increase Stalin's confidence in Britain, and by making concessions to limit his appetite for territory.Behind this there still lurked a fear that the USSR might make a separatepeace.96 In Moscow there was a markedimprovementin Anglo-Americanrelationsbefore the visit took place, Clark Kerr writing to Eden on 27 April: The huddleI wentinto with Stalinprovedto be cosierandpleasanter thanI everdaredto it was no more than a of two old hope.Probably juxtaposition rogues,eachone seeingthe in it, andchuckling of the otherandfinding comfort andharmony overit-chuckroguery ling all the more shamelesslybecause of the goveressy presenceof that bootfaced Molotov... I have greathopesof the talksyou areto have withbootface.97 It seems quite clear that Clark Kerr did not understandStalin, or the Stalin-Molotov relationship. In that he had not been in post a month, this is not surprising,but perhapshe might have been better briefed on these matters.

Molotov's visit to Britain and the USA, May-June 1942 London, 22-27 May 1942 In his telegramof 20 April to Roosevelt, Stalin had specified 10-15 May as the dates for Molotov's visit to Washington.98 Roosevelt suggested to Churchillthat Molotov visit but this idea was headed off by the British prime Washington first, might who said that Molotov minister, might already have left by the time Roosevelt's in Churchill arrived Moscow. message proposed that Molotov should visit Britain It soon became the to then first, USA, finally returning Britain,to sign an agreement.99 clear that initially Molotov did not envisage returningto Britain after visiting the
USA. 00

GeneralA. E. Golovanov was responsiblefor planningthe mission, the knowledge of which was apparentlylimited to him, Molotov and Stalin, who, it appears, in December 1941 had proposed making such a visit personally. Golovanov led the but Stalin and Molotov insisted on advanced party which arrived on 29 April,101 keeping the date of Molotov's arrivalsecret, which made the Britishfeel thatMolotov was keeping other options open for the time.'02Clearly, secrecy was essential for Molotov's personal safety, but he would have become even more wary when the

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USSR air attache and three other Soviet officials, including a secretary who was a member of the advancedparty for the Molotov visit, were killed in late April, when a RAF plane in which they were flying burst into flames.103 Cadoganwas deputedto meet Molotov. He spent 10-14 May in Scotland,awaiting Molotov's arrival at Tealing airportnear Dundee, taking Maisky and other Soviet officials on sightseeing visits to Edinburgh,Balmoraland other venues in the interim. Six days after Cadogan's returnto London, Molotov arrivedon 20 May,104 after an of He in a Tb-7 be 10.25 hours. travelled renamed Pe-8 after its (to overnight flight in V. M. who was killed a 1942), four-enginedheavy bomber, designer Petlyakov, only nine of which were in existence. These planes were capable of flying at high altitudes and Molotov flew over the front and occupied Europe at an altitude of 30 000 feet, thus avoiding German fighters. The pilot was Major E. R. Pusep, who made a number of flights of this nature. On arrival,Molotov, who travelled as 'Mr Brown', reported, a little alarmingly, that one engine was leaking oil and needed
servicing.105

Cadogan boardedthe special train bringing Molotov and his party to London near Hatfield,and found Molotov dressedin a smartbrown suit, 'at the top of his form and most chatty'. He had refused to fly to London, probablybecause of the recent plane crash killing Soviet personnel.From London, Molotov was driven to Chequerswhere he and his party, including Maisky, were to stay for the visit.'06 According to Churchill,staff at Chequerswere surprisedwhen the Soviet partyasked for theirroom keys and insisted on keeping their doors locked. When the staff eventually managed to gain access, to make the beds, they were disturbedto find that Molotov and other leading officials slept with pistols under their pillows. In addition to male NKVD bodyguards,Molotov had a female attendantwho was responsible for looking after his clothes and keeping his room tidy. She kept constant guard in the room in Molotov's absence. On Molotov's arrivalthe NKVD bodyguardsmade a meticulous search of the room and every piece of furniturein it. The bedding was so arranged that Molotov could spring out of it at a moment's notice, and a revolver was placed next to his briefcase by the bed each night. Churchill's comment on these arrangements was that Molotov should have asked whether anyone on the British side had any interest in killing him.'07Molotov recordedin his memoirs: I arranged fromLondon. a dinner thereon the We stayedat Chequers fifty-sixtykilometres EdenandI werethere. There was somesortof smallgarden. firstdayof the visit.Churchill, someold nobleman hadgivenit to the government Not a palatial old building. Apparently, Therewas a bathroom residence. but no shower.Then to use. It was the primeminister's of Roosevelt'swas when I visited Roosevelt,I stayedin the WhiteHouse.Everything he had a bathroom with a showeras well.108 up-to-date; Formal negotiations commenced on 21 May. Molotov was assisted by Maisky throughout the negotiations, the chief British representatives were Churchill and that the USSR clearly had multiple objecEden. Molotov immediately demonstrated tives for the conference. He began the proceedings by stating that he was authorised to negotiate on two matters,althoughdiscussion of others was not precluded.The first was the treaties, protocol and related matters, already discussed with Eden the previous December;the second was the 'establishmentof a Second Frontin the west',

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which he would be travelling to discuss in the USA as well as in Britain. Molotov added that the Soviet governmentconsidered the Second Front, an issue raised by Roosevelt, to be especially/moreimportantand to be primarilya political ratherthan This statementclearly broughtthe question of the Second Frontto militarymatter.109 the top of the agenda,but its significanceduringthe negotiationswas to vary with the Soviet military situation, and Soviet post-war security was something that could be tradedoff for it. On both issues, Molotov could exploit differences between Britain and the USA. After talk about Molotov's appeal for secrecy, particularly as he was travellingon to the USA, there was a general discussion of the draftdocuments,and of the Soviet demandfor treaties which recognised the 1941 frontiersof the USSR as a guarantee for Soviet security.Molotov claimed that the Soviet governmentwould do everything to reach an amicable settlement with the Polish government, despite the current differences. Churchill, who said that the Soviet claims created 'grave difficulties' because they contravened the Atlantic Charter,ended this first meeting trying to deflect Molotov's demand for a Second Front, by going into details on the logistics of a proposedjoint US-British invasion of the continent,which he said was a military question.Molotov insisted thathe wished to clarify the political aspects of the Second Front.10? Cadogan made the comment 'Blackmail' in his diary!"' Molotov had a more detailed conversationwith Eden later the same day, most of the meeting being a long wrangle over the Polish frontierquestion.They agreedthat, at the end of the war, Poland might be compensatedwith German territoryin the west, but Molotov insisted on the 1941 Soviet-Polish frontierbased on the Curzon line, and the right of the Soviet governmentto negotiate this directly with the Polish government. Eden, pointing out that since December the British government had made concessions with regard to the Baltic states, was adamant that the British governmenthad pledges to Poland which it had to honour under the August 1939 MutualAssistance Agreement,reaffirmedat the time of the Soviet-Polish agreement of 30 July 1941. 12 Eden may have been attemptingto obtain a Soviet concession on the Polish frontier in return for the British concession on the Baltic states, but Molotov insisted that the British governmenthad made no concessions, since 'the Baltic states had been partof Russia for hundredsof years'. He claimed that the only compromisewas being made by the USSR, in agreeingto settle the frontierquestion of the very large remainingpart amicablywith Poland,leaving open the determination of the USSR's western frontier.He believed that Britain should make a concession in agreeing not to insist on her statement of July 1941 to the Poles. 13Molotov's reportto Stalin on these two meetings confirmedthe aims of Soviet policy. He wrote:
I stressed the particularimportance and urgency of the question of the Second Front, referringto Roosevelt's initiative, in connection with the invitationto me to visit the USA to discuss this question ... The minimum for us is the restorationof what has been violated by Hitler, plus additional minimumguaranteesof security, in the first place, north-westand south-west of the USSR frontiers.If the British governmentmaintainsthat an agreementon this basis is impossible at the moment, it is better to postpone the issue of treaties until a more favourabletime in the future...

