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Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission (Kat) June 26, 1940 PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. vs.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION LAUREL, J: SUMMARY: CA 146 as amended by CA 454 gave the PSC discretion on whether to issue certificates for the operation of a public utility. PTC challenged this delegation of power as unconstitutional for being unlimited and without guide. DOCTRINE: All that has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the administrative function, involving the use discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner. The fact that the National Assembly may itself exercise the function and authority thus conferred upon the Public Service Commission does not make the provision in question constitutionally objectionable. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the court. FACTS: -Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc: engaged in transporting passengers (in Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales) by means of TPU buses in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued in its favor by the former Public Utility Commission. -Aug 26 39: PTC filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application for authorization to operate 10 addnal new Brockway trucks needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. -Public Service Commission: in granting pet's application for increase of equipment ordered: -Accdg to Art 15 of Law No. 146 of the Commonwealth, amended by Art 1 of Law No. 454, is hereby amended by the conditions of certificates of convenience published records issued and authorization granted, so are considered incorporated therein the following two conditions: -(1) certificates of public convenience and above authorization shall be valid and subsisting only during the period of 25 years, counted from the date of the enactment of this decision. -(2) the applicant company may be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Phil. or any agency thereof at any time it so desires payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less a reasonable depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of acquisition. -Sec 15 of CA146, as amended by section 1 of CA No. 454: "With the exception of those enumerated in the preceding section, no public service shall operate in the Phil. without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as 'certificate of public convenience,' or 'certificate of convenience and public necessity,' as the case may be, to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner. "The Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of the certificate provided in the preceding paragraph that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time; and that the violation of any of these conditions shall produce the immediate cancellation of the certificate without the necessity of any express action on the part of the Commission. "In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the equipment, its actual condition, the age of the model, or other circumstances affecting its value in the market shall be taken into consideration.

"The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or amendment of certificates actually in force and to those which may hereafter be issued, to permits to modify itineraries and time schedules of public services and to authorizations to renew and increase equipment and properties." ISSUES: (1) W/N section 1 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 454 unconstitutional and void? No. Valid! (2) If it is constitutional, W/N the provisions thereof are not applicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939? No. Applicable HELD: Decision appealed from Reversed. Case remanded to PSC for further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision RATIO -Pet: (1) the legislative powers granted to the PSC, without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its functions in the premises, and. for that reason, the Act is unconstitutional and void. (2) Even if it is a valid delegation of legislative powers, the PSC exceeded its authority bec: (a) The Act applies only to future certificates and not to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939, when said Act took effect, and (b) the Act, as applied by the Commission, violates constitutional guarantees. (1) As there is a relation between the first and second paragraphs of said section 15, the two provisions must be read and interpreted together. -Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot be disregarded by the Commission in determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of time," the Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its power being that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146; Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8. ) - All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of "public interests in a proper and suitable manner." The fact that the National Assembly may itself exercise the function and authority thus conferred upon the Public Service Commission does not make the provision in question constitutionally objectionable. -The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall over action which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which narrows the range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain legal devices. -One thing apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegari or delegata potestas non potest delegari (no delegated powers can further be delegated) has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" -Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts. - Since the decision in the case of Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, relied upon by the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its seal of approval to the "delegation of greater powers by the legislature." (2) The National Assembly, by virtue of the Constitution ( Sec 8 Art XIII), logically succeeded to the Congress of the United States in the power to