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Churchillmade a brief statementon the question of the Second Front,the meaning of which is that the British Governmentand the US governmenthave decided in principleto establish such a front in Europe, with maximum forces at their disposal and at the earliest possible date, and they are making energetic preparationsfor that. Nonetheless Churchillrefrainedfrom elaboratingon these general statements,while referring to the great technical difficulties involved in the realisationof a Second Front ... I held to the view that this was not a purely military question, but was above all a political question, and one of great urgency. ... The question of Poland was discussed at length. I wanted to prove that, in our willingness to meet the wishes of Britain, we were proposing a compromise and making a big concession by not demandingBritain's approvalof the restorationof the 1941 Soviet-Polish bordernow, and, promisingto settle this matterdirectlywith Poland in an amicable way, we are asking Britain for a smaller concession, namely, that she not reiterateher statementof
10 [mistake for 31] July 1940."l4

On the following day the morning was taken up by a meeting on the military logistics of the Second Front proposed by Churchill.115Molotov, who Cadogan noted 'had all the grace and conciliation of a totem pole',"16 insisting on a political focus, argued that although the idea was Roosevelt's, since the true burden of establishing a Second Front in Europe must necessarily fall on Britain, it should be discussed there before he went to the USA. He continued by pointing out that the main burden of resisting Hitler was falling on the USSR, and, in the light of the desperate situation his country faced, asked whether the Allies of the Soviet Union, above all Britain, could not divert 40 German divisions to fighting a battle in Western Europe in the summer of 1942. This, he argued, might determine the eventual outcome of the war that year, and not later. Rather than begging for help, he was telling the Western powers how victory could be achieved most quickly. In response, Churchill spoke of the lack of British and American resources to mount a European offensive in 1942. He claimed, however, that operations in Libya occupied eleven Axis divisions, including three German, and that Hitler had to maintain thirty three divisions in Norway, France and Holland. He said that Britain intended to invade Europe in 1943. During this discussion, Molotov (perhaps looking for divisions in the 'imperialist camp') repeatedly tried to clarify whether Churchill was stating an agreed AngloAmerican position or was speaking only on behalf of Britain.ll7 Embarrassingly, he insisted on reminding the British prime minister of the small proportion of British forces actively engaged in military operations in May 1942, and of the relatively minor losses the British had suffered. In response, Churchill could say only that Britain had stood alone after the fall of France until the German attack on the USSR, and try to explain the difficulty of mounting an attack on the continent. He suggested that the military representatives meet for this to be elucidated. The Soviet record of this conversation, which makes clear Molotov's misgivings, states: Molotov asked with a touch or irony 'What are in fact the prospects of the generals' 1 meeting?' 8 Later in the day Molotov met Eden again. There were further inconclusive discussions on the Soviet-Polish frontier, on the British proposal on a right of emigration in the

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Baltic states, and on the Soviet demand for mutual assistance treaties with Finland and Romania. Molotov claimed that the USSR needed to protect itself from further attacksfrom these countriesin alliance with Germany,but the British suspectedit was to allow the USSR to occupy them if it chose.'19 After his returnfrom Downing Street on 22 May, to Molotov's surprise,Churchill and Eden arrivedat Chequersfor anothermeeting. This was an attemptby Churchill and Eden to browbeat Molotov into concessions. Held in a room where, Molotov reportedto Stalin, 'there happened to be a large revolving globe', the discussions continued from 10 p.m. to 1 a.m. the following morning, and were centred on Churchill's analysis of the military situation.Following this, Churchilltalked about the need to avoid controversialmatters such as frontiers, and Eden introducedhis 'reserve' treaty, in which there was no mention of frontiers,the details of which, he said, he would supply tomorrow. The implication was clear: British concessions would be withdrawnif Molotov continued to insist on the Soviet proposals for the Polish eastern frontier. Interestingly,there is no record of this meeting in British archives, only hints in diaries. Molotov's report to Stalin and the Narkomlndel archive, however, now make clear that this additionalmeeting took place-and its
significance.120

In three reportson 23 May Molotov explained the position to Stalin. If he did not agree to the original British proposal of two treaties without any statementattached regardingfrontiers,the British leaders were falling back on Eden's reserve document, keeping the original document open for signatureonly if Molotov agreed to discuss it in the USA and then returnto Britain. Molotov resisted this, saying that a second visit to Britain after travellingto the USA was not in his instructions.He knew that discussions with Roosevelt were not going to strengthenhis position on the USSR's frontiers. Churchill and Eden clearly believed that when Molotov found that Roosevelt was unsympatheticto Soviet security demands,he would be persuadedto sign a treaty that referredfrontierquestions to the end of the war. On his side, Molotov, who reportedto Stalin the personalpressureChurchilland Eden were puttingon him, was trying desperatelyto obtain a statementon post-war frontiersacceptable to the USSR, if not in the treaty itself, in a note accompanyingit. He informed Stalin that Churchillwas unsympatheticboth on the question of the Second Frontand on Soviet frontiers,writing: CONCLUSIONS 1. All the recentconversations thatChurchill ... is not in a hurry give me the impression to agreewith us at the moment.
2. I consider it pointless to returnto Britain after my visit to the USA, because I see no prospects of improvementresulting from this. 3. Most probably,the prospects for my trip to the USA are not favourable,either, but the promise to go has to be kept.'12 On 23 May Eden presented his alternative document, which he said he was sure that the USA would support. He explained that the new treaty combined the agreed portions of the first two drafts: a treaty of alliance during the war and post-war cooperation. It excluded points in dispute, especially the USSR's frontier with Poland,

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and Article 4 of the British draft-the proposal to allow emigration.Eden stated that the distinguishing feature of the new draft was an article stipulatingthat the USSR and GreatBritain should renderreciprocalassistance to each other for 20 years after the war. This would put the relations between the two parties on a firm footing, and could be suspended if the post-war organisation of Europe was achieved to their mutual satisfaction. Molotov's response was guarded:the Soviet governmentwould have to be consulted, and, with a completely new draft, this was not possible by telegraph whilst he was in Britain. He also said that he had reservationsabout the exclusion of matters in the earlier versions. Whilst not rejecting the new document, Molotov asked to conclude discussion on the original drafts. This Eden agreed to, and Molotov focused discussion on amendments to the Soviet proposalson Finland and Romania.He also tried to whittle down the British proposalregardingright of emigration,restrictingit to nationalminorities He had not received a telegram from Stalin, written that day, telling him to only.122 focus on the Second Frontand giving him permissionto returnto Britainafter visiting the USA.'23 Little progress was made in the discussions and Molotov reported to Stalin: underdiscussion, andgave the draftof a to derailthe two treaties Eden ... was prepared
new, emasculated, treaty as cover.'24

He also sent to Stalin Eden's new draft treaty. Stalin replied promptly, on 24 May, with an abruptchange of policy: 1. We have receivedthe drafttreatyEdenhandedyou. We do not considerit an empty document. It lacks the questionof securityof declaration but regardit as an important of frontiers, for it gives us a free hand.The question but this is not badperhaps, frontiers, of ourfrontiers at one or another section for the security or to be moreexact,of guarantees will be decidedby force. of our country, to old drafttreaties be discarded andthatEden'sdraftuniting 2. We proposeamendments as the basis. the two treaties be accepted to sign the treatyas soon as possibleand thenfly to America. 5. It is desirable
Instantsiya125

Typically, Stalin used the familiar second person singular to address Molotov, showing that he was writing personally,but then signed the telegramInstantsiya-the highest authority-the term usually used to refer to the Central Committee or Politburo. A major factor behind Stalin's sudden change in policy was the rapidly deterioratingSoviet military situation, the Germans having broken through in the Crimea on 22-24 May. An alliance and militaryhelp were of overridingimportance. In addition, Stalin may have believed that he had gained as much as he could hope for in the British concessions on the Baltic states, which he could use at future negotiations,and that Molotov was not going to gain concessions on Polish frontiers. Moreover, if Molotov signed the treatyhe could travel on rapidly to the USA, where Stalin believed the prospect of the Second Frontwas being held out.126He knew that

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the USA was opposed to Soviet territorialclaims, and perhapsthoughthe could use differences between the 'imperialist powers' to persuade the USA to launch the Second Front at an early date. Security was to be tradedfor the Second Front.There are few clues to the way in which Stalin made his decision, although,on 23 and 24 May, he saw V. G. Dekanozov, Molotov's deputy at Narkomlndelin his office, the only occasions in that year when Dekanozov visited Stalin's office.127 Unfortunately,Molotov had not received Stalin's message before the next session of talks on 24 May. Here Eden claimed that the new treaty 'made a bigger offer than His Majesty's governmenthad ever made in the course of history'. It would allow discussion of the complete map of Europe, not only of Romania and Finland. The main discussion, however, which again proved inconclusive, focused on Soviet security interests, Molotov apparentlybeing preparedto make some concessions on the Polish frontierquestion. Cadogan commented: on theirsleeve.128 Theyare extraordinary peopleto deal with-they weartheirsuspicions Molotov did receive some encouragementon the question of the Second Frontwhen he saw Beaverbrookon 24 May. Beaverbrookemphasised that 'Roosevelt was the man to talk to about the Second Front', and that in the USA the governmentwas in front of the people on the matter,whilst in Britain, although public opinion was in favour, the governmentslowed it down.'29He also received encouragementfrom the American ambassadorto Britain, J. G. Winant, who told him that Roosevelt, H. L. (Harry)Hopkins and General G. C. Marshallwere ardent supportersof the Second Front. According to the Soviet record of the meeting, Winant told Molotov that Churchilland Eden were being held back by the British militaryleadership,especially Sir A. F. (Alan) Brooke. According to Winant's report to Roosevelt, Molotov informed him of this. After the meeting Winant telegraphedRoosevelt, saying how importantthe Second Front was to the Russians.130 Late on 24 May Molotov had received Stalin's instructionson the second treatyand immediately fell into line on the new policy: 1. I shallactin accordance fromInstantsiya withthe directive andbelievethatthenewdraft can also have a value. I failed to it treaty positive appreciate at once. 2.... I shall presentour consentto considerthe new drafttreatyas a big concessionto and especiallyto Roosevelt,whose dissatisfaction with the formerdraftswas Churchill, stressed andEden. by Churchill 3. On 25 May I shallproposeto Edenthatwe discusshis new draftand try my best to conclude the matter on 26 May. 4. We shallcertainly If I haveotheramendments, I tryto carrythrough youramendments. shall sendthemto you promptly. 5. In addition I am sendingyou the preamble to the treaty. If thereare amendments to it,
please write to me.131

The telegramsmake clear thatMolotov acceptedthe new treatyand abandonedSoviet territorialclaims because of instructionsfrom Stalin, not, as some older authorities The tone of the correspondence suggested, as a result of his interview with Winant.132 also raises the question of how far Stalin and Molotov believed the Western powers

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were interceptingtheir messages. Unless Molotov and Stalin were endeavouringto signal Stalin's dictatorialauthority,the answer must be they had no suspicions. Maisky now telephonedEden to say that Molotov was preparedto discuss the new treaty,'33and on 25 May the effect of Stalin's instructionswas clear. Molotov was enthusiasticfor the new document, introducingtwo minor technical amendmentsto wording proposed by Stalin, and one of his own referringto the 'security interests' of the signatories.'34He also proposed a formal title for the treaty, which Stalin amended, inserting the word 'Hitlerite' before Germany(again leaving room for the USSR to negotiate a separate peace if Hitler was overthrown). Stalin also altered 'Collaborationin the Settlement of Post-war Matters' to 'Collaborationafter the War'.135 Eden commented: 'A more or less satisfactory compromise on the Polish
question is now possible'.136

A further meeting, from 10.00 p.m. to 1.00 a.m. at Downing Street, like the previous late night meeting at Chequers, was again limited to Molotov, Maisky, Churchill, who, Molotov noted, 'never stopped smoking his cigar and sipping from a glass of whisky', and Eden. It was primarily concerned with military matters, Molotov informing Churchill and Eden that he was authorisedto return to Britain after visiting the USA.137 He now received final approval from Stalin for the new
treaty: 1. The preamble to Eden's draft is quite acceptable and does not need amendments. 2. We recommendyou not to introduceany more amendmentsto the draft except the two we sent you yesterday. 3. You should not make hints to Churchillabout Roosevelt entering the treaty [something Molotov had suggested to Stalin he should do] since this will be indelicate and the British might consider it as diminishing their role. 4. Should the Americansor Churchillhimself put forwardthe question of the USA entering the treaty, you should accept it with full readiness.

Instantsiya

38

The treatywas signed on 26 May, and Molotov departedfor the USA from Prestwick 39 airportat noon on 27 May. Commentingon these negotiations to Chuev in 1976 he said: frontiers. I do not remember the We insistedon a document dealingwith our post-war
details, but well rememberthe essence, of course. We were insisting on it all the time; I pressed as had Stalin in 1941, then I arrivedwith a draftin 1942. Churchillsaid: 'In no way can we do it'. I dodged this way and that. I sent a telegramto Stalin. He replied: 'Agree without this'. But I am getting ahead of the story. The whole question turnedon the recognition of the Baltic as ours. They would not agree. And when we backed down-which was certainlynecessary at the time-they were surprised.Churchillwas amazed. Eden was delirious we had agreed to their terms.140 Reflecting on the negotiations in 1963, Cadogan commented on the ability of the

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Russians overnight to make 'right-aboutturns without exposing themselves to any embarrassment'.141 At the time Churchillwrote to Roosevelt: We have done very good workthis and last week with Molotov... we have completely free fromthe objections transformed the treatyproposals. They arenow in my judgement we bothentertained, andareentirely withourAtlantic Charter. The treaty was compatible afternoon with on both sides. Molotov is a and statesman, signedyesterday greatcordiality of actionverydifferent fromwhatyou andI sawin Litvinov. I amverysure has a freedom with him...142 you will be able to reachgood understandings Clearly, Churchill had reached the wrong conclusion on the reasons for Molotov accepting the new treaty. Washingtonand the Second Front After his appointmentas head of NarkomIndelin May 1939, Molotov had far less contact with L. Steinhardt,the AmericanAmbassador,than with his British counterparts, and cool relations after the failure of the Triple Alliance negotiations were worsened by the Finnish war and Soviet treatmentof the Baltic states.143 They were to improve only after the Germanattack and the visit of HarryHopkins to Moscow in July 1941, Hopkins having a personal interview with Molotov.l44But the real turningpoints in Soviet-Americanrelations were the entry of the USA into the war, in the spring of the following year which resultedin the Molotov the correspondence and the in April 1942 by AdmiralW. Standley,a new, visit, replacementof Steinhardt more sympathetic,Americanambassador.145 Before this, Molotov had alreadyclashed with Litvinov, the new Soviet ambassadorin Washington, rejecting his advice to condemn the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbourand to accept the invitation for the USSR to join the proposed Anglo-AmericanSupreme War Council.'46 Molotov travelled to Washingtonexpecting large-scale militaryhelp-the Second Front-in return for the Soviet concession in signing a treaty that did not specify Soviet post-war frontiers. He was not aware that, by the time he had arrived in London, Churchillhad not only rejected the American plan for 'Sledgehammer'(a secondaryinvasion of Europe in 1942 in the Cherbourgarea) but had also informed Roosevelt of this, placing the responsibility for informing Molotov of it on the President's shoulders,or allowing him to commit Americanresources independently to the Second Front in 1942.'47 On the journey the plane was delayed at Reykjavik by bad weather. Here Pusep, the pilot, met an AmericanAir Force colonel who advised him to divert to refuel at Goose Bay. He did this and landed at WashingtonDC on 29 May, 19 hours after leaving Iceland. The plane suffered from overheating engines and burst a tyre on landing.Molotov was met by CordellHull, the AmericanSecretaryof State, and went 'somewhat dishevelled and unwashed', as he admitted, immediately to meet Roosevelt. Litvinov and Hopkins were also presentat this preliminary interview.Molotov recordedin his memoirs: was at our generalmeetingwhenRooseveltsaidto me: 'Introduce me to your [Litvinov] I hadChekists andeveryone fromtheministry withme. Thepilotwasthere.So delegation'. Rooseveltgreeted everyone.'48

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There was a review of the military situationwith regardto both Germanyand Japan, and Roosevelt raised some minor matters,including asking Molotov why the USSR had not joined the Geneva Convention to improve the lot of its prisoners of war. Molotov replied that the USSR did not wish to join, as it did not wish to give the impression that Germany observed internationalrules in any way.149 Later the same day, at the first full session with Roosevelt, where, besides the principals, only Hopkins and interpreterswere present, Molotov immediately made clear that althoughhe had signed a treatywhich did not mention Soviet frontiers,the USSR's position on that matter had not changed. Roosevelt then proposed an 'international police force' of the four majorpowers (USA, USSR, Britainand China) in the post-war world. These powers would retain their arms to ensure Germany, Japanand their allies remaineddisarmedand to preventfurtheraggression.Roosevelt asked Molotov to convey this plan to Stalin.l50 In furtherconversationsbetween Roosevelt, Molotov and Hopkins, lasting sevenand-a-halfhours, during and after dinner, Roosevelt tackled head-on the question of the Second Front.He said that it was necessary to defeat Hitler before Japan,and that although preparationsfor an invasion of Europe that stood a real chance of success could be completedonly in 1943, he was tryingto persuadehis militaryleadersto risk landing from six to 10 divisions in Francein 1942. Molotov, in response, stressedthe perilous militaryposition of the USSR, and that help in 1942 to draw off 40 German divisions was vital.151Clearly the figure was in Molotov's brief for the mission. After the meeting Hopkins came to Molotov's room and told him to be pessimistic about the Soviet position at the conference on the Second Front, scheduled for the next day. This might persuade the American generals of its necessity.'52Hopkins commented: on Mr Molotov'spart was markedby a somewhat The whole evening'sconversation whichleads,not unnaturally, to the supposition frankness andamiability, that, unexpected the wordhas gone out fromMr Stalinto be since the Sovietswantsomething seriously, somewhat moreagreeable thanis Mr Molotov'scustom.153 Hopkins seems to have sensed that Molotov followed Stalin's instructions. The following morning, 30 May, when General G. Marshall and Admiral E. J. King, the Americanmilitaryleaders, were present,Roosevelt took up Molotov's plea to draw off 40 Germandivisions. Supportinghim, Molotov stressed that the Second Frontwas above all a political question:Hitler was now capable of using most of the resources of Europe against the USSR, and if his country could not hold its present from capturedSoviet assets, position, Hitler's resourcesmight be furtherstrengthened more difficult in 1943. He went would make the allied oil. This position particularly on to make the point he had made in London: that if 40 Germandivisions could be drawn off in 1942, the war might be decided in that year. He stated that he had not received a positive answer to this question in London and asked for the help of the USA. In response to Roosevelt's question whetherMolotov could reportto Stalin that the USA was 'preparingthe establishmentof' and 'hoping to open' a Second Front in 1942, King talking about the difficultiesof getting convoys to Murmansk.Marshall American troops to Britain, and emphasised the logistical difficulties of transferring the shortageof landing craft to invade the continentfrom that country.He suggested