amend, alter or repeal any franchise or right granted prior to or after the approval of the Constitution (Sec 74 of the Phil Bill and Jones Law, Sec 28); and when Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 were enacted, the National Assembly, to the extent therein provided, has declared its will and purpose to amend or alter existing certificates of public convenience. -Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation. -Moreover, CAs 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the Public Service Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility company operating or seeking to operate a franchise" in the Philippines. The business of a common carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. When private property is "affected with a public interest it ceased to be juris privati only." -Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it is well settled that the power of the state to exercise legislative control over public utilities may be exercised through boards of commissioners. - This right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon the police power, and statutes for the control and regulation of utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the protection of the public as well as of the utilities themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either as impairing the obligation of contracts, taking property without due process, or denying the equal protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question whether or not private property shall be devoted to a public use and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide; and if he voluntarily places his property in public service he cannot complain that it becomes subject to the regulatory powers of the state. -This is the more so in the light of authorities which hold that a certificate of public convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor a contract, confers no property right, and is a mere license or privilege. - On the matter of limitation of twenty five (25) years of the life of its certificates of public convenience, there had been neither notice not opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or present evidence. -There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right of a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co. (Therese) November 25, 1932 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., ET AL., respondents. MALCOLM, J SUMMARY: Manila Electric is petitioning the members of the SC, acting as arbitrators, to determine the compensation it is entitled to due to the use of persons or corporations of the Pasig Bridge. The petition is based on Act No. 1446, which mandates the SC to act as a board of arbitrators whose decision would be final. DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. FACTS: Manila Electric Company requested the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use its Pasig bridge and the compensation to be paid by such transportation companies. Sec. 11 of Act 1446 (An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain and operate an electric light, heat and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town in Pasig, in the Province of Rizal) provides:

"Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final." When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed, it was ordered that the petitioner be required to serve copies on the Attorney-General and the transportation companies affected by the petition. Thereafter, the Attorney-General disclaimed any interest in the proceedings, and opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility operators. On the submission of memoranda after an oral hearing, the petition was made ready for resolution. The Framework of the Statutory Provision: Power is to be granted members of the SC sitting as a board of arbitrators and not the SC as an entity. Decision of a majority of the members of the SC is final. The franchise granted the Manila Electric Company by the Government of the Philippine Islands, although only a contract between the parties to it, is now made to affect the rights of persons not signatories to the covenant. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. A clause in a contract, providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: W/N the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, can fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies can use Manila Electrics Pasig bridge HELD: NO. RATIO: Petitioner: Relies heavily on Tallasee Falls Mfg. Co. vs Commissioners Court (An Act of a state legislature authorizing the commissioners' court of a certain county to regulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the owners of a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the courts.) SC: NO. That is not the question before us. Here the question is not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity. First Case: Members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercising judicial functions Not within the jurisdiction granted the SC. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. If this be the proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the

courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators Second Case: Members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercising administrative or quasi judicial functions. If the functions performed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The present petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court of all. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possess none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court. In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice Taney, it was said: "The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. . . . The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and without any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at some future time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial power confided to this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the whole power that the court is allowed to exercise under this act of Congress. . . . And while it executes

firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it, the court will carefully abstain from exercising any power that is not strictly judicial in its character, and which is not clearly confided to it by the Constitution. . . ." DISPOSITION: The Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter. Noblejas v. Tejankee (Ayesha) April 29, 1968 ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, petitioner, vs. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as Executive Secretary, respondents. Reyes, JBL, Acting CJ SUMMARY: RA 1151 and appropriation laws granted the same rank and privileges to the Commissioner of Land Registration as those of a CFI Judge. When Commissioner Noblejas was suspended by the President, through the Executive Secretary and the Secretary of Justice, he petitioned the SC for writs of prohibition and injunction against them. The SC denied, since, even granting that RA 1151 granted upon the Commissioner to be investigated by the SC alone, such grant would be unconstitutional. DOCTRINE: There is no inherent power in the executive or legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. FACTS: Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice from investigating the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by RA 1151 SEC 2: Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the CFI" appropriation laws (RA 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the item setting forth the salary of said officer, use the following expression: One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges of district judge P19,000.00 March 7, 1968, respondent Sec of Justice letter to petitioner requiring him to explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles" Noblejas: as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the CFI, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner; papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (RA 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. March 17, 1968, ExecSec to petitioner: "by authority of the President" based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the

public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges" March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice: lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that: the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140 function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in nature Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers

ISSUE: WoN Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court (NO) HELD: writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is ordered dismissed RATIO: Sec 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all petitioner: grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation SC: this would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges, like: (a) Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice (Judiciary Act, sec. 42) (b) Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number (RA 4360) (c) City Fiscal of Quezon City (RA 4495) (d) City Fiscal of Manila (RA 4631) and (e) Securities and Exchange Commissioner (RA 5050, s. 2) petitioner's theory would mean placing upon the SC the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly placed under the President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]) would also mean that Solicitor General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).