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that the most that could be achieved was the transferof Americanplanes to Britain to engage the German air force.'54Having been led to believe that Marshallwas a supporterof the Second Front,his attitudemust have disappointedMolotov. He later wrote to Stalin: 'The insincerity of this reply was obvious to me'.155The most optimistic Americanversion of the reporton this meeting states that Marshallagreed to Roosevelt authorisingMolotov to inform Stalin that 'we expect the formationof a second front this year'.156 If this was the case, Molotov still concluded his report on the meeting to Stalin: comThey told me nothingconcrete... My missionto Washington may be considered
plete.157

At lunch, after the meeting, Roosevelt tactlessly asked Molotov, in view of his recent experiences,to give his impressionsof Hitler!He repliedthat it was possible to arrive at a common understanding with anyone, but he had never had to deal with two more disagreeablepeople than Hitler and Ribbentrop.'58 Molotov may have considered his mission complete, but he was prevented from leaving the USA by the need to repair his plane, the Goodrich company having to completely rebuild the huge tyre which had burst.'59During the delay, Roosevelt again tried to persuadeChurchillto cooperatein opening a Second Front in 1942 on the lines suggested by Marshall,using air attacks, but the plan was rejected by the time Molotov met Roosevelt again on 1 June.'60 After a ratherbrittle exchange when Roosevelt offered to mediate between the USSR and Finland, the President talked about air communicationsbetween the USA and USSR, Lend-Lease, the post-war settlement and his plans for an internationalpolice force. Molotov, having received a telegram from Stalin on this, was able to be positive.16' Roosevelt finished by expressing hopes for the opening of the Second Front in 1942 on the basis of air attacks, as suggested by General Marshall, saying that this would be more practical if the USSR reducedits demandsfor supplies from 8 000 000 tons to 2 000 000 tons, thus freeing ships to transportmen and arms to Britain.'62 This faced Molotov with a dilemma, and, accordingto one Americanreport,he 'bristled'.He agreed to report the proposalto 'the Soviet government',but stressedthe need for equipment.He then asked Roosevelt to summarisehis views on the Second Front. Roosevelt replied that 'the US Governmentwas striving and hoping to create the Second Frontin 1942'. If the USSR reduced its demand for war materials,the chances would be improved.It was necessary, however, to consult Britain, as that country would have to bear the main burden.He was placing the decision firmly on Churchill'sshoulders.According to an American record of the conversation,Molotov then retorted withsomeemphasis thatthe SecondFront wouldbe stronger if the FirstFrontstill stoodfast,andinquired withdeliberate sarcasm whatwouldhappen if the Sovietscut down theirrequirements andthenno Second Front eventuated. stillmoreinsistent, Then,becoming he emphasised thathe hadbrought the new treatyfromBritain.'Whatanswer', he asked, 'shallI takebackto London andMoscowon thegeneral thathasbeenraised? What question is the President's answerwith respectto the SecondFront?'163 In conclusion, Molotov handed Roosevelt Stalin's list of supplies the USSR was requesting.'64 Following this meeting, Roosevelt wrote to Churchill:

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Molotov's visit is, I think, a real success, because we have got on a personal footing of candour and as good friendshipas can be acquiredthroughan interpreter... He has made very clear his very real anxiety as to the next four or five months, and I think this is sincere and not put forwardto force our hand. I have a very strong feeling that the Russian position is precariousand may grow steadily worse during the coming weeks. I will telegraphwhen Molotov leaves, and I am specially anxious that he carry back some real results of his mission and that he will give a favourable account to Stalin ... But the importantthing is that we may be and probablyare faced with real trouble on the Russian front and must make our plans to meet it.165 On the same day Molotov met Hopkins, who restated and elaborated the American position on the Second Front, pressing Molotov for the Soviet demand for supplies to be reduced. At the end of the conversation Molotov said he was satisfied that the USA wanted to help the USSR and create a Second Front, but he would like more clarity.'66 Molotov reported to Stalin Roosevelt's proposal for the reduction of supplies, noting a discrepancy between Roosevelt's figures and the Soviet calculations. He concluded: To my question, what in the final analysis I should say in London and Moscow of the President'sattitudeto the question of the Second Front,he replied he was all for the Second Front opening this year, that much work was being done in the USA and Britain to bring it about, and he was promoting the issue in every way, but that it all depended on the
British. 167

Molotov now drafted a bland communique, covering both sets of talks, for Stalin's approval. There was no mention of the Second Front or Soviet frontiers.168But Stalin was now alarmed and furious, replying to Molotov on 3 June: 1. The Instantsiya is dissatisfied with the terseness and reticence of your communications, You convey to us ... only what you yourself consider importantand omit all the rest. Meanwhile the Instantsiyawould like to know everything,what you consider importantand what you think unimportant. 2. This refers to the draftof the communiqudas well. You have not informedus whose draft it is, whetherit has been agreed on by the British in full, and why, after all, there could not be two communiquds... we are having to guess because of your reticence. 3. We consider it expedient to have two draft communiquds-one on the negotiations with Britain, and anotheron the talks in the USA. We furtherconsider it absolutely necessary that both communiquesshould mention, among other things, the subject of creating the Second Front in Europe and that full understanding has been reached on this matter. We also consider it necessary that both communiques should mention the supply of war materials to the Soviet Union from Britain and the
USA ...169

Instructions from Stalin to Molotov were to dominate the remainder of Molotov's visit. His response to the first angry telegram was immediate. When he met Cordell Hull the same day, Hull found him 'very insistent on the question of the Second Front', totally preoccupied with the war situation, and not interested in post-war questions.170 Molotov suggested amendments to the communique, the most important

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of which were statements that 'full understanding' had been reached on the Second Front-these being Stalin's words-and that supplies from the USA to the USSR were to be increased.'71 This arose from a new agreement in course of negotiation, but was no doubt meant to pacify Stalin's ire about the proposal for the reduction of supplies. Molotov also sent a long telegram to Stalin that began: I have taken into account the direction of the Instantsiya to provide complete information about my meetings and talks including those of lesser significance. Of course, all my talks are thoroughly recorded and the records will be submitted by me to the Instanstiya in addition to the code messages. He concluded: ... I agree that it would be better to have two communiqueson the talks in Britain and the USA, ratherthan a common one. ... Hull said that the mention of the Second Front suggested by me should be conveyed to the Presidentfor consideration;he did not object to the other amendments... He went on to describe in detail his meeting with Hull, and the other talks he was having. He concluded by saying that he had travelled to New York and been on a three to four hour sightseeing tour of the city by car.172This was when, in the back of a car, the famous argument with Litvinov on 'appeasement' witnessed by Gromyko took place.173 On 4 June Stalin sent another telegram in which he agreed to reduce the demand for supplies, assuming that this would release ships to transport troops to Europe for the Second Front. After summarising the 'final results of your negotiations with the USA', and repeating his earlier instructions that the communique should mention both the Second Front and military supplies to the USSR, he concluded: This is imperative because it will bring confusion to the ranks of the Hitlerites and the neutralcountries in the whole of Europe.
Instantsiya174

Either Stalin was more optimistic than Molotov about the establishment of the Second Front in 1942, or he was intent on trying to get a commitment to it, believing that this might force the hand of the Western powers. He was also aware of its propaganda value. Molotov now forwarded the agreed text of his communique on his talks in the USA (no longer a joint communique on the two sets of talks). It included the following statements: was reachedwith regardto the urgenttask of creatinga Second Frontin Full understanding Europe in 1942. In addition,measuresfor increasingand speeding up the supply of planes, tanks and other kinds of war materials from the United States to the Soviet Union were discussed. 75 Stalin replied tersely: Have received the draft of joint communiqudwith the Americans. The communiqudhas come out quite satisfactory. Instantsiya

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In response to Stalin's angry complaint of 3 June Molotov sent a further five telegrams between 4 and 7 June, describing in great detail the talks in which he had participated.176 He telegraphed on 7 June: I think ... that Churchillshould be informed of Roosevelt's proposal, with a proviso that it is unacceptableto speed up the establishmentof the Second Front by way of scaling down military supplies, and that he be asked whether our self-limitationin regard to the tonnage needed for shipments to the USSR will guarantee the opening of the Second Front this year ... 2. Arguing in favour of my second visit to London, Churchillsaid that if I came he would 'give me an account' of the measurestaken by the British against the Germansand stressed that the air raids on Germany by British aircraft would be serious ... I do not expect Churchill will tell me anything about the exact terms of opening the Second Front, but I think I must press him to give a more definite promise ... I should like to have
instructions ... 177

'Mr Brown' finally left the USA on 5 June, but was delayed for two days at Gander by the weather.178 Roosevelt wrote to Churchill on 6 June: I was greatly pleased with the visit. He warmedup more than I expected and I am sure that he has a far better understandingof the situation here than when he arrived. I confess I view with great concern the Russian front and am going to wire you in a day or two a specific proposal which I have in mind.179

Final negotiations-London, 8-11 June 1942


Molotov landed at Prestwick in the afternoon of 8 June and went by train to London. Here he received two more telegrams from Stalin. The first, dated 6 June, reiterated Stalin's instructions on the content of the joint communique with Britain and dealt with the timing of publication of both statements. Molotov responded with a draft that mentioned participation in the talks in Britain, the Treaty signed, and included statements on the Second Front and military supplies very similar to the communique on the talks with the USA. The second telegram, dated 7 June, concluded: 2. You should press Churchillto organise the Second Front and start operationsthis year, taking into considerationthat we are reducing our request for tonnage.180 Molotov met Churchill again on 9 June. Attlee, Cadogan, Maisky and others were present. After initial courtesies, Molotov immediately began to press the question of opening the Second Front in 1942, describing Roosevelt and Marshall as sympathetic in general, and Roosevelt as sharing his own opinion of the advantage of opening it in 1942 and not later. He said, however, that the question 'had not been made sufficiently clear', and asked now for 'a more direct and clear answer'. He talked of Roosevelt's proposal for the reduction of supplies, saying that he had received a message from the 'Soviet government' that if the British government could initiate the

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He emphasisedagain Second Frontin 1942, the USSR would reduceits requirements. the need to draw off 40 divisions, mentioning Roosevelt's idea for a limited expedition and a 'second Dunkirk', something which aroused Churchill's ire. He remindedChurchillof his promiseof clarificationwhen he returned from Washington. He went on to describe Roosevelt's proposalfor an international police force, only to find Churchill antagonistic, and asked detailed questions on the supply agreement. On the Second Front, Churchill said that he was waiting for proposals from Roosevelt which had not yet arrived,but that preparations were being made to land six divisions in Francein the autumn.He repeatedthis before talking about plans for a large-scale Anglo-Americaninvasion of the continentin 1943. Churchilloffered to preparea written statementon what the Soviet governmentmight count on from the British governmentin 1942. Molotov accepted Churchill'soffer, but challenged him as to why, if he was so hostile to a 'second Dunkirk',he was proposingto land only six divisions in France. In response Churchillreferredto 'successful operations',but then talked aboutthe difficulty of landingtroops from boats. On this note the meeting
concluded.
81

There was anothermeeting with Eden the same day to discuss the communiqueon the Anglo-Soviet talks. Eden argued that since the Soviet-American communique mentioned the Second Front in 1942, the Anglo-Soviet document should mention British militaryplans for 1942, 'since the Americanswith the best will in the world cannot do much in 1942'. Eden also said, ominously for Molotov, 'that these statements might be a means of worrying and deceiving the Germans'. To this Molotov replied that 'theremust be no deceptionbetween friends'.l82 By this time he must have realised that there was little chance of a Second Front in 1942. Then, no doubt prompted by Stalin's telegram,183 Molotov said that the question of the speeding up of the supply of war materialsshould be included as well. The meeting ended with a discussion of the mechanics of publishingthe statementsand a number of other matters,including Eden's proposal that Molotov should meet Sikorski, the future frontiers of Yugoslavia, and a possible Yugoslav-Soviet mutual assistance treaty.184 Relaying these talks to Stalin, Molotov explained that they were followed by a private dinner attended by Churchill, Molotov, Eden, Attlee and Maisky. Like the after-dinner meeting on 22 May, this session does not appearto be recordedin British archives. For three hours Churchilltried to persuadeMolotov of the impossibility of opening the Second Front in 1942, but repeated his suggestion that it might be possible to land six divisions in France. Molotov reported: I insisted theSecond Front theirstrength and openthisyear,sayingtheyareunderestimating
the possibilities that are available now, and that 1943 might prove more difficult ... the British government should not decline to open the Second Front, but rather expand for the operationinvolving six divisions into the wider operationof a Second preparations Front ... To conclude: the British governmentis not undertakingany obligation to open the Second Frontthis year, but is saying, and with reservationat that, that it is preparinga trial landing
operation.185

On this sour note, apart from a farewell interview when Churchill handed Molotov the

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aide-memoire he had promised, the main negotiations ended. The aide-memoire stated, and Churchillreiteratedwhen handing it to Molotov, that the British government was not bound by any definite obligations on the Second Front in 1942:186 the British were being more careful than the Americans. It must now have been clear to Molotov that there was going to be no Second Front in 1942, and that he had failed in what he had stated at the beginning to be the major objective of his mission. Churchill'saide-memoirereiteratedwhat he had said during the conversations about the aid Britain could give the USSR: convoys via the Northernroute, the bombing of Germany,raids on the continentincluding a possible small landing later in 1942; but the major effort to be a combined British and American invasion of the continent in 1943. It also mentioned again certain minor offers Churchill had made, such as sending RAF squadrons to Murmansk. The document claimed that British military operations in 1942 were preventing the Germans from transferringthirty-threedivisions from Western Europe.187 During his brief second stay in Britain Molotov had interviews with the Foreign minister of Yugoslavia,188 Sikorski and Benes, in which he did not reveal his disappointment, describing his visits to Britain and the USA as 'on the whole satisfactory'.189 He tried to enlist Benes's support to pressure the British and American leaders to open the Second Front in 1942. He was more guarded with Sikorski since Eden was present when they talked.190 As the visit drew to a close Molotov was punctilious in correcting the Soviet In the agreed record reportson the negotiations, particularlyon the Second Front.'19 of the discussions he insisted on an amendmentto the British draft, which specified that, at the meeting on the Second Front on 22 May, he had said that he wanted the operations on the Second Front to draw off 40 German divisions from the Soviet front, not occupy 40 Germandivisions, including those already stationedin Western He now sought approval of everything from Stalin, including the formal Europe.192 of telegrams thanks for hospitality he was sending to Roosevelt, Hull, Churchilland Eden.'93 Clearly, already having aroused Stalin's ire once, he did not wish to antagonise him further,particularlyas the mission had not really achieved its major objectives. In the Soviet report of the meeting of 23 May, dealing with new draft treaties, Molotov deleted a passage which read 'there seem to be a few deficiencies
on our side'.'94

Molotov's plane left Britainin the evening of 9 June, with a British fighterescort. He again flew over German-occupiedEurope where the plane was attacked by German fighter aircraft, and before finally landing in Moscow it was mistakenly attackedby Soviet fighters.'95 Molotov must have been quite clear he was in personal danger! Conclusion The GrandAlliance was never an end in itself. From the beginning it is clear that the USSR approachedthe negotiationswith multiple objectives. Initially, as a top priority these included concern with the post-war balance of power in Europe, reflected in demands for Soviet frontiers to guaranteethe security of the USSR. The objectives extended to post-war internationalorganisations,the post-war world order and the

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USSR's place in it. With the deteriorating military situation,however, these broader objectives had to be abandonedfor a Second Front to relieve pressureon the USSR and ensure its survival. In spite of all the difficulties, the treaty that Molotov signed did provide the basis for an alliance which achieved the destructionof Nazi power and a new balance in Europe. Was Stalin's peculiar personality or diplomatic manoeuvringon both sides the chief reason for it not achieving more? Molotov's diplomaticactivity from September1939 to May 1941 suggests that he had considerable freedom of action in formulatingpolicy towards Britain in such matters as proposing that Britain should act as a mediator in the Finnish war, on insisting that Cripps be given ambassadorialstatus, and refusal to see Cripps for a period. His lukewarm attitude towards Britain also seems to reflect his personal feelings. With the outbreakof war there was an abruptchange. If Molotov's early insistence on the need for a political agreementwas influencedby his personalexperiencein the 1939 negotiations, his preoccupationwith the flight of Hess, the Second Front, the need for militaryassistanceand Soviet post-warfrontiersare evidence of the priorities of the Soviet leaders, as is the personal involvement of Stalin in the negotiations. Molotov, however, must have played his part in establishing these priorities. There was a furtherchange when Molotov visited Britainand the USA. He appearsto have been workingto very detailed instructionsfrom Stalin, possibly agreedwith Politburo colleagues, as to the objectives of his mission, with the Second Front and post-war frontiersas top priorities.His behaviourduringthe mission provides no evidence that he was preparedto pursuean independentline as Khrushchev,Gromykoand Zhukov suggested. Most authorities stress Molotov's commitment to Marxist ideology, something which becomes quite clear in his memoirs.During the negotiationsthis is reflectedin his attemptsto divide his potentialcapitalistallies, and he seemed quite confidentthat there was room to manoeuvrebetween them. Back in Moscow Molotov continuedto insist on a British and US commitmentto the Second Front. On 22 June Standley, who saw Molotov on 19 June, warned Hull of this,196 and on 3 July 1942 Eden was writing to Clark Kerr asking him to see Molotov urgently, to tell him that Churchill and he were disturbed that he was Molotov's overestimatingthe probabilityof the establishmentof the Second Front.197 response was to hedge, to say that he quite understood the British government's position, but that it was not surprisingthat attentionon the communiquein the USSR was focused on the statement on the Second Front. Stalin's ploy in having the statement included had an important propaganda value and could be used to embarrasshis allies. This came to a climax during Churchill's visit to Moscow in August 1942.198Laterin the year there were also constantSoviet complaintsaboutthe shortfall in Lend-Lease deliveries to the Soviet Union.199 In his War Memoirs Churchillcommented that Molotov was a manof outstanding ... He hadlivedin a society ruthlessness abilityandcold-blooded menaceof personal whereever-varying was accompanied by the constant liquiintrigue andcomprehending dation... His cannon-ball head,blackmoustache, eyes,his slabface,his and imperturbable of his verbaladroitness were appropriate manifestations demeanour,