Such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance in the case of the Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations and those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies (RA 1267, as amended by Act 1409; RA 1125) expressly provide that they are to be removed from office for the same causes and in the same manner provided by law for Judges of First Instance", or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank" same w Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103) and Commissioner of Public Service (Public Service Act, Sec. 3) where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder: There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties US Supreme Court, Federal Radio Commission vs. General Electric Co., et al: But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of review or otherwise. It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative SC of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. petitioner: under Section 4, RA 1151, he is endowed with judicial functions decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties That the Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the corresponding department head even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner under RA 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the

resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and merely incidental to the latter the grant to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void investigation and suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction

Garcia v. Macaraig (Chrissa) summary: judge was not able to perform duties as his office was yet to be built through no fault of his. he instead helped out with the secretary of justice and is now being charged for violating RA and judiciary act for nonperformance of his duties. HELD: the laws do not apply to him as he had not yet assumed office. however, the court feels strongly that the practice (judiciary performing exeutive work) must be discontinued doctrine: The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. May 31, 1971. PAZ M. GARCIA, complainant, vs. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., respondent. BARREDO, J p: Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge . . . gross incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, Sections 5, 55 and 58: has not submitted his monthly reports containing the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided and/or resolved, the number of cases pending decisions for one month, two months to over three months, together with the title, number, number of hours of court session held a day, etc., has not submitted his certificate of service knowing fully well that he has never performed his official duties or discharged the duties appertaining to his office, he has collected and was paid his salaries in flagrant violation of section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended. his deliberate violation of his Oath of Office as a District Judge he has manifested such moral bankruptcy as to deny his fitness to perform or discharge official duties in the administration of justice. wrote to the Honorable Secretary of Justice informing him that he was entering upon the performance of his duties FACTS "Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. respondent decided to accept the offer of the Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space for the courtroom and offices of the court; to utilize the financial assistance promised by the

Laguna provincial government for the purchase of the necessary supplies and materials; and to rely on the national government for the equipment needed by the court The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed the respondent that the province was not in a position to do so To be accommodated in the west wing of the Calamba municipal building but the treasurer and several municipal councilors objected. To rent in Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but the owner of the building refused to reduce the rent Rent at Laguna Development Bank, Another month passed before the municipal government could release the amount necessary for the improvements to convert the space that was rented, Property Officer of the Department of Justice but, unfortunately, the appropriation for the equipment of courts of first instance was released only on December 23, 1970 respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave. The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending to the needs of his court. WON guilty of charges (NO.. but) complaint must be dismissed. To begin with, We cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the actuations of the respondent complained of. As We see it, the situation is not exactly as complainant has attempted to portray it. What is lost sight of, however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming this position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the request of the Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in whatever way possible which would not, it must be presumed, impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as in this case, the government offices or officers in duty bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without any fault on his part. That respondent took it upon himself to make himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit. it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of service to the government, since he was receiving salaries, while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without any fault on his part. Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports. He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him, for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others. II. BUT Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually

eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.

In Re Judge Rodolfo Manzano (Mel) October 5, 1988 IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE. RESOLUTION PADILLA, J p: SUMMARY: Judge Manzano wrote to the SC if he can accept appointment as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice (E.O. 326) that perform administrative functions. Issue: Should the SC issue a resolution in favor of Judge Manzano authorizing his acceptance of the appointment to a committee on justice as not violative of the constitution? SC: No. DISAPPROVED. Under the Constitution, the members of the SC and other Courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Art. VIII (12)). It is evident that the office in question performed administrative functions which involve regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules/regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature. DOCTRINE: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character FACTS: June 21, 88: Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19 was designated and appointed by the Gov. Rodolfo C. Farias of Ilocos Norte thru E.O. RF6-04, as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to E.O. No. 856 (Dec. 12, 86) as amended by E.O. No. 326 (June 1, 88). July 4, 88: Before he accepted the appointment , he wrote a letter to the SC addressed to CJ Fernan through the Court Administrator (Leo Medialdea) in which he requests for the issuance of a Resolution: o Authorizing him to accept the appointment and to assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;