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and often wise qualities and skill ... His smile of Siberian winter, his carefully-measured words, his affable demeanour,combined to make him the perfect agent of Soviet policy in a deadly world. He continued: Only once did I seem to get a natural,humanreaction.This was in the springof 1942, when he alighted in Britain on his way back from the United States. We had signed the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and he was about to make his dangerous flight home. At the garden gate of Downing Street, which we used for secrecy, I grippedhis arm and we looked each other in the face. Suddenly he appeareddeeply moved. Inside the image there appearedthe man. He responded with an equal pressure. Silently we wrung each other's hands.20? But one must ask whether Molotov was being stirred by his meeting with Churchill. Or was it frustration at not achieving a greater commitment to the Second Front and secure post-war Soviet frontiers? Or indeed, was it fear of Stalin when he returned to Moscow? If Churchill could trumpet the May-June 1942 negotiations as a successful step in the forging of the Grand Alliance, Molotov must have felt he had not achieved his objectives. CREES, University of Birmingham

of the SovietIndustrialisation *Theauthor is gratefulto members (SIPS)of the ProjectSeminar andDr Jonathan Caroline Haslam,for Universityof Birmingham, especiallyProfessor Kennedy-Pipe valuablecommentson an earlierdraftof this article. ' See Derek Watson, 'Molotov's in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Apprenticeship in 1939', Europe-Asia Studies,52, 4, 2000, pp. 695-722. Negotiations 2 'This term,of Russianorigin,had come to signify in Moscow parlancean Anglo-American invasionof France acrosstheEnglishchannel; it carried theinsulting connotation thatthe SovietUnion
alone was really fighting'. V. Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 (New York, 1970), p. 46.

3N. Khrushchev, Ogonek,1989, 36, p. 18. 'Vospominaniya',


4A. Gromyko, translated Memories, (London,1989),p. 404. by H. Shukman k biografii 5K. Simonov,'Zametki G. K. Zhukova',Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal,1987,9, p. 49.
6

in ForeignPolicy', p. 715. Watson,'Molotov'sApprenticeship

Federatsii(hereinafter AVPRF),f. 6, op. 1, pap. 1, del. 4, 11.167-170.


8

7Public Record Office (hereinafter PRO) F0371/24845, 163; Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossisskoi

G. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven, 1999),

p. 16. 9H. Hanak,'Sir StaffordCrippsas BritishAmbassador in Moscow,

May 1940 to June 1941',

English Historical Review, 94, 1, 1979, p. 54; G. Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow,

overtheUSSR'sdelivery 1941-1942 (Cambridge, of rawmaterials 1984),pp. 18-19. Therewasfriction andmutualsuspicionwas growing. 10PROF0371/24846,6-7. Two of thefourTikhomimov brothers hadbeencloselyassociated with Molotovwas the patronof one, G.A. Tikhomimov, Molotovsince he hadbeen a student. who wrote
the official kratkava biografiya of Molotov. l Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, 1941-1942, pp. 20-23. ' Pravda, 31 March 1940. 13PRO F0371/24847, 134, 184, 186; Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, 1941-1942, pp. 32-36. 14 Ibid., pp. 55-57; PRO F0371/24845, 2. 15J. Haslam, 'Soviet Soviet Union/Union 1939-41: Isolationand

ForeignPolicy

Expansion',

18, 1991, pp. 112-113. Sovietique, 16 Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, p. 51; W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, Their Finest Hour (Bungay, 1952), pp. 122-123.

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17Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 52-53; Hanak, 'Sir Stafford Cripps, p. 61. 18AVPRF,f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81, 1. 1. 19 Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 64-65; PRO F0371/24847, 263-264. 20AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81, 1. 6. 21 Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 80-81. 22 PRO F0371/24848, 185. 23 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81,1. 2; Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp.

98-99.

24 Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 126-127; W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3: The GrandAlliance (Bungay, 1952), pp. 290-292; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 159-169. 25 Gorodetsky, Sir StaffordCrippsMission to Moscow, pp. 126, 131-135; G. Gorodetsky, 'The Hess Affair and Anglo-Soviet Relations on the Eve of "Barbarossa"', English Historical Review, 94,4, 1986, p. 419; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 247-274. 26 See for instance R. Overy, Russia's War (London, 1998), pp. 73-79; A. V. Korotkov et al., 'Posetiteli kremlevskogo kabineta I.V. Stalina', Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, 2, pp. 51-57. 27 Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3: The Grand Alliance, p. 301. 28 G. P. Kynin et al. (eds), Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya vo vremya velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, 1941-1945, T. 1, 1941-1943 (Moscow, 1983) (hereinafter Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya), p. 47. 29 Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 178-179; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 47-52. 30 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81, 1. 6; PRO F0371/29466 N3231/3/38. 31 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81,11. 6-14, printed, Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 47-52; cf S. M. Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin: the Soviet Union and the Origins of the Grand Alliance

AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81,11.15-17, printed, Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniva, pp. 53-55. 33Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 181-182. 34G. A. Arbatov et al. (eds), Sovetsko-amerikanskieotnosheniya vo vremya velikoi otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945, T. 1, 1941-1943 (Moscow, 1984) (hereinafterSovetsko-amerikanskieotnosheniya), p. 46. 35 Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 196, 198, 203. 36AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81,11.24-41; Gorodetsky, Sir StaffordCripps Mission to Moscow, p. 181; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniva, pp. 56-62, 65-68. 37 AVPRF,f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81,11.,42-50; printed,Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 69-73; Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, pp. 145-146. 38 Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 77-81. 39 Miner, Between Churchilland Stalin, p. 150; Gorodetsky, Sir StaffordCripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 188-189, 193. 40 V. M. Kulish, Istoriya vtorogo fronta (Moscow, 1971), pp. 51, 54. 41 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81, 1. 56. 42 Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 85, 111-113, 118-119. 43 Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 193-194. 44 Miner, Between Churchilland Stalin, p. 153; Churchill, The Second WorldWar,vol. 3: The Grand Alliance, pp. 346-355. Much of the initiative for this conference came from Cripps. See Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford CrippsMission to Moscow, pp. 193-203. In the key clauses of the Atlantic CharterRoosevelt and Churchill stated that they rejected territorialaggrandisement at the end of the war and that territorial changes should be in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. 5 0. A. Rzheshevsky, 'Vizit A. Idena v Moskvu v dekabre 1941 g. peregovory s I. V. Stalinym i V.M. Molotovym', Novaya i noveishava istoriya, 1994, 2, p. 86. For the 'three-power conference' see Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 235-248; and W. A. Harriman & E. Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946 (New York, 1975), pp. 87-97. 46 Ibid., p. 97; W. H. Standley & A.A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Chicago, 1955), p. 71. 47AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 82,11. 45-47; Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, p. 165; Avon Papers, Birmingham University Library (hereinafter Eden Papers), AP/33/9/1/vol. 24, f. 437. I am grateful to Lady Avon for allowing me to use and cite these papers. 48 AVPRF,f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 82,11,52-3; printed,Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 156-157. 490. A. Rzheshevsky (ed.), War and Diplomacy: the Making of the Grand Alliance: Documents from Stalin's Archives (Amsterdam, 1996) (hereinafter War and Diplomacy), p. 293. This work prints the reports from the presidential archive on Molotov's conversations in London and Washington, and

Hill, 1988),p. 141. (Chapel 2

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correspondence between him and Stalin duringthe negotiations. The reports sometimes differ from those in AVPRF, part-printed in Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya and Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniva. 50 Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 236-241. 51Ibid., pp. 247-248. For Molotov's relations with Litvinov see J. Haslam, 'Soviet-German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: the Jury is Still Out', Journal of Modern History, 69, 1997, p. 788. 52 PRO FO 371/29558, 123, quoted in Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, p. 251. 53 S. Kot, Conversations with the Kremlin and Dispatches from Russia (London, 1963), p. 71. 54 Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 24, ff. 455-59; Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, p. 171. 55 W. Citrine, In Russia Now (London, 1942), p. 91. 56 Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 24, f. 493. 57 Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniva, pp. 171-172; quoted in Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3: The Grand Alliance, pp. 414-415. 58 Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 24, ff. 510-20; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 176-177. Stalin had by this time raised the question of the post-war western frontiers of the USSR being based on the territorialgains of 1939-41. Harriman& Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, pp. 109-110. 59The Times, 8 December 1941 (the same day on which the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbourwas reported). 60 Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, pp. 180-183. 61 Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 277-279; Rzheshevsky, 'Vizit A. Idena v Moskvu', pp. 85-86; J. Harvey (ed.), The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey (London, 1978), pp. 70, 72. Oliver Harvey was a British Foreign Office official and Eden's private secretary. 62 D. Dilks, The Diaries ofAlexander Cadogan 1938-1941 (hereinafterCadogan Diaries) (London, 1971), p. 420; Rzheshevsky, 'Vizit A. Idena v Moskvu', p. 90. 63 Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniva, pp. 184-186. 64 War and Diplomacy, pp. 15-16. This work translates and reprints in slightly amended form Rzheshevsky, 'Vizit A. Idena v Moskvu', Novava i noveishava istoriya, 1994, 2, pp. 85-103 and 1994, 3, pp. 100-123. 65 PRO F0371/32875, 50A; War and Diplomacy, pp. 11-22. In the record of this conversation in the Presidential Archive, Eden says only that he must consult the British government. In the British version he mentions Churchill, the USA and the Dominions. See also Eden's account of this meeting in his memoirs, The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs: the Reckoning (London, 1965), pp. 289-290, where Eden refers only to consulting the Cabinet. Cripps had already indicated on 22 October that the British government was preparedto recognise de facto control (not sovereignty) over the Baltic states, AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 82, 11.50-52; cf. A. Polonsky (ed.), The Great Powers and the Polish Question 1941-1945: A Documentary Study in Cold War Origins (London, 1976), p. 17. 66 Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, p. 237. 67 PRO F0371/32875, 53-56; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniva, pp. 188-190; War and Diplomacy, pp. 28-35. 68 War and Diplomacy, pp. 35-40; PRO FO 371/32874, 56-58A; The Eden Memoirs: the Reckoning, p. 295; Eden Papers, AP20/3/3. See also E. Mark, 'Revolution by Degrees: Stalin's National Front Strategy for Europe, 1941-1947', Cold War InternationalHistory Project, Working Paper no. 31, Washington, 2001, pp. 8-10. 69 Eden Papers, AP20/3/3. 70 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, ii. 82, 70-78; War and Diplomacy, pp. 43-49. Maisky had in fact approached Eden about the USSR's frontiers with Poland as early as 4 July 1941. Polonsky (ed.), The Great Powers and the Polish Question, pp. 81-82. 71War and Diplomacy, p. 54. Stalin had suggested joint military action in the Petsamo region at an earlier meeting, with the USSR providing land forces and the British naval forces. Eden had agreed to consider this but had not replied. 72 Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 280-288; PRO FO 371/32874, 45-61; the record of the conversations in Eden Papers, AP/33/9/1, vol. 25, 1-18. It is difficult to substantiate cf. Miner's suggestion that Eden was anxious for an agreement at any price. Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, p. 248. 73PRO FO 371/32874, 49-49A. 74 Harvey (ed.), The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, pp. 78-80 75 PRO FO 371/32874, 45a, 55, 55a, 58; War and Diplomacy, pp. 33, 39. 76 The Eden Memoirs: the Reckoning, pp. 302-303; Churchill, The Second World War,vol. 2, Their Finest Hour, p. 463. 77Eden Papers, AP/33/9/1, vol. 25, f. 28.

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78AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 82, 11. 6, 89-96. 79Ibid., 97, 99. 80 Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 291-292. 81Gorodetsky, G. Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations 1941-1945 (Cambridge, 1984), p. 19. 82 Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniva, pp. 213-215. 83J. Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany, vol. 1 (London, 1975), p. 455. 84 War and Diplomacy, pp. 29-30. 85 Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin, pp. 19-21. For British attemptsto persuade Roosevelt to make concessions to Stalin on post-war Soviet frontiers see US Congress, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1942, vol.III, Europe (hereinafter Foreign Relations of the United States) (Washington, 1961), pp. 505-540. 86 Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniya, pp. 150-151, 155-158. 87 Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin, p. 22; W. S. Churchill, The Second World War: vol. 4, The Hinge of Fate (London, 1954), p. 272. 88 Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 217-218; PRO FO 371/32879, 112. 89 Sovetsko-amerikanskieotnosheniya, pp. 159-160; Foreign Relations of the United States, p. 543. 90Eden Papers, AP/33/9/1, vol. 25, f. 88; PRO F0371/32879, 89. 91Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniya, pp. 160, 164. 92 Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 219-220. 93 M. A. Stoler, The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941-1943 (Westport, 1977), p. 43. 94 Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin, pp. 22-23, 95-101. 95 Ibid., p. 23; PRO F0371/32882, 93. 96 Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, p. 226. 97Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 25, f. 129. 98 Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniya, p. 164. 99Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 25, f. 118; W.F. Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt: the Complete Correspondence, vol. 1, Alliance Emerging, October 1933-November 1942 (hereinafter, Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt) (Princeton, 1984), pp. 466, 470. 100 War and Diplomacy, p. 104. 101 Harvey (ed.), War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, p. 119. 102 F. Chuev, Molotov: Poluderzhavnyi vlastelin (Moscow, 1999), pp. 83, 87; PRO F0371/32882, 158; 32908, 53. 103 Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 25, ff. 142, 164, 172-173; Foreign Relations of the United States, p. 553. 104 Cadogan Diaries, pp. 451-453. 105V. B. Shavrov, Istoriya konstruktsii samoletov v SSSR 1938-1950gg.: materialv k istorii samoletostroeniva (Moscow, 1994), pp. 150-155; V. Suvorov, Den' -M: kogda nachalas' vtoraya mirovaya voina (Moscow, 1994), pp. 21-31; War and Diplomacy, p. 63; PRO F0371/32879, 177. Chuev, Molotov, Poluderzhavnyi vlastelin, p. 84. I am indebted to Dr L. Samuelson for providing me with source material on the Tb-7 (Pe-8) and on Molotov's flight. 106 Cadogan Diaries, p. 453; Harvey (ed.), War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, p. 125. 1)7 Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 4, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 278-279. 1(8 Chuev, Molotov: Poluderzhavnyi vlastelin, p. 84. 119 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47, 11.4-5; War and Diplomacy, p. 67; PRO F0371/32882, 36. There is a difference between the British and Soviet reportshere, the British implying that Molotov said that the 'Second Front' was the more important question. The Soviet report on this first meeting is far more detailed than the British. 10 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11. 7-12; War and Diplomacy, pp. 68-72; PRO F0371/32882, 37-38A. Contraryto Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, p. 237, who claims that Molotov assumed that the future of the Baltic states was settled and did not mention them at this first meeting, he did find it necessary to defend Soviet claims to them, when the question was raised by the British. 111 Cadogan Diaries, p. 453. 112 The Mutual Assistance Agreement of 25 August 1939 formalised Britain's March 1939 guarantee to Poland. As early as November 1939 General Sikorski, as leader of the Polish government in exile, had agreed that if Poland could not recover the territory she had lost to Russia she should be compensated at the expense of Germany. See Polonsky (ed.), The Great Powers and the Polish Question 1941-1945, pp. 15-16. Under the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 30 July 1941 the USSR recognised 'the Soviet-German Treaties of 1939 as to territorialchanges in Poland as having lost their validity' (ibid.,

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andthe Poles clearlyfelt saidnothingaboutthe Polish-Sovietfrontier, pp. 18, 22), butthe agreement thatthey had not cededtheir 1939 easternboundary.
113AVPRF, f.
114

40-41A.
115

6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11. 14-25; Warand Diplomacy, pp. 72-78; PRO F371/32882,

117 between the USA and Britainfor a In April 1942 there had been preliminary agreement of a morelimited of northern in April1943,withthepossibility invasion France cross-channel expedition Admiral areain September to the Cherbourg Ambassador, 1942;see Standley, pp. 201-202. Thefigure of to Churchill of 40 divisionshadbeenmentioned 1941;see Ministry by Stalinas earlyas September

War and Diplomacy, pp. 78-81. PRO F0371/32882, 43. 116 Cadogan Diaries, p. 454.

Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman 1941-1945 (London, 1955), pp. 20-22. 118 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11.38-48; Warand Diplomacy, pp. 89-96; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 223-230.

119 f. 6, op.4, pap.5, del.47,11.26-27;Warand AVPRF, Diplomacy, pp.81-86; PROF0371/32882, 43-44A.


120 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11.49-57; Warand Diplomacy, pp. 96-101; cf. Miner, Between

andthe EdenPapers boththe ForeignOfficedocuments andStalin,p. 247. I haverechecked Churchill for a copy of the recordof this meeting. 121 F0371/32882, 46-48.
War and Diplomacy, pp. 102-104; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 230-231. 122AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47, 11. 58-69; War and Diplomacy, pp. 106-114; PRO
123 War and Diplomacy, 124 Ibid., p. 119. 125

pp. 105-106.