Considering the membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Sec. 12, Art. VIII, or of the 2nd par. of Sec. 7, Art. IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of the present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; and o Consider the membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge. ISSUE: Whether the SC should issue the requested resolution? (NO) In other words, whether the Provincial Committee on Justice performs administrative functions and his appointment therein as member of the judiciary would violate Art. VIII, Sec. 12? (YES) RATIO: Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, so request is denied. ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit vs. Tapucar, Black's Law Dictionary). Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions o They are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. (E.O. No. 856) o Among the functions of the Committee are to receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action and recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice. (E.O. No. 856) o Sec. 6 of E.O. No. 326 amending E.O. No. 856 also provides that they shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of Justice such that quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the latters office. SEPARATION OF POWERS (Former CJ Fernando, concurring opinion in Garcia vs. Macaraig) o While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. o Only a higher court can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less." However, even as non-members of said committees, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties (adjudication). o As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. DISPOSITIVE: Request of Judge Manzano DENIED. GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting: Votes to approve request of Manzano because Provincial or City

Committees on Justice do not perform administrative functions. o "Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control. o Membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory Nothing wrong in judiciary members joining a study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation. The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which may compromise their independence or hamper their work. Membership in the committee do not involve the encroachment of the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into matters which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the other departments into judicial affairs. As to ASSISTANCE by Judges to Committees suggested by majority opinion o Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers? Consultants? Is it the act of being "designated" which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it participation in the prohibited functions? If Judges cannot become members, why should they be allowed or even encouraged to assist these Committees? The line drawn by the majority is vague and unrealistic. o As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy away from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. Constitutional Interpretation: The Court should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of society. Constitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.

Melencio-Herrera, J. SUMMARY: An election was held for the 11 Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI). The elected Directors were divided into two groups: the Puyat group and the Acero group. The Puyat group would be in control of the board. The Acero group filed with the SEC a quo warranto case, alleging that the votes were not properly counted during the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez orally entered his appearance for as counsel for the Acero group. However, he did not continue his appearance as it was prohibited under the 1973 Constitution. At a later date however, Fernandez acquired 10 shares (out of 260K+ shares) and then filed an urgent motion to intervene in the SEC case alleging legal interest as owner of the measly shares. SEC Commissioner De Guzman allowed the intervention. Thus, an instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed. SC HELD that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution. FACTS: May 14, 1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. The following were elected as Directors: Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero Erwin L. Chiongban R. G. Vildzius Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado Rafael R. Recto Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI. May 25, 1979: The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warranto proceedings (the SEC Case), questioning the election. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted. May 25-31, 1979: The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. o Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before . . . any administrative body," and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition, being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. May 31, 1979: When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that: o On May 15: Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director. o The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30 and was sought to be registered on said date. o ON May 31, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. July 17, 1979: The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares. This Order allowing intervention resulted in the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction. July 3, 1979: Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case against N.V. Verenigde Buinzefabrieken Excelsior-De Maas and respondent Eustaquio T.C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent Acero. In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: The majoritys interpretation of Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 is a restrictive and impractical interpretation to the Constitution. What is contemplated in the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular functions. The Committee on Justice is not such agency as it is a study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench in said committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of their position. Also, the matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice is confined to Committee work and will by no means extend to the performance of judicial functions per se. Puyat v. De Guzman (Joan) March 25, 1982 EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO, and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners, vs. HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R.G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO, and ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

defendant Excelsior. SC ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a case originally filed with a CFI as in such situation the Court would be one "without appellate jurisdiction." September 4, 1979: Court en banc issued a TRO enjoining SEC Associate Commissioner De Guzman from allowing the participation as an intervenor of Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case. The SolGen, in his Comment, supports the stand of the Commissioner in allowing intervention.

legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. [SCs last notes: Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of the constitutional prohibition against members of the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any controversy before the SEC relating to intra-corporate matters. A resolution of that question is not necessary in this case.] DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. TRO is made permanent. No costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as stockholder, may intervene without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution (In other words, whether or not in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitution provision) RATIO:

SEC 11. No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction, before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,or before any administrative body. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office. He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis and paragraphs supplied). Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is not joining the cause of private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel. HOWEVER, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case: o He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. o He acquired them "after the fact," that is, after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. o And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. o Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it may be noted that in the case filed before the Rizal CFI, he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, codefendant of respondent Acero. Under the facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before . . . any administrative body and that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly. A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general