I. V. Stalina',Istoricheskii kabineta 'Posetiteli arkhiv,1996, 3, p. 22. It should, kremlevskogo had stronglinks with the NKVD. howeverbe notedthatDekanazov f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47, 11.76-88; War and Diplomacy,pp. 124-130; PRO 128AVPRF, F0371/32882, 50-51A; CadoganDiaries,p. 454. I have foundno evidenceto suggestthattherewas and Roosevelt,p. 247, suggests.The a further roundof talks thatday as Miner,BetweenChurchill at 4', arrived 'Russians this is in factprefaced he cites to support comment by the remark by Cadogan to the mainmeeting. whichis a reference 129AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap.5, del. 48, 1. 1; War and Diplomacy, p. 132;Foreign Relations of the Molotovto acceptEden'snew Warand Diplomacy, pp. 138-139. In his telegram instructing afterthisreply,Molotov of wording. amendments Stalinhadsenthimtwo minortechnical draft, Shortly on individualsecurityinterestsin the cooperation emphasising proposedto Stalin one amendment post-warera.Ibid.,p. 139. 132 Molotovhad in fact told Winant andthatthe Soviet thatthe new drafttreatywas interesting, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 48,1. 4. woulddiscussit. AVPRF, government
133

126 Ibid., 127

Ibid., pp. 122-123. pp. 102; Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, p. 258.

United States, p. 560. 130 Ibid., p. 560; War and Diplomacy, p. 134; AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 48, 11.4-5.
131

134AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap.5, del. 47,11.89-94; WarandDiplomacy, pp. 122-123, 139-143;PRO

Cadogan Diaries, p. 455.

F0371/32882, 53-54; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 232-235. 135 War and Diplomacy, p. 143; Sovetsko-Angliiskie Otnosheniya, pp. 234-235. 136 EdenPapers,AP 33/9/1, vol. 25, f. 219. 137 War and Diplomacy, pp. 146-148; AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47, 11. 94-97; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 235-237; PRO F0371/32882, 60-63. 138 War and Diplomacy, p. 149. 139 forFrank Office f. 6, op. AVPRF, Sainsbury 5, del.47,1, 1. TheBritish

4, pap. arranged Foreign to painta pictureof the signingceremony,but it was judgedto be so awful thatit was given to the werefelt to havebeen so numbed Russians,'whoseaestheticsensibilities by yearsof socialistrealism
that they were unlikely to be offended'. M. Kitchen, British Policy towards the Soviet Union during the

SecondWorldWar(Basingstoke, 1986),p. 122.


140 141 142

withPoland. hadmadea concession, theBalticstates,wheretheBritish Molotovseemsto haveconfused


Cadogan, Diaries, p. 455.

Chuev, Molotov: Poluderzhavnyi vlastelin, pp. 84-85. In this 1976 interview with Chuev

in Churchill, The Second World War: vol. 4, EdenPapers,AP/33/9/1, vol. 25, f. 248; printed

The Hinge of Fate, p. 280; Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, p. 490.

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143 See for instance A VPRF, f. 6, op. 1, pap. 3, del. 1, 11.21-24, 100-102; f. 6, op. 2, pap. 24, del. 295, ii. 2-6, 15-31; f. 6, op. 2, pap. 24, del. 296, 1. 2; f. 059, op. 1, pap. 320, del. 2202, 11.56-57. 14 Ibid., f. 6, op. 3, pap. 21, del. 282, 11.7-14; f, 6, op. 3, pap. 21, del. 288, 11.1-14. 145 Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniya, p. 161. 146 AVPRF, f. 48, op. 24, pap. 2, del. 23,11. 320, 322-325; see A. Filitov, 'The Soviet Union and the Grand Alliance: the Internal Dimension of Foreign Policy', in G. Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1991: a Retrospective (London, 1994), p. 98. 147 Churchill, The Second WorldWar: vol. 4, TheHinge of Fate, pp. 268-270; Warand Diplomacy, Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, pp. 493-500; Harriman & Abel, Special Envoy to 183; p. Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, p. 136. 148 Chuev, Molotov: Poluderzhavnyi vlastelin, pp. 85-86, 131-132; War and Diplomacy, pp. 163, 176, 224, 254. 149 War and Diplomacy, pp. 170-175; Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 566-568, 571-572. 150 War and Diplomacy, pp. 173-175; Sovetsko-amerikanskieotnosheniya, pp. 175-178; Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 566-568, 571-572. For another American report on these early meetings see R. E. Sherwood (ed.), The WhiteHouse Papers of Harry L. Hopkins: An Intimate History by Robert E. Sherwood, vol. II, January 1942-July 1942 (London, 1949), pp. 559-564. 151 War and Diplomacy, pp. 176-179, 225; Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniva, pp. 178-180; Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 568-571, 572-574. It seems clear that Roosevelt was committing British troops, for there was little possibility of an American landing in 1942. 152 War and Diplomacy, pp. 179-180. 153 Sherwood (ed.), The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 2, p. 564. 154 War and Diplomacy, pp. 183-189; Sovetsko-amerikanskieotnosheniya, pp. 181-187; Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 575-578; Sherwood (ed.), The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 2, pp. 566-569. 155 War and Diplomacy, p. 228. 156 Harriman& Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, p. 137. Stoler, The Politics of the Second Front, p. 47, quotes an American archival source as saying 'The President then authorised Mr Molotov to inform Mr Stalin that we expect the formation of a second front this year'. 157 War and Diplomacy, p. 193. 158 Sherwood (ed.), The WhiteHouse Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 2, p. 569; Foreign Relations of the United States, p. 577. 159 War and Diplomacy, p. 254. 160 Sherwood (ed.), The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 2, pp. 573-574; Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, p. 504. 161 War and Diplomacy, pp. 195-197, 204; Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 25, f. 256; Sovetskoamerikanskieotnosheniyva, pp. 187-192; Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 578-581; Sherwood (ed.), The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 2, pp. 575-578. 162 War and Diplomacy, pp. 198-199; Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniyva, pp. 187-192; Foreign Relations of the United States, p. 582. 163 Sherwood (ed.), The WhiteHouse Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 2, p. 579; Harriman& Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, p. 137; Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 582-583. 164 War and Diplomacy, pp. 199-200. 165 Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 25, f. 248; Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, pp. 503-504. For a slightly different version of this see Sherwood (ed.), The WhiteHouse Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 2, pp. 573-574. 16 War and Diplomacy, pp. 201-204; Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniya, pp. 192-194. 167 War and Diplomacy, p. 206. 168 Ibid., pp. 207-209. 169 Ibid., pp. 210-211. 170 Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 25, ff. 250-251. 171 Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniya, pp. 195-197; War and Diplomacy, pp. 211-213. 172 Ibid., pp. 215-217. 173 Gromyko, Memories, p. 401. 174 War and Diplomacy, pp. 218-219; Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniya, pp. 197-198. 175 Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, p. 220. Marshall and Hopkins thought the statement on the Second Front too strong and wished to have it changed, but Roosevelt would not agree, Sherwood (ed.), The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 2, pp. 581-582. Harrimanlater commented:

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That single sentence was to be to be interpreted,misinterpretedand over-interpretedfor many years to come. In accepting Molotov's version, Roosevelt provided employment for a whole generation of Cold War publicists and historians who solemnly argued its meaning in dozens of books and hundreds of articles (Harriman& Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, p. 138).
176

17

War and Diplomacy, pp. 222-230. 77 Ibid., p. 230.


Ibid., p. 254.

Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, p. 508. There is no indication in the correspondence as to the nature of this proposal. 180 War and Diplomacy, pp. 264-266. t18Ibid., pp. 267-274; AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11. 110-120; Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 25, ff. 257-260; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 244-247. The result of these plans was the Dieppe raid of August 1942. 182 PRO F0371 132882, 216. The statement in the communiqu6 on the American talks referring to 'a Second Frontin 1942' apparentlyalarmedChurchilland Eden. See M. Gilbert, WinstonS. Churchill, vol. VII. Road to Victory 1941-1945 (London, 1986), p. 119. 183 War and Diplomacy, p. 264. 14 Ibid., pp. 275-280; PRO F0371/32882, 216-217A. 185 War and Diplomacy, pp. 283-284; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 246-247. 186 War and Diplomacy, pp. 295-297; AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47, 11. 133-137. 187 Warand Diplomacy, pp. 298-300; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 247-248; A VPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47, 11. 138-139. 1X War and Diplomacy, pp. 300-301; AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 48, 1. 23. x9AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 48, 11.13-16; War and Diplomacy, pp. 285-288. 19(Ibid., pp. 291-294; AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 48, 11.17-22. 191 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 49, 11.5-73. 192 War and Diplomacy, pp. 301-302. 193 Ibid., pp. 306-307. 194 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 49, 1. 73. 195 Chuev, Molotov: Poluderzhavnyi vlastelin, pp. 83-84. 196 Harriman& Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, p. 139; Standley, Admiral Ambassador, p. 203. 197 Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 25, f. 288. 19xIbid., 290; Standley, Admiral Ambassador, p. 212. '99Ibid., p. 243. 2(1 W. S. Churchill, The Second World War: vol. 1, The Gathering Storm (Bungay, 1950), p. 301.
179

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